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Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Ghana’s urban strategies neglect the needs of street vendors: policy must catch up with reality

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

    Street vending is a major economic activity in most of Ghana’s urban areas. The vendors bring everyday goods to residents and commuters at affordable prices in places convenient to them. However, the growing intensity of street vending activities in Ghanaian cities such as Accra and Kumasi is creating management problems for city authorities. Vendors are being removed as cities aim to “clean up” and modernise the urban landscape.

    City authorities haven’t created ways to support street vendors. Instead, they treat them as a nuisance and use stringent regulations aimed at displacing them. This approach overlooks the potential benefits that the thriving street economy could bring to the local economy and social fabric. In contrast, for example, South Africa’s policy supports informal economic activities by providing vending spaces for street traders.

    As academics who specialise in urban planning, we set out to investigate the rules around street vending in Ghana. Our study was conducted in Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti region and the second most important city in Ghana. We found that the regulation of street vending in Ghana is unclear, contradictory and ineffective. It fails to provide a clear policy direction and adequate planning tools for integrating street vending into urban areas.

    Our research reinforces the argument that the regulation of street vending is often ambiguous. We argue that these policy inconsistencies create loopholes for the hostile attitude of city authorities towards street vendors.

    We call for policies that recognise the socioeconomic value of street vending and make urban spaces more inclusive.

    The lay of the land

    Our analysis is based on two national policy documents. These are the National Urban Policy Framework and the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936). We also rely on two local policy documents specific to the Kumasi Metropolitan Area. These are the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly By-Laws on Control of Hawkers 1995 and the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly Medium-Term Development Plan (2018–2021).

    The National Urban Policy recognises and promotes street vending as part of the urban economy. It calls for local government authorities to recognise and include the informal sector.

    But the overarching law regulating street vending in Ghana is the Local Governance Act. It authorises local government bodies (city authorities) to pass by-laws that forbid street vending. This is in conflict with the national policy.

    The gaps

    Our study revealed that in the Kumasi Metropolitan Area, the authorities seem to want to help street vendors in some ways – to strengthen the capacity of informal economic actors. But they don’t make plans or take actions to do so in the medium term development plan. Local government authorities sometimes evict street vendors from the central business district.

    In Kumasi, urban policy, regulations and local development planning do not include street vending in the urban development process even though vendors are the largest group of business people in the city. Instead of building stalls and facilities to accommodate these economic operators, the authorities rather expropriate urban space from them to develop modern structures which are expensive for street vendors to occupy.

    There is conflict over the use of urban public spaces. City authorities view the activities of street vendors as illegal, while the vendors see them as legitimate sources of livelihood. Authorities control vending through eviction and relocation.

    In recent years, city authorities have adopted urban infrastructural planning and development as a strategy to remove street vendors. Take the case of the new Kejetia Market Redevelopment Project, which replaced the largest traditional market in west Africa with a modern urban market structure in Kumasi. Over 10,000 street vendors and 4,000 market traders were displaced.

    The neglect of street vending in the design means vendors will have to earn a living informally – which simply adds to the “problem” as the city sees it.

    What next?

    Policies and practices that try to exclude people are not a solution to the problems of street vending. They are often counter productive. Regulating street vending requires inclusive policy measures and a clear policy direction to manage these activities. At present, Ghana, like many other African countries, lacks effective planning strategies to manage the activities of street vending.

    Our recommendations include:

    • coherent and inclusive policies that recognise the socioeconomic value of street vending and give vendors a rightful place in cities

    • reforming urban governance to support the informal economy

    • coherent and precise policies that give street vendors more security.

    The current policy vacuum fuels repressive regulation and excludes street vendors from urban development processes.

    To develop effective policy models, it is critical to learn from the experiences of street vendors and involve them in urban development processes. This starts with a change of attitude among city authorities.

    – Ghana’s urban strategies neglect the needs of street vendors: policy must catch up with reality
    – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-urban-strategies-neglect-the-needs-of-street-vendors-policy-must-catch-up-with-reality-248020

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Sustainable economic growth in South Africa will come from renewables, not coal: what our model shows

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrew Phiri, Associate Professor of Economics, Nelson Mandela University

    Coal fired power stations produce 85% of South Africa’s electricity, making the country the biggest producer of harmful greenhouse-gas emissions in Africa. To move away from coal and meet its commitment to reaching net zero emissions by 2050, South Africa needs to dramatically increase production of renewable energy. New research by economics associate professor Andrew Phiri looked at the relationship between renewable and non-renewable energy consumption and GDP growth in South Africa to find out which energy source is most compatible with economic development.

    Non-renewables, renewables and economic growth: what’s there to know?

    We set out to discover whether renewable energy in South Africa, such as wind or solar power, supports sustainable economic growth. We also wanted to find out if renewables can replace non-renewable energy as a source and enabler of economic growth.

    Together with student Tsepiso Sesoai, I did research comparing the impact of renewable and non-renewable energy on economic growth in South Africa.

    South Africa currently faces a dual challenge when it comes to energy. It is heavily dependent on non-renewable energy (coal), which also worsens global warming and speeds up climate change. But it desperately needs to grow the economy at a faster rate, given very high unemployment, poverty and inequality.

    It’s therefore important to find out whether South Africa would be able to make a smooth transition from non-renewable energy to cleaner energy, and grow the economy at the same time.

    Past studies have looked into the role of energy in South Africa’s economic growth, but their methods have provided only limited information about whether South Africa can make a smooth transition from dirty to clean energy.

    Read more: African economic expansion need not threaten global carbon targets: study points out the path to green growth

    To get a deeper understanding, we conducted a modelling exercise. We used an analytical tool called “continuous complex wavelets” to see how renewable and non-renewable energy influences growth over time.

    Our model shows that an increased supply and higher consumption of non-renewable energy causes long-term economic growth over 10-15 year cycles. Renewables, at best, have short-term growth effects over six months to one year.

    After 2000, there was a very sharp increase of almost 25% in the use of renewable energy throughout the decade. According to our model, this sharp increase was enough to have an impact on economic growth over the short term but not over the long term.

    This is because South African energy regulators have not adopted strong enough measures for renewable energy to enable long-term growth. They have not funded the mass rollout of renewable energy, or connected renewables to the national grid. We found that renewables can only sustain growth over six to 12 month cycles whereas policymakers work towards longer cycles such as the 2030 and 2050 sustainable development goals.

    Economic growth and coal consumption: what did you find?

    In 2003, the government started taking climate change seriously with the release of the White Paper on Renewable Energy. The government started intentionally trying to increase the use of renewable energy while decreasing the use of dirty energy, such as coal. Before this, South Africa’s economic growth was heavily driven by coal consumption.

    Courtesy Andrew Phiri

    Renewable energy saw its biggest surge after the 2010 launch of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme. This opened competitive bidding for renewable energy providers to supply electricity to the grid.

    The transition to renewable energy had begun. But coal-fired power, while declining, remained the main source of electricity.

    In 2019 carbon taxes were formally introduced. This resulted in a further slowdown in consumption of non-renewable energy. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 coincided with severe power cuts. These two events combined caused a general slowdown in non-renewable and renewable energy use, and in economic growth.

    At this point, the drop in coal consumption was actively dragging down the economy. This in turn reduced society’s income, as measured by the gross national product. And because incomes were constrained, fewer private households purchased renewable energy systems. People didn’t spend on solar panels.

    What do your findings mean?

    Our research suggests that relying on non-renewable energy, like coal, won’t lead to long-term growth for South Africa. This is because non-renewables are not a reliable source of energy, as shown by loadshedding.

    Our research further suggests that renewable energy policies, subsidies and programmes made some positive short-term impacts on economic growth, measured as gross domestic product.

    Overall, our findings highlight that policymakers have treated renewables as a “nice-to-have” gesture for humanity, instead of a key driver of long-term economic growth.

    This has led to weak policies, poor regulation, and under-investment in renewable energy. These have held the sector back from making a bigger contribution to economic growth.

    Read more: Africa doesn’t have a choice between economic growth and protecting the environment: how they can go hand in hand

    For example, the government has not taken renewables seriously enough to include them in the power grid. This has largely limited the use of renewable energy to private homes and businesses. Coal-fired electricity from the country’s power utility, Eskom, is still cheaper for households than leaving the grid and purchasing their own renewable energy infrastructure (solar energy systems). The government has not funded the infrastructure needed to unlock South Africa’s vast renewable energy potential.

    The planet is at a critical state with global warming. The government should urgently set up policies and actions to overcome the barriers to using renewable energy. Only then will renewable energy have a permanent, positive influence on economic growth.

    South Africa has huge potential in renewables like solar, wind and biomass, thanks to its diverse geography. Yet, when people think about moving away from coal, they worry about job losses in the coal industry. But historically, energy transitions have never been instant. African countries that embraced the change early on reaped the benefits. They became more industrialised and prosperous.

    The South African government must act now if it wants to use renewable energy to drive future economic growth and stay ahead in the global shift to clean energy. Climate change affects us deeply. But it also presents a chance for Africa to leap ahead technologically.

    – Sustainable economic growth in South Africa will come from renewables, not coal: what our model shows
    – https://theconversation.com/sustainable-economic-growth-in-south-africa-will-come-from-renewables-not-coal-what-our-model-shows-239339

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: The African Medical Centre of Excellence (AMCE) Unveils Construction Milestones as June 2025 Launch Approaches

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ABUJA, Nigeria, February 12, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The African Medical Centre of Excellence (AMCE), a groundbreaking tertiary medical institution spearheaded by African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) in partnership with King’s College Hospital, London, hosted a high-level stakeholder and media tour to showcase major construction milestones and reaffirm its commitment to revolutionising healthcare in Africa by building a world-class medical city ahead of its highly anticipated June 2025 launch. 

    A distinguished delegation, led by Prof. Benedict Oramah, President of Afreximbank & AMCE Board Chairman, alongside AMCE Board Members, top Nigerian government officials—including Deputy President of the Senate of Nigeria, Senator Barau Jibrin; Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Senator George Akume; Mrs. Toyin Saraki, Founder-President of Wellbeing Foundation Africa and wife of the former Senate President and former First Lady of Kwara State; and Senator Asuquo Ekpenyong and  Kabiru Rabiu, Group Executive Director, BUA Group—as well as leading corporate CEOs and executives, gathered for an exclusive walkthrough of AMCE’s rapidly progressing construction site. 

    Attendees received firsthand updates on key project milestones and explored the hospital’s state-of-the-art medical infrastructure and technology. They also gained insights into the significant progress toward completion, including the final stages of interior tiling, vinyl flooring installation, lift system integration, and external infrastructure development. 

    With the hospital’s launch set for June 2025, AMCE Abuja which will deliver comprehensive services in oncology, haematology, cardiovascular care, and general healthcare continues to make remarkable progress. As of February 2025, all civil and structural works have been completed, with rigorous quality assurance and control measures ensuring the highest construction standards. External roadworks and infrastructure services are also advancing, marking a crucial phase in the project’s finalisation. 

    The visit reaffirmed a shared commitment to AMCE’s transformative mission and vision—delivering world-class medical care, reducing medical tourism, and positioning Nigeria as a leading hub for specialised healthcare in Africa. 

    Commenting on the progress, Prof Benedict Oramah, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of both Afreximbank and AMCE, stated: “The Africa Medical Centre of Excellence (AMCE) represents a defining moment in Africa’s pursuit of self-sufficiency in healthcare. For too long, our continent has borne the heavy burden of non-communicable diseases, capital flight from medical tourism, and the exodus of skilled professionals seeking opportunities abroad. AMCE is set to change that narrative. 

    By delivering world-class, lifesaving care to over 350,000 patients within its first five years, this facility will ensure that quality healthcare is no longer a privilege reserved for those who can afford to travel overseas. It will create 3,000 jobs, stimulate Intra-African trade in medical services, and strengthen critical supply chains in pharmaceuticals and healthcare delivery. Most importantly, it will help Nigeria retain the over $1.1 billion lost annually to outbound medical tourism, redirecting those resources towards strengthening our own systems. 

    He further stated: This initiative is more than an investment in infrastructure—it is an investment in Africa’s future. Through strategic partnerships with governments, international stakeholders, and the private sector, we are demonstrating that Africa has both the ambition and the capability to provide world-class healthcare for its people. The AMCE is not just a medical facility; it is a statement of intent, a symbol of progress, and a beacon of hope for a healthier, more self-reliant continent.” 

    Speaking at the event, Brian Deaver, Chief Executive Officer of AMCE, highlighted the hospital’s impact: “The Africa Medical Centre of Excellence is not just a hospital—it is a bold step toward reshaping the future of specialised healthcare in Africa. By integrating cutting-edge medical technologies, pioneering research, and world-class training, AMCE is creating a sustainable healthcare ecosystem that will set new standards for medical excellence across the continent. 

    This facility is more than a response to Africa’s healthcare challenges—it is a proactive investment in the well-being of millions. From early diagnostics to advanced treatment and long-term disease management, AMCE will provide a seamless continuum of care that improves patient outcomes, strengthens medical expertise, and retains talent that might otherwise seek opportunities abroad. 

    As we move closer to our launch, our focus remains unwavering: building a centre of excellence that not only delivers life-saving care but also drives economic growth, supports local innovation, and reinforces Nigeria’s position as a leading destination for specialised medical treatment. Through strategic partnerships and state-of-the-art infrastructure, we are not just treating diseases—we are transforming healthcare delivery for generations to come.” 

    Senator Barau Jibrin, Deputy Senate President: “The Africa Medical Centre of Excellence represents a transformative leap for healthcare in Nigeria and across the continent. Witnessing the rapid progress of this project reaffirms our commitment to fostering world-class medical infrastructure that will provide accessible and high-quality care for all. The Government of Nigeria remains dedicated to supporting initiatives that strengthen our healthcare system and enhance the well-being of our people.” 

    Senator George Akume, Secretary to the Government of the Federation: “Healthcare is the backbone of national development, and the Africa Medical Centre of Excellence is a shining example of what strategic investment and collaboration can achieve. This project will not only position Nigeria as a hub for cutting-edge medical services but also create jobs and drive innovation in the sector. The government is proud to support such a visionary initiative that will serve generations to come.” 

    As AMCE prepares to open its doors, the vision for a world-class medical ecosystem continues to take shape. The full development of the AMCE Campus will further solidify its role as a centre of excellence in healthcare, education, and research. Future phases will include a second 350-bed hospital facility, a medical and nursing school, a medical and sciences foundation, a dedicated medical office suite and research centre, as well as medical residences and a medical lodge to support patients and healthcare professionals alike. 

    With this expansion, AMCE is not only addressing Africa’s immediate healthcare needs but also building a sustainable foundation for medical innovation, talent development, and long-term health security. By fostering world-class training, cutting-edge research, and comprehensive patient care, AMCE is shaping the future of specialised healthcare in Africa—ensuring that the continent’s brightest medical minds and most complex cases can be treated at home. 

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

    US president Donald Trump’s recent actions seem designed to reassert American power and demonstrate that it is still the dominant global power and is capable of bullying weaker nations into following America’s lead.

    He has shown contempt for international collaboration by withdrawing from the UN climate negotiations and the World Health Organization. His officials have also indicated that they will not participate in upcoming G20 meetings because he does not like the policies of South Africa, the G20 president for 2025.

