Category: AM-NC

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Nobel’s spotlight on our perilous path and how we change course

I want to start by congratulating Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha for their Nobel Peace Prize.

As a young diplomat almost 40 years ago, I was fortunate to be part of a UN disarmament fellowship programme and to visit Hiroshima. There, fellows had an opportunity to meet the hibakusha and I had a conversation with an ailing victim. I have carried to every meeting, to every negotiation, and to every posting, the memory this woman’s silent testimony. When I asked her about that morning in 1945, she struggled to express the horror in words. She tried to articulate some words but stayed silent. Looking at me, right into my eyes. The look in her eyes has stayed with me ever since, like a powerful reminder, a secret mandate, to work so that her suffering is never repeated.

For decades after the Second World War, the international community has been dealing with this unique dilemma: we built robust norms and passed nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. Instead of dozens of countries armed with nuclear weapons, as was the concern in the 1960s, there are less than ten. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons have shrunk from tens of thousands to thousands.

But on its journey through the perils of the atomic age, the world has come to a crucial crossroads. Our deep psychological connection caused by collectively seeing the horror of the consequences of nuclear war seems to be evaporating, taking with it our joint resolve to do everything possible to prevent a repetition.

Like a giant spotlight, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize has lit up our path ahead. It has done it, by reminding us of the past, and of the consequences of ignoring the perils of nuclear weapons use.

Context of conflicts

To understand the important challenges we face, we must look at the global context, at what is happening around the world.  

War has returned to Europe, and it directly involves a nuclear weapon state. The conflict in Ukraine is also an indirect confrontation between the world’s biggest nuclear weapon states, the first since the end of the Cold War. But nuclear exercises and open references to the use of nuclear weapons in the theatre of this war are increasing the risks and can not be ignored.

In the Middle East, the conflict of the past year has ignited smoldering tensions between Israel and Iran and led to the unprecedented step of direct exchanges and attacks between the two. Here there is also a nuclear weapons dimension. On one side, the assumed presence of nuclear weapons looms in the background. On the other, the very real potential of nuclear proliferation is raising the stakes.

We find ourselves in a harmful loop: the erosion of the restraints around nuclear weapons is making these conflicts more dangerous. Meanwhile, these conflicts are contributing to the erosion of the restraints. The vicious circle dynamic is in motion.

An unfortunate change of direction

Doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons are being revised or reinterpreted. The quantity and quality of nuclear weapon stockpiles are being increased. 

And in some non-nuclear weapon states – states that are important in their region – leaders are asking “why not us?”. And they are asking this openly!

At the start of the nuclear arms race, J Robert Oppenheimer described the USSR and the US as “two scorpions in a bottle” each capable of killing the other, but only by risking their own life.

Oppenheimer’s blunt statement would later be developed and elaborated under the roof of deterrence and the more sophisticated concept of “Mutual Assured Destruction,” or MAD.

Today, independent of the vantage point of the observer, there is widespread concern that the risk of mutual destruction through nuclear war is higher than it has been for more than a generation.

Lessons from history

But it does not have to be this way. We can do better. History has shown that effective dialogue among superpowers has, more often than not, led to confidence and, as a result, also to arms limitation and even disarmament. At certain moments in history, world leaders took the right decisions, to tone down, or, to use today’s parlance, to de-escalate. Let’s see:

The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis happened thanks to the direct engagement of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and US President John F Kennedy. Decades later, at the Geneva Summit of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan agreed a crucial axiom: “Nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.” They met again the next year in Reykjavik and significant reductions in nuclear arsenals followed. Nuclear weapon reductions and the elimination of a whole category of weapon, through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty, were agreed. These steps towards rapprochement took leadership and courage. They often happened despite skepticism and voices against them.

