Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Economics: AlUla Conference for Emerging Market Economies

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    The AlUla Conference for Emerging Market Economies is an annual economic policy conference, held in AlUla, Saudi Arabia, organized by the Ministry of Finance of Saudi Arabia and the IMF Regional Office in Riyadh. The conference will convene a select group of emerging markets’ ministers of finance, central bank governors, and policymakers, as well as public and private sector leaders, international institutions, and academia. It will offer a unique platform to exchange views on domestic, regional, and global economic developments and discuss policies and reforms to spur inclusive prosperity and build resilience supported by strong international cooperation.

    The sessions with an asterisk (*) will be streamed live on this page.

    Agenda

    Day 1: February 16, 2025

    09:30-09:40 – Opening remarks by H.E. Mohammed Al-Jadaan (Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia) and Kristalina Georgieva (Managing Director, IMF) *

    09:40-10:00 – Keynote Lecture: Emerging Markets Amid Structural Shifts in the World Economy

    The keynote address will discuss global trends and their potential implications for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), as well as the role of international cooperation.

    • Keynote Address: H.E. Pan Gongsheng (Governor, PBOC)

    10:00-10:50 – Emerging Markets: Policy Challenges Amid Structural Shifts in the World Economy

    The panel will delve into EMDEs’ policy challenges in the context of the rising uncertainty and the changing global economic landscape. Specifically, it will cover the implications for EMDEs of (i) more frequent external shocks; (ii) elevated uncertainty; and (iii) structural challenges in the context of high debt, weak growth, energy transitions, and new technologies.

    • Moderator: Jihad Azour (Director, Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF)

    Panelists:

    • H.E. Olayemi Cardoso (Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria)
    • José De Gregorio (Dean, School of Economics and Business, University of Chile)
    • H.E. Ali bin Ahmed Al Kuwari (Minister of Finance, Qatar)
    • Jin Liqun (President, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)

    10:50-11:10 – Coffee break

    11:10-12:10 – High Debt-Low Fiscal Space—Fiscal Consolidation and Multilateral Solutions to Debt Restructuring

    Maintaining or restoring debt sustainability in EMDEs is a challenging task in the context of elevated debt, higher interest rate and weak potential growth, as well as significant spending pressures (e.g., related to sustainable development goals, defense, energy transitions, and economic diversification). The panelists will discuss the pace of the ongoing pivot towards fiscal consolidation and ways to garner support for politically difficult reforms. Potential debt restructuring mechanisms from both creditor and debtor perspectives will also be highlighted.

    • Moderator: Ryadh Alkhareif (IMFC Deputy, Saudi Arabia)

    Panelists:

    • H.E. Mohammed Al-Jadaan (Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia)
    • Mauricio Cárdenas (Professor, Columbia University, former Minister of Finance, Colombia)
    • H.E. Situmbeko Musokotwane (Minister of Finance and National Planning, Zambia)
    • H.E. Anton Siluanov (Minister of Finance, Russia)

    12:10-13:00 – Lunch

    13:00-14:00 – Monetary Policy and Capital Flows Amid Elevated Uncertainty

    The session will discuss the path of future monetary policy in EMDEs, considering the spillovers from monetary policy in advanced economies and potential swings in global market sentiment, as well as the uncertainty around the implications for inflation, the neutral rate, and capital flows of the changing economic landscape.

    • Moderator: Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (Economic Counsellor, Director of the Research Department, IMF)
    • Author: Hélène Rey (Professor, London Business School)

    Discussants:

    • H.E. Fatih Karahan (Governor, Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye)
    • H.E. Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput (Governor, Bank of Thailand)

    14:00-15:00 – Resilience of the Financial System in Emerging Markets

    The panel will focus on the implications of the changing global landscape for financial stability in emerging markets, as well as the policy priorities.

    • Moderator: Tobias Adrian (Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF)

    Panelists:

    • H.E. Ayman Mohammad Al-Sayari (Governor, SAMA)
    • H.E. Sheikh Bandar bin Mohammed bin Saoud Al Thani (Governor, Qatar Central Bank)
    • H.E. Taleh Kazimov (Governor, Central Bank of Azerbaijan)
    • H.E. Andriy Pyshnyi (Governor, National Bank of Ukraine)

    19:30-21:30 – Dinner hosted by the Ministry of Finance of Saudi Arabia

    Day 2: February 17, 2025

    09:00-10:00 – Navigating Trade Tensions and Uncertainties

    Against the backdrop of mounting risks and uncertainty, the session will discuss (i) how geoeconomic fragmentation and geopolitical risks are affecting trade and investment globally and in EMDEs; (ii) how EMDEs can adapt to these developments and mitigate risks; (iii) what policies to enhance trade and investment flows; and (iv) what changes to the current global trade system to respond to EMDEs’ needs.

    • Moderator: Indermit Gill (Chief Economist, World Bank Group)

    Panelists:

    • H. E. Adebayo Olawale Edun (Minister of Finance, Nigeria)
    • H.E. Nadia Fettah (Minister of Economy and Finance, Morocco)
    • H.E. Sergii Marchenko (Minister of Finance, Ukraine)

    10:00-11:00 – Productivity in EMDEs: Challenges and Opportunities

    Compared with the pre-pandemic period, the medium-term growth outlook has worsened significantly, including in EMDEs. The projected slowdown jeopardizes income convergence and could also lead to widening income inequality within countries. Against this backdrop, the session will take stock of EMDEs’ growth outlook, including the main headwinds, and discuss the potential challenges and opportunities from shifts in the economic landscape (e.g., AI).

    • Moderator: H.E. Muhammad Al Jasser (President, Islamic Development Bank)
    • Author: Leslie Teo (Director, AI Products, AI Singapore; Former chief economist and head of investment strategy, GIC Singapore)

    Discussants:

    • H.E. Faisal F. Alibrahim (Minister of Economy and Planning, Saudi Arabia)
    • Santiago Levy (Senior Fellow, Brookings)
    • H.E. Federico Sturzenegger (Minister of Deregulation and State Transformation, Argentina)

    11:00-11:20 – Coffee break

    11:20-12:20 – Closing Panel: A Path for Emerging Market Resilience *

    The concluding panel will focus on (i) how EMDEs should deal with shocks in the short term, taking into consideration the persistence of some global shocks; (ii) identifying the main trade-offs for fiscal and monetary policymakers to build resilience, maintain stability and spur growth (“rise strong”); and (iii) how the underlying concerns behind “anti-globalization” pressures can be addressed to revitalize global economic integration.

    • Moderator: Kristalina Georgieva (Managing Director, IMF)

    Panelists:

    • H.E. Muhammad Aurangzeb (Minister of Finance, Pakistan)
    • H.E. Rania Al-Mashat (Minister of Planning, Development, International Cooperation, Egypt)
    • H.E. Fernando Haddad (Minister of Finance, Brazil)
    • H.E. Mehmet Şimşek (Minister of Finance, Türkiye)
    • H.E. Hon. John Mbadi Ng’ongo (Minister of Finance, Kenya)

    12:20-12:40 – Closing remarks by H.E. Mohammed Al-Jadaan (Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia) and Kristalina Georgieva (Managing Director, IMF) *

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: Living with multiple chronic conditions cuts lives short – but Africans are overlooked in research

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Isaac Kisiangani, Researcher and PhD student, African Population and Health Research Center

    When a person suffers from two or more long-term health conditions at the same time this is known as multimorbidity.

    The World Health Organization says multimorbidity puts patients at greater risk and complicates primary care. It also drives up healthcare costs.

    People with more than one condition face a higher risk of early death and poorer quality of life. They may also have to take multiple medications. Polypharmacy increases the risk of harmful drug interactions and side effects, and patients find it harder to stick to treatment.

    In African countries the situation is further complicated by several disease burdens converging. Individuals may suffer non-communicable diseases like hypertension and diabetes, as well as from infectious diseases like HIV and tuberculosis.

    Poverty and unequal access to healthcare add to the impact of multimorbidity.

    Most research on multimorbidity has focused on populations of European ancestry. When people of African descent are included, the focus is often on African-Americans. This group does not represent the diversity or health challenges faced in Africa.

    As specialists in genetic epidemiology and chronic diseases management, we set out to research the gaps in understanding multimorbidity among people with African ancestry.

    Identifying gaps

    We examined 232 medical research publications (published from 2010 to June 2022), and included those published in English and French. That’s not a lot if one considers all the different health challenges that people of African descent suffer globally.

    Of these studies, 113 focused on continental African populations and 100 on the diaspora. Nineteen included both groups.

    Our review spanned five major academic databases. We used search terms such as “multimorbidity”, “comorbidity” and “African population”. Restricting searches to titles and abstracts and relying on texts that our institutions could access may have excluded some studies.

    Heart diseases dominate

    Cardiometabolic diseases, including hypertension, heart disease and diabetes, were the most studied conditions in both populations (those in Africa and those elsewhere).

    But notable differences emerged.

    In populations on the continent, cardiometabolic diseases tended to occur along with chronic infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis.

    In diaspora populations, cardiometabolic diseases more commonly occurred along with other non-communicable diseases and psychiatric conditions such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.

    Age, sex, poverty

    As with all populations worldwide, older people in the studies we reviewed were the group most likely to have more than one health condition.

    But on the continent, the burden of infectious diseases meant younger adults were also at risk of having more than one illness.

    Women were more likely than men to have multiple conditions, particularly in relation to conditions such as hypertension and diabetes. This likely reflects both biological factors, such as hormonal differences, and social influences like income inequalities and differences in working environments.

    Individuals with lower socioeconomic status (which often means women) would be more likely to be exposed to unhealthy lifestyles, and to have less access to preventive care.

    What can be done?

    Our review found that the way health conditions combine differs between people of African descent outside Africa and those on the continent. This means medical research should include a greater diversity of participants.

    Expanded data collection should include genetic and metabolomic data.

    It is also essential to study a wider range of chronic conditions.

    The increasing co-existence of conditions means that treatment for cardiovascular, metabolic and infectious diseases should be integrated.

    Some African countries, including South Africa and Kenya, have already introduced integrated care, with encouraging results. A patient with two or more diseases is offered treatment for the conditions at the same facility during the same visit.

    Michele Ramsay receives funding from the National Research Foundation (RSA), National Institutes of Health (USA) and Wellcome (UK). She serves on the WHO TAG-G committee.

    Isaac Kisiangani and Michelle Kamp do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Living with multiple chronic conditions cuts lives short – but Africans are overlooked in research – https://theconversation.com/living-with-multiple-chronic-conditions-cuts-lives-short-but-africans-are-overlooked-in-research-241627

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: South Africa’s history uncovered: the 1,000-year gap they don’t teach in school

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Peter Delius, Professor emeritus, University of the Witwatersrand

    Were you told that gold mining in southern Africa started after 1852? Or that the export of iron, steel, copper and gold began in the late 19th century? Or that South Africa became integrated into a global trading system only after 1652? Or that the first powerful state in South Africa was the Zulu kingdom?

    If you learned that any of these things were true, you are like most South Africans, who have missed out on at least a thousand years of the country’s history.

    Both radical and conservative historians have focused heavily on colonial history, a story starting at the Cape and playing out within colonial boundaries. As a result, South Africa’s past has been compressed into a shortened timeline and a limited geography. That shorter version is what’s taught at schools and universities.

    If we abandon 1652 – when the first Dutch settlers arrived in the Cape – as the key historical starting point, and go back a thousand years and cast our gaze 2,000km north of Table Mountain, a very different story unfolds.

    Our research is attempting to rethink South African history. As many years of work in the interior show, along with our new focus on a central southern African trading landscape, Thulamela, the formative steps in South Africa’s history began here, along the Limpopo River.

    Early cooperative relationships

    Two thousand years ago, San hunter gatherers were the primary occupants of the region around the Limpopo River valley, an area around the confluence of the Limpopo and Shashe rivers that includes Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Contrary to popular opinion, these groups weren’t living in isolated bands. They were connected through regional networks of exchange spanning hundreds, even thousands, of kilometres.

    At this time, South Africa was on the brink of fundamental change. From about 350 AD, Bantu-speaking, iron-using, livestock-owning farmers began to settle the Soutpansberg, south of the Limpopo River. They initially established mainly cooperative relationships with the San, especially in hunting and trading.




    Read more:
    Archaeology shows how hunter-gatherers fitted into southern Africa’s first city, 800 years ago


    These farmers introduced a key innovation into the region – the production of metal tools, weapons, currency and jewellery. These goods were for their own use and for expanding trade networks.

    At the start, iron was the most important metal but over time, copper and gold became more and more significant. The farmers were skilled in locating and extracting these ores, which, in the case of gold and copper, often involved shaft mining. Metal production also demanded pyrotechnical knowledge to smelt ores and to fashion metals into functional and decorative forms.

    Local trade, global connections

    Another crucial development took place in the 7th century AD. The Indian Ocean world connected to the expanding regional trade networks which had linked the coast and the interior. The transoceanic sailors and traders were initially motivated by the growing demand for ivory in Asia and the Middle East.




    Read more:
    South Africa risks losing rich insights into an ancient farming society


    This external demand brought exotic glass beads and cloth deep into the interior, through African traders and rulers. A node in the system was Chibuene, a large coastal trading settlement on the Mozambican coast near modern Vilanculos. From here, beads and cloth travelled south, to the vicinity of Durban in modern-day KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, and across the interior, past the Okavango delta to places such as the Tsodilo hills west of the delta’s panhandle in Botswana.

    Between the 10th and 15th centuries, the market for gold boomed – especially in Egypt, Persia, India and China. Southern Africa played an important role in meeting this demand because of the rich gold reserves of the Zimbabwe plateau and the adjacent region of the Limpopo valley.

    So, it is clear that an economic and mineral revolution took place long before Europeans settled South Africa’s Cape. Colonial processes of globalisation and the mineral revolution in the 19th century trailed far in the wake of African involvement in the vast Indian Ocean economy through their hunting, mining, smelting and artisanal skills.

    Rise of states

    Indian Ocean trade contributed to major transformations in the interior. The wealth it generated led to social stratification and the emergence of a distinct ruling class. Leaders’ economic, political and spiritual power intensified. These processes found expression in the establishment in 1220 of Mapungubwe, in the middle Limpopo Valley, and the first state in southern Africa.




    Read more:
    New book on Mapungubwe Archive contests history of South African world heritage site


    Over the centuries that followed, linked but shifting patterns of demand gave rise to major states like Great Zimbabwe, Thulamela, and later the Venda Kingdom, the Pedi Kingdom and the Zulu Kingdom.

    The little-known trading state, Thulamela, was located in the north of what’s now the Kruger Park. From 1250 to 1650 it was a key node of production and exchange. But for many decades the site was ignored. When intensive research finally started in the 1990s it made very limited progress in revealing the form and nature of the state. But renewed and interdisciplinary research at the site and surrounding areas has already produced new insights into the history of Thulamela and promises to generate many more in the near future.

    New windows to a past

    Given this deep history of powerful kingdoms connected by an underlying but dynamic economic system, we have to let go of the idea that the Zulu Kingdom, which formed in the early 19th century, was the first powerful state in what was to become South Africa. In fact, it was a relatively recent example of much deeper and wider transformations.

