Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Presence of British Bases in the Republic of Cyprus – E-000388/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000388/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

    The United Kingdom (UK) appears to be pursuing an institutional rapprochement with the EU. We must be the ones to define the negotiating framework.

    The British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus were created in 1960 with the Zurich-London Agreements, for the independence of the Republic of Cyprus (RC), on the agreement that the UK would be a guarantor power for the RC, a role it completely failed to fulfil in 1974 when it ignored the illegal Turkish invasion. In contrast, the UK has used the SBAs for military operations in Iraq, Syria and Somalia, which is completely incompatible with its presence there. It does not even inform the Republic of Cyprus about these operations. At the same time, Türkiye often confirms its expansionist attitude towards the RC[1] and increases its military presence in the – illegally – occupied Cypriot territories.[2] In the debate on strengthening the EU’s European military role[3] there have been no references to the protection of the RC, despite the Turkish occupation/threat.

    In view of the above, can the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy answer the following:

    • 1.How many times and in what circumstances has she raised the issue of the withdrawal of British troops from Cyprus, in discussions with the UK?
    • 2.Does she plan to call for the replacement of the British military presence in Cyprus with a European military force to defend the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus?

    Submitted: 28.1.2025

    • [1] https://gr.euronews.com/2024/03/19/proklitiki-anafora-erdogan-gia-tin-kypro-an-eixame-piesei-pros-ton-noto-kypros-diki-mas
    • [2] https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/local/turkey-expands-military-presence-in-cyprus-with-bases-and-radar-installations/
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/europe%E2%80%99s-demosthenes-moment-putting-defence-centre-eu-policies_en
    Last updated: 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The ongoing conflict in Sudan – E-002569/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The implementation of the arms embargo is the responsibility of Member States. T he export (outside of the EU) of military technology and equipment is subject to the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP[1], revised in 2019, which is binding for all Member States.

    The competent authorities of Member States take the final decision on a case-by-case basis whether to authorise or deny an individual export or transit license of military equipment in accordance with the criteria of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

    These criteria cover inter alia the risk of violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the risk of diversion (notably via unauthorised re-export), and the behaviour of the recipient country with regard to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and the respect of international law.

    Where licences are granted, conditions are generally attached to them, for instance on end-use, storage and on re-exportation. The conditions can be adjusted to the level of risk of the recipient countries.

    The EU has maintained an arms embargo on the whole of Sudan since 1994, prohibiting the sale, supply, transfer, or export of arms and related materiel to the entire country[2].

    Thus, the EU has already implemented the recommendation of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission[3] to expand the United Nations arms embargo (currently applying only to Darfur) to the entire country and will continue encouraging others to follow suit.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj/eng
    • [2] See current EU legislation in Council Decision 2014/450/CFSP (OJ L 203 11.7.2014, p. 106).
    • [3] See the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan (A/HRC/57/CRP.6), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf
    Last updated: 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Thursday, 13 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    42 Recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 44 Repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 45 Continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 27 Further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia     – Motions for resolutions Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 11:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 12:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00 50 Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo     – Motion for a resolution Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 20:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 16:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 7 February 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Wednesday, 12 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    29 Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Genetically modified maize DP910521     – Amendments Wednesday, 5 February 2025, 13:00 28 Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Genetically modified maize MON 95275     – Amendments Wednesday, 5 February 2025, 13:00 42 Recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 44 Repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 45 Continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 10 February 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 14:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 7 February 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Tuesday, 11 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    Agenda
    Strasbourg
    Monday, 10 February 2025 – Thursday, 13 February 2025  
    Tuesday, 11 February 2025 Version: Monday, 10 February 2025, 17:33

    12:00 – 12:30   Formal sitting      
    59   Address by Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada


    09:00 – 11:50   Debates     
    Council (including replies) 20′
    Commission (including replies) 20′
    “Catch the eye”   (2×5′) 10′
    Members 104′
    13:30 – 22:00   Debates (or at the end of the votes)     
    Council (including replies) 50′
    Commission (including replies) 65′
    Author (committee) 5′
    “Catch the eye”   (7×5′) 35′
    Members 239′

    32 Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression
    17 European Central Bank – annual report 2024
    Anouk Van Brug (A10-0003/2025
        Amendments Wednesday, 5 February 2025, 13:00
    50 Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
        Motion for a resolution Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00
        Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00
        Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 20:00
        Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 16:00
    Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes
    Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 7 February 2025, 12:00
    Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00
    Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00
    Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Yemen, Lebanon & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    ———————————

    Highlights:

    – Secretary-General/France
    – Yemen
    – Lebanon
    – Lebanon/Humanitarian
    – Egypt
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Libya
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Somalia
    – Security Council
    – Cyprus
    – Report/Africa
    – International Days
    – Financial Contributions
    – Guest Tomorrow

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/FRANCE
    Earlier today, the Secretary-General arrived in Paris where, tomorrow, he will attend the Artificial Intelligence summit, co-hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India.
    He is expected to tell leaders gathered there that the growing concentration of AI capabilities in the hands of a few companies and countries risks widening global inequalities and deepening geopolitical divides.
    He will underscore that we must prevent a world of AI “haves” and “have-nots,” and he will call on AI leaders to pool expertise and cooperate with each other. He will emphasize that it is in the interests of government and technology leaders to commit to global guardrails.
    While in Paris, he is also expected to meet with President Emmanuel Macron and other world leaders during a working dinner later today.
    He will also have a bilateral meeting with the French Foreign Minister, Jean-Noël Barrot, prior to attending the AI summit.
    The Secretary-General will leave Wednesday evening for the African Union summit.

    YEMEN
    Following the recent detention by the Houthi de facto authorities of eight additional United Nations personnel, including six working in Sa’ada governorate, which has impacted the UN’s ability to operate, the Secretary-General has instructed the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations, in the absence of the necessary security conditions and guarantees, to pause all operations and programmes in Sa’ada governorate, Yemen.
    This extraordinary and temporary measure seeks to balance the imperative to stay and deliver with the need to have the safety and security of the UN personnel and its partners guaranteed. Such guarantees are ultimately required to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of our efforts.
    This pause is to give time to the de facto authorities and the United Nations to arrange the release of arbitrarily detained UN personnel and ensure that the necessary conditions are in place to deliver critical humanitarian support guided by the principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence and humanity.
    The United Nations remains fully committed to assist the millions of people in need across Yemen.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ossg/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=10+February+2025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NBmwqslkyHE

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: Terrorism: UN Calls for Stronger Global Counter-Terrorism Efforts – Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Briefing by Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.

    “Mr. President,
    Excellencies,
    I am honoured to brief the Security Council on the 20th report of the Secretary-General on the
    threat posed by Da’esh to international peace and security and the United Nations efforts in
    support of Member States in countering the threat.
    I am pleased to be joined by Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of the
    Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Ms. Natalia Gherman, to present this
    report, which was prepared jointly by our Offices.
    I would also like to thank Mr. Colin Smith, Coordinator of the Analytical Support and
    Sanctions Monitoring Team, for their contribution in the preparation of this report.
    Mr. President,
    Excellencies,
    The terrorism landscape is evolving and demands collective, multilateral action, as terrorist
    attacks threaten life, wellbeing and the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.
    Despite steady counter-terrorism efforts by Member States, international and regional
    partners, Da’esh continues to demonstrate resilience and adapt its modus operandi.
    The volatile situation in the Syrian Arab Republic is of great concern, especially as there is a
    risk that stockpiles of advanced weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. The Syrian
    Badia region continued to serve as a centre for Da’esh external operational planning and a
    critical region for their activities.
    This instability also affects the camps, detention and other facilities in the north-east of the
    country. An estimated 42,500 individuals, some with alleged links to Da’esh, remained held.
    This includes 17,700 Iraqi and 16,200 Syrian nationals, as well as 8,600 nationals from other
    countries.

    Regrettably, the overall pace of repatriations declined significantly in the reporting period.
    Only five Member States reportedly repatriated more than 760 individuals from Iraq and the
    Syrian Arab Republic. The Government of Iraq repatriated approximately 400 Iraqi children
    from the northeast of the Syrian Arab Republic to a rehabilitation centre. I would like to
    commend Iraq’s leadership in facilitating the return of its citizens from northeastern Syria.
    I reiterate the Secretary-General’s call for Member States to facilitate the safe, voluntary and
    dignified repatriation of their nationals still stranded in those camps and facilities.
    ISIL-K continued to pose a significant threat in Afghanistan, the region and beyond. In
    addition to attacks in Afghanistan, ISIL-K supporters plotted attacks in Europe and were
    actively seeking to recruit individuals from Central Asian States. There were also reports of
    small numbers of foreign terrorist fighters continuing to travel to Afghanistan.
    I would like to recall the Secretary-General’s appeal to all Member States to unite to prevent
    Afghanistan from again becoming a hotbed of terrorist activities.
    In sub-Saharan Africa, Da’esh and its affiliates continued to increase their operations and
    expand territorial control.
    The situation is deeply concerning in West Africa and the Sahel, where Da’esh affiliates and
    other terrorist groups intensified attacks, including against schools in Burkina Faso, Mali and
    Niger. Both ISGS and ISWAP continue to operate and recruit fighters across borders.
    In East Africa, Da’esh in Somalia successfully recruited foreign terrorist fighters and the AlKarrar Office remains a key financial and coordination hub for Da’esh in the region.
    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Allied Democratic Forces remained resilient
    despite the military operations conducted by Congolese and Ugandan forces and perpetrated
    horrific attacks resulting in over 300 civilian fatalities.
    Mr. President,
    Excellencies,
    The resilience of terrorist groups underscores the need for sustained international
    collaboration. Member States must prioritize comprehensive, long-term responses that
    address the conditions conducive to terrorism while strengthening the rule of law and
    upholding international human rights and humanitarian law.
    The United Nations continues to adapt and tailor its capacity-building support to the
    evolution of the threat posed by Daesh and its affiliates. I would like to highlight four priority
    areas of focus:
    First, as sub-Saharan Africa has become the epicentre of global terrorism, we have prioritized
    capacity-building support to the continent. Last year, my Office increased its delivery of
    technical assistance by 16 per cent, relying notably on the work of our Office in Rabat. For
    instance, our Fusion Cells programme delivered specialized training to 124 analysts from 21
    African Member States (…)” [Excerpt].

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ad_KZf2oAW4

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-Evening Report: Climate impacts are forcing people from their homes. When, how and why do they have valid refugee claims?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jane McAdam, Scientia Professor and ARC Laureate Fellow, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, UNSW Sydney

    For a long time, it seemed refugee law had little relevance to people fleeing the impacts of climate change and disasters.

    Nearly 30 years ago, the High Court of Australia, for instance, remarked that people fleeing a “natural disaster” or “natural catastrophes” could not be refugees.

    Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Canada had said “victims of natural disasters” couldn’t be refugees “even when the home state is unable to provide assistance”.

    It was back in 2007 that I first started considering whether international refugee law could apply to people escaping the impacts of drought, floods or sea-level rise. At the time, I also thought refugee law had limited application. For a start, most people seeking to escape natural hazards move within their own country and don’t cross an international border. That fact alone makes refugee law inapplicable.

    Refugee law defines a refugee as someone with a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group.

    So one challenge was in classifying supposedly “natural” events as “persecution”, which requires an identifiable human actor.

    It was also widely thought such events were indiscriminate and couldn’t target people on account of their race, religion or one of the other five grounds. This is partly why some advocates called for an overhaul of the Refugee Convention to protect so-called “climate refugees”.

    However, we have learned a lot in the intervening years.

    A new approach

    It’s become clear the impacts of climate change and disasters interact with other social, economic and political drivers of displacement to create risks for people.

    This is what some legal experts have called the “hazard-scape”.

    And the impacts of climate change and disasters are not indiscriminate – they affect people in different ways. Factors such as age, gender, disability and health can intersect to create particular risk of persecution for particular individuals or communities.

    For example, a person who is a member of a minority may find their government is withholding disaster relief from them. Or, climate or disaster impacts may end up exacerbating inter-communal conflicts, putting certain people at heightened risk of persecution.

    Now, we have a much more nuanced understanding of things. Refugee law (and complementary protection under human rights law) do have a role to play in assessing the claims of people affected by climate change.

    No such thing as a ‘climate refugee’ under the law

    There isn’t a legal category of “climate refugee” – a popular label that has caused confusion. However, there are certainly people facing heightened risks because of the impacts of climate change or disasters. These impacts can generate or exacerbate a risk of persecution or other serious harm.

    This means that when it comes to the law, we don’t need to reinvent the wheel.

    Instead, by applying existing legal principles and approaches, it’s clear some people impacted by climate change already qualify for refugee status or complementary protection (under human rights law).

    One instructive case, heard in New Zealand, involved a deaf and mute man from Tuvalu who was seeking to avoid deportation on humanitarian grounds. He was found to be at heightened risk if a disaster struck because he could not hear evacuation or other warnings. He also didn’t have anyone who could sign for him or ensure his safety.

    In another case, an older couple from Eritrea were found to be especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change because of “their elderly status and lack of family support”, in circumstances where they would be exposed to “conditions of abject poverty, underdevelopment and likely displacement”. This, in addition to other conditions in Eritrea, meant that there was “a real chance they would suffer cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by way of starvation and destitution”. They were granted complementary protection.

    A practical way forward

    New Zealand has led the way on showing how existing international refugee and human rights law can provide protection in the context of climate change and disasters. It’s time for the rest of the world to catch up.

    With colleagues from Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, I’ve helped create a practical toolkit on international protection for people displaced across borders in the context of climate change and disasters.

    This is a detailed resource for legal practitioners and decision-makers tasked with assessing international protection claims involving the impacts of climate change and disasters.

    It shows when, why and how existing law can apply to claims where climate change or disasters play a role.

    Inaccurate but popular labels aren’t helpful

    Inaccurate but popular labels – such as “climate refugee” – have caused confusion and arguably hampered a consistent, principled approach.