    In addition, he’s shown a lack of concern for international solidarity by halting US aid programmes and by undermining efforts to keep businesses honest. He has demonstrated his contempt for allies by imposing tariffs on their exports.

    These actions demand a response from the rest of the international community that mitigates the risk to the well-being of people and planet and the effective management of global affairs.

    My research on global economic governance suggests that history can offer some guidance on how to shape an effective response.

    Such a response should be based on a realistic assessment of the configuration of global forces. It should seek to build tactical coalitions between state and non-state actors in both the global south and the global north who can agree on clear and limited objectives.

    The following three historical lessons help explain this point.

    Cautionary lessons

    The first lesson is about the dangers of being overoptimistic in assessing the potential for change.

    In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US was confronting defeat in the war in Vietnam, high inflation and domestic unrest, including the assassination of leading politicians and the murder of protesting students.

    The US was also losing confidence in its ability to sustain the international monetary order it had established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.

    In addition, the countries of the global south were calling for a new international economic order that was more responsive to their needs. Given the concerns about the political and economic situation in the US and the relative strength of the Soviet bloc at the time, this seemed a realistic demand.

    In August 1971, President Richard Nixon, without any international consultations, launched what became known as the Nixon Shock. He broke the link between gold and the US dollar, thereby ending the international monetary system established in 1944. He also imposed a 10% surcharge on all imports into the US.

    When America’s European allies protested and sought to create a reformed version of the old monetary order, US treasury secretary John Connolly informed them that the dollar was

    our currency but your problem.

    Over the course of the 1970s, US allies in western Europe, Asia and all countries that participated in the old Bretton Woods system were forced to accept what the US preferred: a market-based international monetary system in which the US dollar became the dominant currency.

    The US, along with its allies in the global north, also defeated the calls for a new international economic order and imposed their neo-liberal economic order on the world.

    The second cautionary lesson highlights the importance of building robust tactical coalitions. In 1969, the International Monetary Fund member states agreed to authorise the IMF to create special drawing rights, the IMF’s unique reserve asset. At the time, many IMF developing country member states advocated establishing a link between development and the special drawing rights. This would enable those countries most in need of additional resources to access more than their proportionate share of special drawing rights to fund their development.

    All developing countries supported this demand. But they couldn’t agree on how to do it. The rich countries were able to exploit these differences and defeat the proposed link between the special drawing rights and development. As a result, the special drawing rights are now distributed to all IMF member states according to their quotas in the IMF. This means that most allocations go to the rich countries who do not need them and have no obligation to share them with developing countries.

    A third lesson arises from the successful Jubilee 2000 campaign to forgive the debts of low-income developing countries experiencing debt crises. This campaign, supported by a secretariat in the United Kingdom, eventually involved:

    • civil society organisations and activists in 40 countries

    • a petition signed by 21 million people

    • governments in both creditor and debtor countries.

    These efforts resulted in the cancellation of the debts of 35 developing countries. These debts, totalling about US$100 billion, were owed primarily to bilateral and multilateral official creditors.

    They were also a demonstration of the political power that can be generated by the combined actions of civil society organisations and governments in both rich and poor countries. They can force the most powerful and wealthy institutions and individuals in the world to accept actions that, while requiring them to make affordable sacrifices, benefit low-income countries and potentially poor communities within those states.

    What conclusions should be drawn?

    We shouldn’t under-estimate the power of the US or the determination of the MAGA movement to use that power. However, their power is not absolute. It is constrained by the relative decline in US power as countries such as China and India gain economic and political strength. In addition, there are now mechanisms for international cooperation, such as the G20, where states can coordinate their actions and gain tactical victories that are meaningful to people and planet.

    But gaining such victories will require the following:

    Firstly, the formation of tactical coalitions that include states from both the global south and the global north. If these states cooperate around limited and shared objectives they can counter the vested interests around the world that support Trump’s objectives.

    Secondly, a special kind of public-private partnership in which states and non-state actors set aside their differences and agree to cooperate to achieve limited shared objectives. Neither states alone nor civil society groups alone were able to defeat the vested interests that opposed debt relief in the late 1990s. Working together they were able to defeat powerful creditor interests and gain debt relief for the poorest states.

    Thirdly, this special partnership will only be possible if there’s general agreement on both the diagnosis of the problem and on the general contours of the solution. This was the case with the debt issue in the 1990s.

    There are good candidates for such collaborative actions. For example, many states and non-state actors agree that international financial institutions need to be reformed and made more responsive to the needs of those member states that actually use their services but lack voice and vote in their governance. The institutions also need to be more accountable to those affected by their policies and practices. They also agree that large corporations and financial institutions should pay their fair share of taxes and should be environmentally and socially responsible.

    The urgency of the challenges facing the global community demands that the world begin countering Trump as soon as possible. South Africa as the current chair of the G20 has a special responsibility to ensure that this year the G20, together with its engagement groups, acts creatively and responsibly in relation to people and planet.

    Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria, is an advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs on G20 issues and is a co-chair of the T20 Taskforce on the Financing of Sustainable Development.

    – ref. Donald Trump’s war on global governance: lessons from the past on how to fight back – https://theconversation.com/donald-trumps-war-on-global-governance-lessons-from-the-past-on-how-to-fight-back-249666

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Ghana’s urban strategies neglect the needs of street vendors: policy must catch up with reality

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

    Street vending is a major economic activity in most of Ghana’s urban areas. The vendors bring everyday goods to residents and commuters at affordable prices in places convenient to them. However, the growing intensity of street vending activities in Ghanaian cities such as Accra and Kumasi is creating management problems for city authorities. Vendors are being removed as cities aim to “clean up” and modernise the urban landscape.

    City authorities haven’t created ways to support street vendors. Instead, they treat them as a nuisance and use stringent regulations aimed at displacing them. This approach overlooks the potential benefits that the thriving street economy could bring to the local economy and social fabric. In contrast, for example, South Africa’s policy supports informal economic activities by providing vending spaces for street traders.

    As academics who specialise in urban planning, we set out to investigate the rules around street vending in Ghana. Our study was conducted in Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti region and the second most important city in Ghana. We found that the regulation of street vending in Ghana is unclear, contradictory and ineffective. It fails to provide a clear policy direction and adequate planning tools for integrating street vending into urban areas.

    Our research reinforces the argument that the regulation of street vending is often ambiguous. We argue that these policy inconsistencies create loopholes for the hostile attitude of city authorities towards street vendors.

    We call for policies that recognise the socioeconomic value of street vending and make urban spaces more inclusive.

    The lay of the land

    Our analysis is based on two national policy documents. These are the National Urban Policy Framework and the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936). We also rely on two local policy documents specific to the Kumasi Metropolitan Area. These are the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly By-Laws on Control of Hawkers 1995 and the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly Medium-Term Development Plan (2018–2021).

    The National Urban Policy recognises and promotes street vending as part of the urban economy. It calls for local government authorities to recognise and include the informal sector.

    But the overarching law regulating street vending in Ghana is the Local Governance Act. It authorises local government bodies (city authorities) to pass by-laws that forbid street vending. This is in conflict with the national policy.

    The gaps

    Our study revealed that in the Kumasi Metropolitan Area, the authorities seem to want to help street vendors in some ways – to strengthen the capacity of informal economic actors. But they don’t make plans or take actions to do so in the medium term development plan. Local government authorities sometimes evict street vendors from the central business district.

    In Kumasi, urban policy, regulations and local development planning do not include street vending in the urban development process even though vendors are the largest group of business people in the city. Instead of building stalls and facilities to accommodate these economic operators, the authorities rather expropriate urban space from them to develop modern structures which are expensive for street vendors to occupy.

    There is conflict over the use of urban public spaces. City authorities view the activities of street vendors as illegal, while the vendors see them as legitimate sources of livelihood. Authorities control vending through eviction and relocation.

    In recent years, city authorities have adopted urban infrastructural planning and development as a strategy to remove street vendors. Take the case of the new Kejetia Market Redevelopment Project, which replaced the largest traditional market in west Africa with a modern urban market structure in Kumasi. Over 10,000 street vendors and 4,000 market traders were displaced.

    The neglect of street vending in the design means vendors will have to earn a living informally – which simply adds to the “problem” as the city sees it.

    What next?

    Policies and practices that try to exclude people are not a solution to the problems of street vending. They are often counter productive. Regulating street vending requires inclusive policy measures and a clear policy direction to manage these activities. At present, Ghana, like many other African countries, lacks effective planning strategies to manage the activities of street vending.

    Our recommendations include:

    • coherent and inclusive policies that recognise the socioeconomic value of street vending and give vendors a rightful place in cities

    • reforming urban governance to support the informal economy

    • coherent and precise policies that give street vendors more security.

    The current policy vacuum fuels repressive regulation and excludes street vendors from urban development processes.

    To develop effective policy models, it is critical to learn from the experiences of street vendors and involve them in urban development processes. This starts with a change of attitude among city authorities.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Ghana’s urban strategies neglect the needs of street vendors: policy must catch up with reality – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-urban-strategies-neglect-the-needs-of-street-vendors-policy-must-catch-up-with-reality-248020

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Sustainable economic growth in South Africa will come from renewables, not coal: what our model shows

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrew Phiri, Associate Professor of Economics, Nelson Mandela University

    Coal fired power stations produce 85% of South Africa’s electricity, making the country the biggest producer of harmful greenhouse-gas emissions in Africa. To move away from coal and meet its commitment to reaching net zero emissions by 2050, South Africa needs to dramatically increase production of renewable energy. New research by economics associate professor Andrew Phiri looked at the relationship between renewable and non-renewable energy consumption and GDP growth in South Africa to find out which energy source is most compatible with economic development.

    Non-renewables, renewables and economic growth: what’s there to know?

    We set out to discover whether renewable energy in South Africa, such as wind or solar power, supports sustainable economic growth. We also wanted to find out if renewables can replace non-renewable energy as a source and enabler of economic growth.

    Together with student Tsepiso Sesoai, I did research comparing the impact of renewable and non-renewable energy on economic growth in South Africa.

    South Africa currently faces a dual challenge when it comes to energy. It is heavily dependent on non-renewable energy (coal), which also worsens global warming and speeds up climate change. But it desperately needs to grow the economy at a faster rate, given very high unemployment, poverty and inequality.

    It’s therefore important to find out whether South Africa would be able to make a smooth transition from non-renewable energy to cleaner energy, and grow the economy at the same time.

    Past studies have looked into the role of energy in South Africa’s economic growth, but their methods have provided only limited information about whether South Africa can make a smooth transition from dirty to clean energy.



    Read more:
    African economic expansion need not threaten global carbon targets: study points out the path to green growth

    To get a deeper understanding, we conducted a modelling exercise. We used an analytical tool called “continuous complex wavelets” to see how renewable and non-renewable energy influences growth over time.

    Our model shows that an increased supply and higher consumption of non-renewable energy causes long-term economic growth over 10-15 year cycles. Renewables, at best, have short-term growth effects over six months to one year.

    After 2000, there was a very sharp increase of almost 25% in the use of renewable energy throughout the decade. According to our model, this sharp increase was enough to have an impact on economic growth over the short term but not over the long term.

    This is because South African energy regulators have not adopted strong enough measures for renewable energy to enable long-term growth. They have not funded the mass rollout of renewable energy, or connected renewables to the national grid. We found that renewables can only sustain growth over six to 12 month cycles whereas policymakers work towards longer cycles such as the 2030 and 2050 sustainable development goals.

    Economic growth and coal consumption: what did you find?

    In 2003, the government started taking climate change seriously with the release of the White Paper on Renewable Energy. The government started intentionally trying to increase the use of renewable energy while decreasing the use of dirty energy, such as coal. Before this, South Africa’s economic growth was heavily driven by coal consumption.

    Renewable energy saw its biggest surge after the 2010 launch of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme. This opened competitive bidding for renewable energy providers to supply electricity to the grid.

    The transition to renewable energy had begun. But coal-fired power, while declining, remained the main source of electricity.

    In 2019 carbon taxes were formally introduced. This resulted in a further slowdown in consumption of non-renewable energy. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 coincided with severe power cuts. These two events combined caused a general slowdown in non-renewable and renewable energy use, and in economic growth.

    At this point, the drop in coal consumption was actively dragging down the economy. This in turn reduced society’s income, as measured by the gross national product. And because incomes were constrained, fewer private households purchased renewable energy systems. People didn’t spend on solar panels.

    What do your findings mean?

    Our research suggests that relying on non-renewable energy, like coal, won’t lead to long-term growth for South Africa. This is because non-renewables are not a reliable source of energy, as shown by loadshedding.

    Our research further suggests that renewable energy policies, subsidies and programmes made some positive short-term impacts on economic growth, measured as gross domestic product.

    Overall, our findings highlight that policymakers have treated renewables as a “nice-to-have” gesture for humanity, instead of a key driver of long-term economic growth.

    This has led to weak policies, poor regulation, and under-investment in renewable energy. These have held the sector back from making a bigger contribution to economic growth.



    Read more:
    Africa doesn’t have a choice between economic growth and protecting the environment: how they can go hand in hand

    For example, the government has not taken renewables seriously enough to include them in the power grid. This has largely limited the use of renewable energy to private homes and businesses. Coal-fired electricity from the country’s power utility, Eskom, is still cheaper for households than leaving the grid and purchasing their own renewable energy infrastructure (solar energy systems). The government has not funded the infrastructure needed to unlock South Africa’s vast renewable energy potential.

    The planet is at a critical state with global warming. The government should urgently set up policies and actions to overcome the barriers to using renewable energy. Only then will renewable energy have a permanent, positive influence on economic growth.

    South Africa has huge potential in renewables like solar, wind and biomass, thanks to its diverse geography. Yet, when people think about moving away from coal, they worry about job losses in the coal industry. But historically, energy transitions have never been instant. African countries that embraced the change early on reaped the benefits. They became more industrialised and prosperous.

    The South African government must act now if it wants to use renewable energy to drive future economic growth and stay ahead in the global shift to clean energy. Climate change affects us deeply. But it also presents a chance for Africa to leap ahead technologically.

    Andrew Phiri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Sustainable economic growth in South Africa will come from renewables, not coal: what our model shows – https://theconversation.com/sustainable-economic-growth-in-south-africa-will-come-from-renewables-not-coal-what-our-model-shows-239339

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Video: State of the Nation Address Debate: Day 2 | 12 February- Part 2

    Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

    State of the Nation Address Debate: Day 2 | 12 February- Part 2
    #SONA2025 #GovZAupdates

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiPluE6Pb5w

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Cameroon: Greenpeace Africa calls on the covernment to cancel the decree creating Ma Mbed Mbed Park

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    Yaoundé, 12-02-2025 – In 2020, the Cameroonian government issued a decree establishing Ma Mbed Mbed Park, covering an area of more than 12,000 hectares. This decree has sparked reactions from local communities, who have taken to the streets demanding its cancellation. They fear the project could lead to conflicts between humans and wildlife, particularly elephants, and result in the loss of their land. They also criticize the government for not sufficiently consulting them during the decision-making process.