    It was only in the 19th century that expanding colonial capitalism and settlement fuelled by the “second” mineral revolution penetrated the interior and encountered its kingdoms and trading opportunities.

    The interaction between the two worlds culminated in a hard-fought struggle over trade, land and labour. While the African kingdoms were ultimately defeated and traders and craftsmen were displaced, their impact on the shape and nature of South African society is still felt today.

    A challenge to historians now is to deepen our understanding of this missing millennium, and of pre-colonial transformations.

    Researchers need to pay greater attention to a wider range of documentary sources (beyond those in English) and to oral traditions. Collaboration with scholars working on archaeology, historical linguistics and genetics will also tell us more about the forces that have shaped our present.

    Linell Chewins received funding from the National Research Foundation for her Masters.

    Tim Forssman receives funding from the National Research Foundation.

    Peter Delius does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. South Africa’s history uncovered: the 1,000-year gap they don’t teach in school – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-history-uncovered-the-1-000-year-gap-they-dont-teach-in-school-248244

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Online romance scams: who Nigeria and Ghana’s fraudsters are, how they operate, and why they do it

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Suleman Lazarus, Visiting Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science

    People find love in many ways and through diverse mediums. Online platforms have become popular meeting places for people looking to find intimate partners, making them a prime target for cybercriminals.

    Online romance fraud has become a global phenomenon. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the US, romance scams accounted for losses to about 24,000 Americans, exceeding US$1 billion, in 2022.

    On the African continent, Nigeria and Ghana have emerged as hubs for internet fraud. The “Yahoo Boys” operating in Nigeria and “Sakawa Boys” in Ghana have a reputation for engaging in various fraudulent schemes, including online romance scams.

    Over the past decade, I have researched cybercrime and criminology, focusing on west African online fraudsters. Coverage of romance scams often centres on victim narratives or sensational headlines, leaving offender-focused research largely unexplored.

    In a recent paper, I studied the cases of 50 people convicted of online romance in Nigeria. A separate research study I spearheaded involved interviews with active offenders in Ghana. Rather than relying solely on fragmented media accounts, the two research papers offer a robust, evidence-based understanding of the cultural, economic and historical factors driving cybercriminal behaviour.

    My findings from both papers show that romance fraud offenders frequently present themselves as white and primarily target western societies. In framing fraud as a way to reclaim wealth they believed was unjustly taken during colonial rule, many saw their actions as a civic duty. In the case file study on Nigerian fraudsters, I found that many were driven by “socioeconomic needs”.

    My findings provide insights into offenders’ tactics and motivations. This could be useful for law enforcement officials developing targeted interventions, and for policymakers wanting to frame informed strategies.

    Who, where, how and why

    This article uses “scam” and “fraud”, as well as “scammers” and “fraudsters”, interchangeably. The media, financial institutions, and the public typically use “scams” and “scammers”. Academics often prefer “fraud” and “fraudsters” to emphasise the seriousness of these crimes, as noted in my research.

    I examined case files of 50 individuals convicted of romance fraud in Nigeria following prosecutions by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. In a separate study I conducted interviews with active romance fraud offenders in Ghana.

    My decision to focus on Nigeria and Ghana was based on findings in research done earlier. For example, I co-authored a paper that reviewed 21 years of empirical studies (2000–2021) in which we found that many west African scammers predominantly targeted individuals in the west. Another research study I spearheaded showed how songs by Nigerian artists glamorised the actions of scammers and highlighted their preference for western victims.




    Read more:
    What Nigerian hip-hop lyrics have to say about the country’s Yahoo Boys


    Similarly, the Nigeria case file study found that over half of the romance scam victims (56%) were in the US. My interviews with offenders in Ghana further showed that romance scammers viewed their actions as “legitimate retribution for colonial injustice”. These scammers operate within a historical framework in which colonial subjugation narratives influence their motivations and societal attitudes toward cybercrime.

    Profile of an online fraudster

    The analysis of the case files of the 50 convicted romance scammers showed patterns in offender profiles and strategies. Most were young – 81.7% were under 26. Nearly 60% preferred Apple’s iPhone for their fraudulent schemes. When it came to occupation, 74% were university students.

    Offenders carefully constructed their online personas. Nearly half (46%) posed as white American males, 12% as military personnel, and 10% as white European males.

    The victims they chose were mostly women: 70% of offenders primarily targeted females, 14% targeted males, 10% targeted both genders and 6% did not specify the victim’s gender.

    Facebook was the most commonly used platform, appearing in 46% of the Nigerian cases.

    Some of the Ghanaian scammers said they saw their crimes as acts of service to a greater cause. This included loyalty to their communities or the pursuit of economic justice. They portrayed their scams as efforts to reclaim wealth from nations historically exploiting their regions.

    Policymakers and law enforcement agencies can use these findings to develop more effective prevention strategies and intervention measures.

    Suleman Lazarus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Online romance scams: who Nigeria and Ghana’s fraudsters are, how they operate, and why they do it – https://theconversation.com/online-romance-scams-who-nigeria-and-ghanas-fraudsters-are-how-they-operate-and-why-they-do-it-247916

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How narrow views of romance inform which marriages are seen as legitimate

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jennifer A. Selby, Professor, Religious Studies and Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland

    Legislation and scrutiny of ‘fraudulent marriage’ subtly position romance as a proxy to assess narrow liberal ideals. (Shutterstock)

    Valentine’s Day is sold to us as a moment to celebrate romance: we should buy cards, roses and chocolates. Go for fancy, dimly lit dinners with our significant others. Make loving declarations.

    Romance can enhance our lives. Studies have shown the benefits of romance, from companionship to improving our physical, sexual and mental health.

    However, romance can also be mobilized to judge and surveil relationships, and determine which are valid and which are not. Numerous countries, including Canada, have laws against what they deem as fraudulent marriages.
    To consider the impact of these laws, and to study the colonial legacies within them, I conducted a study of the marriage (and for many, migration) experiences of people of Algerian origin in three contexts: Ghazaouet and Tizi Ouzou in Algeria, a Parisian suburb called Petit-Nanterre and in Montréal from 2011 to 2019. My findings drew on almost 200 personal interviews focused on the marriage partner preferences and ceremonies of my participants.

    I was particularly interested in a comparison between France and Canada, where monitoring romance has served as a way to gauge the sincerity of marriages among migrants for whom citizenship is at stake.

    Laws targeting fraudulent marriage

    In an effort to curb a seeming rise in fraudulent marriages in immigration family sponsorship requests, governments in France and Canada introduced legislation in the 2000s to promote greater surveillance of and penalties for marriage fraud.

    In France, this began in 2008 with a law to curb “love fraud with a migratory aim.” Passed in the same year, Canada’s law centred on impeding “bad faith” marriages.

    Such legislation often comes with penalties. In France, if one is found guilty of being party to a fraudulent marriage, the penalty can be annulment, five to 10 years in prison, fines or deportation. The impetus for such laws is the unquantified sense that a growing number of foreign nationals take advantage of family unification immigration pathways through disingenuous relationships.

    The state’s involvement in France is more acute because the burden of assessment falls primarily on marriage officiants and immigration officers. Civil marriages there must take place in a municipal office and prior to a religious marriage.

    A 2010 directive to French marriage officiants is especially revelatory of this surveillance. Evidence of financial and sexual intimacies act as evidence of a sincere marriage. Romance is seen as a reflection of a spontaneous and uncalculated relationship.

    Of course, there is no evidence that expressions of romance in an early marriage are signs of success; divorce occurs for almost half of marrying couples, whether couples are transnational or not. Figures in Canada indicate a slightly higher divorce rate than in France.

    In Montréal, one can be married outside of a municipal office. Still, my participants in that city shared similar stories of pressures to perform specific sexual politics in the presence of state officials.

    One man whose wife wore a hijab was interrogated by first responders about the husband’s involvement when she fainted, while pregnant, outside a grocery store. Bewildered by the situation, he answered their questions about whether theirs was a forced marriage (it was not). In retrospect, he said he would have declined this line of questioning and focused their attention on his wife.

    Arranged marriages

    One of my notable findings is that many marriages in my sample were quasi-arranged — organized with the assistance of family members (often mothers). Yet, these types of marriages often fall outside idealized ideas of romance, rendering these couples more vulnerable to being accused of fraud.

    I also found that potential scrutiny from immigration officials did not impede interest in a transnational marriage partner. Many of my interviewees liked the idea of a partner of the same religion or culture, and who spoke Arabic or Tamazight. In addition, for many, a cosmopolitan transnational life linking Algeria with France or Québec was appealing.

    Depending on their gender, social class, religiosity, families and personalities, individuals grapple with these politics differently. The social contexts of a Parisian suburb and Montréal further shaped a participant’s sense of longing and belonging. Fewer Algerian women in Montréal were interested in such arrangements. Invariably, however, individuals of Algerian origin in both contexts knew that transnational unions were highly scrutinized.

    Despite the attention granted to curbing marriage fraud, the data suggest that few marriages are annulled. The spectre of this surveillance is greater than its enforcement.

    Unfairly penalizing migrants

    Legislation and scrutiny of marriages seen as fraudulent subtly position romance as a proxy to assess narrow liberal ideals. Some scholars have called this phenomenon a push for a “sexual democracy,” where women’s bodies are subtly expected to remain visible and sexually available as signs of their putative equality.

    Perhaps unexpectedly, niqab bans in both France and Québec further reflect these values. Full-face veils are, tellingly, depicted as lacking sexual agency and individualism, and impeding a cisgender woman’s ability to attract men.

    Narrow views of what kind of romance should be legitimized and celebrated are not limited to governments. Such views also manifest in consumer culture and in the wedding industry, and are desired and performed by many of us, including among my research participants in arranged marriages. Romance’s pervasiveness, desirability and seeming spontaneity mask its politics.

    As we enjoy romantic gestures on Valentine’s Day, we should also consider the cultural specificity of these tropes and their potentially exclusionary politics in determining whose relationships are deemed legitimate. Entrenchments of patriarchal chivalry, monogamy, consumerism and narrow gender roles can run in tandem.

    Jennifer A. Selby receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    ref. How narrow views of romance inform which marriages are seen as legitimate – https://theconversation.com/how-narrow-views-of-romance-inform-which-marriages-are-seen-as-legitimate-247085

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Living with multiple chronic conditions cuts lives short – but Africans are overlooked in research

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Isaac Kisiangani, Researcher and PhD student, African Population and Health Research Center

    When a person suffers from two or more long-term health conditions at the same time this is known as multimorbidity.

    The World Health Organization says multimorbidity puts patients at greater risk and complicates primary care. It also drives up healthcare costs.

    People with more than one condition face a higher risk of early death and poorer quality of life. They may also have to take multiple medications. Polypharmacy increases the risk of harmful drug interactions and side effects, and patients find it harder to stick to treatment.

    In African countries the situation is further complicated by several disease burdens converging. Individuals may suffer non-communicable diseases like hypertension and diabetes, as well as from infectious diseases like HIV and tuberculosis.

    Poverty and unequal access to healthcare add to the impact of multimorbidity.

    Most research on multimorbidity has focused on populations of European ancestry. When people of African descent are included, the focus is often on African-Americans. This group does not represent the diversity or health challenges faced in Africa.

    As specialists in genetic epidemiology and chronic diseases management, we set out to research the gaps in understanding multimorbidity among people with African ancestry.

    Identifying gaps

    We examined 232 medical research publications (published from 2010 to June 2022), and included those published in English and French. That’s not a lot if one considers all the different health challenges that people of African descent suffer globally.

    Of these studies, 113 focused on continental African populations and 100 on the diaspora. Nineteen included both groups.

    Our review spanned five major academic databases. We used search terms such as “multimorbidity”, “comorbidity” and “African population”. Restricting searches to titles and abstracts and relying on texts that our institutions could access may have excluded some studies.

    Heart diseases dominate

    Cardiometabolic diseases, including hypertension, heart disease and diabetes, were the most studied conditions in both populations (those in Africa and those elsewhere).

    But notable differences emerged.

    In populations on the continent, cardiometabolic diseases tended to occur along with chronic infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis.

    In diaspora populations, cardiometabolic diseases more commonly occurred along with other non-communicable diseases and psychiatric conditions such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.

    Age, sex, poverty

    As with all populations worldwide, older people in the studies we reviewed were the group most likely to have more than one health condition.

    But on the continent, the burden of infectious diseases meant younger adults were also at risk of having more than one illness.

    Women were more likely than men to have multiple conditions, particularly in relation to conditions such as hypertension and diabetes. This likely reflects both biological factors, such as hormonal differences, and social influences like income inequalities and differences in working environments.

    Individuals with lower socioeconomic status (which often means women) would be more likely to be exposed to unhealthy lifestyles, and to have less access to preventive care.

    What can be done?

    Our review found that the way health conditions combine differs between people of African descent outside Africa and those on the continent. This means medical research should include a greater diversity of participants.

    Expanded data collection should include genetic and metabolomic data.

    It is also essential to study a wider range of chronic conditions.

    The increasing co-existence of conditions means that treatment for cardiovascular, metabolic and infectious diseases should be integrated.

    Some African countries, including South Africa and Kenya, have already introduced integrated care, with encouraging results. A patient with two or more diseases is offered treatment for the conditions at the same facility during the same visit.

    – Living with multiple chronic conditions cuts lives short – but Africans are overlooked in research
    – https://theconversation.com/living-with-multiple-chronic-conditions-cuts-lives-short-but-africans-are-overlooked-in-research-241627

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: South Africa’s history uncovered: the 1,000-year gap they don’t teach in school

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Peter Delius, Professor emeritus, University of the Witwatersrand

    Were you told that gold mining in southern Africa started after 1852? Or that the export of iron, steel, copper and gold began in the late 19th century? Or that South Africa became integrated into a global trading system only after 1652? Or that the first powerful state in South Africa was the Zulu kingdom?

    If you learned that any of these things were true, you are like most South Africans, who have missed out on at least a thousand years of the country’s history.

    Both radical and conservative historians have focused heavily on colonial history, a story starting at the Cape and playing out within colonial boundaries. As a result, South Africa’s past has been compressed into a shortened timeline and a limited geography. That shorter version is what’s taught at schools and universities.

    If we abandon 1652 – when the first Dutch settlers arrived in the Cape – as the key historical starting point, and go back a thousand years and cast our gaze 2,000km north of Table Mountain, a very different story unfolds.

    Our research is attempting to rethink South African history. As many years of work in the interior show, along with our new focus on a central southern African trading landscape, Thulamela, the formative steps in South Africa’s history began here, along the Limpopo River.

    Early cooperative relationships

    Two thousand years ago, San hunter gatherers were the primary occupants of the region around the Limpopo River valley, an area around the confluence of the Limpopo and Shashe rivers that includes Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Contrary to popular opinion, these groups weren’t living in isolated bands. They were connected through regional networks of exchange spanning hundreds, even thousands, of kilometres.

    At this time, South Africa was on the brink of fundamental change. From about 350 AD, Bantu-speaking, iron-using, livestock-owning farmers began to settle the Soutpansberg, south of the Limpopo River. They initially established mainly cooperative relationships with the San, especially in hunting and trading.


    Read more: Archaeology shows how hunter-gatherers fitted into southern Africa’s first city, 800 years ago


    These farmers introduced a key innovation into the region – the production of metal tools, weapons, currency and jewellery. These goods were for their own use and for expanding trade networks.