Diplomacy and dialogue (and the duty of nuclear weapon states)

A return to diplomacy and dialogue is urgently needed, and this, not only in things nuclear. Shutting the other side out has never solved a problem and almost certainly aggravates it. Top leadership involvement is simply indispensable when nuclear weapons are involved. President Trump took the initiative and talked to Kim Jong Un. More of this is needed. Some have said these talks were ill prepared. I say, this is important. Nuclear weapon policy and limitations does not work bottom up. It is of course the other way around.

We must be proactive in building the trust and protections that lower the risk of close calls and of brinkmanship, especially during today’s tensions. Not taking active steps means we rely on luck – or the assumption that the other side will show restraint – to save us from nuclear war. The longer you rely on luck, the more likely it is to run out.

Conflict and tensions compel nations to arm themselves. Diplomacy and compromise create conditions in which they can disarm.

The road to a nuclear weapon-free world is long and winding. The disarmament landscape is complex, and it’s worth acknowledging that. This does not diminish the responsibility nuclear weapons states have to make progress. After all, they committed themselves to this goal back in 1968, through the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Steps can be taken to decrease the reliance on nuclear weapons, both in their production and the scenarios for their use.

Nuclear weapon states, through their actions at home and on the world stage, have a responsibility to avoid a scenario in which more countries seek nuclear weapons. Pushing ahead with increases in arsenals leads to despair, cynicism, and a growing skepticism about the value of past commitments. Disengagement and unilateralism fuel sentiments of vulnerability in other countries, and with that, the notion nuclear weapons could be the ultimate protection against outside threats.

Engagement among the five permanent members of the Security Council is indispensable. Such engagement can take many different shapes, starting with direct contact among themselves, bilaterally or as a group. This dialogue, which still exists, has been reduced to a very low level, virtually without real impact. Perhaps its revival could be assisted by an international organization, or facilitated with the support of a respected, impartial leader. Therefore, it’s essential that the United Nations, other international organizations, and their leaders work effectively to ensure their continued relevance amid the changing needs of their stakeholders.

Do not make things worse (by falling for the siren call of proliferation)

The IAEA has played its indispensable technical role during past attempts of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the Middle East. As the difficult experiences in Iraq, Libya and Syria remind us, the draw of nuclear weapons is real and so is the geopolitical and military response.

Today’s tensions are prompting even leaders of important counties that, so far, are in good standing with the NPT to ask: “Why shouldn’t we have a nuclear weapon too?”

To this, I would say, “Do not make things worse.” Acquiring a nuclear weapon will not increase national security, it will do the opposite. Other countries will follow. And this will contribute to the unravelling of a nonproliferation regime that has had its ups and downs – and it still has its limitations – but none-the-less it has served humanity extraordinarily well. The problem and challenge to the NPT regime may come from those nuclear armed but also those who, while not having nuclear weapons, may feel the NPT has failed as a catalyst to disarmament.

Weakening the non-proliferation treaty under the argument that progress on nuclear disarmament has been slow and more drastic approaches are required, would be totally misguided and may make us throw away existing international measures committing nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in this field.

I come from a non-nuclear weapon state. I understand the frustration that some people feel about the “haves” and “have-nots” of nuclear weapons. But I have also seen the legacy of peace and prosperity left by leaders who resisted that siren call. In the 1980s, vision, resolve and dialogue meant Brazil and Argentina changed course and did not go down the path to nuclear arms. Today, Latin America is a nuclear weapon free zone.

Multilateral leaders: step up by stepping in

Many wonder whether there’s still a role for multilateralism in guiding us through this maze of conflicting interests. Yes, there is. During difficult times in the past, international organizations have had a big impact on peace and security. But it only happens when leaders of these organizations get off the side lines and use their mandate and their own good offices effectively.

We prove our relevance in extraordinary times.   

Each organization has different tools, a different mandate, a different membership, and each of their leaders will determine how to act. I can speak for the IAEA.  We have nuclear science at our core, and we are the world’s nuclear weapons watchdog. Let me give you an example:

For almost three years, Ukraine, the world and the IAEA have been confronted with a completely unprecedented situation – never before has a military conflict involved the seizure of a nuclear power plant and been fought among the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

At the beginning of the war, Ukraine’s biggest nuclear power plant – the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe, with nearly 6 gigawatts of installed capacity – was taken by Russia. This established a hotspot in the middle of a combat zone. The chance of an incident – or accident – causing terrible radiological consequences became real.