    Professor Ngoussandou Bello Pierre, National Coordinator of Jag Sir, the National Toupouri Cultural Association, said:
    “The Toupouri community believes this is a scheme against their land and their livelihoods. Elephants do not distinguish between ethnic groups, religions, or professions—their presence is a threat to everyone, including the BIR camp, which is less than 12 km away. Kidnappers frequently operate in Taibong and Guidiguis before seeking refuge in a protected area in Chad. Expanding this area with the new park would only worsen insecurity. The government must acknowledge its mistake and revoke the decree to ease tensions. Given the determination of the local population, if the government persists, the extermination of elephants will become inevitable.”

    Cameroon’s Far North is already facing significant challenges, particularly concerning security, and is one of the regions most affected by climate change. Last year, it experienced multiple waves of flooding. Food insecurity remains a persistent issue.

    Dr. Lamfu Fabrice, Forest Campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, said:
    “This park was created to combat climate change and promote social and professional integration—objectives that are commendable. However, the project significantly reduces the land and resources available to local populations. This is why their essential role in the sustainable management of their land and environment must be recognized. When decisions are made without their free, prior, and informed consent, it can unfortunately lead to delicate situations like this one. We call on the government to reconsider the project. This is one threat too many for the people of the Far North.”

    This protest follows a similar demonstration that took place a few weeks ago in the southern region, where local residents of the Camvert project in Campo took to the streets, demanding that the company revise its specifications. According to the residents, the document does not sufficiently account for their rights. The current situation in the Far North presents similar challenges to those faced by the people of Campo, particularly regarding human-wildlife conflicts, land grabbing, and the lack of consultation with local communities before project development.

    Media Contacts:

    Luchelle Feukeng
    Communications and Storytelling Manager, Greenpeace Africa
    Email: [email protected]
    Telephone: +237 656 46 35 45 (WhatsApp)
    Greenpeace Africa Newsdesk: [email protected] 

    Dr. Lamfu Fabrice
    Forest Campaigner, Greenpeace Africa
    Email: [email protected]
    Telephone: +237 678 06 57 58

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: AFRICA/EGYPT – In the small village of Kom Ghareeb, the Church is a refuge for the young and the most needy

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Wednesday, 12 February 2025

    Anselmo Fabiano

    Kom Ghareeb (Agenzia Fides) – These days, the Coptic Church celebrates the feast of the prophet Jonah, a deeply felt commemoration, marked by three days of prayer and fasting that prepare the faithful for the time of Lent.Anselmo Fabiano, a young missionary of the Society of African Missions (SMA), arrived last September at the SMA house in the Shoubra neighborhood. For more than a month he has been in the village of Kom Ghareeb, in the heart of the Egyptian countryside, where he will remain for the next five months.”Here the days pass quickly in this warm and sunny winter, where snow and rain are only a distant memory – he tells Fides -. In these weeks, I have lived many experiences and I have been able to taste the beauty of a young community, enthusiastic in faith and very dynamic. I am overwhelmed by the affection and generosity of these simple people, but with a big heart. Every time I walk through the streets of the village, the children see me and start shouting, running towards me to greet me, invite me to play or share some food. They are curious and ask many questions. I feel like one of them and I try, in my own way, to be a true witness of the Gospel.”“There are so many experiences to tell: weddings, first communions, home visits, funerals, moments with young people and children. Among them, I like to remember three small episodes.” The first is related to the Eucharist. “Here Mass is celebrated with leavened bread, prepared on Saturday afternoons by a group of children and young people, with the help of an adult. It is beautiful to live this experience with them: a true school of faith and life, where service becomes prayer. Their joy and enthusiasm in teaching me how to make bread I keep as a precious gift. And that smell of bread that, on the altar, becomes the body of Jesus, moves me every time.”“The second episode – the missionary continues – I can call ‘the children of the parish’. In fact, very poor families live here around the church, with very complicated and dramatic human situations. For many children, the Coptic parish and its parish priest, Abuna Iusif, have become their second home. After school, they spend the day there. The parish priest invites them to share the meal, and our table becomes a meeting place for young and old.Even at weddings or parties, it is common to see these children barefoot or in worn-out slippers, standing next to the bride and groom or among the elegantly dressed guests. It fills me with joy to know that the Church is a refuge for the youngest and most needy.”“Finally, the third episode I can call the ‘fire of hospitality’. Every day we visit the families of the village, an enriching experience that allows us to learn about their life, with their joys and difficulties, but above all to touch their authentic and deep faith. Often, visits extend beyond dusk, and then we gather around the fire, with a glass of hot tea or coffee, to shelter ourselves from the cold desert wind. And the smell of smoke or the tiredness that is felt does not matter, but the joy of being together and of being able to pray, lights and feeds the fire of faith”, concludes Anselmo. (AP) (Agenzia Fides, 12/2/2025)
    Anselmo Fabiano

    Anselmo Fabiano

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    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: AFRICA/DR CONGO – M23 advances in South Kivu; airport serving Bukavu is in its sights

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Kinshasa (Agenzia Fides) – “The ceasefire declared in recent days has been broken. In reality, it has only served to supply the M23 rebel movement and the Rwandan army with weapons, ammunition and provisions to their troops so that they can then continue their advance southwards,” an observer from the local Church in Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, tells Fides.On February 3, the M23 militia, which had taken Goma, the capital of the Congolese province of North Kivu at the end of January, declared a ceasefire “for humanitarian reasons”, which came into force on February 4 (see Fides, 4/2/2025).”The M23 has resumed its advance in South Kivu and attacked the village of Ihusi,” the observer said. “Currently, Rwandan soldiers and M23 fighters are about 60 km from the center of Bukavu. Their target is probably much closer, it is Kavumu airport, which is about 30 km from the city and is of strategic importance for supplying the Congolese army troops (FARDC) with men and resources,” the observer underlines, reporting that “the situation in the city is calm. “The foreign employees of the various non-governmental organizations and international agencies have meanwhile left the city, while missionaries and local clergy remain on site.”It therefore remains uncertain whether the advance of the M23 units will stop at Kavumu airport or continue on to the capital of South Kivu province. “Bukavu is defended not only by Congolese soldiers and militiamen, but also by soldiers of the Burundian army, which has stationed 16 battalions in the region with a total of about 12,000 men. These soldiers seem to be better equipped than the soldiers of the Congolese army, who often claim that they do not even have enough to eat,” the observer continues.On a diplomatic level, the crisis in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo will be discussed at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) this weekend. “Many promises, many words, but nothing concrete,” the observer suspects. “Sanctions against Rwanda are threatened, but nothing concrete seems to have been done to put them into practice.” In Goma, meanwhile, the drama continues with hundreds of thousands of displaced people forced to leave their shelters because, according to the rebel movement M23, “security conditions have been restored.” “This is a political move to show that the ‘new masters’ of the region have the situation under control,” the observer says. “However, thousands of people are forced to return to villages, in some cases 30-40 km from Goma, without the guarantee of finding their homes and the minimum conditions for a decent life,” he concludes. “Many of them remain in the city in makeshift shelters or welcomed by friends and relatives.” (L.M.) (Agenzia Fides, 12/2/2025)
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Raksha Mantri holds bilateral meetings on Day 2 of Aero India 2025

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 10:30PM by PIB Delhi

    On the sidelines of Aero India 2025, Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh held bilateral meetings with Minister of Defence of Armenia Mr Suren Papikyan, Minister of Defence, Malawi Ms Monica Changanamuno and Minister of the Armed Forces of Madagascar Lt Gen Sahivelo Lala Monja Delphin in Bengaluru on February 11, 2025.

    The meeting of Raksha Mantri and the Armenian Defence Minister provided both sides with an opportunity to discuss matters related to bilateral defence cooperation. Both leaders acknowledged the growing significance of defence ties between both nations which are progressing well with multi-pronged approach on Military and Military-Technical Cooperation. They discussed increasing bilateral training cooperation and possibilities of joint ventures between defence industries of both countries. Towards enhancing interoperability Armenia’s inclusion as an observer in the Joint India-Central Asia Army exercise was decided between both leaders.

    During the meeting with the Minister of Defence, Malawi, both leaders had wide-ranging discussions on ways to further strengthen bilateral defence relations and enhance cooperation in areas of training, military courses and capacity building of the Armed Forces. Both sides also agreed to expedite signing of Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation to foster mutual understanding and enhance strategic interests.

    During the meeting with Minister of the Armed Forces of Madagascar, both sides held comprehensive discussions on the matters of bilateral defence cooperation and maritime domain. They also discussed the possibilities for expanding bilateral defence cooperation, particularly early conclusion of an agreement for promoting Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region and cooperation in capacity building of Defence Forces.

    *****

    SR/Savvy

    (Release ID: 2102076) Visitor Counter : 46

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Defence Secretary meets multiple defence delegations at Aero India 2025

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 8:00AM by PIB Delhi

    Defence Secretary Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh held a number of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of Aero India 2025 in Bengaluru on February 11, 2025. He held discussions with the Mozambican Defence Secretary Mr Casimiro Augusto Mueio; Secretary, Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Sampath Thuyacontha; Permanent Secretary of Defence, Suriname Mr Jayantkumar Bidesie; State Secretary of Mongolia Brigadier General Gankhayug Degvadorj; Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Nepal Mr Rameshwor Dangal; Permanent Secretary, Mauritius Mr Devendre Gopaul and Permanent Secretary, Democratic Republic of Congo Major General Lukwikila Metikwiza Marcel.

    The meetings focused on reviewing the ongoing defence cooperation and exploring ways to enhance the ties. In particular, the discussions centred on enhancing defence industrial cooperation. Later, the Defence Secretary also met Director of the International Directorate of the Directorate General of Armament, France Lt Gen Gael Diaz de Tuesta to discuss various joint projects and defence industrial cooperation.

    ******

    SR/Savvy

    (Release ID: 2102070) Visitor Counter : 75

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Congo: CLG Experts Unpack Upcoming Gas Code and Investment Opportunities

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    BRAZZAVILLE, Republic of the Congo, February 12, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The matter of the gas code will undoubtedly be discussed at the Congo Energy & Investment Forum, taking place from March 24-26, 2025, in Brazzaville. This regulatory milestone aims to provide a clear and structured framework for gas exploration, production and commercialization, boosting investor confidence and unlocking the full potential of the country’s vast natural gas reserves. As part of the forum, CLG Congo, a leading legal and commercial advisory firm in the energy sector, will play a key role in discussions surrounding regulatory reforms. In an interview with Energy Capital & Power (ECP) (www.EnergyCapitalPower.com), Yves Ollivier, Managing Director and Daoudou Mohammad, Director of Tax & Legal at CLG, shared their insights on the country’s upcoming Gas Code, regulatory landscape and upcoming opportunities. 

    Please provide an overview of CLG’s current activities in the Congo, particularly in relation to the energy sector? 

    CLG Congo is a leading provider of legal, tax, and commercial advisory services, working closely with oil and gas companies. In 2024, CLG was involved in Trident Energy’s acquisition of Chevron and TotalEnergies’ interests in the Lianzi, Nkosa and Nsoko 2 and Moho Bilondo fields. Trident now holds15,75% in Lianzi field, 85% in Nkosa and Nsoko 2 fields and 21.5% in Moho-Bilondo. To expand our client base, we actively participate in major energy events, such as African Energy Week in Cape Town and are honored to partner with Capital Energy & Power as legal counsel for CEIF 2025. 

    How does the Republic of Congo’s legislative framework impact foreign investment in hydrocarbons? 

    Historically, about 80% of direct investments in the country come from oil and gas, reflecting its economic dependence on hydrocarbons. To enhance investment conditions, the government has created investment promotion structures, including a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Agency and a dedicated Ministry for International Cooperation and for Public-Private Partnership. 

    The 2016 Hydrocarbons Code introduced competitive bidding for exploration rights, increasing transparency and investor confidence. However, a Gas Code is still needed to provide a specific legal framework for natural gas investments. The current draft, developed with international institutions, aims to secure foreign capital and streamline regulations for a more competitive and structured industry. 

    What fiscal incentives does Congo offer to attract energy investments? 

    The government provides among others, corporate tax exemptions and progressive tax reductions for oil and gas projects, negotiated within the Production Sharing Contracts. Companies also benefit from customs incentives, such as the IM5 temporary import regime, allowing tax-free equipment imports under the condition of re-export. These measures lower entry costs for investors and enhance profitability. 

    What are the key expectations from the Gas Code and how could the regulatory framework improve investment conditions? 

    The Gas Code, expected in 2025, will provide a clear legislative framework for gas monetization, fiscal terms, and resource management. The draft was presented to gas companies in late 2023, and after modifications, is set for final approval. Additionally, the Gas Master Plan, developed by SNPC and McKinsey, aims to boost investment and expand gas utilization in Congo. 

    Another key issue is the VAT decree (2023-1337), which extends VAT to previously exempt oil and gas operations. There are ongoing discussions between the government and industry players to find a compromise that suits all parties. 

    How does the regulatory framework impact local content development in the oil and gas industry? 

    Despite 2019 local content decrees, enforcement remains a challenge. The law mandates 70% Congolese employment in management roles, but lacks clear compliance mechanisms. Companies try to follow the guidelines, but without effective monitoring, implementation varies. Strengthening verification processes is essential for sustainable workforce development in the sector. 

    What are your key expectations for the Congo Energy & Investment Forum 2025? 

    We see this as an opportunity to engage with foreign investors and showcase Congo’s gas potential, which includes proven reserves of 284 billion cubic meters and significant ongoing projects such as Eni’s Tango FLNG and Wing Wah’s Banga Kayo Gas Project. The forum will allow direct dialogue with policymakers, enabling us to propose solutions for industry challenges such as the Gas Code finalization and fiscal reforms. We also aim to highlight investment opportunities and regulatory reforms. Discussing topics like the Gas Code, VAT decree, and Hydrocarbons Code updates is crucial to ensuring a competitive and attractive investment environment. 

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Libya: Migrants face extreme violence and exclusion from healthcare

    Source: Médecins Sans Frontières –

    In 2024, some 787,000 people who are migrants and refugees were present in Libya, according to the International Organization for Migration. While some of them come in search of work, others try from to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea.

    In Libya, they live in precarious conditions and are subjected to a range of violence and abuse, both inside and outside the country’s detention centres. Abducted, subjected to extortion and trafficking practices, assaulted or sexually abused, their access to healthcare is severely hampered at a time when they desperately need it.

    “I fainted under the blows, and when I woke up, they were still beating me,” says Ahmed*, a young Sudanese boy arrested and thrown into prison while trying to travel to Tunisia. “I was disfigured, I had no teeth, and my friend Saud told me they had hit my head with a brick.”

    Ahmed, a Sudanese boy who was detained I fainted under the blows, and when I woke up, they were still beating me.

    Drawings by Ricardo Sanchez Hernandez, depicting conditions in Libya. January 2025.
    © Ricardo Fernandez Sanchez/MSF

    Taken care of by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams in Zuwara, a coastal town around 100 kilometers from the capital, Tripoli, Ahmed spent a month in hospital.

    “People living undocumented in Libya have no protection, either in law or from the country’s fragile institutions, which prevents them from accessing healthcare,” says Steve Purbrick, MSF’s head of programmes in Libya. “They are exposed to violence on a daily basis. We see people who have been trafficked, others who have been tortured, raped.”

    No protection and no access to healthcare

    Libya is the first country of departure for people attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. Like Ahmed, undocumented migrants and refugees arriving there are exposed to violence throughout their journey. On the spot, they live in places often overcrowded, dangerous and unhealthy – shared rooms, but also sometimes abandoned sheds or building sites where they are also at risk of contracting diseases.