    A map showing some of the prominent trading sites in the East African trade network: 1: Kilwa; 2: Tsodilo Hills; 3: Khami; 4: Great Zimbabwe; 5: Initial gold reefs; 6: Chibuene; 7: Schroda, K2 and Mapungubwe; 8: Thulamela and Makahane; 9: Dzata/Venda Capital; 10: KwaGandaganda and Ndondwane (labeled from north to south). Author supplied

    At the start, iron was the most important metal but over time, copper and gold became more and more significant. The farmers were skilled in locating and extracting these ores, which, in the case of gold and copper, often involved shaft mining. Metal production also demanded pyrotechnical knowledge to smelt ores and to fashion metals into functional and decorative forms.

    Local trade, global connections

    Another crucial development took place in the 7th century AD. The Indian Ocean world connected to the expanding regional trade networks which had linked the coast and the interior. The transoceanic sailors and traders were initially motivated by the growing demand for ivory in Asia and the Middle East.


    Read more: South Africa risks losing rich insights into an ancient farming society


    This external demand brought exotic glass beads and cloth deep into the interior, through African traders and rulers. A node in the system was Chibuene, a large coastal trading settlement on the Mozambican coast near modern Vilanculos. From here, beads and cloth travelled south, to the vicinity of Durban in modern-day KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, and across the interior, past the Okavango delta to places such as the Tsodilo hills west of the delta’s panhandle in Botswana.

    An aerial view of an ancient residential enclosure in Thulamela. Author supplied.

    Between the 10th and 15th centuries, the market for gold boomed – especially in Egypt, Persia, India and China. Southern Africa played an important role in meeting this demand because of the rich gold reserves of the Zimbabwe plateau and the adjacent region of the Limpopo valley.

    So, it is clear that an economic and mineral revolution took place long before Europeans settled South Africa’s Cape. Colonial processes of globalisation and the mineral revolution in the 19th century trailed far in the wake of African involvement in the vast Indian Ocean economy through their hunting, mining, smelting and artisanal skills.

    Rise of states

    Indian Ocean trade contributed to major transformations in the interior. The wealth it generated led to social stratification and the emergence of a distinct ruling class. Leaders’ economic, political and spiritual power intensified. These processes found expression in the establishment in 1220 of Mapungubwe, in the middle Limpopo Valley, and the first state in southern Africa.


    Read more: New book on Mapungubwe Archive contests history of South African world heritage site


    Over the centuries that followed, linked but shifting patterns of demand gave rise to major states like Great Zimbabwe, Thulamela, and later the Venda Kingdom, the Pedi Kingdom and the Zulu Kingdom.

    The little-known trading state, Thulamela, was located in the north of what’s now the Kruger Park. From 1250 to 1650 it was a key node of production and exchange. But for many decades the site was ignored. When intensive research finally started in the 1990s it made very limited progress in revealing the form and nature of the state. But renewed and interdisciplinary research at the site and surrounding areas has already produced new insights into the history of Thulamela and promises to generate many more in the near future.

    New windows to a past

    Given this deep history of powerful kingdoms connected by an underlying but dynamic economic system, we have to let go of the idea that the Zulu Kingdom, which formed in the early 19th century, was the first powerful state in what was to become South Africa. In fact, it was a relatively recent example of much deeper and wider transformations.

    It was only in the 19th century that expanding colonial capitalism and settlement fuelled by the “second” mineral revolution penetrated the interior and encountered its kingdoms and trading opportunities.

    Pottery is common at Iron Age sites and their decorations are specific to groups and periods. Author supplied

    The interaction between the two worlds culminated in a hard-fought struggle over trade, land and labour. While the African kingdoms were ultimately defeated and traders and craftsmen were displaced, their impact on the shape and nature of South African society is still felt today.

    A challenge to historians now is to deepen our understanding of this missing millennium, and of pre-colonial transformations.

    Researchers need to pay greater attention to a wider range of documentary sources (beyond those in English) and to oral traditions. Collaboration with scholars working on archaeology, historical linguistics and genetics will also tell us more about the forces that have shaped our present.

    – South Africa’s history uncovered: the 1,000-year gap they don’t teach in school
    – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-history-uncovered-the-1-000-year-gap-they-dont-teach-in-school-248244

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Online romance scams: who Nigeria and Ghana’s fraudsters are, how they operate, and why they do it

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Suleman Lazarus, Visiting Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science

    People find love in many ways and through diverse mediums. Online platforms have become popular meeting places for people looking to find intimate partners, making them a prime target for cybercriminals.

    Online romance fraud has become a global phenomenon. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the US, romance scams accounted for losses to about 24,000 Americans, exceeding US$1 billion, in 2022.

    On the African continent, Nigeria and Ghana have emerged as hubs for internet fraud. The “Yahoo Boys” operating in Nigeria and “Sakawa Boys” in Ghana have a reputation for engaging in various fraudulent schemes, including online romance scams.

    Over the past decade, I have researched cybercrime and criminology, focusing on west African online fraudsters. Coverage of romance scams often centres on victim narratives or sensational headlines, leaving offender-focused research largely unexplored.

    In a recent paper, I studied the cases of 50 people convicted of online romance in Nigeria. A separate research study I spearheaded involved interviews with active offenders in Ghana. Rather than relying solely on fragmented media accounts, the two research papers offer a robust, evidence-based understanding of the cultural, economic and historical factors driving cybercriminal behaviour.

    My findings from both papers show that romance fraud offenders frequently present themselves as white and primarily target western societies. In framing fraud as a way to reclaim wealth they believed was unjustly taken during colonial rule, many saw their actions as a civic duty. In the case file study on Nigerian fraudsters, I found that many were driven by “socioeconomic needs”.

    My findings provide insights into offenders’ tactics and motivations. This could be useful for law enforcement officials developing targeted interventions, and for policymakers wanting to frame informed strategies.

    Who, where, how and why

    This article uses “scam” and “fraud”, as well as “scammers” and “fraudsters”, interchangeably. The media, financial institutions, and the public typically use “scams” and “scammers”. Academics often prefer “fraud” and “fraudsters” to emphasise the seriousness of these crimes, as noted in my research.

    I examined case files of 50 individuals convicted of romance fraud in Nigeria following prosecutions by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. In a separate study I conducted interviews with active romance fraud offenders in Ghana.

    My decision to focus on Nigeria and Ghana was based on findings in research done earlier. For example, I co-authored a paper that reviewed 21 years of empirical studies (2000–2021) in which we found that many west African scammers predominantly targeted individuals in the west. Another research study I spearheaded showed how songs by Nigerian artists glamorised the actions of scammers and highlighted their preference for western victims.


    Read more: What Nigerian hip-hop lyrics have to say about the country’s Yahoo Boys


    Similarly, the Nigeria case file study found that over half of the romance scam victims (56%) were in the US. My interviews with offenders in Ghana further showed that romance scammers viewed their actions as “legitimate retribution for colonial injustice”. These scammers operate within a historical framework in which colonial subjugation narratives influence their motivations and societal attitudes toward cybercrime.

    Profile of an online fraudster

    The analysis of the case files of the 50 convicted romance scammers showed patterns in offender profiles and strategies. Most were young – 81.7% were under 26. Nearly 60% preferred Apple’s iPhone for their fraudulent schemes. When it came to occupation, 74% were university students.

    Offenders carefully constructed their online personas. Nearly half (46%) posed as white American males, 12% as military personnel, and 10% as white European males.

    The victims they chose were mostly women: 70% of offenders primarily targeted females, 14% targeted males, 10% targeted both genders and 6% did not specify the victim’s gender.

    Facebook was the most commonly used platform, appearing in 46% of the Nigerian cases.

    Some of the Ghanaian scammers said they saw their crimes as acts of service to a greater cause. This included loyalty to their communities or the pursuit of economic justice. They portrayed their scams as efforts to reclaim wealth from nations historically exploiting their regions.

    Policymakers and law enforcement agencies can use these findings to develop more effective prevention strategies and intervention measures.

    – Online romance scams: who Nigeria and Ghana’s fraudsters are, how they operate, and why they do it
    – https://theconversation.com/online-romance-scams-who-nigeria-and-ghanas-fraudsters-are-how-they-operate-and-why-they-do-it-247916

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks at AI Action Summit [scroll down for all-English version]

    Source: United Nations – English

    strong>[Bilingual, as delivered]

    Excellences,
     
    Permettez-moi tout d’abord de remercier le Président Macron et le Premier ministre Modi d’avoir organisé ce Sommet pour l’action sur l’intelligence artificielle.
     
    Mesdames et Messieurs,
     
    Allons droit au but.
     
    Regardons le monde qui nous entoure au-delà de ceux qui sont dans cette salle.
     
    Notre réunion pose une question fondamentale sur notre rapport à l’intelligence artificielle.
     
    Sommes-nous prêts pour l’avenir ?
     
    La réponse s’impose d’elle-même.
     
    Non.
     
    Nous ne sommes peut-être même pas prêts pour le présent.
     
    En un battement de cils, l’Intelligence Artificielle a quitté l’univers de la science-fiction pour devenir une force puissante qui révolutionne notre monde.
     
    Transformant nos modes de vie, de travail et d’interaction.
     
    Alimentant des avancées majeures dans l’éducation, la santé, l’agriculture…
     
    Mais mettant également à l’épreuve nos valeurs communes et nos droits fondamentaux.
     
    Le pouvoir de l’intelligence artificielle impose d’immenses responsabilités.
     
    Aujourd’hui, ce pouvoir est entre les mains d’une poignée de personnes.  
     
    Tandis que certaines entreprises et certains pays se lancent dans une course effrénée avec des investissements sans précédent, la plupart des nations en développement se retrouvent laissées pour compte.
     
    Cette concentration grandissante des capacités en matière d’intelligence artificielle menace d’aggraver les clivages géopolitiques.
     
    Nous devons empêcher l’émergence d’un monde de “nantis” et de “démunis” de l’Intelligence Artificielle.
     
    Nous tous devons travailler ensemble pour que l’Intelligence Artificielle puissent combler le fossé entre les pays développés et les pays en développement – et non le creuser.
     
    Elle doit accélérer le développement durable – au lieu de perpétuer les inégalités.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    The United Nations offers an inclusive, transparent and effective platform for AI solidarity.
     
    And we are working to strengthen that platform.
     
    The Global Digital Compact, adopted at the Summit of the Future, established the first universal agreement on the governance of AI.
     
    It brings the world together around a shared vision:
     
    One where technology serves humanity, not the other way around.
     
    The creation of an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI will be central to translating this vision into reality.
     
    By pooling global expertise, this Scientific Panel will promote a common understanding of AI risks, benefits and capabilities, and opportunities and help bridge knowledge gaps.
     
    I urge everyone to support its creation without delay.
     
    Member States also agreed to establish a Global Dialogue on AI Governance – within the United Nations – to ensure that all countries have a voice in shaping the future of AI.
     
    Through the Global Dialogue, we can align governance efforts around the world and reinforce their interoperability; uphold human rights in AI applications and prevent misuse.
     
    The UN provides an inclusive forum for cooperation, complementing existing mechanisms such as the OECD AI Principles, G7 and the Global Partnership on AI – as well as regional efforts by the African Union, European Union, ASEAN and the Council of Europe.
     
    And I am confident that discussions at this Summit will help enrich this Dialogue.
     
    The Compact also calls for building AI capacity in developing nations.
     
    This is not only about technology diffusion.
     
    We need concerted efforts to build sustainable digital infrastructure at an unprecedented scale;
     
    Foster talent and train workforces to develop, deploy and maintain AI systems;
     
    And ultimately, empower peoples and nations to become not just users, but active participants in the AI revolution.
     
    A global AI capacity-building network, as proposed by my High-Level Advisory Body on AI, is an economic necessity and a moral imperative.
     
    Today’s launch of Current AI, a public interest partnership, is an important contribution.
     
    I will soon present a report on innovative voluntary financing models and capacity-building initiatives to help all countries harness AI as a force for good.
     
    Finally, we know that AI can be a force for climate action and energy efficiency.
     
    But we also know AI power-intensive systems are already placing an unsustainable strain on our planet.
     
    So it is crucial to design AI algorithms and infrastructures that consume less energy and integrate AI into smart grids to optimize power use.
     
    From data centres to training models, AI must run on sustainable energy so that it fuels a more sustainable future.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    I began with a question.  Let me end with a few more. 
     
    Who decides what problems AI should or should not resolve?
     
    Who benefits most from its deployment?
     
    Who bears the cost of its mistakes?
     
    These questions affect everyone – so the answers must also involve everyone.
     
    It is in all our interests for governments and technology leaders to commit to global guardrails, share best practices, and shape fair policy and business models.
     
    The whole world benefits when development banks and the philanthropic community provide catalytic funding to jumpstart capacity-building worldwide.
     
    And we all stand to gain when academia and thought leaders help us navigate through this complex landscape.
     
    AI is not standing still.
     
    Neither can we.
     
    Let us move for an AI that is shaped by all of humanity, for all of humanity.
     
    In other words, let’s make sure we are ready for the future… right now.
     
    Thank you.
     
    ***
    [all-English]
     
    Excellencies,
     
    Let me begin by thanking President Macron and Prime Minister Modi for convening this AI Action Summit.
     
    Ladies and gentlemen,
     
    Let’s get straight to the point. 
     
    Let’s look at the world around us beyond those who are in this room.
     
    This meeting poses a fundamental question about our relationship with Artificial Intelligence:  
     
    Are we ready for the future?
     
    The answer is easy.
     
    No. 
     
    We may not even be ready for the present.
     
    In what seems like the blink of an eye, AI has gone from the stuff of science fiction to a powerful force that is transforming our world.
     
    Reshaping the way we live, work, and interact.
     
    Fueling breakthroughs in education, healthcare, agriculture…
     
    But also testing our shared values and rights.
     
    The power of AI carries immense responsibilities.
     
    Today, that power sits in the hands of a few.
     
    While some companies and some countries are racing ahead with record investments, most developing nations find themselves left out in the cold.
     
    This growing concentration of AI capabilities risks deepening geopolitical divides.
     
    We must prevent a world of AI “haves” and “have-nots”.
     
    Nous tous devons travailler ensemble pour que l’Intelligence Artificielle puissent
     
    We must all work together so that artificial can bridge the gap between developed and developing countries – not widen it.
     
    It must accelerate sustainable development – not entrench inequalities.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    The United Nations offers an inclusive, transparent and effective platform for AI solidarity.
     
    And we are working to strengthen that platform.
     
    The Global Digital Compact, adopted at the Summit of the Future, established the first universal agreement on the governance of AI.
     
    It brings the world together around a shared vision:
     
    One where technology serves humanity, not the other way around.
     
    The creation of an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI will be central to translating this vision into reality.
     
    By pooling global expertise, this Scientific Panel will promote a common understanding of AI risks, benefits, opportunities and capabilities, and help bridge knowledge gaps.
     
    I urge everyone to support its creation without delay.
     
    Member States also agreed to establish a Global Dialogue on AI Governance – within the United Nations – to ensure that all countries have a voice in shaping the future of AI.
     
