NewzIntel.com

Category: Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 31 July 2025 Departmental update Redefining the HIV response in Africa through local production of medicines and diagnostics

    Source: World Health Organisation

    While Sub-Saharan Africa bears the highest HIV burden globally and is home to almost 65% of all people living with HIV, for decades, access to HIV treatment across the African region depended almost entirely on imports of lifesaving drugs and diagnostic tests manufactured thousands of miles away. 

    To boost supply chain resilience and regional self-reliance, WHO’s Global HIV, Hepatitis and Sexually Transmitted Infections Programmes Department, in collaboration with the Regulation and Prequalification Department, has been actively advocating for locally manufactured quality-assured medicines and diagnostics. This work is carried out in close partnership with countries, manufacturers in Africa and partners such as the Global Fund and Unitaid. 

    In 2023, Universal Corporation Ltd (UCL), a Kenya-based pharmaceutical company led by Mr Palu Dhanani, became the first African manufacturer to receive WHO prequalification to produce tenofovir disoproxil fumarate, lamivudine and dolutegravir (TLD), a WHO-recommended first-line antiretroviral therapy for HIV infection.

    “Local production of quality-assured health products is an urgent priority. With every African manufacturer that meets WHO prequalification standards, we move closer to a more self-reliant, resilient, and equitable health system. Regulation and prequalification are not just technical processes; they are catalysts for health sovereignty and timely access to lifesaving medicines and diagnostics,” said Dr Rogerio Gaspar, WHO Director for Regulation and Prequalification.

    A first for the continent

    As recently announced, the Global Fund now procures UCL’s TLD for Mozambique, marking the first time TLD is manufactured on African soil. This milestone reflects ongoing collaboration between WHO and the Global Fund to support essential HIV services, through the NextGen market shaping approach.

    “The procurement of the African-manufactured first-line HIV treatment by the Global Fund for Mozambique is a great milestone towards strengthening supply chain systems in Africa. This will contribute to better health outcomes for people living with HIV who need uninterrupted medicine supplies,” said Dr Meg Doherty, Director of WHO’s Global HIV, Hepatitis and STIs Programmes.  

    However, production alone isn’t enough. To ensure sustainable and resilient supply chains, critical enablers are needed, such as advanced market commitments, fair procurement policies and continued technical support.

    WHO shares the vision of a world where every region has the capacity to secure its own health. Locally manufactured TLD is a major step towards that goal, but more action is needed. African manufacturers should be prioritized in global supply chains, and  guaranteed equitable access to health technologies that meet quality, safety and efficacy/performance standards.

    HIV testing: another critical frontline

    HIV testing is a critical health service and a vital gateway to both prevention and treatment. With current shifts in donor funding, many countries are facing financial strain, putting testing programmes at risk. Keeping people living with HIV on treatment is important and requires affordable and reliable access to HIV rapid tests. 

    WHO is urging governments to shift towards low-cost, quality-assured HIV rapid tests, especially the first test in their national testing algorithms, for significant cost savings. 

    Codix Bio, a Nigerian in-vitro diagnostics company, has received a sublicense to manufacture rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs), with an initial focus on RDTs for HIV, using technology transferred from the global in-vitro diagnostics company SD Biosensor. Thanks to the collaborative efforts of WHO’s Health Technology Access Programme and the Medicines Patent Pool, this new local manufacture of HIV RDTs will improve access to affordable diagnostic tests and help mitigate disruptions of HIV testing services.

    “Having locally produced HIV RDTs will help increase affordability, and more broadly address supply chain vulnerabilities and delays in access to diagnostics,” said Dr Meg Doherty, Director of WHO’s Global HIV, Hepatitis and STIs Programmes.

    In addition to switching to low-cost quality-assured HIV tests, WHO encourages countries to use HIV self-tests to mitigate gaps in human resources for health as well as stockouts for the first RDT in national algorithms.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Nuclear Science and Nuclear Security Infrastructure to Protect Rare Rhinos: IAEA-Supported Project Marks a Milestone

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    In a pioneering effort to combat wildlife trafficking of the threatened rhinoceros, a South African University today began implementing a project supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The project combines the safe insertion of radioactive isotopes into rhino horns and available nuclear security infrastructure to deter and detect illegal poaching.

    With over 10,000 rhinos lost to poaching in the past decade, South Africa – home to the world’s largest population of rhinos – remains a target for criminals driven by the illegal trade of rhino horn. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the South African Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment reported 103 rhinos poached. In response, this project run by the University of the Witwatersrand is using radiation to support conservation and enforcement efforts.

    After two years of initial tests, the Rhisotope Project was created in 2021 with the idea to tag rhino horns with radioactive material. This makes the horns detectable by radiation portal monitors (RPMs) already deployed at borders, ports and airports worldwide. These RPMs, commonly used to detect nuclear and other radioactive material, can now be harnessed against wildlife crime.

    The IAEA’s support to the Rhisotope Project leverages its central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework. With millions of vehicles and people crossing borders every day, the use of an estimated 10,000 RPMs worldwide has become a critical tool for detecting unauthorized transboundary movements of nuclear and other radioactive material.

    “The Rhisotope Project shows how nuclear science and nuclear security infrastructure can be used in new ways to address global challenges,” said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “The IAEA is supporting countries to maximize the benefits of nuclear. By using already installed nuclear security infrastructure in novel ways, we can help protect one of the world’s most iconic and endangered species.”

    At an event today in the Waterberg, Limpopo, about 250 kilometres north of Johannesburg, the University of Witwatersrand announced the results of the rigorous safety assessments conducted during the pilot phase of the project. In June last year, radioisotopes were inserted into 20 rhinos. Health monitoring and cytological examinations of 15 treated animals and a comparison of five animals not treated were conducted by Ghent University in Belgium. The test results proved that the method is non-invasive and does not pose a risk to the rhinos’ health.

    “This has been an international collaboration of likeminded individuals who are trying to make a real difference to this poaching crisis,” said James Larkin, Director, Radiation and Health Physics Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. “We started with the question – what if radiation could protect rather than harm, by turning rhino horns into traceable markers that stop poachers before they trade? After two years of digital modelling, safety testing and detection simulations, we’re ready to roll out a solution that could truly reduce rhino poaching.”

    The success of project also opens the door for future applications to other endangered species.

    “The methodology could be adapted to protect other endangered species like elephants or pangolins,” said Larkin.

    The IAEA is providing both technical and financial support to the project under its Coordinated Research Project titled Facilitation of Safe and Secure Trade Using Nuclear Detection Technology – Detection of RN and Other Contraband. As part of the project, the Agency also supports countries in their efforts to optimize the detection of radiation by the use of its Minimum Detectable Quantity and Alarm Threshold Estimation Tool, thereby allowing detection of the tagged with radiation rhino horns.

    “The Rhisotope Project brings the entire global nuclear security network into play,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security. “The nuclear security infrastructure that exists in many countries around the world to detect smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material can be used to pick up the trafficking of rhino horn, and any other contraband that might be carried alongside it. Committing to nuclear security pays off in multiple ways.”

    B-roll and photos will be made available here.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Nuclear Science and Nuclear Security Infrastructure to Protect Rare Rhinos: IAEA-Supported Project Marks a Milestone

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The Rhisotope Project team inserting radioactive isotopes into rhino horns. (Martin Klinenboeck/IAEA)

    In a pioneering effort to combat wildlife trafficking of the threatened rhinoceros, a South African University today began implementing a project supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The project combines the safe insertion of radioactive isotopes into rhino horns and available nuclear security infrastructure to deter and detect illegal poaching.

    With over 10,000 rhinos lost to poaching in the past decade, South Africa – home to the world’s largest population of rhinos – remains a target for criminals driven by the illegal trade of rhino horn. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the South African Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment reported 103 rhinos poached. In response, this project run by the University of the Witwatersrand is using radiation to support conservation and enforcement efforts.

    After two years of initial tests, the Rhisotope Project was created in 2021 with the idea to tag rhino horns with radioactive material. This makes the horns detectable by radiation portal monitors (RPMs) already deployed at borders, ports and airports worldwide. These RPMs, commonly used to detect nuclear and other radioactive material, can now be harnessed against wildlife crime.

    The IAEA’s support to the Rhisotope Project leverages its central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework. With millions of vehicles and people crossing borders every day, the use of an estimated 10,000 RPMs worldwide has become a critical tool for detecting unauthorized transboundary movements of nuclear and other radioactive material.

    “The Rhisotope Project shows how nuclear science and nuclear security infrastructure can be used in new ways to address global challenges,” said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “The IAEA is supporting countries to maximize the benefits of nuclear. By using already installed nuclear security infrastructure in novel ways, we can help protect one of the world’s most iconic and endangered species.”

    At an event today in the Waterberg, Limpopo, about 250 kilometres north of Johannesburg, the University of Witwatersrand announced the results of the rigorous safety assessments conducted during the pilot phase of the project. In June last year, radioisotopes were inserted into 20 rhinos. Health monitoring and cytological examinations of 15 treated animals and a comparison of five animals not treated were conducted by Ghent University in Belgium. The test results proved that the method is non-invasive and does not pose a risk to the rhinos’ health.

    “This has been an international collaboration of likeminded individuals who are trying to make a real difference to this poaching crisis,” said James Larkin, Director, Radiation and Health Physics Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. “We started with the question – what if radiation could protect rather than harm, by turning rhino horns into traceable markers that stop poachers before they trade? After two years of digital modelling, safety testing and detection simulations, we’re ready to roll out a solution that could truly reduce rhino poaching.”

    The success of project also opens the door for future applications to other endangered species.

    “The methodology could be adapted to protect other endangered species like elephants or pangolins,” said Larkin.

    The IAEA is providing both technical and financial support to the project under its Coordinated Research Project titled Facilitation of Safe and Secure Trade Using Nuclear Detection Technology – Detection of RN and Other Contraband. As part of the project, the Agency also supports countries in their efforts to optimize the detection of radiation by the use of its Minimum Detectable Quantity and Alarm Threshold Estimation Tool, thereby allowing detection of the tagged with radiation rhino horns.

    “The Rhisotope Project brings the entire global nuclear security network into play,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security. “The nuclear security infrastructure that exists in many countries around the world to detect smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material can be used to pick up the trafficking of rhino horn, and any other contraband that might be carried alongside it. Committing to nuclear security pays off in multiple ways.”

    B-roll and photos will be made available here.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI: TOP Ships Announces Distribution Date of August 1, 2025 for Spin-Off of Rubico Inc.

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ATHENS, Greece, July 31, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — TOP Ships Inc. (the “Company” or “TOP Ships”) (NYSE American:TOPS), an international owner and operator of modern, fuel-efficient “ECO” tanker vessels, announced today that the expected distribution date for the common shares of Rubico Inc. (“Rubico”) is August 1, 2025.

    Rubico common shares are expected to commence trading on a standalone basis on the Nasdaq Capital Market on August 4, 2025, the first trading day after the date of distribution, under the ticker “RUBI”.

    As previously announced, TOP Ships intends through Rubico to effect a spin-off of two of its vessels, the M/T Eco Malibu and M/T Eco West Coast, each a modern, high specification, scrubber-fitted and fuel-efficient 157,000 dwt Suezmax tanker. As part of the spin-off transaction, TOP Ships intends to distribute 100% of the common shares of Rubico pro rata to its securityholders of record as of June 16, 2025. As previously announced, the NYSE American established an ex-distribution date for the distribution of Rubico common shares of June 16, 2025. Beginning on that date, TOP Ships common shares traded without an entitlement by the purchaser of such shares to Rubico common shares distributed in connection with the spin-off.

    Rubico has filed a registration statement on Form 20-F pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with the SEC, which includes a more detailed description of the terms of the spin-off. A copy of the registration statement on Form 20-F is available at www.sec.gov.

    About TOP Ships Inc.

    TOP Ships Inc. is an international owner and operator of ocean-going vessels focusing on modern, fuel-efficient eco tanker vessels transporting crude oil, petroleum products (clean and dirty) and bulk liquid chemicals. For more information about TOP Ships Inc., visit its website: www.topships.org.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    Matters discussed in this press release may constitute forward-looking statements. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides safe harbor protections for forward-looking statements in order to encourage companies to provide prospective information about their business. Forward-looking statements include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts, including statements regarding the proposed spin-off and the prospects and strategies of TOP Ships and Rubico following the spin-off, the valuation of the shares of Rubico and TOP Ships following the spin-off, and the listing of Rubico’s common shares on the Nasdaq Capital Market.

    The Company desires to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and is including this cautionary statement in connection with this safe harbor legislation. The words “believe,” “anticipate,” “intends,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “project,” “plan,” “potential,” “may,” “should,” “expect,” “pending,” and similar expressions identify forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements in this press release are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including, without limitation, our management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records, and other data available from third parties. Although we believe that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, we cannot assure you that we will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs, or projections. Please see our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission for a more complete discussion of these and other risks and uncertainties. The information set forth herein speaks only as of the date hereof, and we disclaim any intention or obligation to update any forward‐looking statements as a result of developments occurring after the date of this communication.

    For further information please contact:
    Alexandros Tsirikos
    Chief Financial Officer
    TOP Ships Inc.
    Tel: +30 210 812 8107
    Email: atsirikos@topships.org

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Nuclear Science and Nuclear Security Infrastructure to Protect Rare Rhinos: IAEA-Supported Project Marks a Milestone

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    The Rhisotope Project team inserting radioactive isotopes into rhino horns. (Martin Klinenboeck/IAEA)

    In a pioneering effort to combat wildlife trafficking of the threatened rhinoceros, a South African University today began implementing a project supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The project combines the safe insertion of radioactive isotopes into rhino horns and available nuclear security infrastructure to deter and detect illegal poaching.

    With over 10,000 rhinos lost to poaching in the past decade, South Africa – home to the world’s largest population of rhinos – remains a target for criminals driven by the illegal trade of rhino horn. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the South African Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment reported 103 rhinos poached. In response, this project run by the University of the Witwatersrand is using radiation to support conservation and enforcement efforts.

    After two years of initial tests, the Rhisotope Project was created in 2021 with the idea to tag rhino horns with radioactive material. This makes the horns detectable by radiation portal monitors (RPMs) already deployed at borders, ports and airports worldwide. These RPMs, commonly used to detect nuclear and other radioactive material, can now be harnessed against wildlife crime.

    The IAEA’s support to the Rhisotope Project leverages its central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework. With millions of vehicles and people crossing borders every day, the use of an estimated 10,000 RPMs worldwide has become a critical tool for detecting unauthorized transboundary movements of nuclear and other radioactive material.

    “The Rhisotope Project shows how nuclear science and nuclear security infrastructure can be used in new ways to address global challenges,” said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “The IAEA is supporting countries to maximize the benefits of nuclear. By using already installed nuclear security infrastructure in novel ways, we can help protect one of the world’s most iconic and endangered species.”

    At an event today in the Waterberg, Limpopo, about 250 kilometres north of Johannesburg, the University of Witwatersrand announced the results of the rigorous safety assessments conducted during the pilot phase of the project. In June last year, radioisotopes were inserted into 20 rhinos. Health monitoring and cytological examinations of 15 treated animals and a comparison of five animals not treated were conducted by Ghent University in Belgium. The test results proved that the method is non-invasive and does not pose a risk to the rhinos’ health.

    “This has been an international collaboration of likeminded individuals who are trying to make a real difference to this poaching crisis,” said James Larkin, Director, Radiation and Health Physics Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. “We started with the question – what if radiation could protect rather than harm, by turning rhino horns into traceable markers that stop poachers before they trade? After two years of digital modelling, safety testing and detection simulations, we’re ready to roll out a solution that could truly reduce rhino poaching.”

    The success of project also opens the door for future applications to other endangered species.

    “The methodology could be adapted to protect other endangered species like elephants or pangolins,” said Larkin.

    The IAEA is providing both technical and financial support to the project under its Coordinated Research Project titled Facilitation of Safe and Secure Trade Using Nuclear Detection Technology – Detection of RN and Other Contraband. As part of the project, the Agency also supports countries in their efforts to optimize the detection of radiation by the use of its Minimum Detectable Quantity and Alarm Threshold Estimation Tool, thereby allowing detection of the tagged with radiation rhino horns.

    “The Rhisotope Project brings the entire global nuclear security network into play,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security. “The nuclear security infrastructure that exists in many countries around the world to detect smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material can be used to pick up the trafficking of rhino horn, and any other contraband that might be carried alongside it. Committing to nuclear security pays off in multiple ways.”

    B-roll and photos will be made available here.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: The quiet war: What’s fueling Israel’s surge of settler violence – and the lack of state response

    Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Arie Perliger, Director of Security Studies and Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies, UMass Lowell

    An Israeli soldier prays in the Evyatar outpost in the Israeli-occupied West Bank on July 7, 2024. AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg

    Since Oct. 7, 2023, as Israel’s war against Hamas drags on in the Gaza Strip, a quieter but escalating war has unfolded in the West Bank between Israelis and Palestinians.

    While precise figures are elusive, United Nations estimates indicate that Jewish settlers have carried out around 2,000 attacks against Palestinians since the war in Gaza began. That number represents a dramatic surge compared with any previous period during the nearly six decades Israel has controlled the West Bank.

    Attacks include harassment of Palestinian villagers trying to access their crops or work outside their villages, as well as more extreme and organized violence, such as raiding villages to vandalize property. While many of the attacks are unprovoked, some are what settlers call “price tag” actions: retaliation for Palestinian violence against Israelis, such as car-rammings, rock-throwing and stabbings.

    Settlers’ attacks displaced more than 1,500 Palestinians in the first year of the war in Gaza, and gun violence is increasingly common. Since October 2023, more than 1,000 Palestinians in the West Bank have been killed. While most of these fatalities resulted from military operations, some were killed by settlers.

    Mourners attend the funeral of three Palestinians who were killed when Jewish settlers stormed the West Bank village of Kafr Malik, on June 26, 2025.
    AP Photo/Leo Correa

    As a scholar who has studied Jewish religious extremism for over two decades, I contend this campaign is not merely a result of rising tension between the settlers and their Palestinian neighbors amid the Gaza conflict. Rather, it is fueled by a confluence of ideological fervor, opportunism and far-right Israelis’ political vision for the region.

    Religious redemption

    Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967’s Six-Day War against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, transforming this small region of around 2,000 square miles (5,200 square kilometers) to an amalgam of Jewish and Palestinian enclaves. Most countries other than Israel consider Jewish settlements illegal, but they have rapidly expanded in recent decades, becoming a major challenge for any settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    The ideological roots of violence lie within religious Zionism: a worldview embraced by about 20% of Israel’s Jewish population, including most West Bank settlers.

    The great majority of the leaders of the early Zionist movement held strong secular views. They pushed for the creation of a Jewish state over the objections of Orthodox figures, who argued that it should be a divine creation rather than a human-made polity.

    Religious Zionists, on the other hand, view the creation of modern-day Israel and its military victories as steps in a divine redemption, which will culminate in a Jewish kingdom led by a heaven-sent Messiah. Adherents believe contemporary events, particularly those asserting Jewish control over the entire historical land of Israel, can accelerate this process.

    In recent decades, influential religious Zionist leaders have argued that final redemption requires Israel’s total military triumph and the annihilation of its enemies, particularly the Palestinian national movement. From this perspective, the devastation of Oct. 7 and the subsequent war are a divine test – one the nation can only pass by achieving a complete victory.

    This belief system fuels most religious Zionists’ opposition to ending the war, as well as their advocacy for scorched-earth policies in Gaza. Some hope to rebuild the Jewish settlements in the strip that Israel evacuated in 2005.

    Some religious Zionists hope to reestablish Jewish settlements in Gaza.‘
    Sally Hayden/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

    The violence in the West Bank reflects an extension of the same beliefs. Extreme groups within the settler population aim to solidify Jewish control by making Palestinian communities’ lives in the region unsustainable.

    Opportunistic violence

    Hamas’ Oct. 7 massacre, which killed over 1,200 Israelis, traumatized the nation. It also hardened many Jewish Israelis’ conviction that a Palestinian state would be an existential threat, and thus Palestinians cannot be partners for peace.

    This shift in sentiment created a permissive environment for violence. While settler attacks previously drew criticism from across the political spectrum, extremist violence faces less public condemnation today – as does the government’s lack of effort to curb it.

    This increase in violence is also enabled by a climate of impunity. Israeli security forces have been stretched thin by operations in Gaza, Syria, Iran and beyond. In the West Bank, the military increasingly relies on settler militias known as “Emergency Squads,” which are armed by the Israeli military for self-defense, and army units composed primarily of religious Zionist settlers, such as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion. Such groups have little incentive to stop attacks on Palestinians, and at times, they have participated.

    This dynamic has dangerously blurred the line between the state military and militant settlers. The Israeli police, meanwhile, under the command of far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, appear focused on protecting settlers. Police leadership has been accused of ignoring intelligence about planned attacks and failing to arrest violent settlers or enforce restraining orders. Yesh Din, an Israeli human rights group, asserts that just 3% of attacks have resulted in a conviction.

    In June 2025, military attempts to curb settler militancy triggered a violent backlash, as extremist settlers attacked military commanders and tried to set fire to military facilities. Settlers view efforts to restrict their actions as illegitimate and a betrayal of Jewish interests in the West Bank.

    Political vision

    Violence by extremist settlers is not random; it is one arm of a coordinated pincer strategy to entrench Jewish control over the West Bank.

    Emergency volunteers put out a fire during an attack by Israeli right-wing settlers on the West Bank village of Turmusaya on June 26, 2025.
    Ilia Yefimovich/picture alliance via Getty Images

    While militant settlers create a climate of fear, Israeli authorities have undermined legal efforts to stop the violence – ending administrative detention for settler suspects, for example. Meanwhile, the government has intensified policies that undermine Palestinians’ economic development, freedom of movement and land use. In May, finance minister and far-right leader Bezalel Smotrich approved 22 new settlements, calling it a “historic decision” that signaled a return to “construction, Zionism, and vision.”

    Together, violence from below and policy from above advance a clear strategic goal: the coerced depopulation of Palestinians from rural areas to solidify Israeli sovereignty over the entire West Bank.

    Levers for change

    The militant elements of the settler movement constitute a fractional segment of Israeli society. When it comes to improving the situation in the West Bank, broad punitive measures against the entire country, such as economic boycotting and divestment, or blocking access to scientific, economic and cultural programs and organizations, have historically proved ineffective.

    Instead, such policies seem to entrench many Israelis’ perception of international bias and double standards: the sense that critics are antisemitic, or that few outsiders understand the country’s challenges – particularly in light of threats from entitles like Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, which openly seek Israel’s elimination.

    More targeted policies aim specifically at the Israeli far right, including sanctions – economic, political or cultural – directed at settler communities and their infrastructure. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the U.K. have imposed travel bans on Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, and frozen their assets in those countries. Similarly, I believe decisions to ban goods produced in the West Bank settlements, as Ireland has recently debated, would be more effective than banning all Israeli products.

    This targeted approach, I would argue, would allow the international community to cultivate stronger alliances with the many Israelis concerned about the settlements and Palestinians’ rights in the West Bank.

    Arie Perliger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The quiet war: What’s fueling Israel’s surge of settler violence – and the lack of state response – https://theconversation.com/the-quiet-war-whats-fueling-israels-surge-of-settler-violence-and-the-lack-of-state-response-261990

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: What is personalized pricing, and how do I avoid it?

    Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Jay L. Zagorsky, Associate Professor Questrom School of Business, Boston University

    Recently, Delta Air Lines announced it would expand its use of artificial intelligence to provide individualized prices to customers. This move sparked concern among flyers and politicians. But Delta isn’t the only business interested in using AI this way. Personalized pricing has already spread across a range of industries, from finance to online gaming.

    Customized pricing – where each customer receives a different price for the same product – is a holy grail for businesses because it boosts profits. With customized pricing, free-spending people pay more while the price-sensitive pay less. Just as clothes can be tailored to each person, custom pricing fits each person’s ability and desire to pay.

    I am a professor who teaches business school students how to set prices. My latest book, “The Power of Cash: Why Using Paper Money is Good for You and Society,” highlights problems with custom pricing. Specifically, I’m worried that AI pricing models lack transparency and could unfairly take advantage of financially unsophisticated people.

    The history of custom pricing

    For much of history, customized pricing was the normal way things happened. In the past, business owners sized up each customer and then bargained face-to-face. The price paid depended on the buyer’s and seller’s bargaining skills – and desperation.

    An old joke illustrates this process. Once, a very rich man was riding in his carriage at breakfast time. Hungry, he told his driver to stop at the next restaurant. He went inside, ordered some eggs and asked for the bill. When the owner handed him the check, the rich man was shocked at the price. “Are eggs rare in this neighborhood?” he asked. “No,” the owner said. “Eggs are plentiful, but very rich men are quite rare.”

    Custom pricing through bargaining still exists in some industries. For example, car dealerships often negotiate a different price for each vehicle they sell. Economists refer to this as “first-degree” or “perfect” price discrimination, which is “perfect” from the seller’s perspective because it allows them to charge each customer the maximum amount they’re willing to pay.

    Wanamaker’s department store in Philadelphia was a pricing pioneer.
    Hulton Archive/Getty Images

    Currently, most American shoppers don’t bargain but instead see set prices. Many scholars trace the rise of set prices to John Wanamaker’s Philadelphia department store, which opened in 1876. In his store, each item had a nonnegotiable price tag. These set prices made it simpler for customers to shop and became very popular.

    Why uniform pricing caught on

    Set prices have several advantages for businesses. For one thing, they allow stores to hire low-paid retail workers instead of employees who are experts in negotiation.

    Historically, they also made it easier for stores to decide how much to charge. Before the advent of AI pricing, many companies determined prices using a “cost-plus” rule. Cost-plus means a business adds a fixed percentage or markup to an item’s cost. The markup is the percentage added to a product’s cost that covers a company’s profits and overhead.

    The big-box retailer Costco still uses this rule. It determines prices by adding a roughly 15% maximum markup to each item on the warehouse floor. If something costs Costco $100, they sell it for about $115.

    The problem with cost-plus is that it treats all items the same. For example, Costco sells wine in many stores. People buying expensive Champagne typically are willing to pay a much higher markup than customers purchasing inexpensive boxed wine. Using AI gets around this problem by letting a computer determine the optimal markup item by item.

    What personalized pricing means for shoppers

    AI needs a lot of data to operate effectively. The shift from cash to electronic payments has enabled businesses to collect what’s been called a “gold mine” of information. For example, Mastercard says its data lets companies “determine optimal pricing strategies.”

    So much information is collected when you pay electronically that in 2024 the Federal Trade Commission issued civil subpoenas to Mastercard, JPMorgan Chase and other financial companies demanding to know “how artificial intelligence and other technological tools may allow companies to vary prices using data they collect about individual consumers’ finances and shopping habits.” Experiments at the FTC show that AI programs can even collude among themselves to raise prices without human intervention.

    To prevent customized pricing, some states have laws requiring retailers to display a single price for each product for sale. Even with these laws, it’s simple to do custom pricing by using targeted digital coupons, which vary each shopper’s discount.

    How you can outsmart AI pricing

    There are ways to get around customized pricing. All depend on denying AI programs data on past purchases and knowledge of who you are. First, when shopping in brick-and-mortar stores, use paper money. Yes, good old-fashioned cash is private and leaves no data trail that follows you online.

    Second, once online, clear your cache. Your search history and cookies provide algorithms with extensive amounts of information. Many articles say the protective power of clearing your cache is an urban myth. However, this information was based on how airlines used to price tickets. Recent analysis by the FTC shows the newest AI algorithms are changing prices based on this cached information.

    Third, many computer pricing algorithms look at your location, since location is a good proxy for income. I was once in Botswana and needed to buy a plane ticket. The price on my computer was about $200. Unfortunately, before booking I was called away to dinner. After dinner my computer showed the cost was $1,000 − five times higher. It turned out after dinner I used my university’s VPN, which told the airline I was located in a rich American neighborhood. Before dinner I was located in a poor African town. Shutting off the VPN reduced the price.

    Last, often to get a better price in face-to-face negotiations, you need to walk away. To do this online, put something in your basket and then wait before hitting purchase. I recently bought eyeglasses online. As a cash payer, I didn’t have my credit card handy. It took five minutes to find it, and the delay caused the site to offer a large discount to complete the purchase.

    The computer revolution has created the ability to create custom products cheaply. The cashless society combined with AI is setting us up for customized prices. In a custom-pricing situation, seeing a high price doesn’t mean something is higher quality. Instead, a high price simply means a business views the customer as willing to part with more money.

    Using cash more often can help defeat custom pricing. In my view, however, rapid advances in AI mean we need to start talking now about how prices are determined, before customized pricing takes over completely.

    Jay L. Zagorsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. What is personalized pricing, and how do I avoid it? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-personalized-pricing-and-how-do-i-avoid-it-262195

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Strengthening collective labor rights can help reduce economic inequality

    Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Skip Mark, Assistant professor of political science, University of Rhode Island

    Only about 1 in 10 U.S. workers belong to unions today. champc/iStock via Getty Images Plus

    Despite the strength of the U.S. economy, the gap between rich and poor Americans is increasing.

    The wealthiest 1% of Americans have more than five times as much wealth as the bottom 50%, according to the U.S. Federal Reserve. That’s up from four times as much in the year 2000. In 2024 alone, the wealthiest 19 families got a total of US$1 trillion richer – the largest one-year increase on record.

    And yet 59% of Americans don’t have enough money saved up to cover an unexpected $1,000 expense.

    We are political scientists who study human rights and political economy.

    In a 2023 study, our team looked at 145 countries, including the U.S., to understand the link between labor rights and inequality. We found evidence that strengthening collective labor rights may reduce economic inequality.

    Empowering workers

    Collective labor rights include the rights to form and join a union, bargain collectively for higher pay and better working conditions, go on strike, and get justice if employers punish workers who exercise these rights.

    In the U.S., where less than 10% of workers belong to unions, union members typically earn higher wages than their nonunion counterparts.

    Through negotiations on behalf of their members, unions can pressure employers to provide fair wages and benefits. If negotiations break down, the union can call for a strike – sometimes winning better benefits and higher wages as a result.

    Some U.S. unions don’t have the right to strike, including air traffic controllers, teachers and those working on national security issues. But most unions have some ability to implement work stoppages and impose costs on employers to negotiate for raises and better benefits and conditions.

    Reducing inequality

    For our study, we analyzed the human rights in the CIRIGHTS dataset, which uses human rights reports from the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International and other sources to measure government respect for 24 human rights, including the rights to unionize and bargain collectively. The dataset is produced by the University of Rhode Island, Binghamton University and the University of Connecticut. One of us, Skip Mark, serves as a co-director of the project.

    Using a scoring guide, a team of researchers reads human rights reports and gives each country a score of zero if they have widespread violations, one point if they have some violations, or two if they have no evidence of violations. The team has assigned scores for all 24 rights from 1994 through 2022.

    Using this data, we created a measure of collective labor rights by adding scores for the right to workplace association and the right to collective bargaining. The resulting collective labor rights score ranges from zero to four.

    Countries where workers’ rights are routinely violated, such as Afghanistan, China and Saudi Arabia, scored a zero. The United States, Macedonia and Zambia, three countries with little in common, were among those that tended to get two points, placing them in the middle. Countries with no reported violations of the rights to workplace association and collective bargaining, including Canada, Sweden and France, got four points.

    According to the CIRIGHTS dataset, the strength of respect for collective labor rights around the world declined by 50%, from 2.06 in 1994 to 1.03 in 2022.

    At the same time, according to the World Inequality Dataset, the share of income earned by the 1% with the biggest paychecks increased by 11%.

    We used advanced statistical methods to figure out whether better worker protections actually reduce inequality or are just associated with it.

    Gaps between individuals and ethnic groups

    We also measured what’s been happening to economic inequality, using two common ways to track it.

    One of them is vertical inequality, the gap between what people earn within a country – the rich versus the poor. The more unequal a society becomes, the higher its vertical inequality score gets. We measured it using the disposable income measure from the Gini index, a commonly used indicator of economic inequality that captures how much money individuals have to spend after taxes and government transfers.

    We found that a one-point increase in collective labor rights on our four-point scale reduces vertical inequality by 10 times the average change in inequality. For the U.S., a one-point increase in collective labor rights would be about enough to undo the increase in inequality that occurred between 2008 and 2010 due to the Great Recession and its aftermath. It would also likely help stem the growing wealth gap between Black and white Americans. That’s because income disparities compound over time to create wealth gaps.

    We also assessed the connection between horizontal inequality, which measures income inequality between ethnic or other groups, and collective labor rights.

    Negative horizontal inequality measures the amount of a country’s income held by the poorest ethnic group. Higher scores for this metric indicate that the lowest-earning ethnic group has less income relative to the rest of society. Black Americans have the lowest median income of any racial or ethnic group, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

    Positive horizontal inequality measures the income earned by the richest ethnic group. When positive horizontal inequality rises, that means the richest ethnic group has more income relative to the rest of society. According to the same Census Bureau report, Asian Americans had the highest median earnings.

    We found that stronger collective labor rights, both in law and in practice around the world, also reduce both types of horizontal inequality. This means they raise the floor by helping to improve the income of the poorest ethnic groups in society. They also close the gap by limiting the incomes of the richest ethnic group, which can reduce the likelihood of conflicts.

    That is, our findings suggest that when workers are free to advocate for higher wages and better benefits for themselves, it also benefits society as a whole.

    Stephen Bagwell is a researcher with the Human Rights Measurement Initiative, a charitable trust registered in New Zealand

    Skip Mark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Strengthening collective labor rights can help reduce economic inequality – https://theconversation.com/strengthening-collective-labor-rights-can-help-reduce-economic-inequality-254258

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Pacific tsunami: modern early warning systems prevent the catastrophic death tolls of the past

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ian Main, Professor of Seismology and Rock Physics, University of Edinburgh

    The earthquake in Russia’s Kamchatka peninsula on July 30 2025 may have been one of the most severe on record, with a magnitude of 8.8. But innovations in science and technology gave governments vital time to warn and evacuate their people from the resulting tsunami.

    Millions of people escaped to higher ground before the tsunami hit.

    The 2004 Boxing Day 9.3 magnitude earthquake and tsunami in Sumatra, which caused approximately 230,000 deaths, some as far away as Somalia on the other side of the Indian Ocean, shows how important these warnings are.

    Early warning systems were not in place for the Indian Ocean in time for the 2004 disaster. But there is now a system in place, with 27 countries participating in the group effort.