    In Libya, migrants and refugees live in precarious conditions and are subjected to various forms of violence and abuse, both inside and outside the country’s detention centers. Kidnapped, subjected to extortion and trafficking, assaulted or sexually abused, their access to healthcare is severely hindered despite their desperate need for it.
    MSF

    “Their state of health reflects both their living conditions and the extreme violence they face,” says Issam Abdullah, a doctor and the deputy medical manager for MSF in Libya. “Without protection and access to care, their injuries and traumas are rapidly worsening.”

    MSF teams provide medical support in the cities of Misrata, Tripoli and Zuwara for basic healthcare, sexual and reproductive health, mental health, diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis, and sexual violence. The most serious medical cases requiring hospitalisation are referred to the capital. Ahmed’s jaw operation was financed by MSF and carried out in a Tripoli hospital as there was no alternative solution.

    In 2024, MSF teams carried out over 15,000 consultations. The majority of those receiving mental healthcare were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorders linked to the violence they had endured.

    “Your destiny can change at any moment in Libya, all it takes is one little thing and your life is turned upside down, you can die, you can end up in prison,” says Nelson, a man from Cameroon who has been under the care of an MSF psychologist since the sinking of the boat he had boarded with his wife and two children to reach Europe. His wife and children did not survive the shipwreck.

    Nelson, a Cameroonian who lost his wife and daughter in a shipwreck Your destiny can change at any moment in Libya, all it takes is one little thing and your life is turned upside down, you can die, you can end up in prison.

    Drawings by Ricardo Sanchez Hernandez, depicting conditions in Libya. January 2025.
    © Ricardo Fernandez Sanchez/MSF

    “To go and see a doctor, for example, or to buy bread, you can take the wrong road and run into police. If it’s your lucky day, they don’t see you; if it’s not your lucky day, they arrest you,” says Nelson.

    Delayed care

    Faced with the risk of abduction and arrest by the police or militia, people are forced underground in isolated places where they are even more vulnerable. They seek medical care only as a last resort when their state of health has already seriously deteriorated.

    In 2024, MSF teams diagnosed and treated more than 250 people with tuberculosis. Sixteen died because they were not treated in time.

    “We receive people suffering from tuberculosis who seek treatment very late, which leads to high mortality and further spread of the disease,” say Dr Abdullah. “Our teams are also seeing the negative impact of interrupted treatment.”

    Salma* is 37 and has diabetes. She fled the war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023. “Diabetes requires regular meals and medication, and in Libya that’s not possible,” says the university professor.

    Salma, a diabetic woman from Sudan Diabetes requires regular meals and medication, and in Libya that’s not possible.

    In 2024, approximately 725,000 migrants were present on Libyan soil, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). While some come seeking work, others attempt to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean. In Libya, migrants and refugees live in precarious conditions and are subjected to various forms of violence and abuse, both inside and outside the country’s detention centers. Kidnapped, subjected to extortion and trafficking, assaulted or sexually abused, their access to healthcare is severely hindered despite their desperate need for it.
    © Ricardo Fernandez Sanchez/MSF

    “When I had to leave, my health deteriorated rapidly as the days went by – I became incapable of doing anything, not cooking, not even getting dressed… I became completely dependent on my daughters,” she says.

    More evacuations from Libya

    “People on the move are an integral part of an economic model set up by militias, with the complicity of the European Union and its member states, with the aim of extorting money from them. They have to pay in exchange for their crossing, in exchange for their release and the continuation of their journey, but always with the risk of falling victim to criminal networks once again,” says Purbrick, MSF’s head of programmes.

    “This is why, in addition to providing access to healthcare in the country, we are also focusing our efforts on opening up safe and legal pathways to evacuate people from Libya, in particular via the humanitarian corridor that exists between Libya and Italy,” he says. “MSF participates in this corridor by identifying vulnerable people to be evacuated and taking charge of some of them in Italy. But these options need to be drastically increased.”

    Since 2021, this corridor has already enabled the evacuation of more than 700 people, around 60 of whom were patients of MSF in Libya. Fourteen people were subsequently cared for by MSF in Palermo, Sicily.

    In April 2023, the United Nations published a report concluding there were grounds to believe a wide array of crimes against humanity have been committed against migrants in Libya. 

    *Names have been changed.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sols 4450-4451: Making the Most of a Monday

    Source: NASA

    Earth planning date: Monday, Feb. 10, 2025
    Last Saturday around 20:00 Pacific Standard Time I saw a 22-degree halo encircling our mostly-full Moon and Mars; an entire planet hanging in the sky between our Moon and the atmospheric phenomenon. As I took in the view I wondered what our rover was doing at that moment… turns out the Sun had just risen over Gale crater and Curiosity was still asleep, waiting for her alarm to go off in about 2.5 hours for another full day of science. 
    She wouldn’t start the weekend’s drive until Monday morning about 1:30, while I was still asleep waiting for my alarm to sound at 5:15. The drive’s data arrived on Earth about 5:30, and told us we drove until our time-of-day limit for driving — stopping about 36 meters (about 118 feet) away from Friday’s location. Unfortunately, our right-front wheel was shown to be perched on some tall rocks and we couldn’t quantify the drop risk if we unstowed the arm. We decided to play it safe and keep the arm stowed instead.
    Today’s two-sol plan would normally be in “nominal” sols — meaning we’d get a full day of science and a drive on the second sol — but due to some DSN downtime on Earth we moved our drive to the first sol, therefore switching to “restricted” sols a bit earlier than usual after our last soliday. Even though we couldn’t plan contact science, we’re making the most of our plan with almost 90 minutes of remote sensing. Mastcam will take an approximately 24-frame stereo mosaic of Wilkerson butte to the north, and ChemCam will shoot their laser at a rock in our workspace named “Carbon Canyon,” as well as three separate RMI mosaics! We’ll then attempt to drive until our time-of-day limit of about 15:00 local Gale time, hopefully getting us to a more stable spot on Wednesday for contact science. The second sol contains our usual dust-devil surveys with Navcam, atmospheric opacity measurements with Mastcam, and a blind LIBS on a piece of bedrock the rover chooses autonomously.
    Written by Natalie Moore, Mission Operations Specialist at Malin Space Science Systems

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: MEXC Unveils February Futures Trading Competition with 8,000,000 USDT Prize Pool

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb. 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — MEXC, a leading global cryptocurrency exchange, is thrilled to announce the launch of its highly anticipated Futures Trading Competition, set to take place from February 12 to February 26, 2025. This event offers participants the opportunity to sharpen their trading skills and compete for a substantial prize pool that can reach an impressive 8,000,000 USDT based on the number of participants.

    Event Timeline

    • Registration Period: February 11, 2025, 08:00 – February 26, 2025, 14:55 (UTC)
    • Event Period: February 12, 2025, 15:00 – February 26, 2025, 14:59 (UTC)

    Who Can Participate?

    The competition is open to all participants who maintain a minimum Futures wallet balance of 200 USDT. MEXC will verify the eligibility of registered participants prior to the competition. Participants who do not meet this requirement can easily adjust their wallet balance and re-register for a chance to compete.

    Prize Pool Unlocks Up to 8,000,000 USDT

    The Futures Trading Competition opens with a 1,000,000 USDT prize pool. As the competition unfolds and participant numbers hit the 150,000 mark, the prize pool grows to 8,000,000 USDT. This progressive prize structure is designed to increase participation and trading volume, thereby enhancing the stakes and rewards for all involved.

    Ways to Win: Futures Bonuses and Prize Pool Breakdown

    Traders can claim their share of the prize pool and win Futures Bonuses through several ways, including:

    Lucky Spin: Share 35% of the Total Prize Pool
    Every participant has the chance to spin the Lucky Wheel. For every 150,000 USDT in daily trading volume, participants earn one spin, with the opportunity to spin up to 3 times daily. Each spin offers random Futures bonuses from the prize pool until all bonuses are claimed. Spins reset daily at 14:59 (UTC), providing participants with fresh opportunities to earn rewards each day.

    Top Ranking Traders: Share 35% of the Total Prize Pool
    Participants with a cumulative USDT-M Futures trading volume of at least 20,000 USDT will qualify for the PNL and Daily Trading Volume rankings.

    • The top 200 traders by Daily Trading Volume will share 25% of the prize pool.
    • The top 100 traders by PNL will share 10% of the prize pool.

    Special Rewards for Exceeding Daily Trading Volume Threshold
    If the overall daily trading volume exceeds a specific threshold, participants will be eligible to claim additional rewards and Futures bonuses.

    Best of MEXC

    MEXC aims to become the go-to platform offering the widest range of valuable crypto assets. The platform has grown its user base to 32 million by providing a diverse selection of tokens, high-frequency airdrops, and simple participation processes. In 2024, MEXC launched a total of 2,376 new tokens, including 1,716 initial listings and 605 memecoins, with total airdrop rewards exceeding $136 million.

    About MEXC
    Founded in 2018, MEXC is committed to being “Your Easiest Way to Crypto”. Serving over 32 million users across 170+ countries, MEXC is known for its broad selection of trending tokens, frequent airdrop opportunities, and low trading fees. Our user-friendly platform is designed to support both new traders and experienced investors, offering secure and efficient access to digital assets. MEXC prioritizes simplicity and innovation, making crypto trading more accessible and rewarding.
    MEXC Official Website｜ X ｜ Telegram ｜How to Sign Up on MEXC

    Contact:
    Lucia Hu
    PR Manager
    lucia.hu@mexc.com

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by MEXC. The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the content provider. The information provided in this press release is not a solicitation for investment, nor is it intended as investment advice, financial advice, or trading advice. It is strongly recommended you practice due diligence, including consultation with a professional financial advisor, before investing in or trading cryptocurrency and securities. Please conduct your own research and invest at your own risk.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/74acc1a4-044f-42ee-81b5-d3303fddab4a

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Bitget Wallet Integrates Mantra Mainnet, Enabling Access to RWA Tokenization

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb. 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bitget Wallet, a leading Web3 non-custodial wallet, has announced full support for the Mantra Mainnet, a Layer 1 blockchain focused on the tokenization of real-world assets (RWA). With this integration, Bitget Wallet users can easily access Mantra’s network to transfer and receive $OM tokens, participate in cross-chain transactions, and explore staking opportunities through Mantra’s DApp.

    The Mantra Mainnet is designed to enable the onchain representation of real-world assets, bridging the gap between traditional finance and blockchain ecosystems. Through tokenization, Mantra aims to provide a scalable and flexible foundation for integrating RWAs within decentralized finance (DeFi). By offering a compliant-ready framework, it positions itself as a key player in unlocking RWA potential.

    Bitget Wallet’s integration with Mantra highlights its commitment to expanding user access to emerging on-chain asset ecosystems. Users can interact seamlessly with Mantra’s DApp, which offers $OM token staking, cross-chain functions, and official rewards programs. This integration aligns with the growing trend of bringing real-world asset exposure to the decentralized world.

    Looking ahead, Bitget Wallet plans to deepen its collaboration with Mantra through upcoming reward programs designed to encourage user participation in the evolving RWA ecosystem. “As real-world assets move on-chain, wallets become gateways to a new era of finance,” said Alvin Kan, COO of Bitget Wallet. “Our partnership with Mantra accelerates this shift by providing users with direct access to tokenized assets, reshaping how value is stored, transferred, and grown in the digital world.”

    About Bitget Wallet
    Bitget Wallet is the home of Web3, uniting endless possibilities in one non-custodial wallet. With over 60 million users, it offers comprehensive onchain services, including asset management, instant swaps, rewards, staking, trading tools, live market data, a DApp browser, an NFT marketplace and crypto payment. Supporting over 100 blockchains, 20,000+ DApps, and 500,000+ tokens, Bitget Wallet enables seamless multi-chain trading across hundreds of DEXs and cross-chain bridges, along with a $300+ million protection fund to ensure safety of users’ assets. Experience Bitget Wallet Lite to start a Web3 journey.
    For more information, visit: X | Telegram | Instagram | YouTube | LinkedIn | TikTok | Discord | Facebook
    For media inquiries, please contact media.web3@bitget.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2b1b3321-b108-40cb-94a7-2d49171cac93

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Raksha Mantri holds bilateral meetings with Defence Ministers of Zimbabwe, Yemen, Ethiopia, Gambia & Gabon on Day 3 of Aero India 2025

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 4:03PM by PIB Delhi

    On the margins of Aero India 2025, Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh held bilateral meetings with Minister of Defence, Zimbabwe Mrs Oppah Muchinguri Kashiri; Minister of Defense, Yemen Lt Gen Mohsen Mohammed Hussein Al Daeri; Minister of Defense, Ethiopia Mrs Aisha Mohammed (Eng.); Minister of Defence, Gambia Mr Sering Modou Njie and Minister of National Defence, Gabon Ms Brigitte Onkanowa in Bengaluru on February 12, 2025.  

    During the meeting with the Defence Minister of Zimbabwe, both sides reviewed existing bilateral defence cooperation and agreed to cooperate in areas of training, military courses and capacity building of the Armed Forces of Zimbabwe. Both leaders signed an MoU on defence cooperation and expressed confidence that this would lead to further deepening of ties. They underscored the importance of regular engagements between the Defence Ministers to effectively implement the MoU. Both countries affirmed their commitment to deepen collaboration between the defence industries for production and maintenance of assets. Cooperation in the fields of Military Medicine was also discussed. 

    During the meeting with the Ethiopian Defence Minister, both leaders expressed satisfaction at the growing bilateral defence ties. Acknowledging the importance of close and active engagement, both Ministers signed an MoU cooperation in the field of defence for institutionalising the ongoing ties. Both sides considered collaboration in various areas including military training, courses, peacekeeping and capacity building of the Armed Forces of Ethiopia. Discussions to further strengthen defence industry cooperation were also held and India’s emerging private sector was highlighted. 

    In the meeting with the Defence Minister of Yemen, both leaders took note of enhancing engagements in the field of defence. To take this a step further, both leaders held discussions for partnership in the field of military training, courses and capacity building of the Armed Forces of Yemen. The meeting gave an additional impetus and guidance to the deepening of the defence cooperation between India and Yemen.  

    During the meeting with the Gambian Defence Minister, both leaders reiterated their commitment to working together in defence domain. The two leaders reaffirmed their desire to enhance cooperation for capacity building, capability enhancement and sharing of best practices for the mutual benefits of both sides. Both sides also highlighted the huge potential for defence industry cooperation. 

    Raksha Mantri’s meetings with the Defence Minister of Gabon provided both sides with an opportunity to discuss the matters related to bilateral defence cooperation. Both leaders pledged to continue to deepen cooperation and focused their discussions on key issues related to training and capability enhancement of the Armed Forces. Both sides also explored the possibility to collaborate in the area of defence industry. 

     ***

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India Energy Week 2025 Showcases India’s Clean Cooking Gas Model: A Blueprint for the Global South

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 12 FEB 2025 3:06PM by PIB Delhi

    Union Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Shri Hardeep Singh Puri chaired a Ministerial Roundtable on Clean Cooking on the second day of India Energy Week 2025. Shri Puri highlighted India’s remarkable success in ensuring universal access to clean cooking gas through targeted subsidies, strong political will, digitization of distribution networks by Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs), and nationwide campaigns promoting cultural shifts towards clean cooking.