    Through the Global Dialogue, we can align governance efforts around the world and reinforce their interoperability; uphold human rights in AI applications and prevent misuse.
     
    The UN provides an inclusive forum for cooperation, complementing existing mechanisms such as the OECD AI Principles, G7 and the Global Partnership on AI – as well as regional efforts by the African Union, European Union, ASEAN and the Council of Europe.
     
    And I am confident that discussions at this Summit will help enrich this Dialogue.
     
    The Compact also calls for building AI capacity in developing nations.
     
    This is not only about technology diffusion.
     
    We need concerted efforts to build sustainable digital infrastructure at an unprecedented scale;
     
    Foster talent and train workforces to develop, deploy and maintain AI systems;
     
    And ultimately, empower peoples and nations to become not just users, but active participants in the AI revolution.
     
    A global AI capacity-building network, as proposed by my High-Level Advisory Body on AI, is an economic necessity and a moral imperative.
     
    Today’s launch of the AI Foundation for Public Interest is an important contribution.
     
    I will soon present a report on innovative voluntary financing models and capacity-building initiatives to help all countries harness AI as a force for good.
     
    Finally, we know that AI can be a force for climate action and energy efficiency.
     
    But we also know AI power-intensive systems are already placing an unsustainable strain on our planet.
     
    So it is crucial to design AI algorithms and infrastructures that consume less energy and integrate AI into smart grids to optimize power use.
     
    From data centres to training models, AI must run on sustainable energy so that it fuels a more sustainable future.
     
    Excellencies,
     
    I began with a question.  Let me end with a few more. 
     
    Who decides what problems AI should or should not solve?
     
    Who benefits most from its deployment?
     
    Who bears the cost of its mistakes?
     
    These questions affect everyone – so the answers must also involve everyone.
     
    It is in all our interests for governments and technology leaders to commit to global guardrails, share best practices, and shape fair policy and business models.
     
    The whole world benefits when development banks and the philanthropic community provide catalytic funding to jumpstart capacity-building worldwide.
     
    And we all stand to gain when academia and thought leaders help us navigate through this complex landscape.
     
    AI is not standing still.
     
    Neither can we.
     
    Let us move for an AI that is shaped by all of humanity, for all of humanity.
     
    In other words, let’s make sure we are ready for the future… right now.
     
    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: IOM, Partners Appeal for USD 81 Million to Assist Over One Million Migrants in Horn of Africa, Yemen, and Southern Africa

    Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM)

    11 February 2025, Nairobi –The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and 45 humanitarian and development partners are appealing for USD 81 million to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to over one million migrants — including women and children — and the communities that host them in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Republic of Tanzania, Kenya and Yemen. The funding request falls under the Migrant Response Plan for the Horn of Africa to Yemen and Southern Africa (MRP), coordinated by IOM.

    Hundreds of thousands of migrants embark each year on dangerous irregular journeys, primarily from Ethiopia and Somalia, aiming to reach Gulf nations including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia via Djibouti and Yemen. On another route, migrants travel through Kenya, Tanzania, and other Southern African nations, with the hope of reaching South Africa.

    These perilous and life-threatening journeys are largely taken by migrants who are desperately searching for work because of grinding economic hardship and poverty, and in some cases because of violence and political instability at home. Also, climate shocks and disasters are increasingly becoming a migration driver.

    “Every day, countless women, men and children face deadly risks along the Eastern and Southern migration routes in Africa,” said Amy Pope, IOM’s Director General. “Without immediate support for migrants and the communities that host them, suffering will deepen, tensions will rise, and life-saving aid will remain out of reach. The time to act is now—we must step up to protect lives, strengthen protection systems, and tackle the root causes of displacement.

    Last year 446,000 movements were tracked along the Eastern Route, 10 percent of which were by children, according to the IOM Regional Data Hub for East, Horn and Southern Africa. On the route migrants are often subject to life-threatening conditions, including starvation and dehydration. According to IOM’s Missing Migrants Project, at least 559 people lost their lives along the Eastern and Southern routes in 2024, while many more deaths are known to go unreported. Women and girls, who make up nearly a third of the tracked movements, often risk facing sexual and gender-based violence. Migrants also often face violence, exploitation, and abuse, and risk being targeted by human traffickers and arbitrary detention.

    According to MRP partners, over 1.4 million migrants and the communities that host them along these routes will need assistance this year. The needs include food, non-food items, medical care, water, sanitation and hygiene, protection, psycho-social support, along with voluntary return and reintegration support. 

    MRP partners have been responding to the needs of migrants and host communities on the routes, while working to support governments in the region, civil society and other partners to address immediate needs, and also to address the root causes of irregular migration.  But the MRP remains chronically underfunded. In 2024, an appeal for USD 112 million was launched, but it remains 80 percent underfunded.

    “Migration is a global phenomenon that requires global solutions. We must work together to create a world where migration is a choice, not a necessity, and where all migrants are treated with dignity and respect” said Dr. Abera Adeba, Executive Director, Agar Ethiopia Charitable Society.

    “Children and adolescents on the move in Eastern and Southern Africa face immense challenges and perils along migration routes. Children are three times more likely than adults to experience violence, exploitation and abuse during their journeys,” said Alison Parker, Deputy Regional Director, Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, UNICEF. “The Migrant Response Plan presents a critical inter-agency support framework to collaboratively address these vulnerabilities, coordinate the provision of services to migrants and host communities and safeguard children and their families, throughout their migration journey.”

    “With the steady deterioration of the economic and instability context in East and Horn of Africa, the motivation to move out is at a new peak,” said Mutuku Nguli, Chief Executive Officer, Counter Human Trafficking Trust East Africa.  “This reality has further weakened the community support structures along the transit routes while at the same time aggravating the risk factors associated with irregular migration in Horn of Africa to Yemen and Southern Africa routes. This appeal therefore offers the best opportunity to rescue the situation”.

    Note to Editor

    To learn more about the Regional Migrant Response Plan (MRP): https://www.mrp-easternroute.com/ 

    MRP section in the Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO): https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2025-enarfres

    Link to the GHO: https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2025-enarfres

    For more information, please contact

    In Nairobi : ronairobimcu@iom.int, +254 797 735977

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Foreign students of the State University of Management opened a “Window to Africa”

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On February 9, 2025, the African Culture Festival “Window to Africa” was held at the Moscow House of Nationalities with the support of the Department of National Policy and Interregional Relations of the City of Moscow. It was dedicated to the traditions and art of African countries, as well as cultural exchange between countries. Foreign students of the State University of Management took part in the Festival.

    Cultural cooperation has acquired special significance after the Russia-Africa summit in 2023 and the intensification of bilateral ties. The opening of the Festival was attended by the director of the Moscow House of Nationalities Sergey Anufrienko, the president of the Cameroonian diaspora in Russia “DIASPOCAM” Louis Gouend. The event brought together more than 400 people, including representatives of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, diplomatic missions, other official structures and African diasporas.

    At the Festival, the State University of Management was represented by foreign students from Africa, China, Vietnam, and Syria. SUM students took an active part in the events. They attended national music and dance performances, lectures by Kassae Nygusie Wolde Mikael, professor of the Department of Theory and History of International Relations at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia named after Patrice Lumumba, and learned a lot of new information about the history and geography of African countries. SUM foreign students also took part in various master classes on traditional African dances, mastered the skills of braiding African braids with Kanekalons, played African drums, learned the art of wearing an African scarf with a child on the back in a traditional style, and tried the delights of African cuisine. The Festival featured an exhibition of national African clothing, which could be tried on for bright photos.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 02/11/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: BOBC Auction Results – 11 February 2025

    Source: Bank of Botswana

    The Monetary Policy Rate (MoPR) was unchanged at 1.9 percent of the previous week, for a paper maturing on 19 February 2025. The summarised results of the auction held on 11 February 2025, are attached below:

    BOBC Auction Results – 11 February 2025.pdf

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia

    Source: Council of the European Union

    Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/155 of 27 January 2025 amending Decision 2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: State of the Nation Address Debate: Day 1 | 11 February- Part 2

    Source: Republic of South Africa (video statements)

    State of the Nation Address Debate: Day 1 | 11 February
    #SONA2025 #GovZAupdates

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eFZcokcVYk

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: Young Trade Leaders: Eric, Nigeria

    Source: World Trade Organization – WTO (video statements)

    The Young Trade Leaders Programme was established to connect young people with the work of the WTO. Eric Andrew is the founder and Team Lead of AgrofixiNG, an organization in Nigeria successfully implementing solutions in agriculture and the circular economy.

    Eric shares his impressions about the programme and his plans as a Young Trade Leader.

    Download this video from the WTO website:
    https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/webcas_e/webcas_e.htm

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7TE7dxZSP0

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Security: Defense News: Exercise Cutlass Express 2025 launches across East Africa

    Source: United States Navy

    Exercise Cutlass Express 2025, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and enabled by U.S. 6th Fleet, brings together more than 20 multinational partners for two weeks of training to support collaborative maritime security operations in the region.

    Throughout the exercise, U.S. forces will work alongside participating nations to enhance maritime domain awareness, improve international law enforcement capacity and increase interoperability between the U.S., African, and other multinational partner navies and coast guards.

    “Cutlass Express continues to provide an exceptional venue to collaborate with our African partners on maritime security,” said Vice Adm. J. T. Anderson, commander, U.S. 6th Fleet. “When we combine the strength of our partnerships with the high level of training provided by exercises like this, we improve the overall security and economic prosperity of a region that extends far beyond the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of each individual nation.”

    This year’s exercise will focus training efforts in Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania, though information sharing and coordination will take place across nine maritime operation centers (MOCs) located throughout the region. Additionally, Exercise Cutlass Express 2025 is linked to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s International Maritime Exercise 2025 through information sharing between MOCs to improve theater-to-theater coordination, reduce regional seams, and strengthen U.S. and partner nation capabilities and interoperability.

    Exercise Cutlass Express 2025 will also run concurrently with the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa led exercise Justified Accord 2025 in Kenya and Tanzania to improve defense capabilities of multi-domain forces and refine crisis and counterterrorism responses, ultimately reducing global maritime threats.

    Participants in this year’s iteration of Cutlass Express include Belgium, Comoros, Djibouti, France, Georgia, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom.

    Cutlass Express is one of three regional maritime exercises led by U.S. 6th Fleet as part of a comprehensive strategy to provide collaborative opportunities to African forces and international partners to address maritime security concerns.

    Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners to advance U.S. national interests, security and stability in Europe and Africa.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Gaza: Return to war must be avoided at all costs, insists UN chief

    Source: United Nations 4

    Peace and Security

    A return to war in Gaza must be avoided at all costs, UN Secretary-General António Guterres insisted on Tuesday, amid fears that the three-week old ceasefire agreement between Hamas fighters and Israel is about to end.

    We must avoid at all costs the resumption of hostilities in Gaza that would lead to an immense tragedy,” said the UN chief, in a statement relayed to journalists by UN Geneva spokesperson Rolando Gomez.

    “I appeal to Hamas to proceed with the planned liberation of hostages next Saturday. Both sides must fully abide by their commitments in the ceasefire agreement and resume serious negotiations in Doha for the second phase.”

    The development comes amid reports that Hamas suspended the scheduled release of hostages from Gaza on Saturday, on the grounds that Palestinians continue to be killed in the war-torn enclave and that too little aid is entering the Strip.

    UNRWA operations continue

    The UN agency for Palestine refugees, UNRWA, said on Tuesday that its operations continue uninterrupted in Gaza and the occupied West Bank including East Jerusalem.

    “Our clinics across the occupied West Bank including East Jerusalem are open while the humanitarian operation in Gaza continues. We are committed to staying and delivering,” UNRWA said in an online post.

    The UN aid coordination office, OCHA, meanwhile, highlighted that a significant aid boost into Gaza has been possible “under the conditions generated by this [ceasefire] deal” that began on 19 January.

    Speaking in Geneva, OCHA spokesperson Jens Laerke said that the UN had delivered food, medical, shelter supplies and more in the last 21 days “which have enabled us to provide a range of critical services to people in need across Gaza and initiate repairs”.

    Responding to questions from journalists that UN aid teams had not been able to bring in certain materials which could help with the reconstruction of shattered medical centres and more, Mr. Laerke insisted that “the full visibility of the pipeline and the ceasefire deal and the compliance indicators, should be available to the guarantors of the ceasefire deal, which does not include the United Nations, but Egypt, Qatar and the US”.

    Surge in aid

    According to the latest humanitarian update from OCHA, more than 1.5 million people in Gaza have received food parcels since the ceasefire began.

    The World Food Programme (WFP) has distributed food parcels, hot meals and cash to more than 860,000 people in Gaza, OCHA said, and partners are providing more meals as community kitchens open in new areas. 

    Repair work continues on water wells across the enclave. However, widespread destruction of infrastructure and shortages of spare parts, generators and solar panels have impacted efforts to increase water production.      

    Today, nearly 60 health partners provide primary and secondary health services across the Gaza Strip, ensuring access to essential care.

    The UN reproductive health agency UNFPA is distributing supplies expected to benefit more than 65,000 people over the next three weeks. 

    UNFPA has also supported another health partner which has opened three temporary primary healthcare centres in Gaza and a temporary medical point in Jabalya in the north.

    OCHA reported that recent winter storms destroyed at least five child-friendly spaces in Khan Younis and the Middle Area in Gaza.

    “The needs are enormous,” Mr. Gomez told journalists. “The ceasefire is in place and of course that doesn’t mean that there aren’t enormous needs and they remain so…This is where our priorities lie.” 

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Camp Hill virus explained: what are the risks of a henipavirus outbreak in America?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Shirin Ashraf, Postdoctoral Researcher, MRC-Centre for Virus Research, University of Glasgow

    A new pathogen, called Camp Hill virus, was recently discovered in Alabama, drawing attention to a group of viruses known as henipaviruses. This is a big deal because other viruses in this group are linked to serious, often fatal, disease, and this is the first time one of them has been found in North America.

    Camp Hill virus was discovered by looking at tissue samples from short-tailed shrews that were collected in 2021. It’s a new species of virus that’s related to other dangerous viruses such as Nipah and Hendra, which have caused serious outbreaks in other parts of the world. It’s also distantly related to the measles virus.

    The first known henipavirus, Hendra virus, was identified in Australia in 1994. There have been just seven cases of humans getting infected – four of them were fatal.

    Nipah virus, discovered in Malaysia in 1998, is much more deadly. It has caused 30 outbreaks in south-east Asia, infecting over 600 people, with death rates as high as 100% in some cases.

    These viruses usually cause fever and other serious symptoms, such as brain swelling and difficulty breathing. They are thought to be carried by bats and can spread to humans through their saliva or urine. Horses are also thought to be carriers.

    Thanks to new technology that allows scientists to study the genetics of viruses, they’ve now found nearly 20 species of henipaviruses around the world. These viruses have been found on every continent except Antarctica, including places like Ghana, China, Australia and Brazil. This shows that henipaviruses are probably common in nature, and new ones could pop up almost anywhere.

    For example, in China, a virus called Mojang virus was linked to the deaths of three workers who were exposed to it in a mine. Another virus, Langya, spread by shrews, caused an outbreak in which 35 people got sick – although they all recovered.

    So far, other henipaviruses haven’t caused human infections, but the potential is there.

