Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
TIANJIN, June 30 — The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Digital Economy Forum will be held in north China’s Tianjin Municipality from July 10 to 11, its organizers announced on Monday.
Themed “New Bonds in the Digital Economy, New Horizons for Cooperation,” the forum aims to expand new development space for the SCO and ensure digital dividends benefit people across the region.
Over 600 participants from China and abroad will discuss data circulation and trade, industrial digitalization, digital infrastructure, AI applications, smart cities, and digital talent development — key areas of common interest to SCO members.
The event is co-organized by the National Data Administration (NDA) and the Tianjin municipal government.
Speaking at a press conference, Yu Ying, deputy director of the NDA, said that China places great importance on international cooperation on the digital economy.
Since the establishment of the NDA in October 2023, China has signed memorandums of understanding on digital economy cooperation with 26 countries, including Russia, Brazil, Hungary, Nigeria and Malaysia.
China has achieved positive progress in developing the digital economy in recent years, with the added value of its core digital economy industries accounting for about 10 percent of its GDP by the end of 2024, Yu said.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
TIANJIN, July 1 (Xinhua) — The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Forum on Digital Economy will be held in north China’s Tianjin City from July 10 to 11.
The event, entitled “New Ties of the Digital Economy, New Horizons of Cooperation,” will aim to highlight the role of the digital economy as a hub and driving force in creating a new space for the development of the SCO and ensuring the availability of digital dividends for the population of the organization’s member states, the organizers said.
More than 600 participants from China and abroad are expected to discuss topics of common interest: data circulation and trade, industrial digitalization, digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence applications, smart cities and digital talent development.
The forum was organized by the State Data Administration (SDA) of the People’s Republic of China and the Tianjin Municipal Government.
China attaches great importance to international cooperation in the digital economy, Yu Ying, deputy head of the department, said at a press conference on Monday. Since the establishment of the GUD in October 2023, China has signed memorandums of understanding on cooperation in the digital economy with 26 countries, including Russia, Brazil, Hungary, Nigeria and Malaysia.
In recent years, China has made positive progress in developing its digital economy, with the added value created by key digital industries accounting for 10 percent of the country’s GDP by the end of 2024, Yu Ying said. -0-
The IMF Executive Board today concluded the 2025 Article IV consultation and completed the eighth review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) for Guinea-Bissau. The completion of the review allows for an immediate disbursement of SDR 4.73 million (about US$ 6.5 million), bringing total disbursement under the arrangement to SDR 35.04 million (about US$ 48.1 million)
Program performance was mixed. Seven out of nine Quantitative Performance Criteria and three out of four Structural Benchmarks for end-December 2024 were met. The continuous Structural Benchmark on debt service payments was met while the continuous Structural Benchmark on the expenditure committee (COTADO) was missed.
Growth is expected to reach 5.1 percent in 2025 while inflation should average 2 percent. The current account deficit is expected to narrow to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2025, reflecting better terms of trade. The authorities are committed to achieving a fiscal deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP in 2025, to put public debt on a firm downward trajectory. The economic outlook is positive but remains subject to significant domestic and external risks.
Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded today the 2025 Article IV consultation[1] and completed the eighth review under Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for Guinea-Bissau. The three-year arrangement, approved on January 30, 2023, aims to secure debt sustainability, improve governance, and reduce corruption, while creating fiscal space to foster inclusive growth. The Executive Board granted an augmentation of access (140 percent of quota or SDR 39.76 million) on November 29, 2023. The completion of the eighth review enables the disbursement of SDR 4.73 million (about US$ 6.5 million) to help meet the country’s balance-of-payments and fiscal financing needs. This brings total disbursement under the arrangement to SDR 35.04 million (about US$ 48.1 million). The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]
Program performance was mixed. Seven out of nine Quantitative Performance Criteria and three out of four Structural Benchmarks for end-December 2024 were met. The continuous Structural Benchmark on debt service payments was met while the continuous Structural Benchmark on the expenditure committee (COTADO) was missed. In completing the eighth review, the Executive Board granted waivers for the non-observance of quantitative performance criteria based on corrective actions taken by the authorities [including the revenue and expenditure measures adopted as prior actions for the review], approved the authorities’ request for modification of performance criteria and indicative targets, and completed the financing assurance review. The Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for the program extension until July 29, 2026, and rephasing of access to provide them with sufficient time to implement fiscal consolidation policies supported by the ECF program.
Economic growth is projected to reach 5.1 percent in 2025, supported by strong exports and investments, while inflation is expected to decelerate and average 2 percent. The current account deficit should narrow to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2025, reflecting a significant improvement in Guinea-Bissau’s terms of trade. The authorities are committed to achieving a fiscal deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP in 2025 to put public debt on a firm downward trajectory. While the direct impact of recent global trade tensions on Guinea-Bissau is limited, the economy remains subject to significant downside risks amid a challenging socio-political climate in an election year and capacity constraints. The 2025 Article IV consultation discussions focused on policies aimed at supporting economic diversification to reduce dependency on cashew nuts, maintaining fiscal sustainability through domestic revenue mobilization, and bolstering social protection and human capital to promote inclusive growth.
Following the Executive Board discussion, Mr. Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:
“The economy of Guinea-Bissau has been resilient, supported by strong investment spending. While growth is projected to continue around its potential of 4½-5 percent over the medium term, significant challenges remain. In particular, the high export dependency on cashew nuts and the high risk of debt distress leave the country vulnerable to adverse changes in the international environment. Against this background, the authorities are focused on policies designed to diversify the economy and broaden the export base, including by supporting additional growth sectors such as mining and fishing.
“Achieving the fiscal consolidation target for 2025 is essential to reduce public debt vulnerabilities. In this context, the authorities remain committed to containing domestic primary spending within the 2025 budget and to maintain strict control over the wage bill. This is being supported by strong expenditure controls, including by ensuring that project disbursements are thoroughly verified and discretionary spending remains within agreed allocations. Measures to boost revenue mobilization to bring tax collection closer to its potential through a combination of tax policy measures and revenue administration reforms are vital to create fiscal space to support economic development while reducing fiscal risks.
“Good progress has been made in addressing financial sector vulnerabilities. The recent approval by the regional Banking Commission for the purchase offer for the undercapitalized bank, and the authorities’ decision to divest the government’s stake in the bank, are important steps in reducing systemic financial sector risks.
“Boosting inclusive growth calls for implementing sustained social protection programs to protect the poor, diversifying the economy, strengthening the business environment and governance, and improving the efficiency of education and health spending. Broadening the coverage of social protection programs and mainstreaming them within government structures would help reduce poverty indicators. At the same time, progressively reducing broad-based subsidies and moving towards more targeted programs would also boost the impact of social spending.”
Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed the resilience of the economy and the significant progress in infrastructure development since the last Article IV consultation. Noting the mixed performance under the ECF and significant downside risks, they welcomed the strong corrective measures that have been implemented as prior actions for the eighth ECF review. They supported the authorities’ request for a six-month extension of the ECF, to help anchor the fiscal targets for the whole of 2025 and reinforce the commitment to fiscal consolidation.
Given the high risk of debt distress, Directors underscored the critical importance of sustained fiscal consolidation and further reinforcing debt management to ensure that the debt to GDP ratio remains on a downward trajectory. They encouraged the authorities to boost revenue mobilization through tax policy and tax administration measures, thereby creating fiscal space for priority social and development spending while strengthening debt sustainability. They called for reinforcing expenditure controls and strengthening public financial management to contain the wage bill and prevent the recurrence of spending overruns. Continuing to refrain from nonconcessional borrowing while keeping further concessional borrowing within program targets remains important. Fiscal risks from the public utility company should also be addressed, including by speeding up its revenue mobilization.
Directors welcomed the approval of the sale of the undercapitalized bank, which paves the way for the government’s disengagement. They called for a swift capitalization of the bank by its new owners to strengthen financial sector resilience.
Directors stressed the need for sustained structural reforms to underpin macroeconomic stabilization and boost growth. They highlighted the importance of efforts to strengthen the business environment, remove market distortions, and reduce informality. Diversifying the economy, notably in sectors with potential such as fishing, mining, and traditional agriculture, remains critical for inclusive growth and reducing dependence on cashew exports. They urged the authorities to expedite steps to strengthen governance, anti-corruption, and AML/CFT standards. They called for reforms to strengthen procurement transparency and enhance the robustness of the audit function, to help improve public sector transparency and efficiency.
Directors positively noted the authorities’ efforts to address gaps in the provision of macroeconomic data.
It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Guinea Bissau will be held on a 24-month cycle in accordance with the Executive Board decision on consultation cycles for members with Fund arrangements.
Population (2024): 2.0 million Per capita GDP (2024): US$ 1,104
Main export product: cashew nuts Key export markets: India, Vietnam
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
Prel.
Proj.
Proj.
Output
Real GPD growth (%)
4.6
5.2
4.8
5.1
5.0
Prices
Inflation (annual average, %)
7.9
7.2
3.7
2.0
2.0
Central government finances
Revenue and grants (% GDP)
15.2
13.7
13.1
16.1
15.7
Expenditure (% GDP)
21.3
21.9
20.4
19.5
19.2
Fiscal balance (% GDP)
-6.1
-8.2
-7.3
-3.4
-3.5
Public debt (% GDP)
80.7
79.4
82.2
78.5
76.3
Money and credit
Broad money (% change)
3.5
-1.1
6.2
5.6
5.4
Credit to economy (% change)
23.5
-9.4
-12.2
14.4
13.8
Balance of payments
Current account (% GDP)
-8.6
-8.6
-8.2
-5.8
-5.0
FDI (% GDP)
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
WAEMU reserves (US$ billions)
25.2
26.1
…
…
…
External public debt (% GDP)
39.0
35.4
34.7
32.0
30.9
Exchange rate
CFAF/US$ (average)
622.4
606.5
606.2
…
…
Sources: Guinea-Bissau authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections
[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.
[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/guinea-bissau page.
[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.
The Board of Directors of the African Development Bank Group has approved approximately €301 million to support Morocco’s economic resilience and drive job creation. The funding will back two key initiatives: the Entrepreneurship Support and Financing Programme for Job Creation (PAFE-Emplois) and the second phase of Economic Governance and Climate Resilience (PGRCC II).
With €181.8 million in funding, PGRCC II aims to boost the Moroccan economy and strengthen its resilience to external shocks, particularly climate change. It will support competitiveness, private investment and economic resilience by modernizing the water and energy sectors. This programme will also contribute to consolidating Morocco’s new development model, in particular by promoting investment under the new Investment Charter.
The PAFE-Emplois programme, backed by €119 million, will promote job creation by developing entrepreneurship and very small and medium-sized enterprises (VSEMEs). It will help establish a results-oriented culture, particularly in terms of employment impact. Its objectives are to support public support mechanisms for entrepreneurs, finance inclusive entrepreneurship, strengthen incentive mechanisms for VSEs and support innovative operational approaches to employment. This project will support the new roadmap for employment to promote job creation and entrepreneurship.
‘Together, these two new operations work in synergy and complement each other to strengthen their impact,’ said Achraf Tarsim, Country Manager for Morocco at the African Development Bank Group. They combine their objectives to consolidate the economy’s competitiveness, strengthen its resilience to shocks and boost investment and entrepreneurship. These are all levers for creating opportunities and jobs for young people and women. “
For more than half a century, the African Development Bank Group has mobilised nearly €15 billion to finance more than 150 projects and programmes in the Kingdom. Its interventions cover strategic sectors such as transport, social protection, water and sanitation, energy, agriculture, governance and the financial sector.
The African Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have signed an agreement strengthening their collaboration on sustainable economic development, designed to boost infrastructure development and economic opportunities across the African continent.
The Memorandum of Understanding, which builds on an earlier one in 2018, was signed by African Development Bank president, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, and AIIB President and Chair of the Board of Directors Jin Liqun on Saturday 28 June. The signing took place on the sidelines of a meeting of Heads of Multilateral Development Banks held in Paris, France, the same day.
The agreement outlines continued collaboration from both parties in six priority areas, aligned with the Bank Group’s Ten-Year Strategy 2024–2033 as well as AIIB’s Corporate Strategy and its Strategy on Financing Operations in Non-Regional Members. The areas are:
(i) Green infrastructure
(ii) Industrialization
(iii) Private capital mobilization including Public – Private Partnerships
(iv) Cross-border-connectivity
(v) Digitalization; and
(vi) Policy-based financing
The MOU will promote among other things, co-financing, co-guaranteeing and other forms of joint participation in financial assistance for development projects primarily in sustainable infrastructure. The African Development Bank and AIIB’s existing cooperation in this area, includes providing guarantees to support the issuance of Egypt’s first Sustainable Panda Bond in 2023, valued at RMB 3.5 billion.
This historic issuance—backed by guarantees from both AfDB and AIIB—marked the first African sovereign bond placed in the Chinese interbank bond market. The guarantees provided by the two triple-A-rated multilateral banks were instrumental in de-risking the transaction, enabling Egypt to secure competitive terms and attract investor confidence.
“This partnership continues to be an effective pathway to provide economic development for our member countries, especially in infrastructure. By reaffirming today, we are boosting energy access by accelerating Mission 300 which is targeting to connect 300 million people to electricity by 2030,” Dr Adesina said.
Mr. Jin Liqun remarked: “The renewal of our partnership with the African Development Bank reflects AIIB’s commitment to supporting sustainable development beyond Asia. Through this collaboration, we can leverage our combined expertise to deliver transformative projects that will benefit millions across the continent and create prosperity through quality infrastructure investment.”
About the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB):
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a multilateral development bank dedicated to financing “infrastructure for tomorrow,” with sustainability at its core. AIIB began operations in 2016, now has 110 approved members worldwide, is capitalized at USD100 billion and is AAA-rated by major international credit rating agencies. AIIB collaborates with partners to mobilize capital and invest in infrastructure and other productive sectors that foster sustainable economic development and enhance regional connectivity.
Bollywood star Aamir Khan’s return to the big screen after a three-year hiatus has been far from ordinary. Sitaare Zameen Par (2025) which translates to “stars on Earth”, is the first major Bollywood production to feature a mostly neurodivergent cast.
A remake of the 2018 Spanish film Campeones, the story follows a mouthy, knuckle-headed basketball coach, Gulshan (Aamir Khan), who is put in charge of a team of players with intellectual disabilities.
The film slowly grows into itself, much like its characters, but ultimately delivers what the trailer promises: a heartwarming, humorous and uplifting celebration of our individual differences.
In an era of blockbuster spectacles, Aamir Khan Productions brings back a kind of Bollywood storytelling we haven’t seen in a while – something sincere, gentle and quietly revolutionary.
Who is Aamir Khan?
Aamir Khan was born in Mumbai in 1965, and started his acting career as a child actor in his uncle’s film Yaadon Ki Baaraat (1973).
Khan is now one of Bollywood’s most enduring and respected figures. He is one of the iconic “three Khans”, alongside Shah Rukh Khan and Salman Khan (the three are unrelated), who have dominated Indian cinema since the 1990s.
But unlike his Khan counterparts, Aamir Khan has carved a unique career path built on both commercial success and socially-driven storytelling.
He is known for championing social causes through cinema. In one 2015 article, media studies professor Vamsee Juluri referred to him as a “national conscience figure”.
Khan’s films don’t just entertain; they challenge norms and often spark national conversations on important issues.
From producing Lagaan: Once Upon a Time in India (2001), India’s Oscar-nominated colonial-era sports epic, to his directorial debut Taare Zameen Par (2007), a moving portrait of a child with dyslexia, Khan’s work often brings underrepresented stories to the mainstream.
Lagaan follows farmers from a small Indian village under British colonial rule. The British challenge the farmers to a game of cricket, in exchange for an exemption from paying the land tax (‘lagaan’). IMDb
His film PK (2014) challenges religious dogma. Meanwhile, Dangal (2016) is a boundary-pushing film based on real-life female wrestlers from rural India, and is also Bollywood’s highest-grossing film of all time.
Beyond the box office, Khan has hosted the TV show Satyamev Jayate (2012–14), which is also the national emblem of India, meaning “truth alone triumphs”.