    The session brought together representatives from Brazil, Tanzania, Malawi, Sudan, Nepal, and industry leaders including the International Energy Agency (IEA), Total Energy, and Boston Consulting Group (BCG).

    Shri Puri emphasized that India’s model is not only successful but also highly replicable in other Global South nations facing similar energy access challenges. The Union Minister noted that under India’s Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), beneficiaries receive LPG access at a highly affordable cost of just 7 cents per day, while other consumers can avail themselves of clean cooking fuel at 15 cents per day. This affordability has been a game-changer in driving widespread adoption.

    During the discussion, international representatives shared their experiences and challenges in expanding access to clean cooking solutions. Hon. Dkt. Doto Mashaka Biteko, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy, Tanzania outlined its strategy to enable 80% of households to transition to clean cooking by 2030, leveraging subsidies and a mix of energy sources, including LPG, natural gas, and biogas. However, he acknowledged significant challenges, including financing constraints, the high cost of infrastructure, and the need for regulatory reforms to encourage private-sector participation.

    H.E. Dr. Mohieldien Naiem Mohamed Saied, Minister of Energy and Oil, Sudan, emphasized the need for private sector engagement to bridge gaps in LPG supply, as the country still imports a significant portion of its energy needs. Encouraging local cylinder production and ensuring cost-effective imports remain key hurdles in achieving broader adoption. Representatives of Rwanda and Nepal shared their efforts in reducing firewood dependency through electric stoves and biogas expansion.

    Mary Burce Warlick, Deputy Executive Director of IEA noted that India’s success offers valuable lessons for other countries, particularly in tackling challenges related to affordability, access, and infrastructure. She further emphasized the role of concessional financing and public-private partnerships (PPP) in expanding clean cooking access globally. Addressing cultural acceptance and regulatory adjustments, such as tax reductions, were also highlighted as crucial measures for large-scale adoption.

    Rahool Panandiker, Partner at Boston Consulting Group (BCG) highlighted India’s clean cooking transformation, underscoring its strong political commitment, effective subsidy targeting, and robust public awareness campaigns. He further credited India’s Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) for enabling last-mile LPG delivery through digital platforms, making adoption seamless. Panadiker also underscored the need for refining the cylinder refill model to ensure sustained usage and balancing affordability with economic sustainability.

    Responding to the potential of solar cookers in expanding clean cooking technologies across the Global South, Shri Puri highlighted that IOCL’s advanced solar cookers, featuring integrated solar panels, are priced at approximately $500 per unit with no additional costs over their lifecycle. The Union Minister added that while the current price point remains a challenge for widespread adoption, leveraging carbon financing and collaborating with the private sector could drive costs down, making solar cooking a viable alternative for millions.

    This initiative aligns with India’s broader efforts to diversify clean cooking options beyond LPG, reinforcing the country’s commitment to reducing reliance on traditional biomass fuels and cutting carbon emissions.

    Shri Puri concluded the discussion by reaffirming India’s commitment to supporting energy access initiatives worldwide. He underscored that the Indian model, backed by smart subsidies and sustainable policies, provides a scalable solution for other developing nations striving to achieve clean cooking access. He stressed that achieving universal clean cooking access is not merely an economic imperative but a moral one, given the severe health and environmental impacts of traditional biomass cooking.

    This roundtable reaffirmed India’s position as a global leader in energy transition and clean cooking solutions, setting the stage for greater international cooperation in achieving universal access to clean energy.

    About India Energy Week 2025

    India Energy Week was envisioned as more than just another industry conference—it was designed to be a dynamic platform redefining global energy dialogues. In just two years, this self-funded initiative has achieved precisely that, becoming the world’s second-largest energy event. The third edition, scheduled from February 11-14, 2025, at Yashobhoomi, New Delhi, represents a significant milestone in shaping the global energy narrative.

    ****

    MONIKA

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – RC-B10-0102/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michael Gahler, Lukas Mandl, Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Marit Maij
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Cristian Terheş
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Hilde Vautmans, Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Raquel García Hermida‑Van Der Walle, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Yvan Verougstraete
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Sara Matthieu
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Marc Botenga, Rudi Kennes, Manon Aubry, Rima Hassan, Damien Carême
    on behalf of The Left Group
    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

    – having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 25 January 2025 on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

    – having regard to the statement by G7 foreign ministers of 2 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

    – having regard to the press statement of the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

    – having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

    – having regard to the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 28 January 2025 on the recent developments in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,

    – having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

    – having regard to the Partnership Agreement of 15 November 2023 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas in January 2025, the armed rebel group M23, backed by Rwandan forces, further advanced in the eastern DRC and seized the regional capital city of Goma; whereas violence between rebel groups and the Congolese army increased sharply, causing a high number of civilian casualties; whereas an estimated 3 000 deaths occurred during the offensive on Goma; whereas approximately 800 000 internally displaced people were sheltering at that time in densely populated displacement sites around the city;

    B. whereas M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to begin on 4 February 2025; whereas fighting has nonetheless continued, Goma airport remains closed, air traffic management equipment is damaged and humanitarian access is still limited; whereas there are reports that the mining town of Nyabibwe in South Kivu has been captured by M23; whereas M23 leaders have declared their intention to continue advancing in the DRC; whereas the latest advances of M23 mark an alarming escalation of the devastating conflict in the eastern DRC, a violation of territorial integrity and an escalation in violence, leading to a dire humanitarian crisis, human rights violations and the further destabilisation of the country;

    C. whereas the region has been plagued by decades of cyclical violence, causing a security and humanitarian crisis; whereas after a ceasefire that lasted several years, the M23 fighters took up arms again at the end of 2021; whereas martial law has been in force since 2021 in the eastern DRC and the civilian government has been replaced by the military; whereas the M23 forces have been expanding their presence in the eastern DRC, setting up new governance administrations and taxation systems, establishing military training camps and exporting minerals directly to Rwanda; whereas the long-term consequences of the terrible 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi are still fuelling violence, hatred and forced displacements today;

    D. whereas on 23 and 24 January 2025, M23 fired on positions of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), which resulted in the deaths of 13 peacekeepers deployed with MONUSCO and the peacekeeping mission led by the Southern African Development Community (SADC);

    E. whereas the UN Group of Experts concluded in its June 2024 report that the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) ‘violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ and that the RDF’s ‘de facto control and direction over M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23’;

    F. whereas the seizing of Goma has led to significant displacement of civilians; whereas over 500 000 people are estimated to have been displaced since early January 2025; whereas thousands of Congolese people had previously fled to the city to escape violence and have been further driven from camps for internally displaced people into makeshift tents or forced to sleep out in the open; whereas the safety of internally displaced people is now seriously threatened, with women and girls suffering disproportionately;

    G. whereas the deputy head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma has reported on the mass rape and killing of women inmates inside Goma’s Munzenze prison, and it is estimated that hundreds of women were raped and many burned alive in the prison;

    H. whereas women and girls in the DRC face increased levels of sexual and gender-based violence, resulting in there being one victim of rape every four minutes; whereas the staff of Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, which receives many survivors of sexual violence, is alarmed about the deteriorating security situation in the area and about the security of the staff and patients in Panzi Hospital itself;

    I. whereas the seizure of Goma triggered violent protests in Kinshasa, with dozens of protesters attacking embassies and calling on the international community to halt the advance of M23;

    J. whereas the conflict in the DRC is at risk of regional spillover; whereas a peacekeeping deployment from the East African Community Regional Forces withdrew in 2023; whereas the SADC deployed a peacekeeping mission to the DRC in December 2023 with troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi; whereas at least 20 peacekeepers were killed during the M23 advance on Goma; whereas on 6 February 2025, Malawi announced the withdrawal of its troops from this mission;

    K. whereas it is widely acknowledged that Rwanda is active in the conflict in the eastern DRC, including through its de facto control of M23, to which it supplies weapons, logistical support and troops; whereas UN experts estimate that there are between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan troops operating with M23;

    L. whereas North Kivu is a resource-rich region, with vast supplies of critical raw materials including cobalt, gold and tin, which are necessary for the global digital and energy transition; whereas Goma is a major transport and trading hub for the export of minerals; whereas the UN estimates that around 120 tonnes of coltan are being moved by M23 to Rwanda each month; whereas UN experts further estimate that M23 is financed by around EUR 288 000 per month generated through its control of the mineral trade in the DRC; whereas the rebel groups often recruit child soldiers in a blatant violation of international law and humanity;

    M. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations in the DRC have focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in the eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North and South Kivu Provinces, since 1 July 2002; whereas the DRC made a second referral to the ICC in May 2023 concerning alleged crimes committed in North Kivu since 1 January 2022;

    N. whereas on 8 February 2025 at a joint summit in Tanzania’s capital Dar es Salaam, the regional blocs of southern Africa, the SADC, and eastern Africa, the East African Community (EAC), called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, demanded the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from the DRC territory, urged all warring parties to hold peace talks within five days, and demanded the reopening of Goma airport and other key routes to facilitate humanitarian aid; whereas the African Union is set to address the matter at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 14 February 2025; whereas other mediation efforts are ongoing, notably by France, which aims to bring all actors to the negotiation table;

    O. whereas the Foreign Affairs Council of the Council of the EU is expected to exchange views on the situation in the DRC on 24 February 2025;

    P. whereas between 2021 and 2024, the EU provided EUR 260 million in funding to Rwanda, with an additional EUR 900 million pledged under the Global Gateway strategy; whereas following the latest developments in the eastern DRC, the EU declared that it stood ready to boost emergency assistance, particularly for the newly displaced populations in and around Goma, and on 28 January 2025, the Commission announced new humanitarian support for the DRC with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; whereas the EU is trying to intensify its presence in the region, including through its recent support for the ‘Green Corridor Kivu-Kinshasa’ programme via a Global Gateway initiative, which aims to help establish a sustainable 2 600 km corridor connecting the eastern DRC to Kinshasa and the Atlantic Coast, covering 540 000 km2;

    Q. whereas the EU has formed raw materials partnerships with several countries, including the DRC, Rwanda and other countries in the region; whereas these partnerships are focused on, among other things, advancing due diligence and traceability, cooperation in fighting against the illegal trafficking of raw materials, and alignment with international environmental, social and governance standards; whereas Parliament, unlike the Council, was not given the opportunity by the Commission to share its political assessment of the decision to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Rwanda or to provide technical feedback on the draft MoU;

    R. whereas the DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Nobel Prize laureate Denis Mukwage briefed Parliament on 5 February 2025, at an extraordinary meeting of the Delegation to the Africa-EU Parliamentary Assembly (DAFR) and the Committee on Development, on the occupation of the eastern DRC and the dire humanitarian impact on the local population and internally displaced people;

    S. whereas the Council appointed Johan Borgstam as the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region on 1 September 2024; whereas on 30 January 2025, DAFR organised an extraordinary hearing with the EU Special Representative and Bintou Keita, Head of MONUSCO;

    T. whereas prior to recent developments, the DRC faced one of the largest displacement crises in Africa, with 6.7 million internally displaced persons, including 4.6 million in South and North Kivu; whereas the DRC also hosts over 520 000 refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries, while 1.1 million refugees from the DRC are being hosted in neighbouring countries in the region, more than half of them in Uganda; whereas the recent surge in violence has internally displaced over half a million people since the beginning of the year; whereas given the severe overcrowding in the displacement sites where people remain and the lack of water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure, the risk of a cholera outbreak is extremely high, along with that of a rapid spread of the Mpox epidemic;

    1. Strongly condemns the occupation of Goma and other territories in the eastern DRC by M23 and the RDF as an unacceptable breach of the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, as they are in clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and to cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; demands that Rwanda and all other potential state actors in the region cease their support for M23;

    2. Strongly condemns the indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas of North Kivu by all parties, including on displacement camps and other densely populated areas near Goma, as well as the unlawful killings, rapes and other apparent war crimes, forced labour, forced recruitment and other abusive practices committed by M23 with the support of the RDF and by the armed forces of the DRC, the FARDC;

    3. Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence against women and girls as a tool of repression and weapon of war in the eastern DRC as well as the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay; strongly reiterates that any attack against UN-mandated forces is inexcusable and might be considered a war crime;

    4. Calls for an immediate end to the violence, particularly the mass killings and the use of rape as a strategic weapon of war; calls on the DRC and Rwanda to investigate and appropriately prosecute those responsible for war crimes, including sexual violence, under the principle of command responsibility;

    5. Is extremely concerned by the critical humanitarian situation in the country; calls for the immediate reopening of Goma airport to re-establish humanitarian operations and bring in supplies via the airport and the land border; calls for the creation and immediate opening of humanitarian corridors and for all parties, including armed groups operating in the eastern DRC, to allow and facilitate full humanitarian access based on needs and humanitarian principles, including ensuring that civilians and displaced people are not denied access to items essential for their survival;

    6. Emphasises that humanitarian workers must be able to operate safely to deliver life-saving assistance to Congolese civilians, and that the safety of medical facilities must be preserved; stresses that this is a central obligation under international humanitarian law, and that perpetrators violating these obligations should be held to account; underlines that Rwanda and the neighbouring countries have a special responsibility to facilitate humanitarian access to the region;

    7. Strongly condemns the attack on diplomatic institutions of the EU, its Member States and civil society organisations, such as political foundations in Kinshasa; underlines that the protection of civilians and diplomatic staff must be guaranteed;

    8. Expresses concern over the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess the implementation of its renewed EU Great Lakes strategy; recalls that the EU and its special representative for the region are ready to assist all mediation efforts;

    9. Welcomes the increased humanitarian support pledged by the EU, notes that this still falls far short of meeting the basic needs for food, water, medical assistance and shelter in the eastern DRC, especially in the light of the recent termination of support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); calls on the Commission and the international community to significantly step up financial support for urgent and life-saving assistance;

    10. Regrets that the EU has not taken appropriate measures to sufficiently address the crisis and effectively press Rwanda to end its support for M23, and that it has instead taken steps – including the signing in February 2024 of an MoU on sustainable raw materials value chains without sufficiently discussing the conflict, and the decision to top up support for Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique under the European Peace Facility (EPF) – that have failed to demonstrate sufficient safeguards and that have contributed to sending an inconsistent message to the Rwandan authorities;

    11. Urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda MoU on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda proves that it is ceasing its interference and its exportation of minerals mined from M23-controlled areas; calls on all actors to increase transparency and to effectively ban the entry of all blood minerals into the EU;

    12. Calls on the Commission to render the future re-activation of cooperation on critical raw materials conditional upon Rwanda joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which the DRC is already part of;

    13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the current Conflict Minerals Regulation[2] is strongly enforced and on the Commission to propose a revision of the EU rules, with the aim of ensuring the highest standards of traceability and transparency;

    14. Notes that parliamentary oversight and civil society involvement in the preparation, signing and implementation of raw material MoUs and roadmaps are essential for an inclusive process with adequate scrutiny, and must become part of the MoU;