    The rapid growth in our understanding of these viruses comes from improvements in technology and global efforts to study diseases. But it also reminds us that viruses can suddenly jump from animals to humans in unpredictable ways.

    Whether a virus can harm humans depends on how well it can infect human cells, and how badly it affects the body. Some viruses cause mild symptoms, while others can lead to life-threatening diseases. Studying these viruses requires scientists to look closely at their genetic code and run laboratory tests to understand how they work.

    Henipaviruses can infect many animals, including bats, horses, monkeys, dogs, cats and even rodents. This means they are more adaptable and have a higher chance of jumping from animals to humans in different ways. In comparison, a virus like measles can only infect humans, which makes it less likely to spread to other species.

    No drugs or vaccines … yet

    There is no cure for henipavirus infections, but researchers are working on a vaccine for Nipah virus. Some new treatments, such as monoclonal antibodies, are also being developed but aren’t ready for use yet. This makes Nipah and Hendra viruses major public health concerns. The World Health Organization has called for more research to help fight them.

    While there’s no evidence that Camp Hill virus has infected any humans yet – and the chances of it doing so are low – its discovery in North America is a reminder that viruses can emerge anywhere. Even though shrews usually live in forests and don’t come into much contact with people, the potential for the virus to spread remains a worry.

    The more we learn about these viruses, the better we’ll be at creating vaccines that can protect us from both known and new threats. Keeping up with research and staying prepared is crucial to protecting global health from future outbreaks.

    Shirin Ashraf does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Camp Hill virus explained: what are the risks of a henipavirus outbreak in America? – https://theconversation.com/camp-hill-virus-explained-what-are-the-risks-of-a-henipavirus-outbreak-in-america-249183

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE INDEX

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 4:08PM by PIB Delhi

    As per the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI), 2023 India moved up to 22nd Rank in the Global Ranking in International Shipments category and the Overall 38th Rank in Logistics Performance Index score. Indian Ports have registered quantum improvement in “Turn Around Time”. Global comparison of Indian Ports on “Turn Around Time” parameter, as published in World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) Report-2023, acknowledges Indian Ports “Turn Around Time” as 0.9 days which is better than USA (1.5 days), Australia (1.7 days), Belgium (1.3 days), Canada (2.0 days), Germany (1.3 days), UAE (1.1 days), Singapore (1.0 days), Russian Federation (1.8 days), Malaysia (1.0 days), Ireland (1.2 days), Indonesia (1.1 days), New Zealand (1.1 days) and South Africa (2.8 days).

    The Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 was developed in alignment with the principles of the blue economy. It outlines long-term aspirations for India’s maritime sector and provides a broad action plan for implementation. The vision aims to transform the sector through various key initiatives, including the expansion of port capacity through greenfield and brownfield developments, enhancing operational efficiency by leveraging automation and digitization, and making the sector more sustainable through green initiatives such as the development of hydrogen hubs. In addition to sustainability, the vision emphasizes the development of islands and the cruise sector, aiming to boost coastal tourism and related infrastructure. It also focuses on strengthening maritime capacity building by enhancing workforce training and skill development. Furthermore, the vision aspires to elevate India’s global maritime presence by increasing participation in international maritime platforms. Another critical area of focus is the shipbuilding and repair sector. The vision seeks to position India as a global leader in shipbuilding while also working toward increasing the country’s shipping tonnage. To achieve these ambitious objectives, the strategy proposes a comprehensive set of interventions spanning infrastructure development, policy reforms, technological advancements, institutional strengthening, and regulatory enhancements.

    GMIS 2023 attracted investment commitment of ₹10 lakh crore. This includes signing of 360 MoUs, with an investment commitment of ₹8.35 lakh crore (including international collaborations), and the announcement of additional investible projects worth ₹1.68 lakh crore.

    This information was given by the Union Minister for Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal in Rajya Sabha, today.

    ***

    G.D. Hallikeri/Henry

    (Release ID: 2101760) Visitor Counter : 42

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0127/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michael Gahler, Lukas Mandl, Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0127/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes Region,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 February 2023 entitled ‘A renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy: Supporting the transformation of the root causes of instability into shared opportunities’,

     having regard to the statement of 25 January 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

     having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 October 2023 on sustainable raw materials between the EU and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

     having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 19 February 2023 on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains between the EU and Rwanda,

     having regard to the letter of 27 December 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the President of the UN Security Council,

     having regard to the press statement by the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in Democratic Republic of Congo,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) of 12 March 2004,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas for decades the resource-rich and multi-ethnic eastern region of the DRC has been plagued by violence, war and unimaginable human suffering; whereas the long-term consequences of the terrible 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi are still fuelling violence, hatred and forced displacements today;

    B. whereas on 27 January 2025 the roughly 2 000-soldier-strong rebel group M23 gained control of Goma, the capital of the DRC region of North Kivu and a central hub with two million inhabitants; whereas numerous UN reports have confirmed the presence of 3 000-4 000 Rwandan soldiers in the DRC who are cooperating with the M23 and are taking part in combat operations; whereas on 6 February 2025 the M23 reiterated that it wanted to ‘liberate all of the Congo’ in its first public meeting as its fighters advanced towards South Kivu;

    C. whereas there have been numerous UN reports about the illegal smuggling of minerals from the DRC to Rwanda, which then sells these minerals on the international market, claiming that they originate from Rwanda; whereas Rwandan exports of gold and coltan have risen sharply in recent years;

    D. whereas numerous UN Group of Experts reports have documented that Rwanda is supporting the M23 rebel military group; whereas Rwanda has even sent numerous soldiers into the DRC; whereas in 2012 the M23 briefly captured Goma, but Rwanda ended its support for the rebel force due to international pressure and a cut in development funding;

    E. whereas, since the resurgence of the M23, the already very dire humanitarian situation has further deteriorated, with a total lack of humanitarian assistance, forced evictions from camps for internally displaced people and increased violence against innocent civilians, including a large increase in sexual violence against girls and women;

    F. whereas after a ceasefire that lasted several years, the M23 fighters took up arms again at the end of 2021; whereas martial law has been in force since 2021 in eastern DRC and the civilian government has been replaced by the military;

    G. whereas, before this latest episode in the crisis, 800 000 internally displaced people were already in overcrowded sites for displaced people around Goma; whereas over 6.4 million people were already displaced throughout the country before the current escalation (of which 2.9 million were new displacements in 2024 alone);

    H. whereas for decades the central DRC Government has not been able to ensure complete control over the vast territory of the DRC, particularly in eastern DRC; whereas more than 100 rebel groups have exploited this vacuum and are often supported by neighbouring countries to ensure access to the many natural resources in eastern DRC, among other reasons; whereas the rebel groups often recruit child soldiers in a blatant violation of international law and assault on humanity;

    I. whereas the conflict is fuelled by the smuggling of minerals, such as tin, tungsten, coltan (tantalum), gold and diamonds, which are often mined in inhumane conditions; whereas armed groups control mining areas and smuggling routes, whereas gold and coltan, in particular, are transported across the border to Rwanda (and Uganda) and from there sold on as ‘conflict-free’ raw materials; whereas the DRC Government estimates that it loses USD 1 billion a year in revenue from raw materials illegally taken out of the country; whereas in addition to state and rebel actors from outside the DRC, many Congolese actors from the security sector are also part of these complex interdependencies;

    J. whereas on 8 February 2025 at a joint summit in Tanzania’s capital Dar es Salaam, the regional blocs of southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and eastern Africa, the East African Community (EAC), called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, demanded the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from the DRC territory, urged all warring parties to hold peace talks within five days, and demanded the reopening of Goma airport and other key routes to facilitate humanitarian aid; whereas the African Union is set to address the matter at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 14 February 2025; whereas other mediation efforts are ongoing, notably by France, which aims to bring all actors to the negotiation table;

    K. whereas the EU and Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains is focused on the advancement of due diligence and traceability, cooperation in fighting against the illegal trafficking of raw materials and alignment with international environmental, social and governance standards; whereas the EU has a similar memorandum of understanding with the DRC and other countries in the region;

    L. whereas Rwanda has repeatedly claimed that the DRC is supporting rebels from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an extremist group who aim to overthrow the government in Rwanda; whereas the FDLR is also accused of guerrilla attacks and assaults on civilians, such as the assassination of the late Italian Ambassador Luca Attanasio in 2021; whereas the government in Kinshasa published a declaration at the end of 2023 stating that all soldiers cooperating with the FDLR would be arrested; whereas Rwanda claims that the DRC Government is not militarily capable of providing full security in the east of its country;

    M. whereas Uganda and the DRC have been cooperating in many ways, including in their efforts to fight terrorism in the region; whereas this has led to an increased Ugandan presence in eastern DRC, which has also resulted in increased illegal transfers of minerals from eastern DRC to Uganda;

    N. whereas a private Romanian security company and a small number of independent military trainers had been active on the side of the DRC Government from the beginning of 2023, but largely withdrew in the midst of intensified fighting in late January 2025;

    O. whereas the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monusco) has been trying to stabilise eastern DRC since 1999; whereas the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been deployed since December 2023, with 2 100 soldiers from Tanzania and Malawi and 2 900 soldiers from South Africa;

    P. whereas public sentiment in Kinshasa against perceived inaction by the international community led to attacks on and the looting of the diplomatic missions of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and the United Nations, as well as civil society organisations;

    Q. whereas the EU is trying to intensify its presence in the region, including through its recent support for the ‘Green Corridor Kivu-Kinshasa’ programme via a Global Gateway initiative, which aims to help establish a sustainable 2 600 km corridor connecting eastern DRC to Kinshasa and the Atlantic Coast, covering 540 000 km2;

    R. whereas the Commission announced new humanitarian support for the DRC, with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; whereas the EU is a major donor to the humanitarian response in the DRC and has provided over EUR 272 million in humanitarian assistance since early 2023;

    S. whereas the DRC has been a clear critic of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and has supported numerous resolutions at the UN and other international forums condemning the Russian war of aggression and expansion;

    T. whereas the Council appointed Johan Borgstam as the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region on 1 September 2024;

    1. Strongly condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by the rebels of the M23 and Rwanda;

    2. Urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, the presence of whom is a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; underlines that the territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected;

    3. Calls on all regional actors to cease their support to the numerous rebel groups; demands therefore that both the M23 and FDLR groups, among others, be dissolved; underlines that, as well as Rwanda and the DRC, all regional actors have a special responsibility in this regard;

    4. Recalls that only an inclusive and regional approach will be able to address and tackle the multifaceted long-standing problems in the region; strongly welcomes the joint SADC and EAC peace summit in Dar es Salaam on 8 February 2025; reiterates in this regard its full support to the Luanda and Nairobi processes and calls on all Great Lake countries, in particular the DRC and Rwanda, to urgently pursue negotiations in these frameworks; emphasises that any solution must also address the root causes of the conflict, including, but not limited to, the illicit trafficking of natural resources; underlines that regional organisations, such as the African Union, the SADC and the EAC, must play a central role in all of these efforts; underlines as well that a lasting solution requires a reform of the DRC security sector, with a better organised DRC army and administration;

    5. Expresses concern over the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes Region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess the implementation of its renewed EU Great Lakes strategy; recalls that the EU and its special representative for the region are ready to assist all mediation efforts; urges the EU to cooperate with other actors on the ground, in particular Monusco, to ensure the protection of civilians in eastern DRC;

    6. Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence as a tool of repression and weapon of war in eastern DRC, as well as the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay; strongly reiterates that any attack against UN-mandated forces is inexcusable and might be considered a war crime;

    7. Is outraged by the humanitarian catastrophe and lack of humanitarian assistance and expresses its concern that the crisis will further deteriorate unless immediate action is taken, including improved humanitarian access and improvements to the sanitary situation; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of displaced people in eastern DRC and in the DRC as a whole; underlines that all countries in the region have a legal and moral obligation to ensure the safety of international aid workers on their territories; underlines that Rwanda has a special responsibility to facilitate humanitarian access to the region;

    8. Expresses its condolences to all the victims of the recent violence and expresses its gratitude to the numerous aid workers who, despite the very difficult and challenging conditions, continue to provide much-needed support to the population;

    9. Reiterates its condemnation of hate speech and xenophobia, as well as ethnic-based politics; underlines that all those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC must be held accountable;

    10. Calls for an urgent increase in the overall EU support budget for the region, in particular given the unknown future engagement of the US Government;

    11. Expresses its strong concern about the increasing presence of disinformation campaigns; condemns in particular efforts by Russia to foster anti-Western sentiments through the dissemination of fake news about Western players on social media;

    12. Calls on the Commission to urgently review its engagement with Rwanda and prepare a set of possible measures with clear pathways towards implementation in case the Rwandan Government does not swiftly reverse its policies, including, among others, a possible suspension of bilateral assistance and a halt of the Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains;

    13. Calls on the Member States to consider the adoption of additional restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that sustain, support or benefit from the armed conflict, instability or insecurity in the DRC, as well as those responsible for inciting violence, or exploiting the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, including through the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources;

    14. Urges the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to immediately cease military assistance to the Rwandan armed forces via the European Peace Facility;

    15. Expresses its concern about the increasing presence of Chinese actors in the mining sector of the DRC and the region acting without respect for economic and social responsibilities; recalls that European industries and companies in the region will only have long-term security of supply if a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict is found;

    16. Strongly condemns the attack on diplomatic institutions of the EU, its Member States and civil society organisations, such as political foundations in Kinshasa, and underlines that the protection of civilians and diplomatic staff must be guaranteed; demands that those responsible be brought to justice;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as the secretariats of Monusco, the SADC and the EAC.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Suspected tax fraud in Moroccan tomato imports to the EU in recent years – E-000444/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000444/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Carmen Crespo Díaz (PPE)

    Spanish farmers are facing a serious problem due to Morocco’s alleged breaches of the import limit for duty-free tomatoes, while the Spanish Government stands idly by.

    Since 2019, Morocco has allegedly repeatedly exceeded duty-free export quotas, which could amount to EUR 71.7 million of tax evasion, or around EUR 14 million each year. This lost revenue is directly undermining the sustainability of EU policies, as is evident in the tomato sector, where our producers’ profit margins have been squeezed by pressure from imported products sold at artificially low prices.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Will the Commission investigate Morocco’s failure to comply with the terms of the trade agreement and the Spanish Government’s neglect of its duties?
    • 2.Will the Commission demand appropriate economic compensation if tax evasion has taken place?
    • 3.Will European farmers be protected by strengthening import monitoring mechanisms and reviewing the current trade framework with Morocco?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Denouncing Trump’s unacceptable proposal for mass expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip – E-000449/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000449/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos (NI), Kostas Papadakis (NI)

    US President Donald Trump made an unacceptable statement about the Palestinians of Gaza, claiming that he would prefer that certain Arab countries get involved and build housing in a different area where they can perhaps live peacefully. He bluntly confessed to the plan of the occupying state of Israel and the USA — after the genocide — to displace the Palestinians from their land permanently. He even proposed the expulsion of Palestinians to Jordan and Egypt, which would mean the final displacement and occupation-colonisation of the Palestinian territories by Israel.

    Despite thousands of murders and Israel’s criminal policy marked by the genocide of the Palestinians, the EU and governments, including the New Democracy government in Greece, still today maintain commercial, military and political relations with Israel, and the EU-Israel Association Agreement remains in force.