    Some judges and decision-makers assessing refugee claims may be spooked by “climate change”. They may think they need specialist scientific expertise to grapple with it.

    The new toolkit shows why international protection claims arising in the context of climate change and disasters should be assessed in the same way as all other international protection claims. That is, by applying conventional legal principles and considering the facts of each case.

    The toolkit stresses that it’s important to assess the impacts of climate change and disasters within a broader social context.

    That includes examining underlying systemic issues of discrimination or inequity that may impact on how particular people experience harm.

    The toolkit also shows why a cumulative assessment of risk is necessary, especially since risks may emerge over time, rather than as the result of a single, extreme event.

    And it emphasises the need to look at the “hazard-scape” as a whole in assessing the future risk of harm to a person.

    We hope the toolkit helps to debunk some common misunderstandings and charts a clear way forward. Our ultimate ambition is that people seeking international protection in the context of climate change and disasters will have their claims assessed in a consistent, fair and principled way.

    Jane McAdam receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is a member of the expert sub-committee of the Ministerial Advisory Council on Skilled Migration. She thanks the Open Society Foundations (OSF) for its generous support of this project and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for its endorsement.

    ref. Climate impacts are forcing people from their homes. When, how and why do they have valid refugee claims? – https://theconversation.com/climate-impacts-are-forcing-people-from-their-homes-when-how-and-why-do-they-have-valid-refugee-claims-248865

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council hears of persistent and evolving Da’esh threat

    Source: United Nations 4

    Peace and Security

    The terrorist group Da’esh, also known as ISIL, remains a serious global security threat despite years of sustained efforts to dismantle its operations, UN counter-terrorism officials warned during a Security Council meeting on Monday. 

    The discussion focused on the 20th biannual report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Da’esh to international peace and security.

    “Terrorism remains a significant and evolving threat to global peace and security, one that no State can confront in isolation,” said Under-Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov, Head of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism

    Da’esh remains agile, taking advantage of ongoing conflicts and regions experiencing growing instability,” emphasised Natalia Gherman, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). 

    This comes amid shifting global counter-terrorism efforts, including the conclusion of the Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh (UNITAD) mandate, which leaves behind a significant judicial support legacy for future accountability processes. 

    Ongoing threats in Syria 

    The volatile situation in the Syrian Arab Republic is concerning, “especially as there is a risk that stockpiles of advanced weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists,” explained Mr. Voronkov.

    The risk is particularly high in the Syrian Badia region, the central hub for Da’esh’s external operational planning. 

    Meanwhile, over 40,000 people – including women and children – are stuck in overcrowded camps in northeastern Syria due to the ongoing instability. Many face extreme shortages of clean water, medical care and sanitation. 

    The Under-Secretary-General stressed the need for urgent action, noting that repatriation efforts have slowed dramatically: “Only five Member States reportedly repatriated more than 760 individuals from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic,” he noted.  

    Sub-Saharan Africa: A new frontline 

    “In sub-Saharan Africa, Da’esh and its affiliates continue to increase their operations and expand territorial control,” said Mr. Voronkov.

    Terrorist groups like Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) have been carrying out deadly attacks on civilians and security forces. 

    “In the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, Da’esh’s decentralised operations continue to proliferate as regional cooperation declines,” Ms. Gherman warned. 

    UN assessments in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritania and Tanzania found that while some progress has been made, gaps in border security, counter-financing of terrorism and regional cooperation remain critical challenges. 

    Officials in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have specifically called for enhanced UN support to prevent the further expansion of terrorist threats southward.

    Growing online radicalisation

    Da’esh continues to recruit and inspire attacks through online propaganda. One of its most dangerous branches, ISIL-K, has been plotting attacks beyond Afghanistan. 

    “ISIL-K supporters plotted attacks in Europe and were actively seeking to recruit individuals from Central Asian States,” noted Ms. Gherman.

    French authorities recently arrested an 18-year-old plotting an attack in July 2024.

    Meanwhile, the 1 January terrorist attack in New Orleans in the United States, where an individual claimed to have been inspired by ISIL, has raised additional concerns about the group’s expanding influence through digital propaganda and online radicalisation.

    Fighting terrorist financing

    In response to the evolving financing methods of terrorist groups, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) recently adopted the Algeria Guiding Principles, which aim to prevent, detect and disrupt the use of new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes.

    CTED has also strengthened cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), contributing to a landmark case in Mozambique, where the first successful prosecution of a terrorism-financing case was recently achieved.

    “Multilateral cooperation remains essential” 

    Mr. Voronkov emphasised the need for a coordinated, multilateral approach to counter Da’esh’s evolving strategies. 

    “Despite steady counter-terrorism efforts by Member States, international and regional partners, Da’esh continues to demonstrate resilience and adapt its modus operandi,” he told the Council. “The group’s ability to exploit instability highlights the need for sustained international collaboration.

    Ms. Gherman echoed this sentiment, urging countries to adopt long-term strategies that respect human rights and the rule of law.

    “CTED, working alongside Member States and other United Nations entities, remains committed to ensuring that our actions are responsive to emerging challenges,” she concluded. 

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Macoupin County Man Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for Possession of Firearms as a Felon

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    SPRINGFIELD, Ill. – Chad Dickerson, 34, of Brighton, Illinois, was sentenced on February 6, 2025, to 36 months of imprisonment for possessing a firearm as a felon, to be followed by 36 months of supervised release.

    At the sentencing hearing, U.S. District Judge Colleen R. Lawless found that Dickerson possessed four firearms and noted that all four were fully loaded.

    Dickerson pleaded guilty on September 4, 2024.

    The statutory penalties for possession of firearm by a felon are up to 15 years imprisonment, up to three years of supervised release, and up to a $250,000 fine.

    The Macoupin County Sheriff’s Office and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Sarah E. Seberger represented the government in the prosecution.

    The case against Dickerson is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK remains committed to achieving justice for survivors of Daesh crimes: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Statement by Fergus Eckersley, UK Minister Counsellor, at the UN Security Council meeting on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.

    The UK remains fully focused on tackling the continued threat from Daesh and its affiliates. 

    Whilst steady progress has been made by the international community to suppress Daesh, we cannot become complacent. 

    Daesh continues to exploit regional instability, drive division and seek new ways to finance its operations through emerging technology and this remains a global threat which we need to address collectively. 

    In the Middle East, after decades of atrocities committed by the Assad regime, the United Kingdom stands with the people of Syria and their desire to build a more stable, free and prosperous future. 

    We welcome continued efforts, including by the Global Coalition, to suppress Daesh and reduce the risk they pose as Syria embarks on this historic political transition.   

    Iraq also remains a critical partner – the reduction in Daesh’s influence and impact in Iraq is a credit to Iraqi determination and sustained military efforts, alongside Coalition partners.  

    The UK remains committed to achieving justice for survivors of Daesh crimes. 

    We will continue working with the Government of Iraq as they build on UNITAD’s legacy and deliver accountability through their National Centre for International Judicial Cooperation (NCIJC).

    In Asia, ISKP continue to pose a threat despite work to combat them, including by Pakistan, and other countries in the region. 

    The UK continues to coordinate action against the group through the ISKP Diplomatic Grouping, targeting their propaganda and seeking to restrict their access to financial resources.  

    In Africa, Daesh continues to spread across large parts of the continent, threatening regional stability and inspiring individuals to conduct attacks. 

    The African Union plays a central role in coordinating the international response, and the UK welcomes, for example. the renewed mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force and the recent deployment of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission to Somalia.  

    Finally, we cannot fight terrorism with force alone. 

    A whole of society approach with the meaningful participation of women is needed to address the long-term drivers of terrorism. 

    The protection of human rights and rule of law should be at the heart of all of our efforts.

    Updates to this page

    Published 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Video: Secretary Rubio meets with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty

    Source: United States of America – Department of State (video statements)

    Secretary of State Marco A. Rubio meets with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty at the Department of State, on February 10, 2025.

    ———-
    Under the leadership of the President and Secretary of State, the U.S. Department of State leads America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interests of the American people, their safety and economic prosperity. On behalf of the American people we promote and demonstrate democratic values and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world.

    The Secretary of State, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is the President’s chief foreign affairs adviser. The Secretary carries out the President’s foreign policies through the State Department, which includes the Foreign Service, Civil Service and U.S. Agency for International Development.

    Get updates from the U.S. Department of State at www.state.gov and on social media!
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    #StateDepartment #DepartmentofState #Diplomacy

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiX3RPJitb4

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Morocco

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 10, 2025

    End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    • Economic growth is accelerating thanks to strong domestic demand, amid a new investment cycle in many sectors.
    • Tax reforms have allowed the fiscal deficit in 2024 to be lower than expected while also funding spending measures. Going forward, saving part of the revenue windfall would help strengthen the fiscal buffers. The current monetary policy stance is appropriate and should remain data dependent.
    • Structural reforms should focus on strengthening job creation, including by better targeting active labor market polices, consolidating programs to support small and medium firms, and removing regulatory distortions that hinder firms’ growth.

    Rabat, Morocco: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team led by Roberto Cardarelli conducted discussions with the Moroccan authorities in Rabat on the 2025 Article IV Consultation from January 27 to February 7. At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Cardarelli issued the following statement:

    “Economic activity is expected to have grown by 3.2 percent in 2024 and to accelerate to 3.9 percent in 2025, as agricultural output rebounds after the recent droughts and the nonagricultural sector continues to expand at a robust pace amid strong domestic demand. Higher growth is expected to increase the current account deficit towards its estimated medium-term norm of around 3 percent, while inflation is expected to stabilize at around 2 percent. The risks to the outlook are broadly balanced, with significant uncertainty regarding the economic impact of geopolitical tensions and changing climate conditions.

    “With inflation expectations anchored around 2 percent and little signs of demand pressures, the current broadly neutral monetary policy stance is appropriate, and staff agrees with Bank Al-Maghrib that future changes of policy rates should remain data dependent. With inflation back to around 2 percent, Bank Al-Maghrib should continue its preparation to adopt an inflation-targeting framework.”

    “Recent reforms to the tax system and tax administration have helped expand the tax base while lowering the tax burden. As a result, tax revenues in 2024 have been greater than expected. With only a small part of the additional tax revenues being saved, the central government’s deficit for the year was 4.1 percent of GDP compared to the 4.3 announced in the 2024 Budget. While the 2025 Budget confirms the gradual pace of fiscal adjustment projected last year, higher-than-expected revenues should be used to accelerate the pace of debt reduction to levels closer to pre-pandemic. In addition, continuing to finance structural reforms may require further efforts to expand the tax base and rationalize spending, including by reducing transfers to state-owned enterprises as part of the ongoing reform of the sector and expanding the use of the Unified Social Registry to all social programs.

    “Staff welcomes the ongoing reform of the Organic Budget Law that should introduce a new fiscal rule based on a medium-term debt anchor. Good progress has been made in the Medium-Term fiscal framework to include an assessment of the risk from climate change. Staff encourages the authorities to build on this progress by adding more information on the impact of new policy measures and a quantification of the risks from the increased reliance on public-private partnership (PPP) projects.

     “Stronger job creation requires a novel approach to active labor market policies, focusing on labor displaced from the agricultural sector due to the sequence of droughts. A special focus should be placed on encouraging the growth of small and medium size enterprises (SME)  and favoring their integration into sectoral value chains. Staff welcomes the progress in the operationalization of the Mohammed VI Investment Fund that should help SMEs access equity financing. Measures that may encourage the development of a more buoyant private sector include strengthening the support for SMEs under the new Charter of Investment, strengthening regional investment centers so they can better help SMEs access the financial and technical resources needed for their growth, and reviewing the labor code, tax system, and regulatory and governance frameworks so as remove the distortion that incentivize firms to remain small or informal. It will also be necessary that the ongoing SOE reform effectively pursues market neutrality between public and private sector firms.

    “The IMF team held discussions with senior officials of the government of Morocco, Bank Al-Maghrib, and representatives of the public and private sectors. The team thanks the Moroccan authorities and other stakeholders for their hospitality and candid and productive discussions.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/10/pr-2533-morocco-imf-staff-completes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Neag School Alumni Board Announces the 2025 Alumni Award Winners

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    The UConn Neag School of Education and its Alumni Board are delighted to announce the 2025 Neag School Alumni Awards honorees. Eight outstanding graduates will be formally recognized at the Neag School’s 27th Annual Alumni Awards Celebration on Saturday, March 15.

    Outstanding School Educator – Tracey-Ann Lafayette ’15 (CLAS), ’15 (ED), ’16 MA, ’22 6th Year

    Tracey-Ann Lafayette ’15 (CLAS), ’15 (ED), ’16 MA, ’22 6th Year (Submitted photo)

    A graduate of the Neag School’s Integrated Bachelor’s/Master’s Teacher Education Program and UConn Administrator Preparation Program, Tracey-Ann Lafayette is an innovative educator dedicated to fostering inclusivity and academic excellence. She taught grades three and four at Robert J. O’Brien Elementary School in East Hartford, Connecticut, from 2016 until 2024. Currently, she teaches seventh-grade English Language Arts at Illing Middle School in Manchester, Connecticut. With expertise in culturally responsive teaching, Lafayette integrates diversity, advocacy, and conflict resolution into daily lessons, ensuring a positive classroom climate. A leader in professional development, Lafayette has facilitated workshops on equity and secured grants to support educational initiatives. Beyond the classroom, Lafayette has mentored aspiring educators of color through organizations like the Neag School’s Leadership in Diversity (LID) group, which she co-founded as a student, and the Neag School’s Diverse Educators Making Outstanding Change (DEMO) program. She co-founded the international Melanin Magic Educators collective, exemplifying her commitment to supporting educators of color. Her work has been featured on Connecticut’s WTNH Channel 8 and earned her a Fund for Teachers Fellowship (FFT). Through FFT, she had the opportunity to travel to South Africa to explore the connections between the country’s anti-apartheid movement and the civil rights movement here in the U.S. As a sought-after speaker, Lafayette has also presented at numerous conferences on anti-racist education and student activism. She is also a Malka Penn Award Committee member, allowing her to highlight literature promoting human rights.