    The 2004 tsunami was particularly tragic because tsunami waves travel at a steady speed in the open ocean, about as fast as a jet plane. This means they can take several hours to reach shore across an ocean, with plenty of time for warning.

    An early warning system for the Pacific Ocean, based in Hawaii, was created in 1948 following a deadly tsunami two years before. On April 1 1946, the magnitude 8.6 Aleutian Islands earthquake in the northern Pacific Ocean generated a tsunami that devastated parts of Hawaii hours later, leading to 146 fatalities.

    The death toll was exacerbated by the leading wave being downwards. This happens in around 50% of tsunamis, and exposes the seashore in a similar way to when the tide goes out, but exposing a larger area than normal. People sometimes investigate out of curiosity, bringing them closer to the danger.

    The accuracy and response times of early tsunami warnings have significantly improved since 1948.

    How tsunamis happen

    To understand the work involved in protecting coastal communities, first you need to understand how tsunamis are generated.

    Tsunamis are caused by displacement of mass on the sea floor after an earthquake, landslide or volcanic eruption. This provides an energy source to set off a wave in the deep sea, not just near the surface like in the ocean waves we see whipped up by the wind and storms. Most are small. The Japanese word tsunami translates somewhat innocuously as “harbour wave”.

    Detailed global mapping of the sea floor, pioneered by US geologist Marie Tharpe between 1957 and 1978, helped establish the modern theory of plate tectonics. It also improved the physical models for how the tsunami will travel in the ocean.

    Wave height increases as it approaches the shore, and the topography of the sea floor can result in a complicated pattern of wave interference and concentration of the energy in stream-like patterns. The establishment of sea-floor observatories led to better data for the pressure at the sea floor (related to wave height) and satellite networks now directly monitor wave height globally using radar signals from space.

    One of the factors that has helped scientists predict the range of a tsunami includes the setting up of the worldwide standard station network of seismometers in 1963, which allowed better estimations of earthquake location and magnitude.

    These were superseded by the digital broadband global network of seismometers in 1978, which allowed more detail on the source to be calculated quickly. This includes a better estimate of earthquake size, the source rupture area and orientation in three dimensions.

    It also tells scientists about the slip, which controls the pattern of displacement on the sea floor. This data is used to forecast the time of landing, the amplitude of the wave on the shoreline, and its height in areas where the wave travels further inland.

    The Pacific Ocean warning system now has 46 countries contributing data. It also uses physical and statistical models for estimating tsunami height. The models developed as scientists learnt more about earthquake sources, mapped features on the sea floor and tested model forecasts against outcomes.

    Today’s technology

    The early warning systems we have today are due to a decades-long commitment to global research collaboration and open data. Scientists have also improved their forecast methods. Recently they started using trained AI algorithms which could improve the timeliness and accuracy.

    Pioneered by the US Geological Survey, rapid data sharing is now used routinely to estimate earthquake parameters and make them available to the public soon after the rupture stops. This can be within minutes for an initial estimate then updated over the next few hours as more data comes in.

    However, the forecast wave height is inherently uncertain, variable from place to place, and may turn out to be more or less than expected. Similarly, large earthquakes are rare, making it hard to estimate how likely they are on average, and therefore to design appropriate mitigation measures.

    The 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan destroyed or overtopped the eight-metre high protective sea walls that had been put in place based on such hazard estimates. There were over 19,000 fatalities. As a consequence, their height has been increased to 12-15 metres in some areas.

    Early warning systems also rely on rapid communication to the public, including mass alerts communicated by mobile phone, coordination by the relevant authorities across borders, clear advice, and advance evacuation plans and occasional alarm tests or drills. Although tsunami waves slow down to the speed of a car as they approach the shore, it is impossible to outrun one, so it is better to act quickly and calmly.

    The effectiveness of warnings also means accepting a degree of inconvenience in false alarms where the tsunami height is less than that forecast, because this is inevitable with the uncertainties involved. For good reason, authorities issuing alerts will err on the side of caution.

    To give an example, nuclear power plants on Japan’s eastern seaboard were shut down on July 30.

    So far it looks like the Pacific early warning system – combined with effective levels of preparedness and action by service providers and decision makers – has worked well in reducing the number of casualties that might have happened without it.

    There will always be a level of uncertainty we will have to live with. On balance, it is a small price to pay for avoiding a catastrophe.

    Ian Main is professor of Seismology and Rock Physics at the University of Edinburgh. He receives funding from UK Research and Innovation Research Council, a member of the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation Expert panel on external hazards, and acts as an independent reviewer for the Energy Industry-funded SeIsmic hazard and Ground Motion Assessment research program SIGMA3.

    – ref. Pacific tsunami: modern early warning systems prevent the catastrophic death tolls of the past – https://theconversation.com/pacific-tsunami-modern-early-warning-systems-prevent-the-catastrophic-death-tolls-of-the-past-262283

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: New peace plan increases pressure on Israel and US as momentum grows for Palestinian statehood

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

    A new vision for Middle East peace emerged this week which proposes the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and the West Bank, the disarming and disbanding of Hamas and the creation of a unified Palestinian state. The plan emerged from a “high-level conference” in New York on July 29, which assembled representatives of 17 states, the European Union and the Arab League.

    The resulting proposal is “a comprehensive and actionable framework for the implementation of the two-state solution and the achievement of peace and security for all”.

    Signatories include Turkey and the Middle Eastern states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan. Europe was represented by France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the UK. Indonesia was there for Asia, Senegal for Africa, and Brazil, Canada and Mexico for the Americas. Neither the US nor Israel were present.

    Significantly, it is the first time the Arab states have called for Hamas to disarm and disband. But, while condemning Hamas’s attack on Israel of October 7 2023 and recalling that the taking of hostages is a violation of international law, the document is unsparing in its connection between a state of Palestine and an end to Israel’s assault on Gaza’s civilians.

    It says: “Absent decisive measures toward the two-state solution and robust international guarantees, the conflict will deepen and regional peace will remain elusive.”

    A plan for the reconstruction of Gaza will be developed by the Arab states and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – a Jeddah-based group which aims to be the collective voice of the Muslim world – supported by an international fund. The details will be hammered out at a Gaza Reconstruction and Recovery Conference, to be held in Cairo.

    It is a bold initiative. In theory, it could end the Israeli mass killing in Gaza, remove Hamas from power and begin the implementation of a process for a state of Palestine. The question is whether it has any chance of success.

    First, there appears to be growing momentum to press ahead with recognition of the state of Palestine as part of a comprehensive peace plan leading to a two-state solution. France, the UK and, most recently, Canada have announced they would take that step at the UN general assembly in September. The UK stated that it would do so unless Israel agreed to a ceasefire and the commencement of a substantive peace process.



    Read more:
    UK and France pledges won’t stop Netanyahu bombing Gaza – but Donald Trump or Israel’s military could

    These announcements follow those made in May 2024 by Spain, Ireland and Norway, three of the other European signatories. By the end of September at least 150 of the UN’s 193 members will recognise Palestinian statehood. Recognition is largely symbolic without a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from both Gaza and the West Bank. But it is essential symbolism.

    For years, many European countries, Canada, Australia and the US have said that recognition could not be declared if there was the prospect of Israel-Palestine negotiations. Now the sequence is reversed: recognition is necessary as pressure for a ceasefire and the necessary talks to ensure the security of both Israelis and Palestinians.

    Israel accelerated that reversal at the start of March, when it rejected the scheduled move to phase two of the six-week ceasefire negotiated with the help of the US, and imposed a blockade on aid coming into the Strip.

    The Netanyahu government continues to hold out against the ceasefire. But its loud blame of Hamas is becoming harder to accept. The images of the starvation in Gaza and warnings by doctors, humanitarian organisations and the UN of an effective famine with the deaths of thousands can no longer be denied.

    Saudi Arabia and Qatar, behind the scenes and through their embassies, have been encouraging European countries to make the jump to recognition. Their efforts at the UN conference in New York this week are another front of that campaign.

    Israel and the Trump administration

    But in the short term, there is little prospect of the Netanyahu government giving way with its mass killing, let alone entering talks for two states. Notably neither Israel nor the US took part in the conference.

    Trump has criticised the scenes of starvation in Gaza. But his administration has joined Netanyahu in vitriolic denunciation of France and the UK over their intentions to recognise Palestine. And the US president has warned the Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, that recognition of Palestinian statehood would threaten Canada’s trade deal with the US.

    In response to Trump’s concern over the images of starving children and his exhortation “We’ve got to get the kids fed,” Israel has airdropped a few pallets of aid – less than a truck’s worth. Yet this appears more of a public relations exercise directed at Washington than a genuine attempt to ease the terrible condition on the Strip.

    A small number of lorries with supplies from UN and humanitarian organisations have also crossed the border, but only after lengthy delays and with half still held up. There is no security for transport and delivery of the aid inside Gaza.

    A sacrifice for a state?

    So the conference declaration is not relief for Gaza. Instead, it is yet another marker of Israel’s increasing isolation.

    After France’s announcement, the Netanyahu government thundered: “Such a move rewards terror and risks creating another Iranian proxy … A Palestinian state in these conditions would be a launch pad to annihilate Israel.”

    But while recognising Hamas’s mass killing of October 7 2023, most governments and their populations do not perceive Israel as attacking Hamas and its fighters. They see the Netanyahu government and Israeli military slaying and starving civilians.

    Even in the US, where the Trump administration is trying to crush sympathy for Palestine and Gazans in universities, non-governmental organisations and the public sphere, opinion is shifting.

    In a Gallup poll taken in the US and released on July 29, only 32% of respondents supported Israel’s actions in Gaza – an all-time low – and 60% opposed them. Netanyahu was viewed unfavourably by 52% and favourably by only 29%.

    Israel has lost its moment of “normalisation” with Arab states. Its economic links are strained and its oft-repeated claim to being the “Middle East’s only democracy” is bloodstained beyond recognition.

    This will be of no comfort to the people of Gaza facing death. But in the longer term, there is the prospect that this sacrifice will be the catalyst to recognise Palestine that disappeared in 1948.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. New peace plan increases pressure on Israel and US as momentum grows for Palestinian statehood – https://theconversation.com/new-peace-plan-increases-pressure-on-israel-and-us-as-momentum-grows-for-palestinian-statehood-262259

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: New peace plan increases pressure on Israel and US as momentum grows for Palestinian statehood

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

    A new vision for Middle East peace emerged this week which proposes the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and the West Bank, the disarming and disbanding of Hamas and the creation of a unified Palestinian state. The plan emerged from a “high-level conference” in New York on July 29, which assembled representatives of 17 states, the European Union and the Arab League.

    The resulting proposal is “a comprehensive and actionable framework for the implementation of the two-state solution and the achievement of peace and security for all”.

    Signatories include Turkey and the Middle Eastern states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan. Europe was represented by France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the UK. Indonesia was there for Asia, Senegal for Africa, and Brazil, Canada and Mexico for the Americas. Neither the US nor Israel were present.

    Significantly, it is the first time the Arab states have called for Hamas to disarm and disband. But, while condemning Hamas’s attack on Israel of October 7 2023 and recalling that the taking of hostages is a violation of international law, the document is unsparing in its connection between a state of Palestine and an end to Israel’s assault on Gaza’s civilians.

    It says: “Absent decisive measures toward the two-state solution and robust international guarantees, the conflict will deepen and regional peace will remain elusive.”

    A plan for the reconstruction of Gaza will be developed by the Arab states and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – a Jeddah-based group which aims to be the collective voice of the Muslim world – supported by an international fund. The details will be hammered out at a Gaza Reconstruction and Recovery Conference, to be held in Cairo.

    It is a bold initiative. In theory, it could end the Israeli mass killing in Gaza, remove Hamas from power and begin the implementation of a process for a state of Palestine. The question is whether it has any chance of success.

    First, there appears to be growing momentum to press ahead with recognition of the state of Palestine as part of a comprehensive peace plan leading to a two-state solution. France, the UK and, most recently, Canada have announced they would take that step at the UN general assembly in September. The UK stated that it would do so unless Israel agreed to a ceasefire and the commencement of a substantive peace process.



    Read more:
    UK and France pledges won’t stop Netanyahu bombing Gaza – but Donald Trump or Israel’s military could

    These announcements follow those made in May 2024 by Spain, Ireland and Norway, three of the other European signatories. By the end of September at least 150 of the UN’s 193 members will recognise Palestinian statehood. Recognition is largely symbolic without a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from both Gaza and the West Bank. But it is essential symbolism.

    For years, many European countries, Canada, Australia and the US have said that recognition could not be declared if there was the prospect of Israel-Palestine negotiations. Now the sequence is reversed: recognition is necessary as pressure for a ceasefire and the necessary talks to ensure the security of both Israelis and Palestinians.

    Israel accelerated that reversal at the start of March, when it rejected the scheduled move to phase two of the six-week ceasefire negotiated with the help of the US, and imposed a blockade on aid coming into the Strip.

    The Netanyahu government continues to hold out against the ceasefire. But its loud blame of Hamas is becoming harder to accept. The images of the starvation in Gaza and warnings by doctors, humanitarian organisations and the UN of an effective famine with the deaths of thousands can no longer be denied.

    Saudi Arabia and Qatar, behind the scenes and through their embassies, have been encouraging European countries to make the jump to recognition. Their efforts at the UN conference in New York this week are another front of that campaign.

    Israel and the Trump administration

    But in the short term, there is little prospect of the Netanyahu government giving way with its mass killing, let alone entering talks for two states. Notably neither Israel nor the US took part in the conference.

    Trump has criticised the scenes of starvation in Gaza. But his administration has joined Netanyahu in vitriolic denunciation of France and the UK over their intentions to recognise Palestine. And the US president has warned the Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, that recognition of Palestinian statehood would threaten Canada’s trade deal with the US.

    In response to Trump’s concern over the images of starving children and his exhortation “We’ve got to get the kids fed,” Israel has airdropped a few pallets of aid – less than a truck’s worth. Yet this appears more of a public relations exercise directed at Washington than a genuine attempt to ease the terrible condition on the Strip.

    A small number of lorries with supplies from UN and humanitarian organisations have also crossed the border, but only after lengthy delays and with half still held up. There is no security for transport and delivery of the aid inside Gaza.

    A sacrifice for a state?

    So the conference declaration is not relief for Gaza. Instead, it is yet another marker of Israel’s increasing isolation.

    After France’s announcement, the Netanyahu government thundered: “Such a move rewards terror and risks creating another Iranian proxy … A Palestinian state in these conditions would be a launch pad to annihilate Israel.”

    But while recognising Hamas’s mass killing of October 7 2023, most governments and their populations do not perceive Israel as attacking Hamas and its fighters. They see the Netanyahu government and Israeli military slaying and starving civilians.

    Even in the US, where the Trump administration is trying to crush sympathy for Palestine and Gazans in universities, non-governmental organisations and the public sphere, opinion is shifting.

    In a Gallup poll taken in the US and released on July 29, only 32% of respondents supported Israel’s actions in Gaza – an all-time low – and 60% opposed them. Netanyahu was viewed unfavourably by 52% and favourably by only 29%.

    Israel has lost its moment of “normalisation” with Arab states. Its economic links are strained and its oft-repeated claim to being the “Middle East’s only democracy” is bloodstained beyond recognition.

    This will be of no comfort to the people of Gaza facing death. But in the longer term, there is the prospect that this sacrifice will be the catalyst to recognise Palestine that disappeared in 1948.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. New peace plan increases pressure on Israel and US as momentum grows for Palestinian statehood – https://theconversation.com/new-peace-plan-increases-pressure-on-israel-and-us-as-momentum-grows-for-palestinian-statehood-262259

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Benjamin Dousa’s visit to Egypt to focus on trade and humanitarian issues

    Source: Government of Sweden

    On 26–27 May, Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade Benjamin Dousa is travelling to Cairo. He is accompanying a business delegation to promote Swedish exports and increased trade with Egypt. Mr Dousa will also meet with humanitarian organisations to discuss issues such as the acute and unacceptable situation in Gaza.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Burkina Faso: African Development Bank supports youth entrepreneurship in rural areas

    Source: African Development Bank Group
    The African Development Bank and the Government of Burkina Faso launched the third phase of the incubator program of the Support Project for Youth Employment and Skills Development in Rural Areas (PADEJ-MR in the French acronym) on July 15, 2025, in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: A fast-paced year of work against antimicrobial resistance (AMR)

    Source: Government of Sweden

    One of Malin Grape’s main tasks is to promote the visibility of the government’s priority issues in the field of antimicrobial resistance in the international arena and to contribute to a strengthened global dialogue. As Swedish Ambassador for work against AMR, she highlighted this issue at several key forums in 2023, including during the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union and at the World Health Assembly (WHA).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: New Development Bank and SANRAL sign ZAR7 billion loan agreement for South Africa Roads Infrastructure

    Source: New Development Bank

    Johannesburg, South Africa – on July 22, 2025, The New Development Bank (NDB) and the South African National Roads Agency Soc Limited (SANRAL) have today signed a landmark loan agreement worth ZAR7 billion to finance the rehabilitation and expansion of key national road segments. This strategic partnership reflects a shared commitment to modernizing South Africa’s transport infrastructure, reducing logistics costs, and boosting economic growth.

    The loan agreement will fund critical upgrades including the widening of highways, rehabilitation of bridges, and improvement of intersections along major freight corridors. These infrastructure enhancements are expected to significantly reduce travel times, improve road safety, and facilitate smoother movement of goods and people across the country.

    To optimise financial efficiency, the loan is denominated in South African Rand (ZAR), which helps reduce debt financing charges by mitigating currency risk and aligning repayment obligations with local revenue streams.

    South Africa’s transport sector plays a vital role in the national economy, and efficient road networks are essential for supporting trade, tourism, and job creation. By investing in the modernization of its road infrastructure, SANRAL aims to lower transportation costs for the majority of road users in South Africa, enhance connectivity between urban and rural areas, and stimulate inclusive economic development.

    This financing aligns with the New Development Bank’s mission to support sustainable infrastructure projects that foster regional integration and economic resilience. As Mr. Monale Ratsoma, Chief Financial Officer, explained, “This loan agreement with SANRAL demonstrates the New Development Bank’s commitment to partnering with South Africa in building resilient and efficient infrastructure that drives economic transformation. We are proud to support projects that will improve the quality of life for millions of South Africans.”

    From SANRAL’s perspective, Reginald Demana, Chief Executive Officer, emphasised, “The investment from the New Development Bank is a vital step towards upgrading our national road network. It will enable us to deliver safer, more reliable roads that underpin economic growth and social development.

    The signing ceremony took place in Johannesburg at NDB’s Africa Regional Office and was attended by senior officials from both organisations, highlighting the strong cooperation between the New Development Bank and South African government agencies.
    Background Information

    New Development Bank

    NDB was established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging market economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.

    For more information on NDB, please visit www.ndb.int

    South African National Roads Agency LTD

    The South African National Roads Agency (SANRAL) is an independent, statutory company. South Africa’s Ministry of Transport is the sole shareholder and owner of SANRAL. Its mandate focuses on building and maintaining roads to enhance connectivity and development in South Africa.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI: Societe Generale: Second quarter and first half 2025 results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RESULTS AT 30 JUNE 2025

    Press release                                                         
    Paris, 31 July 2025, 6:25 a.m.

    GROUP NET INCOME OF EUR 3.1BN IN H1 25, UP +71% VS. H1 24

    UPGRADE OF 2025 TARGETS

    FIRST ADDITIONAL SHARE BUY-BACK OF EUR 1BN

    NEW INTERIM CASH DIVIDEND OF EUR 0.611 PER SHARE

    • Group revenues at EUR 13.9 billion in H1 25, up +8.6% excluding asset disposals vs. H1 24, exceeding 2025 annual target > +3%
    • Costs down -2.6% in H1 25 vs. H1 24, excluding asset disposals, ahead of our 2025 annual target of a decrease higher than -1%
    • Cost / income ratio at 64.4% in H1 25, below the initial annual target of <66% for 2025
    • Solid asset quality with a low cost of risk at 24bps in H1 25, below the 2025 annual target of 25 to 30 basis points
    • Group net income of EUR 3.1 billion in H1 25, up +71% vs. H1 24, ROTE at 10.3%, above the initial annual target of >8% for 2025
    • As in H1 25, strong performance in Q2 25, C/I ratio at 63.8% (vs. 68.4% in Q2 24), Group net income of EUR 1.5bn (+31% vs. Q2 24) and ROTE at 9.7%
    • Upgrade of the 2025 financial targets driven by better than guided revenues and costs:
      • Cost / income ratio now expected below 65% in 2025
      • ROTE target for 2025 increased to ~9% in 2025
    • First distribution of excess capital in the form of an additional share buy-back of EUR 1 billion (~-25 basis points of the CET1 ratio), to be launched as soon as 4 August 2025
    • CET1 ratio at 13.5% at the end of Q2 25 after additional share buy-back of EUR 1bn, around 330 basis points above the regulatory requirement
    • The Board of Directors approved an amendment to the distribution policy, introducing an interim cash dividend payable in the fourth quarter of each year from 2025 onwards. For the first half of 2025, an interim dividend of EUR 0.611 per share will be paid on 9 October 2025

    Slawomir Krupa, Group Chief Executive Officer, commented:

    “We are once again reporting strong results this quarter with a solid commercial and financial performance in all our businesses. Revenue growth, cost reduction, cost income ratio and profitability improvement: we are ahead of all our annual targets for the first half of the year, and we have revised them upwards for the full year 2025. With a high capital ratio, well above our target, we decided to provide an additional distribution to shareholders in the form of a share buy-back and to introduce an interim dividend for the first half of 2025. I would like to thank all our teams for their commitment to our clients and to our Bank. We remain fully focused on the precise and methodical execution of our 2026 roadmap to continue delivering sustainable and profitable growth for all our stakeholders.”

    1. GROUP CONSOLIDATED RESULTS
    In EURm Q2 25 Q2 24 Change H1 25 H1 24 Change
    Net banking income 6,791 6,685 +1.6% +7.8%* 13,874 13,330 +4.1% +8.8%*
    Operating expenses (4,331) (4,570) -5.2% -0.1%* (8,935) (9,550) -6.4% -2.6%*
    Gross operating income 2,460 2,115 +16.4% +25.3%* 4,939 3,780 +30.7% +37.8%*
    Net cost of risk (355) (387) -8.2% +0.7%* (699) (787) -11.1% -4.9%*
    Operating income 2,105 1,728 +21.8% +30.6%* 4,240 2,993 +41.7% +48.8%*
    Net profits or losses from other assets 75 (8) n/s n/s 277 (88) n/s n/s
    Income tax (477) (379) +25.8% +37.7%* (967) (653) +48.1% +58.3%*
    Net income 1,702 1,348 +26.3% +34.6%* 3,557 2,265 +57.1% +64.4%*
    o/w non-controlling interests 249 235 +5.8% +11.5%* 496 472 +5.0% +11.3%*
    Group net income 1,453 1,113 +30.6% +39.6%* 3,061 1,793 +70.8% +78.1%*
    ROE 8.6% 6.5%     9.1% 5.1% +0.0% +0.0%*
    ROTE 9.7% 7.4%     10.3% 5.8% +0.0% +0.0%*
    Cost to income 63.8% 68.4%     64.4% 71.6% +0.0% +0.0%*

    Asterisks* in the document refer to data at constant scope and exchange rates

    Societe Generale’s Board of Directors, at a meeting chaired by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi on 30 July 2025, reviewed the Societe Generale Group’s results for the second quarter and first half of 2025.

    Net banking income 

    Net banking income stood at EUR 6.8 billion, up +1.6% vs. Q2 24 and +7.1% excluding asset disposals.

    Revenues of French Retail, Private Banking and Insurance were up +6.5% vs. Q2 24 (+10.7% excluding asset disposals). They stood at EUR 2.3 billion in Q2 25. Net interest income grew strongly in Q2 25 by +14.8% vs. Q2 24, and by +2.4% when restating the disposals and the impact of short-term hedges recognised in Q2 24 (around EUR -150 million). Assets under management in Private Banking (excluding disposals of the Swiss and UK operations) and life insurance outstandings increased by +6% and +5% in Q2 25 vs. Q2 24 respectively. Lastly, BoursoBank continued its strong commercial development with ~424,000 new clients during the quarter, and has reached 8 million clients in July 2025, ahead of its initial 2026 guidance given at the Capital Markets Day in September 2023.

    Global Banking and Investor Solutions maintained a high level of revenues of EUR 2.6 billion in Q2 25, up +0.7% vs. Q2 24 owing to the continued sustained activity in Fixed Income and Currencies and in Financing and Advisory. Global Markets posted a revenue base up +0.8% in Q2 25, compared with a level that was already very high in Q2 24. The Equities business maintained a very high level of revenues, although this fell slightly by -2.9% in Q2 25, compared with an elevated level in Q2 24, mainly due to the positive commercial momentum in derivatives. Fixed Income and Currencies grew by 7.3%, driven by buoyant activity in flow and financing products. Securities Services posted a slight decrease in revenues of -3.1% due to the impact of the fall in interest rates. Global Banking & Advisory benefited from the strong performance of the acquisition finance, fund financing and project finance businesses, as well as from the solid momentum in loan origination and distribution. Lastly, despite robust commercial activity with corporate and institutional clients, Global Transaction & Payment Services recorded a fall in revenues of -4.7% compared with Q2 24, also due to the contraction of interest rates.

    In Mobility, International Retail Banking and Financial Services, revenues were down -5.6% vs. Q2 24 mainly due to a scope effect of around EUR -260 million in Q2 25. Excluding the impact of asset disposals, they were up +7.3%. International Retail Banking recorded a -12.1% fall in revenues vs. Q2 24 to
    EUR 0.9 billion, due to a scope effect related to the disposals completed in Africa (mainly Morocco and Madagascar). They rose +2.7% at constant perimeter and exchange rates. Revenues from Mobility and Financial Services were up +0.4% vs. Q2 24 and up +11.7% excluding the disposal of SGEF. Ayvens’ revenues grew by +10.6% vs. Q2 24, with notably improved margins. Consumer Finance posted a revenue increase of +12.6%, notably driven by higher net interest income.

    The Corporate Centre recorded revenues of EUR -160 million in Q2 25.

    In the first half of the year, the Group’s net banking income increased by +4.1% vs. H1 24 and +8.6% excluding asset disposals.

    Operating expenses 

    Operating expenses came to EUR 4,331 million in Q2 25, down -5.2% vs. Q2 24 and -0.6% excluding asset disposals.

    The slight decrease in operating expenses in Q2 25 excluding asset disposals largely results from the accounting of an exceptional charge of approximately EUR 100 million2 related to the launch of a Global Employee Share Ownership Programme in June 2025. Restated from this non-recurring item, operating expenses were down -2.8% vs. Q2 24, confirming the strong cost control at Group level. In Q2 25, transformation charges fell by EUR -93 million vs. Q2 24.

    The cost-to-income ratio stood at 63.8% in Q2 25, down from Q2 24 (68.4%) and below the initial guidance of <66% for 2025.

    In the first half of the year, operating expenses fell significantly by -2.6% vs. H1 24 (excluding asset disposals). The cost-to-income ratio stood at 64.4% (vs. 71.6% in H1 24), also ahead of the initial 2025 guidance of <66%.

    Revenues and costs in H1 25 being ahead of the initial targets in H1 25, the C/I ratio target is now at <65% in 2025.

    Cost of risk

    The cost of risk remained low during the quarter at 25 basis points, or EUR 355 million and is still at the lower end of the target set for 2025 of between 25 and 30 basis points. This comprises a
    EUR 390 million provision for doubtful loans (around 27 basis points) and a reversal of a provision for performing loans for EUR 35 million.

    At end-June, the Group had a stock of provisions for performing loans of EUR 3,011 million, down by -3.8% from 31 March 2025, mainly driven by asset disposals and FX impact.

    The gross non-performing loan ratio amounted to 2.77%3,4 at 30 June 2025, down compared with its level at end-March 2025 (2.82%). The net coverage ratio on the Group’s non-performing loans stood at 81%5 at 30 June 2025 (after netting of guarantees and collateral).

    Net profits from other assets

    The Group recorded a net profit of EUR 75 million in Q2 25, mainly related to the accounting impacts resulting from the sale of Societe Generale Burkina Faso, completed in June 2025.

    Group net income

    Group net income stood at EUR 1,453 million for the quarter, equating to a Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE) of 9.7%.

    In the first half of the year, Group net income stood at EUR 3,061 million, equating to a Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE) of 10.3%, higher than the target set for 2025 of >8%.

    Considering the performance in the first half of 2025, the Group is now targeting a ROTE of around 9% in 2025.

    Shareholder distribution

    The Board of Directors approved an amendment to the distribution policy, introducing an interim cash dividend payable in the fourth quarter of each year from 2025 onwards. Based on the financial statements for the first half of 2025, the Board of Directors has decided the payment of an interim dividend of EUR 0.61 per share. The ex-dividend date will be on 7 October 2025 and the payment on 9 October 2025.

    In addition, as part of the first application of a possible option of the Group’s new distribution policy announced on 6 February 20256, a distribution of excess capital will be made in the form of an additional EUR 1 billion share buy-back. Authorisations, including the one from the ECB, have been obtained7 to launch this programme, which will start on 4 August 2025.

    1. ESG: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

    The Group announced the composition of its Scientific Advisory Council this quarter. The role of this body is to provide the General Management with ESG insights, taking a science-based approach to the key emerging trends that will influence the economic environment and the Group’s activities in the future. Composed of eight expert members with complementary skills, the Council will provide holistic views in order to identify long-term opportunities and challenges (for more details, see Societe Generale unveils the composition of its Scientific Advisory Council – Societe Generale).

    At the same time, Societe Generale is continuing to develop its actions for the energy transition, as well as innovative financing solutions to support its customers:

    • During the United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC), Societe Generale recalled its efforts to protect marine ecosystems and its key role in the transition to a more sustainable maritime economy. It acted as the exclusive advisor to Eurazeo for the “Maritime Upgrade” debt fund (Eurazeo and Societe Generale to join forces to support the sustainable transition of the maritime sector – Wholesale Banking).
    • Through its subsidiary REED, Societe Generale has invested in Voltekko Tech, a platform specialising in energy-efficient data centres. A total of nine investments, mainly in the energy sector, have been made since the acquisition of REED.

    Lastly, Societe Generale received the Euromoney award for “The World’s Best Bank for ESG”, together with an excellent rating from Sustainalytics, at 15.4 – an improvement on the rating assigned by the agency in its last review, which positions it among the world’s best banks (top 12%).

    1. THE GROUP’S FINANCIAL STRUCTURE

    At 30 June 2025, the Group’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio stood at 13.5%, or around 330 basis points above the regulatory requirement. Likewise, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) was also well above regulatory requirements at 148% at end-June 2025 (149% on average for the quarter), while the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) stood at 117% at end-June 2025.

    All liquidity and solvency ratios are well above the regulatory requirements.

      30/06/2025 31/12/2024 Requirements
    CET1(1) 13.5% 13.3% 10.22%
    Tier 1 ratio(1) 15.8% 16.1% 12.14%
    Total Capital(1) 18.4% 18.9% 14.71%
    Leverage ratio(1) 4.4% 4.3% 3.60%
    TLAC (% RWA)(1) 29.9% 29.7% 22.33%
    TLAC (% leverage)(1) 8.3% 8.0% 6.75%
    MREL (% RWA)(1) 33.4% 34.2% 27.44%
    MREL (% leverage)(1) 9.2% 9.2% 6.13%
    End of period LCR 148% 162% >100%
    Period average LCR 149% 150% >100%
    NSFR 117% 117% >100%
    In EURbn 30/06/2025 31/12/2024
    Total consolidated balance sheet 1,551 1,574
    Shareholders’ equity (IFRS), Group share 68 70
    Risk-weighted assets 388 390
    O.w. credit risk 314 327
    Total funded balance sheet 923 952
    Customer loans 456 463
    Customer deposits 594 614

    8

    As of 30 June 2025, the parent company has issued EUR 13.5 billion of medium / long-term debt under its 2025 financing programme, including EUR 4.5 billion of pre-financing raised at end-2024. The subsidiaries had issued EUR 1.8 billion. In total, the Group has issued a total of EUR 15.3 billion in medium / long-term debt since the start of the year.

    As of 30 June 2025, the parent company’s 2025 financing programme is around 80% complete for vanilla issuance.

    The Group is rated by four rating agencies: (i) Fitch Ratings – Issuer default rating “A-”, stable outlook, senior preferred debt rating “A”, short-term rating “F1”; (ii) Moody’s – long-term rating (senior preferred debt) “A1”, stable outlook, short-term rating “P-1”; (iii) R&I – long-term rating (senior preferred debt) “A”, stable outlook; and (iv) S&P Global Ratings – long-term rating (senior preferred debt) “A”, stable outlook, short-term rating “A-1”.

    1. FRENCH RETAIL, PRIVATE BANKING AND INSURANCE
    In EURm Q2 25 Q2 24 Change H1 25 H1 24 Change
    Net banking income 2,269 2,131 +6.5% 4,568 4,146 +10.2%
    Of which net interest income 1,036 902 +14.8% 2,097 1,729 +21.3%
    Of which fees 1,013 1,027 -1.4% 2,069 2,045 +1.1%
    Operating expenses (1,477) (1,649) -10.4% (3,043) (3,377) -9.9%
    Gross operating income 791 482 +64.3% 1,525 770 +98.2%
    Net cost of risk (146) (173) -15.4% (317) (420) -24.5%
    Operating income 645 309 x 2.1 1,208 350 x 3.5
    Net profits or losses from other assets 20 8 x 2.6 27 8 x 3.3
    Group net income 488 240 x 2.0 909 271 x 3.4
    RONE 11.2% 5.7%   10.4% 3.3%  
    Cost to income 65.1% 77.4%   66.6% 81.4%  

    Commercial activity

    SG Network, Private Banking and Insurance 

    The SG Network’s average outstanding deposits amounted to EUR 227 billion in Q2 25, down -3% compared with Q2 24, and -1% vs. Q1 25.

    The SG Network’s average loan outstandings contracted by -2% on Q2 24 to EUR 194 billion and were stable excluding repayments of state-guaranteed loans (PGE). Mortgage loan production saw a sharp increase of +175% vs. Q2 24.

    The average loan to deposit ratio came to 85.5% in Q2 25, down -1 percentage point relative to Q2 24.