This show tackles various topics considered taboo in Indian societies, including female feticide, domestic violence and caste discrimination. It has reached millions of households, and even ignited parliamentary debates.
Khan is also popular in other countries, including China, where his films 3 Idiots (2009), Dangal (2016) and Secret Superstar (2017) were massive hits that resonated with audiences for their universal themes.
In Dangal (2016), Mahavir (Aamir Khan) trains his two daughters in wrestling. IMDb
Sitaare Zameen Par marks his return following the commercial underperformance of Laal Singh Chaddha (2022), an Indian remake of Forrest Gump (1994).
Sitaare (stars) who make the film shine
Directed by R.S. Prasanna, Sitaare Zameen Par enjoyed a strong opening weekend at the box office.
It stars ten individuals with special needs as they prepare for a basketball tournament under the direction of their coach (Khan). This plot alone makes the film a significant entry to Indian cinema, which often ignores or misrepresents disability.
The neurodivergent stars of Sitaare Zameen Par are aged between 18 and 42. Aamir Khan Productions.
Despite early online trolling and negativity, the film depicts its neurodivergent characters not as victims, or “inspirations”, but simply as people with dreams, struggles and joy.
One line captures this beautifully: “Everyone sticks to their own normal. We each have our own normal.”
Aamir Khan, now 60, plays a key role in the film, but doesn’t dominate it. Instead, his younger co-stars shine. The result is a healing film that celebrates inclusion, while being full of joy and humanity.
Stories that matter
No film is perfect. But it’s hard to dislike a film made with so much compassion.
Bollywood as an industry has increasinglyleaned into action-packed blockbusters, as well as nationalist and Hindu-centred narratives (such as in the 2022 film Brahmāstra).
While many of these offer thrills, few deliver the kind of emotional and social depth that once defined Hindi cinema’s global appeal. Much like Taare Zameen Par – a spiritual prequel to the new release – did 18 years ago, Sitaare Zameen Par invites the audience to slow down and reflect.
In Taare Zameen Par (2007), Khan plays a neurotypical teacher who helps a student with dyslexia. IMDb
It prompts neurotypical viewers to see people with Down’s syndrome as part of the same emotional universe as them – and to laugh with, not at them.
In an interview, Khan explains how the film goes further than just neurodivergent representation, to participation:
In [Taare Zameen Par], it’s the teacher, Nikumbh, a supposedly neuro-typical person, who helps the child with dyslexia. In this film, ten neuro-atypical people are helping the coach, Gulshan. I feel Sitare takes the discourse of the first film ten steps ahead, especially in our country where people need to be sensitised to the topic of neurodivergence.
Last week, India’s president, Droupadi Murmu, attended a special screening and met the cast. The visit sent a clear messsage: stories like this matter.
With Sitaare Zameen Par, Aamir Khan returns to what he does best: using film as both a mirror and message for Indian society. While it won’t change the world overnight, it will make viewers see the world, and each other, a little differently.
Yanyan Hong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The IMF Executive Board today completed the second review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for Togo, allowing the authorities to draw about SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 60.5 million). The Executive Board approved the 42-month ECF arrangement in March 2024 and concluded the first review in December 2024.
Growth has remained robust, and inflation has continued to slow. The medium-term economic outlook is favorable, with sustained robust growth, but elevated risks remain.
Implementation of the IMF-supported program has been broadly satisfactory: the authorities met all quantitative targets at end-December 2024 except for the performance criterion on the fiscal balance, and they have met all but one structural benchmark due since the completion of the first ECF review.
Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the second review of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for Togo. The Board’s decision enables the immediate disbursement of about SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 60.5 million), which will be used for budget support. The ECF-arrangement provides overall financing of SDR 293.60 million (about US$ 403.4 million) on favorable terms.
The IMF approved the ECF arrangement in March 2024 to help the authorities address the legacies of shocks experienced since 2020, notably the COVID pandemic and the increase in global food and fuel prices. The Togolese authorities were able to lessen the impacts of these shocks on the Togolese population, but this came at the price of large fiscal deficits and a rapidly rising public debt burden. The IMF-supported government program aims to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit fiscal and financial sector risks. The IMF Executive Board completed the first ECF review in December 2024.
The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth. Economic growth reached an estimated 5.3 percent in 2024 and is projected at 5.2 percent in 2025 and 5.5 percent per year thereafter, according to IMF staff projections, barring major adverse shocks. Headline inflation eased to 2.6 percent in April 2025 and core inflation (which excludes the prices of energy and fresh products) fell to 1.3 percent (annual averages).
However, the outlook is subject to high risks. In particular, insecurity from the presence of terrorist groups at the country’s northern border continues, putting pressure on spending. The authorities face challenging trade-offs between the need to achieve fiscal consolidation to lower the debt burden and the need to maintain security, enhance inclusion, and support growth.
Implementation of the IMF-supported program has been broadly satisfactory. The authorities met all quantitative targets at end-December 2024 except for the performance criterion on the fiscal balance. A notable success has been that the authorities raised tax revenue in 2024 as planned and pushed non-tax revenue beyond expectations. At the same time, higher-than-budgeted spending pushed debt higher. The authorities also met all but one structural benchmark due since the completion of the first ECF review, thanks to public financial management and banking sector reforms.
At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:
“The authorities have implemented the IMF-supported program in an overall satisfactory manner in an environment marked by continued security challenges, tight financing conditions, and elevated global uncertainty. Among other achievements, the authorities mobilized tax revenue in line with targets, while non-tax revenue exceeded projections.
“Nonetheless, progress on fiscal consolidation has been slower than programmed due to operations the authorities recorded below the line, resulting in faster-than-expected debt accumulation. The authorities’ efforts to address this development, in particular the publication of an innovative note on budget execution and debt accumulation, are welcome.
“Against this background, the authorities are encouraged to redouble their efforts at fiscal consolidation while preserving growth and strengthening inclusion. The IMF approves the authorities’ request for a limited relaxation of the fiscal deficit target for 2024 and for delaying the goal of lowering the present value of debt below 55 percent of GDP by one year, to 2027. These modifications appropriately balance the need to respond to security threats against the need to strengthen debt sustainability.
“Further, the authorities are encouraged to continue efforts to enhance revenue while making taxation more efficient, supported by a timely elaboration of a medium-term revenue mobilization strategy. Reforms to improve the efficiency of spending and strengthen the effectiveness of the social safety net, including phasing out fuel subsidies, will also be important. Further, it will be important to strengthen electricity and water provision, including raising tariffs to ensure cost recovery in combination with measures to protect the most vulnerable.
“The IMF welcomes the authorities’ efforts to reduce financial sector and fiscal risks by recapitalizing the remaining state-owned bank, which have boosted the bank’s compliance with regulatory norms. Further efforts will be needed to address the remaining breaches of regulatory norms and to restructure the bank’s operations to ensure its stability and profitability.
“Finally, efforts to strengthen governance will be critical for nurturing the business environment and supporting sustainable growth. The authorities’ commitment to publishing the planned Governance Diagnostic Assessment is very welcome. The authorities should also align asset and income declarations regime with international standards.”
Togo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023–27
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
Estimates
Projections
Real GDP
5.6
5.3
5.2
5.5
5.5
Real GDP per capita
3.1
2.8
2.7
3.0
3.0
GDP deflator
2.9
2.2
2.0
2.0
2.0
Consumer price index (annual average)
5.3
2.9
2.3
2.0
2.0
GDP (CFAF billions)
5,507
5,927
6,360
6,843
7,364
Exchange rate CFAF/US$ (annual average level)
606
…
…
…
…
Real effective exchange rate (appreciation = –)
-8.2
…
…
…
…
Terms of trade (deterioration = –)
2.5
-0.4
-0.3
0.9
0.6
Monetary survey
Net foreign assets
2.0
1.3
3.6
2.4
2.3
Net credit to government
1.2
8.6
2.6
-1.3
-0.1
Credit to nongovernment sector
2.9
3.6
1.4
7.4
7.0
Broad money (M2)
6.5
8.5
7.3
7.6
7.6
Velocity (GDP/end-of-period M2)
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
Investment and savings
Gross domestic investment
28.0
26.8
25.6
24.4
25.3
Government
11.5
10.1
8.5
7.1
7.8
Nongovernment
16.5
16.7
17.1
17.3
17.5
Gross national savings
24.0
23.7
23.2
23.0
24.3
Government
4.8
2.7
4.6
4.1
4.8
Nongovernment
19.2
20.9
18.7
18.8
19.5
Government budget
Total revenue and grants
19.8
19.0
18.8
18.5
19.0
Revenue
16.8
17.0
16.6
17.1
17.6
Tax revenue
14.8
14.9
15.4
15.9
16.4
Expenditure and net lending
26.6
26.4
22.7
21.5
22.0
Expenditure and net lending (excl. banking sector operations)
One of the most vicious groups operating in the region is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims). The militant group emerged in 2017 in Algeria and Mali, and has targeted civilian populations.
The UN listed the group as an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2018. Al-Qaeda is an Islamist organisation founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s.
The 2024 global terrorism index listed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organisations. Its influence has expanded in most parts of the Sahel. The group emerged to strengthen the jihadist insurgency under al-Qaeda. It combines violence with diplomacy to expand its influence and challenge state authorities.
Despite growing pressure from counter militancy campaigns spearheaded by local, regional and international militaries, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin continues to survive and adapt by regrouping and reorganising. This was demonstrated in its latest operation in Burkina Faso in 2024. The group exerted significant control by closing schools, setting up taxation checkpoints and abducting locals.
Its engagement in illicit economies has been key to the group’s successful expansion. This revenue is used to carry out devastating attacks.
We research jihadi-based insurgencies, and have found that this is a common tactic among terrorist groups in the west Africa-Sahel axis, including Boko Haram militants.
From our research, we find that Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin funds its activities by relying on
artisanal mining
kidnapping
livestock theft
money laundering.
Dismantling the group’s illicit economies and blocking its financial flows are key to countering its activities.
Financial resources
The group needs money for fighting, and to sustain political and social influence in its areas of operation.
Artisanal gold mining has proven to be a major factor in its expansion and resilience. In areas where the group exerts influence, illicit gold mining generates over US$30 billion annually. According to a report by Swissaid, a development group based in Switzerland, the main destinations for this gold are the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Switzerland.
The jihadists gain access to gold by controlling mining sites and transport routes to and from mines. They sometimes allow trusted allies, who include local armed groups, bandits and other criminal networks, to mine in exchange for a payout. The extent of gold mining funds is not exactly known, but the artisanal sites in areas controlled by the group have the capacity to produce 725 kilograms of gold per year, valued at US$34 million.
Another source of income – and political influence – is kidnapping for ransom. Kidnap victims include cattle owners, businessmen, state officials and foreigners. The group received a ₤30 million ransom in 2020 to release one French and two Italian hostages. Between 2017 and 2023, the group and its affiliated units were responsible for 845 out of approximately 1,100 recorded kidnappings in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali remain the epicentre of the group’s violent activities. In the first quarter of 2023, over 180 cases of kidnapping were recorded in these countries’ war-torn areas.
Livestock theft has also been a critical source of funds. The practice of livestock theft as economic warfare and a means to generate funds has led to livestock being forcibly taken from herders who fail to pay zakat (a religious fee among Muslims) or subscribe to the group’s ideology. The stolen livestock are sold in Mali, Mauritania or Senegal. The ability to monetise stolen livestock makes their theft a cornerstone of the Sahelian war economy and a source of cash for weapons and vehicles.
Money laundering is another illicit economy central to the militant group’s financing. It lends money to merchants, invests with banks and funds small shops with the aim of getting profits. This helps ensure a constant flow of money and provisions to support the group’s terrorist acts. It has attached much importance to this illicit economy, to the extent of assassinating those who interfere with its investments.
Way out
To cut down Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s financial base – and thereby weaken its capacity for militancy – counterinsurgency efforts need to take the following actions.
Government security actors should collaborate with local self-defence militias to regulate artisanal mining and thwart kidnappings.
Financial intelligence units need to identify merchants who receive money from the militant group to block the flow of illicit funds.
Specialised courts that deal with money laundering and terrorism financing cases should be established and made operational in Burkina Faso and Mali, the epicentres of the group’s activities.
Burkina Faso and Mali should increase security around civilians to minimise civilian casualties from terror operations.
Since finance is the basis of the militant group’s strength, regional security co-operation should be strengthened. This would help with systematically tracking illicit flows and stopping them.
Egodi Uchendu receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany. She has also received funding from TETFund, Nigeria, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Senegal, The A. G. Leventis Foundation, Greece, and the Fulbright Commission, USA.
Muhammed Sani Dangusau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
A typical student wants a university degree as a ticket to a salary. For this young person, education is a journey towards “having”. And the way to complete the journey is mainly to remember, repeat or reproduce what the teacher says and does.
This having-orientation is understandable given the often precarious realities of life, particularly in the global south, including South Africa, where I am based as a university lecturer. It is understandable, yet it fosters apathy in the classroom, for the monetary aims of students are not typically aligned with the aims of learning.
In response to this situation, for a decade Rhodes University’s Allan Gray Centre for Leadership Ethics has been developing a course called IiNtetho zoBomi, which translates from isiXhosa, one of South Africa’s languages, as “conversations about life”.
IiNtetho zoBomi is a year-long course offered to all students at the university. Over 2,000 have completed it since its inception. It aims to bridge the gap between character education and vocational education. The course shows students how interrelated reading, writing, thinking and being are.
It’s an opportunity for students to think about what matters to them and how to live accordingly. We hope they learn to have a say in how their lives will go. We want them to understand how education will equip them for life – not just work – and promote self-mastery. Ideally, students will realise along the way that self-mastery comes from learning with others in communities of inquiry.
With my colleagues at the centre, I wrote about the course in a recent paper, explaining the thinking behind it and how it works. From initial reticence and outright suspicion, the course is starting to receive broad institutional support from academics and management. The idea has been mooted that it should become become a common course for all first-year students.
The course has also received an endorsement from educational sociologist Kathy Luckett and feminist philosopher Ann Cahill. In their review of the course they commented that it had developed “a unique and powerful form of pedagogy that is clearly speaking to students’ interests and existential needs, and effectively providing students with capacities that allow them to author their own thoughts and lives”.
Inquisitiveness versus apathy
If a salary is the overriding motive for pursuing higher education, it helps to explain why so many students seem to lack inquisitiveness to seek knowledge, and hence are not in the correct frame of mind required for deep learning and the human growth that comes with the learning mindset.
This lack of inquisitiveness is also encouraged by the fact that the global university has primarily become a market service provider. The market wants and needs professionals, and universities provide them. This may not be a problem, unless the professional aspect of human life is separated, as it often is, from the central goal of education: to form well-adjusted, autonomous human beings.
This severance between learning for work and learning for life leaves human growth to chance. It fosters the passive absorption of whatever happens to be in the air of the times, instead of the formation of a capacity for critical thinking necessary for autonomy.
Contemporary universities presume that if one looks after people’s career concerns, life will look after itself, which is a grave mistake.
Conversations about life
The course includes student-led lectures, peer dialogues and weekly service learning at local no-fee paying public primary schools. The students also keep journals in which they reflect on their lives in relation to the course’s material.
We introduce students to ideas such as the existential psychologist Erich Fromm’s distinction between “being” and “having” orientations to education. In other words, a good education helps you to be a certain way, not just to have certain things.
Students also learn that “to take freedom for granted is to extinguish the possibility of attaining it”, as expressed in the documentary Creating Freedom: The Lottery of Birth. This is the idea that people are shaped by circumstances, and understanding how these circumstances shape them is a first step in attaining real freedom. We show this documentary to our students in addition to other movies and documentaries about the weekly topics discussed in class.
We encourage students to develop an inner dialogue and understand that they passively absorb much of what their thinking draws on. We challenge students to consider what they see, or fail to see, and how they see it. We invite students to reflect on how external forces like peer pressure and ideology act on them, as do internal forces like the confirmation bias (which motivates us to favour information that confirms what we already believe and to ignore information that doesn’t).
The following idea frames the content of the course: barriers to acting ethically, indeed to autonomy, are produced by psychological, social and political forces.
Then there is the service-learning aspect of Iintetho zoBomi.