    15. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the international financial institutions to freeze direct budget support to Rwanda subject to it meeting conditions on, among other things, humanitarian access and the breaking of all links with M23; urges the Commission and the Member States to freeze their military and security assistance to the Rwandan armed forces to ensure that they do not contribute directly or indirectly to abusive military operations in the eastern DRC; calls strongly, in particular, for a review of the EU’s renewed support under the EPF to ensure that troops deployed in northern Mozambique and benefiting from EPF support, as well as their commanders, have been properly vetted and have not been involved in the eastern DRC or in other human rights violations, with a view to suspending the support if it is found to contribute directly or indirectly to abusive military operations in the eastern DRC;

    16. Urges the Commission and all Member States to ban the transfer of weapons to the Rwandan forces and M23 and to ensure greater transparency of trade in EU weapons;

    17. Urges the Council to expand sanctions against senior M23 commanders, leaders of other armed groups and senior officials from the DRC and Rwanda, including Major-General Eugene Nkubito, the commander of the RDF’s 3rd Division Major-General Ruki Karusisi, RDF Special Force Commander, and Major-General Emmy K. Ruvusha, Commander of the Rwanda Security Forces, all identified in the June 2024 report of the UN Group of Experts and in reports from other countries across the region as being responsible for or complicit in recent serious abuses by their forces or those for which they have command responsibility;

    18. Urges the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Member States and the Government of the DRC to take immediate action to prevent sexual violence and improve care for survivors, including by adapting the national legal framework to guarantee access to medical abortion care; draws attention to the health needs of pregnant women, notably those who are displaced and out of reach of medical support; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to further prioritise the disbursement of humanitarian support for women and girls in the region;

    19. Calls on the Commission to continue supporting anti-corruption efforts and the strengthening of governance in the DRC;

    20. Commends the Prosecutor of the ICC’s announcement that the ICC will continue to investigate alleged crimes committed by any person, irrespective of affiliation or nationality; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for the ICC and calls on the Council and Commission to fulfil their obligations to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the ICC;

    21. Reiterates its full support for MONUSCO in protecting civilians and stabilising the region; urges the EU to cooperate with all actors on the ground, in particular MONUSCO, to ensure the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC; calls on the UN to work towards a stronger mandate for MONUSCO in order to enable peacemaking; calls on the UN to ensure the protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law, particularly given the increased risk of gender-based violence, and to preserve the safety of humanitarian staff, health workers and medical facilities;

    22. Calls on the UN to take immediate and specific measures to protect Panzi Hospital and its patients and staff;

    23. Welcomes the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the DRC; supports the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into serious violations committed since January 2022;

    24. Reiterates its condemnation of hate speech and xenophobia, as well as ethnic-based politics; underlines that all those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC must be held accountable;

    25. Is concerned about the consequences of Russian interference in the conflict and more widely in the region, and about the increasing presence of disinformation campaigns; condemns, in particular, efforts by Russia to foster anti-Western sentiment through the dissemination of fake news on social media about Western players;

    26. Expresses its concern about the increasing presence of Chinese actors in the mining sector of the DRC and the region acting without respect for economic and social responsibilities, and recalls that European industries and companies in the region will only have long-term security of supply if a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict is found;

    27. Recalls that only an inclusive and regional approach will be able to address and tackle the multifaceted, long-standing problems in the region; strongly welcomes the joint SADC and EAC peace summit in Dar es Salaam on 8 February 2025; reiterates, in this regard, its full support for the Luanda and Nairobi processes and calls upon all Great Lake countries, in particular the DRC and Rwanda, to urgently pursue negotiations within these frameworks; emphasises that any solution must also address the root causes of the conflict, including, but not limited to, the illicit trafficking of natural resources; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully support national and regional initiatives, such as the initiative of the Congolese Catholic and Protestant leaders, and the Luanda Process; underlines that regional organisations, such as the African Union, the SADC and the EAC, must play a central role in all of these efforts; underlines also that a lasting solution requires a reform of the DRC security sector, with a better organised DRC army and administration;

    28. Calls on the international community and all actors involved to use the Addis Ababa framework agreement and to organise an international conference for peace in the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region; stresses that this ‘Business for Peace’ conference will have the unique feature of having the private sector around the peace negotiation table, since the war is about strategic minerals; underlines that business people can have significant leverage to push their countries to act for peace; believes that the business for peace approach can help us move forward in finding a solution;

    29. Calls for the cancellation of the 2025 International Cycling Union (UCI) Road World Championships in Kigali if Rwanda does not change course;

    30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of Rwanda and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the African Union, the secretariats of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community, and other relevant international bodies.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and the Planet

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    1. Participants from over 100 countries, including government leaders, international organisations, representatives of civil society, the private sector, and the academic and research communities gathered in Paris on February 10 and 11, 2025, to hold the AI Action Summit. Rapid development of AI technologies represents a major paradigm shift, impacting our citizens, and societies in many ways. In line with the Paris Pact for People and the Planet, and the principles that countries must have ownership of their transition strategies, we have identified priorities and launched concrete actions to advance the public interest and to bridge digital divides through accelerating progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Our actions are grounded in three main principles of science, solutions – focusing on open AI models in compliance with countries frameworks – and policy standards, in line with international frameworks.
    2. This Summit has highlighted the importance of reinforcing the diversity of the AI ecosystem. It has laid an open, multi-stakeholder and inclusive approach that will enable AI to be human rights based, human-centric, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy while also stressing the need and urgency to narrow the inequalities and assist developing countries in artificial intelligence capacity-building so they can build AI capacities.
    3. Acknowledging existing multilateral initiatives on AI, including the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, the Global Digital Compact, the UNESCO Recommendation on Ethics of AI, the African Union Continental AI Strategy, and the works of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe and European Union, the G7 including the Hiroshima AI Process and G20, we have affirmed the following main priorities: 

    • Promoting AI accessibility to reduce digital divides

    • Ensuring AI is open, inclusive, transparent, ethical, safe, secure and trustworthy, taking into account international frameworks for all 

    • Making innovation in AI thrive by enabling conditions for its development and avoiding market concentration driving industrial recovery and development

    • Encouraging AI deployment that positively shapes the future of work and labour markets and delivers opportunity for sustainable growth

    • Making AI sustainable for people and the planet

    • Reinforcing international cooperation to promote coordination in international governance

    To deliver on these priorities: 

    • Founding members have launched a major Public Interest AI Platform and Incubator, to support, amplify, decrease fragmentation between existing public and private initiatives on Public Interest AI and address digital divides. The Public interest AI Initiative will sustain and support digital public goods and technical assistance and capacity building projects in data, model development, openness and transparency, audit, compute, talent, financing and collaboration to support and co-create a trustworthy AI ecosystem advancing the public interest of all, for all and by all. 

    • We have discussed, at a Summit for the first time and in a multi-stakeholder format, issues related to AI and energy. This discussion has led to sharing knowledge to foster investments for sustainable AI systems (hardware, infrastructure, models), to promoting an international discussion on AI and environment, to welcoming an observatory on the energy impact of AI with the International Energy Agency, to showcasing energy-friendly AI innovation.
    • We recognize the need to enhance our shared knowledge on the impacts of AI in the job market, though the creation of network of Observatories, to better anticipate AI implications for workplaces, training and education and to use AI to foster productivity, skill development, quality and working conditions and social dialogue.
    1. We recognize the need for inclusive multistakeholder dialogues and cooperation on AI governance. We underline the need for a global reflection integrating inter alia questions of safety, sustainable development, innovation, respect of international laws including humanitarian law and human rights law and the protection of human rights, gender equality, linguistic diversity, protection of consumers and of intellectual property rights. We take notes of efforts and discussions related to international fora where AI governance is examined. As outlined in the Global Digital Compact adopted by the UN General Assembly, participants also reaffirmed their commitment to initiate a Global Dialogue on AI governance and the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and to align on-going governance efforts, ensuring complementarity and avoiding duplication. 
    2. Harnessing the benefits of AI technologies to support our economies and societies depends on advancing Trust and Safety. We commend the role of the Bletchley Park AI Safety Summit and Seoul Summits that have been essential in progressing international cooperation on AI safety and we note the voluntary commitments launched there. We will keep addressing the risks of AI to information integrity and continue the work on AI transparency. 
    3. We look forward to next AI milestones such as the Kigali Summit, the 3rd Global Forum on the Ethics of AI hosted by Thailand and UNESCO, the 2025 World AI Conference and the AI for Good Global Summit 2025 to follow up on our commitments and continue to take concrete actions aligned with a sustainable and inclusive AI.

    Signatory countries: 

    1. Armenia
    2. Australia
    3. Austria
    4. Belgium
    5. Brazil
    6. Bulgaria
    7. Cambodia
    8. Canada
    9. Chile
    10. China
    11. Croatia
    12. Cyprus
    13. Czechia
    14. Denmark
    15. Djibouti
    16. Estonia
    17. Finland
    18. France
    19. Germany
    20. Greece
    21. Hungary
    22. India
    23. Indonesia
    24. Ireland
    25. Italy
    26. Japan
    27. Kazakhstan
    28. Kenya
    29. Latvia
    30. Lithuania
    31. Luxembourg
    32. Malta
    33. Mexico
    34. Monaco
    35. Morocco
    36. New Zealand
    37. Nigeria
    38. Norway
    39. Poland
    40. Portugal
    41. Romania
    42. Rwanda
    43. Senegal
    44. Serbia
    45. Singapore
    46. Slovakia
    47. Slovenia
    48. South Africa
    49. Republic of Korea
    50. Spain
    51. Sweden
    52. Switzerland
    53. Thailand
    54. Netherlands
    55. United Arab Emirates
    56. Ukraine
    57. Uruguay
    58. Vatican
    59. European Union
    60. African Union Commission

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Humanitarian Crisis in Eastern DRC Remains Volatile – Press Conference | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Press conference by Mr. Bruno Lemarquis, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), on the situation in the country.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Npzg0z32Mhk

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI: Trident and the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and Digital Technology of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Sign an Agreement for the Implementation of the National Digital Identity System

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SINGAPORE, Feb. 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Trident Digital Tech Holdings Ltd (“Trident” or the “Company,” NASDAQ: TDTH), a leading catalyst for digital transformation in technology optimization services and Web 3.0 activation based in Singapore, today announced the signing of an implementation agreement with the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and Digital Technology of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC” or the “Republic”). This agreement marks the beginning of the deployment of the national digital identity system.

    This preliminary collaboration agreement signifies the operational launch of a comprehensive digital identification and authentication platform in the DRC. It formalizes the initial collaboration between Trident and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, transitioning from strategic planning to contractual execution.

    The agreement outlines specific deliverables, including the development and deployment of an integrated digital identity verification and authentication system based on a secure infrastructure for delivering government services.

    Furthermore, the system will incorporate robust data protection measures aligned with international standards, ensuring the security and confidentiality of citizens’ information. These fundamental elements aim to revolutionize interactions between citizens and the government, marking a major step toward a digitally integrated nation. This technology will also benefit citizens by enhancing the efficiency and security of government services while ensuring user control and consent.

    Statements from Leadership

    Soon Huat Lim, Founder, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer of Trident, stated:

    “The signing of this agreement represents a crucial milestone in our mission to provide the citizens of the DRC with secure and accessible digital identity services. By working directly with the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and Digital Technology, we will implement advanced digital identity verification and authentication systems that will serve as the cornerstone of the DRC’s digital transformation. This implementation phase will focus on building a robust infrastructure, ensuring that every citizen can securely access government services through a verified digital identity.”

    He added:

    “The systems we are developing will establish new standards for digital governance in Africa while creating a replicable model for developing nations. This partnership is a prime example of how innovative technology can be leveraged to drive meaningful change in people’s daily lives.”

    H.E. Augustin Kibassa Maliba, Minister of Posts, Telecommunications, and Digital Technology of the DRC, commented:

    “The Digital Identity System is a key pillar in modernizing our country through digital transformation. With Trident, we will be able to provide our citizens with secure and efficient access to government services while protecting their personal data through advancements in blockchain technology. This partnership demonstrates our commitment to leveraging innovative solutions for the benefit of all Congolese. By implementing this digital transformation, we are not only building infrastructure but also creating new opportunities for economic growth and social inclusion.”

    About Trident

    Trident is a leading catalyst for digital transformation in digital optimization, technology services, and Web 3.0 activation worldwide based in Singapore. The Company offers commercial and technological digital solutions designed to optimize its clients’ experience with their end-users by promoting digital adoption and self-service.

    Tridentity, the Company’s flagship product, is an innovative and highly secure blockchain-based identity solution designed to provide secure single sign-on authentication capabilities to integrated third-party systems across various industries. Tridentity aims to offer unparalleled security features, ensuring the protection of sensitive information and preventing potential threats, thus promising a new secure era in the global digital landscape in general, and in Southeast Asia etc.

    Beyond Tridentity, the Company’s mission is to become the global leader in Web 3.0 activation, notably connecting businesses to a reliable and secure technological platform, with tailored and optimized customer experiences.

    Safe Harbor Statement

    This announcement contains statements that may constitute “forward-looking” statements pursuant to the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “will,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “aims,” “future,” “intends,” “plans,” “believes,” “estimates,” “likely to,” and similar statements. The Company may also make written or oral forward-looking statements in its periodic reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), in its annual report to shareholders, in announcements and other written materials, and in oral statements made by its officers, directors, or employees to third parties. Statements that are not historical facts, including statements about the Company’s beliefs, plans, and expectations, are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties, including the possibility that a definitive agreement will not be concluded as contemplated under the preliminary collaboration agreement discussed in this announcement, and the possibility that the e-GOV system will not materialize as contemplated under the preliminary collaboration agreement or a definitive agreement if and once concluded. A number of factors could also cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statement, including but not limited to the following: the Company’s strategies, future business development, and financial condition and results of operations; the expected growth of the digital solutions market; the political, economic, social and legal developments in the jurisdictions that the Company operates in or in which the Company intends to expand its business and operations; the Company’s ability to maintain and enhance its brand. Further information regarding these and other risks is included in the Company’s filings with the SEC. All information provided in this announcement is as of the date of this announcement, and the Company does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statement, except as required under applicable law.

    Investor and Media Contacts

    Investor Relations
    Robin Yang, Partner
    ICR, LLC
    Email: investor@tridentity.me
    Phone: +1 (212) 321-0602

    Media Relations
    Brad Burgess, SVP
    ICR, LLC
    Email: Brad.Burgess@icrinc.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/1627fdde-b97d-48f2-b2b9-f50149c37570

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Phoenix Group’s Bitcoin Mining Revenue Soars 236% YoY, Fuelled by Strategic Global Expansion

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, Feb. 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Phoenix Group PLC (ADX:PHX), ADX-listed technology leader, today announced a remarkable 236% year-over-year (YoY) surge in revenue for FY 2024, solidifying its position as a driving force in the global digital asset ecosystem.

    The company’s mining revenue reached $107 million in 2024, a significant leap from $32 million in 2023 and $5.4 million in 2022. This represents an astounding 1852% increase over two years. This exceptional performance underscores Phoenix Group’s strategic vision and operational excellence in a dynamic market.

    Despite industry headwinds, including the Bitcoin halving and a prolonged bearish market until November 2024, Phoenix Group demonstrated resilience and adaptability. The company’s total gross revenue across all verticals reached $206 million. Phoenix Group’s proactive operational efficiencies and strategic initiatives, including global expansion and diversification, have paved the way for sustained profitability and growth.