    Private Banking saw its assets under management9 grow by +6% vs. Q2 24 to EUR 132 billion in Q2 25. Net asset inflows totalled EUR 2.3 billion in Q2 25, with asset gathering pace (annualised net new money divided by AuM) standing at +6% in H1 25. Net banking income amounted to EUR 308 million for the quarter and EUR 669 million for the first half of the year.

    Insurance, which covers activities in and outside France, posted a strong commercial performance. Life insurance outstandings increased by +5% vs. Q2 24 to reach EUR 150 billion in Q2 25. The share of unit-linked products remained high at 40%. Gross life insurance savings inflows amounted to EUR 4.8 billion in Q2 25.

    BoursoBank 

    BoursoBank reached 7.9 million clients in Q2 25, the threshold of 8 million clients being reached in July 2025. In Q2 25, the bank recorded a +22% increase in the number of clients vs. Q2 24, bringing growth in the number of clients to +1.4 million year on year. Onboarding remained high during the quarter (~424,000 new clients in Q2 25), while the attrition is very low, at less than 4%.

    BoursoBank once again confirmed its position as the French market leader, as shown by the award received from Euromoney for best digital bank in France10.

    Average outstanding savings, including deposits and financial savings, totalled EUR 69.8 billion, the average outstanding deposits increasing sharply by +16% vs. Q2 24. Average life insurance outstandings increased by +7% vs. Q2 24 (the share of unit-linked products was 48%) and gross inflows being up +12% vs. Q2 24. The brokerage activity recorded a strong increase in the number of market orders of +33% vs. Q2 24.

    Average loan outstandings rose +10% compared with Q2 24 to EUR 16.7 billion in Q2 25.

    Net banking income

    Revenues for the quarter amounted to EUR 2,269 million (including PEL/CEL provision) up +6.5% compared with Q2 24 and +10.7% excluding asset disposals. Net interest income grew by +14.8%
    vs. Q2 24 and +2.4% excluding asset disposals and the impact of short-term hedges in Q2 24. Fees were down -1.4% compared with Q2 24 and up +1.4% excluding asset disposals.

    First-half revenues came to EUR 4,568 million (including PEL/CEL provision), up +10.2% on H1 24 and +13.6% excluding asset disposals. Net interest income grew by +21.3% vs. H1 24. It is up +0.6% excluding asset disposals and the impact of short-term hedges in H1 24. Fee income rose +1.1% vs. H1 24 and +3.7% excluding asset disposals.

    Operating expenses

    Operating expenses came to EUR 1,477 million for the quarter, down -10.4% vs. Q2 24 and -5.7% excluding asset disposals. The cost-to-income ratio stood at 65.1% in Q2 25, an improvement of 12.3 percentage points vs. Q2 24.

    During the first half of the year, operating expenses amounted to EUR 3,043 million, down -9.9% compared with H1 24 and -6.2% excluding asset disposals. The cost-to-income ratio stood at 66.6%, an improvement of 14.8 percentage points vs. H1 24.

    Cost of risk

    The cost of risk amounted to EUR 146 million, or 25 basis points, for the quarter, which was lower than in Q2 24 and Q1 25 (29 basis points in both cases).

    In the first half of the year, the cost of risk totalled EUR 317 million, or 27 basis points.

    Group net income

    Group net income totalled EUR 488 million for the quarter. RONE stood at 11.2% in Q2 25.

    In the first half of the year, Group net income totalled EUR 909 million. RONE stood at 10.4% in H1 25.

    1. GLOBAL BANKING AND INVESTOR SOLUTIONS
    In EUR m Q2 25 Q2 24 Variation H1 25 H1 24 Change
    Net banking income 2,647 2,628 +0.7% +2.4%* 5,542 5,259 +5.4% +5.5%*
    Operating expenses (1,630) (1,647) -1.0% +0.2%* (3,385) (3,404) -0.5% -0.4%*
    Gross operating income 1,017 981 +3.6% +6.1%* 2,157 1,856 +16.2% +16.4%*
    Net cost of risk (81) (21) x 3.8 x 3.8* (136) (1) x 91.4 x 91.4*
    Operating income 936 960 -2.5% -0.1%* 2,021 1,854 +9.0% +9.2%*
    Reported Group net income 750 776 -3.4% -1.1%* 1,606 1,473 +9.0% +9.2%*
    RONE 16.8% 19.0% +0.0% +0.0%* 17.7% 18.2% +0.0% +0.0%*
    Cost to income 61.6% 62.7% +0.0% +0.0%* 61.1% 64.7% +0.0% +0.0%*

    Net banking income

    Global Banking and Investor Solutions reported solid results for the quarter, with revenues of
    EUR 2,647 million, remaining consistently high, slightly up +0.7% compared with Q2 24.

    In the first half of the year, revenues grew by +5.4% vs. H1 24 (EUR 5,542 million vs. EUR 5,259 million).

    Global Markets and Investor Services maintained a high level of revenues of EUR 1,753 million, stable (+0.4%) over the quarter compared with Q2 24. In the first half of the year, they amounted to EUR 3,674 million, up +5.2% vs. H1 24.

    Market Activities were slightly up during the quarter (+0.8%), with revenues of EUR 1,577 million. In the first half of the year, they rose +5.9% in comparison with H1 24 to EUR 3,336 million.

    The Equities business was resilient during the quarter, at -2.9% compared with a high level in Q2 24. Revenues stood at EUR 962 million for the quarter, driven by the positive commercial momentum in derivatives. In the first half of the year, they rose +8.7% in comparison with H1 24 to EUR 2,023 million.

    Fixed Income and Currencies rose sharply during the quarter, with revenues up +7.3% vs. Q2 24 to
    EUR 615 million, driven by a strong performance in flow and financing products. Commercial momentum remained strong during the quarter, despite an uncertain macroeconomic environment. In the first half of the year, revenues were up +1.9% from H1 24 to EUR 1,313 million.

    In Securities Services, revenues fell -3.1% compared with Q2 24 to EUR 176 million, due to the fall in interest rates. Excluding equity participations, revenues are down -2.4%. In the first half of the year, revenues were down -1.0% and -1.3% excluding equity participations. Assets under Custody and Assets under Administration amounted to EUR 5,222 billion and EUR 638 billion, respectively.

    Revenues for the Financing and Advisory business totalled EUR 895 million for the quarter, slightly up +1.3% compared with Q2 24. In the first half of the year, they were up +5.7% in comparison with H1 24 to EUR 1,868 million.

    Global Banking & Advisory posted significant revenues for the quarter, up +3.6% compared with Q2 24, driven in particular by buoyant activity in acquisition finance, fund financing and project finance. In the first half of the year, revenues were up +7.1% versus H1 24.

    Global Transaction & Payment Services delivered good commercial performance during the quarter, particularly with corporate and institutional clients. However, revenues fell by -4.7% during the quarter due to the impact of lower interest rates. In the first half of the year, revenues were up +1.6% vs. H1 24.

    Operating expenses

    Operating expenses came to EUR 1,630 million for the quarter, down -1.0% vs. Q2 24. The cost-to-income ratio was 61.6% in Q2 25.

    During the first half of the year, operating expenses contracted by -0.5% compared with H1 24, while the cost-to-income ratio reached 61.1%, vs. 64.7% in H1 24.

    Cost of risk

    During the quarter, the cost of risk was EUR 81 million, or 19 basis points vs. 5 basis points in Q2 24.

    During the first half of the year, the cost of risk was EUR 136 million, or 16 basis points vs. 0 basis points in H1 24.

    Group net income

    Group net income fell -3.4% vs. Q2 24 to EUR 750 million. In the first half of the year, it rose +9.0% to
    EUR 1,606 million.

    Global Banking and Investor Solutions reported RONE of 16.8% for the quarter and RONE of 17.7% for the first half of the year.

    1. MOBILITY, INTERNATIONAL RETAIL BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
    In EURm Q2 25 Q2 24 Change H1 25 H1 24 Change
    Net banking income 2,036 2,157 -5.6% +7.2%* 4,036 4,318 -6.5% +4.1%*
    Operating expenses (1,059) (1,261) -16.0% -4.2%* (2,240) (2,611) -14.2% -4.5%*
    Gross operating income 977 896 +8.9% +22.9%* 1,796 1,707 +5.3% +17.4%*
    Net cost of risk (126) (189) -33.1% -18.4%* (250) (370) -32.4% -21.2%*
    Operating income 850 708 +20.1% +32.9%* 1,546 1,336 +15.7% +27.5%*
    Net profits or losses from other assets 0 (0) n/s n/s 0 4 -92.7% -92.7%*
    Non-controlling interests 246 211 +16.5% +23.5%* 458 406 +12.6% +20.6%*
    Group net income 404 321 +25.7% +41.3%* 722 599 +20.5% +33.7%*
    RONE 15.3% 11.4%     13.2% 10.7%    
    Cost to income 52.0% 58.4%     55.5% 60.5%    

    )()

    Commercial activity

    International Retail Banking

    International Retail Banking posted strong commercial momentum in Q2 25, mainly driven by loan outstandings, up +4.3%* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 61 billion. Deposit outstandings stabilised* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 75 billion.

    Europe continued to post strong growth in loan outstandings of 7.0%* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 46 billion in Q2 25. Deposits were stable* this quarter at EUR 56 billion in Q2 25.

    In Africa, Mediterranean Basin and French Overseas Territories, loan outstandings were down -3.1%* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 15 billion. Deposit outstandings increased +1.9%* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 19 billion in Q2 25, mainly driven by sight deposits from retail and corporate clients.

    Mobility and Financial Services

    Overall, Mobility and Financial Services recorded a broadly stable commercial performance.

    Ayvens maintained earning assets of around EUR 53 billion at end-June 2025, broadly stable compared to end-June 2024.

    Consumer Finance posted loans outstanding of EUR 23 billion, still down -2.8% vs. Q2 24.

    Net banking income

    In Q2 25, Mobility, International Retail Banking and Financial Services delivered a good performance, with EUR 2,036 million in Q2 25, up 7.2%* vs. Q2 24.

    In the first half of the year, revenues grew by +4.1%* vs. H1 24 to EUR 4,036 million.

    International Retail Banking revenues increased +2.7%* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 920 million in Q2 25. They rose +2.3%* in the first half vs. H1 24 to EUR 1,833 million in H1 25.

    In Europe, revenues amounted to EUR 528 million in Q2 25, strongly up +6.1%* vs. Q2 24. The increase was due to the high level of net interest income in both countries (+7.3%* vs. Q2 24).

    Overall, revenues in Africa, Mediterranean Basin and French Overseas Territories were slightly down -1.5%* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 392 million in Q2 25, compared with a high Q2 24 level. The net interest income was up +2.8%* vs. Q2 24.

    Mobility and Financial Services posted strong revenue growth in both businesses, at +11.1%* overall vs. Q2 24, to EUR 1,116 million in Q2 25. In the first half of the year, the increase was +5.7%* vs. H1 24 to EUR 2,203 million.

    The significant improvement in Ayvens’ revenues of +10.6% vs. Q2 24 (EUR 868 million in Q2 25) is due, as expected, to the reduced impact of depreciation adjustments and non-recurring items11 (-3% revenues vs. Q2 24, adjusted from those two items). Margins increased to 550 basis points in Q2 25 vs. 539 basis points in Q2 24, excluding non-recurring items. The depreciations were down vs. Q2 24 and the average results on sales of used vehicles per unit on the secondary market continued to normalise very gradually (EUR 1,23412 in Q2 25 vs. EUR 1,4802 in Q2 24). At company level, Ayvens had a cost-to-income ratio of 57.6%13 in Q2 25, in line with the 2025 guidance (57%-59% for the year).

    Revenues from the Consumer Finance business increased by +12.6% vs. Q2 24, to EUR 247 million in Q2 25. This significant growth reflects both an improvement in the margin on new production and the positive impact of an asset revaluation.

    Operating expenses

    Over the quarter, operating expenses for the quarter decreased by -4.2%* vs. Q2 24 to EUR 1,059 million in Q2 25 (including EUR 29 million in transformation charges). The cost-to-income ratio improved in Q2 25 to 52.0% vs. 58.4% in Q2 24. In the first half of the year, costs of EUR 2,240 million were down -4.5%* vs. H1 24, while the cost-to-income ratio stood at 55.5% vs. 60.5% in H1 24.

    International Retail Banking recorded a -5.2%* decrease in costs vs. Q2 24 at EUR 482 million, in a still inflationary local environment.

    Mobility and Financial Services costs reached EUR 577 million in Q2 25, down -3.3%* vs. Q2 24. Ayvens benefitted from the initial cost synergies related to the integration of Leaseplan.

    Cost of risk

    Over the quarter, the cost of risk amounted to EUR 126 million or 35 basis points this quarter, which was considerably lower than in Q2 24 (45 basis points).

    In the first half of the year, the cost of risk stood at 33 basis points vs. 44 basis points in H1 24.

    Group net income

    Group net income came to EUR 404 million for the quarter, up +41.3%* vs. Q2 24. RONE improved to 15.3% in Q2 25 vs. 11.4% in Q2 24. RONE was 18.4% in International Retail Banking and 13.1% in Mobility and Financial Services in Q2 25.

    In the first half of the year, Group net income came to EUR 722 million, up +33.7%* vs. H1 24. RONE improved to 13.2% in H1 25 vs. 10.7% in H1 24. RONE was 16.3% in International Retail Banking and 11.1% in Mobility and Financial Services in H1 25.

    1. CORPORATE CENTRE
    In EURm Q2 25 Q2 24 Change H1 25 H1 24 Change
    Net banking income (160) (231) +30.8% +30.8%* (273) (394) +30.8% +30.8%*
    Operating expenses (164) (13) x 12.3 x 4.3* (267) (158) +68.3% +45.3%*
    Gross operating income (324) (245) -32.5% -20.2%* (539) (552) +2.4% +6.6%*
    Net cost of risk (2) (4) -55.7% -55.7%* 4 5 +16.7% +16.7%*
    Net profits or losses from other assets 57 (15) n/s n/s 250 (99) n/s n/s
    Income tax 83 67 -23.0% -12.2%* 143 157 +8.7% +12.3%*
    Group net income (188) (225) +16.1% +22.5%* (176) (551) +68.0% +69.1%*

    The Corporate Centre includes:

    • the property management of the Group’s head office,
    • the Group’s equity portfolio,
    • the Treasury function for the Group,
    • certain costs related to cross-functional projects, as well as various costs incurred by the Group that are not re-invoiced to the businesses.

    Net banking income

    The Corporate Centre’s net banking income totalled EUR -160 million for the quarter, vs. EUR -231 million in Q2 24.

    In the first half of the year, the Corporate Centre’s net banking income totalled EUR -273 million, vs. EUR -394 million in H1 24.

    Operating expenses

    During the quarter, operating expenses totalled EUR -164 million, vs. EUR -13 million in Q2 24. They include around EUR 100 million in expenses related to the Global Employee Share Ownership Programme launched in June 2025.

    In the first half of the year, operating expenses totalled EUR -267 million, vs. EUR -158 million in H1 24.

    Net profits from other assets

    The Corporate Centre recognised EUR 57 million in net profits from other assets during the quarter, mainly related to the completion of the disposal of Societe Generale Burkina Faso in June 2025.

    Group net income

    The Corporate Centre’s Group net income totalled EUR -188 million for the quarter, vs. EUR -225 million in Q2 24.

    The Corporate Centre’s Group net income totalled EUR -176 million in the first half, vs. EUR -551 million in H1 24.

    8.   2025 FINANCIAL CALENDAR

       2025 and 2026 Financial communication calendar
    7 October 2025 Ex-dividend date
    9 October 2025 Payment of the interim dividend
    30 October 2025 Third quarter and nine months 2025 results
    6 February 2026 Fourth quarter and full year 2025 results
    30 April 2026 First quarter 2026 results
     
    The Alternative Performance Measures, notably the notions of net banking income for the pillars, operating expenses, cost of risk in basis points, ROE, ROTE, RONE, net assets and tangible net assets are presented in the methodology notes, as are the principles for the presentation of prudential ratios.

    This document contains forward-looking statements relating to the targets and strategies of the Societe Generale Group.

    These forward-looking statements are based on a series of assumptions, both general and specific, in particular the application of accounting principles and methods in accordance with IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) as adopted in the European Union, as well as the application of existing prudential regulations.

    These forward-looking statements have also been developed from scenarios based on a number of economic assumptions in the context of a given competitive and regulatory environment. The Group may be unable to:

    – anticipate all the risks, uncertainties or other factors likely to affect its business and to appraise their potential consequences;

    – evaluate the extent to which the occurrence of a risk or a combination of risks could cause actual results to differ materially from those provided in this document and the related presentation.

    Therefore, although Societe Generale believes that these statements are based on reasonable assumptions, these forward-looking statements are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, including matters not yet known to it or its management or not currently considered material, and there can be no assurance that anticipated events will occur or that the objectives set out will actually be achieved. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from the results anticipated in the forward-looking statements include, among others, overall trends in general economic activity and in Societe Generale’s markets in particular, regulatory and prudential changes, and the success of Societe Generale’s strategic, operating and financial initiatives.

    More detailed information on the potential risks that could affect Societe Generale’s financial results can be found in the section “Risk Factors” in our Universal Registration Document filed with the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (which is available on https://investors.societegenerale.com/en).

    Investors are advised to take into account factors of uncertainty and risk likely to impact the operations of the Group when considering the information contained in such forward-looking statements. Other than as required by applicable law, Societe Generale does not undertake any obligation to update or revise any forward-looking information or statements. Unless otherwise specified, the sources for the business rankings and market positions are internal.

    9.   APPENDIX 1: FINANCIAL DATA

    GROUP NET INCOME BY CORE BUSINESS

    In EURm Q2 25 Q2 24 Variation H1 25 H1 24 Variation
    French Retail, Private Banking and Insurance 488 240 x 2.0 909 271 x 3.4
    Global Banking and Investor Solutions 750 776 -3.4% 1,606 1,473 +9.0%
    Mobility, International Retail Banking & Financial Services 404 321 +25.7% 722 599 +20.5%
    Core Businesses 1,642 1,322 +24.2% 3,238 2,313 +40.0%
    Corporate Centre (188) (225) +16.1% (176) (551) +68.0%
    Group 1,453 1,113 +30.6% 3,061 1,793 +70.8%

    MAIN EXCEPTIONAL ITEMS

    In EURm Q2 25 Q2 24 H1 25 H1 24
    Operating expenses – Total one-off items and transformation charges (131) (127) (205) (479)
    Transformation charges (30) (124) (104) (476)
    Of which French Retail, Private Banking and Insurance (10) (45) (33) (127)
    Of which Global Banking & Investor Solutions 9 (29) (3) (183)
    Of which Mobility, International Retail Banking & Financial Services (29) (50) (68) (119)
    Of which Corporate Centre 0 0 0 (47)
    One-off items (101) (3) (101) (3)
    Global Employee Share Ownership Programme (101) (3) (101) (3)
             
    Other one-off items – Total 75 (8) 277 (88)
    Net profits or losses from other assets 75 (8) 277 (88)

    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET

    In EUR m   30/06/2025 31/12/2024
    Cash, due from central banks   148,782 201,680
    Financial assets at fair value through profit or loss   566,690 526,048
    Hedging derivatives   7,769 9,233
    Financial assets at fair value through other comprehensive income   103,297 96,024
    Securities at amortised cost   49,240 32,655
    Due from banks at amortised cost   81,711 84,051
    Customer loans at amortised cost   446,154 454,622
    Revaluation differences on portfolios hedged against interest rate risk   (330) (292)
    Insurance and reinsurance contracts assets   494 615
    Tax assets   4,198 4,687
    Other assets   73,477 70,903
    Non-current assets held for sale   4,018 26,426
    Investments accounted for using the equity method   442 398
    Tangible and intangible fixed assets   60,465 61,409
    Goodwill   5,084 5,086
    Total   1,551,491 1,573,545
    In EUR m   30/06/2025 31/12/2024
    Due to central banks   10,957 11,364
    Financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss   406,704 396,614
    Hedging derivatives   13,628 15,750
    Debt securities issued   156,922 162,200
    Due to banks   100,588 99,744
    Customer deposits   518,397 531,675
    Revaluation differences on portfolios hedged against interest rate risk   (6,129) (5,277)
    Tax liabilities   2,261 2,237
    Other liabilities   94,155 90,786
    Non-current liabilities held for sale   3,526 17,079
    Insurance and reinsurance contracts liabilities   156,370 150,691
    Provisions   3,916 4,085
    Subordinated debts   12,735 17,009
    Total liabilities   1,474,030 1,493,957
    Shareholder’s equity   – –
    Shareholders’ equity, Group share   – –
    Issued common stocks and capital reserves   20,657 21,281
    Other equity instruments   8,762 9,873
    Retained earnings   36,741 33,863
    Net income   3,061 4,200
    Sub-total   69,221 69,217
    Unrealised or deferred capital gains and losses   (928) 1,039
    Sub-total equity, Group share   68,293 70,256
    Non-controlling interests   9,168 9,332
    Total equity   77,461 79,588
    Total   1,551,491 1,573,545
    1. APPENDIX 2: METHODOLOGY

    1 –The financial information presented for the second quarter and first half 2025 was examined by the Board of Directors on July 30th, 2025 and has been prepared in accordance with IFRS as adopted in the European Union and applicable at that date. The limited review procedures on the condensed interim statement at 30 June 2025 carried by the Statutory Auditors are currently underway.

    2 – Net banking income

    The pillars’ net banking income is defined on page 38 of Societe Generale’s 2025 Universal Registration Document. The terms “Revenues” or “Net Banking Income” are used interchangeably. They provide a normalised measure of each pillar’s net banking income taking into account the normative capital mobilised for its activity.

    3 – Operating expenses

    Operating expenses correspond to the “Operating Expenses” as presented in note 5 to the Group’s consolidated financial statements as at December 31st, 2024. The term “costs” is also used to refer to Operating Expenses. The Cost/Income Ratio is defined on page 38 of Societe Generale’s 2025 Universal Registration Document.

    4 – Cost of risk in basis points, coverage ratio for doubtful outstandings

    The cost of risk is defined on pages 39 and 748 of Societe Generale’s 2025 Universal Registration Document. This indicator makes it possible to assess the level of risk of each of the pillars as a percentage of balance sheet loan commitments, including operating leases.

    In EURm   Q2-25 Q2-24 S1-25 S1-24
    French Retail, Private Banking and Insurance Net Cost Of Risk 146 173 317 420
    Gross loan Outstandings 230,025 236,044 231,781 237,219
    Cost of Risk in bp 25 29 27 35
    Global Banking and Investor Solutions Net Cost Of Risk 81 21 136 1
    Gross loan Outstandings 171,860 164,829 172,321 163,643
    Cost of Risk in bp 19 5 16 0
    Mobility, International Retail Banking & Financial Services Net Cost Of Risk 126 189 250 370
    Gross loan Outstandings 144,329 166,967 151,727 167,429
    Cost of Risk in bp 35 45 33 44
    Corporate Centre Net Cost Of Risk 2 4 (4) (5)
    Gross loan Outstandings 26,404 24,583 25,998 23,974
    Cost of Risk in bp 3 6 (3) (5)
    Societe Generale Group Net Cost Of Risk 355 387 699 787
    Gross loan Outstandings 572,618 592,422 581,827 592,265
    Cost of Risk in bp 25 26 24 27

    The gross coverage ratio for doubtful outstandings is calculated as the ratio of provisions recognised in respect of the credit risk to gross outstandings identified as in default within the meaning of the regulations, without taking account of any guarantees provided. This coverage ratio measures the maximum residual risk associated with outstandings in default (“doubtful”).

    5 – ROE, ROTE, RONE

    The notions of ROE (Return on Equity) and ROTE (Return on Tangible Equity), as well as their calculation methodology, are specified on pages 39 and 40 of Societe Generale’s 2025 Universal Registration Document. This measure makes it possible to assess Societe Generale’s return on equity and return on tangible equity.
    RONE (Return on Normative Equity) determines the return on average normative equity allocated to the Group’s businesses, according to the principles presented on page 40 of Societe Generale’s 2025 Universal Registration Document. Since Q1 25 results, with restated historical data, normative return to businesses is based on a 13% capital allocation. The Q1 25 allocated capital includes the regulatory impacts related to Basel IV, applicable since 1 January 2025.
    Group net income used for the ratio numerator is the accounting Group net income adjusted for “Interest paid and payable to holders of deeply subordinated notes and undated subordinated notes, issue premium amortisation”. For ROTE, income is also restated for goodwill impairment.
    Details of the corrections made to the accounting equity in order to calculate ROE and ROTE for the period are given in the table below:

    ROTE calculation: calculation methodology

    End of period (in EURm) Q2-25 Q2-24 H1 25 H1 24
    Shareholders’ equity Group share 68,293 66,829 68,293 66,829
    Deeply subordinated and undated subordinated notes (8,386) (9,747) (8,386) (9,747)
    Interest payable to holders of deeply & undated subordinated notes, issue premium amortisation(1) 23 (19) 23 (19)
    OCI excluding conversion reserves 512 705 512 705
    Distribution provision(2) (2,375) (718) (2,375) (718)
    ROE equity end-of-period 58,067 57,050 58,067 57,050
    Average ROE equity 58,579 56,797 58,743 56,660
    Average Goodwill(3) (4,174) (4,073) (4,182) (4,040)
    Average Intangible Assets (2,787) (2,937) (2,811) (2,947)
    Average ROTE equity 51,618 49,787 51,749 49,673
             
    Group net Income 1,453 1,113 3,061 1,793
    Interest paid and payable to holders of deeply subordinated notes and undated subordinated notes, issue premium amortisation (200) (190) (387) (356)
    Adjusted Group net Income 1,253 923 2,674 1,437
    ROTE 9.7% 7.4% 10.3% 5.8%

    141516
    RONE calculation: Average capital allocated to Core Businesses (in EURm)

    In EURm Q2 25 Q2 24 Change H1 25 H1 24 Change
    French Retail , Private Banking and Insurance 17,412 16,690 +4.3% 17,549 16,605 +5.7%
    Global Banking and Investor Solutions 17,894 16,313 +9.7% 18,109 16,162 +12.0%
    Mobility, International Retail Banking & Financial Services 10,535 11,247 -6.3% 10,955 11,250 -2.6%
    Core Businesses 45,841 41,180 +11.3% 46,613 40,955 +13.8%
    Corporate Center 12,738 12,544 +1.5% 12,130 12,644 -4.1%
    Group 58,579 56,797 +3.1% 58,743 56,660 +3.7%

    6 – Net assets and tangible net assets

    Net assets and tangible net assets are defined in the methodology, page 41 of the Group’s 2025 Universal Registration Document. The items used to calculate them are presented below:
    1718

    End of period (in EURm) H1 25 Q1 25 2024
    Shareholders’ equity Group share 68,293 70,556 70,256
    Deeply subordinated and undated subordinated notes (8,386) (10,153) (10,526)
    Interest of deeply & undated subordinated notes, issue premium amortisation(1) 23 (60) (25)
    Book value of own shares in trading portfolio (46) (44) 8
    Net Asset Value 59,884 60,299 59,713
    Goodwill(2) (4,173) (4,175) (4,207)
    Intangible Assets (2,776) (2,798) (2,871)
    Net Tangible Asset Value 52,935 53,326 52,635
           
    Number of shares used to calculate NAPS(3) 776,296 783,671 796,498
    Net Asset Value per Share 77.1 76.9 75.0
    Net Tangible Asset Value per Share 68.2 68.0 66.1

    7 – Calculation of Earnings Per Share (EPS)

    The EPS published by Societe Generale is calculated according to the rules defined by the IAS 33 standard (see pages 40-41 of Societe Generale’s 2025 Universal Registration Document). The corrections made to Group net income in order to calculate EPS correspond to the restatements carried out for the calculation of ROE and ROTE.
    The calculation of Earnings Per Share is described in the following table:

    Average number of shares (thousands) H1 25 Q1 25 2024
    Existing shares 800,317 800,317 801,915
    Deductions      
    Shares allocated to cover stock option plans and free shares awarded to staff 2,175 2,586 4,402
    Other own shares and treasury shares 12,653 7,646 2,344
    Number of shares used to calculate EPS(4) 785,488 790,085 795,169
    Group net Income (in EURm) 3,061 1,608 4,200
    Interest on deeply subordinated notes and undated subordinated notes (in EURm) (387) (188) (720)
    Adjusted Group net income (in EURm) 2,674 1,420 3,481
    EPS (in EUR) 3.40 1.80 4.38

    19
    8 – Solvency and leverage ratios

    Shareholder’s equity, risk-weighted assets and leverage exposure are calculated in accordance with applicable CRR3/CRD6 rules, transposing the final Basel III text, also called Basel IV, including the procedures provided by the regulation for the calculation of phased-in and fully loaded ratios. The solvency ratios and leverage ratio are presented on a pro-forma basis for the current year’s accrued results, net of dividends, unless otherwise stated.
    20

    9- Funded balance sheet, loan to deposit ratio

    The funded balance sheet is based on the Group financial statements. It is obtained in two steps:

    • A first step aiming at reclassifying the items of the financial statements into aggregates allowing for a more economic reading of the balance sheet. Main reclassifications:

    Insurance: grouping of the accounting items related to insurance within a single aggregate in both assets and liabilities.
    Customer loans: include outstanding loans with customers (net of provisions and write-downs, including net lease financing outstanding and transactions at fair value through profit and loss); excludes financial assets reclassified under loans and receivables in accordance with the conditions stipulated by IFRS 9 (these positions have been reclassified in their original lines).
    Wholesale funding: includes interbank liabilities and debt securities issued. Financing transactions have been allocated to medium/long-term resources and short-term resources based on the maturity of outstanding, more or less than one year.
    Reclassification under customer deposits of the share of issues placed by French Retail Banking networks (recorded in medium/long-term financing), and certain transactions carried out with counterparties equivalent to customer deposits (previously included in short term financing).
    Deduction from customer deposits and reintegration into short-term financing of certain transactions equivalent to market resources.

    • A second step aiming at excluding the contribution of insurance subsidiaries, and netting derivatives, repurchase agreements, securities borrowing/lending, accruals and “due to central banks”.

    The Group loan / deposit ratio is determined as the division of the customer loans by customer deposits as presented in the funded balance sheet.

    NB (1) The sum of values contained in the tables and analyses may differ slightly from the total reported due to rounding rules.
    (2) All the information on the results for the period (notably: press release, downloadable data, presentation slides and supplement) is available on Societe Generale’s website www.societegenerale.com in the “Investor” section.

    Societe Generale

    Societe Generale is a top tier European Bank with around 119,000 employees serving more than 26 million clients in 62 countries across the world. We have been supporting the development of our economies for 160 years, providing our corporate, institutional, and individual clients with a wide array of value-added advisory and financial solutions. Our long-lasting and trusted relationships with the clients, our cutting-edge expertise, our unique innovation, our ESG capabilities and leading franchises are part of our DNA and serve our most essential objective – to deliver sustainable value creation for all our stakeholders.

    The Group runs three complementary sets of businesses, embedding ESG offerings for all its clients:

    • French Retail, Private Banking and Insurance, with leading retail bank SG and insurance franchise, premium private banking services, and the leading digital bank BoursoBank.
    • Global Banking and Investor Solutions, a top tier wholesale bank offering tailored-made solutions with distinctive global leadership in equity derivatives, structured finance and ESG.
    • Mobility, International Retail Banking and Financial Services, comprising well-established universal banks (in Czech Republic, Romania and several African countries), Ayvens (the new ALD I LeasePlan brand), a global player in sustainable mobility, as well as specialized financing activities.

    Committed to building together with its clients a better and sustainable future, Societe Generale aims to be a leading partner in the environmental transition and sustainability overall. The Group is included in the principal socially responsible investment indices: DJSI (Europe), FTSE4Good (Global and Europe), Bloomberg Gender-Equality Index, Refinitiv Diversity and Inclusion Index, Euronext Vigeo (Europe and Eurozone), STOXX Global ESG Leaders indexes, and the MSCI Low Carbon Leaders Index (World and Europe).

    In case of doubt regarding the authenticity of this press release, please go to the end of the Group News page on societegenerale.com website where official Press Releases sent by Societe Generale can be certified using blockchain technology. A link will allow you to check the document’s legitimacy directly on the web page.

    For more information, you can follow us on Twitter/X @societegenerale or visit our website societegenerale.com.