    In view of the above, can the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy answer the following:

    • 1.What is her position on Trump’s unacceptable proposal to displace Palestinians from the territories and transfer them to other countries so that Israel can continue its occupation of Palestinian territories, which is part of Israel’s broader plan for the genocide and displacement of Palestinians?
    • 2.What is her position on the request to cease here and now the EU-Israel Association Agreement and all economic, military and political cooperation with the occupying state of Israel that contributes to the suffering experienced by the people of Palestine?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Press conference: Call for EU support for the International Criminal Court (ICC)

    Source: European Parliament

    Today, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights will hold a press conference in Strasbourg, after President Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC.

    When: Tuesday 11 February 15.00 CET

    Where: European Parliament, Strasbourg, Daphne Caruana Galizia press conference room (WEISS N -1/201)

    Participants:

    – Chair of the Subcommittee on Human rights (DROI) Mounir Satouri (Greens/EFA, France);
    – Mama Bea, member of the NGO “Association des mamans Anti-Bwaki” (AMAB), implementing partner of the ICC Trust Fund for Victims in DRC;
    – David Yambio, victim of Almasri in Libya, President and spokesperson for Refugees in Libya Association.

    Interpretation will be provided in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish.

    Accredited media representatives may attend the press conference in person. Journalists wishing to ask questions remotely can connect via Interactio. The press conference will also be web streamed live and recorded on the Parliament’s Multimedia Centre.

    Background

    On 6 February 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court, including suspending the entry of ICC officials, employees, and agents, as well as their immediate family members into the United States.

    A delegation of MEPs of the Subcommittee on Human rights travelled to The Hague on 29-30 October 2024 to meet with members of the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court (ICC), EUROJUST and other key partners. After the mission, DROI Chair said he was concerned about the serious threats these institutions face, underlining the crucial role of the ICC to support the victims and declared that  International Criminal Court decisions were binding on all EU member states.

    In their annual report 2023 on Human rights and democracy in the world and the EU’s policy on the matter, MEPs condemned attempts to undermine the work of the ICC and its legitimacy, and called for the EU and its member states to encourage their partners to ratify the Rome Statute and its amendments, expanding the Court’s jurisdiction.

    Information for the media – Use Interactio to ask questions

    To ask questions remotely during the press conference, please connect via Interactio using this link: https://ep.interactio.eu/s871-h7gf-91mi

    Interactio is only supported on iPad (with the Safari browser) and Mac/Windows (with the Google Chrome browser). When connecting, enter your name and the media you are representing in the first name / last name fields. For better sound quality, use headphones and a microphone. Interpretation is only possible for interventions with video.

    Journalists who have never used Interactio before are asked to connect 30 minutes before the start of the press event to perform a connection test. IT assistance can be provided if necessary. When connected, open the chat window (upper right corner) to be able to see the service messages.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0129/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Sara Matthieu, Marie Toussaint, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Saskia Bricmont, Majdouline Sbai, David Cormand, Ville Niinistö, Catarina Vieira, Erik Marquardt, Ignazio Roberto Marino
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    B10‑0129/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

     having regard to the UN Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, of August 2010,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (Conflict Minerals Regulation)[1],

     having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part (the Samoa Agreement),

     having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

     having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

     having regard to the UN Charter,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group captured the towns of Minova on 21 January 2025, Sake on 23 January 2025 and Goma, the capital of the North Kivu region in the DRC, on 27 January 2025; whereas this constitutes a brutal violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC; whereas indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons have increased in recent weeks in densely populated areas of North Kivu, including displacement camps and other highly populated areas near Goma; whereas unlawful killings, rapes and other apparent war crimes, as well as forced labour, forced recruitment and other abusive practices have reportedly been committed by M23 with the support of the Rwandan military;

    B. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established estimates, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004), that between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan army troops are on the ground in the DRC, and considers that the deployment of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and that Rwanda’s de facto control and direction of M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23;

    C. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC concluded that M23 and other armed groups are involved in illegal mineral exploitation and smuggling in the eastern DRC, and that ‘at least 150 tons of coltan’ have been fraudulently exported to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production, leading to the largest contamination of mineral supply chains in the Great Lakes region recorded to date;

    D. whereas the resurgence of M23 relates to the deterioration of the security situation in the eastern DRC over the past year, with other armed groups, and at times government soldiers, committing widespread violence, unlawful killings and other grave abuses, putting civilians at greater risk;

    E. whereas the DRC has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world; whereas many women and children live in precarious conditions and are being exposed to the risk of harassment, assault or sexual exploitation; whereas displaced populations often receive no basic life-saving services and are at risk of malnutrition and disease; whereas cities that host internally displaced people in precarious circumstances, such as Bunia, are also targets of attack by different militias, causing great distress to the displaced communities and to the local population; whereas there is a reported high risk of the spread of Mpox in Goma, due to the dire humanitarian situation;

    F. whereas the deputy head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma has reported on the widespread rape and killing of women inmates in Goma’s Munzenze prison, and the DRC’s Minister for Human Rights Chantal Chambu Mwavit estimates that 163 women were burned alive in the prison; whereas the UN Human Rights Office reported that only between 9 and 13 female inmates, ‘all of whom had also been raped’, survived the blaze;

    G. whereas the security situation in the eastern DRC has dramatically deteriorated in recent weeks and humanitarian access is blocked in the territories illegally occupied since January 2025 by M23;

    H. whereas the Luanda Process, which was relaunched in July 2024 and is being facilitated by Angola, aims to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda regarding the conflict in the eastern DRC;

    I. whereas the UN and the DRC agreed on the withdrawal of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in mid-2024, leading to a degradation of the security situation and affecting civilians, who were left exposed to human rights abuses by state security forces and armed actors;

    J. whereas the M23 and Rwandan forces have obligations to civilians under international humanitarian law, including protecting and facilitating access to humanitarian assistance, and permitting freedom of movement;

    K. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations into the DRC have focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in the eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces, since 1 July 2002; whereas the DRC made a second referral to the ICC in May 2023 concerning allegations of crimes committed in North Kivu since 1 January 2022;

    L. whereas the coltan extraction zone in Rubaya in the DRC, controlled by M23, accounts for 15 % of the global supply of tantalum and, as a result, Rwanda recorded a 50 % increase in its coltan exports in 2023, becoming the world’s leading exporter – far exceeding its national production capacity;

    M. whereas the Commission and the Rwandan Government signed on 19 February 2024 a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains, which anticipates the adoption of an implementation roadmap, opening the door to the EU financing of strategic projects;

    N. whereas this MoU clearly anticipates the risk of importing conflict minerals from the DRC into the EU market by requiring Rwanda to enforce ‘measures to intercept smuggled minerals entering the country and to repatriate them to the country of origin’;

    O. whereas the EU has not made its cooperation with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional on the country joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), while the DRC is a member of the initiative, thereby creating disparities between transparency requirements on minerals from both countries;

    P. whereas Parliament, unlike the Council, was not given the opportunity by the Commission to share its political assessment of the decision to negotiate an MoU with Rwanda, or to provide technical feedback on the draft MoU;

    Q. whereas on 18 December 2024, the DRC filed criminal complaints against Apple subsidiaries in France and Belgium, accusing the tech firm of using conflict minerals in its supply chain;

    R. whereas the DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Nobel Prize laureate Denis Mukwege briefed Parliament on 5 February 2025 on the occupation of the eastern DRC and the dire humanitarian impact on the local population and internally displaced people; whereas women are particularly at risk, in these circumstances, of being victims of sexual abuse and rape; whereas the hospitals in Goma lack sufficient sanitary equipment and hundreds of patients are waiting to undergo life-saving surgery;

    S. whereas a joint summit of the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community took place on 8 February 2025 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, calling for the disengagement of Rwanda’s forces from the DRC and for the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance to the eastern DRC; whereas the Foreign Affairs Council of the Council of the EU is expected to exchange views on the situation in the DRC on 24 February 2025;

    1. Is concerned by findings in the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DRC, and fully supports their recommendations;

    2. Condemns the fact that the RDF has deployed troops to the eastern DRC and has provided direct military support to M23, helping it to expand control in the eastern DRC; condemns the fact that Congolese army units have supported armed groups implicated in serious abuses in the fighting with M23;

    3. Calls for a quick resumption of negotiations within the Luanda Process in order to find a lasting, peaceful and political solution, and urges all sides to fully honour their engagements within the Luanda Process, specifically the ceasefire agreed on 30 July 2024, the neutralisation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the M23 rebel groups, as well as the withdrawal of the RDF from the territory of the DRC; calls for the EU to have an active role in the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict, advocating for an immediate ceasefire and a renewed commitment to dialogue, with the protection of civilians at the core of negotiations, in particular women and children;

    4. Deplores the fact that fighting and the shelling of medical infrastructure in and around Goma has severely limited the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need; calls on all neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda, to facilitate access of humanitarian equipment and personnel to all areas occupied by the rebel groups in the eastern DRC, including through the reopening of Goma airport and of borders; highlights the precarious situation that women and girls face and calls on M23 to lift all restrictions on humanitarian interventions aimed at addressing and preventing gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence;

    5. Calls on the UN Human Rights Council to create an independent mandate to investigate abuses by all parties to the current conflict as soon as possible;

    6. Commends the Prosecutor of the ICC’s announcement that the ICC will continue to investigate alleged crimes committed by any person, irrespective of affiliation or nationality; is highly concerned about the fragile situation of the ICC, which is already undermining its crucial work in bringing justice to victims of the most serious crimes worldwide; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for the ICC and calls on the Council and the Commission to fulfil their obligations to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the ICC;

    7. Calls on the Commission to continue supporting anti-corruption efforts and the strengthening of governance in the DRC;

    8. Calls on the Commission and the Council to impose targeted sanctions against relevant senior M23 and other armed group commanders, army leaders and senior officials, particularly the individuals identified by the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC as responsible for, or complicit in, recent serious human rights abuses by their forces, or those for which they have command responsibility, such as Rwanda’s major generals Eugene Nkubito, Ruki Karusisi and Emmy Ruvusha;

    9. Exhorts the Commission and the Member States to take measures to ensure that support through the European Peace Facility for the deployment of Rwandan troops in northern Mozambique remains exclusively dedicated to the fight against terrorism in Mozambique and does not, directly or indirectly, support the abusive military operations in the eastern DRC;

    10. Expresses regret that the Commission did not present the draft or seek feedback from Parliament in the preparation process of the MoU with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains; regrets that the Council and Parliament were not treated equally in the drafting process of the MoU; highlights the importance of improving the early engagement of the Commission with Parliament in the drafting process of future MoUs;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to suspend the application of the MoU between the Commission and Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains, and freeze any decision to select any project in Rwanda as a strategic project under the Critical Raw Materials Act[2], and to temporarily halt cooperation with Rwanda in the context of the EU’s Global Gateway initiative; calls on the Commission to render the future re-activation of cooperation on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional upon Rwanda joining the EITI, which the DRC is already part of;

    12. Calls for the EU, Rwanda’s neighbouring countries and Rwanda’s main trading partners to put in place a trade embargo for all minerals, including processed minerals, exported from Rwanda, until a definitive withdrawal of the RDF and rebel group supported by Rwanda from the territory of the DRC;

    13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly adopt an export ban of weapons from the EU to Rwanda and for the immediate suspension of any further military and security assistance to Rwanda until the territorial integrity of the DRC is restored;

    14. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure a strong enforcement of the current Conflict Minerals Regulation, and for the Commission to swiftly propose a revision to the EU rules, with the aim of ensuring that the highest standards of traceability and transparency are met for each and every mineral imported into the EU, in particular from the DRC and Rwanda, to review accordingly the current import thresholds currently anticipated in the Regulation, and to enhance anti-circumvention and enforcement provisions regarding sanctions;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of Rwanda.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0105/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Thierry Mariani, Jordan Bardella, Pierre‑Romain Thionnet, Matthieu Valet, Nikola Bartůšek
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    B10‑0105/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), notably those of 18 January 2018[1] and 24 November 2022[2], which address ongoing conflicts and humanitarian concerns in the region,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2008 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and rape as a war crime[3] and to its previous resolutions on human rights abuses in the DRC,

     having regard to the declaration of 25 January 2025 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Kaja Kallas, on behalf of the EU on the security situation in the Kivu,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 December 2019 on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which outline the EU’s strategic approach to the DRC,

     having regard to UN Security Council resolutions on the DRC, notably Resolution 2765 (2024) adopted on 20 December 2024, which extended the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 20 December 2025, and Resolution 2688 (2023) of 27 June 2023, which renewed the DRC sanctions regime until 1 July 2024,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017, laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum, tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas[4],

     having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[5] (the Samoa Agreement),

     having regard to the Addis Ababa Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, signed on 24 February 2013 under the auspices of the African Union and the United Nations, which aimed to address the root causes of instability in the DRC by promoting regional cooperation, respecting state sovereignty and ending external support to armed groups,

     having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, which was adopted unanimously on 31 October 2000,

     having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations,

     having regard to Report S/2024/432 by the Group of Experts on the DRC to the President of the UN Security Council,

     having regard to Report S/2024/969 by the Group of Experts on the DRC to the President of the UN Security Council,

     having regard to the UN Security Council press statement of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reaffirming the international community’s commitment to the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding signed on 19 February 2024 between the European Union and Rwanda concerning sustainable and resilient value chains for critical raw materials,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the DRC has faced decades of ongoing armed conflicts, particularly in the eastern regions of North and South Kivu, fuelled by local, regional and international actors;

    B. whereas since 1998, the conflict in the DRC has resulted in the deaths of more than 5.4 million people, predominantly civilians, making it the most protracted and deadly conflict since World War II;

    C. whereas a significant proportion of these fatalities have been children, who have endured violence and suffered from malnutrition and preventable diseases exacerbated by the ongoing instability;

    D. whereas to this day, the DRC continues to suffer violence, attacks, killings and widespread human rights violations perpetrated by domestic and foreign armed groups, notably in the east of the country;

    E. whereas the Congo River Alliance and its principal member, the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group, with documented support from Rwanda, has recently escalated hostilities in North Kivu, culminating in the recent seizure of Goma, the capital city of North Kivu, in direct violation of the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

    F. whereas numerous UN reports, including findings from the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, have repeatedly documented Rwanda’s military, logistical and financial support to M23, despite official denials from the Rwandan Government;

    G. whereas the ongoing conflict has resulted in widespread human rights violations, including mass killings, sexual violence, forced displacement and the forced recruitment of soldiers, creating one of Africa’s worst protracted humanitarian crises;

    H. whereas rape and sexual violence are systematically used as a weapon of war by the M23 rebel group, as documented by numerous human rights organisations and UN reports;

    I. whereas over 700 000 people have been forcibly displaced as a result of the escalating violence in the Kivu regions, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation in refugee camps and informal settlements;

    J. whereas the recent escalation of violence in the eastern DRC has resulted in the tragic deaths of over 3 000 civilians and the loss of 13 MONUSCO peacekeepers;

    K. whereas armed groups, including M23, continue to illegally exploit the DRC’s vast mineral resources, including coltan, cobalt and gold, fuelling conflict financing and depriving the Congolese people of their national wealth;