    Outstanding Professional – Alicia Bowman ’01 (ED), ’02 MA, ’08 6th Year

    Alicia Bowman ’01 (ED), ’02 MA, ’08 6th Year (Submitted photo)

    Alicia Bowman is a highly accomplished educational leader with expertise in the instructional, operational, and financial aspects of school administration. As associate executive director of the Connecticut Association of Schools, Bowman champions visionary priorities for educational administrators through advocacy, coaching, and professional learning. Her tenure as assistant superintendent for finance and operations for Farmington Public Schools showcased her strategic leadership in mentoring, union collaboration, and large-scale improvement initiatives. Bowman’s impact extends to the classroom and beyond, having previously served as principal at Farmington’s West Woods Upper Elementary School, where she led innovative instructional models and established a Makerspace and flexible learning blocks. She is a lifelong learner, earning her bachelor’s, master’s, and 6th Year diploma from the Neag School, and her doctoral degree from the University of New England. She is also an adjunct faculty member, coach, and former mentor principal for the University of Connecticut Administrator Preparation Program (UCAPP). Widely recognized for her contributions, Bowman has been previously named National Distinguished Principal and Connecticut Elementary Principal of the Year. She has contributed to publications and presented at national forums on equity, leadership, and student-centered learning and is passionate about fostering inclusive, transformative educational systems.

    Outstanding Early Career Professional – Paul Singleton II ’17 MA, ’24 Ph.D.

    Paul Singleton II ’17 MA, ’24 Ph.D. (Submitted photo)

    Paul Singleton II is an accomplished educator, counselor, and advocate for equity in education, dedicated to fostering student success across diverse backgrounds. He holds a master’s in school counseling and a Ph.D. in educational psychology with a focus on counselor education and supervision from the Neag School, where his research centered on the impact of psychoeducational groups on African American male college students and their career readiness. Singleton is a counselor for grades seven through 12 and the diversity, equity, and inclusion coordinator at The Potomac School in McLean, Virginia. Singleton supports students’ academic and social-emotional development in these roles while implementing diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives to build an inclusive school culture. He is also the founding director of the Learning & Engagement at the Potomac School (LEAP) Program, a pioneering effort to enhance student engagement and leadership through tailored support and mentorship. Previously, Singleton has contributed to initiatives such as UConn’s ScHOLA²RS House, focusing on retention and success for Black male students, and has taught graduate courses in school counseling. His widely recognized work, publications, and presentations reflect his passion for empowering students to achieve their full potential.

    Outstanding School Administrator – Lori Leibowitz ’19 Cert.

    Lori Leibowitz ’19 Cert. (Submitted photo)

    With over two decades of experience in education, Lori Leibowitz is a distinguished administrator, educator, and advocate for equity in gifted education who holds a graduate certificate from the Neag School in gifted education and talent development. As the district administrator for Gifted and Talented and the Arts in Norwalk, Connecticut, she has overseen the redesign and implementation of innovative programs, increasing gifted identification rates by 25% and ensuring equitable access for underrepresented populations. Leibowitz’s leadership extends across teacher coaching and districtwide events celebrating diversity and inclusion. A published author, Leibowitz has contributed to scholarly works on gifted education, talent development, and social justice for multilingual learners. Her dissertation at Baylor University focused on empowering Hispanic multilingual learners through a social justice curriculum. She is a sought-after presenter, sharing insights at national conferences such as the National Association of Gifted Children (NAGC), the National Association of Bilingual Educators (NABE), and UConn’s Confratute. Leibowitz has earned accolades such as the Gifted Coordinator Award (NAGC, 2020) and the Outstanding Dissertation Award (NABE, 2024). A dedicated advocate for transformative education, she continues to drive change through research, innovation, and collaboration.

    Outstanding School Superintendent – Howard Thiery III ’91 MS, ’07 ELP

    Howard J. Thiery III ’91 MS, ’07 ELP (Submitted photo)

    A graduate of the Neag School’s Executive Leadership Program (ELP), Howard Thiery III is a dedicated and innovative educational leader with over three decades of experience spanning K-12 and higher education. Thiery also holds a master’s degree in physiology and neurobiology from UConn. As superintendent of Regional School District 10 since 2019, he has championed initiatives that enhance student creativity, increase access to college-credit courses, and improve special education services. Under his leadership, the district has implemented a systemic leadership development system, restructured administrative frameworks to focus on high-quality learning, and launched personalized learning opportunities. Previously, Thiery served as superintendent for Regional School District 17, assistant superintendent for Southington Public Schools, and principal of the Greater Hartford Academy of Math and Science, where he managed curriculum development and led a visionary approach to STEM education. His contributions have extended internationally through his work with UConn’s Advanced Instructional Leadership Program in Jordan and his role as chair of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges Commission on International Education. An accomplished educator and author, Thiery’s publications and teaching reflect a lifelong commitment to academic excellence and innovation.

    Outstanding Higher Education Professional – Daniel Burkey ’23 MA

    Daniel Burkey ’23 MA (UConn photo)

    Daniel Burkey is an accomplished chemical engineer, educator, and academic leader. With degrees from Lehigh University, MIT, and the University of Connecticut, Burkey’s expertise spans chemical engineering and educational psychology, specializing in research methods and engineering education innovation. Currently the associate dean for undergraduate education, outreach, and diversity in UConn’s College of Engineering, he has overseen transformative growth, including a 70% enrollment increase and initiatives to triple female enrollment. He co-developed the College’s new Ph.D. in Engineering Education program and launched innovative undergraduate teaching programs. As an educator, Burkey integrates cutting-edge techniques like game-based learning, earning accolades such as the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) David Himmelblau Award and multiple university teaching awards. His contributions to process safety education and curriculum design are widely recognized, alongside his leadership roles in professional organizations like AIChE, where he was recently elected as a Fellow. Burkey has secured significant research funding, authored book chapters, and developed pioneering educational technologies. Beyond academia, his mentorship and advocacy for diversity and inclusion continue to shape the next generation of engineers.

    Outstanding Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Professional – Fany DeJesús Hannon ’08 MA

    Fany DeJesús Hannon ’08 MA (UConn photo)

    Fany DeJesús Hannon, who holds a Master of Arts in higher education from UConn, is an accomplished higher education administrator and educator dedicated to fostering holistic student success and belonging. She also holds a doctorate in education from New England College. As dean of students at UConn, she leads initiatives addressing critical issues like crisis management, free speech, and student equity, ensuring inclusive engagement and retention across diverse populations. With over 18 years of higher education leadership experience, Hannon has championed programs enhancing cultural identity, leadership, and academic achievement, notably increasing Latinx/a/o retention and graduation rates during her tenure as director of the Puerto Rican/Latin American Cultural Center. A passionate advocate for first-generation and marginalized students, Hannon collaborates with University leadership, faculty, and legislative bodies to develop policies supporting access, equity, and well-being. Her teaching philosophy, rooted in Paulo Freire’s scholarship, centers on student engagement and diverse learning styles. Recognized for her leadership, she has earned accolades like the Nuestro Orgullo Hispano award and has presented nationally on diversity and mentoring. Fluent in multiple languages, she combines strategic vision with cultural competency to empower and inspire future leaders.

    Distinguished Alumnus – Mark Daigneault ’07 (ED)

    Mark Daigneault ’07 (ED) (Oklahoma City Thunder photo)

    Mark Daigneault is the head coach of the NBA’s Oklahoma City Thunder. He previously served as head coach of the Oklahoma City Blue, the Thunder’s G-League affiliate, for five seasons. Originally from Massachusetts, Daigneault graduated with a BA in education from UConn, where he also worked as a student manager for the men’s basketball team. He has credited his studies with being able to connect with players. Daigneault’s coaching career began at Holy Cross, followed by an assistantship at the University of Florida, where he was involved in scouting and working with players off the court. During his tenure, the Gators achieved three SEC titles and four Elite Eight appearances. In 2020, Daigneault became the Thunder’s head coach, guiding the team through a rebuilding phase. Daigneault was 35 years old at the time, becoming the second-youngest head coach in the NBA. In 2023-2024, the Thunder became the youngest team in NBA history to earn the best regular season record in the NBA’s Western Conference, with Daigneault being awarded NBA Coach of the Year. Known for his innovative coaching style, defensive strategies, and player-development focus, Daigneault is praised by players for his adaptability and fostering strong relationships.

    For more information on the event, visit s.uconn.edu/NeagAlumni2025.

    To learn more about the UConn Neag School of Education, visit education.uconn.edu and follow the Neag School on InstagramFacebook, X, and LinkedIn. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Morocco

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    February 10, 2025

    End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    • Economic growth is accelerating thanks to strong domestic demand, amid a new investment cycle in many sectors.
    • Tax reforms have allowed the fiscal deficit in 2024 to be lower than expected while also funding spending measures. Going forward, saving part of the revenue windfall would help strengthen the fiscal buffers. The current monetary policy stance is appropriate and should remain data dependent.
    • Structural reforms should focus on strengthening job creation, including by better targeting active labor market polices, consolidating programs to support small and medium firms, and removing regulatory distortions that hinder firms’ growth.

    Rabat, Morocco: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team led by Roberto Cardarelli conducted discussions with the Moroccan authorities in Rabat on the 2025 Article IV Consultation from January 27 to February 7. At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Cardarelli issued the following statement:

    “Economic activity is expected to have grown by 3.2 percent in 2024 and to accelerate to 3.9 percent in 2025, as agricultural output rebounds after the recent droughts and the nonagricultural sector continues to expand at a robust pace amid strong domestic demand. Higher growth is expected to increase the current account deficit towards its estimated medium-term norm of around 3 percent, while inflation is expected to stabilize at around 2 percent. The risks to the outlook are broadly balanced, with significant uncertainty regarding the economic impact of geopolitical tensions and changing climate conditions.

    “With inflation expectations anchored around 2 percent and little signs of demand pressures, the current broadly neutral monetary policy stance is appropriate, and staff agrees with Bank Al-Maghrib that future changes of policy rates should remain data dependent. With inflation back to around 2 percent, Bank Al-Maghrib should continue its preparation to adopt an inflation-targeting framework.”

    “Recent reforms to the tax system and tax administration have helped expand the tax base while lowering the tax burden. As a result, tax revenues in 2024 have been greater than expected. With only a small part of the additional tax revenues being saved, the central government’s deficit for the year was 4.1 percent of GDP compared to the 4.3 announced in the 2024 Budget. While the 2025 Budget confirms the gradual pace of fiscal adjustment projected last year, higher-than-expected revenues should be used to accelerate the pace of debt reduction to levels closer to pre-pandemic. In addition, continuing to finance structural reforms may require further efforts to expand the tax base and rationalize spending, including by reducing transfers to state-owned enterprises as part of the ongoing reform of the sector and expanding the use of the Unified Social Registry to all social programs.

    “Staff welcomes the ongoing reform of the Organic Budget Law that should introduce a new fiscal rule based on a medium-term debt anchor. Good progress has been made in the Medium-Term fiscal framework to include an assessment of the risk from climate change. Staff encourages the authorities to build on this progress by adding more information on the impact of new policy measures and a quantification of the risks from the increased reliance on public-private partnership (PPP) projects.

     “Stronger job creation requires a novel approach to active labor market policies, focusing on labor displaced from the agricultural sector due to the sequence of droughts. A special focus should be placed on encouraging the growth of small and medium size enterprises (SME)  and favoring their integration into sectoral value chains. Staff welcomes the progress in the operationalization of the Mohammed VI Investment Fund that should help SMEs access equity financing. Measures that may encourage the development of a more buoyant private sector include strengthening the support for SMEs under the new Charter of Investment, strengthening regional investment centers so they can better help SMEs access the financial and technical resources needed for their growth, and reviewing the labor code, tax system, and regulatory and governance frameworks so as remove the distortion that incentivize firms to remain small or informal. It will also be necessary that the ongoing SOE reform effectively pursues market neutrality between public and private sector firms.

    “The IMF team held discussions with senior officials of the government of Morocco, Bank Al-Maghrib, and representatives of the public and private sectors. The team thanks the Moroccan authorities and other stakeholders for their hospitality and candid and productive discussions.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: Healthcare in Africa on brink of crisis as US exits WHO and USAid freezes funds: health scholar explains why

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Catherine Kyobutungi, Executive Director, African Population and Health Research Center

    US president Donald Trump has taken a series of decisions that have delivered body blows to the global management of health. He has announced that the US will leave the World Health Organization. And a 90-day freeze has been placed on money distributed by the US Agency for International Development (USAid) pending a review by the US State Department. This includes funds for the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (Pepfar). The decisions have triggered alarm in the global health sector.

    Catherine Kyobutungi, executive director of the African Population and Health Research Center, outlines which countries are most at risk and which health programmes will suffer the most damage.

    What does the US exit mean for Africa?

    The US exit from the WHO and the freeze announced on USAid funding are devastating moves that will have drastic effects on the health of millions of people in Africa.

    The US is by far the WHO’s largest state donor, contributing approximately 18% of the agency’s total funding.

    US development aid is used to run large-scale health programmes on the continent. For example, Nigeria received approximately US$600 million in health assistance from the US, over 21% of the 2023 health budget.

    The WHO is a global health body that synthesises scientific research and develops guidelines that countries in Africa rely on to shape their own policies and practices.

    The biggest loss for Africa under the USAID umbrella will be funding for Pepfar, which is used for HIV-related programmes including prevention, testing and treatment. Through Pepfar, the US government has invested over US$110 billion in the global HIV/Aids response.




    Read more:
    WHO in Africa: three ways the continent stands to lose from Trump’s decision to pull out


    What’s going to be lost?