    1 Out of a total contemplated distribution accrual of EUR 1.77 per share at end H1 25 based on a pay-out ratio of 50% of the H1 25 Group net income restated from non-cash items (including GESOP) and after deduction of interest on deeply subordinated notes and undated subordinated notes, pro forma including H1 25 results and including interim cash dividend; the distribution policy being based on a balanced mix of the payout between cash dividend and share buy-back
    2 A non-cash item with no impact on the CET1 ratio, and therefore no impact on distributable net income
    3 Ratio calculated according to EBA methodology published on 16 July 2019
    4 Ratio excluding loans outstanding of companies currently being disposed of in compliance with IFRS 5
    5 Ratio of S3 provisions, guarantees and collaterals over gross outstanding non-performing loans
    6 6 February 2025 – Q4 2024 Financial Results – Presentation – Page 6
    7 Cf. Description of the share buy-back program of 17 May 2024 relating to the 22nd resolution of the Combined general meeting of shareholders of 22 May 2024, for which the authorisation for the company to purchase its own shares is valid until 22 November 2025
    8 Including Basel IV phasing
    9 Excluding asset diposals (Switzerland and the United Kingdom)
    10 France Best Digital Bank, Awards for Excellence, Euromoney July 2025
    11 Mainly hyperinflation in Turkey
    12 Excluding impacts of depreciation adjustments
    13 As disclosed in Ayvens Q2 25 earnings report, excluding revenues from used vehicle sales and non-recurring items
    14   Interest net of tax
    15    The dividend to be paid is calculated based on a pay-out ratio of 50%, restated from non-cash items and after deduction of interest on deeply subordinated notes and on undated subordinated notes, and including the additional share buy-back of EUR 1bn for Q1 25 and H1 25
    16    Excluding goodwill arising from non-controlling interests
    17    Interest net of tax
    18 Excluding goodwill arising from non-controlling interests
    19 The number of shares considered is the number of ordinary shares outstanding at end of period, excluding treasury shares and buy-backs, but including the trading shares held by the Group (expressed in thousands of shares)
    20 The number of shares considered is the average number of ordinary shares outstanding during the period, excluding treasury shares and buy-backs, but including the trading shares held by the Group (expressed in thousands of shares)

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Credit Agricole Sa: Results for the second quarter and first half 2025 – The Group is accelerating its development

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    THE GROUP IS ACCELERATING ITS DEVELOPMENT  
               
      CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A. CRÉDIT AGRICOLE GROUP    
    €m Q2 2025 Change Q2/Q2 Q2 2025 Change Q2/Q2  
    Revenues 7,006 +3.1% 9,808 +3.2%  
    Expenses -3,700 +2.2% -5,872 +3.2%  
    Gross Operating Income 3,306 +4.1% 3,936 +3.1%  
    Cost of risk -441 +4.2% -840 -3.7%  
    Net income group share 2,390 +30.7% 2,638 +30.1%  
    C/I ratio 52.8% -0.5 pp 59.9% +0.0 pp  
    STRONG ACTIVITY IN ALL BUSINESS LINES

    • Confirmation of the upturn of loan production in France, international credit activity still strong and consumer finance at a higher level
    • Record net inflows in life insurance, high net inflows in asset management (driven by the medium/long-term and JVs); in insurance, revenues at a higher level driven by all activities
    • CIB: record half year and strong quarter

    CONTINUOUS FLOW OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

    • Gradual achievement of synergies in the ongoing integrations: progress of around 60% for RBC IS Europe and 25% for Degroof Petercam in Belgium
    • Transactions concluded this quarter: launch of partnership with Victory Capital in the United States, increased stake in Banco BPM in Italy, acquisition of Merca Leasing in Germany and Petit-fils and Comwatt in France and acquisition of Santander’s 30.5% stake in CACEIS1
    • New projects initiated: Acquisitions of Banque Thaler in Switzerland, Comwatt and Milleis in France, partnership with the Crelan Group in Belgium and development of Indosuez Wealth Management in Monaco

    HALF-YEARLY AND QUARTERLY RESULTS AT THEIR HIGHEST

    • High profitability (Return on Tangible Equity of 16.6%), driven by high and growing revenues, a low cost/income ratio (53.9% in the first half) and a stable cost of risk (34 basis points on outstandings)
    • Results especially benefiting from the capital gain related to the deconsolidation of Amundi US

    HIGH SOLVENCY RATIOS

    • Crédit Agricole S.A.’s phased-in CET1 at 11.9% and CA Group phased-in CET1 at 17.6%

    CONTINUOUS SUPPORT FOR TRANSITIONS, WITH AN AWARD FROM EUROMONEY

    • Continued withdrawal from fossil energies and reallocation to low-carbon energy sources
    • Support for the transition of households and corporates
    • Crédit Agricole named World’s Best Bank for Sustainable Finance at the Euromoney Awards for Excellence 2025

    PRESENTATION OF THE MEDIUM-TERM PLAN ON 18 NOVEMBER 2025
     

    Dominique Lefebvre,
    Chairman of SAS Rue La Boétie and Chairman of the Crédit Agricole S.A. Board of Directors

    “The high-level results we are publishing this quarter serve our usefulness to the economy and European sovereignty.” ‍
     
     

    Olivier Gavalda,
    Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Agricole S.A.

    “With this high level of results, we are confident in Crédit Agricole S.A.’s ability to achieve a net profit in 2025 higher than 2024, excluding the corporate tax surcharge. These results constitute a solid foundation for Crédit Agricole S.A.’s medium-term strategic plan, which will be unveiled on November 18, 2025.”

    		  

    This press release comments on the results of Crédit Agricole S.A. and those of Crédit Agricole Group, which comprises the Crédit Agricole S.A. entities and the Crédit Agricole Regional Banks, which own 63.5% of Crédit Agricole S.A.

    All financial data are now presented stated for Crédit Agricole Group, Crédit Agricole S.A. and the business lines results, both for the income statement and for the profitability ratios.

    Crédit Agricole Group

    Group activity

    The Group’s commercial activity during the quarter continued at a steady pace across all business lines, with a good level of customer capture. In the second quarter of 2025, the Group recorded +493,000 new customers in retail banking. More specifically, over the year, the Group gained 391,000 new customers for Retail Banking in France and 102,000 new International Retail Banking customers (Italy and Poland). At 30 June 2025, in retail banking, on-balance sheet deposits totalled €838 billion, up +0.6% year-on-year in France and Italy (+0.7% for Regional Banks and LCL and +0.3% in Italy). Outstanding loans totalled €885 billion, up +1.4% year-on-year in France and Italy (+1.4% for Regional Banks and LCL and +1.6% in Italy). Housing loan production continued its upturn in France compared to the low point observed at the start of 2024, with an increase of +28% for Regional Banks and +24% for LCL compared to the second quarter of 2024. For CA Italia, loan production was down -8.1% compared to the high second quarter of 2024. The property and casualty insurance equipment rate (2) rose to 44.2% for the Regional Banks (+0.7 percentage points compared to the second quarter of 2024), 28.4% for LCL (+0.6 percentage point) and 20.6% for CA Italia (+0.9 percentage point).

    In Asset Management, quarterly inflows were very high at +€20 billion, fuelled by medium/long-term assets (+€11 billion) and JVs (+€10 billion). In insurance, savings/retirement gross inflows rose to a record €9.9 billion over the quarter (+22% year-on-year), with the unit-linked rate in production staying at a high 32%. Net inflows were at a record level at +€4.2 billion, spread evenly between euro-denominated funds and unit-linked contracts. The strong performance in property and casualty insurance was driven by price changes and portfolio growth (16.9 million contracts at end-June 2025, +3% year-on-year). Assets under management stood at €2,905 billion, up +5.2% year on year for the three business segments: in asset management at €2,267 billion (+5.2% year on year) despite a negative scope effect linked to the deconsolidation of Amundi US and the integration of Victory, in life insurance at €359 billion (+6.4% year on year) and in wealth management (Indosuez Wealth Management and LCL Private Banking) at €279 billion (+3.7% year on year).

    Business in the SFS division showed strong activity. At CAPFM, consumer finance outstandings increased to €121.0 billion, up +4.5% compared with end-June 2024, with car loans representing 53% (3) of total outstandings, and new loan production up by +2.4% compared with the second quarter of 2024 (+12.4% compared to the first quarter of 2025), driven by traditional consumer finance, but with the automotive market remaining complex in Europe and China. Regarding Crédit Agricole Leasing & Factoring (CAL&F), lease financing outstandings are up +5.0% compared to June 2024 to €20.8 billion; however, production is down -19.4% compared to the second quarter of 2024, mainly in France. Factoring activity remains very strong, with a production of +26.6% year on year.

    Momentum is strong in Large Customers, which again posted record revenues for the half-year in Corporate and Investment Banking and a high-level quarter. Capital markets and investment banking showed a high level of revenues driven by capital markets, especially from trading and primary credit activities, which partially offset the drop in revenues from structured equity activities. Financing activities are fuelled by structured financing with strong momentum in the renewable energy sector, and by CLF activities, driven by the acquisition financing sector. Lastly, Asset Servicing recorded a high level of assets under custody of €5,526 billion and assets under administration of €3,468 billion (+11% and +1.2%, respectively, compared with the end of June 2024), with good sales momentum and positive market effects over the quarter.

    Continued support for the energy transition

    The Group is continuing the mass roll-out of financing and investment to promote the transition. Thus, the exposure of Crédit Agricole Group (4) has increased 2.4 fold between 2020 and 2024 with €26.3 billion at 31 December 2024. Investments in low-carbon energy (5) increased 2.8 fold between end-2020 and June 2025, and represented €6.1 billion at 30 June 2025.

    At the same time, as a universal bank, Crédit Agricole is supporting the transition of all its customers. Thus, outstandings related to the environmental transition (6) amounted to €111 billion at 31 March 2025, including €83 billion for energy-efficient property and €6 billion for “clean” transport and mobility.

    In addition, the Group is continuing to move away from carbon energy financing; the Group’s phased withdrawal from financing fossil fuel extraction resulted in a -40% decrease in exposure in the period 2020 to 2024, equating to €5.6 billion at 31 December 2024. 

    In the field of sustainable finance, Crédit Agricole was named World’s Best Bank for Sustainable Finance at the Euromoney Awards for Excellence 2025. 

    Group results

    In the second quarter of 2025, Crédit Agricole Group’s net income Group share came to €2,638 million, up +30.1% compared to the second quarter of 2024, and up +14.8% excluding capital gains related to the deconsolidation of Amundi US.

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues amounted to €9,808 million, up +3.2% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Operating expenses were up +3.2% in the second quarter of 2025, totalling -€5,872 million. Overall, Credit Agricole Group saw its cost/income ratio reach 59.9% in the second quarter of 2025, stable compared to the second quarter of 2024. As a result, the gross operating income stood at €3,936 million, up +3.1% compared to the second quarter of 2024.

    The cost of credit risk stood at -€840 million, a decrease of -3.7% compared to the second quarter of 2024. It includes a reversal of +€24 million on performing loans (stage 1 and 2) linked to reversals for model updates which offset the updating of macroeconomic scenarios and the migration to default of some loans. The cost of proven risk shows an addition to provisions of -€845 million (stage 3). There was also an addition of -€18 million for other risks. The provisioning levels were determined by taking into account several weighted economic scenarios and by applying some flat-rate adjustments on sensitive portfolios. The weighted economic scenarios for the second quarter were updated, with a central scenario (French GDP at +0.8% in 2025, +1.4% in 2026) an unfavourable scenario (French GDP at +0.0% in 2025 and +0.6% in 2026) and an adverse scenario (French GDP at -1.9% in 2025 and -1.4% in 2026). The cost of risk/outstandings (7)reached 27 basis points over a four rolling quarter period and 28 basis points on an annualised quarterly basis (8).

    Pre-tax income stood at €3,604 million, a year-on-year increase of +19.6% compared to second quarter 2024. This includes the contribution from equity-accounted entities of €56 million (down -24.0%) and net income on other assets, which came to +€452 million this quarter, due to a capital gain of €453 million on the deconsolidation of Amundi US. The tax charge was -€615 million, down +€147 million, or -19.3% over the period.

    Net income before non-controlling interests was up +32.8% to reach €2,990 million. Non-controlling interests increased by +57%, a share of the capital gain on the deconsolidation of Amundi US being reversed to non-controlling interests.

    Net income Group share in first half 2025 amounted to €4,803 million, compared with €4,412 million in first half 2024, an increase of +8.9%.

    Revenues totalled €19,856 million, up +4.3% in first half 2025 compared with first half 2024.

    Operating expenses amounted to -€11,864 million up +5.2% compared to the first half of 2024, especially due to support for business development, IT expenditure and the integration of scope effects. The cost/income ratio for the first half of 2025 was 59.8%, up +0.5 percentage points compared to the first half of 2024.

    Gross operating income totalled €7,992 million, up +3.0% compared to the first half of 2024.

    Cost of risk for the half-year rose moderately to -€1,575 million (of which -€23 million in cost of risk on performing loans (stage 1 and 2), -€1,522 million in cost of proven risk, and +€29 million in other risks, i.e. an increase of +3.4% compared to first half 2024.

    As at 30 June 2025, risk indicators confirm the high quality of Crédit Agricole Group’s assets and risk coverage level. The prudent management of these loan loss reserves has enabled the Crédit Agricole Group to have an overall coverage ratio for doubtful loans (83.3% at the end of June 2025).

    Net income on other assets stood at €456 million in first half 2025, vs. -€14 million in first half 2024. Pre-tax income before discontinued operations and non-controlling interests rose by +10.1% to €7,004 million. The tax charge stood at -€1,66 million, a +9.1% increase. This change is related to the exceptional corporate income tax for -€250 million (corresponding to an estimation of -€330 million in 2025, assuming the 2025 fiscal result being equal to 2024 fiscal result).

    Underlying net income before non-controlling interests was therefore up by +10.4%. Non-controlling interests stood at -€545 million in the first half of 2024, up +26.1%, a share of the capital gain on the deconsolidation of Amundi US being reversed to non-controlling interests.

    Credit Agricole Group, Income statement Q2 and H1 2025

    En m€ Q2-25 Q2-24 ∆ Q2/Q2   H1-25 H1-24 ∆ H1/H1
    Revenues 9,808 9,507 +3.2%   19,856 19,031 +4.3%
    Operating expenses (5,872) (5,687) +3.2%   (11,864) (11,276) +5.2%
    Gross operating income 3,936 3,819 +3.1%   7,992 7,755 +3.0%
    Cost of risk (840) (872) (3.7%)   (1,575) (1,523) +3.4%
    Equity-accounted entities 56 74 (24.0%)   131 142 (7.9%)
    Net income on other assets 452 (7) n.m.   456 (14) n.m.
    Change in value of goodwill – – n.m.   – – n.m.
    Income before tax 3,604 3,014 +19.6%   7,004 6,361 +10.1%
    Tax (615) (762) (19.3%)   (1,656) (1,517) +9.1%
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale ope. 0 – n.m.   0 – n.m.
    Net income 2,990 2,252 +32.8%   5,348 4,843 +10.4%
    Non controlling interests (352) (224) +57.0%   (545) (432) +26.1%
    Net income Group Share 2,638 2,028 +30.1%   4,803 4,412 +8.9%
    Cost/Income ratio (%) 59.9% 59.8% +0.0 pp   59.8% 59.2% +0.5 pp

    Regional banks

    Gross customer capture stands at +285,000 new customers. The percentage of customers using their current accounts as their main account is increasing and the share of customers using digital tools remains at a high level. Credit market share (total credits) stood at 22.6% (at the end of March 2025, source: Banque de France), stable compared to March 2024. Loan production is up +18.8% compared to the second quarter of 2024, linked to the confirmed upturn in housing loans, up +28.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024 and +10% compared to the first quarter of 2025, and also driven by specialised markets up +13.4% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The average lending production rate for home loans stood at 3.02% (9), -16 basis points lower than in the first quarter of 2025. By contrast, the global loan stock rate improved compared to the second quarter of 2024 (+7 basis points). Outstanding loans totalled €652 billion at the end of June 2025, up by +1.2% year-on-year across all markets and up slightly by +0.5% over the quarter. Customer assets were up +2.8% year-on-year to reach €923.3 billion at the end of June 2025. This growth was driven both by on-balance sheet deposits, which reached €606.1 billion (+0.8% year-on-year), and off-balance sheet deposits, which reached €317.2 billion (+7.1% year-on-year) benefiting from strong inflows in life insurance. Over the quarter, demand deposits drove customer assets with an increase of +2.0% compared to the first quarter of 2025, while term deposits decreased by -0.4%. The market share of on-balance sheet deposits is up compared to last year and stands at 20.2% (Source Banque de France, data at the end of March 2025, i.e. +0.1 percentage points compared to March 2024). The equipment rate for property and casualty insurance (10) was 44.2% at the end of June 2025 and is continuing to rise (up +0.7 percentage points compared to the end of June 2024). In terms of payment instruments, the number of cards rose by +1.5% year-on-year, as did the percentage of premium cards in the stock, which increased by 2.2 percentage points year-on-year to account for 17.8% of total cards.

    In the second quarter of 2025, the Regional Banks’ consolidated revenues including the SAS Rue La Boétie dividend stood at €5,528 million, up +4.2% compared to the second quarter of 2024, including the reversal of Home Purchase Saving Plans provisions in the second quarter of 2025 for €16.3 million and in the second quarter of 2024 for +€22 million (11). Excluding this item, revenues were up +4.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024, fuelled by the increase in fee and commission income (+1.9%), driven by insurance, account management and payment instruments, and by portfolio revenues (+9.2%) benefiting from the increase in dividends traditionally paid in the second quarter of each year. In addition, the intermediation margin was slightly down over one year (-2.5%) but remained stable compared to the first quarter of 2025. Operating expenses were up +5.1%, especially relating to IT expenditure. Gross operating income was up year-on-year (+3.4%). The cost of risk was down -13.3% compared with the second quarter of 2024 to -€397 million. The cost of risk/outstandings (over four rolling quarters) was stable compared to the first quarter of 2025, at a controlled level of 21 basis points. Thus, the net pre-tax income was up +7.3% and stood at €2,482 million. The consolidated net income of the Regional Banks stood at €2,375 million, up +5.0% compared with the second quarter of 2024. Lastly, the Regional Banks’ contribution to net income Group share was €182 million in the second quarter of 2025, down -12.7% compared to the second quarter of 2024.

    In the first half 2025, revenues including the dividend from SAS Rue La Boétie were up (+3.1%) compared to the first half of 2024. Operating expenses rose by +3.4%, and gross operating income consequently grew by +2.6% over the first half. Finally, with a cost of risk up slightly by +1.4%, the Regional banks’ net income Group share, including the SAS Rue La Boétie dividend, amounted to €2,721 million, up +0.7% compared to the first half of 2024. Finally, the Regional Banks’ contribution to the results of Crédit Agricole Group in first half 2025 amounted to €523 million (-19.6%) with revenues of €6,716 million (+2.2%) and a cost of risk of -€717 million (+3.7%).

    Crédit Agricole S.A.

    Results

    Crédit Agricole S.A.’s Board of Directors, chaired by Dominique Lefebvre, met on 30 July 2025 to examine the financial statements for the second quarter of 2025.

    In the second quarter of 2025, Crédit Agricole S.A.’s net income Group share amounted to €2,390 million, an increase of +30.7% from the second quarter of 2024. The results of the second quarter of 2025 are based on high revenues, a cost/income ratio maintained at a low level and a controlled cost of risk. They were also favourably impacted by the change in corporate income tax, and the capital gain related to the deconsolidation of Amundi US.

    Revenues are at a high level and increasing. Revenues totalled €7,006 million, up +3.1% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The growth in the Asset Gathering division (+1.3%) is related to strong activity in Insurance, the impact of volatility and risk aversion of customers for Amundi, the deconsolidation of Amundi US (-€89 million) and the integration of Degroof Petercam (+€96 million). Revenues for Large Customers are stable and stood at a high level both for Crédit Agricole CIB and CACEIS. Specialised Financial Services division revenues (-1.0%) were impacted by a positive price effect in the Personal Finance and Mobility business line and by a cyclical drop in margins on factoring. Revenues for Retail Banking in France (-0.3%) were impacted by an unfavourable base effect on the interest margin, offset by good momentum in fee and commission income. Finally, international retail banking revenues (-1.9%) were mainly impacted by the reduction in the intermediation margin in Italy, partially offset by good momentum in fee and commission income over all the entities of the scope. Corporate Centre revenues were up +€214 million, positively impacted by Banco BPM (+€109 million, mainly related to the increase in dividends received).

    Operating expenses totalled -€3,700 million in the second quarter of 2025, an increase of +2.2% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The -€80 million increase in expenses between the second quarter of 2024 and the second quarter of 2025 was mainly due to -€25 million in scope effect and integration costs, (especially including -€51 million related to the deconsolidation of Amundi US, +€89 million related to the integration of Degroof Petercam and -€20 million related to the reduction in ISB integration costs into CACEIS) and +€58 million due to a positive base effect related to the contribution on the DGS (deposit guarantee fund in Italy).

    The cost/income ratio thus stood at 52.8% in the second quarter of 2025, an improvement of -0.5 percentage point compared to second quarter 2024. Gross operating income in the second quarter of 2025 stood at €3,306 million, an increase of +4.1% compared to the second quarter of 2024.

    As at 30 June 2025, risk indicators confirm the high quality of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s assets and risk coverage level. The Non Performing Loans ratio showed little change from the previous quarter and remained low at 2.3%. The coverage ratio (12) was high at 72.2%, down -2.8 percentage points over the quarter. Loan loss reserves amounted to €9.4 billion for Crédit Agricole S.A., relatively unchanged from the end of March 2025. Of these loan loss reserves, 35.3% were for provisioning for performing loans.

    The cost of risk was a net charge of -€441 million, up +4.2% compared to the second quarter of 2024, and came mainly from a provision for non-performing loans (level 3) of -€524 million (compared to a provision of -€491 million in the second quarter of 2024). Net provisioning on performing loans (stages 1 and 2) is a reversal of +€91 million, compared to a reversal of +€31 million in the second quarter of 2024, and includes reversals for model effects and the migration to default of some loans, which offset the prudential additions to provisions for updating macroeconomic scenarios. Also noteworthy is an addition to provisions of -€8 million for other items (legal provisions) versus a reversal of +€37 million in the second quarter of 2024. By business line, 53% of the net addition for the quarter came from Specialised Financial Services (50% at end-June 2024), 21% from LCL (22% at end-June 2024), 14% from International Retail Banking (17% at end-June 2024), 4% from Large Customers (9% at end-June 2024) and 5% from the Corporate Centre (1% at end-June 2024). The provisioning levels were determined by taking into account several weighted economic scenarios and by applying some flat-rate adjustments on sensitive portfolios. The weighted economic scenarios for the second quarter were updated, with a central scenario (French GDP at +0.8% in 2025, +1.4% in 2026) an unfavourable scenario (French GDP at +0.0% in 2025 and +0.6% in 2026) and an adverse scenario (French GDP at -1.9% in 2025 and -1.4% in 2026). In the second quarter of 2025, the cost of risk/outstandings remained stable at 34 basis points over a rolling four quarter period (13) and 32 basis points on an annualised quarterly basis (14).

    The contribution of equity-accounted entities stood at €30 million in second quarter 2025, down -€17 million compared to second quarter 2024, or -35.1%. This drop is related to the impairment of goodwill of a stake in CAL&F and non-recurring items especially the drop in remarketing revenues at CAPFM, offset by the impact of the first consolidation of Victory Capital (+€20 million). The net income on other assets was €455 million in the second quarter of 2025 and includes the capital gain related to the deconsolidation of Amundi US of €453 million. Pre-tax income, discontinued operations and non-controlling interests therefore increased by +19% to €3,350 million.

    The tax charge was -€541 million, versus -€704 million for the second quarter 2024. This quarter’s tax includes positive elements, especially the non-taxation of the capital gain linked to the deconsolidation of Amundi US. The tax charge for the quarter remains estimated and will be reassessed by the end of the year.

    Net income before non-controlling interests was up +33.1% to €2,809 million. Non-controlling interests stood at -€420 million in the second quarter of 2025, up +48.7%, a share of the capital gain on the deconsolidation of Amundi US being reversed to non-controlling interests.

    Stated net income Group share in the first half of 2024 amounted to €4,213 million, compared with €3,731 million in the first half of 2024, an increase of +12.9%.

    Revenues increased +4.9% compared to the first half of 2024, driven by the performance of the Asset Gathering, Large Customers, and Specialised Financial Services business lines and the Corporate Centre. Operating expenses were up +5.5% compared to the first half of 2024, especially in connection with supporting the development of business lines and the integration of scope effects. The cost/income ratio for the first half of the year was 53.9%, an improvement of 0.3 percentage points compared to first half 2024. Gross operating income totalled €6,571 million, up +4.1% compared to first half 2024. The cost of risk increased by +3.8% over the period, to -€-855 million, versus -€824 million for first half 2024.

    The contribution of equity-accounted entities stood at €77 million in first half 2025, down -€13 million compared to first half 2024, or -14.1%. Net income from other assets was €456 million in the first half of 2025. Pre-tax income, discontinued operations and non-controlling interests therefore increased by +11.9% to €6,250 million. The tax charge was -€1,368 million, versus -€1,315 million for first half 2024. This includes the exceptional corporate income tax of -€152 million, corresponding to an estimation of -€200 million in 2025 (assuming 2025 fiscal result being equal to 2024 fiscal result). Net income before non-controlling interests was up +14.3% to €4,882 million. Non-controlling interests stood at -€669 million in first half 2025, up +23.5% compared to first half 2024.

    Earnings per share stood at €0.74 per share in the second quarter 2025, versus €0.58 in the second quarter 2024.

    RoTE (15), which is calculated on the basis of an annualised net income Group share (16) and IFRIC charges, additional corporate tax charge and the capital gain on deconsolidation of Amundi US linearised over the year, net of annualised Additional Tier 1 coupons (return on equity Group share excluding intangibles) and net of foreign exchange impact on reimbursed AT1, and restated for certain volatile items recognised in equity (including unrealised gains and/or losses), reached 16.7% in the first half of 2024, up +1.3 percentage points compared to the first half of 2024.

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Income statement, Q2 and H1-25

    En m€ Q2-25 Q2-24 ∆ Q2/Q2   H1-25 H1-24 ∆ H1/H1
    Revenues 7,006 6,796 +3.1%   14,263 13,602 +4.9%
    Operating expenses (3,700) (3,621) +2.2%   (7,691) (7,289) +5.5%
    Gross operating income 3,306 3,175 +4.1%   6,571 6,312 +4.1%
    Cost of risk (441) (424) +4.2%   (855) (824) +3.8%
    Equity-accounted entities 30 47 (35.2%)   77 90 (14.1%)
    Net income on other assets 455 15 x 29.4   456 9 x 50.7
    Change in value of goodwill – – n.m.   – – n.m.
    Income before tax 3,350 2,814 +19.0%   6,250 5,587 +11.9%
    Tax (541) (704) (23.2%)   (1,368) (1,315) +4.0%
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale ope. 0 – n.m.   0 – n.m.
    Net income 2,809 2,110 +33.1%   4,882 4,273 +14.3%
    Non-controlling interests (420) (282) +48.7%   (669) (542) +23.5%
    Net income Group Share 2,390 1,828 +30.7%   4,213 3,731 +12.9%
    Earnings per share (€) 0.74 0.58 +29.1%   1.30 1.08 +20.3%
    Cost/Income ratio (%) 52.8% 53.3% -0.5 pp   53.9% 53.6% +0.3 pp

    Analysis of the activity and the results of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s divisions and business lines

    Activity of the Asset Gathering division

    At end-June 2025, the assets under management of the Asset Gathering (AG) division stood at €2,905 billion, up +€27 billion over the quarter (i.e. +1%), mainly due to positive net inflows in asset management, and insurance, and a positive market and foreign exchange effect over the period. Over the year, assets under management rose by +5.2%.

    Insurance activity (Crédit Agricole Assurances) was very strong, with total revenues at a high level of €12.7 billion, up +17.9% compared to second quarter 2024.

    In Savings/Retirement, second quarter 2025 revenues reached €9.9 billion, up +22.3% compared to second quarter 2024, in a buoyant environment, especially in France. Unit-linked rate in gross inflows(17) is stable year-on-year at 32.0%. The net inflows reached a record +€4.2 billion (+€2.7 billion compared to the second quarter of 2024), comprised of +€2.4 billion net inflows from euro funds and +€1.8 billion from unit-linked contracts.

    Assets under management (savings, retirement and funeral insurance) continued to grow and came to €359.4 billion (up +€21.5 billion year-on-year, or +6.4%). The growth in outstandings was driven by the very high level of quarterly net inflows and favourable market effects. Unit-linked contracts accounted for 30.2% of outstandings, up +0.6 percentage points compared to the end of June 2024.

    In property and casualty insurance, premium income stood at €1.4 billion in the second quarter of 2025, up +9.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Growth stemmed from a price effect, with the increase in the average premium benefiting from revised rates induced by climate change and inflation in repair costs as well as changes in the product mix, and a volume effect, with a portfolio of over €16.9 million (18) policies at the end of June 2025 (or +2.8% over the year). Lastly, the combined ratio at the end of June 2025 stood at 94.7% (19), stable year-on-year and an improvement of +1.4 percentage points compared to the last quarter.

    In death & disability/creditor insurance/group insurance, premium income for the second quarter of 2025 stood at €1.4 billion, down slightly by -0.6% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Individual death & disability showed growth of +7.1% related to the increase in the average amount of guarantees. Creditor insurance showed a drop in activity of -4.3% over the period, especially related to international consumer finance. Group insurance was slightly up at +2.2%.

    In Asset Management (Amundi), assets under management by Amundi increased by +0.9% and +5.2% respectively over the quarter and the year, reaching a new record of €2,267 billion at the end of June 2025. They take into account the first integration of Victory Capital over the quarter with a scope effect of -€9.7 billion (effect of the deconsolidation of Amundi US for -€70 billion and the integration of Victory for +€60 billion). US business assets amount to €94 billion at end-June 2025, including €36 billion of assets distributed by Amundi to non-US customers (fully integrated) and €58 billion of assets distributed by Victory to US customers (26% share). In addition to the scope effect, assets benefited from a high level of inflows over the quarter (+€20.5 billion) a positive market effect of +€57 billion, and a strong negative exchange rate impact of -€48 billion related to the drop in the US dollar and Indian rupee. Net inflows are balanced between medium/long term assets (+€11 billion) and JVs (+€10 billion). The Institutionals segment also recorded net inflows of +€8.7 billion over the quarter, driven by strong seasonal activity in employee savings (+€4 billion in MLT assets). The JV segment showed net inflows of €10.3 billion over the period, with an upturn of inflows in India and a confirmed recovery in China. Finally, the retail segment showed net inflows of €1.4 billion over the quarter.

    In Wealth management, total assets under management (CA Indosuez Wealth Management and LCL Private Banking) amounted to €279 billion at the end of June 2025, and were up +3.7% compared to June 2024 and stable compared to March 2025.

    For Indosuez Wealth Management assets under management at the end of June stood at €214 billion (20), up +0.4% compared to the end of March 2025, with slightly negative net inflows of -€0.1 billion. Production is supported by structured products and mandates, partially offsetting the outflow especially linked to liquidity events of large customers. The market and foreign exchange impact of the quarter is positive at €1 billion. Compared to end-June 2024, assets are up by +€9 billion, or +4.5%. Also noteworthy is the announcement of the Banque Thaler acquisition project in Switzerland on 4 April 2025 and that of the plan to acquire the Wealth Management customers of BNP Paribas Group in Monaco on 23 June 2025.

    Results of the Asset Gathering division

    In the second quarter of 2025, Asset Gathering generated €1,970 million of revenues, up +1.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Expenses increased +6.2% to -€864 million and gross operating income came to €1,106 million, -2.2% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The cost/income ratio for the second quarter of 2025 stood at 43.8%, up +2.0 percentage points compared to the same period in 2024. Equity-accounted entities showed a contribution of €58 million, up +77.4%, especially in relation to the first integration of the contribution of Victory Capital of 26% over this quarter in the Asset Management division for €20 million. The net income on other assets is impacted by the recognition of a capital gain of €453 million also related to the partnership with Victory Capital. Consequently, pre-tax income was up by +40.1% and stood at €1,610 million in the second quarter of 2025. The net income Group share showed an increase of +49.3% to €1,100 million.

    In the first semester of 2025, the Asset Gathering division generated revenues of €4,028 million, up +7.9% compared to first half 2024. Expenses increased by +14.8%. As a result, the cost/income ratio stood at 44.7%, up +2.7 percentage points compared to the first half of 2024. Gross operating income stood at €2,229 million, a increase of +2.9% compared to first half 2024. Equity-accounted entities showed a contribution of €86 million, up +39.4%, especially in relation to the first integration of the contribution of Victory Capital of 26% over the second quarter of 2025 in the Asset Management division. The net income on other assets is impacted by the recognition of a capital gain of €453 million also related to the partnership with Victory Capital in second quarter 2025. Taxes stood at €601 million, a +19.8% increase. Net income Group share of the Asset Gathering division includes the additional corporate tax charge in France and amounted to €1,780 million, up +22.5% compared to the first half of 2024. The increase affected all the business lines of the division, (+66.1% for Asset Management, +0.8% for Insurance and +92.3% for Wealth Management).

    In the second quarter of 2025, the Asset Gathering division contributed by 41% to the net income Group share of the Crédit Agricole S.A. core businesses and 28% to revenues (excluding the Corporate Centre division).

    As at 30 June 2025, equity allocated to the division amounted to €13.2 billion, including €10.6 billion for Insurance, €1.9 billion for Asset Management, and €0.7 billion for Wealth Management. The division’s risk weighted assets amounted to €51.4 billion, including €24.0 billion for Insurance, €19.7 billion for Asset Management and €7.7 billion for Wealth Management.

    Insurance results

    In the second quarter of 2025, insurance revenues amounted to €790 million, up +2.1% compared to the second quarter of 2024. They are supported by Savings/Retirement in relation to the growth in activity and a positive financial result over the period, Property & Casualty which benefits from a good level of activity and financial results, and by the performance of Death & Disability, which offsets a tightening of technical margins in creditor. Revenues for the quarter included €587 million from savings/retirement and funeral insurance (21), €89 million from personal protection (22) and €114 million from property and casualty insurance (23).

    The Contractual Service Margin (CSM) totalled €26.8 billion at the end of June 2025, an increase of +6.3% compared to the end of December 2024. It benefited from a contribution of new business greater than the CSM allocation and a positive market effect. The annualised CSM allocation factor was 8.0% at end-June 2025.

    Non-attributable expenses for the quarter stood at -€87 million, down -0.9% over the second quarter of 2024. As a result, gross operating income reached €703 million, up +2.5% compared to the same period in 2024. The net pre-tax income was up +2.2% and stood at €703 million. The tax charge totalled €143 million, down -19.9% during the period. Net income Group share stood at €557 million, up +12.6% compared to the second quarter of 2024.

    Revenues from insurance in the first half of 2025 came to €1,517 million, up +1.5% compared to the first half of 2024. Gross operating income stood at €1,335 million, up +1.4% compared to the first half of 2024. Non-attributable expenses came to €182 million, i.e. an increase of +2.0%. The cost/income ratio is thus 12.0%, below the target ceiling set by the Medium-Term Plan of 15%. The net income Group share includes the additional corporate tax charge in France and reached €997 million, up +0.8% compared to first half 2024.

    Insurance contributed 23% to the net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s business lines (excluding the Corporate Centre division) at end-June 2025 and 10% to their revenues (excluding the Corporate Centre division).

    Asset Management results

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues amounted to €771 million, showing a fall of -10.8% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The deconsolidation of Amundi US (previously fully consolidated) and the integration of Victory Capital (at 26% on the equity-accounted entities line) took effect this quarter. As a result, restated for this scope effect,(24), revenues were stable (-0.6%) compared with the second half of 2024. Net management fee and commission income was up +1.0% (25) compared with second quarter 2024. Amundi Technology’s revenues recorded a significant increase and rose +50% over the second quarter of 2024, thanks to the integration of Aixigo (the European leader in Wealth Tech, the acquisition of which was finalised in November 2024) which amplified the continued strong organic growth. Performance fee income fell -29%25 from the second quarter of 2024 due to market volatility and financial revenues fell in connection with the drop in rates. Operating expenses amounted to -€429 million, a decline of -8.8% from the second quarter of 2024. Excluding the scope effect related to the Victory Capital partnership24, they were up +2.2% over the period. The cost/income ratio was up at 55.7% (+1.2 percentage points compared to second quarter 2024). Gross operating income stood at €341 million, down -13.2% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The contribution of the equity-accounted entities, carrying the contribution of Amundi’s Asian joint ventures as well as the new contribution of Victory Capital starting this quarter, was €58 million (+€20 million of which for Victory Capital, whose contribution is recognised with an offset of one quarter, so excluding the synergies already realised in the second quarter of 2025; the contribution of the joint ventures rose sharply to +16.6%, particularly in India), an increase of +77.4% over the second quarter of 2024. Net income on other assets was impacted by the recognition of a non-monetary capital gain of €453 million, also related to the partnership with Victory Capital, over the second quarter of 2025. Consequently, pre-tax income came to €850 million, double the second quarter of 2024. Non-controlling interests were impacted by the partnership with Victory Capital and amounted to €249 million over the quarter. Net income Group share amounted to €506 million, up sharply (x2.3) compared to the second quarter of 2024, taking account of the impact of the partnership with Victory Capital.