    L. whereas the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Rwanda in February 2024 regarding sustainable value chains for critical raw materials, despite growing concerns over Rwanda’s role in the illicit exploitation of DRC minerals; whereas this MoU cannot ensure supply chain due diligence as it relies solely on the seller’s self-declarations, providing no verifiable proof of traceability;

    M. whereas Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, was re-elected on 15 July 2024 with 99.18 % of the vote, extending his 24-year rule by another five years, amid widespread concerns over the absence of political freedom in Rwanda;

    N. whereas MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, has been in the country for over two decades, yet continues to struggle to prevent large-scale violence and human rights violations;

    O. whereas the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have the potential to play a greater role in peacekeeping and regional stabilisation, complementing MONUSCO and other diplomatic efforts, provided that such initiatives align with the sovereignty and wishes of the DRC;

    P. whereas regional efforts, including the Luanda Process led by Angolan President João Lourenço, have sought to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda, though continued hostilities have undermined diplomatic progress;

    Q. whereas the Great Lakes region remains highly fragile, and a full-scale war between the DRC and Rwanda would not only inflict immense suffering on Congolese civilians, but also destabilise the broader east and central African region;

    R. whereas, at the initiative of Kenyan President William Ruto, a joint SADC-EAC summit was held on 7 and 8 February 2025, providing an opportunity for political dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda;

    1. Unequivocally condemns the seizure of Goma by the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, as a grave violation of the DRC’s sovereignty and a threat to regional stability; denounces Rwanda’s documented support for M23 and demands its immediate cessation;

    2. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the stability of the region and calls for full respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC; emphasises the importance of respecting international borders and the sovereignty of nations; condemns any actions that seek to undermine these principles;

    3. Strongly condemns the grave human rights violations committed in Kivu, including pillaging, mass rapes and forced displacement, which have triggered a severe humanitarian crisis, displacing over 230 000 more people; notes that the North and South Kivu provinces are already home to over 4.6 million internally displaced people, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;

    4. Expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the 13 MONUSCO soldiers who lost their lives while carrying out their peacekeeping mission, and to the families of the 3 000 civilians killed in the ongoing violence;

    5. Denounces the systematic exploitation and illegal extraction of the DRC’s natural resources, particularly ores and critical raw materials, by armed groups; notes that this plundering not only deprives the Congolese people of their national wealth, but also fuels the conflict, as revenues from these resources are used to finance rebel activities;

    6. Condemns the perpetuation of modern slavery within the mining sectors of the region, especially in artisanal mines; notes that miners, including children, are subjected to inhumane working conditions, forced labour and severe exploitation;

    7. Expresses deep concern over M23’s recent offensive in South Kivu and the inflammatory rhetoric propagated by the Rwanda-backed rebel alliance; worries about the potential for such actions to further destabilise the region, incite ethnic tensions and undermine efforts toward peace;

    8. Notes the unilateral ceasefire declared by M23; points out that while this development may offer a temporary respite from active hostilities, the Congolese Government has described this ceasefire as a ‘false communication’ amid reports of ongoing violence;

    9. Expresses profound concern over Rwanda’s escalating militarisation and the potential escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war, which could destabilise the entire Great Lakes region; underscores the importance of diplomacy and calls on all regional actors to engage constructively to avert spillover effects that could lead to a broader crisis;

    10. Highlights the opaque roles of some neighbouring countries in the conflict, particularly Uganda; calls for transparency and accountability from all external parties involved;

    11. Takes note of the Commission’s announcement of humanitarian support for the DRC, with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; calls for further improvements in humanitarian aid, including food, clean water, medical assistance and shelter, with a focus on protecting women and children;

    12. Notes that humanitarian assistance must be delivered in full respect of humanitarian principles; calls on the Commission to ensure that EU funding is effectively implemented, directly benefiting local communities and delivering real value to them;

    13. Emphasises the severe environmental threats posed by the conflict, particularly to the Virunga National Park, a UNESCO world heritage site; recalls that its unique wildlife has been historically plagued by poaching, deforestation and habitat destruction, exacerbated by local instability; calls for immediate measures to safeguard these natural treasures by all parties on the ground;

    14. Urges the Commission to immediately suspend and review the EU-Rwanda MoU on critical raw materials in a transparent manner, given Rwanda’s role in destabilising the DRC; notes that the MoU, signed in February 2024, is under scrutiny amid allegations that Rwanda is exploiting DRC resources to fuel the conflict; highlights that Pillar 3 of the MoU, which claims to strengthen due diligence and traceability through Rwanda’s engagement with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, mine-level data publication and scientific verification of mineral origins, lacks credibility as it relies solely on the seller’s self-declarations, providing no verifiable proof of traceability;

    15. Urges the Commission to immediately freeze and review financial assistance, development and security cooperation programmes with Rwanda in response to its ongoing destabilisation of the DRC; underlines that, according to Article 101(7) of the Samoa Agreement, funding from the EU could be resumed and modulated based on the conclusions of the Commission’s review;

    16. Expresses its dismay at the Commission’s passivity towards ongoing atrocities in Kivu, which have persisted for years; calls for a thorough investigation into Rwanda’s mineral supply chains to ensure that the EU’s prerogatives in the region – as per the obligations of each party in the agreements signed thus far – are respected;

    17. Demands the establishment of a common security and defence policy training mission for the DRC’s army to enhance its capacity to protect civilians, counter armed groups and stabilise the conflict zone, tailored to its actual operational needs on the ground;

    18. Acknowledges the need to reassess MONUSCO’s effectiveness, given its prolonged presence and limited impact in preventing large-scale atrocities despite its mandate and resources; calls on the UN to evaluate its strategy and peacekeeping capacity;

    19. Welcomes the regional efforts towards reconciliation, such as the Luanda Process, chaired by Angolan President João Lourenço, and the joint SADC-EAC summit in Tanzania; encourages the DRC and Rwanda to engage in political dialogue and promote reconciliation in this context;

    20. Welcomes the recent efforts of the AU, the EAC and the SADC and invites them to play a greater role in stabilisation through African-led initiatives that complement MONUSCO, while respecting the DRC’s wishes and sovereignty;

    21. Renews its endorsement of an African-led peace process to resolve the conflict in the eastern DRC; calls for the return of all parties to the negotiating table; urges all parties to engage constructively in dialogue to achieve a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the war, in line with the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the AU at its 1256th Emergency Ministerial meeting;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the UN Security Council, the Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parliaments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and the African Union and its institutions.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Bitget Wallet Simplifies BNB Memecoin Trading with MemeX and Zero-Fee On-Ramp

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb. 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bitget Wallet, a leading Web3 non-custodial wallet, has launched the BNB Chain Meme Token List, providing real-time tracking and one-click trading for the most popular meme tokens. As meme tokens surge in popularity on BNB Chain, this feature — alongside the powerful MemeX discovery tool, limit orders, and a zero-fee BNB on-ramp event — ensures users have the right tools to stay ahead of the market and discover early-stage tokens.

    The Meme Token List is a real-time leaderboard that shows the top-performing and emerging meme tokens on BNB Chain. It’s designed to make trading simple by helping users easily find trending tokens and understand market movements. By offering quick and easy access to token insights, Bitget Wallet helps users discover new opportunities without missing key moments.

    To further boost the memecoin trading experience, Bitget Wallet includes MemeX and limit order support for BNB Chain. MemeX is an exclusive discovery tool that finds new, high-potential tokens within seconds of their creation. It also filters out high-risk tokens, giving users added safety when trading. The limit order feature allows users to set a target price for buying or selling, and trades will automatically execute when the market hits their set price. This helps users stay in control, especially when the market is moving fast.

    To make it easier and cheaper to trade meme tokens, users can buy BNB directly within Bitget Wallet with zero on-ramp fees. Bitget Wallet has partnered with Simplex and OnMeta for a special BNB on-ramp event running from February 12, 20:00 to February 19, 20:00 (UTC+8). During this period, users benefit from zero-fee BNB purchases and the chance to win a share of the $5,000 $BGB prize pool. This streamlined, cost-effective on-ramp removes fees and delays, giving users a head start in the fast-moving meme token market.

    Meme tokens are entering a new era where virality and fun will continue, but the big wins will come from smart strategies and early moves,” said Alvin Kan, COO of Bitget Wallet. “We expect trends like cross-vertical memes, AI-driven tokenomics, and sustainable community models to define the next wave of memecoin trading. Our goal is to give users the best tools to capture these opportunities and stay ahead of the next big trend.”

    About Bitget Wallet
    Bitget Wallet is the home of Web3, uniting endless possibilities in one non-custodial wallet. With over 60 million users, it offers comprehensive onchain services, including asset management, instant swaps, rewards, staking, trading tools, live market data, a DApp browser, an NFT marketplace and crypto payment. Supporting over 100 blockchains, 20,000+ DApps, and 500,000+ tokens, Bitget Wallet enables seamless multi-chain trading across hundreds of DEXs and cross-chain bridges, along with a $300+ million protection fund to ensure safety of users’ assets. Experience Bitget Wallet Lite to start a Web3 journey.
    For more information, visit: X | Telegram | Instagram | YouTube | LinkedIn | TikTok | Discord | Facebook
    For media inquiries, please contact media.web3@bitget.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/715e20ac-07d0-4a57-ab07-7e15ac959754

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0133/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Adam Bielan, Carlo Fidanza, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Cristian Terheş, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0133/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the security situation, including the human rights situation, is deteriorating even further in the DRC, especially in the eastern parts of the country and specifically in the provinces of North and South Kivu; whereas North and South Kivu have endured long-lasting conflicts for over two decades; whereas severe human rights violations have been committed in the region;

    B. whereas the Rwandan-backed Tutsi rebel group M23 launched a military operation on 18 January 2025 to expand its territory in North and South Kivu; whereas this attack violates a ceasefire agreement concluded between Rwanda and the DRC as part of the Luanda Peace Process; whereas on 21 January 2025, M23 claimed to have captured several towns, including the strategically important trading town Minova;

    C. whereas on 24 January 2025, intense fighting occurred near Sake, where the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), supported by the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), UN forces (MONUSCO) and a coalition of militia groups, attempted to prevent M23 from advancing towards and capturing Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu; whereas FARDC Major General Peter Cirimwami, who was also the military governor of North Kivu, was fatally shot on the same day; whereas several South African and Malawian soldiers have reportedly been killed in the recent conflict while serving with SAMIDRC; whereas numerous UN peacekeepers have been killed in the DRC and many more have been injured;

    D. whereas on 30 January 2025, Goma fell under M23 control after several days of fighting in the city; whereas M23 has vowed to ‘march all the way to Kinshasa’; whereas M23 is advancing towards Bukavu in South Kivu; whereas on 3 February 2025, M23 declared a ceasefire for ‘humanitarian reasons’; whereas Goma Airport remains closed, leaving no entry point for humanitarian aid; whereas Goma is experiencing a total blackout, with no access to running water, electricity or the internet; whereas M23 is illegally occupying Goma; whereas M23 is deliberately destroying vital infrastructure;

    E. whereas M23’s occupation of Goma will have severe humanitarian consequences for civilians; whereas the Congolese authorities have reported a high risk of a cholera outbreak; whereas bombs and artillery are being used in densely populated areas; whereas statements by Congolese officials indicate that the streets of Goma are filled with rotting bodies; whereas doctors in Goma are overwhelmed and unable to provide adequate care; whereas M23 has already carried out multiple summary executions, used forced labour and forcibly recruited civilians to join it and commit atrocities on its behalf; whereas both M23 and the FARDC have used rape as a weapon of war; whereas the UN reports that more than 100 female prisoners were raped and burned alive during a jailbreak in Goma; whereas this conflict has significantly increased gender-based violence; whereas M23 is deliberately targeting refugee camps full of displaced civilians, including women and children, which constitutes a war crime; whereas the exact number of displaced people in North Kivu is unconfirmed, but is estimated to be at least 2.4 million;

    F. whereas it is widely known that M23 is backed by Rwanda and its forces; whereas this conflict has its roots in the Rwandan civil war; whereas medical staff can only access Goma through Rwanda; whereas Rwanda has never sent medical experts to Goma; whereas Rwanda is benefiting from this conflict, particularly economically;

    G. whereas the DRC is rich in various minerals and other natural resources; whereas M23 is illegally mining these resources and exporting them to Rwanda; whereas M23 is exploiting forced and child labour in the process; whereas this conflict can also be viewed as an economic war driven by these resources; whereas, in the current geopolitical climate, a number of actors are seeking access to resources in other countries; whereas the potential escalation of the conflict in the DRC could pose a serious threat to the entire African continent, given the current geopolitical situation in the region;

    H. whereas in February 2024, the EU and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains; whereas critics say that the deal facilitates the smuggling of conflict minerals from the DRC, further fuels the conflict and helps to finance armed groups in the eastern DRC;

    1. Expresses deep concern about the escalation of violence and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the DRC, caused by the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group; strongly condemns the brutal atrocities committed by M23 in the DRC and Rwanda’s support for the group; demands that Rwanda and all other potential state actors in the region cease their support for M23; demands that M23 withdraw from the territories it has unlawfully gained and return them to the DRC; reminds all parties that territorial integrity must be upheld; demands that M23 immediately stop illegally mining Congolese minerals and resources and sending them to Rwanda; demands the disarmament and dismantling of M23; urges all state parties involved to ensure that any political settlement does not include pardons for individuals who are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

    2. Deplores the fact that millions of civilians have been affected by this conflict, leaving them displaced and in need of humanitarian aid; expresses deep concern over the number of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC;

    3. Demands that the safety of civilians be ensured; demands that medical staff be granted full access to Goma; emphasises the need for a thorough investigation into the crimes committed by M23 and its supporters;

    4. Underlines its support for the DRC in its legitimate fight against M23 and other armed groups, and calls on the international community to increase pressure on Rwanda and M23;

    5. Insists that all EU-funded humanitarian aid must be directed towards helping the most vulnerable people in the eastern DRC, such as women and children, who have suffered the most; stresses that North and South Kivu should be given higher priority for the allocation of EU-funded development aid;

    6. Urges the EU and its Member States to adopt sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against all the Rwandan officials and authorities responsible for supporting M23; calls for the sanctions against M23 commanders to be maintained and extended further to include those newly found responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

    7. Calls for the EU, its Member States and other democratic Western countries to increase their diplomatic visibility and strengthen their economic and strategic influence in the region, which has large quantities of crucial minerals and other vital resources, to ensure that other authoritarian actors cannot further destabilise the area; calls for the EU to guarantee the traceability of minerals imported from Rwanda and to ensure that there is no trade in conflict minerals from the eastern DRC;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the African Union, the Joint Council of Ministers and Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the EU, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the governments and parliaments of Rwanda, the DRC and the other countries of the East African Community.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0109/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0109/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

     having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 25 January 2025 on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

     having regard to the statement by G7 foreign ministers of 2 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

     having regard to the press statement of the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

     having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

     having regard to the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 28 January 2025 on the recent developments in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,

     having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 18 December 1979,

     having regard to the Partnership Agreement of 15 November 2023 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas in January 2025, the armed rebel group M23, backed by Rwandan forces, further advanced in the eastern DRC and seized the regional capital city of Goma; whereas violence between rebel groups and the Congolese army increased sharply, causing a high number of civilian casualties; whereas an estimated 3 000 deaths occurred during the offensive on Goma;