    A range of capabilities.

    Firstly, technical guidance. The WHO provides technical guidance to countries on issues ranging from TB management to cost-effective malaria control.

    Secondly, the ability to mobilise resources. The WHO has the mandate and mechanisms to assemble experts from across the globe to evaluate new therapeutics, diagnostics and vaccines. They can evaluate new evidence on emerging patterns of new bugs, resistance to current treatments, and so on.

    Thirdly, the WHO has tools and mechanisms that have been key to African countries’ health policy decisions. These include:

    • the WHO’s list of Essential Medicines to inform decision-making on critical drugs

    • a similar mechanism to evaluate new vaccines, resulting in guidance that makes regulatory approval faster and easier in African countries which don’t have strong systems.

    Fourth, the WHO also provides resources for emergency response, as in the event of disease outbreaks such as Ebola and COVID-19. The WHO is able to quickly mobilise experts and funds and to coordinate emergency responses.

    Fifth, the WHO provides evidence-informed guidelines. It does this by gathering and sharing information like the causes of outbreaks, while monitoring signals of potential outbreaks and coordinating efforts to develop new technologies, such as vaccines and medical devices.

    Sixth, the WHO’s ability to support critical programmes in tuberculosis prevention and emergency response will be reduced.

    Seventh, the withdrawal of US citizens working in these global agencies – and the orders to stop sharing data – mean the US is essentially excluded from global information-sharing mechanisms that keep us all safe. It will be harder to share information about emerging health threats in the US with the rest of the world and vice versa.

    Which countries will be most affected?

    Many African countries are heavily reliant on the support provided by Pepfar and USAID to fund programmes in the health sector and for humanitarian assistance.

    Countries which will be most affected are those with a high burden of HIV, TB and malaria and those with large populations of refugee and internally displaced people.

    Currently the top eight USAid recipients in Africa are: Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    Without funds being rapidly mobilised to fill the gap left by the US withdrawal, the effect on the health of millions of Africans is at stake. Failure to prevent new infections, and the threat of drug resistance developing because of disrupted treatment, will have far-reaching consequences.

    In Uganda, where about 1.4 million people are living with HIV/Aids, 60% of the spending on its HIV/Aids programme was from Pepfar, and about 20% from the Global Fund (partly funded from Pepfar).

    A drastic reduction in funding will be devastating for patients and the greater health system.

    The Pepfar programme, a lifeline for millions of Africans, has been under threat since before the most recent aid freeze. In 2024, the American congress only gave a one-year authorisation instead of the typical five-year funding authorisation.

    A conservative backlash against this programme has been growing for years with concerns that some funds may be used to fund abortion. The current authorisation expires in March 2025 and falls within the 90-day aid review period. With the current approval expiring next month, and in light of the current atmosphere, it is very likely that it may not be renewed.




    Read more:
    How US policy on abortion affects women in Africa


    What steps should African countries be taking?

    There has a been a lot of discussion around jobs and lives lost, but not much around what happens next: how African governments are planning on mitigating shortfalls in their health budget in the short term and foreseeable future.

    Therefore we need to ask our governments what that means for us and how they are planning to ensure that we do not reverse the gains made so far. This includes preventing millions of HIV infections, improved testing and provision of life-saving antiretroviral treatment.

    The sudden and drastic decisions taken by the Trump administration have been hailed by several commentators as the wake-up call the continent needs – to wean itself off dependency on a flawed “development aid” system that is admittedly a tool for geopolitical influence.




    Read more:
    US health funding cuts: what Nigeria stands to lose


    The disbelief and chaos in the global health sector should be rapidly mobilised into citizen action, for governments to invest in a critical sector that has depended on foreign assistance for too long. In the absence of sustained investment, the gains in the health sector may be lost, reversing decades of progress in global health.

    Lastly, Africans, especially scientists and academics, need to stand up to the worrying anti-science trend that underlies some of these drastic policies. The growing mistrust in science and scientific institutions will not abate unless it is challenged.

    It is ridiculous that a continent of 1.3 billion people is reliant on the whims of one man many kilometres away; on his signature on a single document.

    The world needs to wake up. We need to wake up.

    Catherine Kyobutungi works for the African Population and Health Research Center which receives funding from the National Institutes of Health, Wellcome, and the Gates Foundation

    ref. Healthcare in Africa on brink of crisis as US exits WHO and USAid freezes funds: health scholar explains why – https://theconversation.com/healthcare-in-africa-on-brink-of-crisis-as-us-exits-who-and-usaid-freezes-funds-health-scholar-explains-why-248906

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Glawion, Senior research fellow at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg, Germany, University of Freiburg

    Since it became independent in 1960, the Central African Republic has grappled with poverty, instability and governance challenges.

    A decade into former president François Bozizé’s corrupt rule, a rebellion broke out and toppled the president in 2013. What followed was a devastatingly violent civil war with thousands of people killed and a fifth of the populace displaced.

    To halt violence against civilians, numerous international actors intervened, including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and France. From 2014 onward they put thousands of boots on the ground and pushed rebels from most towns, while protecting and supporting the interim administration.

    But by 2016 all actors had retreated, save the United Nations (UN). The mission – Minusca – was not able to contain a resurgence in rebellion, and the newly elected president Faustin-Archange Touadéra turned to Russian paramilitaries to stabilise his rule in 2017.

    These paramilitaries started out only as “trainers” but took on more prominent and direct combat roles as the years passed, making the country a geopolitical playing field. The Russian paramilitaries and national army again pushed the rebels out of most towns and into the countryside.

    I have studied the Central African Republic’s politics for over a decade, conducting research in towns across the country. I wanted to find out why some areas were more affected by violence than others and how people locally lived together. I believed that in such local stories we might find missing links as to why all the actors involved failed to provide the protection from violence and provision of services that people desired.

    To study people’s expectations of peacekeepers, I used a method I call the “qualitative” survey. This type of survey asks open questions, for example “what do you expect of international actors?”. This leaves space for people to say things that researchers might not have expected. It also included more typical closed questions like “how safe do you feel, on a scale from 1 to 5?”.

    With a team of Central African researchers, I conducted these surveys in four places in 2019 and in two places in 2023 and 2024. At this stage respondents had experienced foreign peacekeeping missions and Russian paramilitary presence.

    We found that peacekeeping missions were losing popular support because they were not fulfilling the expectations of people in the Central African Republic.

    People wanted peacekeepers to confront armed actors. When peacekeepers failed to do so, they criticised them, even requested them to leave.

    Russian paramilitaries offered the forceful response that autocratic regimes and many locals wanted. However, they provided a too simplistic answer to people’s demands, based only on the present. People also had future expectations: they wanted armed actors to be kicked out so that people might be treated fairly and witness the return of a caring state in the near future.

    Thus, while peacekeepers frustrated initial expectations and Russian paramilitaries might fulfil them, the Central African state and their Russian paramilitary allies were not building the future people expected.

    Expectations

    The overall results of the survey showed that people had the most confidence in local institutions, while harbouring high expectations for the state (when it returns), and being broadly disappointed by international peacekeepers.

    The results varied strongly according to local experiences with the state and international actors. Most intriguingly, respondents did not necessarily feel safest in those localities that had the fewest violent incidents. I call this the “security paradox” and it has much to do with unmet expectations for which we need to dig into individual responses.

    Take the example of a middle-aged woman in the Central African Republic’s north-eastern and long rebel-held town of Ndélé, who made two points in early 2019. First, the United Nations peacekeeping mission, Minusca, was inactive in the face of aggression. Second, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were doing a good job:

    Partner organisations such as Minusca who reside among our population do not seem to be there to ensure our protection, as we hear on the radio. A person may well be raped, and they do not even react to rescue the person in danger, even if they know about it. On the other hand, the NGOs are doing a very good job, and it is thanks to them that Ndélé is doing well today.

    However, my own analysis showed that, objectively speaking, both peacekeepers and aid organisations were doing a mediocre job. Under the peacekeepers’ watch few violent incidents occurred and the aid organisations were only covering a fraction of local needs, much less than in other studied localities.

    The difference in perception, I argue, stems from the fact that local people have certain expectations for security and different expectations for service provision in the Central African Republic.

    Security in the Central African Republic is marked by an abundance of armed groups threatening people’s livelihoods. Dozens are currently active, of which a handful have been roaming for more than a decade, controlling trade routes and resources, as well as wielding local political power.

    Services like schooling, health and electricity are almost entirely absent in many areas outside the capital; not even the state provides them.

    Thus, in the security sector, people expect confrontation of armed actors by either the UN peacekeeping mission or the Russian paramilitary, whereas in services they want NGOs to substitute for government failings. Or in the words of an Ndélé trader:

    The international actors can help us during these absences of state authority.

    However, Minusca was not ready to forcefully oppose armed actors as they pursued an approach based on negotiating peace agreements and pursuing voluntary integration or disarmament. What my study shows is that doing too little in the eyes of the population can quickly turn the rumour mill, as this woman in Ndélé suggested:

    As for Minusca, we do not see its work in favour of our well-being, and we even want it to leave since we have seen that it is the cause of our current division and suffering.

    But would confrontation have brought more popular support to Minusca? Well, it did to another actor that stepped in, as a national staffer of an aid organisation stated in early 2022 in Bambari:

    Minusca patrols do not have the confidence of the population. Because in front of Minusca forces, the rebels kill the population. For seven years, Minusca was unable to secure the town. Within minutes, the Central African Armed Forces and their Russian allies managed to dislodge them from the town of Bambari, which is now secure.

    Reality

    I did not judge whether people’s expectations of interventions were realistic.

    Given the state’s history in the Central African Republic, it was surprising how many people wanted a state and army to return.

    However, people were hoping for a “benevolent” state return. This has not happened.

    And as for the Russian “allies”, as they are called in the Central African Republic: their confrontational approach has caused heavy collateral damage and has failed to stabilise former rebel areas. Rebellion is again on the rise.

    My study shows how important it is to analyse expectations in-depth, and to take them as a starting point of intervention policy. Not understanding people’s expectations is what caught peacekeepers by surprise when people started demonstrating in front of their bases and even calling for their withdrawal.

    While there might be good reasons not to pursue a forceful approach against rebels, interveners must be aware that they thereby deceive public expectations and should thus proactively listen to and engage the population about their demands.

    The dilemma is that fulfilling people’s initial expectations does not automatically lead to the future they desire. So there must be difficult and open discussions about what is and what is not feasible in peacekeeping.

    Tim Glawion receives funding from the public German Science Foundation (DFG, project number: 437386574).

    ref. Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace – https://theconversation.com/central-african-republic-listening-to-peoples-stories-about-foreign-forces-could-help-bring-peace-247834

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Healthcare in Africa on brink of crisis as US exits WHO and USAid freezes funds: health scholar explains why

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Catherine Kyobutungi, Executive Director, African Population and Health Research Center

    US president Donald Trump has taken a series of decisions that have delivered body blows to the global management of health. He has announced that the US will leave the World Health Organization. And a 90-day freeze has been placed on money distributed by the US Agency for International Development (USAid) pending a review by the US State Department. This includes funds for the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (Pepfar). The decisions have triggered alarm in the global health sector.

    Catherine Kyobutungi, executive director of the African Population and Health Research Center, outlines which countries are most at risk and which health programmes will suffer the most damage.

    What does the US exit mean for Africa?

    The US exit from the WHO and the freeze announced on USAid funding are devastating moves that will have drastic effects on the health of millions of people in Africa.

    The US is by far the WHO’s largest state donor, contributing approximately 18% of the agency’s total funding.

    US development aid is used to run large-scale health programmes on the continent. For example, Nigeria received approximately US$600 million in health assistance from the US, over 21% of the 2023 health budget.

    The WHO is a global health body that synthesises scientific research and develops guidelines that countries in Africa rely on to shape their own policies and practices.

    The biggest loss for Africa under the USAID umbrella will be funding for Pepfar, which is used for HIV-related programmes including prevention, testing and treatment. Through Pepfar, the US government has invested over US$110 billion in the global HIV/Aids response.


    Read more: WHO in Africa: three ways the continent stands to lose from Trump’s decision to pull out


    What’s going to be lost?

    A range of capabilities.

    Firstly, technical guidance. The WHO provides technical guidance to countries on issues ranging from TB management to cost-effective malaria control.

    Secondly, the ability to mobilise resources. The WHO has the mandate and mechanisms to assemble experts from across the globe to evaluate new therapeutics, diagnostics and vaccines. They can evaluate new evidence on emerging patterns of new bugs, resistance to current treatments, and so on.

    Thirdly, the WHO has tools and mechanisms that have been key to African countries’ health policy decisions. These include:

    • the WHO’s list of Essential Medicines to inform decision-making on critical drugs

    • a similar mechanism to evaluate new vaccines, resulting in guidance that makes regulatory approval faster and easier in African countries which don’t have strong systems.

    Fourth, the WHO also provides resources for emergency response, as in the event of disease outbreaks such as Ebola and COVID-19. The WHO is able to quickly mobilise experts and funds and to coordinate emergency responses.

    Fifth, the WHO provides evidence-informed guidelines. It does this by gathering and sharing information like the causes of outbreaks, while monitoring signals of potential outbreaks and coordinating efforts to develop new technologies, such as vaccines and medical devices.

    Sixth, the WHO’s ability to support critical programmes in tuberculosis prevention and emergency response will be reduced.

    Seventh, the withdrawal of US citizens working in these global agencies – and the orders to stop sharing data – mean the US is essentially excluded from global information-sharing mechanisms that keep us all safe. It will be harder to share information about emerging health threats in the US with the rest of the world and vice versa.

    Which countries will be most affected?

    Many African countries are heavily reliant on the support provided by Pepfar and USAID to fund programmes in the health sector and for humanitarian assistance.

    Countries which will be most affected are those with a high burden of HIV, TB and malaria and those with large populations of refugee and internally displaced people.