    Over the first half of 2025, revenues remained stable at €1,663 million (-0.3%). Excluding the scope effect related to the partnership with Victory Capital in the second quarter of 2025, it would represent an increase of +5.3% over the period. Operating expenses posted a slight increase of +0.7%. Excluding the scope effect related to the partnership with Victory Capital, they would increase +5.3% over the period. The cost/income ratio was 55.7%, an increase of +0.5 percentage points compared to first half 2024. This resulted in a -1.5% decline in gross operating income from the first half of 2024. The income of the equity-accounted entities rose +39.4%, primarily reflecting the first integration of the Victory Capital contribution over second quarter 2025. Net income on other assets was impacted by the recognition of a non-monetary capital gain of €453 million also related to the partnership with Victory Capital over the second quarter of 2025. In total, net income Group share for the half includes the additional corporate tax charge in France and stood at €689 million, an increase of +66.1%.

    Asset management contributed 16% to the underlying net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) at end June 2025 and by 12% to their underlying revenues.

    At 30 June 2025, equity allocated to the Asset Management business line amounted to €1.9 billion, while risk weighted assets totalled €19.7 billion.

    Wealth Management results (26)

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues from wealth management amounted to €409 million, up +33.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024, benefiting from the impact of the integration of Degroof Petercam in June 2024. Excluding this effect, (27) revenues were sustained by the positive momentum of transactional income and the good resilience of the net interest margin, despite falling rates. Expenses for the quarter amounted to -€348 million, up +36.4% compared to the second quarter of 2024, impacted by a Degroof Petercam scope effect27 and -€22.5 million in integration costs in the second quarter of 2025 (28). Excluding these impacts, expenses rose slightly at +1.7% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The cost/income ratio for the second quarter of 2025 stood at 85%, up +1.9 percentage points compared to the same period in 2024. Excluding integration costs, it amounted to 79.5%. Gross operating income reached €61 million, an increase of (+18.3%) compared to the second quarter of 2024. Cost of risk remained moderate at -€5 million. Net income Group share amounted to €36 million, up +52.7% compared to the second quarter of 2024.

    In the first half of 2025, wealth management revenues rose by +48.6% over the first half of 2024, notably benefiting from the integration of Degroof Petercam(29) in June 2024 to reach €848 million. Expenses rose by +47.5% due to the impact of the integration of Degroof Petercam29 in June 2024 and integration costs. Gross operating income was therefore up +54.0% at €156 million. Net income on other assets was nil in the first half of 2025 compared with -€20 million in the first half of 2024, corresponding to Degroof Petercam acquisition costs. Net income Group share was €94 million over the first half, up +92.3% from first half 2024. The additional net income Group share target of +€150 million to +€200 million in 2028 following the integration of Degroof Petercam is confirmed and the rate of progression in synergies realised was approximately 25%.

    Wealth Management contributed 2% to the net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s business lines (excluding the Corporate Centre division) at end-June 2025 and 6% of their revenues (excluding the Corporate Centre division).

    At 30 June 2025, equity allocated to Wealth Management was €0.7 billion and risk weighted assets totalled €7.7 billion.

    Activity of the Large Customers division

    The large customers division posted good activity in the second quarter of 2025, thanks to good performance from Corporate and Investment banking (CIB) and strong activity in asset servicing.

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues from Corporate and Investment Banking were stable at €1,705 million, which is -0.1% compared to second quarter 2024 (+5% excluding FVA/DVA volatile elements and foreign exchange impact). Capital Markets and Investment Banking activity was down -2.7% from second quarter 2024 (+3% excluding non-recurring items and foreign exchange impact), but remained at a high level at €860 million, supported in part by a new progression in revenues from Capital Market activities (+2.8% over second quarter 2024, +10% excluding FVA/DVA volatile items and foreign exchange impact) particularly on the trading and primary credit activities that partially offset the decline in structured equity revenues. Revenues from financing activities rose to €845 million, an increase of +2.8% compared to the second quarter of 2024 (+7% excluding non-recurring items and foreign exchange impact). This mainly reflects the performance of structured financing, where revenues rose +6.8% compared to the second quarter of 2024, primarily explained by the dynamism of the renewable energy sector (increase in production on wind and solar projects). Commercial Banking was up +0.7% versus second quarter 2024, driven by the activities of Corporate & Leveraged Finance, boosted by the acquisition financing sector.

    Financing activities consolidated its leading position in syndicated loans (#1 in France (30) and #2 in EMEA30). Crédit Agricole CIB reaffirmed its strong position in bond issues (#2 All bonds in EUR Worldwide30) and was ranked #1 in Green, Social & Sustainable bonds in EUR (31). Average regulatory VaR stood at €11.1 million in the second quarter of 2025, up from €10.5 million in the first quarter of 2025, reflecting changes in positions and financial markets. It remained at a level that reflected prudent risk management.

    For Asset Servicing, business growth was supported by strong commercial activity and favourable market effects.

    Assets under custody rose by +1.1% at the end of June 2025 compared to the end of March 2025 and increased by +11.3% compared to the end of June 2024, to reach €5,526 billion. Assets under administration fell by
    -3.0% over the quarter because of a planned customer withdrawal, and were up +1.2% year-on-year, totalling €3,468 billion at end-June 2025.

    On 4 July 2025, Crédit Agricole S.A. announced the finalisation of the buyback of the 30.5% interest held by Santander in CACEIS.

    Results of the Large Customers division

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues of the Large Customers division once again reached a record level at €2,224 million (stable from second quarter 2024), buoyed by an excellent performance in the Corporate and Investment Banking and Asset Servicing business lines.

    Operating expenses increased by +4.4% due to IT investments and business line development. As a result, the division’s gross operating income was down -5.1% from the second quarter of 2024, standing at €967 million. The division recorded a limited addition for provision of the cost of risk of -€20 million integrating the update of economic scenarios and benefiting from favourable model effects, to be compared with an addition of -€39 million in the second quarter of 2024. Pre-tax income amounted to €958 million, down -3.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The tax charge amounted to -€149 million in second quarter 2025. Finally, net income Group share totalled €752 million in the second quarter of 2025, an increase of +8.3% over the second quarter of 2024.

    In first half 2025, the revenues of the Large Customers business line amounted to a historic high of €4,632 million (+3.2% compared to first half 2024). Operating expenses rose +4.6% compared to first half 2024 to €2,617 million, largely related to staff costs and IT investments. Gross operating income for first half of 2025 therefore totalled €2,015 million, up +1.4% from first half 2024. The cost of risk ended the first half of 2025 with a net provision to provisions of -€5 million, which was stable compared with the first half of 2024. The business line’s contribution to underlying net income Group share was at €1,475 million, up +4.1% compared to first half 2024.

    The business line contributed 34% to the net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) at end-June 2025 and 32% to revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    At 30 June 2025, the equity allocated to the division was €12.8 billion and its risk weighted assets were €134.7 billion.

    Corporate and Investment Banking results

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues from Corporate and Investment Banking posted a strong performance at €1,705 million (stable in relation to second quarter 2024, +5% excluding FVA/DVA volatile items and foreign exchange impact).

    Operating expenses rose by +6.7% to -€895 million, mainly due to IT investments and the development of business line activities. Gross operating income declined -6.6% compared to second quarter 2024 and recorded a high level of +€810 million. Cost/income ratio was 52.5%, an improvement of +3.3 percentage points for the period. Cost of risk recorded a limited net provision of -€19 million integrating the update of economic scenarios and benefiting from positive model effects. Pre-tax income in second quarter 2025 stands at €793 million, down -5.7% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Lastly, stated net income Group share was up +6.7% to €659 million in the second quarter of 2025.

    In first half 2025, stated revenues rose by +3.7% compared to first half 2024, to €3,591 million, the highest historical half-year level ever. Operating expenses rose +7.1%, mainly due to variable compensation and IT investments to support the development of the business lines. As a result, gross operating income was €1,704 million and stable compared to first half 2024. The cost of risk recorded a net reversal of +€4 million in the first half of 2025, compared to a reversal of +€7 million in the first half of 2024. The income tax charge stood at -€376 million, down -9.3%. Lastly, stated net income Group share for first half 2025 stood at €1,307 million, an increase of +3.0% over the period.

    Risk weighted assets at end-June 2025 were down -€6.6 billion compared to end-March 2025, to €123.6 billion, mainly explained by model effects.

    Asset servicing results

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues for Asset Servicing remained stable compared to second quarter 2024 at €519 million, as the solid performance of the net interest margin was offset by a drop in fee and commission income (notably on foreign exchange). Operating expenses were down by -1.1% to -€361 million, due to the decrease in ISB integration costs compared to the second quarter of 2024 (32). Apart from this effect, expenses were up slightly pending the acceleration of synergies. As a result, gross operating income was up by +3.8% to €158 million in the second quarter of 2025. The cost/income ratio for the second quarter of 2025 stood at 69.6%, down -1.0 percentage points compared to the same period in 2024. Consequently, pre-tax income was up by +8.8% and stood at €165 million in the second quarter of 2025. Net income Group share rose +21.1% compared to second quarter 2024.

    Stated revenues for first half 2025 were up +1.5% compared with first half 2024, buoyed by the strong commercial momentum and a favourable trend in the interest margin over the period. Expenses declined -1.3% and included -€13.7 million in integration costs related to the acquisition of ISB’s activities (versus -€44.3 million in integration costs in the first half of 2024). Gross operating income rose +8.8% increase compared to first half 2024.
    The cost/income ratio stood at 70.1%, down 2.0 points compared to the second half of 2024. The additional net income target (33)of +€100 million in 2026 following the integration of ISB is confirmed and the rate of progression in synergies realised is approximately 60%.

    Finally, the contribution of the business line to net income Group share in the first half of 2025 was €168 million, representing a +13.9% increase compared to the first half of 2024.

    Specialised financial services activity

    Crédit Agricole Personal Finance & Mobility’s (CAPFM) commercial production totalled €12.4 billion in second quarter 2025, an increase of +2.4% from second quarter 2024, and an increase of +12.4% compared to first quarter 2025. This increase was carried by traditional consumer finance, while the automobile activity remained stable in a still complex market in Europe and China. The share of automotive financing (34) in quarterly new business production stood at 49.6%. The average customer rate for production was down slightly by -9 basis points from the first quarter of 2025. CAPFM assets under management stood at €121.0 billion at end-June 2025, up +4.5% from end-June 2024, over all scopes (Automotive +6.6% (35), LCL and Regional Banks +4.2%, Other Entities +2.5%), benefiting from the expansion of the management portfolio with the Regional Banks and the promising development of car rental with Leasys and Drivalia. Lastly, consolidated outstandings totalled €68.0 billion at end-June 2025, down -0.9% from end-June 2024.

    The commercial production of Crédit Agricole Leasing & Factoring (CAL&F) was down -19.4% from second quarter 2024 in leasing, primarily in France in an unfavourable market context (36). In International, production was up, particularly in Poland. Leasing outstandings rose +5.0% year-on-year, both in France (+4.1%) and internationally (+8.6%), to reach €20.8 billion at end-June 2025 (of which €16.4 billion in France and €4.5 billion internationally). Commercial production in factoring was up +26.6% versus second quarter 2024, carried by France, which rose +83.8%, which benefited from the signing of a significant contract; international fell by -27.0%, mainly in Germany. Factoring outstandings at end-June 2025 were up +3.7% compared to end-June 2024, and factored revenues were up by +5.0% compared to the same period in 2024.

    Specialised financial services’ results

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues of the Specialised Financial Services division were €881 million, down -1.0% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Expenses stood at -€438 million, down -1.0% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The cost/income ratio stood at 49.8%, stable compared to the same period in 2024. Gross operating income thus stood at €442 million, down -1.0% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Cost of risk amounted to -€235 million, up +11.7% compared to the second quarter of 2024. Income for the equity-accounted entities amounted to -€13 million, a significant decline from second quarter 2024 which was €29 million, mainly linked to the drop in remarketing revenues for CAPFM as well as a depreciation of goodwill for CAL&F. Pre-tax income for the division amounted to €194 million, down -26.7% compared to the same period in 2024. Net income Group share amounted to €114 million, down -38.9% compared to the same period in 2024.

    In the first half of 2025, revenues for the Specialised Financial Services division were €1,749 million, which was up +0.8% from first half 2024. Operating expenses were up +1.7% from first half 2024 at -€912 million. Gross operating income amounted to €837 million, stable (-0.2%) in relation to first half 2024. The cost/income ratio stood at 52.1%, up +0.5 percentage points compared to the same period in 2024. The cost of risk increased by +12.8% compared to the first quarter of 2024 to -€484 million. The contribution of the equity-accounted entities dropped -62.2% from the same period in 2024, mainly linked to the decline in remarketing revenues CAPFM and a depreciation of goodwill for CAL&F (in the second quarter of 2025). Net income Group share includes the corporate tax additional charge in France and amounted to €263 million, down -20.3% compared to the same period in 2024.

    The business line contributed 6% to the net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) at end-June 2025 and 12% to revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    At 30 June 2025, the equity allocated to the division was €7.7 billion and its risk weighted assets were €80.7 billion.

    Personal Finance and Mobility results

    In the second quarter of 2025, CAPFM revenues totalled €697 million, up +0.3% from the second quarter of 2024, with a positive price effect benefiting from the improvement in the production margin rate, which rose +35 basis points compared to second quarter 2024 (and which was down -7 basis points from first quarter 2025), partially absorbed by the increase in subordinated debt (37). Expenses totalled -€339 million, a drop of -1.1% and the jaws effect was positive over the quarter at +1.3 percentage points. Gross operating income thus stood at €358 million, an increase of +1.5% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The cost/income ratio stood at 48.7%, up -0.6 percentage points compared to the same period in 2024. The cost of risk stood at -€228 million, up +19.6% from the second quarter of 2024. The cost of risk/outstandings thus stood at 135 basis points(38), a slight deterioration of +5 basis points compared to the first quarter of 2025, especially in international activities. The Non Performing Loans ratio was 4.6% at end-June 2025, slightly up by +0.1 percentage points compared to end-March 2025, while the coverage ratio reached 73.2%, down -0.2 percentage points compared to end-March 2025. The contribution from the equity-accounted entities fell by -71.4% compared to the same period in 2024, related mainly to the drop in remarketing revenues. Pre-tax income amounted to €140 million, down -27.1% compared to the same period in 2024. Net income Group share amounted to €81 million, down -38.4% compared to the previous year.

    In the first half of 2025, CAPFM revenues reached €1,380 million, i.e. +1.1% over the first half of 2024, benefiting from volume and positive price effects partially offset by the increase in subordinated debt37. The expenses came to -€709 million, up +1.7% compared to the first half of 2024, related primarily to employee expenses and IT expenses. Gross operating income stood at €671 million, up +0.6%. The cost/income ratio stood at 51.4%, up +0.3 percentage points compared to the same period in 2024. The cost of risk rose by +16.3% over the first half of 2024 to -€453 million, notably related to a slight degradation on the international subsidiaries. The contribution from equity-accounted entities fell by -25.9% compared to the same period in 2024, primarily due to the decline in remarketing revenues. Therefore, net income Group share, which includes the additional corporate tax charge in France, amounted to €188 million, down -18.7% from the first half of 2024.

    Leasing & Factoring results

    In the second quarter of 2025, CAL&F revenues totalled €183 million, down -5.4% from second quarter 2024 due to the decline in factoring margins (related to the rate decrease). Revenues were up in leasing. Operating expenses stood at -€99 million, down -0.8% over the quarter, and the cost/income ratio stood at 54.0%, an improvement of +2.6 percentage points compared to the second quarter of 2024. Gross operating income stood at €84 million, down -10.4% compared to the second quarter of 2024. The cost of risk includes a provision reversal on performing loans of +€20 million and thus amounted to -€7 million over the quarter, a drop of -63.9% from the same period in 2024. Cost of risk/outstandings stood at 21 basis points38, down -4 basis points compared to second quarter 2024. Income of the equity-accounted entities totalled -€22 million in second quarter 2025, a sharp decline from second quarter 2024 at -€2 million, due to a depreciation of goodwill. Pre-tax income amounted to €54 million, down -25.4% compared to the same period in 2024. Net income Group share includes the corporate tax additional charge in France and amounted to €33 million, down -40.2% compared to the previous year.

    In the first half of 2025, revenues were stable (-0.6%) from first half 2024 at €369 million with an increase on leasing absorbed by a decrease in factoring margins because of the decrease in rates. Operating expenses increased by +1.9% to -€203 million. Gross operating income was down -3.5% from the first half of 2024 to total €166 million. The cost/income ratio stood at 55.0%, up +1.3 percentage points compared to first half 2024. The cost of risk declined from the first half of 2024 (-21.8%) because of a provision reversal of +€20 million on performing loans in the second quarter of 2025. The contribution of the equity-accounted entities amounted to -€24 million in the first half of 2025, down sharply from the first half of 2024 at -€4 million due to a depreciation of goodwill in first half 2025. Finally, net income Group share includes the additional corporate tax charge in France and amounted to €75 million, down -24.1% from the first half of 2024.

    Crédit Agricole S.A. Retail Banking activity

    In Retail Banking at Crédit Agricole S.A. this quarter, loan production in France continued its upturn compared to the second quarter of 2024. It was down in Italy in a very competitive housing market. The number of customers with insurance is progressing.

    Retail banking activity in France

    In the second quarter of 2025, activity was steady, with an upturn in loan activity, especially real estate loans, compared with the second quarter of 2024, and an increase in inflows. Customer acquisition remained dynamic, with 68,000 new customers this quarter.

    The equipment rate for car, multi-risk home, health, legal, all mobile phones or personal accident insurance rose by +0.6 percentage points to stand at 28.4% at end-June 2025.

    Loan production totalled €6.8 billion, representing a year-on-year increase of +14%. Second quarter 2025 recorded an increase in the production of real estate loans (+24% over second quarter 2024). The average production rate for home loans came to 3.07%, down -11 basis points from the first quarter of 2025 and -77 basis points year on year. The home loan stock rate improved by +3 basis points over the quarter and by +18 basis points year on year. The strong momentum continued in the corporate market (+10% year on year) and the small business market (+15% year on year) and remains up in the consumer finance segment (+2%).

    Outstanding loans stood at €171.5 billion at end-June 2025, representing a quarter-on-quarter increase (+0.5%) and year-on-year (+2.0%, including +1.8% for home loans, +1.7% for loans to small businesses, and +3.4% for corporate loans). Customer assets totalled €256.0 billion at end-June 2025, up +1.7% year on year, driven by off-balance sheet funds and with a slight increase of on-balance sheet deposits. Over the quarter, customer assets remained stable at -0.2% in relation to end-March 2025, with an increase of demand deposits for +2.6% while term deposits dropped -8.5% over the quarter in an environment that remains uncertain. Off-balance sheet deposits benefited from a positive year-on-year market effect and on the quarter and positive net inflows in life insurance.

    Retail banking activity in Italy

    In the second quarter of 2025, CA Italia posted gross customer capture of 54,000.

    Loans outstanding at CA Italia at the end of June 2025 stood at €62.0 billion (39), up +1.6% compared with end-June 2024, in an Italian market up slightly (40), driven by the retail market, which posted an increase in outstandings of +2.8%. The loan stock rate declined by -96 basis points against the second quarter of 2024 and by -24 basis points from the first quarter of 2025. Loan production for the quarter was down -8.1% compared with a high second quarter 2024, in a very competitive home market in the second quarter of 2025. Loan production for the half rose by +1.3% compared with the first half of 2024.

    Customer assets at end-June 2025 totalled €120.5 billion, up +3.2% compared with end-June 2024; on-balance sheet deposits were relatively unchanged (+0.3%) from end-June 2024. Finally, off-balance sheet deposits increased by +6.9% over the same period and benefited from net flows and a positive market effect.

    CA Italia’s equipment rate in car, multi-risk home, health, legal, all mobile phones or personal accident insurance was 20.6%, up +0.9 percentage points over the second quarter of 2024.

    International Retail Banking activity excluding Italy

    For International Retail Banking excluding Italy, loan outstandings were €7.4 billion, up +5.2% at current exchange rates at end-June 2025 compared with end-June 2024 (+6.6% at constant exchange rates). Customer assets rose by +€11.7 billion and were up +6.4% over the same period at current exchange rates (+9.7% at constant exchange rates).

    In Poland in particular, loan outstandings increased by +5.2% compared to end-June 2024 (+3.6% at constant exchange rates) driven by the retail segment and on-balance sheet deposits of +8.2% (+6.6% at constant exchange rates). Loan production in Poland rose this quarter compared to the second quarter of 2024 (+7.9% at current exchange rates and +6.5% at constant exchange rates). In addition, gross customer capture in Poland reached 48,000 new customers this quarter.

    In Egypt, commercial activity was strong in all markets. Loans outstanding rose +6.8% between end-June 2025 and end-June 2024 (+20.9% at constant exchange rates). Over the same period, on-balance sheet deposits increased by +9.0%% and were up +23.3% at constant exchange rates.

    Liquidity is still very strong with a net surplus of deposits over loans in Poland and Egypt amounting to +€2.0 billion at 30 June 2025, and reached €3.5 billion including Ukraine.

    French retail banking results

    In the second quarter of 2025, LCL revenues amounted to €976 million, stable from the second quarter of 2024. The increase in fee and commission income (+3.1% over second quarter 2024) was driven by the strong momentum in insurance (life and non-life). NIM was down -3.4%, under the impact of an unfavourable base effect, but improved compared to the first quarter of 2025 (+7.8%), thanks to the progressive repricing of loans and the decrease in the cost of customer-related funds (which benefited from a positive change in the deposit mix) and of refinancing, offset by a lower contribution from macro-hedging.

    Expenses were up slightly by +1.0% and stood at -€597 million linked to ongoing investments. The cost/income ratio stood at 61.1%, an increase by 0.8 percentage points compared to second quarter 2024. Gross operating income fell by -2.4% to €380 million.

    The cost of risk was stable (-0.3% compared with second quarter 2024) and amounted to -€95 million (including an addition to provisions of -€104 million on proven risk and a reversal of +€10 million on healthy loans, incorporating the impact of the scenario update offset by the model update. The cost of risk/outstandings was stable at 20 basis points, with its level still high in the professional market. The coverage ratio still remains at a high level and was 60.9% at the end of June 2025. The Non Performing Loans ratio was 2.1% at the end of June 2025.

    Finally, pre-tax income stood at €286 million, down -3.4% compared to the second quarter of 2024, and net income Group share was down -5.7% from the second quarter of 2024.

    In the first half of 2025, LCL revenues were stable, up +0.3% compared to first half 2024 and totalled €1,939 million. The net interest margin was down (-2.6%), benefiting from gradual loan repricing and lower funding and refinancing costs, although the impact of macro-hedging remained positive, though less favourable, and there was an unfavourable base effect in the second quarter. Fee and commission income rose +3.4% compared to first half 2024, particularly on insurance. Expenses rose by +2.4% over the period and the cost/income ratio remained under control (+1.3 percentage points compared with first half 2024) at 63.0%. Gross operating income fell by -3.1% and the cost of risk improved by -12.9%. Lastly, the business line’s contribution to net income Group share includes the additional corporate tax charge in France and amounted to €337 million (-14.4% compared to the first half of 2024).

    In the end, the business line contributed 8% to the net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) in the second quarter of 2025 and 13% to revenues excluding the Corporate Centre division.

    At 30 June 2025, the equity allocated to the business line stood at €5.3 billion and risk weighted assets amounted to €55.7 billion.

    International Retail Banking results (41)

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues for International Retail Banking totalled €1,007 million, down compared with the second quarter of 2024 (-1.9% at current exchange rates, -1.3% at constant exchange rates). Operating expenses amounted to -€520 million, down -6.3% (-6.0% at constant exchange rates), and benefited from the end of the contribution to the DGS in 2025, which was recorded for -€58 million in the second quarter of 2024. Gross operating income consequently totalled €487 million, up +3.2% (+4.3% at constant exchange rates) for the period. Cost of risk amounted to -€61 million, down -15.5% compared to second quarter 2024 (-19.8% at constant exchange rates). All in all, net income Group share for CA Italia, CA Egypt, CA Poland and CA Ukraine amounted to €238 million in the second quarter of 2025, up +4.3% (and +6.4% at constant exchange rates).

    In first half 2025, International Retail Banking revenues fell by -2.5% to €2,033 million (-0.7% at constant exchange rates). Operating expenses totalled -€1,035 million, down -2.4% (-4% at constant exchange rates) from the first half of 2024, and benefited from the end of the contribution to the DGS in 2025, which had been recorded for -€58 million in the second quarter of 2024. Gross operating income totalled €998 million, down -2.6% (+2.9% at constant exchange rates). The cost of risk fell by -17.3% (-14.2% at constant exchange rates) to -€128 million compared to first half 2024. Ultimately, net income Group share of International Retail Banking was €483 million, stable in comparison with €485 million in the first half of 2024.

    At 30 June 2025, the capital allocated to International Retail Banking was €4.3 billion and risk weighted assets totalled €44.9 billion.

    Results in Italy

    In the second quarter of 2025, Crédit Agricole Italia’s revenues amounted to €767 million, down -2.2% from second quarter 2024, due to the decline in the net interest margin (-4.4% compared with the second quarter of 2024 related to the decrease in rates). The net interest margin was up +2% compared to first quarter 2025. Fee and commission income on managed assets rose significantly by +11.6% compared to second quarter 2024. Operating expenses were -€398 million, down -9.5% from second quarter 2024, due to the end of the contribution to the DGS in 2025, whereas an amount of -€58 million had been recognised in this respect in the second quarter of 2024. Excluding the DGS, expenses rose by +4.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024 because of employee and IT expenses to support the growth of the business lines.

    The cost of risk was -€45 million in the second quarter of 2025, a decrease of -26.4% from second quarter 2024, and continues to fall with an improvement in the quality of the assets and the coverage ratio. In effect, the cost of risk/outstandings (42) is 36 basis points, an improvement of 3 basis points versus the first quarter of 2025; the Non Performing Loans ratio is 2.7% and is improved from the first quarter of 2025, just like the coverage ratio which is 81.0% (+3.1 percentage points over the first quarter of 2025). This translates into a net income Group share of €172 million for CA Italia, up +12.3% compared to the second quarter of 2024.

    In first half 2025, revenues for Crédit Agricole Italia fell by -0.9% to €1,545 million. Operating expenses amounted to -€781 million, down -4.8% from the first half of 2024, and an increase of +2.4% excluding the DGS for -€58 million in the second quarter of 2024. This took gross operating income to €763 million, up +3.4% compared to first half 2024. The cost of risk amounted to -€102 million, down -17.2% compared to the first half of 2024. As a result, net income Group share of CA Italia totalled €350 million, an increase of +5.2% compared to first half 2024.

    Results for Crédit Agricole Group in Italy (43)

    In the first half of 2025, the net income Group share of entities in Italy amounted to €652 million, down -1.1% compared to the first half of 2024. The breakdown by business line is as follows: Retail Banking 54%; Specialised Financial Services 14%; Asset Gathering and Insurance 19%; and Large Customers 13%. Lastly, Italy’s contribution to net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A. in first half 2025 was 15%.

    International Retail Banking results – excluding Italy

    In the second quarter of 2025, revenues for International Retail Banking excluding Italy totalled €240 million, down -1.1% (+1.7% at constant exchange rates) compared to the second quarter of 2024. Revenues in Poland were up +9.5% in the second quarter of 2024 (+8.3% at constant exchange rates), boosted by net interest margin and fee and commission income. Revenues in Egypt were down -9.2% (-4.8% at constant exchange rates) with a residual base effect related to the exceptional foreign exchange activity of the second quarter of 2024. The increase in fee and commission income does not offset the slight decline in net interest margin. Operating expenses for International Retail Banking excluding Italy amounted to -€123 million, up +6.0% compared to the second quarter of 2024 (+7.5% at constant exchange rates) due to the effect of employee expenses and taxes in Poland as well as employee expenses and IT expenses in Egypt. At constant exchange rates, the jaws effect was positive by +2.6 percentage points in Poland. Gross operating income amounted to €117 million, down -7.5% (-3.6% at constant exchange rates) compared to the second quarter of 2024. The cost of risk is low at -€16 million, compared with -€11 million in the second quarter of 2024. Furthermore, at end-June 2025, the coverage ratio for loan outstandings remained high in Poland and Egypt, at 124% and 135%, respectively. In Ukraine, the local coverage ratio remains prudent (558%). All in all, the contribution of International Retail Banking excluding Italy to net income Group share was €66 million, down -11.9% compared with the second quarter of 2024 (-6.5% at constant exchange rates).

    In the first half of 2025, revenues for International Retail Banking excluding Italy totalled €488 million, down -7.1% (-1.1% at constant exchange rates) compared to the first half of 2024. Operating expenses amounted to -€254 million, up +5.9% compared to the first half of 2024 (+8.4% at constant exchange rates). The cost/income ratio stood at 52.0% at the end of June 2025, decreasing by 6.4 percentage points compared to the first half of 2024. Gross operating income amounted to €235 million, down -17.9% (-9.7% at constant exchange rates) compared to the first half of 2024. Cost of risk amounted to -€26 million, down -17.8% (-19.7% at constant exchange rates) compared to the first half of 2024. All in all, International Retail Banking excluding Italy contributed €133 million to net income Group share.

    At 30 June 2025, the entire Retail Banking business line contributed 19% to the net income Group share of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s core businesses (excluding the Corporate Centre division) and 28% to revenues excluding the Corporate Centre.

    At 30 June 2025, the division’s equity amounted to €9.6 billion. Its risk weighted assets totalled €100.6 billion.

    Corporate Centre results

    The net income Group share of the Corporate Centre was -€22 million in second quarter 2025, up +€217 million compared to second quarter 2024. The contribution of the Corporate Centre division can be analysed by distinguishing between the “structural” contribution (-€60 million) and other items (+€39 million).
    The contribution of the “structural” component (-€60 million) was up by +€184 million compared with the second quarter of 2024 and can be broken down into three types of activity:

    • The activities and functions of the Corporate Centre of the Crédit Agricole S.A. Parent Company. This contribution was -€287 million in the second quarter of 2025, up +€45 million.
    • The businesses that are not part of the business lines, such as CACIF (Private equity), CA Immobilier, CATE and BforBank (equity-accounted), and other investments. Their contribution, at +€217 million in the second quarter of 2025, was up +€140 million compared to the second quarter of 2024, including the positive impact of the Banco BPM dividend linked to an increased stake of 19.8% combined with a rise in the value of the securities (+€143 million).
    • Group support functions. Their contribution amounted to +€9 million this quarter (unchanged compared with the second quarter of 2024).

    The contribution from “other items” amounted to +€39 million, up +€32 million compared to the second quarter of 2024, mainly due to ESTER/BOR volatility factors.

    The underlying net income Group share of the Corporate Centre division in first half 2025 was -€124 million, up +€221 million compared to first half 2024. The structural component contributed -€114 million, while the division’s other items contributed -€10 million over the half-year.
    The “structural” component contribution was up +€237 million compared to first half 2024 and can be broken down into three types of activity:

    • The activities and functions of the Corporate Centre of the Crédit Agricole S.A. Parent Company. This contribution amounted to -€601 million for first half 2025, up +€26 million compared to first half 2024;
    • Business lines not attached to the core businesses, such as Crédit Agricole CIF (private equity) and CA Immobilier, BforBank and other investments: their contribution, which stood at +€469 million in first half 2025, an increase compared to the first half of 2024 (+€207 million).
    • The Group’s support functions: their contribution for the first half of 2025 was +€18 million, up +€4 million compared to the first half of 2024.

    The contribution of “other items” was down -€15 million compared to first half 2024.

    At 30 June 2025, risk weighted assets stood at €38.3 billion.

    Financial strength

    Crédit Agricole Group has the best level of solvency among European Global Systemically Important Banks.

    Capital ratios for Crédit Agricole Group are well above regulatory requirements. At 30 June 2025, the phased Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (CET1) for Crédit Agricole Group stood at 17.6%, or a substantial buffer of 7.7 percentage points above regulatory requirements. Over the quarter, the CET1 ratio remained stable, reflecting the increase in retained earnings of +31 basis points (bp), -29 bp of organic growth in the business lines, +5 bp of methodological impact and -13 bp of M&A transactions, OCI and other items.

    Crédit Agricole S.A., in its capacity as the corporate centre of the Crédit Agricole Group, fully benefits from the internal legal solidarity mechanism as well as the flexibility of capital circulation within the Crédit Agricole Group. Its phased-in CET1 ratio as at 30 June 2025 stood at 11.9%, 3.2 percentage points above the regulatory requirement, -20 bp compared to the March 2025. The change over the quarter was due to the retained earnings of +28 bp, business lines’ organic growth of -23 bp, +4 bp from methodology impacts and -33 bp from M&A transactions, OCI and other44. The proforma CET1 ratio Including M&A transactions completed after 30 June 2025 would be 11.6%.

    The breakdown of the change in Crédit Agricole S.A.’s risk weighted assets by business line is the combined result of:  +€3.4 billion for the Retail Banking divisions linked to changes in the business lines, -€0.3 billion for Asset Gathering, taking into account the increase in insurance dividends, +€1.7 billion for Specialised Financial Services, -€7.0 billion for Large Customers, linked to favourable methodology and FX impact and moderate business line growth, and  +€3.2 billion for the Corporate Centre division, notably linked to the impact of the increase in the Banco BPM stake to 19.8%.

    For the Crédit Agricole Group, the Regional Banks’ risk weighted assets increased by +€6.9 billion. The evolution of the other businesses follows the same trend as for Crédit Agricole S.A.