    Commenting on the 2024 results, Munaf Ali, CEO & Co-Founder, stated: “These results are a testament to our unwavering commitment to innovation and strategic growth on a global scale. The past year has been pivotal for Phoenix Group, marked by significant expansion and enhanced profitability. We are not simply navigating the digital asset revolution – we are shaping it. With a strong foundation and a clear vision, we are confident in delivering continued value to our shareholders and stakeholders worldwide.”

    The company achieved a total comprehensive income of USD 219 million and a net profit after tax of USD 167 million. 

    Total assets stood at USD 962 million, along with earnings per share (EPS) recorded at USD 0.028, reinforcing Phoenix Group’s continued profitability and shareholder value growth.

    Operational and Financial Highlights during 2024:

    • Improved Profitability: Self-mining gross margins rose to 24% in Q4 2024, up from just 5% in Q3 2024, driven by an average 37% increase in Bitcoin price and a 6% improvement in efficiency improvement mainly coming from sites in the US and Canada.
    • Processing Power Contribution: Phoenix Group maintained a robust contribution of 15.0 EH/s to the Bitcoin network, with its market share holding steady at 1.9%.
    • Expansion and Optimization: The company successfully launched new mining sites in the U.S., Canada, and Oman, adding a total of 160 MW while exiting the CIS region due to regulatory uncertainties.
    • Diversification into Digital Assets: Investments expanded into key cryptocurrencies including SOL, ETH, FAH, UNCN, LVLY, and TON, reinforcing Phoenix Group’s diversified growth strategy.
    • New Strategic Agreements: Phoenix Group secured agreements for additional sites, including a 132 MW facility in Ethiopia and a 20 MW site in Texas, totalling 152 MW of upcoming capacity.
    • Stablecoin Collaboration: Partnered with the Tether Foundation to launch a dirham-backed stablecoin, enhancing the company’s foothold in the broader digital finance ecosystem.

    Phoenix Group continues to position itself as a leader in the Bitcoin mining and digital asset sector, leveraging strategic expansion and operational efficiencies to drive sustainable growth. 

    The company’s preliminary results remain subject to external audit, with audited consolidated financial statements expected by February 14, 2024.

    -END-

    About Phoenix Group 

    Phoenix Group, a multi-billion-dollar tech powerhouse headquartered in the UAE, leads the forefront of the blockchain, crypto, and tech revolution, driving innovation to new heights. Phoenix Group operates several mining facilities in the US, Canada, CIS, and the UAE, with each unique company operating in one of four distinct verticals: Mining, Hosting, Trading, and Investments. 

    Phoenix Group PLC is the region’s first privately owned crypto and blockchain conglomerate listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange. It also runs the largest mining farm in the MENA region.

    Social presence:

    X  | LinkedIn | Website

    Media contact:

    Email: ir@phoenixgroupuae.com 

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Video: State of the Nation Address Debate: Day 2 | 12 February

    Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

    State of the Nation Address Debate: Day 2 | 12 February
    #SONA2025 #GovZAupdates

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wR5m7jmdMM

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Sudan faces an unprecedented humanitarian crisis amid ongoing ‘forgotten war’

    Source: European Asylum Support Office

    The EUAA has just published two new COI reports, a Country Focus and a Security Situation report on Sudan. Conflict-related violence has had a particular impact on women and girls, as well as perceived political opponents, while famine has been declared in at least five parts of the country. The Agency’s new reports come as over 10 000 Sudanese nationals sought asylum in EU+ countries in 2024.

    The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) has just published two Country-of-Origin Information (COI) reports on Sudan, including on the security situation as well as an updated Country Focus report that builds on an earlier report from April 2024. Since the beginning of the conflict in 2023, Sudan has been plunged into severe instability leading to the world’s largest internal displacement crisis – with over 11 million people displaced.

    Over the past 20 months, indiscriminate violence has affected large portions of the country. The situation is severely worsened by acute food insecurity affecting over 25 million people, and famine has been declared in at least five areas of the country. Food deprivation and sexual violence have also been systematically used as weapons against civilians.

    Conflict-related violence has targeted large sections of the civilian population, in particular women and girls, non-Arab Africans in Darfur and Nuba in South Kordofan, journalists and media personnel, humanitarian and health personnel and perceived political opponents. The use of child soldiers has also been documented. Despite international appeals – including from the EU – urging the warring parties to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, the civil war continues.

    Meanwhile, the conflict remains largely underreported. A crackdown on local media outlets, and repeated communication blackouts, have severely hindered reporting capabilities across the country, making the conflict in Sudan a ‘forgotten war’.

    EU Asylum situation for Sudanese nationals

    In 2024, Sudanese nationals lodged over 10 000 applications for international protection in the EU+. Throughout the year, Sudanese applications followed an upward trend and with the highest number of monthly applications received in November 2024 (1 100). Almost all (95 %) were first-time applicants. France was the main receiving country for Sudanese nationals, followed at a distance by Greece and Germany.

    In 2024, EU+ countries issued approximately 6 300 decisions at first instance on Sudanese applications, with 74 % of the decisions granting refugee status and subsidiary protection (which was up from 66 % in 2023). At the end of the year, there were nearly 7 700 cases pending at first instance, which was up by around 1 900 cases compared to December 2023.

    Background

    The EUAA regularly updates its Country of Origin Information reports, which aim to provide accurate and reliable up-to-date information on third countries to support EU+ national asylum and migration authorities involved in migration and international protection procedures.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Empowering Future Leaders: Samsung Innovation Campus at Malawi University of Science & Technology Celebrates Successful Graduates

    Source: Samsung

    Samsung in collaboration with the Malawi University of Science and Technology (MUST) recently hosted an award ceremony where 31 students graduated from the Samsung Innovation Campus (SIC). SIC is a global Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) flagship programme that seeks to improve the nation’s youth employment in the technology sector.
     
    The partnership between MUST and Samsung was officiated at the end of 2023, targeting youth on the African continent who are tertiary students or unemployed, with the aim of empowering them to develop their Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) skills. The SIC programme is aimed at training underserved youths with 21st Century technology knowledge and skills to enable them to stand a better chance of earning a living through employment or business opportunities.
     
    The graduation – a celebration of excellence in technology was attended by the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Youth and Sports in Malawi, Mr Isaac Katopola as well as representatives from the Ministry of Education and the Information Communication Technology Association of Malawi (ICTAM).
     
    The guest of honour at the graduation, Mr Katopola outlined how this coding and software development training is contributing directly to job creation, innovation and entrepreneurship in Malawi. He explained how this MUST-SIC programme is in precise alignment with the country’s long-term development vision: “the Human Capital Development and Enablement in Malawi 2063”.
     
    Mr Katopola said: “In today’s world, coding and programming skills are essential because they allow youth to compete in both local and international platforms. The MUST graduates’ ability to code will now open doors to global markets, entrepreneurship and innovation. These skills will enable these Malawian young people to become problem solvers, innovators and creators rather than just consumers of any technology that is available to them.
     

     
    “This coding training is an enabler and a significant contributor to the attainment and realisation of Malawi’s development vision. He added that this vision is dependent on well educated, high skilled and innovative work force. And by equipping young people with digital skills and programming knowledge, we are all ensuring that they can actively participate in 4IR and drive technological advancement.”
    Through the SIC programme, MUST in partnership with Samsung have now had the opportunity to develop 4IR skills by teaching Coding and Programming (C&P) education in Python.
     
    Yolanda Chisi, a SIC beneficiary said: “I’m grateful to both Samsung and MUST for bringing this SIC programme into our country and for providing the unemployed youth of Malawi access to technological advancement. This SIC programme has not only provided us with technical skills in C&P, but also other critical soft skills, such as work readiness, communication and teamwork. These technical and soft skills combined are already helping to promote and turn us into talented young individuals who will shape the future of our society.”
     

     
    By providing the unemployed youth in Malawi with relevant skills and knowledge, the SIC programme is empowering the next generation of leaders and innovators, poised to drive positive change and economic growth in the country. The inclusion of C&P in education has ensured that the selected individuals are able to learn at their own pace, improve their understanding of key technological concepts as well as develop critical thinking and problem-solving skills.
     
    MUST Vice Chancellor, Professor Address Malata, added: “As MUST, we feel that our partnership with Samsung is critical to the advancement of both our educators and students’ knowledge, skills and experience. We are, therefore, thrilled to be part of a programme that is playing a vital role in harnessing the talent of Malawi’s youth and ultimately, contributing positively to the development of our future leaders.”
     
    Lefa Makgato, Corporate Social Responsibility Manager for Samsung Electronics in Southern Africa concluded: “We are happy to see a group of passionate and talented students graduating from the SIC programme. With this programme focusing on future technological innovation such as Coding and Programming – as Samsung, we are now able to re-affirm our commitment to creating opportunities that will see the youth becoming technology innovators.”
     

     

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: COP29 climate talks end with $300 billion annual pledge, Guterres calls deal a ‘base to build on’

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    Climate and Environment

    Rich nations pledged to contribute at least $300 billion annually to the global fight against climate change as UN climate talks came to a contentious end early Sunday morning in Baku. Developing nations who had sought over $1 trillion in assistance called the agreement “insulting” and argued it did not give them the vital resources they required to truly address the complexities of the climate crisis.

    After two weeks of intense negotiations, delegates at COP29, formally the 29th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), agreed to provide this funding annually, with an overall climate financing target to reach “at least $1.3 trillion by 2035”.

    Soundcloud

    Countries also agreed on the rules for a UN-backed global carbon market. This market will facilitate the trading of carbon credits, incentivizing countries to reduce emissions and invest in climate-friendly projects.

    These were among the big-ticket issues decided upon as the summit, underway since 11 November in the enormous Baku Stadium in the Azerbaijan capital, ran into double overtime. 

    Other steps forward at COP29 included: 

    This summit had been dubbed the ‘climate finance COP’, and representatives from all countries were seeking to establish a new, higher climate finance goal. 

    The target, or new collective quantified goal (NCQG), will replace the existing $100 billion goal that is due to expire in 2025.

    In the closing days at COP29, negotiating teams from the developed and developing worlds were deadlocked over a final deal, with reports that representatives for least developed countries and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOIS) had walked out of the talks.

    ‘A more ambitious outcome’

    Reacting to the outcome, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that while an agreement at COP29 was absolutely essential to keep the 1.5-degree limit alive, “I had hoped for a more ambitious outcome – on both finance and mitigation – to meet the great challenge we face.”

    But he continued, this agreement provides a base on which to build and added: It must be honoured in full and on time. Commitments must quickly become cash. All countries must come together to ensure the top-end of this new goal is met.”

    For many vulnerable nations, it represents a glimmer of hope—but only if commitments translate into swift action. “Commitments must quickly become cash,” the Secretary-General stressed, urging all countries to work together to meet the upper end of the new financial goal.

    Beyond finance, COP29 built on previous gains in emissions reduction targets, the acceleration of the energy transition, and a long-sought agreement on carbon markets. These achievements come despite an “uncertain and divided geopolitical landscape,” which threatened to derail negotiations.

    The UN chief commended negotiators for finding common ground, noting, “You have shown that multilateralism – centred on the Paris Agreement – can find a path through the most difficult issues.”

    ‘An insurance policy for humanity’

    UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell described the new finance goal agreed at COP29 as “an insurance policy for humanity.”

    “This deal will keep the clean energy boom growing and protect billions of lives.  It will help all countries to share in the huge benefits of bold climate action: more jobs, stronger growth, cheaper and cleaner energy for all. But like any insurance policy – it only works – if the premiums are paid in full, and on time.”

    He acknowledged that no country got everything they wanted, and that the world leaves Baku with a mountain of work to do. “So, this is no time for victory laps. We need to set our sights and redouble our efforts on the road to Belém,” in the eastern Amazonian region of Brazil, which is set to host COP30 next year.

    ‘Weak, insulting deal’

    While some delegations applauded the deal, many from the developing world, including Bolivia and Nigeria, expressed their deep disappointment at what they argued was an “insultingly low” financing target and that the agreed text failed to significantly build on an agreement last year at COP28 in Dubai calling for nations to “transition away from fossil fuels”.

    India’s representative strongly denounced the new goal, calling it a “paltry sum” and emphasizing, “We seek a much higher ambition from the developed countries [and the amount agreed] does not inspire trust that we will come out of this grave problem of climate change.”

    A representative from a group of small island nations said: “After this COP29 ends, we cannot just sail off into the sunset. We are literally sinking,” and the conference outcome highlighted “what a very different boat our vulnerable countries are in, compared to the developed countries”.

    UNFCCC/Kiara Worth

    Civil society actors at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, advocate for climate financing initiatives.

    Sierra Leone’s representative said African nations were disappointed in the outcome, which “signals a lack of goodwill by developed countries.” Indeed, the $300 billion deal was “less than a quarter of what science shows is needed and barely enough to forestall a climate catastrophe”.

    Striking a different tone, a representative from the delegation of the European Union said the new climate finance goal would “simply will bring much, much more private money on the table, and that is what we need. And with these funds, we are confident we will reach the 1.3 trillion objective.”

    Want to know more? Check out our special events page, where you can find all our coverage of COP29, including stories and videos, explainers and our newsletter.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Tuesday, 11 February 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament 2

    PV-10-2025-02-11

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Tuesday, 11 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:00.


    2. Preparedness for a new trade era: multilateral cooperation or tariffs (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Preparedness for a new trade era: multilateral cooperation or tariffs (2025/2551(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Maroš Šefčovič (Member of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: Jörgen Warborn, on behalf of the PPE Group, Iratxe García Pérez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Klara Dostalova, on behalf of the PfE Group, Daniele Polato, on behalf of the ECR Group, Karin Karlsbro, on behalf of the Renew Group, Anna Cavazzini, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Manon Aubry, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michał Szczerba, Kathleen Van Brempt, Christophe Bay, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, who also answered a blue-card question from Manon Aubry, Diana Riba i Giner, Lynn Boylan, Fabio De Masi, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, who also answered a blue-card question from Petras Gražulis, Yannis Maniatis, Anna Bryłka, Svenja Hahn, who also answered a blue-card question from Damian Boeselager, Majdouline Sbai, Rudi Kennes, Lídia Pereira, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Bernd Lange, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, who also answered a blue-card question from Cristina Maestre, Sophie Wilmès, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Željana Zovko, Stefano Bonaccini, András László, who also answered a blue-card question from Radan Kanev, Barry Cowen, Luděk Niedermayer, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Raphaël Glucksmann, Ľubica Karvašová, Sebastião Bugalho, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Loucas Fourlas, Dirk Gotink and Salvatore De Meo.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Sebastian Tynkkynen and Billy Kelleher.

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
    Vice-President

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Maria Grapini on the organisation of the debate.

    The following spoke: Maroš Šefčovič and Adam Szłapka.

    The debate closed.