    Currently the top eight USAid recipients in Africa are: Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    Without funds being rapidly mobilised to fill the gap left by the US withdrawal, the effect on the health of millions of Africans is at stake. Failure to prevent new infections, and the threat of drug resistance developing because of disrupted treatment, will have far-reaching consequences.

    In Uganda, where about 1.4 million people are living with HIV/Aids, 60% of the spending on its HIV/Aids programme was from Pepfar, and about 20% from the Global Fund (partly funded from Pepfar).

    A drastic reduction in funding will be devastating for patients and the greater health system.

    The Pepfar programme, a lifeline for millions of Africans, has been under threat since before the most recent aid freeze. In 2024, the American congress only gave a one-year authorisation instead of the typical five-year funding authorisation.

    A conservative backlash against this programme has been growing for years with concerns that some funds may be used to fund abortion. The current authorisation expires in March 2025 and falls within the 90-day aid review period. With the current approval expiring next month, and in light of the current atmosphere, it is very likely that it may not be renewed.


    Read more: How US policy on abortion affects women in Africa


    What steps should African countries be taking?

    There has a been a lot of discussion around jobs and lives lost, but not much around what happens next: how African governments are planning on mitigating shortfalls in their health budget in the short term and foreseeable future.

    Therefore we need to ask our governments what that means for us and how they are planning to ensure that we do not reverse the gains made so far. This includes preventing millions of HIV infections, improved testing and provision of life-saving antiretroviral treatment.

    The sudden and drastic decisions taken by the Trump administration have been hailed by several commentators as the wake-up call the continent needs – to wean itself off dependency on a flawed “development aid” system that is admittedly a tool for geopolitical influence.


    Read more: US health funding cuts: what Nigeria stands to lose


    The disbelief and chaos in the global health sector should be rapidly mobilised into citizen action, for governments to invest in a critical sector that has depended on foreign assistance for too long. In the absence of sustained investment, the gains in the health sector may be lost, reversing decades of progress in global health.

    Lastly, Africans, especially scientists and academics, need to stand up to the worrying anti-science trend that underlies some of these drastic policies. The growing mistrust in science and scientific institutions will not abate unless it is challenged.

    It is ridiculous that a continent of 1.3 billion people is reliant on the whims of one man many kilometres away; on his signature on a single document.

    The world needs to wake up. We need to wake up.

    – Healthcare in Africa on brink of crisis as US exits WHO and USAid freezes funds: health scholar explains why
    – https://theconversation.com/healthcare-in-africa-on-brink-of-crisis-as-us-exits-who-and-usaid-freezes-funds-health-scholar-explains-why-248906

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State University

    With France fast losing its influence in west Africa’s Sahel region and an unpredictable US president in power, will China fill the vacuum?

    The Sahel region covers 10 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

    French troops have been expelled from three of these – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – after military coups. Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast have also expelled French troops. The troops were there because of the security threat from extremist groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province.

    Niger also ended an agreement to keep about 1,000 US troops involved in a counter-terrorism mission. Niger’s military government described the US as having a “condescending attitude”.

    While it has been rightly argued that the presence of the western powers did not resolve the security challenges of the region, their withdrawal creates a vacuum.

    I am a political science and international relations researcher who has been studying China-Africa relations for over a decade.

    I argue that Beijing could take advantage of the vacuum in the Sahel in at least three ways: expansion of investments in critical minerals; resolution of the Ecowas crisis (when Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali exited the regional bloc); and increased arms sales.

    This is especially so as China is not new to the Sahel region of west Africa. For instance, China is constructing a US$32 million headquarters for Ecowas in Abuja, Nigeria.

    Three ways China could benefit

    First, China could expand its influence – and the next four years hold enormous opportunities in this regard.

    US president Donald Trump’s likely transactional and unpredictable approach to international relations may force African countries to look to China. For instance, they may need China to help fill the void created by the US decision to dismantle USAID and freeze international development aid.

    Nigeria joined Brics as a partner country a few days before the inauguration of Trump. Brics is a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This decision by the largest economy in the Sahel is an expression of its commitment to China – with potential implications for other Sahelian countries.

    The vacuum offers Beijing the opportunity to strengthen its investment and position as a top beneficiary of the critical minerals, such as gold, copper, lithium and uranium, in the Sahel region.

    In 2024, west African gold production was estimated to be 11.83 million ounces. Ghana, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Guinea and Mali were the major contributors.

    Second, China is in a unique position to push for a resolution of the Ecowas crisis.

    Following military coups, the Ecowas regional economic bloc sanctioned Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Ecowas even threatened Niger with a military invasion. The three countries then decided to leave Ecowas to form the Alliance of Sahel States.

    As a neutral actor whose non-interference policy accommodates both civil and military regimes, Beijing is in a position to bring Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States into negotiation before the final departure date of 29 July 2025.

    If it succeeds, China would look more like a peaceful power, an image that is contested by others.

    Building on its soft power projects like the Confucius Institutes and scholarships, China would look like the “saviour” of Ecowas integration.

    This is what it did in the case of the Tazara railway project, where China supported Tanzania and Zambia to build a railway line together. It supported the African countries when the US and Europe had failed, were reluctant or were not interested.

    Third is Chinese arms sales.

    Chinese arms are already in the Sahel. In 2019, Nigeria signed a US$152 million contract with the China North Industries Corporation Limited (Norinco) to provide some of the weapons needed to fight the Boko Haram terror group. Since then, Chinese drones and other equipment have become a feature in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism response.

    The Chinese arms market could receive a major boost beyond Nigeria with the withdrawal of western countries from the Sahel. Western countries are likely to be reluctant to sell arms to the countries that have evicted their military.

    Sanctions on Russia have also increased the likelihood of Chinese arms in the Sahel.

    For example, a few months after France and the US left the region, some reports suggested that Russian mercenaries in the Sahel region were using Chinese weapons. Norinco – China’s top arms manufacturer and seventh largest arms supplier in the world – has opened sales offices in Nigeria and Senegal.

    In June 2024, Burkina Faso received 100 tanks from China. Three months after, Mali signed an agreement with Norinco to bolster its fight against terrorism.

    Bumpy road ahead

    China’s non-interference can accommodate both civil and military governments in the Sahel. This is an advantage for Beijing in some ways. But it could also have unexpected impacts.

    There are competing local interests in the Sahel and Beijing’s deepening involvement could be (mis)interpreted as supporting one over the other.

    This could make Chinese interests a target in the violence.

    It is also unclear if China is capable or willing to fill the vacuum created by the evicted western powers. But it looks as though China can benefit from the situation in the Sahel in the short term.

    Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi has previously received research funding or travel support from organisations like the KU Leuven, Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh, Lagos State University, Chatham House (i.e. Robert Bosch Stiftung), Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED), Think Tank Initiative, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Coimbra Group Scholarship Programme, Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TetFund), Global Challenge Research Fund (GCRF), American Council of Learned Societies’ African Humanities Program (ACLS-AHP), Merian Institute of Advanced Studies in Africa (MIASA), Development Studies Association (DSA) UK, Collective for the Renewal of Africa (CORA), Ford Foundation, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), and Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS). However, I must clearly and strongly state that none of these funders have at any time sought to influence or influenced my writings or public engagement. Thus, this article is one of my many expressions of my academic freedom.

    ref. Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits – https://theconversation.com/power-vacuum-in-west-africas-sahel-3-ways-china-could-fill-the-gap-as-west-exits-248353

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Glawion, Senior research fellow at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg, Germany, University of Freiburg

    Since it became independent in 1960, the Central African Republic has grappled with poverty, instability and governance challenges.

    A decade into former president François Bozizé’s corrupt rule, a rebellion broke out and toppled the president in 2013. What followed was a devastatingly violent civil war with thousands of people killed and a fifth of the populace displaced.

    To halt violence against civilians, numerous international actors intervened, including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and France. From 2014 onward they put thousands of boots on the ground and pushed rebels from most towns, while protecting and supporting the interim administration.

    But by 2016 all actors had retreated, save the United Nations (UN). The mission – Minusca – was not able to contain a resurgence in rebellion, and the newly elected president Faustin-Archange Touadéra turned to Russian paramilitaries to stabilise his rule in 2017.

    These paramilitaries started out only as “trainers” but took on more prominent and direct combat roles as the years passed, making the country a geopolitical playing field. The Russian paramilitaries and national army again pushed the rebels out of most towns and into the countryside.

    I have studied the Central African Republic’s politics for over a decade, conducting research in towns across the country. I wanted to find out why some areas were more affected by violence than others and how people locally lived together. I believed that in such local stories we might find missing links as to why all the actors involved failed to provide the protection from violence and provision of services that people desired.

    To study people’s expectations of peacekeepers, I used a method I call the “qualitative” survey. This type of survey asks open questions, for example “what do you expect of international actors?”. This leaves space for people to say things that researchers might not have expected. It also included more typical closed questions like “how safe do you feel, on a scale from 1 to 5?”.

    With a team of Central African researchers, I conducted these surveys in four places in 2019 and in two places in 2023 and 2024. At this stage respondents had experienced foreign peacekeeping missions and Russian paramilitary presence.

    We found that peacekeeping missions were losing popular support because they were not fulfilling the expectations of people in the Central African Republic.

    People wanted peacekeepers to confront armed actors. When peacekeepers failed to do so, they criticised them, even requested them to leave.

    Russian paramilitaries offered the forceful response that autocratic regimes and many locals wanted. However, they provided a too simplistic answer to people’s demands, based only on the present. People also had future expectations: they wanted armed actors to be kicked out so that people might be treated fairly and witness the return of a caring state in the near future.

    Thus, while peacekeepers frustrated initial expectations and Russian paramilitaries might fulfil them, the Central African state and their Russian paramilitary allies were not building the future people expected.

    Expectations

    The overall results of the survey showed that people had the most confidence in local institutions, while harbouring high expectations for the state (when it returns), and being broadly disappointed by international peacekeepers.

    The results varied strongly according to local experiences with the state and international actors. Most intriguingly, respondents did not necessarily feel safest in those localities that had the fewest violent incidents. I call this the “security paradox” and it has much to do with unmet expectations for which we need to dig into individual responses.

    Take the example of a middle-aged woman in the Central African Republic’s north-eastern and long rebel-held town of Ndélé, who made two points in early 2019. First, the United Nations peacekeeping mission, Minusca, was inactive in the face of aggression. Second, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were doing a good job:

    Partner organisations such as Minusca who reside among our population do not seem to be there to ensure our protection, as we hear on the radio. A person may well be raped, and they do not even react to rescue the person in danger, even if they know about it. On the other hand, the NGOs are doing a very good job, and it is thanks to them that Ndélé is doing well today.

    However, my own analysis showed that, objectively speaking, both peacekeepers and aid organisations were doing a mediocre job. Under the peacekeepers’ watch few violent incidents occurred and the aid organisations were only covering a fraction of local needs, much less than in other studied localities.

    The difference in perception, I argue, stems from the fact that local people have certain expectations for security and different expectations for service provision in the Central African Republic.

    Security in the Central African Republic is marked by an abundance of armed groups threatening people’s livelihoods. Dozens are currently active, of which a handful have been roaming for more than a decade, controlling trade routes and resources, as well as wielding local political power.

    Services like schooling, health and electricity are almost entirely absent in many areas outside the capital; not even the state provides them.

    Thus, in the security sector, people expect confrontation of armed actors by either the UN peacekeeping mission or the Russian paramilitary, whereas in services they want NGOs to substitute for government failings. Or in the words of an Ndélé trader:

    The international actors can help us during these absences of state authority.

    However, Minusca was not ready to forcefully oppose armed actors as they pursued an approach based on negotiating peace agreements and pursuing voluntary integration or disarmament. What my study shows is that doing too little in the eyes of the population can quickly turn the rumour mill, as this woman in Ndélé suggested:

    As for Minusca, we do not see its work in favour of our well-being, and we even want it to leave since we have seen that it is the cause of our current division and suffering.

    But would confrontation have brought more popular support to Minusca? Well, it did to another actor that stepped in, as a national staffer of an aid organisation stated in early 2022 in Bambari:

    Minusca patrols do not have the confidence of the population. Because in front of Minusca forces, the rebels kill the population. For seven years, Minusca was unable to secure the town. Within minutes, the Central African Armed Forces and their Russian allies managed to dislodge them from the town of Bambari, which is now secure.

    Reality

    I did not judge whether people’s expectations of interventions were realistic.

    Given the state’s history in the Central African Republic, it was surprising how many people wanted a state and army to return.

    However, people were hoping for a “benevolent” state return. This has not happened.

    And as for the Russian “allies”, as they are called in the Central African Republic: their confrontational approach has caused heavy collateral damage and has failed to stabilise former rebel areas. Rebellion is again on the rise.

    My study shows how important it is to analyse expectations in-depth, and to take them as a starting point of intervention policy. Not understanding people’s expectations is what caught peacekeepers by surprise when people started demonstrating in front of their bases and even calling for their withdrawal.

    While there might be good reasons not to pursue a forceful approach against rebels, interveners must be aware that they thereby deceive public expectations and should thus proactively listen to and engage the population about their demands.

    The dilemma is that fulfilling people’s initial expectations does not automatically lead to the future they desire. So there must be difficult and open discussions about what is and what is not feasible in peacekeeping.

    – Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace
    – https://theconversation.com/central-african-republic-listening-to-peoples-stories-about-foreign-forces-could-help-bring-peace-247834

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State University

    With France fast losing its influence in west Africa’s Sahel region and an unpredictable US president in power, will China fill the vacuum?

    The Sahel region covers 10 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

    French troops have been expelled from three of these – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – after military coups. Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast have also expelled French troops. The troops were there because of the security threat from extremist groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province.

    Niger also ended an agreement to keep about 1,000 US troops involved in a counter-terrorism mission. Niger’s military government described the US as having a “condescending attitude”.