    Crédit Agricole Group’s financial structure

        Crédit Agricole Group   Crédit Agricole S.A.
        30/06/25 31/03/25 Exigences 30/06/25   30/06/25 31/03/25 Exigences 30/06/25
    Phased-in CET1 ratio45   17.6% 17.6% 9.88%   11.9% 12.1% 8.71%
    Tier1 ratio45   18.9% 19.0% 11.72%   14.0% 14.3% 10.52%
    Total capital ratio45   21.4% 21.8% 14.17%   17.8% 18.4% 12.94%
    Risk-weighted assets (€bn)   649 641     406 405  
    Leverage ratio   5.6% 5.6% 3.5%   3.9% 4.0% 3.0%
    Leverage exposure (€bn)   2,191 2,173     1,445 1,434  
    TLAC ratio (% RWA)45,46   27.6% 28.5% 22.4%        
    TLAC ratio (% LRE)46   8.2% 8.4% 6.75%        
    Subordinated MREL ratio (% RWA)45   27.6% 28.5% 21.6%        
    Subordinated MREL ratio (% LRE)   8.2% 8.4% 6.25%        
    Total MREL ratio (% RWA)45   32.7% 34.0% 26.2%        
    Total MREL ratio (% LRE)   9.7% 10.0% 6.25%        
    Distance to the distribution restriction trigger (€bn)47   46 46     13 14  

    For Crédit Agricole S.A., the distance to the trigger for distribution restrictions is the distance to the MDA trigger48, i.e. 318 basis points, or €13 billion of CET1 capital at 30 June 2025. Crédit Agricole S.A. is not subject to either the L-MDA (distance to leverage ratio buffer requirement) or the M-MDA (distance to MREL requirements).

    For Crédit Agricole Group, the distance to the trigger for distribution restrictions is the distance to the L-MDA trigger at 30 June 2025. Crédit Agricole Group posted a buffer of 209 basis points above the L-MDA trigger, i.e. €46 billion in Tier 1 capital.

    At 30 June 2025, Crédit Agricole Group’s TLAC and MREL ratios are well above requirements49. Crédit Agricole Group posted a buffer of 530 basis points above the M-MDA trigger, i.e. €34 billion in CET1 capital. At this date, the distance to the M-MDA trigger corresponds to the distance between the TLAC ratio and the corresponding requirement. The Crédit Agricole Group’s 2025 target is to maintain a TLAC ratio greater than or equal to 26% of RWA excluding eligible senior preferred debt.

    Liquidity and Funding

    Liquidity is measured at Crédit Agricole Group level.

    As of 31 December 2024, changes have been made to the presentation of the Group’s liquidity position (liquidity reserves and balance sheet, breakdown of long-term debt). These changes are described in the 2024 Universal Registration Document.

    Diversified and granular customer deposits remain stable compared to March 2025 (€1,147 billion at end-June 2025).

    The Group’s liquidity reserves, at market value and after haircuts50, amounted to €471 billion at 30 June 2025, down -€16 billion compared to 31 March 2025.

    Liquidity reserves covered more than twice the short-term debt net of treasury assets.

    This change in liquidity reserves is notably explained by:

    • The decrease in the securities portfolio (HQLA and non-HQLA) for -€7 billion;
    • The decrease in collateral already pledged to Central Banks and unencumbered for -€13 billion, linked to the decline in self-securitisations for -€7 billion and the decrease in receivables eligible for central bank for -€6 billion;
    • The increase in central bank deposits for +€4 billion.

    Crédit Agricole Group also continued its efforts to maintain immediately available reserves (after recourse to ECB financing). Central bank eligible non-HQLA assets after haircuts amounted to €131 billion.

    Standing at €1,696 billion at 30 June 2025, the Group’s liquidity balance sheet shows a surplus of stable funding resources over stable application of funds of €179 billion, down -€18 billion compared with end-March 2025. This surplus remains well above the Medium-Term Plan target of €110bn-€130bn.

    Long term debt was €316 billion at 30 June 2025, slightly up compared with end-March 2025. This included:

    • Senior secured debt of €93 billion, up +€4 billion;
    • Senior preferred debt of €162 billion;
    • Senior non-preferred debt of €38 billion, down -€2 billion due to the MREL/TLAC eligible debt;
    • And Tier 2 securities of €23 billion, down -€1 billion.

    Credit institutions are subject to a threshold for the LCR ratio, set at 100% on 1 January 2018.

    At 30 June 2025, the average LCR ratios (calculated on a rolling 12-month basis) were 137% for Crédit Agricole Group (representing a surplus of €87 billion) and 142% for Crédit Agricole S.A. (representing a surplus of €84 billion). They were higher than the Medium-Term Plan target (around 110%).

    In addition, the NSFR of Crédit Agricole Group and Crédit Agricole S.A. exceeded 100%, in accordance with the regulatory requirement applicable since 28 June 2021 and above the Medium-Term Plan target (>100%).

    The Group continues to follow a prudent policy as regards medium-to-long-term refinancing, with a very diversified access to markets in terms of investor base and products.

    At 30 June 2025, the Group’s main issuers raised the equivalent of €21.3 billion51in medium-to-long-term debt on the market, 84% of which was issued by Crédit Agricole S.A.

    In particular, the following amounts are noted for the Group excluding Crédit Agricole S.A.:

    • Crédit Agricole Assurances issued €750 million in RT1 perpetual NC10.75 year;
    • Crédit Agricole Personal Finance & Mobility issued:
      • €1 billion in EMTN issuances through Crédit Agricole Auto Bank (CAAB);
      • €420 million in securitisations through Agos;
    • Crédit Agricole Italia issued one senior secured debt issuance for a total of €1 billion;
    • Crédit Agricole next bank (Switzerland) issued two tranches in senior secured format for a total of 200 million Swiss francs, of which 100 million Swiss francs in Green Bond format.

    At 30 June 2025, Crédit Agricole S.A. raised the equivalent of €16.5 billion through the market 51,52.

    The bank raised the equivalent of €16.5 billion, of which €7.3 billion in senior non-preferred debt and €2.8 billion in Tier 2 debt, as well as €1.7 billion in senior preferred debt and €4.7 billion in senior secured debt at end-June. The financing comprised a variety of formats and currencies, including:

    • €2.75 billion 52,53 ;
    • 5.4 billion US dollars (€5.1 billion equivalent);
    • 1.6 billion pounds sterling (€1.9 billion equivalent);
    • 179.3 billion Japanese yen (€1.1 billion equivalent);
    • 0.4 billion Singapore dollars (€0.3 billion equivalent);
    • 0.6 billion Australian dollars (€0.4 billion equivalent);
    • 0.3 billion Swiss francs (€0.3 billion equivalent).

    At end-June, Crédit Agricole S.A. had issued 77%52,53 of its funding plan in currencies other than the euro.

    In addition, on 13 February 2025, Crédit Agricole S.A. issued a PerpNC10 AT1 bond for €1.5 billion at an initial rate of 5.875% and announced on 30 April 2025 the regulatory call exercise for the AT1 £ with £103m outstanding (XS1055037920) – ineligible, grandfathered until 28/06/2025 – redeemed on 30/06/2025.

    The 2025 MLT market funding programme was set at €20 billion, with a balanced distribution between senior preferred or senior secured debt and senior non-preferred or Tier 2 debt.

    The programme was 82% completed at 30 June 2025, with:

    • €4.7 billion in senior secured debt;
    • €1.7 billion equivalent in senior preferred debt;
    • €7.3 billion equivalent in senior non-preferred debt;
    • €2.8 billion equivalent in Tier 2 debt.

    Economic and financial environment

    Review of the first half of 2025

    An even more conflict-ridden and unpredictable environment, causing a slowdown

    The first half of the year took place in an even more conflict-ridden and unpredictable environment, marked by open wars and powerful geopolitical and trade tensions. The war in Ukraine remained a major unresolved issue: President Trump’s initiatives aimed at ending the conflict proved fruitless, while signalling a strategic shift in US policy, notably away from protecting European territory. President Trump’s statements on NATO (demanding that military spending be increased to 5% of GDP) forced Europe to accelerate the overhaul of its defence strategy, as evidenced by the announcement of a white paper detailing defence support measures worth €800 billion. With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continuing without any lasting political solution in sight, international tensions peaked in June with Israel’s attack on Iran, quickly joined by its US ally. After twelve days of clashes, a ceasefire was announced on 24 June.

    Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency has obviously resulted in a protectionist offensive of unexpected violence. This offensive culminated in “Liberation Day” on 2 April, when “reciprocal” tariffs were imposed on all of the United States’ trading partners. While China was particularly targeted, the European Union was also severely affected; even the countries participating in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, United States, Canada, Mexico) were not spared, as they were subject to sector-specific tariffs applicable everywhere (steel, aluminium, automobiles, semiconductors). However, these announcements were followed by a presidential U-turn on 9 April, with reciprocal tariffs being lowered to 10% and a 90-day truce agreed upon to allow for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements. At the end of this pause (9 July), the US president decided to extend it (to 1 August), offering hope to major trading partners (the European Union, Japan and South Korea) that agreements could be reached to reduce tariffs, while leaving economic players in uncertainty about international trade conditions. Only the United Kingdom, China and Vietnam have signed an agreement.

    The unpredictability of US trade policy, characterised by dramatic announcements followed by partial reversals, has created ongoing uncertainty. In the first half of the year, this was reflected in mixed economic and financial performances across countries, suggesting a more pronounced global slowdown. The IMF has therefore revised its global growth forecast for 2025 downwards to 2.8% (a decrease of -0.5 percentage points (pp) compared to its January forecast and the growth observed in 2024).

    The US economy has shown early signs of slowing down, hit by weaker consumer spending and, above all, a sharp rise in imports as companies seek to build up stocks ahead of the entry into force of new tariffs. GDP contracted by 0.5% in the first quarter (annualised quarter-on-quarter change). After moderating but remaining above the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) 2% target, inflation (year-on-year) stood at 2.7% in June (after 2.4% in May). Core inflation (excluding volatile components, food and energy) reached 2.9%; the increase in tariffs (although not yet finalised) already seems to be visible in the cost of certain goods (furniture, textiles and clothing, household appliances). Despite this turbulence, the job market has stayed relatively strong (unemployment rate at 4.2% in May, still within the narrow range it has been in since May 2024), providing some stability for an otherwise fragile economy.

    In China, despite a very difficult external environment and punitive US tariffs, growth (5.4% and 5.2% in the first and second quarters) stabilised above the official target of 5% for 2025. While consumption is sluggish, a weakness reflected in the absence of inflation (which has not exceeded 1% year-on-year since February 2024), exports have continued to accelerate, making a surprising contribution to growth. At 2.1 percentage points in the first quarter of 2025, the contribution from net external demand reached an historic high (excluding Covid), reflecting China’s undisputed dominance in global manufacturing, although temporary positive effects (anticipation of US tariffs at the beginning of the year) should not be overlooked.

    In an unfavourable environment, the eurozone held up well, with growth initially estimated at 0.3% (quarter-on-quarter) and then revised upwards (0.6%, or 1.5% year-on-year). Growth in the eurozone was mainly driven by investment, followed by net external demand and finally household consumption (with respective contributions to growth of 0.4 pp, 0.3 pp and 0.1 pp), while inventories subtracted 0.1 pp from growth and final public expenditure was “neutral”. This overall performance continued to mask varying national fortunes: among the largest member countries, Spain continued to post very strong growth (0.6%) and Germany saw an upturn (0.4%), while Italy and France posted fairly sustained (0.3%) and weak (0.1%) growth rates, respectively. Continued disinflation (to 1.9% year-on-year in May after 2.2% in April and 2.6% in May 2024) and anchored expectations made it possible for the ECB to continue its monetary easing, reassured by the convergence of inflation towards its 2% target.

    In France, in particular, after benefiting from the boost provided by the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games in the third quarter of 2024 (+0.4% quarter-on-quarter), activity declined slightly in the last quarter of last year (-0.1%) due to after-effects. It picked up again in the first quarter of 2025, but growth remained weak (+0.1%). Domestic demand, which contributed negatively to growth, is largely responsible for this sluggishness. Household consumption declined (-0.2%), undermined by a record savings rate (18% of household disposable income, compared with 15.4% in the eurozone) for 45 years (excluding the Covid period), while public consumption slowed (+0.2% after +0.4%). Investment continued to stagnate, reflecting the fact that companies in France are more indebted than in the rest of the eurozone (making them more vulnerable to past interest rate hikes) and the budgetary efforts of public administrations to reduce the public deficit. As a result, domestic demand weighed on growth in the first quarter (-0.1 pp). However, it was mainly foreign trade that undermined growth (-0.8 pp) due to the collapse of exports, particularly in the aerospace sector. Unlike its European peers, France did not benefit from the sharp rise in global trade in the first quarter (+1.7%) in anticipation of US tariffs.

    In terms of monetary policy, the first half of 2025 was marked by a notable divergence between the status quo of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the continued easing by the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB cut interest rates four times by 25 basis points (bp) each, bringing the cumulative reduction in the deposit rate (2% since 11 June) to 200 bp since the start of easing (June 2024). However, after cutting its policy rate by 100 bp in 2024 (to 4.50%), the Fed kept rates unchanged due to overly modest progress on inflation, even though growth did not appear to be definitively at risk. Inflationary risks linked to tariffs led it to adopt a very cautious stance, which was widely criticised by President Trump.
    The financial markets, while remaining subject to bouts of nervousness prompted by geopolitical events, generally kept pace with Donald Trump’s stated ambitions, their feasibility and his U-turns. Thus, the theme of the American exception at the beginning of the year (growth exceeding potential, resilience despite interest rates set to rise, the privileged status of the dollar, unlimited capacity to borrow and shift risks to the rest of the world) has been supplanted by disenchantment with US assets following “Liberation Day”. Following the president’s backtracking and announcement of a 90-day pause, serious doubts were raised about his ability to truly deliver on his domestic and international commitments. Periods marked by exaggerated negativity have therefore alternated with periods dominated by equally exaggerated positivity.

    Bond markets therefore experienced mixed movements. During the first half of the year, in the United States, the decline in yields (54) on short maturities was ultimately quite sharp (nearly 60 bp for the two-year swap rate to nearly 3.50%) and exceeded that of the ten-year swap rate (down 38 bp to 3.69%), giving the curve a steeper slope. Despite Moody’s rating downgrade, the yield on 10-year sovereign bonds (US Treasuries) fell in line with the swap rate for the same maturity, which it now exceeds by more than 50 bp (at 4.23%). In the eurozone, the steepening effect was less pronounced and unfolded differently: there was a less marked decline in the two-year swap rate (from 22 bp to 1.90%) and an increase in the ten-year swap rate (from 23 bp to 2.57%). Under the influence of the Merz government’s expansionary budget programme, the German 10-year yield (Bund) rose (24 bp to 2.61%) and exceeded the swap rate for the same maturity by a few basis points. Ten-year swap spreads on benchmark European sovereign bonds narrowed in the first half of the year, with Italy posting the strongest performance (spread down 27 bp to 90 bp). This improvement reflects a more favourable perception of Italy’s public finances and a degree of political stability, in contrast to the turbulence of previous years. Italian growth also showed unexpected resilience in the face of trade tensions. Penalised since the dissolution of parliament in June 2024 by a damaging lack of a parliamentary majority and severely deteriorated public finances, the French spread nevertheless narrowed during the half-year, falling from a high level (85 bp) to 71 bp. It now exceeds the Spanish spread (at 67 bp).

    On the equity markets, European indexes outperformed their US counterparts, with the Euro Stoxx 50 up 10% since the start of the year (and a spectacular rise of nearly 25% for the banking sector), while the S&P 500, which was much more volatile over the period, rose by nearly 7%, buoyed by high-tech stocks. The US dollar lost some of its lustre amid economic and international policy uncertainty, with the euro appreciating by 14% against the dollar and 6% in nominal effective terms. Finally, the price of gold rose by 26% in the first half of the year, reaching a record high of US$3,426 per ounce in April, confirming its status as a preferred safe haven during this period of intense uncertainty.

    2025–2026 Outlook

    An anxiety-inducing context, some unprecedented resistance

    The economic and financial scenario, which has already had to contend with the volatility and unpredictability of US economic policy, is unfolding against an even more uncertain international backdrop, in which the risk of disruptive events (blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, incidents affecting infrastructure in the Gulf etc.) cannot be entirely ruled out.

    Our economic scenario for the United States has always been based on a two-step sequence in line with the pace of the economic policy planned by Donald Trump: a positive impact on inflation but a negative impact on growth from tariffs (which fall within the president’s prerogatives), followed by a positive but delayed effect from aggressive budgetary policy (which requires congressional approval). Although our forecasts for 2025 have been revised slightly downwards, our US scenario remains on track, in line with the timetable for economic policy measures: while avoiding recession, growth is expected to slow sharply in 2025, coupled with a pick-up in inflation, before regaining momentum in 2026.

    Even with the recent de-escalation, tariff rates remain significantly higher than they were before Donald Trump’s second election. The negative impact of the new trade policy is the main driver of the decline in the growth forecast for 2025 (1.5% after 2.8% in 2024), while more favourable aspects (the “One Big Beautiful Bill”, tax cuts and deregulation) should contribute to the expected upturn in 2026 (2.2%). The possibility of a recession in 2025 has been ruled out due to solid fundamentals, including lower sensitivity to interest rates, very healthy household finances and a labour market that remains relatively robust, even if there are signs of deterioration. Despite the expected slowdown in growth, our inflation forecasts have been revised upwards. Tariffs are expected to cause year-on-year inflation to rise by around 80 basis points (bp) at peak impact. Although this effect is temporary, inflation (annual average) is expected to reach 2.9% in 2025 and 2.7% in 2026. It is therefore expected to continue to exceed 2%, with underlying inflation stabilising at around 2.5% at the end of 2026.

    In a conflict-ridden and unpredictable external environment, Europe is expected to find salvation in domestic demand, allowing it to better withstand the global slowdown. Two alternative scenarios, between which the balance is delicate, are likely to unfold: a scenario of resilience in the eurozone economy based on an increase in private spending but also, and perhaps above all, in public spending on defence and infrastructure; a scenario of stagnating activity under the effect of a series of negative shocks: competitiveness shocks linked to higher tariffs, appreciation of the euro and the negative impact of uncertainty on private confidence.

    We favour the scenario of resilience against a backdrop of a buoyant labour market, a healthy economic and financial situation for the private sector and a favourable credit cycle. The effective implementation of additional public spending, particularly the “German bazooka”(55), certainly needs to be confirmed. However, this spending could provide the eurozone with growth driven by stronger domestic demand at a time when global growth is slowing. It would offer a type of exceptionalism, especially compared to the past decade, which would put eurozone growth above its medium-term potential. Average annual growth in the eurozone is expected to accelerate slightly in 2025 to 0.9% and strengthen to 1.3% in 2026. Average inflation is expected to continue to moderate, reaching 2.1% and 1.8% in 2025 and 2026, respectively.

    In Germany, the sluggish economy should return to robust growth. Although more exposed than its partners to protectionist policies, the economy should be boosted by the public investment plan. This plan and the removal of barriers to financing infrastructure and defence investment that had previously seemed insurmountable give hope for a significant, albeit not immediate, recovery. While the effects are likely to be minimal in 2025 due to implementation delays, a significant flow of funds is expected in 2026, with positive spillover effects for Germany’s European neighbours and the eurozone as a whole. German growth could recover significantly, rising from -0.2% in 2024 to 0.1% in 2025 and, above all, 1.2% in 2026. In France, growth is expected to remain sluggish in the second quarter of 2025, before accelerating slightly in the second half of the year. The real upturn would not come until 2026, driven by a recovery in investment and the initial favourable impact of German government measures. The risks remain mainly on the downside for activity in the short term. Our scenario assumes growth rates of 0.6% and 1.2% in 2025 and 2026, respectively (after 1.1% in 2024). In Italy, incomplete catching-up and a recent decline in purchasing power, despite strong employment, are likely to limit the potential for a recovery in household consumption. Positive surprises on the investment front are likely to continue, thanks to improved financing conditions and subsidies for the energy and digital transitions. While the recent weakness in industrial orders may weigh on productive investment, construction is holding up well. However, doubts remain about growth potential, with post-pandemic sector allocation favouring less productive sectors. Growth is expected to reach 0.6% in 2025 and 0.7% in 2026 (after 0.7% in 2024).

    The central scenario for the eurozone (developed and quantified in June) assumes that the tariff dispute with the United States will remain unchanged as of 4 June, i.e. a general increase in tariffs to 10% (except for exempted products), 25% on cars and 50% on steel. The risks associated with this central scenario are bearish. The stagnation scenario could materialise if the trade dispute with the United States were to escalate, if competitive pressures were to intensify, if private confidence were to deteriorate significantly and, finally, if fiscal stimulus were to be implemented more gradually than anticipated.

    Such an uncertain environment, characterised by global slowdown and shrinking export opportunities, would certainly have led in the past (and not so long ago) to underperformance by emerging economies, which are further hampered by risk aversion in the markets, higher interest rates and pressure on their currencies. However, despite tariffs (the effects of which will obviously vary greatly from one economy to another), our scenario remains broadly optimistic for the major emerging countries. These countries could show unprecedented resilience thanks to support measures that are likely to partially cushion the impact of an unfavourable environment: relatively strong labour markets, fairly solid domestic demand, monetary easing (with a few exceptions), and a limited slowdown in China (after holding up well in the first half of the year, growth is expected to approach 4.5% in 2025 due to the anticipated slowdown in the second half linked to the trade war). Finally, emerging market currencies have held up well and the risk of defensive rate hikes, which would weigh heavily on growth, is lower than might have been feared. However, these relatively positive prospects are accompanied by higher-than-usual risks due to the unpredictability of US policy.

    In terms of monetary policy, the end of the easing cycles is drawing nearer. In the US, the scenario (a sharp slowdown in 2025, an upturn in 2026 and inflation continuing to significantly exceed the target) and the uncertainties surrounding it should encourage the Fed to remain patient, despite Donald Trump’s calls for a more accommodative policy. The Fed is likely to proceed with a slight easing followed by a long pause. Our scenario still assumes two cuts in 2025, but pushes them back by one quarter (to September and December, from June and September previously). After these two cuts, the Fed is likely to keep rates unchanged with a maximum upper limit of 4% throughout 2026.

    As for the ECB, although it refuses to rule out any future rate cuts, it may well have reached the end of its easing cycle due to an expected recovery in growth and inflation on target. Of course, a deterioration in the economic environment would justify further easing: the ECB stands ready to cut rates if necessary. Our scenario assumes that the deposit rate will remain at 2% in 2026.

    On the interest rate front, in the United States, persistent inflationary risks and a budgetary trajectory deemed unsustainable, a compromised AAA rating, the volatility of economic decisions and heightened investor concerns are exerting upward pressure. Our scenario assumes a 10-year US Treasury yield of around 4.70% at the end of 2025 and 4.95% at the end of 2026. In the eurozone, resilient growth that is expected to accelerate, inflation on target and the ECB believed to have almost completed its easing cycle point to a slight rise in interest rates and a stabilisation or even tightening of sovereign spreads. The German 10-year yield (Bund) could thus approach 2.90% at the end of 2025 and 2.95% at the end of 2026. For the same maturity, the spread offered by France relative to the Bund would fluctuate around 60/65 bp, while Italy’s would narrow to 90 bp by the end of 2026.

    Finally, the US dollar continues to lose ground. The inconsistency and unpredictability of Donald Trump’s economic policies, the deteriorating US budget outlook and speculation about official plans to devalue the dollar, combined with resistance from other economies, are all factors putting pressure on the dollar, although this does not necessarily spell the end of its status as a key reserve currency in the short term. The euro/dollar exchange rate is expected to settle at 1.17 in the fourth quarter of 2025, before depreciating in 2026 (1.10).

    Appendix 1 – Crédit Agricole Group: income statement by business line

    Credit Agricole Group – Results par by business line, Q2-25 and Q2-24

      Q2-25
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 3,364 976 1,031 1,967 881 2,224 (635) 9,808
    Operating expenses (2,690) (597) (540) (864) (438) (1,257) 514 (5,872)
    Gross operating income 674 380 491 1,104 442 967 (121) 3,936
    Cost of risk (397) (95) (61) (7) (235) (20) (26) (840)
    Equity-accounted entities 1 – – 58 (13) 10 – 56
    Net income on other assets 1 1 0 449 1 0 0 452
    Income before tax 278 286 430 1,604 194 958 (147) 3,604
    Tax (96) (69) (130) (249) (58) (149) 136 (615)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale ope. – – 0 – – – 0 0
    Net income 182 218 300 1,356 136 810 (11) 2,990
    Non-controlling interests (0) (0) (40) (247) (22) (43) 1 (352)
    Net income Group Share 182 217 260 1,108 114 767 (10) 2,638
      Q2-24
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 3,255 979 1,051 1,946 889 2,223 (837) 9,507
    Operating expenses (2,560) (591) (573) (813) (443) (1,204) 497 (5,687)
    Gross operating income 694 389 477 1,133 447 1,019 (340) 3,819
    Cost of risk (444) (95) (75) (2) (211) (39) (6) (872)
    Equity-accounted entities 2 – – 33 29 10 – 74
    Net income on other assets 1 2 0 (12) (1) 2 (0) (7)
    Income before tax 253 296 402 1,152 265 993 (347) 3,014
    Tax (44) (65) (117) (282) (54) (248) 48 (762)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale ope. – – – – – – – –
    Net income 209 231 285 870 210 745 (299) 2,252
    Non-controlling interests (1) (0) (38) (124) (23) (36) (2) (224)
    Net income Group Share 208 231 247 746 187 710 (300) 2,028

    Credit Agricole Group – Results par by business line, H1-25 and H1-24

      H1-25
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 6,716 1,939 2,079 4,016 1,749 4,632 (1,275) 19,856
    Operating expenses (5,220) (1,222) (1,075) (1,799) (912) (2,617) 982 (11,864)
    Gross operating income 1,496 717 1,003 2,217 837 2,015 (293) 7,992
    Cost of risk (717) (186) (128) (17) (484) 5 (48) (1,575)
    Equity-accounted entities 7 – – 86 23 16 – 131
    Net income on other assets 3 2 0 449 1 0 0 456
    Income before tax 790 533 875 2,734 376 2,036 (341) 7,004
    Tax (267) (181) (267) (599) (71) (453) 182 (1,656)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale ope. – – 0 – – – – 0
    Net income 523 352 608 2,135 305 1,583 (159) 5,348
    Non-controlling interests (0) (0) (82) (348) (43) (78) 7 (545)
    Net income Group Share 523 352 526 1,787 263 1,504 (151) 4,803
      H1-24
    €m RB LCL IRB AG SFS LC CC Total
                     
    Revenues 6,568 1,933 2,131 3,739 1,736 4,489 (1,565) 19,031
    Operating expenses (5,044) (1,193) (1,098) (1,567) (897) (2,501) 1,024 (11,276)
    Gross operating income 1,524 740 1,033 2,172 839 1,988 (541) 7,755
    Cost of risk (691) (214) (159) (5) (429) (5) (20) (1,523)
    Equity-accounted entities 7 – – 61 59 14 – 142
    Net income on other assets 3 4 (0) (20) (1) 2 (2) (14)
    Income before tax 842 530 875 2,208 468 1,999 (563) 6,361
    Tax (191) (119) (260) (501) (97) (482) 133 (1,517)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale ope. – – – – – – – –
    Net income 651 412 615 1,707 372 1,517 (430) 4,843
    Non-controlling interests (1) (0) (89) (236) (42) (69) 6 (432)
    Net income Group Share 650 412 525 1,471 330 1,448 (424) 4,412

    Appendix 2 – Crédit Agricole S.A.: ‍ Income statement by business line

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Results par by business line, Q2-25 and Q2-24

      Q2-25
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total
                   
    Revenues 1,970 2,224 881 976 1,007 (51) 7,006
    Operating expenses (864) (1,257) (438) (597) (520) (25) (3,700)
    Gross operating income 1,106 967 442 380 487 (76) 3,306
    Cost of risk (7) (20) (235) (95) (61) (24) (441)
    Equity-accounted entities 58 10 (13) – – (24) 30
    Net income on other assets 453 0 1 1 0 0 455
    Income before tax 1,610 958 194 286 426 (125) 3,350
    Tax (249) (149) (58) (69) (129) 113 (541)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale operations – – – – 0 – 0
    Net income 1,361 810 136 218 297 (12) 2,809
    Non-controlling interests (261) (58) (22) (10) (59) (10) (420)
    Net income Group Share 1,100 752 114 208 238 (22) 2,390
      Q2-24  
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total  
                   
    Revenues 1,944 2,223 889 979 1,027 (267) 6,796
    Operating expenses (813) (1,204) (443) (591) (555) (15) (3,621)
    Gross operating income 1,131 1,019 447 389 472 (283) 3,175
    Cost of risk (2) (39) (211) (95) (72) (5) (424)
    Equity-accounted entities 33 10 29 – – (25) 47
    Net income on other assets (12) 2 (1) 2 0 24 15
    Income before tax 1,150 993 265 296 400 (289) 2,814
    Tax (283) (248) (54) (65) (117) 63 (704)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale operations – – – – – – –
    Net income 867 745 210 231 283 (226) 2,110
    Non-controlling interests (131) (51) (23) (10) (55) (12) (282)
    Net income Group Share 736 694 187 220 228 (238) 1,828

    Crédit Agricole S.A. – Results par by business line, H1-25 and H1-24

      H1-25
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total
                   
    Revenues 4,028 4,632 1,749 1,939 2,033 (118) 14,263
    Operating expenses (1,799) (2,617) (912) (1,222) (1,035) (106) (7,691)
    Gross operating income 2,229 2,015 837 717 998 (224) 6,571
    Cost of risk (17) 5 (484) (186) (128) (45) (855)
    Equity-accounted entities 86 16 23 – – (47) 77
    Net income on other assets 453 0 1 2 0 0 456
    Income before tax 2,749 2,037 376 533 870 (316) 6,250
    Tax (601) (454) (71) (181) (266) 205 (1,368)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale operations – – – – 0 – 0
    Net income 2,148 1,583 305 352 604 (111) 4,882
    Non-controlling interests (368) (108) (43) (16) (121) (13) (669)
    Net income Group Share 1,780 1,475 263 337 483 (124) 4,213
      H1-24  
    €m AG LC SFS FRB (LCL) IRB CC Total  
                   
    Revenues 3,733 4,489 1,736 1,933 2,085 (374) 13,602
    Operating expenses (1,567) (2,501) (897) (1,193) (1,060) (71) (7,289)
    Gross operating income 2,166 1,988 839 740 1,024 (445) 6,312
    Cost of risk (5) (5) (429) (214) (154) (16) (824)
    Equity-accounted entities 61 14 59 – – (46) 90
    Net income on other assets (20) 2 (1) 4 (0) 24 9
    Income before tax 2,203 1,999 468 530 870 (483) 5,587
    Tax (502) (482) (97) (119) (259) 144 (1,315)
    Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale operations – – – – – – –
    Net income 1,701 1,517 372 412 610 (339) 4,273
    Non-controlling interests (248) (101) (42) (18) (126) (7) (542)
    Net income Group Share 1,453 1,416 330 393 485 (345) 3,731

    Appendix 3 – Data per share

    Credit Agricole S.A. – Earnings p/share, net book value p/share and ROTE
                   
    €m   Q2-25 Q2-24   H1-25 H1-24  
    Net income Group share   2,390 1,828   4,213 3,731  
    – Interests on AT1, including issuance costs, before tax   (141) (83)   (270) (221)  
    – Foreign exchange impact on reimbursed AT1   4 –   4 (247)  
    NIGS attributable to ordinary shares [A] 2,252 1,745   3,947 3,263  
    Average number shares in issue, excluding treasury shares (m) [B] 3,025 3,025   3,025 3,008  
    Net earnings per share [A]/[B] 0.74 € 0.58 €   1.30 € 1.08 €  
                   
    €m         30/06/25 30/06/24  
    Shareholder’s equity Group share         75,528 70,396  
    – AT1 issuances         (8,612) (7,164)  
    – Unrealised gains and losses on OCI – Group share         872 1,305  
    Net book value (NBV), not revaluated, attributable to ordin. sh. [D]       67,787 64,537  
    – Goodwill & intangibles** – Group share         (18,969) (17,775)  
    Tangible NBV (TNBV), not revaluated attrib. to ordinary sh. [E]       48,818 46,763  
    Total shares in issue, excluding treasury shares (period end, m) [F]       3,025 3,025  
    NBV per share, after deduction of dividend to pay (€) [D]/[F]       22.4 € 21.3 €  
    TNBV per share, after deduction of dividend to pay (€) [G]=[E]/[F]       16.1 € 15.5 €  
    ** y compris les écarts d’acquisition dans les participations ne donnant pas le contrôle             
    €m         H1-25 H1-24  
    Net income Group share       4,213 3,731  
    Added value Amundi US         304 0  
    Additionnal corporate tax         -129 0  
    IFRIC         -173 -110  
    NIGS annualised (1) [N]       8,382 7,572  
    Interests on AT1, including issuance costs, before tax, foreign exchange impact, annualised [O]       -536 -689  
    Result adjusted [P] = [N]+[O]       7,846 6,884    
    Tangible NBV (TNBV), not revaluated attrib. to ord. shares – average*** (2) [J]       47,211 44,710    
    ROTE adjusted (%) = [P] / [J]       16.6% 15.4%  
    *** including assumption of dividend for the current exercise         0,0%    
                 

    (1)ROTE calculated on the basis of an annualised underlying net income Group share and linearised IFRIC costs over the year
    (2)Average of the NTBV not revalued attributable to ordinary shares. calculated between 31/12/2024 and 30/06/2025 (line [E]), restated with an assumption of dividend for current exercises

    Alternative Performance Indicators56

    NBV Net Book Value (not revalued)
    The Net Book Value not revalued corresponds to the shareholders’ equity Group share from which the amount of the AT1 issues, the unrealised gains and/or losses on OCI Group share and the pay-out assumption on annual results have been deducted.

    NBV per share Net Book Value per share – NTBV Net Tangible Book Value per share
    One of the methods for calculating the value of a share. This represents the Net Book Value divided by the number of shares in issue at end of period, excluding treasury shares.

    Net Tangible Book Value per share represents the Net Book Value after deduction of intangible assets and goodwill, divided by the number of shares in issue at end of period, excluding treasury shares.