This is about the students getting involved in communities and learning through one-on-one interactions with children at no-fee primary schools, helping them with English literacy and life orientation-related schoolwork. Our students learn by teaching learners material that’s related to IiNtetho zoBomi. Service learning helps bring ideas and experiences together.
Responses
We are seeing encouraging results in the form of hundreds of unsolicited comments relating to how the course has transformed the lives of our students.
Most of these comments come from student reflective journals. Lecturers read the journals as the main form of assessment of IiNtetho zoBomi. Some students even wrote articles in local media about what they had learned. In one of the articles, student Tanatswa Chivhere concludes that:
Most of us who have done the course can testify to how it made us more aware of how our thoughts and actions impact the world as a whole. IiNtetho zoBomi has changed the way in which I view my place in the world and how to use that place to better not only my life, but those of others around me.
Pedro Tabensky works for Rhodes University. He receives funding from the Allan & Gill Gray Philanthropies.
The spread of conditional cash transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries has been described as perhaps the most remarkable innovation of recent decades in welfare programmes. These programmes provide regular cash transfers to poor families contingent on specific behaviours. These include school enrolment and regular attendance.
The programmes started in the late 1990s in Mexico and quickly became the public policy of choice to fight poverty and low enrolment. Today, more than 60 countries operate education conditional cash transfer programmes, often at a national scale.
There is plenty of evidence showing that conditional cash transfers boost enrolment. But evidence on their impacts on children’s learning is mixed. Explanations for the lack of learning gains relate to the short-term nature of the evaluations, which may not provide enough time for the learning effects to materialise.
In recent research, conducted in Morocco, we show that conditional cash transfers can constrain learning when no accompanying measures are taken by governments to account for increased enrolment. We found that the introduction of a programme can deteriorate school quality and thus constrain learning for children who enrol in school.
Conditional cash transfers in Morocco
We looked at a programme implemented at scale in Morocco. Known as Tayssir, it began operating in 2008 and quickly became the flagship education policy of a government strongly committed to reducing school dropout rates.
Earlier research showed that the pilot version of Tayssir had substantial positive effects on enrolment, but not on learning.
Following this evaluation, Tayssir was quickly scaled-up to reach annually up to 800,000 children in 434 municipalities. Because the allocation of transfers remained remarkably stable over time, the scaled-up version of Tayssir offers an ideal setup to study how conditional cash transfer programmes affect learning, with enough time for the effects to materialise.
Tayssir targeted all municipalities with a poverty rate above 30% and all households with children aged 6-15 within these municipalities.
To study the impacts of the programme, we used data from the information system of Morocco’s ministry of education.
In the first part of our analysis, we assessed Tayssir’s effects on dropout rates and checked for possible differences with the research done in 2015 on the pilot version of the scheme.
We confirmed that the grade-specific dropout rate decreased by 1.3 percentage points on average (41% of the sample mean). This is equivalent to an increase in enrolment of about 9 percentage points by the end of grade 6.
We found a greater decrease for girls: 1.8 percentage points, or 50% of the sample mean.
Remarkably, these estimates were in line with those on the pilot, despite the nationwide expansion of the programme and the ten-fold increase in the number of beneficiaries.
The impact on quality
The reduction of the dropout rates induced by Tayssir may have affected both class size and class composition by retaining lower-ability students. This could potentially lead to negative effects on learning outcomes through peer effects and less effective teaching practices.
Our estimates show that class size in targeted areas increased by 3.6 students by the end of primary school, equivalent to 12% of the sample mean.
Variation in class composition increased by 0.30 standard deviations (SD) by the end of primary school.
Figure 1 shows that these effects are stronger in higher grades. This suggests that the reduction in dropout rates accumulated over time and progressively overburdened school resources. Large effects in grade 1 likely reflect the fact that children in targeted municipalities started school earlier – possibly to benefit from the transfers – and repeated grade 1 more often.
Figure 1: Effect of Tayssir on class size and heterogeneity
Notes: Each bar reports the coefficient estimate of the local average treatment effects of Tayssir. The dependent variables are class size (number of students per class) and class heterogeneity (standard deviation of the GPAs within a class). 95% confidence intervals are reported.
Larger class sizes and increased differences in class composition had negative impacts on children’s test scores.
In the final part of our analysis, we looked at the effects on test scores at the end of primary school exam. We found that Tayssir had negative effects on test scores. We estimated that the programme reduced test scores by 0.12 standard deviation for the full sample.
What needs to be done
Our insights should not be interpreted as evidence that policymakers should not pursue conditional cash transfer programmes. Such programmes, including the one we study, have proven particularly effective at increasing access to education, which is a crucial first step to enhance learning.
These programmes also have many other benefits. These include delayed marriage and childbearing for adolescent girls.
However, our results, together with evidence showing alarmingly low literacy and numeracy levels among students in low- and middle-income countries, indicate that the attendance gains from the programmes alone are unlikely to equip students with the foundational skills they need to thrive.
In fact, our results show that conditional cash transfer programmes can have adverse effects on learning when schools lack the necessary resources to accommodate the influx of new students. Such insights may be particularly relevant for other interventions aiming to increase school attendance without complementary investments in school capacity.
providing information on the benefits, costs and quality of education;
supporting teachers with structured pedagogy;
pedagogical interventions that tailor teaching to student learning.
In Morocco, where our study takes place, other scholars have demonstrated that an intervention combining two of these three “great buys” – targeted instruction based on learning level and structured pedagogy – yields large gains in learning.
Claire Ricard received funding from Agence Nationale de la Recherche of the French government through the program “Investissements d’avenir” (ANR-10-LABX-14-01).
Jules Gazeaud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In the digital economy, data is more than just information – it is an asset with immense economic and strategic value. Yet, despite its significance, a fundamental legal question remains unresolved: Can data be owned? While privacy laws worldwide focus on protecting individuals’ rights over their personal data, they often sidestep the issue of ownership. This has led to legal uncertainty, particularly in South Africa, where the Protection of Personal Information Act (Popia) grants data subjects various rights over their personal information but does not explicitly address ownership.
This gap in legal clarity raises pressing questions: If personal data – such as private health information – exists within a vast and ever-growing digital landscape, can it be owned? And if so, who holds the rightful claim?
Legal academic Donrich Thaldar, whose research focuses on data governance, explores these questions in a recent academic article. He unpacks his findings for The Conversation Africa.
Why does it matter who owns data?
In today’s digital economy, data is the most valuable asset – it’s often referred to as “the new oil”. Whether in commerce, research, or social interactions, the ability to generate, use and trade with data is central to economic competitiveness.
If data ownership is not clearly established, it could stifle innovation and investment. Companies require legal certainty to operate effectively in a knowledge-driven economy.
Countries have taken different legal approaches to tackling the question of who owns data. China, for instance, formally recognises the proprietary rights of data generators, meaning that businesses and individuals who generate data have legally defined rights over its use and commercialisation. This provides legal support for the country’s digital industries.
What does South African law say?
In the past, the South African Information Regulator has taken the position that personal information is automatically owned by the data subject – the person to whom the data relates – rather than by the entity generating the data. In this view, the rights created by Popia imply that data subjects themselves are the owners of their personal data, and nobody else.
I suggest that this stance is legally flawed, as it conflates two different branches of the law: privacy law and property law. Moreover, it could severely disrupt the digital economy. The digital economy depends on data as a tradeable asset – it must be capable of being sold, licensed and commercialised like any other economic object. If ownership must always be with data subjects, businesses face uncertainty in using and monetising data. Uncertainty stifles innovation, discourages investment, and undermines South Africa’s digital competitiveness.
You applied property law to the question of data ownership. Why?
Ownership is a concept in property law, not privacy law. Therefore, to answer the data ownership question, we need to look for answers in property law.
Property law governs the relationship between subjects (legal persons) and objects (things external to the body, whether physical or not). Ownership is about the rights that a subject has over an object. For an object to be capable of being owned, it must be valuable, useful, and – importantly – capable of human control. A bottle of water meets these criteria, but the vast oceans do not, as they are not within human control.
Personal data in the abstract is like the water in the ocean – vast, uncontained, and beyond individual control. However, a digital instance of personal data, such as a computer file, is more like a bottled version of that water – defined and subject to human control. Just like digital money and other valuable digital assets, a specific instance of personal data meets all the requirements under South African common law for private ownership. Thus, in this sense personal data can be owned.
Is the data owner not the data subject?
At first glance this might seem so, but no, not necessarily. The reason that it might seem so, is because some of the privacy rights created by Popia resemble ownership rights. For example, an owner’s agreement is required before someone else can use the owned object (e.g., loan for use and rent). Similarly, a data subject’s consent is in most cases required before personal data can be processed. Furthermore, the owner of a thing has the right to destroy it; similarly, a data subject typically has the right to have personal data deleted.
Do these privacy rights mean that data subjects actually own their personal data? I suggest not. Wearing a feather in one’s hat does not make one a bird. In the same way, privacy rights that resemble ownership rights do not mean that they constitute ownership. Ownership is acquired by following the rules of property law.
So who owns the data?
Because a newly created personal data instance has no antecedent legal object – in other words, it is not created out of another legal object – it initially belongs to no one. It is res nullius. Ownership of res nullius is acquired through appropriation, which requires two elements: control and the intention to own.
This means that the entity generating the data, such as a company or university collecting and recording it, is best positioned to acquire ownership. Since it already has control over the data, the only remaining requirement is simply the intention to be the owner.
If an entity like a university generates data and intends to own it, then – provided it is in control of that data – it will legally become the owner. This in principle allows the entity to use, license and trade the data as an economic asset. Indeed, it is prudent for data-generating entities, such as universities, to explicitly assert ownership over the data they produce. This not only establishes their legal rights with clarity but also serves as a safeguard against unauthorised access and misuse by malicious actors.
Doesn’t this compromise data privacy?
No, it should not. Ownership is always limited by other legal rules. For example, while I might own a car, I cannot drive it in any way I like – I must obey the rules of the road. Similarly, ownership of personal data is subject to strict limitations, particularly the privacy rights of data subjects under Popia.
However, it is also important to understand that privacy rights apply only to personal data. If personal data is de-identified, meaning that it can no longer be linked to the data subjects, privacy rights cease to apply. What remains are the ownership rights in the data itself. It can be a fully tradeable asset.
Recognising that a digital instance of personal data can be owned – and that the rightful owner is typically the data generator – does not undermine the privacy protections of Popia. Rather, it clarifies the legal landscape, ensuring that the rights of both data subjects and data generators are recognised and protected.
When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, five of the country’s universities used Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. There were also two bilingual universities teaching in Afrikaans and English.
Stellenbosch University, about 50km from Cape Town, is the oldest historically Afrikaans university. Over the past three decades English has gradually replaced Afrikaans in the core functions of teaching and research.
The status of Afrikaans at formerly Afrikaans or bilingual universities remains the subject of considerable debate. This has led to litigation and three judgments in South Africa’s apex court, the constitutional court.
Afrikaans is commonly categorised as an Indo-European language, related to Dutch. It can be more accurately described as a Creole language that developed after the Dutch colonised the Cape in 1652. In 1925, standardised Afrikaans became an official language alongside English. It subsequently became associated with white Afrikaner nationalism and, from 1948, apartheid education policies. In 1976, Black students mobilised against attempts to make Afrikaans a compulsory medium of instruction in schools.
I’m a sociologist who studies language and communication in science and higher education. In a recent article and presentation I examined the three phases in which the language shift and the decline of Afrikaans at Stellenbosch University has unfolded.
The first phase (1994-2002) involved an attempt to defend Afrikaans institutional monolingualism. The second (2002-2015) saw a shift to institutional bilingualism. Afrikaans and English were used in undergraduate classes. The final and current phase began with the 2015-16 #FeesMustFall student protests. Pressure for the transformation of a predominantly white campus escalated. This triggered a rapid shift to English.
In 2024, the university’s language policy is, on paper, a scaled-down version of institutional bilingualism (Afrikaans and English). However, in practice English is the main medium of instruction. Afrikaans is, increasingly, not used across all disciplines. This reflects the trend at other formerly Afrikaans or bilingual public universities.
There is a case to be made for defending Stellenbosch University’s position as a centre of Afrikaans language and culture. But the centralised language planning apparatus it has developed over the past two decades is simply unsustainable. This case study prompts a broader reflection on languages and language planning within South African higher education.
First, for reasons related to its global academic status and its national second-language status, English has emerged as the dominant language of teaching and research at South African universities.
The second issue has to do with the nature of “language” at different levels of the education system. The official languages adopted in 1994 are not uniform “mother tongues” or “vehicles” moving from basic education to PhD.
Languages are more than individual “competencies”: they are political and economic projects. They are also particularly expensive and difficult to “plan” in university teaching and research.
First phase (1994-2002)
In 1994, South Africa’s then-interim constitution recognised 11 official languages. It committed “the state” to “practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages”.
Afrikaans universities faced a particular dilemma. How could they retain Afrikaans as a medium of instruction and open enrolment to formerly excluded Black students? These are generally second-language English speakers who opt to study in English.
Other historically Afrikaans institutions adopted parallel medium instruction. Stellenbosch University resisted this trend and asserted its autonomy as a monolingual institution. Postgraduate teaching and research, however, shifted to English. Afrikaans was reframed as an undergraduate teaching issue.
The university argued that the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces needed an Afrikaans-medium university.
Two factors undermined this demographic argument. First, the university enjoys national status. This can be traced back to an elite Anglophone college system in the 19th century British Cape Colony. Second, after the 1994 transition, the university focused on internationalisation. It also established itself as a leading research-intensive institution. As a result it has increasingly attracted students and academics with little or no Afrikaans competency.
Second phase (2002-2015)
In the early 2000s South Africa’s higher education system was overhauled. This involved institutional mergers, which coincided with the adoption of the 2002 Language Policy for Higher Education. The policy effectively disestablished monolingual Afrikaans universities, stating:
The notion of Afrikaans universities runs counter to the end goal of a transformed higher education system.
Stellenbosch University adopted its first language policy and plan in 2002. Afrikaans was reframed as one of four undergraduate language options and described as “the default language of undergraduate learning and instruction”. A heated debate erupted in the Afrikaans media. In this first public – and acrimonious – taaldebat (language debate) many criticised the new “default” status of Afrikaans. That’s because, like a default setting on a computer, this option could be switched.
Multilingual signage outside a building at Stellenbosch University. Lloyd Hill, CC BY
The new policy introduced formal language planning as an institutional process that would involve periodic policy updates. It also presented three module “options” that represented possible routes away from institutional monolingualism.
First, dual medium instruction involved using both English and Afrikaans in one lecture. Second, parallel medium instruction involved separate lectures in English and Afrikaans. Third was an English medium option. However, the second and third options were reserved for “exceptional circumstances”.
Within a few years, most modules shifted to the dual medium option. The university shifted to a dual medium form of institutional bilingualism. But a tacit racial assumption underpinned this model. The language policy ignored the growing enrolment of Black students and the appointment of Black staff members who didn’t have the required bilingual proficiency.
A new language policy, adopted in December 2014, tried to address the bilingual proficiency problem. It prioritised parallel medium instruction and “educational interpeting”. It never got off the ground.
Third phase (2015 to date)
Beginning in March 2015, a series of “Fallist” movements mobilised on South African campuses. A predominantly Black student movement called Open Stellenbosch was established. It aimed “to challenge the hegemony of white Afrikaans culture and the exclusion of Black students and staff”. Language policy was a key point of contention.
The university responded by redrafting its language policy. In June 2016 it established English as the primary medium of teaching at the undergraduate level.
This moment also marks the shift to what I term the second taaldebat. Afrikaans language activists now argued that English and Afrikaans ought to enjoy equal status. Institutional bilingualism became the new ideal framework for defending Afrikaans at Stellenbosch University.
Language activism included litigation, which ended in a constitutional court ruling. The court upheld the 2016 language policy review process. It also noted the “hard racial edge” to the evidence produced by Stellenbosch University. It remarked that:
Seen as a bloc, the new entrants for whom Afrikaans is an obstruction are not brown or white, but overwhelmingly Black.
Today, Stellenbosch remains notionally committed to “multilingualism”. In practice, this means a scaled down version of institutional bilingualism. It involves very limited parallel medium instruction and some simultaneous interpreting. English is the compulsory medium in modules where no duplication occurs.