    While it has been rightly argued that the presence of the western powers did not resolve the security challenges of the region, their withdrawal creates a vacuum.

    I am a political science and international relations researcher who has been studying China-Africa relations for over a decade.

    I argue that Beijing could take advantage of the vacuum in the Sahel in at least three ways: expansion of investments in critical minerals; resolution of the Ecowas crisis (when Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali exited the regional bloc); and increased arms sales.

    This is especially so as China is not new to the Sahel region of west Africa. For instance, China is constructing a US$32 million headquarters for Ecowas in Abuja, Nigeria.

    Three ways China could benefit

    First, China could expand its influence – and the next four years hold enormous opportunities in this regard.

    US president Donald Trump’s likely transactional and unpredictable approach to international relations may force African countries to look to China. For instance, they may need China to help fill the void created by the US decision to dismantle USAID and freeze international development aid.

    Nigeria joined Brics as a partner country a few days before the inauguration of Trump. Brics is a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This decision by the largest economy in the Sahel is an expression of its commitment to China – with potential implications for other Sahelian countries.

    The vacuum offers Beijing the opportunity to strengthen its investment and position as a top beneficiary of the critical minerals, such as gold, copper, lithium and uranium, in the Sahel region.

    In 2024, west African gold production was estimated to be 11.83 million ounces. Ghana, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Guinea and Mali were the major contributors.

    Second, China is in a unique position to push for a resolution of the Ecowas crisis.

    Following military coups, the Ecowas regional economic bloc sanctioned Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Ecowas even threatened Niger with a military invasion. The three countries then decided to leave Ecowas to form the Alliance of Sahel States.

    As a neutral actor whose non-interference policy accommodates both civil and military regimes, Beijing is in a position to bring Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States into negotiation before the final departure date of 29 July 2025.

    If it succeeds, China would look more like a peaceful power, an image that is contested by others.

    Building on its soft power projects like the Confucius Institutes and scholarships, China would look like the “saviour” of Ecowas integration.

    This is what it did in the case of the Tazara railway project, where China supported Tanzania and Zambia to build a railway line together. It supported the African countries when the US and Europe had failed, were reluctant or were not interested.

    Third is Chinese arms sales.

    Chinese arms are already in the Sahel. In 2019, Nigeria signed a US$152 million contract with the China North Industries Corporation Limited (Norinco) to provide some of the weapons needed to fight the Boko Haram terror group. Since then, Chinese drones and other equipment have become a feature in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism response.

    The Chinese arms market could receive a major boost beyond Nigeria with the withdrawal of western countries from the Sahel. Western countries are likely to be reluctant to sell arms to the countries that have evicted their military.

    Sanctions on Russia have also increased the likelihood of Chinese arms in the Sahel.

    For example, a few months after France and the US left the region, some reports suggested that Russian mercenaries in the Sahel region were using Chinese weapons. Norinco – China’s top arms manufacturer and seventh largest arms supplier in the world – has opened sales offices in Nigeria and Senegal.

    In June 2024, Burkina Faso received 100 tanks from China. Three months after, Mali signed an agreement with Norinco to bolster its fight against terrorism.

    Bumpy road ahead

    China’s non-interference can accommodate both civil and military governments in the Sahel. This is an advantage for Beijing in some ways. But it could also have unexpected impacts.

    There are competing local interests in the Sahel and Beijing’s deepening involvement could be (mis)interpreted as supporting one over the other.

    This could make Chinese interests a target in the violence.

    It is also unclear if China is capable or willing to fill the vacuum created by the evicted western powers. But it looks as though China can benefit from the situation in the Sahel in the short term.

    – Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits
    – https://theconversation.com/power-vacuum-in-west-africas-sahel-3-ways-china-could-fill-the-gap-as-west-exits-248353

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI: Ormat Commences Commercial Operation of 35 MW Ijen Geothermal Facility in Indonesia, Delivering Low Carbon Geothermal Power

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RENO, Nev., Feb. 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ormat Technologies Inc. (NYSE: ORA), a leading geothermal and renewable energy company, today announced the successful commencement of commercial operations (COD) for the 35MW Ijen geothermal power plant. The power plant is jointly owned with PT Medco Power Indonesia (“Medco Power”), through their subsidiary company, PT Medco Cahaya Geothermal (“MCG”). Ormat’s share of the facility is 17MW. This is the first geothermal power plant in East Java, Indonesia, contributing to Indonesia’s plan for an additional 7.2 GW of geothermal capacity by 2035.

    The Ijen Geothermal Power Plant, equipped with Ormat Energy Converter (“OEC”), began operations with its first phase, delivering 35 MW of electricity power to the Java grid. The commencement of this first phase marks a significant step of the Ijen Facility, which has a total planned capacity of 110 MW under a 30-year power purchase agreement.

    MCG, a jointly owned company between Medco Power (51% equity share) and Ormat Technologies (49% equity share), will operate the Ijen geothermal facility.

    Doron Blachar, Chief Executive Officer of Ormat Technologies, stated, “We are pleased to announce the commencement operations of the Ijen geothermal facility. The launch of the Ijen facility is a key step in our strategy to consistently and accretively grow our leading global geothermal energy portfolio and expand our presence in Indonesia. Indonesia has one of the largest geothermal potentials globally and with the geothermal targets set by the Indonesian government, we plan to expand our operations in the country. Achieving COD at Ijen demonstrates our strong development capabilities and our commitment towards advancing our short and long-term growth targets in our Electricity segment. We look forward to supporting Indonesia’s goal of increasing geothermal deployment and aiding in their efforts to achieve net zero emissions.”

    ABOUT ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES

    With over five decades of experience, Ormat Technologies, Inc. is a leading geothermal company, and the only vertically integrated company engaged in geothermal and recovered energy generation (“REG”), with robust plans to accelerate long-term growth in the energy storage market and to establish a leading position in the U.S. energy storage market. The Company owns, operates, designs, manufactures and sells geothermal and REG power plants primarily based on the Ormat Energy Converter – a power generation unit that converts low-, medium- and high-temperature heat into electricity. The Company has engineered, manufactured and constructed power plants, which it currently owns or has installed for utilities and developers worldwide, totaling approximately 3,400MW of gross capacity. Ormat leveraged its core capabilities in the geothermal and REG industries and its global presence to expand the Company’s activity into energy storage services, solar Photovoltaic (PV) and energy storage plus Solar PV. Ormat’s current total generating portfolio is 1,537MW with a 1,247MW geothermal and solar generation portfolio that is spread globally in the U.S., Kenya, Guatemala, Indonesia, Honduras, and Guadeloupe, and a 290MW energy storage portfolio that is located in the U.S.

    ORMAT’S SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT

    Information provided in this press release may contain statements relating to current expectations, estimates, forecasts and projections about future events that are “forward-looking statements” as defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that we expect or anticipate will or may occur in the future, including such matters as our projections of annual revenues, expenses and debt service coverage with respect to our debt securities, future capital expenditures, business strategy, competitive strengths, goals, development or operation of generation assets, market and industry developments and the growth of our business and operations, are forward-looking statements. When used in this press release, the words “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “expects”, “plans”, “anticipates”, “believes”, “estimates”, “predicts”, “projects”, “potential”, or “contemplate” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such words or expressions. These forward-looking statements generally relate to Ormat’s plans, objectives and expectations for future operations and are based upon its management’s current estimates and projections of future results or trends. Although we believe that our plans and objectives reflected in or suggested by these forward-looking statements are reasonable, we may not achieve these plans or objectives. Actual future results may differ materially from those projected as a result of certain risks and uncertainties and other risks described under “Risk Factors” as described in Ormat’s annual report on Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on February 23, 2024, and in Ormat’s subsequent quarterly reports on Form 10-Q that are filed from time to time with the SEC.

    These forward-looking statements are made only as of the date hereof, and, except as legally required, we undertake no obligation to update or revise the forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Ormat Technologies Contact:
    Smadar Lavi
    VP Head of IR and ESG Planning & Reporting
    775-356-9029 (ext. 65726)
    slavi@ormat.com
    Investor Relations Agency Contact:
    Joseph Caminiti or Josh Carroll
    Alpha IR Group
    312-445-2870
    ORA@alpha-ir.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why the price of your favorite chocolate will continue to rise

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Narcisa Pricope, Professor of Geography and Land Systems Science and Associate Vice President for Research, Mississippi State University

    Chocolate prices spiked amid very dry conditions in Africa. Chuck Fishman/Getty Images

    Valentine’s Day often conjures images of chocolates and romance. But the crop behind this indulgence faces an existential threat.

    Regions like northeastern Brazil, one of the world’s notable cocoa-producing areas, are grappling with increasing aridity – a slow, yet unrelenting drying of the land. Cocoa is made from the beans of the cacao tree, which thrives in humid climates. The crop is struggling in these drying regions, and so are the farmers who grow it.

    This is not just Brazil’s story. Across West Africa, where 70% of the world’s cacao is grown, and in the Americas and Southeast Asia, shifting moisture levels threaten the delicate balance required for production. These regions, home to vibrant ecosystems and global breadbaskets that feed the world, are on the frontlines of aridity’s slow but relentless advance.

    A farmer in Colombia holds a cacao pod, which holds the key ingredients for chocolate.
    ©2017CIAT/NeilPalmer, CC BY-NC-SA

    Over the past 30 years, more than three-quarters of the Earth’s landmass has become drier. A recent report I helped coordinate for the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification found that drylands now cover 41% of global land, an area that expanded by nearly 1.7 million square miles (4.3 million square kilometers) over those three decades — about half the size of Australia.

    This creeping dryness is not just a climate phenomenon. It’s a long-term transformation that may be irreversible and that carries devastating consequences for ecosystems, agriculture and livelihoods worldwide.

    What causes aridity?

    Aridity, while often thought of as purely a climate phenomenon, is the result of a complex interplay among human-driven factors. These include greenhouse gas emissions, land use practices and the degradation of critical natural resources, such as soil and biodiversity.

    These interconnected forces have been accelerating the transformation of once-productive landscapes into increasingly arid regions, with consequences that ripple across ecosystems and economies.

    Greenhouse gas emissions: A global catalyst

    Human-induced climate change is the primary driver of rising aridity.

    Greenhouse gas emissions, particularly from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation, increase global temperatures. Rising temperatures, in turn, cause moisture to evaporate at a faster rate. This heightened evaporation reduces soil and plant moisture, exacerbating water scarcity – even in regions with moderate rainfall.

    Aridity began accelerating globally in the 1950s, and the world has seen a pronounced shift over the past three decades.

    This process is particularly stark in regions already prone to dryness, such as Africa’s Sahel region and the Mediterranean. In these areas, reduced precipitation – combined with increased evaporation – creates a feedback loop: Drier soils absorb less heat, leaving the atmosphere warmer and intensifying arid conditions.

    The number of people living in dryland regions has been rising in each region in recent years. Years 1971-2020. Scales vary.
    UNCCD

    Unsustainable land use practices: A hidden accelerator

    Aridity is also affected by how people use and manage land.

    Unsustainable agricultural practices, overgrazing and deforestation strip soils of their protective vegetation cover, leaving them vulnerable to erosion. Industrial farming techniques often prioritize short-term yields over long-term sustainability, depleting nutrients and organic matter essential for healthy soils.

    For example, in cocoa-producing regions like northeastern Brazil, deforestation to make room for agriculture disrupts local water cycles and exposes soils to degradation. Without vegetation to anchor it, topsoil – critical for plant growth – washes away during rainfall or is blown away by winds, taking with it vital nutrients.

    These changes create a vicious cycle: Degraded soils also hold less water and lead to more runoff, reducing the land’s ability to recover.

    Aridity can affect the ability to grow many crops. Large parts of the country of Chad, shown here, have drying lands.
    United Nations Chad, CC BY-NC-SA

    The soil-biodiversity connection

    Soil, often overlooked in discussions of climate resilience, plays a critical role in mitigating aridity.

    Healthy soils act as reservoirs, storing water and nutrients that plants depend on. They also support biodiversity below and above ground. A single teaspoon of soil contains billions of microorganisms that help cycle nutrients and maintain ecological balance.

    However, as soils degrade under aridity and mismanagement, this biodiversity diminishes. Microbial communities, essential for nutrient cycling and plant health, decline. When soils become compacted and lose organic matter, the land’s ability to retain water diminishes, making it even more susceptible to drying out.

    In short, the loss of soil health creates cascading effects that undermine ecosystems, agricultural productivity and food security.

    Global hot spots: Looming food security crises

    Cocoa is just one crop affected by the encroachment of rising aridity.

    Other key agricultural zones, including the breadbaskets of the world, are also at risk. In the Mediterranean, Africa’s Sahel and parts of the U.S. West, aridity already undermines farming and biodiversity.

    By 2100, up to 5 billion people could live in drylands – nearly double the current population in these areas, due to both population growth and expansion of drylands as the planet warms. This puts immense pressure on food systems. It can also accelerate migration as declining agricultural productivity, water scarcity and worsening living conditions force rural populations to move in search of opportunities.

    A map shows average aridity for 1981-2010. Computer simulations estimate that greenhouse gas emissions from human activities caused a 1.2% larger increase in the four types of dry regions combined for the periods between 1850 and 1981–2010 than simulations with only solar and volcanic effects considered.
    UNCCD

    Aridity’s ripple effects also extend far beyond agriculture. Ecosystems, already strained by deforestation and pollution, are stressed as water resources dwindle. Wildlife migrates or dies, and plant species adapted to moister conditions can’t survive. The Sahel’s delicate grasslands, for instance, are rapidly giving way to desert shrubs.

    On a global scale, economic losses linked to aridification are staggering. In Africa, rising aridity contributed to a 12% drop in gross domestic product from 1990 to 2015. Sandstorms and dust storms, wildfires and water scarcity further burden governments, exacerbating poverty and health crises in the most affected regions.

    The path forward

    Aridity is not inevitable, nor are its effects completely irreversible. But coordinated global efforts are essential to curb its progression.