    EPS Earnings per Share
    This is the net income Group share, from which the AT1 coupon has been deducted, divided by the average number of shares in issue excluding treasury shares. It indicates the portion of profit attributable to each share (not the portion of earnings paid out to each shareholder, which is the dividend). It may decrease, assuming the net income Group share remains unchanged, if the number of shares increases.

    Cost/income ratio
    The cost/income ratio is calculated by dividing operating expenses by revenues, indicating the proportion of revenues needed to cover operating expenses.

    Cost of risk/outstandings
    Calculated by dividing the cost of credit risk (over four quarters on a rolling basis) by outstandings (over an average of the past four quarters, beginning of the period). It can also be calculated by dividing the annualised cost of credit risk for the quarter by outstandings at the beginning of the quarter. Similarly, the cost of risk for the period can be annualised and divided by the average outstandings at the beginning of the period.

    Since the first quarter of 2019, the outstandings taken into account are the customer outstandings, before allocations to provisions.

    The calculation method for the indicator is specified each time the indicator is used.

    Doubtful loan
    A doubtful loan is a loan in default. The debtor is considered to be in default when at least one of the following two conditions has been met:

    • a payment generally more than 90 days past due, unless specific circumstances point to the fact that the delay is due to reasons independent of the debtor’s financial situation.
    • the entity believes that the debtor is unlikely to settle its credit obligations unless it avails itself of certain measures such as enforcement of collateral security right.

    Impaired loan
    Loan which has been provisioned due to a risk of non-repayment.

    Impaired (or non-performing) loan coverage ratio 
    This ratio divides the outstanding provisions by the impaired gross customer loans.

    Impaired (or non-performing) loan ratio 
    This ratio divides the impaired gross customer loans on an individual basis, before provisions, by the total gross customer loans.

    Net income Group share
    Net income/(loss) for the financial year (after corporate income tax). Equal to net income Group share, less the share attributable to non-controlling interests in fully consolidated subsidiaries.

    Net income Group share attributable to ordinary shares
    The net income Group share attributable to ordinary shares represents the net income Group share from which the AT1 coupon has been deducted, including issuance costs before tax.

    RoTE Return on Tangible Equity
    The RoTE (Return on Tangible Equity) measures the return on tangible capital by dividing the Net income Group share annualised by the Group’s NBV net of intangibles and goodwill. The annualised Net income Group share corresponds to the annualisation of the Net income Group share (Q1x4; H1x2; 9Mx4/3) excluding impairments of intangible assets and restating each period of the IFRIC impacts in order to linearise them over the year.

    Disclaimer

    The financial information on Crédit Agricole S.A. and Crédit Agricole Group for second quarter and first half 2025 comprises this presentation and the attached appendices and press release which are available on the website: https://www.credit-agricole.com/finance/publications-financieres.

    This presentation may include prospective information on the Group, supplied as information on trends. This data does not represent forecasts within the meaning of EU Delegated Act 2019/980 of 14 March 2019 (Chapter 1, article 1, d).

    This information was developed from scenarios based on a number of economic assumptions for a given competitive and regulatory environment. Therefore, these assumptions are by nature subject to random factors that could cause actual results to differ from projections. Likewise, the financial statements are based on estimates, particularly in calculating market value and asset impairment.

    Readers must take all these risk factors and uncertainties into consideration before making their own judgement.

    Applicable standards and comparability

    The figures presented for the six-month period ending 30 June 2025 have been prepared in accordance with IFRS as adopted in the European Union and applicable at that date, and with the applicable regulations in force. This financial information does not constitute a set of financial statements for an interim period as defined by IAS 34 “Interim Financial Reporting” and has not been audited.

    Note: The scopes of consolidation of the Crédit Agricole S.A. and Crédit Agricole groups have not changed materially since the Crédit Agricole S.A. 2024 Universal Registration Document and its A.01 update (including all regulatory information about the Crédit Agricole Group) were filed with the AMF (the French Financial Markets Authority).

    The sum of values contained in the tables and analyses may differ slightly from the total reported due to rounding.

    Financial Agenda

    30 October 2025                Publication of the 2025 third quarter and first nine months results
    18 November 2025        Presentation of the Medium-Term Plan
    4 February 2026                Publication of the 2025 fourth quarter and full year results
    30 April 2026                Publication of the 2026 first quarter results
    20 May 2026                2026 General Meeting
    31 July 2026                Publication of the 2026 second quarter and the first half-year results
    30 October 2026                Publication of the 2026 third quarter and first nine months results

    Contacts

    CREDIT AGRICOLE PRESS CONTACTS

    CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A. INVESTOR RELATIONS CONTACTS

    Institutional investors   investor.relations@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Individual shareholders + 33 800 000 777 (freephone number – France only) relation@actionnaires.credit-agricole.com
         
    Cécile Mouton + 33 1 57 72 86 79 cecile.mouton@credit-agricole-sa.fr
     

    Equity investor relations:

    		    
    Jean-Yann Asseraf
    Fethi Azzoug    		 + 33 1 57 72 23 81
    + 33 1 57 72 03 75    		 jean-yann.asseraf@credit-agricole-sa.fr fethi.azzoug@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Oriane Cante + 33 1 43 23 03 07 oriane.cante@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Nicolas Ianna + 33 1 43 23 55 51 nicolas.ianna@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Leila Mamou + 33 1 57 72 07 93 leila.mamou@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Anna Pigoulevski + 33 1 43 23 40 59 anna.pigoulevski@credit-agricole-sa.fr
         
         
    Debt investor and rating agency relations:  
    Gwenaëlle Lereste + 33 1 57 72 57 84 gwenaelle.lereste@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Florence Quintin de Kercadio + 33 1 43 23 25 32 florence.quintindekercadio@credit-agricole-sa.fr
    Yury Romanov + 33 1 43 23 86 84 yury.romanov@credit-agricole-sa.fr
         
         
         

    See all our press releases at: www.credit-agricole.com – www.creditagricole.info

             

    1 Closing at 4thof July
    (2)Car, home, health, legal, all mobile phones or personal accident insurance.
    (3)CA Auto Bank, automotive JVs and automotive activities of other entities        
    (4)Low-carbon energy exposures made up of renewable energy produced by the clients of all Crédit Agricole Group entities, including nuclear energy exposures for Crédit Agricole CIB.
    (5)CAA outstandings (listed investments managed directly, listed investments managed under mandate and unlisted investments managed directly) and Amundi Transition Energétique.
    (6)Crédit Agricole Group outstandings, directly or via the EIB, dedicated to the environmental transition according to the Group’s internal sustainable assets framework, as of 31/03/2025. Change of method on property compared with the outstandings reported at 30/09/2024: with the same method, the outstandings at 31/03/2025 would be €85.9 billion.
    (7)The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on a four-quarter rolling basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the past four quarters divided by the average outstandings at the start of each of the four quarters
    (8)The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on an annualised basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the quarter multiplied by four and divided by the outstandings at the start of the quarter
    (9)Average rate of loans to monthly production for April to May 2025
    (10)Equipment rate – Home-Car-Health policies, Legal, All Mobile/Portable or personal accident insurance
    (11)Reversal of the provision for Home Purchase Saving Plans: +€16.3m in Q2-25 vs. +€22m in Q2-24 in revenues (+€12.1m in Q2-25 vs. +€17m in Q2-24 in net income Group share)

    (12)Provisioning rate calculated with outstandings in Stage 3 as denominator, and the sum of the provisions recorded in Stages 1, 2 and 3 as numerator.
    (13)The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on a four-quarter rolling basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the past four quarters divided by the average outstandings at the start of each of the four quarters
    (14)The cost of risk/outstandings (in basis points) on an annualised basis is calculated on the cost of risk of the quarter multiplied by four and divided by the outstandings at the start of the quarter
    (15)See Appendixes for details on the calculation of the RoTE (return on tangible equity)
    (16)The annualised net income Group share corresponds to the annualisation of the net income Group share (Q1x4; H1x2; 9Mx4/3) by restating each period for IFRIC impacts, the effects of the additional corporate tax charge and the capital gain related to the deconsolidation of Amundi US to linearise them over the year.
    (17)In local standards
    (18)Scope: property and casualty in France and abroad
    (19)Combined property & casualty ratio in France (Pacifica) including discounting and excluding undiscounting, net of reinsurance: (claims + operating expenses + fee and commission income)/gross premiums earned. Undiscounted ratio: 97.4% (+0.1 pp over the year)
    (20)Excluding assets under custody for institutional clients
    (21)Amount of allocation of Contractual Service Margin (CSM), loss component and Risk Adjustment (RA), and operating variances net of reinsurance, in particular
    (22)Amount of allocation of CSM, loss component and RA, and operating variances net of reinsurance, in particular.
    (23)Net of reinsurance cost, including financial results
    (24)Pro forma scope effect of deconsolidated Amundi US in Q2 2024: €89m in revenues and €51m in expenses.
    (25)Excluding scope effect
    (26)Indosuez Wealth Management scope
    (27)Degroof Petercam scope effect April/May 2025: Revenues of €96m and expenses of -€71m
    (28)Q2-25 Integration costs: -€22.5m vs -€5.4m in Q2-24
    (29)Degroof Petercam scope effect over H1-25: reminder of figures for Degroof Petercam scope effect of Q1-25 revenues of €164m and expenses of -€115m
    (30)Refinitiv LSEG
    (31)Bloomberg in EUR
    (32)ISB integration costs: -€5m in Q2-25 (vs -€24.4m in Q2-24)
    (33)Net income becomes net income Group share following the purchase of minority shares in Santander by Crédit Agricole S.A.
    (34)CA Auto Bank, automotive JVs and auto activities of other entities
    (35)CA Auto Bank and automotive JVs
    (36)Lease financing of corporate and professional equipment investments in France: -7.5% in Q1-25 (source: ASF)
    (37)Increase in RWA of around +€7G primarily connected to the consolidation of the leasing activities in Q4-24
    (38)Cost of risk for the last four quarters as a proportion of the average outstandings at the beginning of the period for the last four quarters.
    (39)Net of POCI outstandings
    (40)Source: Abi Monthly Outlook, July 2025: +0.9% June/June for all loans
    (41)At 30 June 2025 this scope includes the entities CA Italia, CA Polska, CA Egypt and CA Ukraine.

    (42) Over a rolling four quarter period.
    (43)At 30 June 2025, this scope corresponds to the aggregation of all Group entities present in Italy: CA Italia, CAPFM (Agos, Leasys, CA Auto Bank), CAA (CA Vita, CACI, CA Assicurazioni), Amundi, Crédit Agricole CIB, CAIWM, CACEIS, CALEF.
    (44)Banco BPM stake -21 bps; Stake in Victory Capital: – 8 bps or –1 bp including capital gain from the deconsolidation of Amundi US; Additional threshold excess for other financial participations: -7 bps.

    (48)
    (49)

    (54)This refers to the change between the value at 30 June 2025 and the value at 1 (or 2) January 2025; the latter is the value of the variable concerned at 30 June 2025.
    (55)In March, Parliament approved the creation of a €500 billion infrastructure investment fund over 12 years. The first phase of the reform of the debt brake was also approved, allowing regions to run a structural deficit of up to 0.35% of GDP. Finally, defence spending above 1% of GDP will be exempt from the deficit calculation. The adoption of these measures has broken down barriers to financing infrastructure and defence investment that had previously seemed insurmountable.
    (56)APMs are financial indicators not presented in the financial statements or defined in accounting standards but used in the context of financial communications, such as net income Group share or RoTE. They are used to facilitate the understanding of the company’s actual performance. Each APM indicator is matched in its definition to accounting data.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-Evening Report: The Muslim world has been strong on rhetoric, short on action over Gaza and Afghanistan

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies, Australian National University; and Vice Chancellor’s Strategic Fellow, Australian National University

    When it comes to dealing with two of the biggest current crises in the Muslim world – the devastation of Gaza and the Taliban’s draconian rule in Afghanistan – Arab and Muslim states have been staggeringly ineffective.

    Their chief body, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in particular, has been strong on rhetoric but very short on serious, tangible action.

    The OIC, headquartered in Saudi Arabia, is composed of 57 predominantly Muslim states. It is supposed to act as a representative and consultative body and make decisions and recommendations on the major issues that affect Muslims globally. It calls itself the “collective voice of the Muslim world”.

    Yet the body has proved to be toothless in the face of Israel’s relentless assault on Gaza, triggered in response to the Hamas attacks of October 7 2023.

    The OIC has equally failed to act against the Taliban’s reign of terror in the name of Islam in ethnically diverse Afghanistan.

    Many strong statements

    Despite its projection of a united umma (the global Islamic community, as defined in my coauthored book Islam Beyond Borders), the OIC has ignominiously been divided on Gaza and Afghanistan.

    True, it has condemned Israel’s Gaza operations. It’s also called for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the starving population of the strip.

    It has also rejected any Israeli move to depopulate and annex the enclave, as well as the West Bank. These moves would render the two-state solution to the long-running Israeli–Palestinian conflict essentially defunct.

    Further, the OIC has welcomed the recent joint statement by the foreign ministers of 28 countries (including the United Kingdom, many European Union members and Japan) calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, as well as France’s decision to recognise the state of Palestine.

    The OIC is good at putting out statements. However, this approach hasn’t varied much from that of the wider global community. It is largely verbal, and void of any practical measures.

    What the group could do for Gaza

    Surely, Muslim states can and should be doing more.

    For example, the OIC has failed to persuade Israel’s neighbouring states – Egypt and Jordan, in particular – to open their border crossings to allow humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza, the West Bank or Israel, in defiance of Israeli leaders.

    Nor has it been able to compel Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco to suspend their relations with the Jewish state until it agrees to a two-state solution.

    Further, the OIC has not adopted a call by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and the United Nations special rapporteur on Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, for Israel to be suspended from the UN.

    Nor has it urged its oil-rich Arab members, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to harness their resources to prompt US President Donald Trump to halt the supply of arms to Israel and pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the war.

    Stronger action on Afghanistan, too

    In a similar vein, the OIC has failed to exert maximum pressure on the ultra-extremist and erstwhile terrorist Taliban government in Afghanistan.

    Since sweeping back into power in 2021, the Taliban has ruled in a highly repressive, misogynist and draconian fashion in the name of Islam. This is not practised anywhere else in the Muslim world.

    In December 2022, OIC Secretary General Hissein Brahim Taha called for a global campaign to unite Islamic scholars and religious authorities against the Taliban’s decision to ban girls from education.

    But this was superseded a month later, when the OIC expressed concern over the Taliban’s “restrictions on women”, but asked the international community not to “interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs”. This was warmly welcomed by the Taliban.

    In effect, the OIC – and therefore most Muslim countries – have adopted no practical measures to penalise the Taliban for its behaviour.

    It has not censured the Taliban nor imposed crippling sanctions on the group. And while no Muslim country has officially recognised the Taliban government (only Russia has), most OIC members have nonetheless engaged with the Taliban at political, economic, financial and trade levels.

    Why is it so divided?

    There are many reasons for the OIC’s ineffectiveness.

    For one, the group is composed of a politically, socially, culturally and economically diverse assortment of members.

    But more importantly, it has not functioned as a “bridge builder” by developing a common strategy of purpose and action that can overcome the geopolitical and sectarian differences of its members.

    In the current polarised international environment, the rivalry among its member states – and with major global powers such as the United States and China – has rendered the organisation a mere talking shop.

    This has allowed extremist governments in both Israel and Afghanistan to act with impunity.

    It is time to look at the OIC’s functionality and determine how it can more effectively unite the umma.

    This may also be an opportunity for its member states to develop an effective common strategy that could help the cause of peace and stability in the Muslim domain and its relations with the outside world.

    Amin Saikal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The Muslim world has been strong on rhetoric, short on action over Gaza and Afghanistan – https://theconversation.com/the-muslim-world-has-been-strong-on-rhetoric-short-on-action-over-gaza-and-afghanistan-262121

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Unlock More Capital, Deputy Secretary-General Urges at AGFUND Event Citing Real Leadership across Africa to Achieve Sustainable Food Security, Resilience

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI

    Following are UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed’s remarks, as prepared for delivery, at the UN Food Systems Summit+4 Stocktake (UNFSS+4) Arab Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND) side event:  “Mobilizing Investment for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2:  The Role of Public-Private Partnerships”, in Addis Ababa today:

    It is a pleasure to be with you today to confront one of the great injustices of our time, and to spotlight a response that offers hope.

    Let me start with the stark reality we all know too well.  Hunger is rising.  Over 800 million people are food insecure.  Climate shocks and conflict are battering food systems.  Inflation and instability are undermining livelihoods.

    Once again, those with the least are paying the highest price.  Behind the numbers are human potential being lost every single day.  Children whose growth is stunted, mothers who skip meals to feed their families and farmers trapped in cycles of debt when harvests fail.

    This is both a development emergency and a solvable failure.  We have the knowledge and the means, what we lack is the scale of investment needed to act decisively.  Food systems don’t stop at borders:  rivers flow across regions and markets stretch across continents. Our response must reflect that same interconnection grounded in shared responsibility. 

    We meet here in Addis Ababa, a city that has long embodied African cooperation and leadership.  There is no better place to recommit to food security and resilience.

    Food is more than a necessity.  It is also a foundation for peace and a force for unity.  In a divided world, food carries the promise of shared responsibility and shared survival.  It is with this understanding that I welcome the Global Flagship Initiative for Food Security.

    That is why I welcome the Global Flagship Initiative for Food Security.  Launched at the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP16) under Saudi leadership and supported by AGFUND and many others, this initiative offers a structured, forward-looking response to today’s urgent needs.

    The value of the Flagship lies in its design.  It brings together science and policy, local knowledge and institutional finance, Governments and field-based delivery.  Over 30 partners are already involved.

    With careful targeting and strong regional coordination, the Flagship is directing resources to the people and places that need them most — smallholder farmers, women producers and fragile ecosystems.

    This approach recognizes that sustainable food security cannot be achieved through top-down solutions alone.  It requires empowering local communities, strengthening Indigenous knowledge systems and ensuring that women — who produce the majority of the world’s food — have equal access to land, credit and decision-making power.

    This initiative is not just a vision on paper, it is already generating real momentum — through integration with the Global Drought Resilience Partnership and through collaboration with the Joint SDG Fund in countries like Ethiopia and Cameroon.  These efforts show that it’s possible to build practical, blended financing models that support action.

    We are seeing real leadership across Africa.  Countries are moving forward with national strategies, restoring land and linking action to results.  This is African leadership in motion rooted in local priorities, supported by global partners.

    Yet we must be clear-eyed about the obstacles that remain, particularly around financing.  The financing gap for food systems transformation is estimated at over $300 billion annually.

    Connected, is the fundamental inequity in how climate finance flows.  The countries most affected by climate change receive the least support, while those who have contributed least to the problem bear the greatest burden.

    The financing gap is felt most in the least developed countries and small island developing States.  We need to unlock more capital, not only from traditional sources, but also through environmental, social and governance bonds, responsible land investment and climate-aligned funds.

    Before I close, I want to acknowledge the partners who have made this possible.  Let me thank AGFUND and Dr. Nasser Al Kahtani for their leadership, the Crop Trust for hosting the Secretariat and the Arab Coordination Group for their financial and strategic backing.

    As we move forward together, we must remember what this work is really about. This initiative is a reminder that change comes from purpose, partnership and persistence.

    So, let us move forward with a shared determination.  Because food systems transformation is not only about agriculture.  It is about dignity.  It is about justice.  It is about the future we owe one another.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mining Elites in Africa 2026: It’s time to have your say

    Source: APO

    Do you know of a project, company or individual that making a difference in African mining?

    Nominations are now open for Mining Elites in Africa 2026.

    Every year Mining Elites in Africa recognises those companies and individuals who go above and beyond to ensure responsible and sustainable mining on the continent. Whether it is through financial contributions to countries and communities, protecting the environment or socio-economic development initiatives, they are creating an indelible legacy on the continent.

    Mining Elites in Africa 2026 pays tribute to these often unsung heroes. In addition, this annual publication, published by Mining Review Africa, features projects that are making a substantial contribution to growing the African mining sector.

    “Mining Elites is the perfect platform to recognise those who are truly making a meaningful difference in African mining. Through their leadership and innovations, they are ensuring that mining is sustainable and positively impacts the lives of all stakeholders, especially communities,” states Gerard Peter, Editor-in-Chief of Mining Review Africa.

    Nomination process:

    Nominations are open to all projects and leaders in the African mining minerals value chain in a number of categories. The final selection of projects and people is made by an independent advisory board composed of experienced industry figures with extensive mining knowledge across the African continent.

    The 2026 categories are:

    • Leaders
    • Future leaders
    • ESG
    • Innovation and tech
    • Projects

    How to nominate:

    This is your opportunity to publically acknowledge those companies, projects and individuals whose efforts contribute to sustainable mining that benefits all.

    To nominate simply scan the QR code or visit http://apo-opa.co/4mfrQpn

    Nominations close on 1 September 2025

    Check out the 2025 winners

    Scan the QR to read Mining Elites 2025 

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of VUKA Group.

    Media files

    .

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: More transport choices are coming to Mackworth

    Source: City of Derby

    Derby’s final mobility hub is underway, bringing more transport choices to residents in Mackworth.

    Building on the success of similar schemes elsewhere in the city, the new mobility hub will be installed at the Prince Charles Avenue shopping precinct, giving residents and local businesses greater choice when deciding how they travel around their local community.

    Mobility hubs provide greater opportunities to use sustainable and active travel methods – such as walking and cycling – making it easier to access local amenities. It is hoped that they will also draw more people into the area and enhance the local economy.

    Work on site to install the Prince Charles Avenue mobility hub is expected to be completed later this summer and will include:

    • Electric vehicle (EV) charging and dedicated parking for up to three EVs
    • An Enterprise Car Club location (subject to expected demand)
    • An accessible seating area with bike storage, designed in consultation with local businesses, ward councillors and the Police
    • Interactive information totem with live travel updates

    Councillor Carmel Swan, Cabinet Member for Climate Change, Transport and Sustainability said:

    This mobility hub will be the final piece of the jigsaw in delivering enhanced, sustainable transport choices to our communities. 

    A welcome addition to our ever-growing transport network, the Mackworth mobility hub will support our work to combat climate change through reduced pollution and congestion in Derby.

    The Mackworth mobility hub will add to the network of hubs already completed or in construction in Six Streets, Chaddesden, Allenton and Normanton/Arboretum. As well as providing alternative transport choices, the hubs help the Council to learn more about the community’s travel needs and preferences, helping to shape future schemes. 

    Mobility hubs are funded by the Department for Transport (DFT)’s Future Transport Zones Fund, which was awarded to Derby City Council to trial new and exciting developments in transport.

    Residents who would like to know more about the mobility hubs can get in touch with the Future Transport Zones team by emailing traffic.management@derby.gov.uk.
    Ends. 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Modi’s visit to Ghana signals India’s broader Africa strategy. A researcher explains

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Veda Vaidyanathan, Associate, Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard Kennedy School

    Ghana has historically been an anchor of Indian enterprise and diplomacy on the African continent.

    New Delhi and Accra formalised ties in 1957. At the time, their partnership was grounded in shared anti-colonial ideals and a common vision for post-independence development. India offered counsel on building Ghana’s institutions, including its external intelligence agency. Meanwhile, Indian teachers, technicians, and traders regularly travelled to the west African country in search of opportunity.

    The July 2025 visit of the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, to Ghana – the first by an Indian leader in over three decades – came at a critical moment for the continent. As the global order shifts towards multi-polarity, countries like Ghana are navigating a complex landscape, which includes western donors scaling back commitments. This has opened space to deepen cooperation through pragmatic, interest-driven collaborations with longstanding partners like India. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, Ghana’s President John Mahama captured the spirit of this global realignment, noting that

    as bridges are burning, new bridges are being formed.

    Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Modi’s visit offered an opportunity to both revive and recalibrate bilateral ties. The visit carried a strong economic and strategic orientation. Ghana positioned itself as a partner in areas where India holds comparative advantage, such as pharmaceuticals. Over 26% of Africa’s generic medicines are sourced from India. The Food and Drugs Authority’s (Ghana’s regulator of pharmaceutical standards) listing of foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities is dominated by Indian firms.

    Defence cooperation was also on the agenda. Ghana is looking to India for training, equipment and broader security engagement in response to rising threats from the Sahel and coastal piracy.

    This emphasis on shared security interests is underscored by Ghana’s alignment with India on counter-terrorism. President Mahama for instance has condemned the Pahalgam terrorist attacks that occurred in April, 2025.

    Reviving economic ties

    Economic ties are at the heart of this renewed engagement between the two countries. Bilateral trade currently stands at around US$3 billion. Both leaders aim to double it to US$6 billion over the next five years. Currently, Ghana enjoys a trade surplus with India. This is mainly due to gold exports, which account for over 70% of its shipments. Cocoa, cashew nuts, and timber are also key exports, while imports from India include pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles, and various industrial goods.

    India has invested more than US$2 billion in Ghana. These investments span private capital, concessional finance and grants across 900 projects. India now ranks among Ghana’s top investors. Indian firms and state-backed institutions play a key role in critical infrastructure development. Landmark projects include the 97km standard gauge Tema-Mpakadan Railway Line and the Ghana-India Kofi Annan ICT Centre, a hub for innovation and research.

    In an earlier study, I documented the perspectives of Indian entrepreneurs in Ghana. The findings underscored the country’s appeal as a land of economic opportunity. In interviews, Indian businesses highlighted Ghana’s stable political environment. An expanding consumer base, and relatively transparent regulatory framework were also mentioned. Together, these factors continue to attract investor interest.

    This economic momentum likely paved the way to pursue a closer bilateral relationship, marked by the elevation to a ‘Comprehensive Partnership’.

    While delegates in the July visit addressed issues such as financial inclusion, healthcare and agriculture, the tangible outcomes were limited. Four memoranda of understanding were signed. They cover cooperation on traditional medicine, regulatory standards and cultural exchange. The creation of a joint commission to structure and advance bilateral collaboration across priority sectors was also signed.

    Moving forward, Ghana offers India an entry point into west Africa’s resource landscape. With reserves of gold, bauxite, manganese and lithium, Ghana is well positioned to contribute to India’s needs for critical minerals. President Mahama’s invitation for investment in mineral extraction and processing aligns with India’s National Critical Mineral Mission, New Delhi is looking for supply chains for its energy transition. It creates an opportunity for Indian mining companies to expand into African markets.

    Read more: The world is rushing to Africa to mine critical minerals like lithium – how the continent should deal with the demand

    Pragmatic diplomacy

    With nearly US$100 billion in trade, cumulative investments of nearly US$75 billion, and a 3.5 million strong diaspora, the broader contours of India’s Africa policy is increasingly pragmatic and issue based.

    New Delhi’s evolving relations with Accra reflects this. It comes as Ghana is making sweeping economic reforms domestically, particularly in fiscal management and debt restructuring.

    This ambitious “economic reboot” hinges on attracting private sector investment. In this context, the Indian diaspora, already deeply embedded in Ghana’s commercial networks, is well positioned to foster stronger economic ties.

    In his address to Ghana’s Parliament, The Indian Prime Minister spoke of development cooperation that is demand driven and focused on building local capacity and creating local opportunities. This approach “to not just invest, but empower”, signals India’s growing intent to anchor relationships in mutual agency, rather than dependency.

    – Modi’s visit to Ghana signals India’s broader Africa strategy. A researcher explains
    – https://theconversation.com/modis-visit-to-ghana-signals-indias-broader-africa-strategy-a-researcher-explains-261187

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: 8 policies that would help fight poverty in South Africa’s economic hub Gauteng

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor Economic Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

    Poverty goes beyond income. It often arises when health, education and opportunities fall short of meeting people’s needs.

    Individuals are classified as impoverished when they face deprivation in one-third or more of the indicators in a multidimensional poverty index. The index reflects the various influences on socioeconomic class. These include housing, sanitation, electricity, cooking fuel, nutrition and school attendance.

    The index is one of the most comprehensive measures of poverty. The fact that the multidimentional index captures multiple dimensions enables it to reflect overlapping disadvantages. And provides a fuller picture of well-being. Other monetary measures such as income aren’t as comprehensive.

    About 18% of the world’s population are poor by the definition of the multidimentional poverty index. Sub-Saharan Africa is especially affected, with a multidimensional poverty rate nearing 59%.

    In South Africa, it is at around 40%. This means it experiences four in 10 of the dimensions of poverty.

    The province of Gauteng is South Africa’s economic hub. Nevertheless it contains pockets of severe deprivation. About 4.6% of households are poor. In some wards up to 68% are severely deprived.

    We are social scientists with research histories in food systems and livelihoods, public policy and economics of human capital. We recently conducted a study focused on Gauteng. We wanted to determine what could enable poor and vulnerable households to move out of those categories.

    We used a modelling exercise that allowed us to isolate the most relevant factors for this transition.

    The study found six factors: education, age, income, working time, medical aid and being a recipient of a low income municipal support grant. We concluded from this that attending to these six variables was the foundation for upward mobility.

    Conversely, vulnerability to economic shocks, such as job loss or food insecurity, can trigger rapid downward mobility.

    Based on our findings we make eight policy recommendations. These include boosting education and skills training, better healthcare and affordable, reliable transport.

    Range of factors

    Multidimensional poverty intersects with socioeconomic class structures. It reinforces inequality by placing individuals into hierarchical groups. These range from the affluent and middle class to the transient, vulnerable, and chronically poor.

    These disparities shape access to resources, opportunities and upward mobility.

    Lower-class households differ from middle-class and affluent (non-poor) households across multiple dimensions. These differences include income stability, consumption patterns, access to services, asset ownership, social capital and vulnerability to shocks.

    In the light of this we adopted a multidimensional poverty approach to classify households. We used various dimensions and indicators of poverty to assess the extent of deprivation and associated poverty levels.

    We calculated the deprivation score and classified households into three levels: not poor, moderate poverty (vulnerable), and severe poverty (chronically poor).

    Working time had the strongest effect. Part- or full-time work greatly lowered odds of severe poverty (chronic poverty) and moderate poverty (transient poverty). Working time refers to the duration that a person is engaged in paid employment or work-related activities. This is usually between 35 and 45 hours per week for full-time employment. And fewer than 35 hours per week for part-time employment.

    Some factors only influenced certain groups. For severe poverty, transport access, household health, food parcel reliance, household size, and skipping meals were significant. For moderate poverty, gender, food parcel reliance and skipping meals mattered. And for the vulnerable non-poor (middle class), distance from public transport was the only additional factor.

    Social grants and being part of the black population group showed little influence. Transitions and the ability to transcend poverty classes were driven mainly by direct socio-economic factors.

    These dynamics underscore the precariousness of low-income households. They also highlight the importance of targeted interventions to break cycles of poverty.

    Higher education, stable income and access to full-time work, drastically reduce the odds of remaining in severe or moderate poverty or being vulnerable. Medical aid access and municipal assistance programmes that provide free or subsidised basic services, also serve as protective factors. These help households meet essential health and welfare needs.

    However, several structural and socio-economic constraints hinder transitions out of poverty. For example, living a greater distance from public transport increases the likelihood of severe poverty and vulnerability.

    Food insecurity, measured by skipping meals or dependence on food parcels, remains a persistent marker of entrenched deprivation.

    Gender disparities suggest underlying labour market or social vulnerabilities that require targeted policy interventions. For example, male-headed households are more likely than female-headed households to be moderately poor.

    What can be done

    Escaping multidimensional poverty in Gauteng requires targeted, practical and complementary interventions. Examples include subsidised transport, decentralised clinics, or housing closer to jobs.

    This will enable grants to be translated to improved well-being.

    We suggest eight areas for improvement:

    • access to education, vocational training and digital skills. This will help to increase employment prospects

    • public works and youth entrepreneurship support. This will boost income generation

    • social protection like indigent benefits, food vouchers and subsidised medical aid

    • food security. This can be done through community gardens and nutrition programmes

    • support for female-headed households and young people

    • affordable, reliable public transport. Services also need to be decentralised

    • data-driven municipal planning to guide infrastructure and service investments

    • consistently tracking progress against defined objectives.

    The province implements multiple poverty-reduction initiatives. These include expanded public works, township economy support, food gardens, free basic services, subsidised housing, and public transport projects.

    These efforts address income, food security and mobility. But they have limited impact due to persistent barriers. This is because many, particularly young people, don’t have market-relevant skills. In addition, spatial inequality results in long, costly commutes. And housing shortages and rising food prices deepen vulnerability.

    Fragmented funding, weak coordination and inadequate data tracking also undermine progress.

    – 8 policies that would help fight poverty in South Africa’s economic hub Gauteng
    – https://theconversation.com/8-policies-that-would-help-fight-poverty-in-south-africas-economic-hub-gauteng-261388

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: People smugglers adapt to attempts to shut them down – financial sanctions won’t stop the boats

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By David Suber, Departmental Lecturer in Criminology, University of Oxford

    In the latest attempt to crack down on irregular migration, the UK government has announced a raft of international sanctions against people smugglers. The sanctions will use asset freezes, travel bans and other financial restrictions to go after businesses and individuals thought to be facilitating smuggling operations.

    The government has committed to treating irregular migration as a national security threat, to be tackled with tools drawn from the counter-terrorism playbook. But, given the supply and demand forces that drive the smuggling industry, sanctions may not be effective.

    Smuggling is, essentially, a service industry. Opportunistic entrepreneurs charge migrants a fee to enable them to cross borders they wouldn’t otherwise be able to.

    These operations rely on wide networks: suppliers of dinghies and vehicles, informal money transfer brokers, local guides skilled at avoiding detection. While the routes and logistics vary across regions, empirical research consistently shows that smuggling is usually low-skill and fragmented. It’s rarely the domain of organised, mafia-style cartels.

    This regime of sanctions and asset freezes adds a new tactic to a familiar policy toolbox. Previous Conservative governments and EU countries have treated smuggling as a form of organised crime that can only be defeated through security responses. They’ve invested in surveillance, border walls and policing at home and internationally. Evidence suggests this approach is not only ineffective – it can backfire.

    Why sanctions may miss the target

    Smugglers and migrants alike operate in highly hostile environments. Evading detection and minimising risk is essential. This has made migrant smuggling particularly adaptable to criminal justice responses.

    Take money transfers between migrants and smugglers. Smuggling fees are often handled through the informal “hawala” money transfer system. A migrant deposits funds with a broker in the departure country, who holds the money and issues a code. Only once the migrant has safely arrived at their destination is the code released to a second broker, who then pays the smuggler. Debts between hawala brokers are settled when future operations move money in the opposite direction.