Lloyd Hill received funding from the South African National Research Foundation (Grant #111845).
A media storm blew up in mid-March 2025 when a researcher at South Africa’s isolated Sanae IV base in Antarctica accused one of its nine team members of becoming violent.
The Conversation Africa asked geomorphologist David William Hedding, who has previously carried out research from the frozen continent, about the work researchers do in Antarctica, what conditions are like and why it matters.
What do researchers focus on when they’re working in Antarctica?
Currently, the main focus of research in the Antarctic revolves around climate change because the White Continent is a good barometer for changes in global cycles. It has a unique and fragile environment. It’s an extreme climate which makes it highly sensitive to any changes in global climate and atmospheric conditions. Importantly, the Antarctic remains relatively untouched by humans, so we are able to study processes and responses of natural systems.
Also, the geographic location of Antarctic enables science that is less suitable elsewhere on the planet. An example of this is the work on space weather (primarily disturbances to the Earth’s magnetic field caused by solar activity). Studying space weather is significant because the magnetic field of the Earth can impact communication platforms, technology, infrastructure and even human health.
How many countries have teams working there? Where does South Africa fit in?
Currently, about 30 countries have research stations in the Antarctic but these bases serve a far wider community of researchers. Collaboration is a key component of research in the Antarctic because many study sites are isolated, logistics are a challenge and resources are typically limited.
The South African base in Antarctica, named SANAE IV usually has between 10 and 12 researchers and base personnel. This research station is situated on a nunatak (a mountain piercing through the ice) in Western Dronning Maud Land. It is an extremely remote location approximately 220km inland from the ice-shelf.
The researchers and base personnel remain in Antarctica for approximately 15 months working through the cold and dark winter months.
What have been some of the biggest ‘finds’?
The biggest research finding from the Antarctic was the discovery of the ozone hole in 1985 by scientists from the British Antarctic Survey. This discovery led to the creation and implementation of the Montreal Protocol, a treaty to phase out chlorofluorocarbons (synthetic chemical compounds composed of chlorine, fluorine, and carbon) which destroy ozone. This was a major breakthrough in terms of slowly healing the ozone layer.
The second most significant piece of research to come from the Antarctic has been the use of ice cores to reconstruct past climates. Ice cores preserve air bubbles which provide a wealth of information about the conditions of the atmosphere over time. Importantly, ice cores provide an uninterrupted and detailed window into the past 1.2 million years. This is important because only by understanding past climates and the earth’s responses to those changes are we able to predict future responses. This is significant because of the imminent threats resulting from anthropogenic (human-induced) climate change.
What conditions do scientists work under?
Conducting research in the Antarctic is extremely difficult for three primary reasons: remoteness, the cold and daylight.
The remoteness of many study sites makes it difficult to reach. Distances are vast from the limited number of bases in the Antarctic. Thus, logistics for science in the Antarctic is a major challenge and requires collaboration and planning. For example, the geologists from the University of Johannesburg, who work from the SANAE IV base in Antarctica, often spend weeks in the field collecting samples. They travel significant distances via snow mobile and remain self-sufficient while conducting science in tough conditions.
These tough conditions relate specifically to the cold. Most science only occurs in the austral summer months when temperatures become marginally bearable. Also, the summer season only provides a short window in which to operate because access to Antarctic by sea is limited by extent and thickness of the sea ice.
Lastly, during summer there is 24 hours of daylight which lengthens the working day but these conditions are also short-lived.
Why it is important to do scientific work in the area?
The Antarctic is intricately linked to global systems and plays a major role in influencing these systems.
For example, climate change will cause significant melting of land-based ice in Antarctica which when added to the oceans will cause sea-level rise and disruptions to global oceanic currents. Therefore, it is critical that we obtain a better understanding of how responses of terrestrial systems, such as the Antarctic, will impact oceanic systems because ultimately changes in ocean currents will impact the oceanic food web.
In the context of climate change, sea-level rise is a major concern as it will have global impacts for society, so it is critical that the impacts are investigated to enable society to build resilience and adapt.
David William Hedding receives funding from the National Research Foundation.
A media storm blew up in mid-March 2025 when a researcher at South Africa’s isolated Sanae IV base in Antarctica accused one of its nine team members of becoming violent.
The Conversation Africa asked geomorphologist David William Hedding, who has previously carried out research from the frozen continent, about the work researchers do in Antarctica, what conditions are like and why it matters.
What do researchers focus on when they’re working in Antarctica?
Currently, the main focus of research in the Antarctic revolves around climate change because the White Continent is a good barometer for changes in global cycles. It has a unique and fragile environment. It’s an extreme climate which makes it highly sensitive to any changes in global climate and atmospheric conditions. Importantly, the Antarctic remains relatively untouched by humans, so we are able to study processes and responses of natural systems.
Also, the geographic location of Antarctic enables science that is less suitable elsewhere on the planet. An example of this is the work on space weather (primarily disturbances to the Earth’s magnetic field caused by solar activity). Studying space weather is significant because the magnetic field of the Earth can impact communication platforms, technology, infrastructure and even human health.
How many countries have teams working there? Where does South Africa fit in?
Currently, about 30 countries have research stations in the Antarctic but these bases serve a far wider community of researchers. Collaboration is a key component of research in the Antarctic because many study sites are isolated, logistics are a challenge and resources are typically limited.
The South African base in Antarctica, named SANAE IV usually has between 10 and 12 researchers and base personnel. This research station is situated on a nunatak (a mountain piercing through the ice) in Western Dronning Maud Land. It is an extremely remote location approximately 220km inland from the ice-shelf.
The researchers and base personnel remain in Antarctica for approximately 15 months working through the cold and dark winter months.
What have been some of the biggest ‘finds’?
The biggest research finding from the Antarctic was the discovery of the ozone hole in 1985 by scientists from the British Antarctic Survey. This discovery led to the creation and implementation of the Montreal Protocol, a treaty to phase out chlorofluorocarbons (synthetic chemical compounds composed of chlorine, fluorine, and carbon) which destroy ozone. This was a major breakthrough in terms of slowly healing the ozone layer.
The second most significant piece of research to come from the Antarctic has been the use of ice cores to reconstruct past climates. Ice cores preserve air bubbles which provide a wealth of information about the conditions of the atmosphere over time. Importantly, ice cores provide an uninterrupted and detailed window into the past 1.2 million years. This is important because only by understanding past climates and the earth’s responses to those changes are we able to predict future responses. This is significant because of the imminent threats resulting from anthropogenic (human-induced) climate change.
What conditions do scientists work under?
Conducting research in the Antarctic is extremely difficult for three primary reasons: remoteness, the cold and daylight.
The remoteness of many study sites makes it difficult to reach. Distances are vast from the limited number of bases in the Antarctic. Thus, logistics for science in the Antarctic is a major challenge and requires collaboration and planning. For example, the geologists from the University of Johannesburg, who work from the SANAE IV base in Antarctica, often spend weeks in the field collecting samples. They travel significant distances via snow mobile and remain self-sufficient while conducting science in tough conditions.
These tough conditions relate specifically to the cold. Most science only occurs in the austral summer months when temperatures become marginally bearable. Also, the summer season only provides a short window in which to operate because access to Antarctic by sea is limited by extent and thickness of the sea ice.
Lastly, during summer there is 24 hours of daylight which lengthens the working day but these conditions are also short-lived.
Why it is important to do scientific work in the area?
The Antarctic is intricately linked to global systems and plays a major role in influencing these systems.
For example, climate change will cause significant melting of land-based ice in Antarctica which when added to the oceans will cause sea-level rise and disruptions to global oceanic currents. Therefore, it is critical that we obtain a better understanding of how responses of terrestrial systems, such as the Antarctic, will impact oceanic systems because ultimately changes in ocean currents will impact the oceanic food web.
In the context of climate change, sea-level rise is a major concern as it will have global impacts for society, so it is critical that the impacts are investigated to enable society to build resilience and adapt.
David William Hedding receives funding from the National Research Foundation.
Over the past 15 years there’s been an increasing demand from within and outside the higher education sector for African countries to produce more PhD graduates. For this to happen, it’s important to know what’s holding people back from pursuing or completing their doctoral degrees. The authors of a new review article did just that, with a focus on South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria. Five themes emerged from their work: PhD candidates’ sociodemographic profiles, access to funding, the availability of resources and training, experiences with PhD supervisors, and personal coping mechanisms.
The Conversation Africa spoke with the paper’s authors, Oluwatomilayo Omoya, Udeme Samuel Jacob, Olumide A. Odeyemi and Omowale A. Odeyemi, to learn more about their findings.
Why is it important for African countries to produce PhD graduates?
PhD programmes have been shown to play a crucial role in advancing research, innovation, and economic and scientific progress.
That’s because the more research capacity a country has, the more likely it will be able to address gaps in healthcare, economic barriers and food insecurity. This point has been emphasised by, among others, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the African Union.
Doctoral education builds academic expertise. This drives growth across multiple sectors, such as health, education and technology. It also fosters an environment where creative and practical solutions to local challenges can thrive.
What are some of the main obstacles PhD students faced in the countries you studied?
Our study was a scoping review. This research method allowed us to broadly survey existing studies and identify key concepts, evidence types and knowledge gaps. The review included articles from different African countries, among them South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria.
One of the biggest hurdles we identified for PhD students is a lack of resources. Many of the continent’s universities are underfunded. They struggle to offer their staff and students adequate research facilities, libraries and even internet access.
Another major challenge is the shortage of quality doctoral supervision. In many African universities, the number of qualified supervisors is far lower than the number of doctoral candidates. This imbalance means that some students receive little attention. Their progress may suffer as a result.
A PhD is, by nature, a solitary pursuit. But without the proper support, students can feel disconnected from the academic community. This sense of isolation can increase dropout rates and hinder the completion of research projects.
Supervisors are frequently overwhelmed with other responsibilities – their own research, administrative duties, or teaching large undergraduate classes. This leaves them with limited time to mentor PhD students. The students they’re tasked with supervising can end up feeling isolated.
Personal funding is also hard to come by. Scholarships are rare and, when they are available, they don’t always cover all the student’s expenses over the course of their research. Many students must work full-time jobs to support themselves while pursuing their doctorate. This can severely affect their ability to dedicate time to their studies.
Even in cases where funding is available, it’s often linked to short-term projects or grants that don’t allow students to finish their research without interruption. This leads to long delays in graduation rates, which creates a bottleneck effect: students remain stuck in the system for years, clogging the flow of new researchers entering academia.
Another challenge is that African doctoral students who do succeed may leave their home countries for better opportunities abroad. The so-called “brain drain” phenomenon has a profound effect on Africa’s ability to build a strong academic community. While many African PhD students go on to do groundbreaking research in Europe, North America or Asia, their departure means their home institutions – and countries – lose valuable knowledge and experience.
Brain drain is not just about better salaries or living conditions; it’s also about the availability of cutting-edge research opportunities. Once abroad, many students are able to access better resources and then choose to stay in environments that allow them to thrive professionally.
What role does gender play in the likelihood of completing a PhD?
Women pursuing PhDs face additional challenges that their male peers do not. We found that women PhD students frequently face gender biases, both socially and professionally, that make it harder to fulfil their academic goals.
Over the past decade, the number of women enrolling in PhD training in some countries, such as Ethiopia and South Africa, has increased.
However, women are less likely than men to complete their doctoral studies, partly because of the cultural expectations and responsibilities they bear. Female students who are married or have children must often balance managing their households and care-giving responsibilities with pursuing their studies.
In regions where family is traditionally prioritised over career aspirations, women may feel an added layer of guilt or societal pressure, which can lessen the time they have to focus on research.
Moreover, in areas where colonial or apartheid legacies still influence societal structures, Black women in particular report additional barriers. They say they feel overlooked or underestimated in academic spaces.
There has been some progress. Organisations like the Consortium for Advanced Research Training in Africa (Carta) offer programmes that support women throughout their academic journeys. However, a greater, gender-responsive approach is needed to ensure that women have access to resources, mentorship and flexible support systems that address these unique challenges.
Increasing support for women in PhD programmes isn’t just about numbers. It means institutions and the wider society must address the structural and cultural barriers that hold women back.
Are there solutions to the issues you’ve identified?
The challenges facing doctoral students in Africa are complex, but not impossible to overcome.
With the right investments and a commitment to reform, universities on the continent can grow into global centres of excellence in research and development. It’s vital for societies not to lose sight of the importance of higher education. As we’ve said, and as a large body of evidence shows, strong doctoral training programmes and investing in research and innovation to address the challenges faced by the African continent are key to ensuring that the next generation of researchers and innovators can lead the way in solving some of the world’s most pressing problems.
Governments, universities and funding organisations can collaborate by providing scholarships and research grants, creating gender equality policies, and introducing mentorship programmes or improving those that already exist.
Udeme Samuel Jacob is affiliated with The South African Research Chair: Education and Care in Childhood, Faculty of Education, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Olumide A Odeyemi, Oluwatomilayo Omoya, and Omowale A Odeyemi do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Over the past 15 years there’s been an increasing demand from within and outside the higher education sector for African countries to produce more PhD graduates. For this to happen, it’s important to know what’s holding people back from pursuing or completing their doctoral degrees. The authors of a new review article did just that, with a focus on South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria. Five themes emerged from their work: PhD candidates’ sociodemographic profiles, access to funding, the availability of resources and training, experiences with PhD supervisors, and personal coping mechanisms.
The Conversation Africa spoke with the paper’s authors, Oluwatomilayo Omoya, Udeme Samuel Jacob, Olumide A. Odeyemi and Omowale A. Odeyemi, to learn more about their findings.
Why is it important for African countries to produce PhD graduates?
PhD programmes have been shown to play a crucial role in advancing research, innovation, and economic and scientific progress.
That’s because the more research capacity a country has, the more likely it will be able to address gaps in healthcare, economic barriers and food insecurity. This point has been emphasised by, among others, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the African Union.
Doctoral education builds academic expertise. This drives growth across multiple sectors, such as health, education and technology. It also fosters an environment where creative and practical solutions to local challenges can thrive.
What are some of the main obstacles PhD students faced in the countries you studied?
Our study was a scoping review. This research method allowed us to broadly survey existing studies and identify key concepts, evidence types and knowledge gaps. The review included articles from different African countries, among them South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Nigeria.
One of the biggest hurdles we identified for PhD students is a lack of resources. Many of the continent’s universities are underfunded. They struggle to offer their staff and students adequate research facilities, libraries and even internet access.
Another major challenge is the shortage of quality doctoral supervision. In many African universities, the number of qualified supervisors is far lower than the number of doctoral candidates. This imbalance means that some students receive little attention. Their progress may suffer as a result.
A PhD is, by nature, a solitary pursuit. But without the proper support, students can feel disconnected from the academic community. This sense of isolation can increase dropout rates and hinder the completion of research projects.
Supervisors are frequently overwhelmed with other responsibilities – their own research, administrative duties, or teaching large undergraduate classes. This leaves them with limited time to mentor PhD students. The students they’re tasked with supervising can end up feeling isolated.
Personal funding is also hard to come by. Scholarships are rare and, when they are available, they don’t always cover all the student’s expenses over the course of their research. Many students must work full-time jobs to support themselves while pursuing their doctorate. This can severely affect their ability to dedicate time to their studies.
Even in cases where funding is available, it’s often linked to short-term projects or grants that don’t allow students to finish their research without interruption. This leads to long delays in graduation rates, which creates a bottleneck effect: students remain stuck in the system for years, clogging the flow of new researchers entering academia.
Another challenge is that African doctoral students who do succeed may leave their home countries for better opportunities abroad. The so-called “brain drain” phenomenon has a profound effect on Africa’s ability to build a strong academic community. While many African PhD students go on to do groundbreaking research in Europe, North America or Asia, their departure means their home institutions – and countries – lose valuable knowledge and experience.
Brain drain is not just about better salaries or living conditions; it’s also about the availability of cutting-edge research opportunities. Once abroad, many students are able to access better resources and then choose to stay in environments that allow them to thrive professionally.
What role does gender play in the likelihood of completing a PhD?
Women pursuing PhDs face additional challenges that their male peers do not. We found that women PhD students frequently face gender biases, both socially and professionally, that make it harder to fulfil their academic goals.
Over the past decade, the number of women enrolling in PhD training in some countries, such as Ethiopia and South Africa, has increased.
However, women are less likely than men to complete their doctoral studies, partly because of the cultural expectations and responsibilities they bear. Female students who are married or have children must often balance managing their households and care-giving responsibilities with pursuing their studies.
In regions where family is traditionally prioritised over career aspirations, women may feel an added layer of guilt or societal pressure, which can lessen the time they have to focus on research.
Moreover, in areas where colonial or apartheid legacies still influence societal structures, Black women in particular report additional barriers. They say they feel overlooked or underestimated in academic spaces.
There has been some progress. Organisations like the Consortium for Advanced Research Training in Africa (Carta) offer programmes that support women throughout their academic journeys. However, a greater, gender-responsive approach is needed to ensure that women have access to resources, mentorship and flexible support systems that address these unique challenges.
Increasing support for women in PhD programmes isn’t just about numbers. It means institutions and the wider society must address the structural and cultural barriers that hold women back.
Are there solutions to the issues you’ve identified?
The challenges facing doctoral students in Africa are complex, but not impossible to overcome.
With the right investments and a commitment to reform, universities on the continent can grow into global centres of excellence in research and development. It’s vital for societies not to lose sight of the importance of higher education. As we’ve said, and as a large body of evidence shows, strong doctoral training programmes and investing in research and innovation to address the challenges faced by the African continent are key to ensuring that the next generation of researchers and innovators can lead the way in solving some of the world’s most pressing problems.
Governments, universities and funding organisations can collaborate by providing scholarships and research grants, creating gender equality policies, and introducing mentorship programmes or improving those that already exist.
Udeme Samuel Jacob is affiliated with The South African Research Chair: Education and Care in Childhood, Faculty of Education, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Olumide A Odeyemi, Oluwatomilayo Omoya, and Omowale A Odeyemi do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The ancestors of humans started making tools about 3.3 million years ago. First they made them out of stone, then they switched to bone as a raw material. Until recently, the earliest clear evidence of bone tool making was from sites in Europe, dated to 400,000 years ago. But archaeologists have now found and dated bone tools in Tanzania that are a million years older.
The tools are made from the bones of large animals like hippos and elephants, and have been deliberately shaped to make them useful for butchering large carcasses.
The discovery of bone implements that are the oldest ever found, by far, casts light on human evolution. It shows that our hominin ancestors were able to think about and make this technology a lot earlier than anyone realised.
I am a scientist who co-directs a multidisciplinary research project team at the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, focusing on hominin evolution. Our project’s main goal has been to investigate the changes in hominin technology and behaviour that happened between 1.66 million and 1.4 million years ago.
We’re interested in this time period because it marks a pivotal change in human technology, from the rudimentary stone knives and cores of the Oldowan culture to the more advanced crafted stone handaxes of the Acheulean culture.
We found the Olduvai bone tools in 2018 and recently described them in the journal Nature. They show that by 1.5 million years ago, our ancestors (Homo erectus) had already developed the cognitive abilities required to transfer skills from making stone tools to making bone tools.
This leap in human history was a game-changer because it allowed early hominins to overcome survival challenges in landscapes where suitable stone materials were scarce.
Tools at Olduvai
Olduvai Gorge is a Unesco World Heritage site. It became well known in 1959 through the pioneering work of palaeontologists Louis and Mary Leakey, whose discoveries of early human remains reshaped our understanding of human evolution. The site offers an unparalleled window into human history, spanning nearly 2 million years.
Aside from fossilised bones, it has yielded the most detailed record of stone tool cultures in the world. It has documented the evolution from the simple chopping tools and stone knives of the Oldowan industry (about 2 million years ago) to the more advanced Acheulean tools (1.7 million years ago), such as handaxes, cleavers, picks and spheroids and then on – through arrowheads, points and blades (about 200,000 years ago) to the micro-blades of the Later Stone Age (about 17,000 years ago).
All these tools provide a glimpse into the ingenuity and cultural advancements of our early ancestors.
And now the picture has new detail.
Our team uncovered 27 ancient bone tools during excavations at the T69 Complex, FLK West site at Olduvai. We know how old they are because we found them securely embedded underground where they had been left 1.5 million years ago, along with thousands of stone artefacts and fossilised bones. We dated them using geochronological techniques.
Unlike stone, bone shafts crack and break in a way that allows the systematic production of elongated, well-shaped artifacts. Flaking them by hitting them with another object – a process called knapping – results in pointed tools that would be ideal for butchering, chopping and other tasks.
The knapped tools we found were made from large shaft fragments that came from the limb bones of elephants and hippos, and were found at hippo butchery sites. Hominins likely brought elephant bones to the site on a regular basis, and obtained limb bones from butchered hippos at the site itself.
What Homo erectus knew
The find shows that 1.5 million years ago, Homo erectus could apply knapping skills to bone. Homo erectus, regarded as the evolutionary successor to the smaller-brained Homo habilis, left a lasting imprint on history. Its fossils, found at Olduvai, offer a glimpse into a span of about a million years, stretching from 1.5 million to roughly 500,000 years ago.
Now we know that these hominins not only understood the physical properties of bones but also knew about skeletal anatomy. They could identify and select bones suitable for flaking. And they knew which animals had skeletons large enough to craft reliable tools after the animals’ death.
We don’t know exactly why they chose bones as a raw material. It may have been that suitable stone material was scarce, or they recognised that bones provided a better grip and were more durable.
Why haven’t such old bone tools been found before? The answer is likely that they are destroyed by weathering, abrasion from water transport, trampling and scavenger activity. Organic materials don’t always get time to fossilise. Also, analysts were not used to looking for bone tools among fossils.
This discovery will likely encourage researchers to pay closer attention to the subtle signs of bone knapping in fossil assemblages. This way we will learn more about the evolution of human technology and behaviour.
Jackson K. Njau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The ancestors of humans started making tools about 3.3 million years ago. First they made them out of stone, then they switched to bone as a raw material. Until recently, the earliest clear evidence of bone tool making was from sites in Europe, dated to 400,000 years ago. But archaeologists have now found and dated bone tools in Tanzania that are a million years older.
The tools are made from the bones of large animals like hippos and elephants, and have been deliberately shaped to make them useful for butchering large carcasses.
The discovery of bone implements that are the oldest ever found, by far, casts light on human evolution. It shows that our hominin ancestors were able to think about and make this technology a lot earlier than anyone realised.
I am a scientist who co-directs a multidisciplinary research project team at the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, focusing on hominin evolution. Our project’s main goal has been to investigate the changes in hominin technology and behaviour that happened between 1.66 million and 1.4 million years ago.
We’re interested in this time period because it marks a pivotal change in human technology, from the rudimentary stone knives and cores of the Oldowan culture to the more advanced crafted stone handaxes of the Acheulean culture.
We found the Olduvai bone tools in 2018 and recently described them in the journal Nature. They show that by 1.5 million years ago, our ancestors (Homo erectus) had already developed the cognitive abilities required to transfer skills from making stone tools to making bone tools.
This leap in human history was a game-changer because it allowed early hominins to overcome survival challenges in landscapes where suitable stone materials were scarce.
Tools at Olduvai
Olduvai Gorge is a Unesco World Heritage site. It became well known in 1959 through the pioneering work of palaeontologists Louis and Mary Leakey, whose discoveries of early human remains reshaped our understanding of human evolution. The site offers an unparalleled window into human history, spanning nearly 2 million years.
Aside from fossilised bones, it has yielded the most detailed record of stone tool cultures in the world. It has documented the evolution from the simple chopping tools and stone knives of the Oldowan industry (about 2 million years ago) to the more advanced Acheulean tools (1.7 million years ago), such as handaxes, cleavers, picks and spheroids and then on – through arrowheads, points and blades (about 200,000 years ago) to the micro-blades of the Later Stone Age (about 17,000 years ago).
All these tools provide a glimpse into the ingenuity and cultural advancements of our early ancestors.
And now the picture has new detail.
Our team uncovered 27 ancient bone tools during excavations at the T69 Complex, FLK West site at Olduvai. We know how old they are because we found them securely embedded underground where they had been left 1.5 million years ago, along with thousands of stone artefacts and fossilised bones. We dated them using geochronological techniques.
Unlike stone, bone shafts crack and break in a way that allows the systematic production of elongated, well-shaped artifacts. Flaking them by hitting them with another object – a process called knapping – results in pointed tools that would be ideal for butchering, chopping and other tasks.
The knapped tools we found were made from large shaft fragments that came from the limb bones of elephants and hippos, and were found at hippo butchery sites. Hominins likely brought elephant bones to the site on a regular basis, and obtained limb bones from butchered hippos at the site itself.
What Homo erectus knew
The find shows that 1.5 million years ago, Homo erectus could apply knapping skills to bone. Homo erectus, regarded as the evolutionary successor to the smaller-brained Homo habilis, left a lasting imprint on history. Its fossils, found at Olduvai, offer a glimpse into a span of about a million years, stretching from 1.5 million to roughly 500,000 years ago.
Now we know that these hominins not only understood the physical properties of bones but also knew about skeletal anatomy. They could identify and select bones suitable for flaking. And they knew which animals had skeletons large enough to craft reliable tools after the animals’ death.
We don’t know exactly why they chose bones as a raw material. It may have been that suitable stone material was scarce, or they recognised that bones provided a better grip and were more durable.
Why haven’t such old bone tools been found before? The answer is likely that they are destroyed by weathering, abrasion from water transport, trampling and scavenger activity. Organic materials don’t always get time to fossilise. Also, analysts were not used to looking for bone tools among fossils.
This discovery will likely encourage researchers to pay closer attention to the subtle signs of bone knapping in fossil assemblages. This way we will learn more about the evolution of human technology and behaviour.
Jackson K. Njau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
“The art of tracking may well be the origin of science.” This is the departure point for a 2013 book by Louis Liebenberg, co-founder of an organisation devoted to environmental monitoring.
The connection between tracking in nature, as people have done since prehistory, and “western” science is of special interest to us as ichnologists. (Ichnology is the study of tracks and traces.) We learned our skills relatively late in life. But imagine if we had learned as children and if, as adults, we tracked as if our lives depended on it? What additional visual and cognitive talents would we bring to our field work as scientists?
Our mission is to find and document the fossilised tracks and traces of creatures that existed during part of the Pleistocene Epoch, between 35,000 and 400,000 years ago, on the Cape coast of South Africa. Since 2008, through the Cape South Coast Ichnology project, based in the African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience at Nelson Mandela University, more than 370 vertebrate tracksites have been identified. They have substantially complemented the traditional record of body fossils. Examples include trackways of giant tortoises and giraffe.
Given the challenges inherent in identifying such tracks, we wondered how hunters who’ve been tracking all their lives would view our work, and how age-old indigenous expertise might align with our approach.
Fortunately we could call on experts with these skills in southern Africa. The Ju/’hoansi (pronounced “Juun-kwasi”) San people of north-eastern Namibia are perhaps the last of southern Africa’s indigenous inhabitants who retain the full suite of their ancient environmental skills. The Nyae Nyae conservancy in which they live gives them access to at least some of their historical land with its remaining wildlife. They still engage in subsistence hunting with bow and poisoned arrow and gather food that’s growing wild.
A handful among them have been recognised as Indigenous Master Tracker, a title created by Liebenberg’s CyberTracker initiative in recognition of their top-flight hunter-gatherer status. And so, late in 2023, the Master Trackers #oma (“Komma”) Daqm and /uce (“Tchu-shey”) Nǂamce arrived in Cape Town.
We were not the first to think along these lines. Ju/’hoansi Master Trackers have assisted scientists in the interpretation of hominin tracksites in French caves, and prehistoric tracks in the rock art record in Namibia. However, we knew that our often poorly preserved tracksites in aeolianites (cemented dunes) might present a stiffer challenge.
Our purpose was to compare our own interpretations of fossil trackways with those of the Master Trackers, and possibly find some we had overlooked. As we’ve set out in a recently published paper with the Ju/’hoansi trackers and our colleague Jan De Vynck as co-authors, they did exactly this, confirming the first fossil hyena trackway ever to be found.
Swapping techniques
The Late Pleistocene is not that far distant from the present (a mere 125,000 years), and many of the species that made tracks on the Cape south coast then are still with us. Some are extinct but have recognisable tracks, like the giant long-horned buffalo and giant Cape zebra.
We knew, though, that tracking in Kalahari sand, like the Ju/’hoansi do, is not the same as tracking on Pleistocene rock surfaces. Many of our tracks are preserved on the undersides of ceilings and overhangs, or are evident in profile in cliff exposures. Our track-bearing surfaces are usually small, and present no associated signs. We can’t follow the spoor for any distance. We don’t know at what time of day the tracks were made or the role of dew, and we have never succeeded in actually tracking down our quarry. Coprolites – fossilised droppings – are seldom found conveniently beside the tracks of the depositor.
We showed our new colleagues known fossil tracksites, without providing our own interpretations. #oma and /uce discussed these between themselves and presented their conclusions about what had made the tracks and how the animal had been behaving. We then shared our insights and our 3D photogrammetry data where applicable, and reached joint conclusions.
Soon they were identifying freshly exposed tracksites without our input, and were providing fascinating, new interpretations for sites which had puzzled us. For example, they saw ostrich tracks which we had missed, beside ostrich egg remnants, and concluded that we were probably looking at a fossilised ostrich nest. On another occasion they pointed out the distinctive track pattern of a scrub hare on the hanging wall of an eroded piece of cliff.
First fossilised hyena trackway
One of the most memorable experiences involved a 400,000-year-old trackway on a rock surface at Dana Bay, identified a few years earlier by local geologists Aleck and Ilona Birch. This rock had only been transiently exposed for a few days in the past decade, usually being covered by beach sand.
Our earlier interpretation had been that the trackmaker might have been a hyena, probably the brown hyena.
We were vindicated when our master tracker colleagues independently reached the identical conclusion. Examining our digital 3D images together fortified our collective judgement.
This was a big deal: it was the first fossil hyena trackway to be confidently identified, as previous examples had involved only individual tracks or poorly preserved possible trackway segments. Hyena trackways are distinctive: the forefoot tracks are substantially larger than those of the hindfoot.
Different ways of seeing
Both of us are privileged to have university degrees and institutional affiliations. But there is another way in which acumen can be measured: the ability to use the ancient methods of discernment and pattern recognition to support and feed one’s family and community through tracking, hunting and gathering.
What we have demonstrated, we believe, is a novel confluence of old and new ways to reveal fascinating features of the past. We use geological understanding, satellite technology, paleontological databases, tracking manuals and sophisticated dating methods. But hunter-gatherers see what escapes us and our drones: obscure strokes and enigmatic configurations on time-beaten surfaces. They tap an alternative knowledge base, both culturally received and cultivated from childhood.
The follow-through challenge must be to develop this partnership for mutual discovery and reward, understanding the past to better equip us for our uncertain future.
Clive Thompson is a trustee of the Discovery Wilderness Trust, a non-profit organization that supports environmental conservation and the fostering of tracking skills.
Charles Helm does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
A new archaeological discovery at Kach Kouch in Morocco challenges the long-held belief that the Maghreb (north-west Africa) was an empty land before the arrival of the Phoenicians from the Middle East in around 800 BCE. It reveals a much richer and more complex history than previously thought.
Everything found at the site indicates that during the Bronze Age, more than 3,000 years ago, stable agricultural settlements already existed on the African coast of the Mediterranean.
This was at the same time as societies such as the Mycenaean flourished in the eastern Mediterranean.
Our discovery, led by a team of young researchers from Morocco’s National Institute of Archaeology, expands our knowledge of the recent prehistory of north Africa. It also redefines our understanding of the connections between the Maghreb and the rest of the Mediterranean in ancient times.
How the discovery was made
Kach Kouch was first identified in 1988 and first excavated in 1992. At the time, researchers believed the site had been inhabited between the 8th and 6th centuries BCE. This was based on the Phoenician pottery that was found.
Nearly 30 years later, our team carried out two new excavation seasons in 2021 and 2022. Our investigations included cutting-edge technology such as drones, differential GPS (global positioning systems) and 3D models.
A rigorous protocol was followed for collecting samples. This allowed us to detect fossilised remains of seeds and charcoal.
Subsequently, a series of analyses allowed us to reconstruct the settlement’s economy and its natural environment in prehistoric times.
What the remains revealed
The excavations, along with radiocarbon dating, revealed that the settlement underwent three phases of occupation between 2200 and 600 BCE.
The earliest documented remains (2200–2000 BCE) are scarce. They consist of three undecorated pottery sherds, a flint flake and a cow bone.
The scarcity of materials and contexts could be due to erosion or a temporary occupation of the hill during this phase.
In its second phase, after a period of abandonment, the Kach Kouch hill was permanently occupied from 1300 BCE. Its inhabitants, who probably numbered no more than a hundred, dedicated themselves to agriculture and animal husbandry.
They lived in circular dwellings built from wattle and daub, a technique that combines wooden poles, reeds and mud. They dug silos into the rock to store agricultural products.
Analysis shows that they cultivated wheat, barley and legumes, and raised cattle, sheep, goats and pigs.
They also used grinding stones for cereal processing, flint tools, and decorated pottery. In addition, the oldest known bronze object in north Africa (excluding Egypt) has been documented. It is probably a scrap metal fragment removed after casting in a mould.
Interactions with the Phoenicians
Between the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, during the so-called Mauretanian period, the inhabitants of Kach Kouch maintained the same material culture, architecture and economy as in the previous phase. However, interactions with Phoenician communities that were starting to settle in nearby sites, such as Lixus, brought new cultural practices.
For example, circular dwellings coexisted with square ones made of stone and wattle and daub, combining Phoenician and local construction techniques.
Furthermore, new crops began to be cultivated, like grapes and olives. Among the new materials, wheel-made Phoenician ceramics, such as amphorae (storage jugs) and plates, and the use of iron objects stand out.
Around 600 BCE, Kach Kouch was peacefully abandoned, perhaps due to social and economic changes. Its inhabitants likely moved to other nearby settlements.
So who were the Bronze Age inhabitants?
It’s unclear whether the Maghreb populations in the Bronze Age lived in tribes, as would later occur during the Mauretanian period. They were probably organised as families. Burials suggest there were no clear signs of hierarchy.
They may have spoken a language similar to the Amazigh, the indigenous north African language, which did not become written until the introduction of the Phoenician alphabet. The cultural continuity documented at Kach Kouch suggests that these populations are the direct ancestors of the Mauretanian peoples of north-west Africa.
Why this matters
Kach Kouch is not only the first and oldest known Bronze Age settlement in the Maghreb but also reshapes our understanding of prehistory in this region.
The new findings, along with other recent discoveries, demonstrate that north-west Africa has been connected to other regions of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Sahara since prehistoric times.
Our findings challenge traditional narratives, many of which were influenced by colonial views that portrayed the Maghreb as an empty and isolated land until it was “civilized” by foreign peoples.
As a result, the Maghreb has long been absent from debates on the later prehistory of the Mediterranean. These new discoveries not only represent a breakthrough for archaeology, but also a call to reconsider dominant historical narratives. Kach Kouch offers the opportunity to rewrite north Africa’s history and give it the visibility it has always deserved.
We believe this is a decisive moment for research that could forever change the way we understand not only the history of north Africa, but also its relationship with other areas of the Mediterranean.
Hamza Benattia, director of the Kach Kouch Archaeological Project, received funding from the National Institute of Archaeology and Heritage of Morocco (INSAP), the Prehistoric Society Research Fund, the Stevan B. Dana Grant of the American Society of Overseas Research, the Mediterranean Archaeological Trust Grant, the Barakat Trust Early Career Award, the Centre Jacques Berque Research Grant, the Institute of Ceutan Studies Research Fund and the University of Castilla La Mancha.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jannes Landschoff, Marine biologist at Sea Change and Research Associate at Stellenbosch University’s Department of Botany and Zoology., Stellenbosch University
South Africa’s marine realm is globally unique because of the two major ocean currents that meet here. The cold, slow-moving Benguela and the warm, fast-flowing Agulhas currents create a special environment that supports high levels of biodiversity. Over 13,000 marine species are currently known to live in these waters. About 30% of these are endemic, meaning they occur nowhere else.
Biodiversity metrics (the number or abundance of species) are dominated by invertebrates such as sponges, bivalves and crustaceans. These are usually small, which makes them adaptable and versatile. In terms of numbers, invertebrates make up a vast majority of marine life.
I have been involved in marine biodiversity research for the last 10 years and have worked with teams of researchers, biology students and citizen scientists from across the country. I have also been involved in the naming and classification of organisms.
In South Africa, where there is still much to discover, one focus of my work is identifying new species.
Looking at subtle differences and finding similarities in how tiny organisms evolved in different regions is a global effort. In my own work, carried out together with many experts, there are three finds that have been particularly exciting – a “walking sponge” (Suberites ambulodomos), a tiny clam (Brachiomya ducentiunus) and a rare and miniature isopod (Pseudionella pumulaensis).
Long-term efforts to identify new species like these guide effective conservation. They help to ensure that critical habitats are protected.
These three newly described species may seem small and insignificant individually. However, small species make up the foundation of the food chain and play vital roles in nutrient cycling and in promoting biodiversity.
The walking sponge
First, there’s Suberites ambulodomos, or the “walking sponge”. This animal forms a unique partnership with hermit crabs. It settles on the tiny shell of a very young hermit crab. As the sponge grows it overgrows the shell completely, many hundred times in size and volume.
As a result, the crab – which usually needs to search for a bigger shell as it grows – never outgrows its home. Instead, it carries the sponge with it.
This is the first symbiotic relationship of its kind recorded in South African waters. This hermit-crab associated sponge was described in a collaborative effort by South African researchers at several institutes including the universities of the Western Cape, Johannesburg and Cape Town.
The tiny clam
Next is Brachiomya ducentiunus, a small clam that lives in the spaces between the spines of a heart urchin. The heart urchin burrows into shallow gravel and spends its life largely hidden, feeding on food fragments trapped in the sand.
It was discovered in Pumula, KwaZulu-Natal, a region known for its high biodiversity. This isopod has a rather sinister survival strategy: it attaches to the gills of hermit crabs and feeds on their body fluids. Only two specimens have ever been found: a female measuring 2–3 millimetres and an even smaller male, so tiny it was almost missed entirely during the discovery process. I discovered it by chance during my PhD research on hermit crabs, while photographing and zooming in to the smallest details to carry out this work.
Parasites tend to be small and hidden on, or inside, their hosts. They can be overlooked. However, they are vital to understanding biological processes as they regulate populations and are main drivers of evolution.
Pseudionella pumulaensis is the first of its genus in the entire Indian Ocean, a testament to how much more marine life we have yet to uncover. With my local support the isopod was described by an international expert at Hofstra University, New York, and published through the Senckenberg Ocean Species Alliance, a collaborative global initiative to advance marine taxonomy.
Biodiversity knowlege can help save our heritage
The majority of species on Earth remain unidentified. Over 242,000 marine species have been described globally, but the actual number of living ocean species may exceed one million. Many species remain undiscovered, and a large proportion of those already identified are poorly understood. We’re now racing against extinction to learn about and from them before it’s too late.
There is a lack of funding and job opportunities in discovering new species. In fact, the field of taxonomic expertise may now be as endangered as many of the ecosystems and species it seeks to document.
There are no simple, fast-track solutions to the biodiversity crisis – the threat of species extinction combined with vast, unexplored diversity, and the lack of expertise and resources to address this at scale. However, biodiversity initiatives that work collaboratively locally and globally to share expertise offer hope.
Discoveries like these three new species from South Africa emphasise the need for continued exploration. Each species described brings us one step closer to understanding our oceans’ rich biodiversity and finding new ways to protect it.
(Tatjana Baleta, a University of Exeter Wikimedia Fellow for Climate at the Global Systems Institute, was instrumental in producing the first draft submission of this article.)
Jannes Landschoff works for the Sea Change Project, leading the science and storytelling initiative “1001 Seaforest Species” that is primarily funded by and in collaboration with the Save Our Seas Foundation
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola, Senior Research Associate, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations University
Extreme climate events — floods, droughts and heatwaves — are not just becoming more frequent; they are also more severe.
It’s important to understand how communities can recover from these events in ways that also build resilience to future events.
In a recent study, we analysed how communities affected by the extreme flood events of 2021 in Germany’s Ahr Valley and in Lagos, Nigeria, grappled with recovery from floods.
Our aim was to identify the factors – and combinations of factors – that served as barriers (or enablers) to recovery from disasters.
We found that financial limitations, political interests and administrative hurdles led to prioritising immediate relief and reconstruction over long-term sustainable recovery.
We concluded from our findings that the success of recovery efforts lies in balancing short-term relief and a long-term vision. While immediate aid is essential after a disaster, true resilience hinges on proactive measures that address systemic challenges and empower communities to build a better future.
Recovery should not be merely action-oriented and building back infrastructure (engineering). It should also include insights in other areas, like governance and psychology, helping people to deal with losses and to heal.
What worked
To understand the recovery pathways of the two regions, we reviewed relevant literature, newspaper articles and government documents. We also interviewed government agencies, NGO representatives, volunteers and local residents in the communities where these floods occurred.
We found that in the Ahr Valley, recovery wasn’t just about rebuilding structures, it was about empowering individuals.
Through initiatives like mental health and first aid courses, residents learned to support one another. This fostered a sense of community and resilience that was essential for meeting the emotional challenges posed by the disaster.
The focus on rebuilding with a sustainable vision also included environmental initiatives. For example, a type of heating system was put in place that didn’t rely on fossil fuels.
Not only did this reduce carbon emissions, it also served as a symbol of hope. It showed there was an opportunity to create a more sustainable and environmentally friendly community.
In Lagos, too, residents found strength in community and innovation. Grassroots efforts using sustainable materials like bamboo and palm wood highlighted the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the people. Faith-based organisations provided material aid as well as emotional and spiritual support. This reinforced the bonds that held the community together.
Each community faced unique challenges. But they shared a common thread: the importance of adaptive governance – flexible decision-making and strong community ties.
For example, established building codes in the Ahr Valley provided a framework for reconstruction, ensuring that new structures were resilient and safe.
In Lagos, the absence of strong government support highlighted the critical role of community organisations in providing services and fostering a sense of shared responsibility.
What needs improvment
In both the Ahr Valley and Lagos, the journey towards recovery has been fraught with obstacles as well.
In the Ahr Valley, bureaucratic red tape has become a formidable barrier. Residents, eager to rebuild their lives, find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations and lengthy approval processes. This has delayed their access to insurance and recovery funds. Waiting for months or even years has eroded hope and fuelled a sense of abandonment.
Meanwhile, in Lagos, insufficient government support has left communities to fend for themselves, creating a breeding ground for uncertainty and conflict.
Land tenure disputes, fuelled by a lack of clear property rights, sow seeds of distrust and hinder resettlement efforts. Political disagreements complicate the picture, as competing interests divert attention and resources away from those who need them most.
In Lagos, none of the respondents reported having insurance to help them to recover from disaster-related losses.
While some residents in the Ahr Valley did have insurance, many were under-insured.
The Ahr Valley’s building codes offer a framework for reconstruction. But it’s clear that processes should be streamlined so communities can take ownership of their recovery.
In Lagos, the importance of robust social safety nets is clear. Partnerships between communities and authorities are also needed.
A different approach
Recovery isn’t a separate process that occurs after disasters only. It should be seen as an essential part of managing risks. It’s important to understand what recovery involves and what resources are needed.
This will help reduce future risks and increase resilience after extreme events.
Governments should encourage flexible governance structures that value community voices and local knowledge to enable recovery. A good example is the New Orleans Recovery Authority, established after Hurricane Katrina. It involved local residents and city officials in planning and rebuilding efforts.
Grassroots efforts in Lagos demonstrated the power of sustainable materials and community-led initiatives. Seeing things from the community’s point of view can help tailor solutions that fit the situation and adapt to evolving challenges.
Training and capacity-building programmes empower communities to be active in their own recovery.
Mental health and first aid courses were successful in the Ahr Valley. Equipping individuals with skills in sustainable practices and disaster preparedness helps weave a social fabric capable of weathering future storms.
Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola is a Visiting Scientist at, the United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)
Saskia E. Werners works with United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). She is grateful to have received research grants in support of her research on climate change adaptation and recovery.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Steven Matome Mathetsa, Senior Lecturer at the African Energy Leadership Centre, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand
South Africa’s state-owned electricity company, Eskom, has applied to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa to approve a 36.1% electricity price hike from April 2025, a 11.8% price increase in 2026 and an 9.1% increase in 2027. Steven Mathetsa teaches and researches sustainable energy systems at the University of the Witwatersrand’s African Energy Leadership Centre. He explains some of the problems with the planned tariff increase.
Why such a big hike?
Eskom says the multi-year price increase is because of the need to move closer a cost-reflective tariff that reflects the actual costs of supplying electricity.
Some companies have installed their own generation capacity, and individuals have moved to rooftop solar systems. As a result electricity sales have fallen by about 2% , resulting in a drop in revenue.
There’s a knock on effect for municipalities, the biggest distributors of electricity, which have also been forced to hike tariffs in line with Eskom’s increases.
All these costs are passed onto the consumers.
What will the impact be on South Africans?
If the hike is approved it will certainly worsen the economic difficulties facing
South Africa. One of the most unequal countries in the world, South Africa has an extremely high unemployment rate – 33.5%at the last count.
Exorbitant increases in electricity costs aggravate these problems.
South Africans and businesses in the country have little choice about where they source their energy. Eskom is still the sole supplier for nearly all the country’s electricity needs. This means that ordinary citizens are likely to continue relying on electricity supplied by Eskom, irrespective of the costs.
The high costs affect businesses negatively. Large industrial and small, medium, and micro enterprises have all highlighted that costs associated with utilities, mainly electricity, are affecting their sustainability.
The Electricity Regulation Amendment Act implementation will make major changes to Eskom. The reforms establish an independent Transmission Systems Operator tasked with connecting renewable energy providers to the grid. This will allow the creation of a competitive market where renewable energy providers can sell power to the grid.
But it’s not yet clear if these changes will address the issue of exorbitant electricity price rises.
What are the problems?
The country’s energy frameworks are drafted on the basis of the World Energy Trilemma Index. The index promotes a balanced approach between energy security, affordability, and sustainability. In other words, countries must be able to provide environmentally friendly and reliable electricity that their residents can afford.
South Africa is currently unable to meet these goals because of different energy policies that do not align, a lack of investment in electricity and dependency on coal-fired power. Electricity is increasingly becoming unaffordable in the country. Although there’s been a recent reprieve from power cuts, security of supply is still uncertain.
Furthermore, over 78% of the country’s electricity is produced by burning coal. This means South Africa is also far from attaining its 2015 Paris Agreement greenhouse gas reduction goals.
The country has made some inroads into improving security of supply. To date, recent interventions have resulted in over 200 days without power cuts. This should be commended. The same focus must be placed on ensuring that electricity remains affordable while giving attention to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.
The question is whether the country’s electricity tariff methodology is flexible enough to accommodate poor South Africans, especially during these challenging economic times.
In my view, it is not. In its current form, vulnerable communities continue to foot the bill for various challenges confronting Eskom, including financial mismanagement, operational inefficiencies, municipal non-payment, and corruption.
I believe the following steps should be taken.
Firstly, South Africa should revise its tariff application methodologies so that consumers, especially unemployed and impoverished people, are protected against exorbitant increases.
Secondly, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa should strengthen its regulations to ensure its compliance and enforcement systems are effective. For example, Eskom should be held accountable when it does not deliver efficient services or mismanages funds, and be transparent about costs associated with its processes. Municipalities should also be held accountable for non-payment and other technical issues they regularly struggle with. Both affect the revenue of the power utility.
Thirdly, the government must make sure that price increases are affordable and don’t hurt the broader economy. It can do this by adjusting its policies to make sure that increases in electricity tariffs are in line with the rate of inflation.
Fourthly, communities can play a vital role in saving electricity at a household level. This will reduce the country’s overall energy consumption. Furthermore, both small and large businesses should continue to consider alternative energy technologies while implementing energy saving technologies.
Lastly, the level of free-basic electricity is not sufficient for poor households. Subsidy policies should also be reviewed to allow users access to affordable electricity as their financial situation changes negatively.
Steven Matome Mathetsa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Karen Hofman, Professor and Programme Director, SA MRC Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science – PRICELESS SA (Priority Cost Effective Lessons in Systems Strengthening South Africa), University of the Witwatersrand
By 2030, non-communicable diseases will account for 75% of all deaths annually. Eighty percent of these will be in the global south. Most of these diseases are what we call silent killers: type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure and heart disease, as well as certain types of cancer at increasingly younger ages.
The consumption of sugary drinks and processed foods high in sugar, salt and saturated fats is fuelling these pandemics. And increasingly advertising is being seen as the means by which the consumption of unhealthy products is promoted. This translates into the growth of non-communicable diseases in populations across the globe. This rising threat is driven largely by the way in which markets and industries are organised, which, in turn, shapes social norms towards consumption of tobacco, alcohol, food and sugary beverages.
These products are heavily advertised. For example, in South Africa from 2013 to 2019, sugary beverage manufacturers spent US$191 million (R3.7 billion) to advertise their products. Many of the TV advertisements for sugary drinks were placed during child and family viewing time, between 3pm and 7pm.
Over the past decade a number of countries have introduced policies in a bid to limit the use and intake of harmful food and beverages. These have ranged from taxes on certain products, such as sugar, alcohol and tobacco, to bans on advertising. Many have proved effective. But there are still big gaps in policies to control these harmful products.
As academics who have researched this field for three decades we believe that the G20 can play a significant role in plugging these gaps. The countries under the G20 umbrella, which represent two thirds of the world’s population, have reason to act: all are experiencing a mounting burden of obesity-related illness such as diabetes, high blood pressure and cancer at ever-younger ages.
One of South Africa’s G20 presidency health priorities is “stemming the tide of non-communicable diseases”. In our view this is an invitation for the G20 to pledge to combat the drivers of non-communicable diseases.
The G20 can acknowledge that these diseases are part of a pathological system in which commercial actors are causing ill health. And G20 leaders can acknowledge that progress enacting health taxes has stagnated in most countries.
By galvanising attention in this way, the G20 can give impetus to a high level United Nations meeting in 2025 at which a new vision for the control and prevention of non-communicable diseases is due to be set. Health taxes and bans on marketing are focus areas.
What stands in the way of progress
Efforts by various countries to curb consumption of these harmful products have shown one thing clearly: there’s no silver bullet.
Nevertheless, evidence shows that consumers are responsive to price. This points to the fact that taxes are a key tool for decreasing demand, especially for young consumers.
There is also mounting evidence that health taxes are progressive for health at a population level – in other words they lead to better health outcomes. Research also shows that they scarcely affect overall employment, if at all.
But advances on alcohol and tobacco taxes are slow. And there has been little progress on taxes on sugary beverages.
In 2024, a report by a panel of experts showed that US$3.7 trillion in additional revenue could be generated over five years if all countries increased prices of tobacco, alcohol and sugary beverages by 50%.
This money is sorely needed to boost healthcare. Non-communicable diseases disproportionately affect the most poor and vulnerable and healthcare systems are increasingly unable to cope. Screening, diagnosis, medications and treatment are very expensive for both ministries of finance and at the household level, where health needs can result in catastrophic expenditure.
And taxes that generate a 50% increase in real prices of tobacco, alcohol and sugary beverages would save 50 million lives globally over 50 years.
Where to begin
We believe the G20 platform is a sound one on which to champion efforts to curb the consumption of harmful products. This is because half of the countries in the group have one or two policies for food such as taxes on sweetened beverages. Their experiences can therefore inform debates about how to protect the public from the fatal effects of diet-influenced diseases.
But building a solid foundation won’t be easy. What’s needed is for the G20 to put its weight behind these key points:
Promoting good health before people get sick should be an imperative because the cost of inaction in financial and human terms is just too high.
Promoting the case for raising tobacco taxes, because tobacco continues to cause the most death and illness. But taxation has stalled. Approximately 90% of smokers live in countries where cigarettes were equally or more affordable in 2022 than they were five years earlier.
A renewed focus on alcohol taxes, which have shown little improvement in the last decade. Alcohol excise taxes are not being used effectively.
Fresh impetus behind increasing the level of taxes as a percentage of the cost of sugar sweetened beverages. Evidence suggests that to be effective, taxes on sugar sweetened beverages should increase product prices by at least 20%.
Champion nutrition regulation when navigating the trade and nutrition policy environment. Trade policies can be inconsistent with health policies.
Lastly, push for stronger global monitoring frameworks to track corporate accountability in health. This should include clear conflict of interest policies, information management, and exposing when corporations try to shape their own evidence-base or discredit research that would be supportive of public health policies.
Susan Goldstein receives funding from the SAMRC, the NIHR and UNICEF. She is a Board Member of the Southern African Alcohol Policy Alliance: South Africa,
Karen Hofman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
When world leaders engage, the assumption is always that they engage on issues based on verified facts, which their administrative staff are supposed to prepare. Under this assumption, we thought the meeting at the White House on 21 May between South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and US president Donald Trump would follow this pattern.
Issues of agriculture, farming and land (and rural crime) were central to the discussions. What is clear to us as agricultural economists is that the skewed views expressed by Trump about these issues originate in South Africa. This includes Trump’s statement: “But Blacks are not farmers.”
In our work as agricultural economists, we have, in many pieces and books (our latest titled The Uncomfortable Truth about South Africa’s Agriculture), tried to present South Africans with the real facts about the political economy policy reforms and structural dimensions of South African agriculture.
Writing on these matters was necessary given that official data – agricultural census 2017, as well as the official land audit of 2017 – all provide an incomplete picture of the real state and structure of South African agriculture. The reason is that the agricultural census, which is supposed to provide a comprehensive and inclusive assessment of the size and structure of the primary agricultural sector, and the land audit, which was supposed to record the ownership of all land in South Africa, are incomplete in their coverage.
The incomplete and inaccurate official data provides fertile ground for radical statements by the left and the right – and novices on social media. This is why South Africa has to deal with falsehoods coming from the US. These include Trump’s statement that black people are not farmers in South Africa.
South Africa is to blame for providing inaccurate data to feed these false narratives.
The facts presented here should allow a more nuanced interpretation of South Africa’s farm structure. Firstly, there are more black farmers in South Africa than white farmers. And not all white commercial farm operations are “large-scale”, and not all black farmers are “small-scale”, “subsistence” or “emerging”. Most farm operations can be classified as micro, or small in scale.
This is important so that one doesn’t view South Africa’s agriculture as mainly white farmers. Indeed, we are a country of two agricultures with black farmers mainly at small scale and accounting for roughly 10% of the commercial agricultural output. Still, this doesn’t mean they are not active in the sector. They mainly still require support to expand and increase output, but they are active.
The facts
In the wake of the circus in the Oval Office, we were amazed by the total silence of the many farmers’ organisations in South Africa. We have not seen one coming out to reject all of Trump’s claims. The only thing we can deduce from this is that these falsehoods suit the political position of some farmer organisations. But at what cost? Will many of their members be harmed by trade sanctions or tariffs against South Africa? The US is an important market for South Africa’s agriculture, accounting for 4% of the US$13.7 billion exports in 2024.
When Ramaphosa highlighted the fact that crime, and rural crime in particular, has an impact on all South Africans and that more black people than white people are being killed, Trump’s response was disturbing, to say the least: “But Blacks are not farmers”. This requires an immediate fact check.
We returned to the text from our chapter in the Handbook on the South African Economy we jointly prepared in 2021. In the extract below, we discuss the real numbers of farmers in South Africa and try to provide a sensible racial classification of farmers to denounce Trump’s silly statement.
As highlighted earlier, the two latest agricultural censuses (2007 and 2017) are incomplete as they restricted the sample frame to farm businesses registered to pay value added tax. Only firms with a turnover of one million rands (US$55,500) qualify for VAT registration.
We were able to expand the findings from the censuses with numbers from the 2011 population census and the 2016 community survey to better understand the total number of commercial farming units in South Africa. The Community Survey 2016 is a large-scale survey that happened between Censuses 2011 and 2021. The main objective was to provide population and household statistics at municipal level to government and the private sector, to support planning and decision-making.
Data from the 2011 population census (extracted from three agricultural questions included in the census) shows that 2,879,638 households out of South Africa’s total population, or 19.9% of all households, were active in agriculture for subsistence or commercial purposes.
Only 2% of these active households reported an annual income derived from agriculture above R307,000 (US$17,000). This translates into 57,592 households that can be considered commercial farmers, with agriculture as the main or only source of household income. This corresponds in some way with the 40,122 farming businesses that are registered for VAT as noted in the 2017 agricultural census report.
If we use the numbers from the agricultural census it is evident almost 90% of all VAT-registered commercial farming businesses could be classified as micro or small-scale enterprises. If the farm businesses excluded from the census are accounted for under the assumption that they are too small for VAT registration, then the fact still stands that the vast majority of all farm enterprises in South Africa are small family farms.
There are, however, 2,610 large farms (with turnover exceeding R22.5 million (US$1.2 million per annum) which are responsible for 67% of farm income and employed more than half the agricultural labour force of 757,000 farm workers in 2017.
Another way to get to farm numbers is to use the 2016 Community Survey. Using the shares as shown in Table 2, we estimate there are 242,221 commercial farming households in South Africa, of which only 43,891 (18%) are white commercial farmers. (This is very much in line with the VAT registered farmers but also acknowledging the fact that many white farm businesses are not necessarily registered for VAT.)
Let’s consider only the agricultural households with agriculture as their main source of income, surveyed in the 2016 community survey. We end up with a total of 132,700 households, of whom 93,000 (70%) are black farmers. This reality is something that policy makers and farm organisations find very difficult to deal with and it seems that Trump also found this too good to be true.
We have tried here in a long winded way to deal with farm numbers and how to get to a race classification of farmers in South Africa. In the end we trust that we have managed to show that there are more black farmers in South Africa than white farmers. Their share in total output is smaller than that of their white counterparts. The National Agricultural Marketing Council puts black farmers’ share of agricultural production as roughly 10%. But these numbers are also incomplete and largely an undercount.
It will always be challenging to get to the real number of black farmers’ share of agricultural output as nobody would ever know whether the potato or the cabbage on the shelf came from a farm owned by a black farmer or a white person but operated by a black farmer, for example. As South Africans know, the labour on farms, in pack houses, distribution systems and retail are all black. So, the sweat and hard work of black South African workers are integral to the food supply chain in South Africa.
Let’s get these facts straight and promote them honestly.
Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).
Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hannah J. Dawson, Senior Lecturer, Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg
South Africa’s young people, aged 15 to 34, who make up more than 50% of the country’s working age population, bear a disproportionate burden of unemployment. They have done so for more than a decade. Of this group, those aged 15-24 face the highest barriers to the job market, according to data from Statistics South Africa. The majority of these young people live in the townships and informal settlements.
A new book, Making a Life: Young Men on Johannesburg’s Urban Margins, examines how young people in Zandspruit, an informal settlement on the outskirts of Johannesburg, make a life. Anthropologist Hannah Dawson explains why she chose Zandspruit for her research and shares her findings about the sociopolitical landscape of urban settlements.
Why the choice of Zandspruit for your research?
It started with my arrival there in 2011 to study a wave of political protests during local elections. This sparked a much longer research journey spanning more than a decade, which this book traces.
The settlement was established in the early 1990s and has grown into a densely populated area of around 50,000 people, across 14 pieces of land.
What sets Zandspruit apart is its location. It is near post-apartheid economic hubs such as Kya Sands, with its light industries and business parks, and Lanseria Airport, a growing freight and logistics hub earmarked for expansion under the Greater Lanseria Masterplan. It also borders affluent suburbs and golf estates. This makes it distinct from older, more isolated settlements in Johannesburg’s south. Its proximity to shopping malls, townhouse complexes, warehouses and commercial zones makes it a destination of choice for migrants. They include people seeking a foothold in the urban market from rural areas of South Africa as well as people from other parts of the African continent.
This proximity makes Zandspruit a case study for understanding how residents access urban job markets, and the connections between wage and non-wage economic activities.
What do your findings tell us about the lives of young people?
The book draws on research primarily with young men, whose work and lives I followed over ten years. It shows how young men on the urban margins navigate structural unemployment and inequality by forging social ties, asserting belonging, and pursuing alternative livelihoods within what I call Zandspruit’s “redistributive economy”. I use the phrase “making a life” to move beyond survival or income generation. A life is not only about securing food and shelter. It involves the pursuit of social connection, identity, place and dignity.
For many of the young men I came to know, this often involved turning down demeaning jobs in favour of self-initiated income strategies that offered greater autonomy. These included renting out shacks, running internet cafes or car washes, or operating as mashonisas (unregistered loan sharks). Such efforts reflect more than personal resilience – they reveal how men’s social position and connections within the settlement shape access to the more lucrative niches of the local economy.
These dynamics point to a broader condition facing young people in South Africa: deep and persistent material insecurity. Yet, they also show the ways in which young people, especially young men, are actively building lives in the face of profound uncertainty. They are crafting meaning and striving for something more in a context marked by chronic unemployment and inequality.
What did you learn about urban inequality and living on the urban margins?
The residents of Zandspruit are not equally poor or marginalised. A focus of the book is the division between “insiders” – long-term residents with access to property who earn rental income – and “outsiders” – new arrivals and immigrants who, as tenants, are more dependent on low-paid jobs. These distinctions shape access to land, housing, livelihoods and local recognition.
Most immigrants form a precarious tenant class, while landlords tend to be established residents with long-standing ties to the settlement. Zandspruit is a deeply stratified space where social connections, property access and local citizenship determine who belongs and who benefits. By tracing men’s positions as insiders or outsiders, the book shows how these inequalities shape their economic strategies and capacity to build a life on the urban margins.
What do you recommend in terms of public policy?
The book doesn’t make policy recommendations. However, it speaks to key public and policy debates. Media and policy narratives often portray unemployed youth as idle and disconnected from society, ignoring the complex, often invisible, economic activities and arrangements that structure their lives. While informal and unstable, these pursuits reflect resourcefulness, local knowledge, and a conscious rejection of degrading labour.
It challenges the idea that informal entrepreneurship can solve youth unemployment. Most enterprises are too precarious to lift young people out of poverty. It also questions the notion that informal settlements are simply ghettos of exclusion and poverty. Instead, it highlights the inequalities within the settlement and calls for greater attention to be paid to the local economies and social orders being forged within these spaces. Understanding these dynamics is crucial to rethinking how we respond to unemployment, the urban housing crisis and inequality in South Africa.
Hannah J. Dawson received funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission and the National Research Foundation.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lauren Graham, Professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of Johannesburg
More than a third of young South Africans are not in employment, education or training. This cohort of 3.4 million (37.1% of those aged 15–24) risks long-term joblessness. Discouragement – giving up looking for work – is also a risk, as the latest data show.
This has serious social and economic implications. Social and economic exclusion can lead to declining mental health, social drift, long-term dependence on grants and lost economic potential.
To help break this cycle, a research team we were part of piloted a Basic Package of Support programme that offered personalised coaching and referrals to services to tackle the barriers young people face. Between 2022 and 2024 we worked with 1,700 young people in three of South Africa’s nine provinces – Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The team worked in peri-urban areas where there were high rates of young people not in education, employment or training.
The initiative aimed to help young people clarify their goals and find pathways into relevant learning and earning an income.
The results of the programme showed improved mental health, reduced distress and a stronger sense of belonging. The findings show the power of targeted and multifaceted support to prevent social drift.
The programme and its participants
The pilot took place in three peri-urban communities with limited job and learning opportunities, and high rates of poverty and unemployment. We chose these areas for their high rates of young people who are not in education, employment or training.
Over half of the participants (51%) were aged 18-20, 43% were 21-24 and just under 6% were aged 25-27. While 51% had completed high school, 30% had grade 9-11, and under 2% had less than grade 9. A further 17% held a university degree. Most (77%) had been actively seeking work, or opportunities in training or volunteering (73%), when they started the programme.
Data were collected at intake and after three sessions. A monitoring survey after each coaching session was used to determine whether the participant was in any earning or learning opportunity.
The qualitative component included in-depth interviews with young people who had completed multiple coaching sessions. Interviews were conducted six to eight months after pilot sites were opened to explore participants’ situations, experiences of coaching, and any shifts in perspective.
The primary objective of this pilot phase was to assess the programme’s capability to:
engage and support disconnected young people
achieve anticipated outcomes, including improved sense of belonging, wellbeing and connection to learning or earning opportunities.
In general, feelings of being supported and having access to resources in their community were low among the participants: 18.33% reported having had low levels of support in general, from adults and from peers. Young men reported considerably higher access to peer support than women (9% of men rated peer support as low relative to 24% of women).
One-third of young people reported a lack of access to, or availability of, resources in their community. These resources included health, psychosocial, or training resources.
Research has also shown that spending a long time without learning or earning creates disillusionment and poor mental health, creating a cycle of chronic unemployment and social drift.
For these reasons we felt it was important to examine how the young people’s well-being had changed as they progressed through the programme. The programme involved:
reaching out to young people
conducting an assessment to understand where they wanted to go and the barriers they faced
coaching sessions
referrals to relevant services to overcome barriers
opportunites to take steps towards their planned objectives.
The research team saw positive changes in all emotional well-being indicators, including quality of life, anxiety, emotional distress, and sense of belonging. Participants also showed an interest in taking up available training and work opportunities. They showed improvements in the three key outcomes we examined for this pilot phase.
Firstly, participants felt supported, were more resilient, and had better mental health outcomes than before they completed three coaching sessions.
Secondly, they showed increased capacity, knowledge and resources to navigate and access the systems and services needed to realise their aspirations.
Thirdly, 40% of them took up available opportunities to learn and earn income after just three coaching sessions. Larger numbers of these young people connected to training or education opportunities than to job opportunities. This is hardly surprising in the context of low job growth.
Taken together, these findings showed that the young people felt more positive about their lives after completing three coaching sessions. They indicated that, prior to starting the programme, they had been feeling unhappy about life and lost about how to move forward in their lives.
Part of their frustration was not having anyone to talk to about how they were feeling.
A 21-year-old female participant said after completing round two:
I didn’t know where I was going in life, what I was going to do, I didn’t know where to start. It was a whole blank page for me.
A young man said after round one:
Before I got here, the way I was feeling I didn’t think I can do anything progressive about my life. I had finished high school, but I didn’t know what step to take from there and … I did try but nothing worked … Coaching helped me cope and feel more optimistic.
Next steps
The programme is based on the idea that some young people need more time and support to find their way back into work or education. This might mean connecting them to counselling, childcare, nutrition or social grants.
The pilot revealed high levels of emotional distress, echoing recent labour force data that shows growing discouragement in the working age population. It’s clear that skills training alone isn’t enough; many young people need broader, deeper support to reconnect and thrive.
Efforts to help young people become employable need to offer more support than simply skills training. People involved in the youth employability/youth employment policy and programming sector have to understand young people from a holistic point of view and take into account the significant barriers that poverty and deprivation continue to create. This is the only way to achieve employability programmes that make an impact.
Lauren Graham receives funding from the DSTI/NRF as the Interim Research Chair in Welfare and Social Development. The Basic Package of Support programme is funded by the Standard Bank Tutuwa Community Foundation, UNICEF, and the National Pathway Manager (Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator). Lauren Graham, in her capacity as co-project lead on the BPS, is a member of the National Pathway Management Network.
Ariane De Lannoy is affiliated with the University of Cape Town. Her research portfolio has a strong focus on youth unemployment and youth well-being. She is one of the principal investigators on the Basic Package of Support for youth who are NEET programme.
Coconut trees are iconic plants found across the world’s tropical regions. They’re called “nature’s supermarket” or the “tree of life” in several cultures because every part of the coconut tree is used. Its leaves can be used to thatch homes, its heart can be eaten and its roots have medicinal uses.
The refreshing liquid found within a young green coconut is a highly prized component of the coconut palm. Coconuts are unique in the world of fruits because they have a large internal cavity filled with water. Other fruits typically store water within individual cells or pulp.
I’m a food scientist who has carried out research on the properties of coconuts.
All coconut palms produce water, though some, like tall varieties, will produce more than others, like dwarf varieties. The water is sourced from the trees’ immature, green coconuts. As the coconut matures, the developing white flesh absorbs the water, resulting in less liquid in a fully ripe brown coconut.
So, how is this water reservoir created, and what factors influence it?
A coconut’s structure
To better understand how coconut water is formed, it is essential to grasp its anatomical structure. The coconut fruit is classified as a drupe, meaning it has three layers: the exocarp (the smooth, green outer layer seen in unripe coconuts), the mesocarp (a fibrous husk beneath the exocarp), and the endocarp (the hard, woody inner shell that protects the white flesh inside).
Within the endocarp, there are two components: the flesh (endosperm, a soft, jelly-like material in immature coconut that hardens as it matures) and the clear coconut water that fills the cavity. This water is a nutritive fluid nourishing the developing seed and is formed naturally during the development of the coconut fruit.
The water is a filtered sap that’s drawn up from the roots and transported through the tree’s vascular system (its water and nutrient transport system), specifically the xylem tissue.
The coconut tree’s extensive root system, ranging from 1 to 5 metres deep, absorbs groundwater – with dissolved nutrients – from the surrounding soil. The absorbed water is then transported upwards through the trunk and branches and finally to the fruit.
The fruit retains this water, stored in the cavity of the coconut. The accumulated water, with its rich nutrients, provides food to the developing endosperm (white flesh).
Therefore, coconut water is neither rainwater nor seawater stored inside, but carefully filtered and nutrient-rich clear liquid formed by the tree itself.
What is coconut water made of?
About 95% of coconut water is simply water, making it an excellent hydrating fluid.
The rest of the water is made up of various components, which are useful for us too.
Minerals (like sodium, potassium, magnesium and calcium) nourish human nerves and muscles; proteins (amino acids and enzymes) can help in metabolism in both the tree and humans; sugars (fructose and glucose) are responsible for the light sweetness and there are trace amounts of vitamins (vitamin C and B vitamins).
Many factors can influence the amount and quality of water in a coconut.
The age of the coconut is a critical determining factor. Immature, green coconuts (six to eight months) are usually full of water: between 300 millilitres and 1 litre. Mature coconuts (12 months and older) have low water levels as the liquid is partially absorbed by the endosperm.
High rainfall encourages greater accumulation of water, while drought conditions reduce the amount of water that can be transported to the fruit.
Healthy soils packed with minerals lead to high-quality and nutrient-rich coconut water. Poor or salty soils, lacking in minerals that can travel up the coconut tree to the fruit, will lead to low quality water.
Finally, unhealthy or diseased trees produce smaller-sized coconuts with little water.
Protecting coconuts
Coconut trees and coconut water are important to tropical economies across south-east Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean Sea territories, as well as the coastlines of central America and Africa.
Conserving the trees and their environment is therefore essential.
Sustainable farming practices, like soil management – including soil testing and organic composting – should be implemented to maintain the proper nutrient profile, which results in high-quality coconut water.
Additionally, protecting freshwater aquifers from saltwater intrusion along coastlines where coconuts grow is crucial for preserving the quality of this refreshing fluid. Drip irrigation and mulching can help maintain soil moisture for the required coconut water production.
Pest and disease management techniques (like intercropping coconuts with bananas or legumes), as well as integrated pest management, can contribute to healthy trees that produce large coconuts with ample water.
Gaston Adoyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Suleman Lazarus, Visiting Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science
This digital infrastructure includes reliable access to electricity and the internet, as well as digital tools such as proxy servers, spoofing software, phishing kits and virtual private networks. Those involved must possess technical competencies in areas like web development, social engineering and systems maintenance, skills that are critical for sustaining fraudulent operations behind the scenes.
Research on cybercrime is expanding in west Africa, particularly studies of Nigeria and Ghana. But Cameroon is understudied. This gap in research has obscured a pervasive problem in Cameroon: website developers who create digital storefronts for fraudsters.
Rather than focusing on the fraudsters themselves, our study examined the infrastructure that enables this fraud to happen and the hidden networks of actors who make deception possible. Our research sheds light on a little-known group of enablers: website developers in anglophone Cameroon who knowingly build fake shopping websites.
Through interviews with 14 website developers engaged in this illicit trade, we explored the socio-economic and political forces that drive their participation.
Our findings showed that a mix of economic hardship, social norms and cultural beliefs drive fraud enablement in Cameroon. Our study highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of cybercrime. The website developers in Cameroon do not fit the typical profile of a fraudster. They see themselves as skilled workers navigating a complex socio-political landscape where survival often comes before morality, given that Cameroon, under Paul Biya’s presidency of more than 40 years, has experienced widespread poverty, instability and an uncertain succession struggle.
To address fraud effectively, interventions must go beyond simply punishing offenders. Instead, efforts should focus on dismantling the structures that allow fraud to thrive, starting with those who enable it.
Why fraudsters choose this activity
A central theme emerging from our interviews was the impact of the Ambazonian Crisis, an ongoing separatist conflict in Cameroon’s anglophone regions. The crisis began as peaceful demonstrations in 2016 when trade unionists and lawyers protested against the mandatory use of the French language in schools and law courts. By 2017, these protests had turned violent as armed separatist groups emerged within the anglophone regions, engaging in sporadic conflict with government forces. The separatists called for the secession of the two anglophone regions, referring to them as Ambazonia. The conflict has since escalated. Reports estimate that the violence has led to approximately 6,000 civilian deaths, the displacement of 600,000 people within Cameroon, and the forced migration of over 77,000 people into Nigeria as refugees.
The website developers we interviewed described how daily gunfire, displacement and political instability had made it difficult to secure stable employment and find clients.
Interviewees cited frequent power outages and internet blackouts as barriers to working with legitimate clients.
As one developer put it:
There are times when we go without electricity or network for days. I might have a legitimate client, but if the power goes out, I lose the job. Fraudsters, on the other hand, don’t care about delays. They are always there with another request.
Ghost-town protests, where separatists enforce economic shutdowns and force people to stay in their homes, further limit opportunities for legitimate business. In this unstable environment, undertaking website development for fraudsters became one of the few steady income streams.
A second theme was spiritual beliefs. We found that spiritual beliefs had an impact on decision-making. Developers rationalised their work by distinguishing between fraud and fraud enablement. Directly perpetrating fraud against victims, they believed, carried spiritual consequences, while simply building websites for fraudsters did not. Some fraudsters in west Africa visit a so-called “juju priest”, who may demand animal sacrifice and even murder in return for their blessing. The website developers we spoke to did not want to get involved in this.
One of the developers shared his fears about spiritual repercussions:
Scammers who do rituals for money, they don’t last. Most of the time, you see them dying at the age of 20 or 30. I don’t want to be involved in that. But making websites? That’s different. I’m not the one taking the money.
A third theme in our findings was the Big Boy culture, a subculture that glorifies online fraud as a symbol of success. In some west African communities, fraudsters who display their wealth through expensive cars, clothes and lifestyles are seen as role models rather than criminals.
Vanesa, a developer, explained:
Everybody wants to chill with the Big Boys. Fraudsters want to be seen as superstars, and that means spending money like celebrities.
The normalisation of internet fraud in some circles has created a perception that financial success justifies the means by which it is achieved. While some developers disapproved of fraudsters’ extravagant lifestyles, others saw it as a model of economic survival to aspire to.
Rethinking fraud prevention
These findings challenge the simplistic notion that the internet inherently enables fraud. Instead, fraud thrives within a complex ecosystem that includes not just the perpetrators but also the enablers who facilitate deception for economic, political, and cultural reasons.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The shortage of blood for medical use is a global challenge. South Africa is not exempt. Blood collection organisations such as the South African National Blood Service struggle to meet the demand for blood products, because of insufficient blood donations and the scarcity of loyal blood donors.
To increase the numbers, the country’s blood donation organisations have focused on the recruitment of new donors and awareness initiatives, using research findings that look at what motivates, and what deters, people from donating blood. But little focus has been put on the behaviour of those who already donate.
I have conducted research in a bid to fill this gap. In a recent paper I examined factors influencing consumers’ intention to donate blood. In addition, in my recently completed PhD, I looked at the retention of existing blood donors and what drives their donation behaviour.
The research suggests that blood collection organisations need to shift focus from acquiring new blood donors to building relationships with existing blood donors. Existing donors are an important cohort because they are reliable, and have higher donation eligibility and lower recruitment costs.
The aim should be to drive loyalty.
I considered the use of technology to encourage people to donate blood regularly. I concluded from my findings that blood collection organisations should customise appeals to various types of donors. They need to appeal to people in a personalised way if they want to drive loyalty.
The drivers
To understand what drives donor loyalty, it was important to understand why people donate blood.
As part of my research, 658 blood donors completed the survey and I conducted interviews with 18 blood donors. The interviews revealed various reasons for donating blood. These included:
Awareness of the importance of donating blood
As one participant in my research put it:
I’ve been in and out of hospital for my kids and for my wife when she was pregnant. If I don’t donate, where are they going to get that blood from?
Contribution to society – saving or changing someone’s life
This was articulated by one person:
I’m past the point of only going for a reward, but I actually want to go, because I want to save someone’s life and do good in the community.
Moral responsibility
As one participant put it:
When I don’t donate blood, I feel bad because, as a universal donor, I could potentially be saving lives as my blood is not limited, as opposed to other groups.
Health-related benefits, like free health checks and the requirement to live a healthy lifestyle
Incentives
The gifts make me feel appreciated. It makes me want to donate more and more.
Beyond just donating blood, some donors also expressed that they shared their blood donation experiences with their friends, family, co-workers and on their social media platforms to encourage others to donate.
The use of technology
Findings from my PhD show that donors would like personalised communication from the blood collection organisations. This should include:
sharing information about blood donation achievements specific to them (the donor)
checking up on the donors who are not donating as they used to or may have stopped donating
following up on deferred donors to encourage them to return for a checkup and subsequent donation. Deferred donors are those who were unable to donate during a donation drive because they didn’t meet the donation requirements (for example they had low iron levels).
reminding donors of their upcoming donations.
Others shared that they would like more interactive communication beyond being told that they have saved three lives after donating blood. This could include sharing specific information about the impact of the donors donation – “your donation helped a cancer patient recover” – and stories to make their contribution more tangible.
What needs to be done
Research has shown that digital technologies have been used successfully to foster customer engagement, enhance customer experiences and satisfaction, facilitate communication and information-sharing, and offer opportunities to shape and influence behaviour. To achieve this, donor organisations have large amounts of donor data and other data (big data) which they can use to gain insights that can be used in the following ways.
Firstly, they should analyse donor data to identify patterns and segment donors based on factors such as how long an individual has been donating, donation frequency, blood type, location, and preferred communication channels.
This information can be used to tailor communication and engagement strategies to specific donor groups. Donors follow different donor paths over time and cannot be viewed as a single segment.
Secondly, organisations should monitor donation trends over time. This will help to understand seasonal fluctuations, identify peak donation periods, and anticipate potential donor needs. These insights can be used to plan targeted recruitment campaigns and allocate resources.
Thirdly, organisations should consider personalised communication. This could include:
Targeted nudging: timely and relevant communication, like reminders for upcoming donation appointments, personalised thank-you messages, information about the donation they have made or invitations to special donor events.
Multi-channel engagement: reaching donors through their preferred communication channels, such as email, SMS, or social media.
Loyalty programmes: rewarding frequent donors with exclusive merchandise, discounts or special recognition, based on individual donor preferences and donation history.
Gamification: using game-like elements to make communication and the donation process more engaging and fun, using challenges, leaderboards and badges to motivate donors and foster a sense of community.
Predictive analytics: using data history and past events to establish donor patterns and predicts future outcomes. This data can be used to identify donors who might lapse and reach out to them with personalised communication.
Relebohiseng Matubatuba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