    Countries can work together to restore degraded lands by protecting and restoring ecosystems, improving soil health and encouraging sustainable farming methods.

    Communities can manage water more efficiently through rainwater harvesting and advanced irrigation systems that optimize water use. Governments can reduce the drivers of climate change by investing in renewable energy.

    Continued international collaboration, including working with businesses, can help share technologies to make these actions more effective and available worldwide.

    So, as you savor chocolate this Valentine’s Day, remember the fragile ecosystems behind it. The price of cocoa in early 2025 was near its all-time high, due in part to dry conditions in Africa. Without urgent action to address aridity, this scenario may become more common, and cocoa – and the sweet concoctions derived from it – may well become a rare luxury.

    Collective action against aridity isn’t just about saving chocolate – it’s about preserving the planet’s capacity to sustain life.

    Narcisa Pricope is a member of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) Science-Policy Interface, which works to translate scientific findings and assessments into policy-relevant recommendations, including collaboration with different scientific panels and bodies.

    ref. Why the price of your favorite chocolate will continue to rise – https://theconversation.com/why-the-price-of-your-favorite-chocolate-will-continue-to-rise-246227

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of His Majesty’s Ambassador to Liberia: Ameer Kotecha

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Mr Ameer Kotecha has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia.

    Mr Ameer Kotecha has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia in succession to Mr Neil Bradley who will be transferring to another Diplomatic Service appointment.  Mr Kotecha will take up his appointment during April 2025.

    Curriculum vitae         

    Full name: Ameer Kotecha

    Year Role
    2023 to present  Ekaterinburg, HM Consul General
    2022 to 2023 FCDO, Full time language training (Russian)
    2021 to 2022  FCDO, Head of Engagement and Programmes Team, Counter Daesh Communications Cell
    2020 to 2021 Hong Kong, Vice Consul
    2018 to 2020  FCO, Senior Desk Officer, West Africa Department
    2017 to 2018  New York, Second Secretary Africa and Peacekeeping
    2016 to 2017 FCO, Kidnaps and Incidents Case Manager, Counter Terrorism Department
    2015 to 2016  FCO, Deputy Head Libya Team, North Africa Joint Unit
    2015  Joined FCO
    2013 to 2015 Financial Analyst, AgDevCo

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ASIA/HOLY LAND – Israeli Jesuit David Neuhaus: the plan to remove Palestinians from Gaza feels like a kick in the stomach

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    youtube

    Jerusalem (Agenzia Fides) – “We are in no hurry”. This is how US President Donald Trump yesterday offered an important detail regarding the plan for the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip under the direct control of the United States that he presented last week during the visit to Washington of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Speaking to journalists aboard Air Force One that was taking him to New Orleans to watch the Superbowl, the US President said that Gaza must be thought of as “a large real estate site, and the United States will take possession of it, and develop it slowly, very slowly”, to bring “stability to the Middle East”.From Moscow, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, when asked about the ‘Trump plan’ on Gaza, also took his time, reporting that “For now we do not know the details, so we must be patient”.On the other hand, Father David Neuhaus, interviewed by Fides, has no hesitation. For him, the conjectures circulating in recent days on the future of the Gaza Strip felt like “a kick in the stomach”.Israeli Jesuit and professor of Sacred Scripture, David Neuhaus was born in South Africa to German-Jewish parents who fled Germany in the 1930s, he was also in the past Patriarchal Vicar for the Hebrew-speaking Catholics and for the Pastoral Among Migrants.Father Neuhaus, what considerations can be made in view of the recent proposals that have emerged on the future of Gaza?DAVID NEUHAUS: Trump, the president of the United States has a vision for Gaza, which he shared with the world on February 4, 2025. Mr. Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel, was visiting him. It felt like a kick in the stomach. And I am not even a Palestinian. I am an Israeli.What in particular are you referring to?NEUHAUS: Trump’s boldly proclaimed plan is to transform the Gaza Strip from the heaps of rubble left by Israel’s military campaign, into a luxurious riviera. In that vision, there is no place for the people who call Gaza home. That population must be moved out (to where is far from clear). This is yet another stage in the removal of Palestinians from Palestine…Do you see what is happening as part of a process?NEUHAUS: Yes. It is a process that began long time ago. E che ha causato anche la concentrazione di popolazione palestinese nella Striscia di Gaza. It was back in 1947/1948 that the population of Gaza more than tripled with the influx of those expelled by the Israelis from their homes inside Israel, making Gaza one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Mr. Trump spoke only about Gaza but Mr. Netanyahu’s administration has already begun to work on the West Bank, sowing Gaza-like destruction in the cities of Jenin and Tulkarm. Thousands of Palestinians have already been expelled from their homes.Are the new ideas about the future of Gaza the only way to imagine the present and future of the Jewish state in the context of the current Middle East?NEUHAUS: Trump and Netanyahu’s vision is quite different from that of Peter Beinhart, a Jewish American journalist. I strongly recommend his latest book, “Being Jewish after the Destruction of Gaza: A Reckoning” as an antidote to the discourse coming from US and Israeli leadership. Beinhart reconstructs Jewish identity in the light of what has been happening in the past months, adamantly insisting that Israel’s only way forward is to ensure equality for all its citizens. Beinhart, whose parents were Jewish South Africans, has fully assimilated the message of the struggle against apartheid. Another prophetic voice, that of Israeli activist Orly Noy, the chair of the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories B’tselem, proclaimed unequivocally: “The war will end only when Israeli society realizes that it is not only immoral but also impossible to secure our existence through the oppression and subjugation of another people — and that the people we imprison, bomb, starve, and rob of their freedom and land are entitled to the exact same rights as we are, down to the last note”. (GV) (Agenzia Fides, 10/2/2025)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: A Stronger Engine for Middle East and North Africa’s Growth

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    The Managing Director’s Keynote Speech at the Ninth Arab Fiscal Forum, Dubai, UAE

    February 10, 2025

    Assalamu alaikum, your excellencies. I would like to thank Minister Al Hussaini for the United Arab Emirates’ continued warm hospitality in hosting this important annual event, as well as his excellent leadership of the World Bank’s Development Committee.

    It is a privilege to address you at the ninth Arab Fiscal Forum. Over the years, the IMF and Arab countries have always had a strong and productive partnership. Today, this partnership is more vital than ever as the world and this region undergo significant economic, technological, and geopolitical shifts—a point that I will reflect on later.

    In my remarks, I will explore how Arab countries can leverage fiscal policy to transform their economies for the future, and harness technology and investment opportunities for the benefit of their people.

    Global outlook and transformations

    Let me start with an overview of the global and regional economic outlook.

    Global growth is projected to hold at 3.3 percent this year and the next, and then to slow over the next five years, to just above 3 percent. This is well below the historical average.

    For the Middle East and North Africa, we expect growth to rebound to about 3.6 percent in 2025, driven by a recovery in oil production and an easing of regional conflicts. However, as with the global economy, our medium-term outlook still sees growth weaker than before the pandemic.

    Policymakers have generally succeeded in taming inflation, but not everywhere, with inflation picking up again in some countries. This could lead to a divergence in interest rates across countries and higher borrowing costs for emerging market and developing economies.

    On the fiscal side, the legacy of the multiple shocks from the last years leaves public finances under significant strain in many countries. Global public debt is projected to hit 100 percent of global GDP by 2030. Many countries in this region face similar pressures, with debt levels exceeding 70 percent of GDP. This poses the risk of them becoming trapped in a low-growth, high-debt scenario.

    Governments have the difficult task of containing high debt levels in the face of rising spending needs. This region faces the pressing need to create jobs, enhance social safety nets, build resilience to more frequent natural disasters, and support economic diversification. The demands of national security and post-conflict reconstruction are also substantial.

    This is all happening at a time of significant global transformations, which are creating a more uncertain and challenging environment for policymaking. We know, for instance, that trade is no longer the engine of growth that is used to be—unlike the decades of the 1990s and 2000s when global trade grew much faster than global GDP, the two are now growing at roughly the same rate. Governments around the world are shifting policy priorities: the new US administration has been clear that it intends to take action in the areas of trade, tax and spending, deregulation, and technology/digital assets. And the technology revolution—especially AI—is upon us and is set to transform the way we live and work, perhaps as early as the next five years.

    These rapid transformations mean the recipes of the past may no longer provide the path to prosperity. Economies will need to be agile, adaptable and resilient—these will be the ingredients for future success.

    How can the MENA region find these ingredients for success and avoid a low-growth, high-debt scenario?

    Building adaptable and more resilient economies

    First, focus on structural changes that increase economic resilience, agility, and long-term growth potential. Too often, countries use fiscal stimulus to boost short-term domestic demand. While this “sugar rush” provides temporary growth, it often fuels inflation and financial turbulence. Instead of merely stepping on the gas, we need a stronger engine.

    Productivity growth is essential for stronger growth and driving up economic performance. Our research in the Arab region shows how to do it: accelerate digitalization, reduce the state’s footprint in the economy, foster trade diversification, and encourage the free flow of capital to dynamic firms.

    Countries in the region that are more digitalized have substantially higher productivity than less-digitalization ones. Some countries are among the most developed in the world in this area. Digital innovation, with AI technologies, is expected to raise UAE’s GDP significantly by 2030. More R&D spending will further enhance productivity.

    Reducing the state’s footprint in the economy and strengthening governance can yield significant benefits. For example, Saudi Arabia’s regulatory improvements have fostered private sector investment, especially in the non-oil economy. The UAE’s National Agenda for Entrepreneurship has supported a vibrant startup community, and Morocco’s New Model of Development aims to spur markets by improving public sector governance.

    Encouraging employment is also a key ingredient for stronger growth. With a growing working-age population, the region has to make the most of its demographic advantage. Creating more private jobs, for women and youth in particular, can lead to more vibrant and inclusive economies. This requires more-flexible labor markets, and investment in education and vocational training. We have recently seen impressive developments in this regard in Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.

    A second priority is economic diversification. Today’s transformations provide an excellent opportunity to stimulate and reallocate resources toward new economic sectors and services. This could become a robust new growth engine, particularly for oil-exporting countries. Many countries are already investing in new technologies, such as batteries for electric cars; in improving connectivity and in green supply chains, for example.

    Third, in a world where patterns of cooperation are shifting, countries need to look for opportunities to cooperate in new ways. In many cases, this means deepening regional cooperation. The GCC is an excellent example of the benefits of regional integration—one that I can imagine can be emulated elsewhere.

    Building fiscal buffers and institutions  

    Let me turn to the fiscal side.

    Prudent fiscal stance is essential for macroeconomic stability — a prerequisite for a vibrant private sector and economic growth. An overarching priority today is to decisively use fiscal policy to build fiscal buffers, which is essentially the capacity to spend when needed – for example, to respond to shocks, manage and mitigate risks, and meet pressing development and climate-related needs.

    Many countries will need to pursue fiscal consolidation. It is crucial to carefully calibrate the size, pace, and composition of fiscal adjustments, to avoid unduly hampering growth. Tailoring budgetary reforms to each country’s circumstances, with a helping hand for those who lose out, is vital to ensure public support.

    In this context, increasing tax revenues remains a priority. Our research finds significant potential in strengthening domestic tax systems. This requires expanding tax bases, especially as economies diversify. For example, as new sectors grow, including through digitalization, they can become an important source of tax revenues. In addition, digitalization and AI can help modernize tax administrations.

    Domestic taxes will remain the primary source of funding government spending. However, private domestic and external financing will be needed to support the spending needs in the region. Addressing the impact of more frequent natural disasters will potentially require a cumulative $1 trillion in investment by 2030. The financial sector must play a larger role, while governments can enable an investment-friendly environment.

    Several countries in the region require special attention, either to resolve ongoing conflicts or to advance post-conflict reconstruction. I pray that peace and stability can be delivered in Sudan and Yemen. I hope that the ceasefire in Gaza, along with political changes in Syria and Lebanon, can mark new beginnings. The international community’s reconstruction efforts provide a unique opportunity to rebuild better and lay the foundations for stronger growth.

    Let me conclude

    In a world of rapid transformations, it is critical for countries to become more agile, adaptable, and resilient. They need to look for new engines of growth, which will also help avoid a low-growth, high-debt trap.

    The private sector has to be in the lead in transforming economies in the region through entrepreneurship, job creation, and innovation.

    The role of governments is to foster the right environment for this private sector-led growth: by strengthening governance, modernizing public institutions, reducing bureaucracy, encouraging youth and female employment, and improving access to capital. And by designing and communicating policies that put people first and increase social support.

    The IMF remains fully committed to supporting the Middle East and North Africa. Since early 2020, we have approved about $33 billion in financing for the region, most recently in 2024 to help mitigate the impact of conflict. We have also recently reformed our surcharge policy, resulting in important savings for some countries. We have also expanded our capacity development and strengthened our regional presence with resident representative offices, technical assistance centers, and the new regional office in Riyadh.

    We are now stepping up our efforts to support the private sector, with the creation of a new IMF Advisory Council on Entrepreneurship and Growth. I can assure you, this region will be represented on it. And we look forward to the upcoming Al-Ula conference with emerging market economies, to discuss key issues affecting your economies. Jobs, innovation, and productivity—combined with a sound fiscal approach—will mean better prospects for citizens in this region and ultimately more peace and stability.

    Let’s get to work, or as you say, “linabda al-âmal”—let’s start the work together!

    I wish you all many insightful discussions and meaningful outcomes today.

    Shukran!

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Russia: A Stronger Engine for Middle East and North Africa’s Growth

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    The Managing Director’s Keynote Speech at the Ninth Arab Fiscal Forum, Dubai, UAE

    February 10, 2025

    Assalamu alaikum, your excellencies. I would like to thank Minister Al Hussaini for the United Arab Emirates’ continued warm hospitality in hosting this important annual event, as well as his excellent leadership of the World Bank’s Development Committee.