    B. whereas M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to begin on 4 February 2025; whereas fighting has continued nonetheless; whereas there are reports that the mining town of Nyabibwe in South Kivu has been captured by M23; whereas M23 leaders have declared their intention to continue advancing in the DRC;

    C. whereas the latest advances of M23 mark an alarming escalation of the devastating conflict in the eastern DRC and have further destabilised the country; whereas the region has been plagued by decades of cyclical violence, causing a security and humanitarian crisis; whereas a ceasefire brokered in 2024 did not hold;

    D. whereas there are estimated to be around 100 separate armed groups operating in eastern DRC; whereas the largest of the foreign armed groups is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR);

    E. whereas the seizing of Goma has led to significant displacement of civilians; whereas an estimated 700 000 people have been displaced since early January 2025; whereas thousands of Congolese people had previously fled to the city to escape violence and have been further driven from camps for internally displaced people into makeshift tents or forced to sleep out in the open; whereas the safety of internally displaced people is now seriously threatened, with women and girls suffering disproportionately;

    F. whereas eastern DRC was already the centre of one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world; whereas thousands of people are facing shortages of food, medicine and drinking water; whereas hospitals are overwhelmed and there is limited electricity and running water in Goma; whereas there are rapidly growing levels of malnutrition, particularly among children; whereas access for humanitarian assistance is restricted and Goma airport remains closed;

    G. whereas sanitary conditions, notably in camps for internally displaced people, are extremely concerning; whereas experts are warning of the risks of widespread outbreaks of diseases, including cholera and mpox; whereas in January 2025 the Commission announced an increase of EUR 60 million in EU humanitarian assistance to the DRC;

    H. whereas instances of gender-based and sexual violence, including the use of rape as a weapon of war, are staggeringly high; whereas the UN reported that more than 165 women were raped and that most were later burned alive during a jailbreak in Goma following the M23 advance on the city; whereas the current spike in rape and assault in eastern DRC follows decades of widespread sexual violence perpetuated against generations of Congolese women;

    I. whereas the seizure of Goma triggered violent protests in Kinshasa, with dozens of protesters attacking embassies and calling on the international community to halt the advancement of M23;

    J. whereas the UN mission Monusco has been deployed in the DRC since 2010; whereas President Tshisekedi announced a deadline of December 2024 for all Monusco peacekeeping troops to leave the DRC; whereas this withdrawal was put on hold and the mandate of the mission extended to December 2025;

    K. whereas the conflict in the DRC is at risk of regional spillover; whereas a peacekeeping deployment from the East African Community Regional Forces (EACRF) withdrew in 2023; whereas the Southern African Development Community deployed a peacekeeping mission to the DRC in December 2023 with troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi; whereas at least 20 peacekeepers were killed during the M23 advance on Goma; whereas on 6 February 2025, Malawi announced the withdrawal of its troops from this mission;

    L. whereas it is widely acknowledged that Rwanda is active in the conflict in eastern DRC, including through its de-facto control of M23, to which it supplies weapons, logistical support and troops; whereas UN experts estimate there are between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan troops operating with M23;

    M. whereas North Kivu is a resource-rich region, with vast supplies of critical raw materials including cobalt, gold and tin, which are necessary for the global digital and energy transition; whereas Goma is a major transport and trading hub for the export of minerals; whereas the UN estimates that around 120 tonnes of coltan is being moved by M23 to Rwanda each month; whereas UN experts further estimate that M23 is financed by around EUR 288 000 per month generated through its control of the mineral trade in the DRC;

    N. whereas the EU has formed raw materials partnerships with several countries, including the DRC and Rwanda; whereas the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains with Rwanda on 19 February 2024 to promote sustainable and responsible production of critical minerals; whereas the MoU is underpinned with a roadmap for joint action; whereas the Rwanda-EU roadmap has not yet been developed, and roadmaps are not made public; whereas parliamentary scrutiny of the development and implementation of the MoU is lacking;

    O. whereas the MoU commits Rwanda to aligning with international standards by joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; whereas Rwanda has not done so to date; whereas under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, the Commission is currently assessing applications for strategic projects with partner countries to increase EU capacity and supply;

    1. Expresses deep concern at the alarming escalation of violence and the seizure of Goma; deplores the loss of life and the sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls; expresses its sympathy with the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

    2. Underlines the urgent need for the stabilisation of the country and the implementation of an immediate ceasefire; calls on M23 to halt its territorial advances, notably to refrain from any further advancement into South Kivu and to withdraw from the territory of the DRC, and for all parties to observe a cessation of violence;

    3. Calls on all state actors, including the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, to cease any cooperation with armed groups, including M23 and FDLR;

    4. Is extremely concerned by the critical humanitarian situation in the country; calls for the creation of a humanitarian corridor and for all parties, including armed groups operating in eastern DRC, to allow and facilitate humanitarian access; emphasises that humanitarian workers must be able to operate safely to deliver life-saving assistance to Congolese civilians; stresses that this is a central obligation under international humanitarian law, and that perpetrators violating these obligations should be held to account;

    5. Welcomes the increased humanitarian support pledged by the EU, but notes that this still falls far short of satisfying the basic needs for food, water, medical assistance and shelter in eastern DRC, especially in the light of the recent termination of support from the United States Agency for International Development; calls on the Commission and the international community to significantly step up financial support for urgent and life-saving assistance;

    6. Urges the Government of the DRC to work with the international community to address the displacement crisis and provide shelter, sanitation and support for internally displaced people, including increased protection for the safety of all displaced people, notably women and girls;

    7. Deplores the endemic sexual and gender-based violence committed against women and girls in the region; underlines that abuse of women and girls escalates into conflict, and that sexual violence is used as a weapon of war; reiterates that sexual violence is a war crime, and those responsible must be held accountable; urges the European External Action Service (EEAS), Member States and the Government of the DRC to take immediate action to prevent sexual violence and improve care for survivors, including by adapting the national legal framework to guarantee access to medical abortion care;

    8. Draws attention to the health needs of pregnant women, notably those who are displaced and out of reach of medical support; calls on the EEAS and Member States to further prioritise the disbursement of humanitarian support for women and girls in the region;

    9. Calls on M23 to allow the immediate reopening of Goma International Airport; underlines that this is essential for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the evacuation of injured people;

    10. Recognises the contribution made by peacekeeping forces from Monusco and the Southern African Development Community mission, as well as the past contribution by the EACRF; offers its condolences for the peacekeepers who have lost their lives; reiterates its support for the continuation of Monusco’s mandate;

    11. Underlines that a lasting peace must be found through a return to political processes and cooperation; calls on the Government of the DRC and all armed groups to commit to the Nairobi Process for resumed national dialogue;

    12. Regrets that there has long been a lack of accountability for human rights violations in eastern DRC; urges the UN Human Rights Council to create an independent mandate for the investigation of human rights abuses in the region; considers that this should contribute to efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account;

    13. Calls on the President and Government of Rwanda to respond to calls from the international community to withdraw their support for M23 and prevent any further destabilisation in the DRC; urges Rwanda to ensure that the advance of M23 is halted and that all M23 and Rwandan troops are withdrawn from eastern DRC; underlines that the territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the Member States to raise these urgent concerns with Rwanda at the highest levels;

    14. Calls on the Commission to suspend the MoU on sustainable raw materials and value chains; further calls on the Commission to undertake an immediate assessment of the feasibility of implementing the MoU in the light of the widespread evidence of illegal mineral smuggling and financing of M23; calls for the conclusions of such an assessment to be presented to Parliament as soon as possible; notes that parliamentary oversight and civil society involvement in the signing and implementation of raw material MoUs and roadmaps is essential for an inclusive process with adequate scrutiny, and must become part of the MoU;

    15. Stresses that effective implementation of the MoU with Rwanda can only be made in good faith if both parties commit to increasing due diligence and traceability, and tackling illegal trafficking; stresses that this is currently not the case; urges Rwanda to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as an essential first step towards implementing the commitments outlined in the MoU;

    16. Calls on the Commission to suspend any proposals for strategic projects with Rwanda that are currently under consideration in the framework of the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Global Gateway initiative; notes that strategic projects must be implemented sustainably and in compliance with human rights and due diligence standards, something which cannot be guaranteed currently;

    17. Stresses the importance of a return to regional dialogue to deescalate the conflict; urges the authorities of the DRC and Rwanda to resume the Luanda peace process;

    18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community, the President, Government and Parliament of Rwanda, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Egypt: Military trials of fishermen an affront to justice

    Source: Amnesty International –

    gyptian authorities must stop trying civilians in military courts, said Amnesty International and the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights, ahead of an expected verdict on 12 February in the military trials of five civilians in relation to fishing in a lake in North Sinai controlled by a development agency operating under the ministry of defence.

    On 6 and 7 January, a military police unit from the Egypt’s Future Sustainable Development Agency (EFSDA) arrested five fishermen at Lake Bardawil.  Military prosecutors investigated the men on charges of fishing during “prohibited periods” as well as being in a military area without permission. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had placed the lake, a fishing spot for around 3,500 fishermen, under military jurisdiction in 2019, according to presidential Decree No. 294 of 2019.

    “It is a travesty that a group of fishermen have found themselves facing military trial for fishing in a lake without authorization. Trying civilians in military courts is a flagrant violation of Egypt’s international human rights obligations. Military authorities must immediately drop the charges against the five men and release them. They must be tried by independent and impartial civilian courts in proceedings meeting international standards of due process and fair trial,” said Ahmed Salem, Executive Director of the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights (SFHR).

    It is a travesty that a group of fishermen have found themselves facing military trial for fishing in a lake without authorization.

    Ahmed Salem, Executive Director of the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights

    “Egypt’s military courts have a notorious history of handing down unjust convictions and sentences, including death sentences, following grossly unfair trials. The authorities must overhaul legislation to ensure that military courts have no jurisdiction over civilians in any case,” said Sara Hashash, Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

    The fishermen, who are in their twenties, are facing two separate military trials. Amnesty International and the SFHR reviewed copies of the arrest reports, prosecution reports, and charge sheets for both trials. The organizations also spoke with a lawyer who attended the hearings, two employees of an official body responsible for lake management, and relatives of detainees.

    The trials were marred by violations of fair trial guarantees. According to a lawyer who attended hearings for both cases on 28 January the defendants’ lawyers made a request to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, but the court ignored their request. The court also held two hearings on 5 and 6 February without any of the defendants present.

    All five detainees are currently held by Central Security Forces, operating under the ministry of interior, in Ismailia Security Forces Camp, which is not officially recognized as a detention facility.

    The five defendants are tried under Law No. 146 of 2021 on the Protection and Development of Lakes and Fisheries, which stipulates that Lake Protection and Fish Wealth Development Authority (LPFWDA), affiliated with the cabinet, is responsible for determining areas in or periods during which fishing is banned. According to the law, fishing during prohibited periods or in banned areas is a crime punishable by six months to two years imprisonment and/or a fine between 10,000 EGP to 100,000 EGP.

    In 2022, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi established the EFSDA by a decree No. 591 of 2022, which was never made public. Since then, the government has assigned several large projects to the agency including development projects in South Egypt and North Sinai, according to local media.

    On 31 October 2024, the spokesman of the government announced that the EFSDA will begin development works in Lake Bardawil aiming at achieving

    “the economic development of the lake”, according to an official statement by the Council of Ministers. The lake was previously under the supervision of LPFWDA, which by law supervises lakes across the country. Two employees at the LPFWDA told Amnesty International and SFHR that, since the government’s announcement EFSDA has taken full control of the lake supervision.

    Military trials of civilians in Egypt are inherently unfair because all personnel in military courts, from judges to prosecutors, are serving members of the military who report to the Minister of Defence and do not have the necessary training on rule of law or fair trial standards. Verdicts by military courts are subject to appeal before higher military courts as well, and ratification by the President.

    On 28 January 2024, the Egyptian parliament approved new amendments to Law No. 25 of 1966 on the Military Code of Justice that further expand the jurisdiction of military courts to prosecute civilians. The new amendments added to the military jurisdiction include “crimes committed against public and vital facilities and public properties, and other comparable things, that are protected by the armed forces”. Presidential ratification of the amendments was never published in the official gazette.

    These amendments coincided with the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2024, ratified by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on 5 February 2024, which expanded military jurisdiction over civilians for even more crimes than in the parliament’s previously mentioned amendments to the Military Code of Justice. The law authorizes the military to assist the police in safeguarding public and vital facilities and “services,” as well as addressing crimes committed against them, including crimes that “undermine the basic needs of society, including food commodities and essential products.”

    Background

    Egypt has a long track record of trying civilians before military courts. Most recently, in December 2024 a military court sentenced 62 residents of North Sinai governorate to prison terms ranging from three to 10 years on charges of damaging military vehicles and using force against public officials.

    The trial followed a sit-in in October 2023 by residents of Sheikh Zuwayed city, who had been forcibly evicted by the authorities demanding to return to their homes. The sit-in was forcibly dispersed by the military. On 24 December 2024, President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi issued a presidential pardon for 54 of them. 

    For over a decade, Egyptian armed and security forces have engaged in military operations against armed groups in North Sinai. In April 2023, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared the end of ongoing military operations in North Sinai. However, the region remains as a de facto military zone, with the Egyptian authorities continuing to maintain a strict media blackout on the security situation in North Sinai. They have for years prevented media, human rights organizations and independent observers from accessing the region. Several presidential decrees, including Decree No. 444 of 2014 and Decree No. 420 of 2021, have placed large areas of North Sinai under military jurisdiction, further militarizing the region and hampering independent reporting.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: INDIA- EGYPT JOINT SPECIAL FORCES EXERCISE CYCLONE-III COMMENCES IN RAJASTHAN

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 3:10PM by PIB Delhi

    The 3rd edition of Joint Special Forces Exercise CYCLONE commenced at Mahajan Field Firing Ranges in Rajasthan yesterday. The exercise is being conducted from 10th to 23rd February 2025. Exercise CYCLONE is an annual event conducted alternatively in India and Egypt. Last edition of the same exercise was conducted in Egypt in January 2024.

    The Indian contingent comprising 25 personnel will be represented by troops from two Special Forces Battalions. Egypt contingent also comprising 25 personnel will be represented by Special Forces Group and Task Force of Egyptian Special Forces.

    Aim of Exercise CYCLONE is to promote military to military relationship between the two countries through enhancement of interoperability, jointness and mutual exchange of special operations tactics. The exercise will focus on high degree of physical fitness, joint planning and joint tactical drills.

    Drills/ aspects to be rehearsed during the exercise will include advanced special forces skills and various other tactics, techniques and procedures as per the   current operational paradigm.

    The exercise will culminate in a 48-hour long validation exercise to rehearse and validate the tactical drills for counter terrorism operations in desert/ semi-desert terrain. The exercise will also include a display of indigenous military equipment and an overview of the defence manufacturing industry for the Egyptian side.

    Exercise CYCLONE will enable the two sides to share their best practices in tactics, techniques and procedures of conducting tactical operations. The exercise will also facilitate developing bonhomie and camaraderie between soldiers of both the sides.

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    SC

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