    3. Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression (2025/2528(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Marta Kos (Member of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: Michael Gahler, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Csaba Dömötör, on behalf of the PfE Group, Adam Bielan, on behalf of the ECR Group, Petras Auštrevičius, on behalf of the Renew Group, Villy Søvndal, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Danilo Della Valle, on behalf of The Left Group, Petras Gražulis, on behalf of the ESN Group, Rasa Juknevičienė, Kathleen Van Brempt, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Reinis Pozņaks, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, who also answered a blue-card question from Alexander Sell, Mārtiņš Staķis, Jonas Sjöstedt, Petar Volgin, Ľuboš Blaha, Sandra Kalniete, Sven Mikser, Viktória Ferenc, Alberico Gambino, Hilde Vautmans, Sergey Lagodinsky, Hans Neuhoff, Fabio De Masi, Michał Szczerba, Thijs Reuten, Petra Steger, Jaak Madison, Bernard Guetta, Markéta Gregorová, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Pekka Toveri, Pina Picierno, Michał Dworczyk, Helmut Brandstätter, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Davor Ivo Stier, Marcos Ros Sempere, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Reinhold Lopatka, who also answered a blue-card question from Alexander Jungbluth, Tonino Picula, Mika Aaltola, who also answered a blue-card question from Merja Kyllönen, Tobias Cremer, Riho Terras and Ana Miguel Pedro.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Hélder Sousa Silva, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Dainius Žalimas, Siegbert Frank Droese and Ondřej Dostál.

    The following spoke: Marta Kos and Adam Szłapka.

    Motions for resolutions to be tabled under Rule 136(2) would be announced at a later stage.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: next part-session.

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    4. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:22.


    5. Formal sitting – Address by Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada

    The President made an address to welcome Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada.

    Ruslan Stefanchuk addressed the House.

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)


    6. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:42.


    7. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.


    7.1. Conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and the government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on certain aspects of air services *** (vote)

    Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on certain aspects of air services [10844/2024 – C10-0111/2024 – 2015/0188(NLE)] – Committee on Transport and Tourism. Rapporteur: Tomas Tobé (A10-0005/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    DRAFT COUNCIL DECISION

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)0008)

    Parliament consented to the conclusion of the agreement.

    (‘Results of votes’, item 1)


    7.2. Conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Protocol (2024-2029) implementing the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cabo Verde *** (vote)

    Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol (2024-2029) implementing the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cabo Verde [11267/2024 – C10-0087/2024 – 2024/0133(NLE)] – Committee on Fisheries. Rapporteur: Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral (A10-0004/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    DRAFT COUNCIL DECISION

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)0009)

    Parliament consented to the conclusion of the agreement.

    (‘Results of votes’, item 2)


    7.3. Renewal of the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European Community and Ukraine *** (vote)

    Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the renewal of the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European Community and Ukraine [14848/2024 – C10-0196/2024 – 2024/0240(NLE)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Borys Budka (A10-0007/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    DRAFT COUNCIL DECISION

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)0010)

    Parliament consented to the renewal of the agreement.

    (‘Results of votes’, item 3)


    7.4. European Central Bank – annual report 2024 (vote)

    Report on European Central Bank – annual report 2024 [2024/2054(INI)] – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Rapporteur: Anouk Van Brug (A10-0003/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 10 February 2025 (minutes of 10.2.2025, item 13).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0011)

    (‘Results of votes’, item 4)

    (The sitting was suspended at 12:53.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Javi LÓPEZ
    Vice-President

    8. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:58.


    9. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.


    10. The need to address urgent labour shortages and ensure quality jobs in the health care sector (debate)

    Commission statement: The need to address urgent labour shortages and ensure quality jobs in the health care sector (2025/2529(RSP))

    Roxana Mînzatu (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Dennis Radtke, on behalf of the PPE Group, Gabriele Bischoff, on behalf of the S&D Group, Gerald Hauser, on behalf of the PfE Group, Ruggero Razza, on behalf of the ECR Group, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu, on behalf of the Renew Group, Maria Ohisalo, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Leila Chaibi, on behalf of The Left Group, Tomislav Sokol, Estelle Ceulemans, Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain, Aurelijus Veryga, Brigitte van den Berg, Tilly Metz, Catarina Martins, Jan-Peter Warnke, Liesbet Sommen, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Pál Szekeres, Adrian-George Axinia, Olivier Chastel, Pernando Barrena Arza, Maria Zacharia, András Tivadar Kulja, Marianne Vind, Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, Michele Picaro, Kathleen Funchion, Adam Jarubas, Nicolás González Casares, Marie Dauchy, Beatrice Timgren, Elena Nevado del Campo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Deloge, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Romana Tomc, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, and Alessandra Moretti.

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Philippe Olivier, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Marit Maij, Malika Sorel, Francesco Ventola, Victor Negrescu and Evelyn Regner.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sérgio Humberto, Maria Grapini, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Ana Miranda Paz, João Oliveira, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos, Dennis Radtke, Idoia Mendia and Rudi Kennes.

    The following spoke: Roxana Mînzatu.

    The debate closed.


    11. Boosting vocational education and training in times of labour market transitions (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Boosting vocational education and training in times of labour market transitions (2025/2530(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Roxana Mînzatu (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: Dennis Radtke, on behalf of the PPE Group, Romana Jerković, on behalf of the S&D Group, Catherine Griset, on behalf of the PfE Group, Chiara Gemma, on behalf of the ECR Group, Brigitte van den Berg, on behalf of the Renew Group, Li Andersson, on behalf of The Left Group, Marcin Sypniewski, on behalf of the ESN Group, Maravillas Abadía Jover, Hannes Heide and Pál Szekeres.

    IN THE CHAIR: Pina PICIERNO
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Georgiana Teodorescu, Laurence Farreng, Nikos Pappas, Fidias Panayiotou, Gheorghe Falcă, Idoia Mendia, Elisabeth Dieringer, Marlena Maląg, Anna-Maja Henriksson, Andrzej Buła, Marc Angel, Mélanie Disdier, Ivaylo Valchev, Sérgio Humberto, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Sabrina Repp, Annamária Vicsek, Elena Donazzan, Eleonora Meleti, Isilda Gomes, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė and Marie Dauchy.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Nina Carberry, Nikolina Brnjac, Marcos Ros Sempere, Alicia Homs Ginel, Kateřina Konečná and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Glenn Micallef (Member of the Commission) and Adam Szłapka.

    The debate closed.


    12. Wider comprehensive EU-Middle East strategy (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Wider comprehensive EU-Middle East strategy (2024/3015(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Dubravka Šuica (Member of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: David McAllister, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jorge Martín Frías, on behalf of the PfE Group, Ana Miranda Paz, on certain remarks made by the previous speaker, Rihards Kols, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Hannah Neumann, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Lynn Boylan, on behalf of The Left Group, Petras Gražulis, on behalf of the ESN Group, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Hana Jalloul Muro, António Tânger Corrêa, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Urmas Paet, Villy Søvndal, João Oliveira, who also answered a blue-card question from Ana Miranda Paz, Alexander Sell, Nikolaos Anadiotis, Hildegard Bentele, Francisco Assis, György Hölvényi, Marion Maréchal, Irena Joveva and Martin Schirdewan.

    IN THE CHAIR: Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Ruth Firmenich, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Lucia Annunziata, Cristian Terheş, Abir Al-Sahlani, Elena Yoncheva, Andrey Kovatchev, Evin Incir, Emmanouil Fragkos, Billy Kelleher, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Wouter Beke, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte and Reinhold Lopatka.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ana Miranda Paz, Marc Botenga and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.

    The following spoke: Dubravka Šuica and Adam Szłapka.

    The debate closed.


    13. Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (2025/2553(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Dubravka Šuica (Member of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: Ingeborg Ter Laak, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, Thierry Mariani, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alberico Gambino, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sara Matthieu, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, Petras Gražulis, on behalf of the ESN Group, Wouter Beke, Francisco Assis, György Hölvényi, Charles Goerens, Majdouline Sbai, Marcin Sypniewski, Lukas Mandl, Laura Ballarín Cereza, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Saskia Bricmont, Hildegard Bentele, Murielle Laurent, Yvan Verougstraete, Giorgio Gori and Udo Bullmann, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

    The following spoke: Dubravka Šuica and Adam Szłapka.

    The following spoke: Hilde Vautmans, again on the subject of the debate.

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate: minutes of 13.2.2025, item I.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 13 February 2025.


    14. Welcome

    On behalf of Parliament, the President welcomed a delegation from the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, who had taken a seat in the distinguished visitors’ gallery.


    15. Political crisis in Serbia (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Political crisis in Serbia (2025/2554(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) made the statement on behalf of the Council.

    IN THE CHAIR: Katarina BARLEY
    Vice-President

    Marta Kos (Member of the Commission) made the statement on behalf of the Commission.

    The following spoke: Davor Ivo Stier, on behalf of the PPE Group, Tonino Picula, on behalf of the S&D Group, Annamária Vicsek, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alessandro Ciriani, on behalf of the ECR Group, Helmut Brandstätter, on behalf of the Renew Group, Vladimir Prebilič, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Konstantinos Arvanitis, on behalf of The Left Group, Petr Bystron, on behalf of the ESN Group, Loucas Fourlas, Alessandra Moretti, Thierry Mariani, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Eugen Tomac, Gordan Bosanac, Kostas Papadakis, Reinhold Lopatka, Thijs Reuten, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Rasmus Nordqvist, Zoltán Tarr, Matjaž Nemec, Irena Joveva (The President explained how the interpreting system worked), Matej Tonin, Andreas Schieder, Dan Barna and Tomislav Sokol.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Seán Kelly, Nikos Papandreou, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Lukas Sieper and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.

    The following spoke: Marta Kos and Adam Szłapka.

    The debate closed.


    16. US AI chip export restrictions: a challenge to European AI development and economic resilience (debate)

    Question for oral answer O-000001/2025 by Borys Budka, on behalf of the ITRE Committee, to the Commission: US AI chip export restrictions: a challenge to European AI development and economic resilience (B10-0002/2025) (2025/2539(RSP))

    Borys Budka moved the question.

    Henna Virkkunen (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) answered the question.

    The following spoke: Wouter Beke, on behalf of the PPE Group, Matthias Ecke, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kris Van Dijck, on behalf of the ECR Group, Bart Groothuis, on behalf of the Renew Group, András László, on behalf of the PfE Group, Virginijus Sinkevičius, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Dario Tamburrano, on behalf of The Left Group, Eszter Lakos, who also answered a blue-card question from András László, Lina Gálvez and Barbara Bonte.

    IN THE CHAIR: Ewa KOPACZ
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Francesco Torselli, Michał Kobosko, Alexandra Geese, Aura Salla, Maria Grapini, Paulius Saudargas, Elisabeth Grossmann, Mirosława Nykiel, Brando Benifei, Paulo Cunha and Oliver Schenk.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Kamila Gasiuk-Pihowicz, Marc Botenga, Kateřina Konečná, Seán Kelly and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Henna Virkkunen.

    The debate closed.


    17. Protecting the system of international justice and its institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice (debate)

    Council and Commission statements: Protecting the system of international justice and its institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice (2025/2555(RSP))

    Adam Szłapka (President-in-Office of the Council) and Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statements.

    The following spoke: Alice Teodorescu Måwe, on behalf of the PPE Group, Francisco Assis, on behalf of the S&D Group, András László, on behalf of the PfE Group, Małgorzata Gosiewska, on behalf of the ECR Group, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mounir Satouri, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Mimmo Lucano, on behalf of The Left Group, Hana Jalloul Muro, Alessandro Ciriani, who also answered a blue-card question from Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Catarina Vieira, Gaetano Pedulla’, Brando Benifei, Jaume Asens Llodrà, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Rima Hassan (the President reminded the speaker of the rules on conduct), Chloé Ridel, Benedetta Scuderi, Alessandro Zan and Ana Miranda Paz.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Billy Kelleher, Tineke Strik, João Oliveira, Lukas Sieper and Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath and Adam Szłapka.

    The following spoke: Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, concerning the last intervention by the Council (the President gave explanations).

    The debate closed.


    18. Explanations of vote

    Written explanations of vote

    Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.


    19. Agenda of the next sitting

    The next sitting would be held the following day, 12 February 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.


    20. Approval of the minutes of the sitting

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.


    21. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 20:52.


    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Alexandraki Galato, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Annunziata Lucia, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Adrian-Dragoş, Benifei Brando, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Bentele Hildegard, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Boylan Lynn, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Bryłka Anna, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Bullmann Udo, Burkhardt Delara, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bystron Petr, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Cârciu Gheorghe, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Deutsch Tamás, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcă Gheorghe, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Firea Gabriela, Firmenich Ruth, Fita Claire, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Friis Sigrid, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Gál Kinga, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glück Andreas, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Gregorová Markéta, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Hadjipantela Michalis, Hahn Svenja, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Hazekamp Anja, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hohlmeier Monika, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaliňák Erik, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kemp Martine, Kennes Rudi, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovatchev Andrey, Krah Maximilian, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulja András Tivadar, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Latinopoulou Afroditi, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Lucano Mimmo, Luena César, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Maréchal Marion, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Marquardt Erik, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meimarakis Vangelis, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Milazzo Giuseppe, Minchev Nikola, Miranda Paz Ana, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mureşan Siegfried, Nagyová Jana, Nardella Dario, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Nica Dan, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolaou-Alavanos Lefteris, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Ohisalo Maria, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Panayiotou Fidias, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Patriciello Aldo, Paulus Jutta, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Pérez Alvise, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picierno Pina, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Pokorná Jermanová Jaroslava, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Razza Ruggero, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Ridel Chloé, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sidl Günther, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Sieper Lukas, Simon Sven, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sippel Birgit, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Ştefănuță Nicolae, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strack-Zimmermann Marie-Agnes, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarczyński Dominik, Tarquinio Marco, Tarr Zoltán, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomac Eugen, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Turek Filip, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, van den Berg Brigitte, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vešligaj Marko, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiesner Emma, Wiezik Michal, Wilmès Sophie, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yoncheva Elena, Zacharia Maria, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana, Zver Milan

    Excused:

    Andrews Barry, Di Rupo Elio, Strada Cecilia, Temido Marta

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU external borders: Irregular border crossings fall 22% in January

    Source: Frontex

    The number of irregular border crossings into the European Union fell to just over 13 400 in January, marking a 22% decrease compared to the same month last year.

    Despite this overall decline, the Central Mediterranean route saw an increase in activity, although the increase also highlights the very low figure a year ago.

    Despite a 34% decline from a year ago, the Western African remained the most active migratory route with 4 740 of arrivals in the first month of 2025. The largest share of the irregular migrants came from Mali, Morocco and Guinea.

    In January, the Eastern Mediterranean was the second most active route for arrivals in the European Union, with almost 3 500 arrivals. Yet it recorded a 21% decrease in detections compared to the same month last year.

    The Central Mediterranean route saw the biggest rise in arrivals of 43% (year-on-year) to 3 275.

    The sea crossings, usually orchestrated by organised criminal networks, continue to pose an extreme danger to migrants. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 93 people lost their lives at sea in January. In all of last year, this figure reached 2 300, underscoring the tragic human cost of these hazardous routes.

    On the Channel route, the number of detections of people seeking to cross into the United Kingdom fell by more than a fifth from a year ago to slightly above 2 500.

    The latest data reflect shifting migration trends compared to last year. As authorities work to address these evolving challenges, monitoring and cooperation remain key in managing Europe’s external borders.

    With 2 700 officers and staff deployed along the EU external borders, Frontex supports the national authorities with their efforts to safeguard the European borders.

    * Note: The preliminary data presented in this statement refer to the number of detections of irregular border crossing at the external borders of the European Union. The same person may cross the border several times in different locations at the external border.

    MIL OSI Europe News –