    It is a privilege to address you at the ninth Arab Fiscal Forum. Over the years, the IMF and Arab countries have always had a strong and productive partnership. Today, this partnership is more vital than ever as the world and this region undergo significant economic, technological, and geopolitical shifts—a point that I will reflect on later.

    In my remarks, I will explore how Arab countries can leverage fiscal policy to transform their economies for the future, and harness technology and investment opportunities for the benefit of their people.

    Global outlook and transformations

    Let me start with an overview of the global and regional economic outlook.

    Global growth is projected to hold at 3.3 percent this year and the next, and then to slow over the next five years, to just above 3 percent. This is well below the historical average.

    For the Middle East and North Africa, we expect growth to rebound to about 3.6 percent in 2025, driven by a recovery in oil production and an easing of regional conflicts. However, as with the global economy, our medium-term outlook still sees growth weaker than before the pandemic.

    Policymakers have generally succeeded in taming inflation, but not everywhere, with inflation picking up again in some countries. This could lead to a divergence in interest rates across countries and higher borrowing costs for emerging market and developing economies.

    On the fiscal side, the legacy of the multiple shocks from the last years leaves public finances under significant strain in many countries. Global public debt is projected to hit 100 percent of global GDP by 2030. Many countries in this region face similar pressures, with debt levels exceeding 70 percent of GDP. This poses the risk of them becoming trapped in a low-growth, high-debt scenario.

    Governments have the difficult task of containing high debt levels in the face of rising spending needs. This region faces the pressing need to create jobs, enhance social safety nets, build resilience to more frequent natural disasters, and support economic diversification. The demands of national security and post-conflict reconstruction are also substantial.

    This is all happening at a time of significant global transformations, which are creating a more uncertain and challenging environment for policymaking. We know, for instance, that trade is no longer the engine of growth that is used to be—unlike the decades of the 1990s and 2000s when global trade grew much faster than global GDP, the two are now growing at roughly the same rate. Governments around the world are shifting policy priorities: the new US administration has been clear that it intends to take action in the areas of trade, tax and spending, deregulation, and technology/digital assets. And the technology revolution—especially AI—is upon us and is set to transform the way we live and work, perhaps as early as the next five years.

    These rapid transformations mean the recipes of the past may no longer provide the path to prosperity. Economies will need to be agile, adaptable and resilient—these will be the ingredients for future success.

    How can the MENA region find these ingredients for success and avoid a low-growth, high-debt scenario?

    Building adaptable and more resilient economies

    First, focus on structural changes that increase economic resilience, agility, and long-term growth potential. Too often, countries use fiscal stimulus to boost short-term domestic demand. While this “sugar rush” provides temporary growth, it often fuels inflation and financial turbulence. Instead of merely stepping on the gas, we need a stronger engine.

    Productivity growth is essential for stronger growth and driving up economic performance. Our research in the Arab region shows how to do it: accelerate digitalization, reduce the state’s footprint in the economy, foster trade diversification, and encourage the free flow of capital to dynamic firms.

    Countries in the region that are more digitalized have substantially higher productivity than less-digitalization ones. Some countries are among the most developed in the world in this area. Digital innovation, with AI technologies, is expected to raise UAE’s GDP significantly by 2030. More R&D spending will further enhance productivity.

    Reducing the state’s footprint in the economy and strengthening governance can yield significant benefits. For example, Saudi Arabia’s regulatory improvements have fostered private sector investment, especially in the non-oil economy. The UAE’s National Agenda for Entrepreneurship has supported a vibrant startup community, and Morocco’s New Model of Development aims to spur markets by improving public sector governance.

    Encouraging employment is also a key ingredient for stronger growth. With a growing working-age population, the region has to make the most of its demographic advantage. Creating more private jobs, for women and youth in particular, can lead to more vibrant and inclusive economies. This requires more-flexible labor markets, and investment in education and vocational training. We have recently seen impressive developments in this regard in Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.

    A second priority is economic diversification. Today’s transformations provide an excellent opportunity to stimulate and reallocate resources toward new economic sectors and services. This could become a robust new growth engine, particularly for oil-exporting countries. Many countries are already investing in new technologies, such as batteries for electric cars; in improving connectivity and in green supply chains, for example.

    Third, in a world where patterns of cooperation are shifting, countries need to look for opportunities to cooperate in new ways. In many cases, this means deepening regional cooperation. The GCC is an excellent example of the benefits of regional integration—one that I can imagine can be emulated elsewhere.

    Building fiscal buffers and institutions  

    Let me turn to the fiscal side.

    Prudent fiscal stance is essential for macroeconomic stability — a prerequisite for a vibrant private sector and economic growth. An overarching priority today is to decisively use fiscal policy to build fiscal buffers, which is essentially the capacity to spend when needed – for example, to respond to shocks, manage and mitigate risks, and meet pressing development and climate-related needs.

    Many countries will need to pursue fiscal consolidation. It is crucial to carefully calibrate the size, pace, and composition of fiscal adjustments, to avoid unduly hampering growth. Tailoring budgetary reforms to each country’s circumstances, with a helping hand for those who lose out, is vital to ensure public support.

    In this context, increasing tax revenues remains a priority. Our research finds significant potential in strengthening domestic tax systems. This requires expanding tax bases, especially as economies diversify. For example, as new sectors grow, including through digitalization, they can become an important source of tax revenues. In addition, digitalization and AI can help modernize tax administrations.

    Domestic taxes will remain the primary source of funding government spending. However, private domestic and external financing will be needed to support the spending needs in the region. Addressing the impact of more frequent natural disasters will potentially require a cumulative $1 trillion in investment by 2030. The financial sector must play a larger role, while governments can enable an investment-friendly environment.

    Several countries in the region require special attention, either to resolve ongoing conflicts or to advance post-conflict reconstruction. I pray that peace and stability can be delivered in Sudan and Yemen. I hope that the ceasefire in Gaza, along with political changes in Syria and Lebanon, can mark new beginnings. The international community’s reconstruction efforts provide a unique opportunity to rebuild better and lay the foundations for stronger growth.

    Let me conclude

    In a world of rapid transformations, it is critical for countries to become more agile, adaptable, and resilient. They need to look for new engines of growth, which will also help avoid a low-growth, high-debt trap.

    The private sector has to be in the lead in transforming economies in the region through entrepreneurship, job creation, and innovation.

    The role of governments is to foster the right environment for this private sector-led growth: by strengthening governance, modernizing public institutions, reducing bureaucracy, encouraging youth and female employment, and improving access to capital. And by designing and communicating policies that put people first and increase social support.

    The IMF remains fully committed to supporting the Middle East and North Africa. Since early 2020, we have approved about $33 billion in financing for the region, most recently in 2024 to help mitigate the impact of conflict. We have also recently reformed our surcharge policy, resulting in important savings for some countries. We have also expanded our capacity development and strengthened our regional presence with resident representative offices, technical assistance centers, and the new regional office in Riyadh.

    We are now stepping up our efforts to support the private sector, with the creation of a new IMF Advisory Council on Entrepreneurship and Growth. I can assure you, this region will be represented on it. And we look forward to the upcoming Al-Ula conference with emerging market economies, to discuss key issues affecting your economies. Jobs, innovation, and productivity—combined with a sound fiscal approach—will mean better prospects for citizens in this region and ultimately more peace and stability.

    Let’s get to work, or as you say, “linabda al-âmal”—let’s start the work together!

    I wish you all many insightful discussions and meaningful outcomes today.

    Shukran!

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/10/sp-021025-md-keynote-speech-ninth-arab-fiscal-forum

    MIL OSI

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  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Italy and WFP partner to reduce malnutrition in Eastern Sudan

    Source: World Food Programme

    PORT SUDAN/NAIROBI– The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in Sudan welcomes a contribution of EUR6.55 million from the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS). This vital funding will enable WFP to provide specialized nutritious foods and cash-based nutrition assistance to nearly 200,000 young children and pregnant or nursing women in Gedaref and Kassala states.

    This support will help prevent malnutrition in eastern Sudan, which is critical as some 3.7 million children under five and pregnant and breastfeeding mothers across the country are malnourished.     

    “Amid Sudan’s deepening hunger crisis, this generous contribution will help to improve diets among vulnerable women and children, which is key to reducing malnutrition. We are extremely grateful to the Government of Italy,” said Mr. Laurent Bukera, WFP Regional Director for Eastern Africa. 

    Sudan continues to face a catastrophic humanitarian situation with approximately 24.6 million people – nearly half of Sudan’s population – facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+). Twenty-seven locations across Sudan are either in famine or at risk of famine, while more than one-third of children in the hardest hit regions are acutely malnourished.

    “With this project, Italy is at the forefront in Sudan in supporting the most vulnerable populations. The partnership with WFP is a tangible example of our commitment in the fight against malnutrition, ensuring access to essential nutritional support for those most in need. This initiative also reflects Italy’s broader strategy of humanitarian assistance and sustainable development, reinforcing long-term resilience and food security in the region” – stated the Ambassador of Italy to Sudan, Michele Tommasi. 

    Since the start of Sudan’s conflict nearly 22 months ago, WFP has provided nutrition assistance to prevent and treat malnutrition to nearly 2.5 million women and children. WFP is working tirelessly to expand food and nutrition assistance to millions more people across Sudan – aiming to triple the number of people it supports to 7 million. Italy has been a long-time supporter of WFP in Sudan, contributing nearly EUR15 million since 2021.   

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    The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

    Follow us on X, formerly Twitter, via @wfp_media and @wfp_sudan

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: EU supports early action as climate extremes compound hunger in the Greater Horn of Africa

    Source: World Food Programme

    NAIROBI – The Danish Refugee Council (DRC), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), and the World Food Programme (WFP) have welcomed a contribution of EUR4 million from the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) to launch a joint project to protect vulnerable communities in the Greater Horn of Africa from the devastating impacts of climate extremes, conflict, and displacement.

    “Increasingly frequent and intense climate extremes such as droughts and floods are compounding existing drivers of hunger such as conflict, displacement and economic instability. As livestock and crops perish, livelihoods are lost, and hunger deepens. Early action saves lives, builds people’s resilience to face future crises, and eases the strain on limited humanitarian resources,” said Rukia Yacoub, WFP’s Deputy Regional Director for Eastern Africa. 

    ‘Scaling Coordinated Multi-Hazard and Conflict-Sensitive Anticipatory Action in the Greater Horn of Africa’ will support 450,000 vulnerable people in Ethiopia and Somalia for two years by reducing the impacts of forecasted shocks before they become crises through capacity strengthening of weather agencies to provide timely, accurate forecasts, enabling better community and government response.

    “The IGAD region faces escalating risks from droughts, floods, cyclones, and conflicts, worsening humanitarian crises that threaten lives and livelihoods. This project proposes a holistic, regional, and harmonized approach to strengthen early warning systems for anticipatory action, enhance cross-border coordination, and facilitate risk-informed decision-making to ensure timely, life-saving early actions. With the March-May forecast indicating below-normal rainfall for the upcoming season, urgent preparedness is essential. Furthermore, this funding will directly support the implementation of the IGAD Regional Roadmap for Anticipatory Actionaiding member states in anticipating and undertaking early actions, improving coordination, and building resilience against climate shocks,” said Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu, IGAD’s Executive Secretary.

    The 2024-2026 project includes an additional EUR2.7 million joint contribution from the five implementing partners (DRC, FAO, IFRC, IGAD and WFP).

    “By supporting this new programme, the European Union intends to enhance our delivery of Anticipatory Action ahead of disasters which are predictable in the region and promote the resilience of communities across the region,” said Ségolène de Beco, the head of the European Union’s regional humanitarian aid office in Nairobi.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: IOM Deeply Alarmed by Mass Graves Found in Libya, Urges Action

    Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM)

    Tripoli, 10 February 2025 – The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has expressed shock and concern at the discovery of two mass graves in Libya containing the bodies of dozens of migrants, some with gunshot wounds.

    Nineteen bodies were discovered in Jakharrah (around 400 km south of Benghazi), while at least 30 more were found in a mass grave in the Alkufra desert in the southeast. It is believed the second grave may contain as many as 70 bodies.

    The circumstance of their death and nationalities remains unknown. Their graves were both discovered following a police raid, during which hundreds of migrants were rescued from traffickers. Security forces continue operations to capture those responsible.

    “The loss of these lives is yet another tragic reminder of the dangers faced by migrants embarking on perilous journeys,” said Nicoletta Giordano, IOM Libya Chief of Mission. “Far too many migrants along these journeys endure severe exploitation, violence and abuse, underscoring the need to prioritize human rights and protect those at risk.”

    IOM acknowledges the efforts of the Libyan authorities in investigating these deaths and urges them, along with UN partner agencies, to ensure a dignified recovery, identification, and transfer of the remains of the deceased migrants, while notifying and assisting their families.

    Last March the bodies of 65 migrants were found in a mass grave in the southwest of the country.

    According to IOM’s Missing Migrants Project, out of the 965 recorded deaths and disappearances in Libya in 2024, more than 22 per cent occurred on land routes. This highlights the often-overlooked risks migrants face on land routes, where fatalities frequently go underreported. Strengthening data collection, search and rescue efforts, and migrant protection mechanisms along these routes is crucial to preventing further loss of life.

    IOM in Libya continues to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable migrants and works to strengthen the capacity of relevant authorities to conduct life-saving search and rescue operations in the desert and at sea. This includes training in human rights obligations and ensuring that border management is in accordance with international law, with a protection-focused approach to assist those most at risk.

    IOM urges all governments and authorities along the route to strengthen regional collaboration to safeguard and protect migrants, irrespective of their status, throughout all stages of their journeys.

     

    For more information, please contact:

    In Libya: Giacomo Terenzi, gterenzi@iom.int

    In Cairo: Joe Lowry, jlowry@iom.int

    In Geneva: Kennedy Okoth kokoth@iom.int

    MIL OSI United Nations News