Observing this from the outside was never, in my mind, an option. Staying on the sidelines and later reflecting on “lessons learned” may have been the more traditional – or expected – path for an international organization. But to me this would have been a dereliction of duty. So, we leaned into our core mission, crossed the front lines of war, and established a permanent presence of IAEA experts at all Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. That makes us the only international organization operating independently in occupied territory. We are informing the world of what’s going on and reducing the chance that a radiological incident enflames the conflict and causes even more devastation.

We did the same by going to Kursk when a Russian nuclear reactor was at risk of coming into the line of fire. I am in constant communication with both sides.

I have been meeting with President Zelenskyy, and President Putin regularly. Nuclear safety and security during this conflict must have the buy-in and continued involvement of both leaders. Talking to only one of them would not achieve this important goal. At the same time, I am keeping an open dialogue with leaders on all continents and briefing the UN Security Council. When it comes to nuclear safety in Ukraine it has been possible to build a level of agreement that is rare during the divisions of this conflict. Where there is agreement, there is hope for more agreement.

Ukraine is not our only hotspot.

In Iran, the IAEA’s job is to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of a growing nuclear programme. Iran has now enriched uranium to a level that is hard to justify. It has not yet answered the IAEA’s questions completely and it has made our work more difficult by taking away some of our cameras and blocking some of our most experienced safeguards inspectors from going into the country. This has caused concern and led to a pattern of mistrust and recriminations. In diplomacy, progress often requires prompting, catalyzing, and suggesting ways forward. This presents a role for an impartial, honest and effective broker. It is a role I, in my capacity as the IAEA’s Director General, have been playing. In fact, I returned from my latest visit to Tehran just a few weeks ago where I presented alternatives and ideas to reduce the growing tensions, and hopefully to retain Iran within the NPT and the non-proliferation norms.

The danger of playing it safe

When it comes to working on behalf of peace and security, playing it safe is dangerous.

Silence and indifference can be deadly.

Dag Hammerskjold, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, said: “It is when we all play safe that we create a world of utmost insecurity.”

A new path

This week, the Norwegian Nobel Committee looked beyond today’s conflicts. In its own way, it did not play it safe. Instead, it shined a light on the horrors of nuclear war and the people who have been warning us about them for many decades.

In doing that, the Nobel Committee, Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha have illuminated the danger of the path we are now on.

We have to make a new path.

First, the leaders of the nuclear weapon states must recognize the need for a responsible management of their nuclear arsenals. Experiences from the past confirm that even at times of crisis and conflict it has been possible to recognize the unique terminal power of these weapons and the responsibility that comes with it. What Kennedy, Khrushchev, Reagan, Gorbachev, or Trump did by reaching out to a nuclear-armed adversary, sets a precedent, a useful one. Such contacts, either bilateral or at the P5 level could possibly be facilitated by a competent broker. These are the first steps to bringing down the tone so that nuclear sabre rattling recedes and the commitments to the unequivocal undertakings to move towards a nuclear free world can be fulfilled.

Secondly, an iron-clad resolve to observe and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime needs to be adopted. Nuclear weapon and nuclear non-weapon states must work together to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We need to walk through perilous times by recognizing limitations and keeping our eyes on our common objectives.

Nuclear disarmament cannot be imposed on the nuclear armed.

Realism is not defeatism. Diplomacy is not weakness.

Difficult times call for enlightened leadership, at the national level, and at the international level as well.

Putting the international system back on track is within our reach. World leaders, including those at the top of the multilateral system, have a duty and an irrevocable responsibility to work towards this.  

Personally, I am convinced. Perhaps, because the secret mandate I received that day in Hiroshima from a hibakusha burns in me, stronger than ever. Thank you.