    Hawala money transfers are legal in most countries. But as no funds cross borders directly, this type of informal banking lends itself well to transactions that are anonymous and untraceable. The UK’s new sanctions target hawala brokers involved in handling payments between smugglers and their clients. But, in the same way that the structures of smuggling groups have evolved and adapted in response to police or border enforcement, so will their systems to move money safely.

    Follow the money: the new sanctions take aim at the business of smuggling.
    Andrzej Rostek/Shutterstock

    On heavily policed borders such as those in the Balkans, small-scale smugglers, often migrants themselves, have formed more coordinated groups bonded by ethnicity or language. Many of the groups listed in the UK sanctions, such as the Kazawi and Tatwani groups, have been on Interpol’s radar for years.

    Even when key figures are arrested, these groups have demonstrated the ability to disband and regroup on a different border. Sometimes they go quiet while developing new strategies, only to resurface in the same areas, driven by unchanged demand in smuggling services. Hawala brokers hit by the new sanction regime are likely to close and restart operations under different names.

    How effective can UK sanctions be if the targets and their assets are not in the UK, and if their operations can quickly shift across borders and names? Unless other countries follow suit and enforce similar measures, these sanctions may amount to little more than politically symbolic.

    Supply and demand

    So long as migration policy focuses almost exclusively on “smashing the gangs” and targeting the supply side of irregular migration, smugglers and other entrepreneurs involved in facilitating it are likely to reinvent themselves and find new, more precarious ways to circumvent border restrictions.

    Unless implemented internationally, UK sanctions will do little to change this. But international counter-smuggling responses are highly dependant on the specific circumstances faced by the states involved.

    In Italy, right and left-leaning governments have pursued an anti-mafia approach to smuggling for years, with limited results. Earlier this year, Italian authorities arrested suspected trafficker Osama Elmasry Njeem, following a warrant by the International Criminal Court on charges of murder, rape and torture.

    They then released him and repatriated him to Libya, sparking a row with the ICC. Although Italy has made deals with with the Libyan government in Tripoli to stop irregular migrant boats, it appears there were concerns that his arrest could strain relations with Libyan counterparts and trigger a surge in boat arrivals from North Africa. This situation highlights the challenges that can arise with such tactics.

    The idea that cracking down on smugglers, through sanctions or criminal justice responses, will deter people from seeking their services is not supported by evidence. If anything, it increases the risks migrants must take, making journeys more dangerous but no less likely. Migration flows to Europe rise and fall in patterns driven far more by global instability and lack of legal alternatives than by changes in law enforcement.

    Including smugglers in a sanctions regime may create headlines, but it misses the bigger point: people smuggling exists because people need to move. It is a demand-led phenomenon, and it is the demand side – why people turn to smugglers in the first place – that remains largely unaddressed.

    To reduce the power and appeal of smugglers, governments need to open safe, legal pathways for migration. This would reduce reliance on illicit networks, protect vulnerable people and restore order to a system that is politically defined by routine crises.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    David Suber received funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council for his PhD in 2020-2024.

    – ref. People smugglers adapt to attempts to shut them down – financial sanctions won’t stop the boats – https://theconversation.com/people-smugglers-adapt-to-attempts-to-shut-them-down-financial-sanctions-wont-stop-the-boats-261864

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Ancient India, Living Traditions: an earnest effort to show how the art of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism is sacred and personal

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ram Prasad, Fellow of the British Academy and Distinguished Professor in the Department Politics, Philosophy and Religion, University of Leicester

    The British Museum’s Ancient India, Living Traditions exhibition brings together exhibits on the sacred art of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. It also encompasses the spread of the devotional art of these traditions to other parts of Asia.

    The exhibition speaks to religious identity and relationships. Buddhism and Jainism distinguish themselves from the vast surrounding traditions that together we call Hinduism; but they have close kinship with it in practices, beliefs and iconography. Museums that have presented sculptures in isolation have usually not attempted to narrate this complex history.

    Not all the items displayed, some going back 2,000 years, are of purely historical interest. There are representations of traditions that are continuously living in a way the gods of ancient Egypt or classical Europe are not.

    The most instantly recognisable example for visitors of such living ancient tradition is likely to be statues of the elephant-headed deity Ganesha. Visitors can see a rare and valuable 4th century sandstone Ganesha on show. They can also see a small bronze version of that ancient Ganesha that is like the kind you would find in people’s home and to which a quick prayer would be addressed every morning.

    The question of how to respect that sense of the sacred while still mounting an exhibition is a moral and aesthetic challenge that few museums (including in India) have started to address. It’s not uncommon to see such pieces wrenched from the reality of their continued practice and presented in secular art displays. Here, however, the curators have tried to make connections between “statues” on display and “icons” in temples and homes.

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    Finally, there’s the problematic history of the imperial museum and its need to reckon with its past. Most objects on display in this exhibition, and The British Museum more widely, have been presented with scarcely any acknowledgement of how they came to be acquired.

    The exhibition makes an earnest effort to tackle most of these issues.

    Ancient but not dead

    The spaces of the exhibition are structured to be respectful of the historical and contemporary sensitivities of Buddhism and Jainism. This is signalled through subtle changes of colour and the placement of translucent drapery, allowing for transitions between distinct Jain, Buddhist and Hindu displays.

    At the same time, conceptual and sensory commonalities are powerfully conveyed. The first space focuses on nature spirits and demi-deities that are shared across all the ancient traditions. The air is filled with the sound of south Asian birds and musical instruments. The explanatory labels draw attention to the percolation of iconographic features between traditions, for instance, those between the Buddha and the Jaina teachers, or the direct inclusion of the deity of learning (Sarasvati) in both Hindu and Jain worship.

    Also well presented is a final space on the spread of south Asian iconography to central, east and southeast Asia. This is a long story that needs its own telling, but can only be hinted at through some beautifully chosen figures.

    It’s the curators’ use of a community advisory panel of people who practice such traditions today that gives the information its sensitivity. Their inclusion in the exhibition’s production can be seen in a marked mindfulness that the content and symbols of these inert objects are alive and sacred to hundreds of millions.

    For example, one Ganesha from Java in Indonesia draws attention to different elements of his iconography. There is the trans-continentally stable depiction of his having a broken tusk (which, as Hindus will know, he is said to have broken off to write down the epic Mahabharata). But this Ganesha also holds a skull, which is unique to the Javanese version. The label gently points out that “various communities understood and worshipped him differently”.

    The combination of community engagement and creative presentation not only conveys a sense of respect for the traditions, but also elicits a respectful response from visitors. Those from within the tradition will note with satisfaction the description of a symbol or icon. Those from outside the traditions are invited to look at the exhibits with attention and care as they might in a cathedral.

    I saw a pair of young Indian Americans looking at a fossilised ammonite from Nepal that is taken as a symbolic representation of god for worshippers of Vishnu. They animatedly compared it to the one in their own diasporic home.

    Elsewhere in the exhibition, I caught an elderly English couple stood in wondering silence in front of a drum slab from the famous 1st century BC Amaravathi Buddhist site in south India. This slab was carved just before figural representations of the Buddha rapidly gained in popularity. Here, there are symbols associated with him, but the Buddha himself is represented by the empty seat from whence he has gone.

    How did it all get here?

    One potential interpretive danger lies in the emphasis on continuity between past objects and present realities. Hindus today from social backgrounds that did not have the privilege of reaching back to high sacred art might ask where they sit in the smoothed out historical narrative. More broadly, there is no acknowledgement of the complexity of Hindu identity and its formation across centuries, regions, social strata, languages and theologies.

    The weakest part of this exhibition’s generally innovative retelling is the faint-hearted way in which it obliquely acknowledges the dubious acquisition process of the British Museum. To say something was “collected” by a major general “while serving in the East India Company army” is hardly facing up to the question with which the exhibition boldly begins: “How did it get here?”

    This exhibition offers a powerful visual narrative of the multi-spiritual traditions of ancient India, mounted with sensitivity to their living communities today. Its immersive presentation is appealing, and the story it tells is respectful and innovative.

    The task of honest self-representation and difficult conversations on reparation remain. Within that larger imperative, Ancient India, Living Traditions is a step in the right direction. It is a direction towards addressing context, responsiveness and engagement that museums can no longer ignore.

    Ancient India, Living Traditions in on at The British Museum, London until October 19 2025

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Ram Prasad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Ancient India, Living Traditions: an earnest effort to show how the art of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism is sacred and personal – https://theconversation.com/ancient-india-living-traditions-an-earnest-effort-to-show-how-the-art-of-hinduism-buddhism-and-jainism-is-sacred-and-personal-262163

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Modi’s visit to Ghana signals India’s broader Africa strategy. A researcher explains

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Veda Vaidyanathan, Associate, Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard Kennedy School

    Ghana has historically been an anchor of Indian enterprise and diplomacy on the African continent.

    New Delhi and Accra formalised ties in 1957. At the time, their partnership was grounded in shared anti-colonial ideals and a common vision for post-independence development. India offered counsel on building Ghana’s institutions, including its external intelligence agency. Meanwhile, Indian teachers, technicians, and traders regularly travelled to the west African country in search of opportunity.

    The July 2025 visit of the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, to Ghana – the first by an Indian leader in over three decades – came at a critical moment for the continent. As the global order shifts towards multi-polarity, countries like Ghana are navigating a complex landscape, which includes western donors scaling back commitments. This has opened space to deepen cooperation through pragmatic, interest-driven collaborations with longstanding partners like India. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, Ghana’s President John Mahama captured the spirit of this global realignment, noting that

    as bridges are burning, new bridges are being formed.

    Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Modi’s visit offered an opportunity to both revive and recalibrate bilateral ties. The visit carried a strong economic and strategic orientation. Ghana positioned itself as a partner in areas where India holds comparative advantage, such as pharmaceuticals. Over 26% of Africa’s generic medicines are sourced from India. The Food and Drugs Authority’s (Ghana’s regulator of pharmaceutical standards) listing of foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities is dominated by Indian firms.

    Defence cooperation was also on the agenda. Ghana is looking to India for training, equipment and broader security engagement in response to rising threats from the Sahel and coastal piracy.

    This emphasis on shared security interests is underscored by Ghana’s alignment with India on counter-terrorism. President Mahama for instance has condemned the Pahalgam terrorist attacks that occurred in April, 2025.

    Reviving economic ties

    Economic ties are at the heart of this renewed engagement between the two countries. Bilateral trade currently stands at around US$3 billion. Both leaders aim to double it to US$6 billion over the next five years. Currently, Ghana enjoys a trade surplus with India. This is mainly due to gold exports, which account for over 70% of its shipments. Cocoa, cashew nuts, and timber are also key exports, while imports from India include pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles, and various industrial goods.

    India has invested more than US$2 billion in Ghana. These investments span private capital, concessional finance and grants across 900 projects. India now ranks among Ghana’s top investors. Indian firms and state-backed institutions play a key role in critical infrastructure development. Landmark projects include the 97km standard gauge Tema-Mpakadan Railway Line and the Ghana-India Kofi Annan ICT Centre, a hub for innovation and research.

    In an earlier study, I documented the perspectives of Indian entrepreneurs in Ghana. The findings underscored the country’s appeal as a land of economic opportunity. In interviews, Indian businesses highlighted Ghana’s stable political environment. An expanding consumer base, and relatively transparent regulatory framework were also mentioned. Together, these factors continue to attract investor interest.

    This economic momentum likely paved the way to pursue a closer bilateral relationship, marked by the elevation to a ‘Comprehensive Partnership’.

    While delegates in the July visit addressed issues such as financial inclusion, healthcare and agriculture, the tangible outcomes were limited. Four memoranda of understanding were signed. They cover cooperation on traditional medicine, regulatory standards and cultural exchange. The creation of a joint commission to structure and advance bilateral collaboration across priority sectors was also signed.

    Moving forward, Ghana offers India an entry point into west Africa’s resource landscape. With reserves of gold, bauxite, manganese and lithium, Ghana is well positioned to contribute to India’s needs for critical minerals. President Mahama’s invitation for investment in mineral extraction and processing aligns with India’s National Critical Mineral Mission, New Delhi is looking for supply chains for its energy transition. It creates an opportunity for Indian mining companies to expand into African markets.



    Read more:
    The world is rushing to Africa to mine critical minerals like lithium – how the continent should deal with the demand

    Pragmatic diplomacy

    With nearly US$100 billion in trade, cumulative investments of nearly US$75 billion, and a 3.5 million strong diaspora, the broader contours of India’s Africa policy is increasingly pragmatic and issue based.

    New Delhi’s evolving relations with Accra reflects this. It comes as Ghana is making sweeping economic reforms domestically, particularly in fiscal management and debt restructuring.

    This ambitious “economic reboot” hinges on attracting private sector investment. In this context, the Indian diaspora, already deeply embedded in Ghana’s commercial networks, is well positioned to foster stronger economic ties.

    In his address to Ghana’s Parliament, The Indian Prime Minister spoke of development cooperation that is demand driven and focused on building local capacity and creating local opportunities. This approach “to not just invest, but empower”, signals India’s growing intent to anchor relationships in mutual agency, rather than dependency.

    Veda Vaidyanathan is Fellow, Foreign Policy and Security Studies, at a leading Indian think tank.

    – ref. Modi’s visit to Ghana signals India’s broader Africa strategy. A researcher explains – https://theconversation.com/modis-visit-to-ghana-signals-indias-broader-africa-strategy-a-researcher-explains-261187

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: 8 policies that would help fight poverty in South Africa’s economic hub Gauteng

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor Economic Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

    Poverty goes beyond income. It often arises when health, education and opportunities fall short of meeting people’s needs.

    Individuals are classified as impoverished when they face deprivation in one-third or more of the indicators in a multidimensional poverty index. The index reflects the various influences on socioeconomic class. These include housing, sanitation, electricity, cooking fuel, nutrition and school attendance.

    The index is one of the most comprehensive measures of poverty. The fact that the multidimentional index captures multiple dimensions enables it to reflect overlapping disadvantages. And provides a fuller picture of well-being. Other monetary measures such as income aren’t as comprehensive.

    About 18% of the world’s population are poor by the definition of the multidimentional poverty index. Sub-Saharan Africa is especially affected, with a multidimensional poverty rate nearing 59%.

    In South Africa, it is at around 40%. This means it experiences four in 10 of the dimensions of poverty.

    The province of Gauteng is South Africa’s economic hub. Nevertheless it contains pockets of severe deprivation. About 4.6% of households are poor. In some wards up to 68% are severely deprived.

    We are social scientists with research histories in food systems and livelihoods, public policy and economics of human capital. We recently conducted a study focused on Gauteng. We wanted to determine what could enable poor and vulnerable households to move out of those categories.

    We used a modelling exercise that allowed us to isolate the most relevant factors for this transition.

    The study found six factors: education, age, income, working time, medical aid and being a recipient of a low income municipal support grant. We concluded from this that attending to these six variables was the foundation for upward mobility.

    Conversely, vulnerability to economic shocks, such as job loss or food insecurity, can trigger rapid downward mobility.

    Based on our findings we make eight policy recommendations. These include boosting education and skills training, better healthcare and affordable, reliable transport.

    Range of factors

    Multidimensional poverty intersects with socioeconomic class structures. It reinforces inequality by placing individuals into hierarchical groups. These range from the affluent and middle class to the transient, vulnerable, and chronically poor.

    These disparities shape access to resources, opportunities and upward mobility.

    Lower-class households differ from middle-class and affluent (non-poor) households across multiple dimensions. These differences include income stability, consumption patterns, access to services, asset ownership, social capital and vulnerability to shocks.

    In the light of this we adopted a multidimensional poverty approach to classify households. We used various dimensions and indicators of poverty to assess the extent of deprivation and associated poverty levels.

    We calculated the deprivation score and classified households into three levels: not poor, moderate poverty (vulnerable), and severe poverty (chronically poor).

    Working time had the strongest effect. Part- or full-time work greatly lowered odds of severe poverty (chronic poverty) and moderate poverty (transient poverty). Working time refers to the duration that a person is engaged in paid employment or work-related activities. This is usually between 35 and 45 hours per week for full-time employment. And fewer than 35 hours per week for part-time employment.

    Some factors only influenced certain groups. For severe poverty, transport access, household health, food parcel reliance, household size, and skipping meals were significant. For moderate poverty, gender, food parcel reliance and skipping meals mattered. And for the vulnerable non-poor (middle class), distance from public transport was the only additional factor.

    Social grants and being part of the black population group showed little influence. Transitions and the ability to transcend poverty classes were driven mainly by direct socio-economic factors.

    These dynamics underscore the precariousness of low-income households. They also highlight the importance of targeted interventions to break cycles of poverty.

    Higher education, stable income and access to full-time work, drastically reduce the odds of remaining in severe or moderate poverty or being vulnerable. Medical aid access and municipal assistance programmes that provide free or subsidised basic services, also serve as protective factors. These help households meet essential health and welfare needs.

    However, several structural and socio-economic constraints hinder transitions out of poverty. For example, living a greater distance from public transport increases the likelihood of severe poverty and vulnerability.

    Food insecurity, measured by skipping meals or dependence on food parcels, remains a persistent marker of entrenched deprivation.

    Gender disparities suggest underlying labour market or social vulnerabilities that require targeted policy interventions. For example, male-headed households are more likely than female-headed households to be moderately poor.

    What can be done

    Escaping multidimensional poverty in Gauteng requires targeted, practical and complementary interventions. Examples include subsidised transport, decentralised clinics, or housing closer to jobs.

    This will enable grants to be translated to improved well-being.

    We suggest eight areas for improvement:

    • access to education, vocational training and digital skills. This will help to increase employment prospects

    • public works and youth entrepreneurship support. This will boost income generation

    • social protection like indigent benefits, food vouchers and subsidised medical aid

    • food security. This can be done through community gardens and nutrition programmes

    • support for female-headed households and young people

    • affordable, reliable public transport. Services also need to be decentralised

    • data-driven municipal planning to guide infrastructure and service investments

    • consistently tracking progress against defined objectives.

    The province implements multiple poverty-reduction initiatives. These include expanded public works, township economy support, food gardens, free basic services, subsidised housing, and public transport projects.

    These efforts address income, food security and mobility. But they have limited impact due to persistent barriers. This is because many, particularly young people, don’t have market-relevant skills. In addition, spatial inequality results in long, costly commutes. And housing shortages and rising food prices deepen vulnerability.

    Fragmented funding, weak coordination and inadequate data tracking also undermine progress.

    Massimiliano Tani receives funding from Australian Research Council (unrelated to this article).

    Adrino Mazenda and Catherine Althaus do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. 8 policies that would help fight poverty in South Africa’s economic hub Gauteng – https://theconversation.com/8-policies-that-would-help-fight-poverty-in-south-africas-economic-hub-gauteng-261388

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: AFRICA/SOUTH SUDAN – National Martyrs’ Day: Bishop Hiiboro Kussala calls for peace in the country

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Wednesday, 30 July 2025

    Tombura-Yambio (Agenzia Fides) – “As a bishop, I pledge to speak out until the truth is heard. To walk with the victims and wounded families. To offer the Church as a space for reconciliation and dialogue. To pray unceasingly for peace and work side by side with all those who pursue it. I will not remain silent. I will not give up. I will be with you until peace prevails.”These are the words that Barani Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala, Bishop of Tombura-Yambio, addressed to the representatives of the South Sudanese government and all people of good will.“After four years of bloodshed, homes in flames, families destroyed, and buried dreams, our people live under plastic sheets, drink contaminated water, walk in fear, and bury their loved ones in silence. This is not a political issue, it is a humanitarian tragedy and a moral failure.”The bishop, who is also President of the Interreligious Council for the Peace Initiative in Western Equatoria State, South Sudan, launches the appeal on the occasion of Martyrs’ Day, today, July 30, 2025: “Let us not belittle their sacrifice with more blood. Let us honor them by bringing peace where there is pain and life where death has reigned.”This day, established to remember the victims and promote peace, commemorates those killed in the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023.“The cry of our brothers in Tombura has echoed for too long,” Hiiboro continues. “We do not wish to condemn, but to awaken the conscience of a nation. We urge you as pastors, fellow citizens, and children of one God. May Tombura be our turning point, a sacred place where the nation chooses healing over hatred, truth over propaganda, and hope over despair,” he added.Addressing the government of South Sudan, the bishop states: “Now is the time to act. We call on everyone, from the highest office to the smallest local leader, to act with boldness, compassion, and determination. Deploy protection forces to stop all violence and restore the rule of law. Disarm and dismantle anyone illegally possessing firearms. Open space for inclusive dialogue involving leaders, youth, women, churches, and civil society. Promptly punish hate speech, disinformation, and tribal incitement. Ensure humanitarian access and rebuild social, health, and education services.”“This is our common pain,” he says, and addressing the people of South Sudan, he adds: “Tombura is not alone. When one limb suffers, the whole body suffers. This is not a tragedy of Tombura, it is a wound of South Sudan. To the elders, rise up with wisdom and counsel. To mothers and women, be voices of healing and moral resistance. To the young, refuse to be weapons of destruction. Choose peace, build South Sudan. To religious communities, unite in truth and reconciliation. To the international community, do not look the other way. Peace needs partners. Lives must be saved.”“If we do nothing, the future is at risk. If the violence in Tombura continues, the cost will be unbearable. Entire communities will disappear. Tribal hatred will spread throughout all regions,” he warns.And he continues: “Trust in the government and in national unity will be further eroded. Generations of young people will be lost to revenge or violence. If we choose peace, it will be a new dawn for South Sudan; if we act together, with sincerity, peace will flourish. Children will return to school, families to their homes, and farmers to their fields. Trust will grow between tribes, between citizens and their government. The soul of South Sudan will be reborn not in blood, but in justice.” “May Tombura become a sign that South Sudan chooses life,” concludes Bishop Hiiboro Kussala. (AP) (Agenzia Fides, 30/7/2025)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ASIA/SOUTH KOREA – The adventure “accompanied by small prayers” of Junho Cho, “digital missionary”

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

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    by Pascale RizkSeoul (Agenzia Fides) – “Now I know. After all, even the Fathers of the Church, Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, repeated this simple phrase: to be happy, I need God, and if God is present, I am happy when I am close to him, and I am not happy when I am far away.” Thus, Korean singer and “Catholic influencer” Junho Chu describes the beating heart that now animates his life. And he reveals what every authentic Christian witness suggests: the source of salvation brought by Christ is mysterious, but accessing it is simple and within everyone’s reach.Junho shared his story and experience with the Jubilee of Catholic digital missionaries and influencers celebrated in Rome these past few days.The Happy Face of GodGrowing up until the age of 22 with no particular interest in religious doctrines and practices, he says that as a teenager he longed for happiness that could last “more than three days or two weeks.” Something that isn’t found in training courses or school curricula, in a competitive society where one’s worth and “is worth” only what one accomplishes. He believed he could achieve that happiness through success at work. But that wasn’t the case.At that time, two years before beginning his military service, Junho heard Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan speak on television, an imposing figure in Korea also for his passion for social justice (see Fides, 11/4/2025). “I was struck by his humility and the witness of the people who mourned his death in 2009.” Without believing in God, Junho saw God’s happy face reflected in those people. They had no personal successes to show off. They were grateful for the free love they had received. “So I started going to church and asked to be baptized. To be close to God, to go to Mass, to take Communion, and to pray. Junho says that a priest once told him: “Do you want something special? Then you must be sincere. If you live with perseverance and sincerity, every day of your life can be special.”Thanking the Lord (also) for TteokbokkiKorean society is based on respect for others, following a social stratification that dates back to the Cheoson Dynasty. Hierarchical respect is an integral part of everyday language and behavior. So when Junho saw a high-ranking Catholic soldier come to church and eat with the others, he was impressed by his humility. “He came to wash dishes with me in the kitchen. It seemed inconceivable to me that someone like him would do that. One day, I was eating tteokbokki (Korean rice dumplings) and I invited him. He sat with me and, clasping his hands, began to pray. I was deeply moved by this gesture. I had no idea that Catholics would stop to thank God for something as small as tteokbokki. I think my life, accompanied by small prayers, began there,” he says.”Sometimes they asked me to sing, I did it a few times, and a bishop told me I should keep singing, and this was like a blessing for the rest of my life,” adds Chu, who, along with other singers, enlivened the Digital Missionaries Jubilee Festival in Piazza Risorgimento on the evening of Tuesday, July 29, singing in his native language.Talent is from God and for GodDuring his military service, Chu embarked on a path that would lead him to his baptism in 2011. He also began participating in parish life, catechism, and choir. It was thanks to a contest on CPBC (Catholic Peace Broadcasting Corporation) that he was able to begin composing music and songs, and singing in Catholic churches. It had been his passion since childhood. The stories of missionaries such as Father Giovanni Lee Tae-seok, a Salesian missionary in South Sudan, and Bishop René Dupont, a MEP missionary who arrived in Korea in 1954 (see Fides, 11/4/2025) led him to imitate them, he shared with others the love of God he had received as a gift, even through his own talents. “That’s why I’m always happy to live as a Catholic on Instagram and YouTube.” His Christian journey, intertwined with music and singing, led Junho to accompany priests and nuns on missions in Cambodia, Zambia, and Mongolia. “The love you receive is incredibly greater than the love you give. It’s an absolute miracle and cannot be understood through the eyes of the world,” says Chu, who today continues his mission singing in Brazil.“The digital mission should not be about self-exaltation. The encounter with Jesus remains the starting point, but also the point of arrival. Our faith can also find comfort in the use of digital media, but it does not depend on them. The Mystery of Jesus’s predilection, savored in the everyday life, is far greater than the captivating power of a voice behind the screen or special effects. And it promises enjoyment and happiness incomparable to the excitement of having 100 followers or 500,000,” he concludes. (Agenzia Fides, 30/7/2025)Share:

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  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Hailing Progress to Transform Food Systems, Deputy Secretary-General Urges Stronger Collaboration to End Global Hunger, at UN Summit+4 Stocktake’s Closing Plenary

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Following are UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed’s remarks, as prepared for delivery, at the closing plenary of the Second United Nations Food Systems Summit Stocktake (UNFSS+4), in Addis Ababa today:

    Let me begin by extending my appreciation to the Government of Ethiopia for its warm hospitality, and to the Italian Government as well, for their support as Co-Hosts of this Second United Nations Food Systems Summit Stocktake.

    Over the last three days, we have engaged and heard from over 3,000 of you — leaders from Ethiopia and Italy, Kenya, Somalia, Comoros, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Cuba; the ministers from a wide range of sectors; National Convenors and other government representatives; youth, Indigenous Peoples, food producers, business, civil society, development partners; our Rome-based agencies; and the UN system.  I am particularly grateful to the resident coordinators that joined us here in Addis and will now go back to work with renewed impetus to make food systems transformation a reality.

    The energy and vitality of this movement continues to inspire.  This gathering has reminded us of the value of coming together as a global community to benefit from the perspectives and experiences of others and to shape new, bold action for the future.

    At the UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS) in 2021, in the midst of a global pandemic, we embarked on a journey to grow and catalyse energy behind an emerging movement for the transformation of our food systems to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  Too often food systems are seen as part of our challenges, when they can be one of the greatest solutions to deliver for people, planet, peace and prosperity.

    Two years ago, still grappling with the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic, facing planetary crises and the effects of new conflicts, the Call to Action from the First Stocktake of the UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS+2) in Rome appealed for inclusivity to strengthen our efforts to drive more targeted investment and mutual accountability.

    Since then, Governments have continued to shift how they govern and shape policy for food systems.  A total of 130 countries have articulated integrated, multisectoral National Pathways for Food Systems Transformation and here again; I want to acknowledge the incredible contribution of Sir David Nabarro.

    In 168 countries, nationally determined contributions are now reflecting the critical role of food and agriculture in reducing greenhouse gas emissions as we seek to adapt and transform.

    More than 170 countries are implementing school meal programmes that support child nutrition, often connecting with local producers and contributing to regenerative production practices.  At the subnational level, many cities are leading the way in reducing food waste and strengthening local supply chains.

    I am proud of what we have achieved.  We have heard powerful stories of progress and rising ambition since 2021 from a diverse ecosystem of partners, who are reforming policies, championing local innovation and digitalization, mobilizing investments and partnerships and empowering women and youth.

    And when it comes to our young people, there is increased understanding that ensuring youth-inclusive and youth-led food systems transformation is important both for enhancing youth welfare and building sustainable and resilient food systems.

    The food systems movement has taken root in global and regional agreements — from the Twenty-Eighth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) Declaration to initiatives emerging from the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20) to regional agreements, such as the Kampala Declaration earlier this year.

    These are powerful commitments to transform food systems for people and the planet that you have helped inspire.  Thanks to your collective work and efforts we are better equipped to meet our ambition.

    You are strengthening coalitions and launching new initiatives to help drive our work, including:

    • The Food Systems Accelerator, launched by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), GAIN and the UN Food Systems Coordination Hub, will support countries to turn strategies into financed, scalable change.
    • Through greater uptake of the Financial Flows to Food Systems framework, co-developed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Bank, we can help Governments design more effective, tailored financing strategies.
    • Business engagement — co-led by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Global Compact and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development — broke new ground.  These efforts culminated in a Business Compendium of 15 investment-ready models, showing how business is shifting from commitment to implementation.
    • As a result of the investment pitch for Cameroon, the Global Flagship Initiative for Food Security has announced their intent to partner with the Joint SDG Fund to significantly scale up existing programmes.  The launch for this large-scale commitment will take place in New York this September 2025.
    • The Convergence Initiative helps drive integration of food systems transformation and climate action for accelerated sustainable development and represents a useful resource for countries to navigate competing policy choices with partners.
    • Investments in critical sectors, including those under the Mattei Plan for Africa, are mobilizing public-private partnerships and catalysing private sector investment.
    • The UNFSS+4 Youth Declaration, crafted by more than 3,000 youth from all over the world, called for inclusive, participatory decision-making in food systems, climate justice and intergenerational collaboration.
    • The UNFSS Coalitions of Action demonstrated that they are dynamic vehicles for food systems transformation, mobilizing diverse stakeholders across sectors and scales to deliver impact aligned with national priorities.

    With just five years until 2030, it is encouraging to see that the world remains committed to the realization of the 2030 Agenda.

    As we conclude this Stocktake, we must acknowledge that we met in the face of challenges that test our moral values and threaten the future sustainability of our planet, underscoring the urgency of our work together.

    The release of the 2025 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World Report last night confirmed:  hunger and malnutrition persist.  Climate shocks, conflict, debt and inequality are widening the cracks in our systems.

    It is estimated that between 638 and 720 million people — a bit less than 1 in 10 people in the world — faced hunger in 2024. 2.6 billion people are still unable to afford a healthy diet.  Only about one third of children aged 6 to 23 months and two thirds of women aged 15 to 49 years achieved minimum dietary diversity globally.

    People’s access to food in conflict zones is highly constrained and — in some instances — attempts to access humanitarian relief has led to injury and death.  Whole communities experience man-made food insecurity and malnutrition, with extreme long-term consequences for their children.

    Farmers everywhere are facing unprecedented adverse climate impacts, threatening livelihoods and food security.  Developing economies are still coping with impacts of inflation, severe fiscal constraints, debt challenges and the high cost of capital.  Looking ahead, 512 million people are still projected to be facing hunger in 2030, of whom nearly 60 per cent will be in Africa.

    As we consider the pathway to 2030, peace and respect for human rights must anchor our ambition.  Every person in our world — rich or poor, young or old — has the right to food that is accessible, affordable, safe and nutritious. Present and future generations are depending on our choices.  Only through inclusive dialogue and genuine partnerships can countries and communities ensure faster and more effective progress.

    As we leave this Stocktake and take what we achieved here in Addis back home and to other milestones, clear points of emphasis have been identified:

    First, we must act urgently to summon the funding, innovations and global solidarity to build the food-secure and climate-resilient future that every person, everywhere, needs and deserves.  The dramatic reduction in life-saving humanitarian funding to respond to these needs must be immediately reversed and safe access to life-saving humanitarian support granted.

    Second, is to deepen the implementation of National Pathways for Food Systems Transformation.  The effective and meaningful participation of all relevant stakeholders is a priority, with particular attention to involving family farmers, front-line food workers, women, youth, Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

    Third, we must unlock finance and investment.  That means mobilizing domestic resources and investments at scale for all dimensions of food systems transformation.  It also means scaling up finance and investment by multilateral development banks, international financial institutions, and public development banks behind country priorities.

    And we have work to do to scale up private sector investment in agriculture and food systems.  This should include the small and medium-sized enterprises that serve as a backbone of our food systems interfacing with millions of food producers and consumers.

    Fourth, we must continue the drive for an integrated approach.  We need to simultaneously pursue policy measures that focus on equity and resilience through linking environmental, economic and social dimensions of food systems.  Policies should be rooted in local culture, communities and traditional knowledge to help guide approaches that can accelerate transformation and enhance self-reliance.

    Fifth, we must continue to leverage science, technology and knowledge.  Science and innovation are prerequisites for food systems transformation and can support alignment of health, agriculture, climate, biodiversity and economic objectives and policies.  Strong science-policy-society interfaces are essential and must appreciate traditional knowledge.

    New technologies, such as artificial intelligence, are changing our economies and our societies.  The road ahead demands we leverage the appropriate and responsible use of technology to ensure prosperity for all in a healthy and liveable planet.  The digital public infrastructure needs more investment to ensure the connectivity of our rural communities.

    And, finally, we must connect with our future.  I agree with our young people — they are not merely future beneficiaries of food systems change, they are active co-leaders in transformation.  Policies should enhance opportunities for young people to create, innovate and thrive.

    On the road to 2030, there will be important milestones that the outcomes of UNFSS+4 will inform and in which this movement will engage.  These include the World Social Summit, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP30, UN Convention on Biological Diversity COP17 and the 2027 SDG Summit.

    UNFSS+4 has reinforced the value of a dedicated space to foster collaboration, deepen systems approaches and encourage the emergence of food systems whose purposes are at the heart of the 2030 Agenda.

    The UN Food Systems Coordination Hub will continue to advance progress at country level, through our resident coordinators and country teams, accompanying National Convenors and collaborating with other partners.  Our movement has shown what is possible when we work together in deliberate ways across sectors, stakeholders and countries with a shared purpose.

    I call on Governments and people everywhere to build on what has been accomplished and continue to work together for peace and to realize the vision of the 2030 Agenda.  Let’s continue to lead the way — together.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –