Category: Artificial Intelligence

MIL-OSI: Fusion Fuel Announces AGM Results: All Shareholder Proposals Approved

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

DUBLIN, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — via IBN – Fusion Fuel Green PLC (Nasdaq: HTOO) (“Fusion Fuel” or the “Company”), a leading provider of energy engineering, advisory, and utility solutions, today announced that all shareholder proposals were approved at the general meeting of shareholders held on June 25, 2025 (the “Annual General Meeting” or the “AGM”).

This fulfills the Nasdaq requirement, as part of the Company’s delisting notice, to hold an Annual General Meeting. In addition, shareholder approval of the first proposal paves the way for a planned share consolidation (“Share Consolidation”) of the Company’s Class A Ordinary Shares (with a nominal value of $0.0001 per share) (the “Class A Ordinary Shares”) intended to raise the share price of the Class A Ordinary Shares above Nasdaq’s $1.00 minimum bid price requirement and position the Company to resolve this outstanding item. The Company plans to share details on the Share Consolidation and its timeline in the near future.

John-Paul Backwell, CEO of Fusion Fuel, commented: “The AGM and the approval of all items mark another important step toward closing legacy issues and enabling management and the board of directors of the Company to focus on growth and delivering on the growth targets for the year. In particular, we look forward to continuing the strong trajectory of Al Shola Gas, advancing BrightHy Solutions, and executing on promising acquisition opportunities.”

About Fusion Fuel Green PLC

Fusion Fuel Green PLC (NASDAQ: HTOO) is an emerging leader in the energy services sector, offering a comprehensive suite of energy supply, distribution, and engineering and advisory solutions through its Al Shola Gas and BrightHy brands. Al Shola Gas provides full-service industrial gas solutions, including the design, supply, and maintenance of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) systems, as well as the transport and distribution of LPG to a broad range of customers across commercial, industrial, and residential sectors. BrightHy, the Company’s newly launched hydrogen solutions platform, delivers innovative engineering and advisory services enabling decarbonization across hard-to-abate industries.

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release includes “forward-looking statements.” Forward-looking statements may be identified by the use of words such as “estimate,” “plan,” “project,” “forecast,” “intend,” “will,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “seek,” “target”, “may”, “intend”, “predict”, “should”, “would”, “predict”, “potential”, “seem”, “future”, “outlook” or other similar expressions (or negative versions of such words or expressions) that predict or indicate future events or trends or that are not statements of historical matters. These forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, conditions or results, and involve a number of known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other important factors, many of which are outside the Company’s control, that could cause actual results or outcomes to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements. Fusion Fuel has based these forward-looking statements largely on its current expectations, which are based on assumptions as to future events that may not prove to be accurate, and are subject to inherent uncertainties, risks, and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Such forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties, including without limitation, those set forth in Fusion Fuel’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2025, which could cause actual results to differ from the forward-looking statements.

Investor Relations Contact
ir@fusion-fuel.eu
www.fusion-fuel.eu

Wire Service Contact:
IBN
Austin, Texas
www.InvestorBrandNetwork.com
512.354.7000 Office
Editor@InvestorBrandNetwork.com

The MIL Network –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI: Micron Technology, Inc. Reports Results for the Third Quarter of Fiscal 2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Record revenue in fiscal Q3 with growth across end markets
Fiscal Q4 revenue projected to grow another 15% sequentially

BOISE, Idaho, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Micron Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: MU) today announced results for its third quarter of fiscal 2025, which ended May 29, 2025.

Fiscal Q3 2025 highlights

Revenue of $9.30 billion versus $8.05 billion for the prior quarter and $6.81 billion for the same period last year
GAAP net income of $1.89 billion, or $1.68 per diluted share
Non-GAAP net income of $2.18 billion, or $1.91 per diluted share
Operating cash flow of $4.61 billion versus $3.94 billion for the prior quarter and $2.48 billion for the same period last year

“Micron delivered record revenue in fiscal Q3, driven by all-time-high DRAM revenue including nearly 50% sequential growth in HBM revenue. Data center revenue more than doubled year-over-year and reached a quarterly record, and consumer-oriented end markets had strong sequential growth,” said Sanjay Mehrotra, Chairman, President and CEO of Micron Technology. “We are on track to deliver record revenue with solid profitability and free cash flow in fiscal 2025, while we make disciplined investments to build on our technology leadership and manufacturing excellence to satisfy growing AI-driven memory demand.”

Quarterly Financial Results
(in millions, except per share amounts)	GAAP⁽¹⁾									Non-GAAP⁽²⁾
(in millions, except per share amounts)	FQ3-25			FQ2-25			FQ3-24			FQ3-25			FQ2-25			FQ3-24

Revenue	$	9,301		$	8,053		$	6,811		$	9,301		$	8,053		$	6,811
Gross margin		3,508			2,963			1,832			3,623			3,053			1,917
percent of revenue		37.7	%		36.8	%		26.9	%		39.0	%		37.9	%		28.1	%
Operating expenses		1,339			1,190			1,113			1,133			1,046			976
Operating income		2,169			1,773			719			2,490			2,007			941
percent of revenue		23.3	%		22.0	%		10.6	%		26.8	%		24.9	%		13.8	%
Net income		1,885			1,583			332			2,181			1,783			702
Diluted earnings per share		1.68			1.41			0.30			1.91			1.56			0.62

For the third quarter of 2025, investments in capital expenditures, net⁽²⁾ were $2.66 billion and adjusted free cash flow⁽²⁾ was $1.95 billion. Micron ended the quarter with cash, marketable investments, and restricted cash of $12.22 billion. On June 25, 2025, Micron’s Board of Directors declared a quarterly dividend of $0.115 per share, payable in cash on July 22, 2025, to shareholders of record as of the close of business on July 7, 2025.

Business Outlook

The following table presents Micron’s guidance for the fourth quarter of 2025:

FQ4-25	GAAP⁽¹⁾Outlook	Non-GAAP⁽²⁾Outlook
Revenue	$10.7 billion ± $300 million	$10.7 billion ± $300 million
Gross margin	41.0% ± 1.0%	42.0% ± 1.0%
Operating expenses	$1.35 billion ± $20 million	$1.20 billion ± $20 million
Diluted earnings per share	$2.29 ± $0.15	$2.50 ± $0.15

Further information regarding Micron’s business outlook is included in the prepared remarks and slides, which have been posted at investors.micron.com.

Investor Webcast

Micron will host a conference call on Wednesday, June 25, 2025 at 2:30 p.m. Mountain Time to discuss its third quarter financial results and provide forward-looking guidance for its fourth quarter. A live webcast of the call will be available online at investors.micron.com. A webcast replay will be available for one year after the call. For Investor Relations and other company updates, follow us on X @MicronTech.

About Micron Technology, Inc.

We are an industry leader in innovative memory and storage solutions transforming how the world uses information to enrich life for all. With a relentless focus on our customers, technology leadership, manufacturing, and operational excellence, Micron delivers a rich portfolio of high-performance DRAM, NAND, and NOR memory and storage products through our Micron® and Crucial® brands. Every day, the innovations that our people create fuel the data economy, enabling advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and compute-intensive applications that unleash opportunities — from the data center to the intelligent edge and across the client and mobile user experience. To learn more about Micron Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: MU), visit micron.com.

© 2025 Micron Technology, Inc. All rights reserved. Micron, the Micron logo, and all other Micron trademarks are the property of Micron Technology, Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release contains forward-looking statements regarding our technologies, demand for our products, our investments, our industry and our financial and operating results, including our expectations and guidance for the fourth quarter of 2025 and full fiscal year. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. Please refer to the documents we file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including our most recent Form 10-K and our upcoming Form 10-Q. These documents contain and identify important factors that could cause our actual results to differ materially from those contained in these forward-looking statements. These certain factors can be found at investors.micron.com/risk-factor. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance, or achievements. We are under no duty to update any of the forward-looking statements to conform these statements to actual results.

⁽¹⁾	GAAP represents U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
⁽²⁾	Non-GAAP represents GAAP excluding the impact of certain activities, which management excludes in analyzing our operating results and understanding trends in our earnings, adjusted free cash flow, and business outlook. Further information regarding Micron’s use of non-GAAP measures and reconciliations between GAAP and non-GAAP measures are included within this press release.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS (In millions, except per share amounts) (Unaudited)

	3rd Qtr.			2nd Qtr.			3rd Qtr.			Nine Months Ended
	May 29, 2025			February 27, 2025			May 30, 2024			May 29, 2025			May 30, 2024

Revenue	$	9,301		$	8,053		$	6,811		$	26,063		$	17,361
Cost of goods sold		5,793			5,090			4,979			16,244			14,485
Gross margin		3,508			2,963			1,832			9,819			2,876

Research and development		965			898			850			2,751			2,527
Selling, general, and administrative		318			285			291			891			834
Other operating (income) expense, net		56			7			(28	)		61			(267	)
Operating income (loss)		2,169			1,773			719			6,116			(218	)

Interest income		135			108			136			350			398
Interest expense		(123	)		(112	)		(150	)		(353	)		(426	)
Other non-operating income (expense), net		(68	)		(11	)		10			(90	)		(24	)
		2,113			1,758			715			6,023			(270	)

Income tax (provision) benefit		(235	)		(177	)		(377	)		(695	)		172
Equity in net income (loss) of equity method investees		7			2			(6	)		10			(11	)
Net income (loss)	$	1,885		$	1,583		$	332		$	5,338		$	(109	)

Earnings (loss) per share
Basic	$	1.69		$	1.42		$	0.30		$	4.79		$	(0.10	)
Diluted		1.68			1.41			0.30			4.75			(0.10	)

Number of shares used in per share calculations
Basic		1,118			1,115			1,107			1,114			1,104
Diluted		1,125			1,123			1,123			1,123			1,104

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (In millions) (Unaudited)

As of	May 29, 2025			February 27, 2025			August 29, 2024

Assets
Cash and cash equivalents	$	10,163		$	7,552		$	7,041
Short-term investments		648			663			1,065
Receivables		7,436			6,504			6,615
Inventories		8,727			9,007			8,875
Other current assets		945			963			776
Total current assets		27,919			24,689			24,372
Long-term marketable investments		1,402			1,375			1,046
Property, plant, and equipment		44,773			42,528			39,749
Operating lease right-of-use assets		628			637			645
Intangible assets		426			423			416
Deferred tax assets		483			552			520
Goodwill		1,150			1,150			1,150
Other noncurrent assets		1,616			1,699			1,518
Total assets	$	78,397		$	73,053		$	69,416

Liabilities and equity
Accounts payable and accrued expenses	$	8,761		$	6,176		$	7,299
Current debt		538			504			431
Other current liabilities		836			1,197			1,518
Total current liabilities		10,135			7,877			9,248
Long-term debt		15,003			13,851			12,966
Noncurrent operating lease liabilities		600			599			610
Noncurrent unearned government incentives		603			836			550
Other noncurrent liabilities		1,308			1,257			911
Total liabilities		27,649			24,420			24,285

Commitments and contingencies

Shareholders’ equity
Common stock		126			126			125
Additional capital		12,960			12,711			12,115
Retained earnings		45,559			43,839			40,877
Treasury stock		(7,852	)		(7,852	)		(7,852	)
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)		(45	)		(191	)		(134	)
Total equity		50,748			48,633			45,131
Total liabilities and equity	$	78,397		$	73,053		$	69,416

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS (In millions) (Unaudited)

Nine Months Ended	May 29, 2025			May 30, 2024

Cash flows from operating activities
Net income (loss)	$	5,338		$	(109	)
Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:
Depreciation expense and amortization of intangible assets		6,203			5,794
Stock-based compensation		722			620
Change in operating assets and liabilities:
Receivables		(123	)		(2,562	)
Inventories		148			(125	)
Other current assets		(206	)		(435	)
Accounts payable and accrued expenses		38			846
Other current liabilities		(681	)		769
Other		356			304
Net cash provided by operating activities		11,795			5,102

Cash flows from investing activities
Expenditures for property, plant, and equipment		(10,199	)		(5,266	)
Purchases of available-for-sale securities		(1,203	)		(1,110	)
Proceeds from government incentives		1,294			267
Proceeds from maturities and sales of available-for-sale securities		1,249			1,433
Other		(30	)		(35	)
Net cash used for investing activities		(8,889	)		(4,711	)

Cash flows from financing activities
Proceeds from issuance of debt		4,430			999
Repayments of debt		(3,604	)		(1,816	)
Payments of dividends to shareholders		(392	)		(384	)
Payments on equipment purchase contracts		—			(127	)
Other		(220	)		(40	)
Net cash provided by (used for) financing activities		214			(1,368	)

Effect of changes in currency exchange rates on cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash		(3	)		(15	)

Net increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash		3,117			(992	)
Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at beginning of period		7,052			8,656
Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at end of period	$	10,169		$	7,664

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES (In millions, except per share amounts)

	3rd Qtr.			2nd Qtr.			3rd Qtr.
	May 29, 2025			February 27, 2025			May 30, 2024

GAAP gross margin	$	3,508		$	2,963		$	1,832
Stock-based compensation		115			89			80
Other		—			1			5
Non-GAAP gross margin	$	3,623		$	3,053		$	1,917

GAAP operating expenses	$	1,339		$	1,190		$	1,113
Stock-based compensation		(148	)		(144	)		(137	)
Patent license charges		(57	)		—			—
Other		(1	)		—			—
Non-GAAP operating expenses	$	1,133		$	1,046		$	976

GAAP operating income	$	2,169		$	1,773		$	719
Stock-based compensation		263			233			217
Patent license charges		57			—			—
Other		1			1			5
Non-GAAP operating income	$	2,490		$	2,007		$	941

GAAP net income	$	1,885		$	1,583		$	332
Stock-based compensation		263			233			217
Patent license charges		57			—			—
Loss on debt prepayments		46			4			—
Other		1			—			3
Estimated tax effects of above and other tax adjustments		(71	)		(37	)		150
Non-GAAP net income	$	2,181		$	1,783		$	702

GAAP weighted-average common shares outstanding – Diluted		1,125			1,123			1,123
Adjustment for stock-based compensation		19			20			13
Non-GAAP weighted-average common shares outstanding – Diluted		1,144			1,143			1,136

GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.68		$	1.41		$	0.30
Effects of the above adjustments		0.23			0.15			0.32
Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share	$	1.91		$	1.56		$	0.62

RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES, Continued

	3rd Qtr.			2nd Qtr.			3rd Qtr.
	May 29, 2025			February 27, 2025			May 30, 2024

GAAP net cash provided by operating activities	$	4,609		$	3,942		$	2,482

Expenditures for property, plant, and equipment		(2,938	)		(4,055	)		(2,086	)
Payments on equipment purchase contracts		—			—			(45	)
Proceeds from sales of property, plant, and equipment		12			7			41
Proceeds from government incentives		266			963			33
Investments in capital expenditures, net		(2,660	)		(3,085	)		(2,057	)
Adjusted free cash flow	$	1,949		$	857		$	425

The tables above reconcile GAAP to non-GAAP measures of gross margin, operating expenses, operating income, net income, diluted shares, diluted earnings per share, and adjusted free cash flow. The non-GAAP adjustments above may or may not be infrequent or nonrecurring in nature but are a result of periodic or non-core operating activities. We believe this non-GAAP information is helpful in understanding trends and in analyzing our operating results and earnings. We are providing this information to investors to assist in performing analysis of our operating results. When evaluating performance and making decisions on how to allocate our resources, management uses this non-GAAP information and believes investors should have access to similar data when making their investment decisions. We believe these non-GAAP financial measures increase transparency by providing investors with useful supplemental information about the financial performance of our business, enabling enhanced comparison of our operating results between periods and with peer companies. The presentation of these adjusted amounts varies from amounts presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP and therefore may not be comparable to amounts reported by other companies. Our management excludes the following items as applicable in analyzing our operating results and understanding trends in our earnings:

Stock-based compensation;
Gains and losses from settlements;
Gains and losses from debt prepayments;
Restructure and asset impairments; and
The estimated tax effects of above, non-cash changes in net deferred income taxes, assessments of tax exposures, certain tax matters related to prior fiscal periods, and significant changes in tax law. The divergence between our GAAP and non-GAAP income tax provision relates to the difference in our GAAP and non-GAAP estimated annual effective tax rates, which are computed separately.

Non-GAAP diluted shares are adjusted for the impact of additional shares resulting from the exclusion of stock-based compensation from non-GAAP income.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP OUTLOOK

FQ4-25	GAAP Outlook	Adjustments		Non-GAAP Outlook

Revenue	$10.7 billion ± $300 million	—		$10.7 billion ± $300 million
Gross margin	41.0% ± 1.0%	1.0%	A	42.0% ± 1.0%
Operating expenses	$1.35 billion ± $20 million	$147 million	B	$1.20 billion ± $20 million
Diluted earnings per share⁽¹⁾	$2.29 ± $0.15	$0.21	A, B, C	$2.50 ± $0.15

Non-GAAP Adjustments (in millions)

A	Stock-based compensation – cost of goods sold	$	119
B	Stock-based compensation – research and development		93
B	Stock-based compensation – sales, general, and administrative		54
C	Tax effects of the above items and other tax adjustments		(27	)
		$	239

⁽¹⁾	GAAP earnings per share based on approximately 1.13 billion diluted shares and non-GAAP earnings per share based on approximately 1.15 billion diluted shares.

The tables above reconcile our GAAP to non-GAAP guidance based on the current outlook. The guidance does not incorporate the impact of any potential business combinations, divestitures, additional restructuring activities, balance sheet valuation adjustments, strategic investments, financing transactions, and other significant transactions. The timing and impact of such items are dependent on future events that may be uncertain or outside of our control.

The MIL Network –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend San Marino on Aligning Citizenship Rights with International Standards, Ask about Temporary Special Measures and Incentives to Encourage Female Employment

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the combined first to fifth periodic reports of San Marino, with Committee Experts commending the State party on ensuring equal transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines, while raising questions on temporary special measures and incentives to promote female employment.

One Committee Expert commended the State party for the efforts and improvements made to align citizenship rights of a small landlocked nation with international standards, ensuring that the rules for transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines were now aligned.

A Committee Expert asked what kind of temporary special measures were already implemented in legislation and in the judicial branch? What temporary special measures had been adopted in the area of parity to achieve increased representation of women? Were there any examples of positive discrimination for women in fields such as the military? Another Expert said there was an ongoing debate in the country about how to enforce the political participation of women in San Marino. How did San Marino plan to achieve parity in public life.

One Committee Expert asked what was being done to facilitate women’s return to employment? Was there a wage gap? Could more information be provided regarding measures to increase work life balance and incentivise employers to employ women?

On temporary special measures, the delegation said measures to guarantee women’s political life in the country were linked to two laws. Women made up 50 per cent of the public administration. Women’s representation within the judiciary was fully granted; a few years ago, the President of the San Marino court was a woman. San Marino did not intend to use the instrument of quotas again, as the results did not justify its existence, and the quotas were intended to be a temporary measure.

The delegation said San Marino had been providing incentives for female employment for several years, including that employers would pay less tax for female workers. As of 2025, the labour force in San Marino was better balanced, with the gender gap reduced. If a female worker had a child and wished to return to work, she could transform her contract into one that was parttime. This was a key provision which would help women balance their professional and private lives.

Introducing the report, Marcello Beccari, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said significant progress had been made to combat gender-based violence in recent years. On 29 October 2024, the Congress of State adopted delegated decree no. 161 on amendments to law no. 97 of 20 June 2008 – prevention and repression of violence against women and gender violence – and subsequent amendments and to the Criminal Code, which aimed to ensure a more effective system of prevention, protection and support for victims of violence. In particular, the definition of violence against women and gender-based violence was rephrased. The Authority for Equal Opportunities was responsible for keeping and disseminating data on gender-based violence.

In closing remarks, Mr. Beccari thanked the Committee for the dialogue which had enabled the State to review the legislation and all areas where discrimination against women could occur. The institutions of San Marino were actively engaged in the implementation of the Convention.

In her closing remarks, Marianne Mikko, Committee Vice-Chair, thanked the delegation of San Marino for the constructive dialogue, which had provided further insight on the situation of women in the country.

The delegation of San Marino was comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Employment; the Department of Foreign Affairs; the Department of Institutional and Internal Affairs; the Department of Health and Social Security; the Department of Education and Culture; the Office of the French Border; the Single Court; the Gendarmerie Corp; the Office for Gender Violence and Minors; the Authority for Equal Opportunities; and the Permanent Mission of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninety-first session is being held from 16 June to 4 July. All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the fifth periodic report of Chad (CEDAW/C/TCD/5).

Report

The Committee has before it the the combined initial to fifth periodic reports of San Marino (CEDAW/C/SMR/1-5).

Presentation of Report

MARCELLO BECCARI, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said the ratification of the Convention in 2003 had been long-awaited by San Marino society, in light of the undeniable steps forward that the country had made since the 1960s. Unfortunately, women’s rights in San Marino had been denied for centuries: women had had, de jure and de facto, a position inferior to that of men. San Marino women exercised their voting right for the first time only in 1964, and it was only in 1974 that they could be elected in the general elections and become members of the San Marino Parliament.

At the end of the 1990s, a serious discrimination experienced by San Marino women persisted: only men could transmit San Marino citizenship, which made it impossible for the children of a San Marino woman to become San Marino citizens if the father was not a San Marino citizen. This discrimination was finally eliminated in 2000. It was only at this time that the country aligned its legal system with the requirements of the Convention.

Significant progress had been made to combat gender-based violence in recent years. On 29 October 2024, the Congress of State adopted delegated decree no. 161 on amendments to law no. 97 of 20 June 2008 – prevention and repression of violence against women and gender violence – and subsequent amendments and to the Criminal Code, which aimed to ensure a more effective system of prevention, protection and support for victims of violence. In particular, the definition of violence against women and gender-based violence was rephrased. The Authority for Equal Opportunities was responsible for keeping and disseminating data on gender-based violence. The data was provided by all the institutions that come into contact with women victims of violence, including the courts, the mental health service and the counselling centre, the Minors’ Protection Service, and all three police forces.

San Marino authorities recently implemented comprehensive policies with the adoption of two national plans for the prevention of gender-based violence, including all competent institutional and civil society actors: the comprehensive national plan to combat violence against women 2024–2026, and the multi-year national plan on the elimination of violence and harassment and discrimination in the world of work to implement International Labour Organization Convention no.190 on the elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work. The 24-hour on-call service of Social Workers and Psychologists was introduced and regulated, and the Emergency Centre was set up, where victims, including those with children, could receive psychosocial, health and legal assistance.

Every year on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, San Marino organised numerous meetings and initiatives to raise awareness, including a recent media campaign “the new languages of violence”. The University of San Marino organised compulsory vocational training courses annually for a wide range of professionals, including magistrates, police forces, professional associations, socio-health services, school staff and family mediators. The University also actively collaborated with schools to foster an innovative and inclusive educational approach.

An initiative speared by civil society, the law regulating civil registered partnerships (law no. 147 of 20 November 2018), allowed same-sex couples to obtain a form of legal recognition of their relationship equivalent to marriage. Another action which originated from civil society was the Referendum for the decriminalisation and legalisation of the voluntary termination of pregnancy in February 2021. One year after the historic overwhelming result which saw more than 77 per cent of San Marino citizens vote in favour of decriminalising abortion, the San Marino Parliament approved law no. 147 of 7 September 2022 regulating voluntary termination of pregnancy. This law contained the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code for both the decriminalisation of the act and the protection of the procedure.

Despite the progress that had been made in recent years, some challenges persisted in San Marino in the area of elimination of discrimination against women, particularly when it came to eliminating gender stereotypes. Mr. Beccari said he would ensure the dialogue was open, useful and fruitful.

Questions by a Committee Expert

ERIKA SCHLÄPPI, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said this was the first report submitted by the State party. It was regretful that no reports had been received from civil society. Were the Convention’s provisions directly applicable in San Marino? Were they referred to in practice in the courts? What had been done to raise the visibility of the Convention? Were there any plans to revise article 4 paragraph 1 of the San Marino Constitution to include other forms of discrimination, including gender identity? Were there plans to introduce a body of laws preventing discrimination in the private and public spheres? How did the San Marino authorities integrate a gender perspective in the legislative process?

What legal procedures could women currently use for submitting complaints about discriminatory acts? What were the possible barriers for women to make use of existing legal remedies? How were judges and lawyers trained to ensure gender equality in administrative procedures? The Committee was concerned about the lack of disaggregated data in San Marino. It was welcomed that authorities were considering taking measures to improve the data collections system. What were the plans to improve data collection in the areas of gender equality? What were the timelines? Did the State plan to enact a comprehensive law to prohibit discrimination?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said civil society organizations were informed about the drafting report and had several opportunities to get in touch. Work had been carried out on the report with the San Marino Union for Women. Women’s rights were a topic close to the heart of San Marino citizens. The Authority for Equal Opportunities conducted important work on the issue of violence against women. The data on cases of violence was quite thorough. San Marino was going through a process to join the European Union and it was hoped that once they had joined, a body on data gathering could be established. Data gathering was currently a weak point for the State and they would appreciate any specific advice from the Committee in this regard.

Work was underway to create a statistical body, and in the meantime, an office was charged with data collection and gathering. Article 4 contained a list of protections which was not exhaustive. This was to simplify the way such protection was worded. The Convention was fully applicable to San Marino’s legal body. The State had signed the Istanbul Convention. Women who were victims of violence could directly submit a complaint to the police, which would be passed on to the court. There were nine police brigades which controlled the whole territory in San Marino, and there was an office dedicated to gender-based violence against minors. A complaint could be received by the main police station, and victims needed to be informed of their rights. Personnel of the gender-based violence office attended a three-week training course, in collaboration with the Italian police.

Data was gathered by the Authority on Equal Opportunities on gender-based violence and violence against minors, as well as discrimination in the world of work. A new office, the Office of Statistics, was being created, which would act as a house for data, and would be used to answer questions from international bodies. The State was striving to have data collected by all different agencies, including the police forces, to have a global vision on the issue.

While direct reference to the Convention was not that common, the legal framework of the State fully supported the provisions of the Convention.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert said San Marino had demonstrated a commitment to promoting gender equality through several institutional frameworks, including the Commission for Equal Opportunities, which addressed a broad range of discrimination, including gender, disability and sexual orientation. Could the State party clarify the mandate and resource allocations for the Commission and the Authority for Equal Opportunities? What were the responsibilities of each body? How were they coordinated? How were gender perspectives currently integrated into public policy? The Authority for Equal Opportunities managed a fund for victim support. Could updated information be provided on human and financial resources available for the bodies responsible for gender equality? Were steps being taken to ensure sustainability in line with their growing mandates?

San Marino had a vibrant civil society, with groups including the San Marino Union for Women contributing to reforms. How were women’s organizations formally included in the development and monitoring of gender equality policies? What measures were taken to ensure the participation of civil society organizations in national platforms? Could an update be provided on the process and timeline for establishing a national human rights institution? How would it ensure compliance with the Paris Principles?

Another Expert asked what kind of temporary special measures were already implemented in legislation and in the judicial branch? What temporary special measures had been adopted in the area of parity to achieve increased representation of women? Were there any examples of positive discrimination for women in fields such as the military?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said there needed to be a radical mind shift within San Marino society. Education at schools and universities played a key role in this regard. If men felt they had a right to discriminate against women, it meant they were not being educated properly. This applied to other challenges, including racism and intolerance towards minorities.

Work was being done to create an Office of the Ombudsman in San Marino. The office was expected to be operational in 2026. The key elements of the office, including monitoring, combatting discrimination, complaints mechanisms, and mediation, among others, had already been identified. The Ombudsman would have an independent budget and would have a six-year mandate.

The State endorsed civil society organizations in fighting gender-based violence and discrimination. A petition called for the creation of mechanisms to combat discrimination. A register was being developed for civil society organizations active in the field of women’s rights to facilitate work with these organizations. San Marino was a small State and its services were fully adequate. The victims’ reception centre had a 24/7 hotline which provided assistance.

A decree had set norms for the employment of specific roles, with incentives for the employment of women. In April 2025, the gap between men and women was significantly reduced, highlighting the effectiveness of these norms.

San Marino was in the process of developing an independent human rights commission, in line with the Paris Principles. The bill would come into force in 2025 and become operative in 2026.

Questions by Committee Experts

An Expert asked how the effectiveness of training was being assessed? What complaints mechanisms existed for discrimination against minority women? Why was psychological harm not considered to be a criminal case? Had the campaigns targeting men been assessed? Was the State considering covering witnesses? Did judges, lawyers and law enforcement receive mandatory training in this regard?

It was welcomed that the State provided services, including shelters for victims of violence. Could women with disabilities and migrant women have access to these services? Were there enough of these services? What economic, labour and housing initiatives were provided for victims? How many judicial sentences regarding gender-based violence had been handed down? What period of time elapsed between the complaint and the finalised sentence? What public funds did civil society organizations currently receive when they provided assistance and support to victims? How many victims of violence and their children had received reparation? What kind of reparation did they receive?

Another Committee Expert said the strong demand for foreign labour in the State created opportunities for trafficking. The State party had reported that no investigations had been launched to date regarding trafficking cases. When was the State party expecting to finalise work on the national action plan on trafficking? What funds would be allocated to ensure its success? How would the State party ensure that all relevant stakeholders were up to speed concerning their role in the fight against trafficking? What steps was the State party taking to put in place national procedures and mechanisms to ensure the referral of trafficking victims? Several sectors of the economy had been identified as being susceptible to trafficking, including domestic work. Was the State party planning to follow the recommendation to raise awareness of the risk of trafficking among the general public? Was the State party planning to decriminalise sex work?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said San Marino was carrying out activities to improve its expertise in the area of trafficking. The State currently had no cases directly relating to human trafficking, demonstrating the phenomenon was limited in the country, possibly due to its limited size, as well as the control and efficacy of law enforcement agencies. The national strategy for combatting trafficking was currently being drafted. Since trafficking cases were non-existent in San Marino, it was unlikely the topic would be addressed extensively in training courses, but it would be mentioned. The anti-violence network included magistrates and representatives of the legal system and law enforcement agencies.

Since the visit of the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings to San Marino, there had been no indication of risks or cases reported. Work was carried out in collaboration with the Italian State in terms of training opportunities, and new modules were being designed for labour inspectors. The Labour Inspectorate carried out direct interviews with the home carers and had reported no issues in this regard. The State would continue to remain vigilant about trafficking, particularly for high-risk sectors, but at present this risk was not prevalent.

Psychological violence was included in the decree of 2024, which addressed domestic violence against women. It was defined as any intentional behaviour which impacted the psychological integrity of women. In 2024, there were four orders of protection enacted by the judge. Parliament recently adopted a law regarding the duration of trial, which would ensure an improvement in the duration of cases pertaining to violence.

Over the last year, training had been dedicated to preventive action against discrimination. The State had a duty to punish perpetrators, and to ensure their rehabilitation. The union contract had been signed for the 24-hour availability of social servants, for cases of discrimination or violence. A protocol was in place with the authorities and Order of Psychologists, where psychologists received a financial contribution for completing mandatory training for victims of violence.

The State had a list of pro-bono lawyers who could assist victims, but were also working on a specific agreement with the Bar Association, to ensure that victims had legal assistance. This assistance would be entirely covered by the Authority of Equal Opportunities. A project was underway to support women victims of violence who did not have access to an income. Two years ago, a training module was created for journalists to raise awareness about gender stereotypes in the media, with work carried out directly with the Association of Journalists.

A new emergency centre was created in 2024 and had been operating 24/7, welcoming women victims of violence and their children, as well as unaccompanied minors.

Questions by Committee Experts

An Expert said the crime of trafficking affected all countries; was size of the country considered an acceptable excuse for the lack of trafficking cases?

A Committee Expert said there was an ongoing debate in the country about how to enforce the political participation of women in San Marino. How did San Marino plan to achieve parity in public life. How did the State party explain the low representation of women in the cabinet? Were there legal or policy measures in place to ensure the representation of women? What would be done to increase the number of women in leading positions in the public administration and the judiciary?

One Committee Expert commended the State party for the efforts and improvements made to align citizenship rights of a small landlocked nation with international standards, ensuring that the rules for transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines were now aligned. The Committee also welcomed the approval concerning the “amendment on citizenship” to remove the obligations for applicants to renounce their existing citizenship. However, it was regretful that there was no data in the report enabling the Committee to assess the impact of these acts. It was also concerning that San Marino was yet to ratify key conventions relating to stateless persons.

What was the number of women who had obtained citizenship through naturalisation compared to men? Was the State party considering abolishing the requirement of the interdiction of dual citizenship? What support mechanism were in place to ensure eligible individuals were able to access the right to San Marino citizenship?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said approximately 50 per cent of the San Marino population lived abroad. Until the year 2000, San Marino citizenship could only be transmitted through the paternal line. Those who held San Marino citizenship could hold others as well. The obligation to renounce other nationalities was linked to the naturalisation process.

Some diplomats believed there were in fact too many women in the diplomatic core, as there had been significant progress in this regard. Measures to guarantee women’s political life in the country were linked to two laws. Women made up 50 per cent of the public administration. Women’s representation within the judiciary was fully granted; a few years ago, the President of the San Marino court was a woman. San Marino did not intend to use the instrument of quotas again, as the results did not justify its existence, and the quotas were intended to be a temporary measure. Instead, the State had introduced a cultural mind shift through better awareness raising. Measures had been introduced to support families, to allow all citizens to participate in the life of the country.

The judiciary had strong female representation, with six female representatives. The coordinator for the civil administrative sector was a woman. Psychical criteria had been adjusted for entering the gendarmerie corps, meaning there were new female recruits. In 2025, 25 per cent of officers within the gendarmerie where female, which was a common trend across all law enforcement agencies. Women had been able to ascend within law enforcement agencies, with women colonels responsible for several units.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert said the Committee commended the State party for achieving literacy rates for both women and men at a rate of 100 per cent. Was the education system full inclusive to migrant girls and girls with disabilities? The Committee congratulated the State party for ensuring that equality and inclusion started from primary school. How did San Marino’s schools directly address topics of human rights, gender stereotypes, racism and gender equality? Were human rights and gender equality issues explicitly addressed in education curricula? What were the specific recommendations made to prevent cyber bullying against women and girls? Could sex disaggregated data be provided regarding access to financial aid for students?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said San Marino had two dedicated decrees related to education, including for students with learning disabilities. There were training courses for teachers to ensure they could provide support to students with disabilities and deal with individual cases. Indications were introduced in all San Marino institutions, from kindergarten to secondary school. Even at university level, courses offered to students related to gender-based violence and racial discrimination. The curriculum of schools included specific projects for awareness raising. This initiative was also passed on to families involved in this approach.

On 5 July, an exhibition entitled “Open Dreams” would open, gathering works of elementary and secondary school students, created during school projects relating to human rights and gender parity. This exhibition would be open to the San Marino people and was part of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization celebration for education for peace.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert said the Committee appreciated policies aimed at better integrating women into the labour force, including the one focusing on women over 50. However, it was concerning that women were underrepresented in the labour market, but overrepresented in part time jobs. Around 95 per cent of those dismissed during the COVID-19 pandemic were women. Could the State party provide disaggregated statistical data on the employment of women? Why were women the majority of those who lost their employment in the pandemic? What was done to facilitate their return to employment? Was there a wage gap? Could more information be provided regarding measures to increase work life balance and incentivise employers to employ women?

What percentage of fathers had benefitted from parental leave since its introduction? What measures were taken to strengthen childcare and support services? What was being done to strengthen the monitoring of labour conditions of vulnerable groups? What measures were being taken to combat sexual harassment in the workplace? What was being done to increase the low numbers of women in leadership positions in the private sector? Was there a specific law prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said in San Marino law, selection of an individual for employment was based on merit and the candidate’s skillset. San Marino’s labour market was fully open, meaning employers were free to make their selection specific to the profile they were looking for. The labour inspectorate would then provide opportunities for the unemployed. San Marino had been providing incentives for female employment for several years, including that employers would pay less tax for female workers.

As of 2025, the labour force in San Marino was better balanced, with the gender gap reduced. If a female worker had a child and wished to return to work, she could transform her contract into one that was part-time. There were fiscal incentives for employers who were ready to hear needs of their female workers. This part time contract was valid for the first three years of the child’s life and could be extended for an additional three years. This was a key provision which would help women balance their professional and private lives. There were no distinctions in the area of training and lifelong learning between men and women.

San Marino had adopted the International Labour Organization convention on workplace discrimination, and the State had adopted a national action plan in this regard. There were several types of paternal leave. The San Marino legal system encouraged fathers to request permission to accompany children to the doctor and for other needs. The legal system also provided for parental leave for foster children.

Discriminatory acts in San Marino were punishable under the law. If this occurred in a work environment, the sentence would be further strengthened. There were harsher punishments for sexual violence when it occurred in a work environment.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert asked what the State party was doing to ensure the right of minorities to health? What were the current challenges faced by the Women’s Health Centre? How was its sustainability guaranteed? What measures were taken to ensure sexual and reproductive health, as well as modern, free and low-cost contraceptive measures, especially for more disadvantaged groups? How was appropriate information provided on how to access appropriate gynaecological and obstetric care?

Forced sterilisation was sanctioned under the Penal Code but could be authorised on the grounds of psycho-social disability. What measures would be taken to combat this harmful practice? Had changes been made to the Penal Code which recognised exceptions to the general prohibition of abortion, including incest and rape? How many women had access to legal abortion in 2023 and 2024? What steps were being taken by the State party to have a team to support female victims of gender violence? How were women’s needs in mental health being taken into account?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the law to support families included rights for mothers, fathers, natural and adopted children. For years, the Women’s Health Centre had been working to support women, including counselling them. This was a dedicated body which fought to protect women, their children, and families. The Centre offered counselling for women and couples, providing them with information and contraceptives. Activities in schools were tailored depending on the age of the pupils.

The Constitutional Court in San Marino had issued a ruling on the desire to de-penalise abortion, reflecting the mind shift already present in society. Screenings for cancer risks were directly managed by the San Marino hospital. The Women’s Health Centre was tasked with prevention and monitoring of such risks. There was no forced sterilisation in the country. Close monitoring of contraception occurred under the supervision of medical personnel.

A series of events were organised in schools dedicated to sexuality, which were optional for elementary school pupils and mandatory for older pupils. The content of these events differed depending on the age of the students. Training courses had been developed to raise awareness among younger populations about sexual health. These interventions had been favourably welcomed by San Marino households. In 2023, a new hub providing psychological support was opened, accessible to all pupils. Mental health support was available through the hub. Adolescents and young people could freely access the human papillomavirus vaccine.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert congratulated the State party on law no. 158 of 2022, which provided a regulatory framework for the protection and support of women who went through pregnancy and postpartum in conditions of psychological, economic and social discomfort, as well as single pregnant women, and single parent families. How many single pregnant women and single-parent families had benefited since the adoption of the law in November 2022?

Had the State party considered instituting surveillance and monitoring mechanisms to specifically track progress in inclusive social security systems? What laws and policies had been implemented to promote women’s entrepreneurship, access to economic assets, and business ownership? Were there government-led programmes that provided support to women entrepreneurs? Were there training or capacity building initiatives in key sectors like financial technology, e-commerce, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and robotics, where women remained underrepresented? What actions were being taken to increase the number of women in leadership roles within sports and cultural institutions?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said a new law provided favourable conditions for both male and female entrepreneurs. More and more women were opting for activities in the e-commerce space. Employers and employees could have access to the family allowance. This was provided by the State to better support childcare. Law 158 from 2022 supported pregnant women and single parent families. The State was currently considering a reform bill which resulted in further allowances to support households with young children, particularly new fathers, to close the gap between men and women in the household.

In 2024, there were 22 cases of voluntary abortion in the country. The San Marino Olympic Committee promoted equality. In 2024, the University of San Marino organised a day focusing on sports and disability, using sports as a tool for inclusion and equality. This special day was open to all sports operators and coaches in the country to raise awareness regarding inclusion and combatting all kinds of discrimination in sports.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert said around five per cent of the State resided in rural areas, being predominantly involved in agriculture or domestic work. Could information on the social conditions of rural women in San Marino be provided? San Marino had 258 migrant workers employed in the private sector as caregivers or badanti. The Committee noted with satisfaction the establishment of the one stop shop set up to provide assistance to these badanti. What was currently being done to prevent violence against badanti?

What measures were in place to ensure inclusive employment for women with disabilities? Since June 2019, discrimination on the ground of gender identity was expressly banned in San Marino. What steps were being taken to recognise same sex marriage for citizens?

A Committee Expert asked for more information on forced sterilisation which had been imposed on women with disabilities over the past five years, possibly authorised by a legal guardian?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said it was difficult to distinguish between urban and rural areas in San Marino. All people living in San Marino enjoyed universal health coverage. A desk had been organised for badanti to answer questions and deal with issues affecting them, and for families who wished to benefit from their services. There was no discrimination towards badanti in the country; efforts were made to protect their work.

Questions by a Committee Expert

A Committee Expert welcomed the law which allowed a judge to order the removal of the aggressor in cases of gender-based violence, among other initiatives. How did the courts deal with custody and the visiting rights of parents? How were the best interests of a child taken into account from a gender perspective? How many children had been able to receive their mothers surname since 2016? What mechanisms existed to provide oversight for family mediation procedures and ensure the Convention standards were respected?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the interests of minors were always protected when it came to custody matters. Judges would take into account the circumstance of violence within the household. When it came to separation between the parents, mediation was ruled out if there was violence within the household.

Closing Remarks

MARCELLO BECCARI, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue which had enabled the State to review the legislation and all areas where discrimination against women could occur. The institutions of San Marino were actively engaged in the implementation of the Convention. The recommendations by the Committee would be carefully considered.

MARIANNE MIKKO, Committee Vice-Chair, thanked the delegation of San Marino for the constructive dialogue, which had provided further insight on the situation of women in the country.

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not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CEDAW25.017E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Kazakhstan, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Ask about Excessive Use of Force during 2022 Demonstrations and Internet Censorship

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Kazakhstan on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending the State’s abolition of the death penalty, and raising issues concerning excessive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations in January 2022 and internet censorship.

Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, and other Committee Experts commended Kazakhstan for its abolition of the death penalty and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.

A Committee Expert cited reports of excessive use of force during demonstrations in January 2022 that resulted in the deaths of several peaceful protesters. Investigations into these incidents were reportedly insufficient. What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?

Another Committee Expert said Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval. Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

Botagoz Zhaxelekova, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said that, as part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections. These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations. Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.

In the ensuing discussion, the delegation said that the 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials. Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms. Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.

On internet censorship, the delegation said this year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed. If it was removed, the site was not blocked. Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events. The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act. It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

Ms. Zhaxelekova, in concluding remarks, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and all those who had facilitated the dialogue. The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans, she said.

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Soh said the delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics. The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly. It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

The delegation of Kazakhstan was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population; Ministry of Culture and Information; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Court Administration; Anti-Corruption Agency; Prosecutor General’s Office; and the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the initial report of Guinea Bissau (CCPR/C/GNB/1).

Report

The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/KAZ/3).

Presentation of the Report

BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said international obligations were an integral part of Kazakhstan’s national legal system. The provisions of the Covenant took precedence over national legislation, and the State’s primary priority was the protection of citizens’ rights.

During the reporting period, the State made far-reaching reforms aiming to consolidate democracy and build a just Kazakhstan. In 2022, constitutional reforms reinforced human rights protections for all Kazakh citizens, moving the State from a super-Presidential form of Government to a Presidential Republic with a strengthened Parliament. The President could now serve only a single seven-year term and could not seek re-election. Rural mayors were now directly elected, and regional authorities had been granted greater autonomy.

The role of the lower house of Parliament in forming the Government had been strengthened – Parliament’s consent was now required for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government. The lower house was also empowered to hear reports from the Government, including on human rights issues.

In addition, the registration process for political parties had been simplified; the electoral process had been improved; and the registration threshold had been reduced fourfold, from 20,000 to 5,000 members. For the first time, six political parties, including opposition parties, were represented in the lower house. Nearly half of the members of Parliament had been newly elected, including independent candidates. A 30 per cent quota for women, youth, and persons with disabilities was introduced for the allocation of party list mandates. The Mazhilis (lower house of Parliament) now included 18 women, six persons with disabilities, and eight individuals under the age of 35.

The Constitutional Court had been re-established as a key mechanism for protecting rights and freedoms. All citizens could appeal to it free of charge, and interpretation services were available. To date, the Court had issued over 500 rulings and 71 final decisions. In 20 per cent of reviewed cases, legal provisions were found to be unconstitutional.

Constitutional law had expanded the powers of the Human Rights Commissioner, who could now directly address the President, both chambers of Parliament, and the Government with proposals to improve human rights mechanisms and initiate systemic legislative measures. The Ombudsman was empowered to file lawsuits to defend the rights of an unlimited number of individuals, access all penal institutions freely, interview any person, and intervene in cases of rights violations. Regional Ombudspersons for the rights of children and for socially vulnerable groups had also been appointed across the country.

Extensive work had been carried out in the field of lawmaking. Laws adopted during the reporting period included the law on peaceful assemblies, which introduced a notification-based system for assemblies; a law decriminalising defamation; a law granting citizens and civil society organizations the right to oversee Government and quasi-public entities; a law obliging the Government to respond to petitions that received more than 50,000 signatures; a law expanding journalists’ rights to access and disseminate information; and the Social Code, which guaranteed equality and the inadmissibility of discrimination in all areas of life and increased State social benefits by 15 per cent.

Other laws adopted included a law aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence, which led to the annual number of crimes against women decreasing by 2.5 times; legislation increasing penalties for crimes against the sexual integrity of children; a law granting public monitoring commissions and the national preventive mechanism unrestricted access to all closed facilities in the country without prior notice and establishing criminal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment; and a law on combatting human trafficking.

As a result of preventive measures, the number of registered torture cases had declined each year. In 2024, the number fell by 40 per cent. Since 2020, a Compensation Fund for Victims of Torture had been operating, and over the past five years, more than 3,000 compensation payments had been made.

Kazakhstan was also taking measures to protect its citizens abroad. From 2019 to 2021, the country carried out special operations repatriating 754 individuals from Syria, including 526 children and citizens of neighbouring countries. All children received passports and women were supported to return to a normal life.

As part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections. A total of 94 actions had been planned, more than 75 per cent of which had already been implemented. These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations. This commitment was also enshrined in the Constitution. Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone. In 2023, Kazakhstan also ratified two Optional Protocols: one to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and another to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

To ensure the effective implementation of decisions and requests from United Nations committees, a working group was established in 2022. It included representatives from the main State authorities. Kazakhstan had responded positively to decisions on individual communications by United Nations committees, including through the payment of compensation in the cases of Gerasimov, Bayramov and Malykhin.

The State party had also incorporated the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner Volker Türk, who visited Kazakhstan in 2023, into a comprehensive action plan on human rights and the rule of law. The action plan focused on protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities; combatting domestic violence; strengthening labour rights; and safeguarding freedom of association.

The Government has been actively engaging with civil society on all major reforms. One notable example of this engagement was the “Dialogue Platform for the Human Dimension” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2013, more than 50 meetings had been held, and their outcomes were reflected in three human rights action plans, including recently adopted laws on combatting human trafficking, the criminalisation of domestic violence, and the fight against torture.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed Kazakhstan’s abolition of the death penalty and its ratification of the Second Optional Protocol in 2022, as well as the strengthening of the Constitutional Court in 2023 and the establishment of several mechanisms and institutions. The Committee had, in recent years, issued a substantial number of Views concluding violations of the Covenant by the State party, but had received disturbing information that most of these had not been followed up. Would the State party extend the mandate of the interagency working group, which was tasked with analysing these Views? What measures had been taken to give full effect to the Committee’s recommendations? How were members of the judiciary trained on international procedures?

The adoption of the international treaties act enhanced the role of international treaties in the national legal order. Did the Covenant have direct effect? The Committee welcomed national plans related to human rights. How effective had implementation of these plans been? Domestic courts had assessed a substantial number of cases involving the Covenant. Had these courts directly implemented the Covenant? Was training on the Covenant for the judiciary compulsory? How was the public educated on the Committee’s work?

The Committee welcomed that the Human Rights Commission’s mandate had been expanded but noted that it had “B” status since 2012. Had the State worked to have it accredited with “A” status? What were the obstacles in this regard? How did the State party guarantee a transparent and independent procedure for appointing members of the Commission? How did the Commissioner monitor the implementation of the Covenant? Could the Commissioner be held accountable for inaction? The State party had invested in the national preventive mechanism against torture, but this institution depended on the Human Rights Commission to carry out its operations and reportedly needed to announce visits to places of detention in advance. How would the State party strengthen the mechanism?

Another Committee Expert welcomed the significant changes to the national framework, including the establishment of the national Anti-Corruption Agency. There were concerns about the influence of public officials over this institution. What measures were in place to ensure the independence of the Agency? Media reportedly faced political pressure when reporting on corruption, with some having been imprisoned. What measures were in place to protect media personnel investigating corruption?

The law on countering extremism included a vague definition of “extremism” that allowed for arbitrary interpretation. Would this definition be revised? Were media personnel pressured to expose colleagues’ actions to reduce sentences against them? Did the State party plan to remove people convicted of non-violent crimes from the list of people accused of financing terrorism? Which objective standards were used in courts to define extremist activities? The Committee called for statistics on persons tried for extremist crimes.

The Committee welcomed legal safeguards against surgical sterilisation, but was concerned about uneven access to contraception and high rates of teenage pregnancy. What steps had been taken to expand access to affordable contraceptives and family planning programmes? The Committee was concerned by reports of forced sterilisation and abortion, particularly targeting persons with disabilities, and gender stereotypes embedded in school curricula. What measures were in place to address these issues and develop adequate sexual and reproductive health education?

A Committee Expert said that demonstrations in December 2011 resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians, and reported torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals put under trial related to these protests. Investigations into these incidents and many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations were reportedly insufficient. What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families? How many investigations had been carried out thus far and what convictions had been handed down?

The Committee welcomed measures taken to address the high suicide rate in detention centres, but this high rate reportedly persisted. What further measures were planned to reduce the suicide rate and to investigate all deaths in custody?

One Committee Expert said that the State party’s laws on discrimination did not address all forms of discrimination included in the Covenant, despite high levels of discrimination against certain groups in the State party. Efforts to revise anti-discrimination laws seemed to have stalled. Was there a plan to revive these?

The Committee welcomed the State party’s efforts to promote the rights of persons with disabilities. Would it remove discriminatory language in its laws related to persons with disabilities?

In 2020, the Dungan community experienced ethnic violence resulting in deaths, injuries, property damage, and the displacement of thousands of community members. Law enforcement authorities reportedly ignored these incidents, delaying investigations and prosecutions. What progress had been made in setting up a reconciliation committee and in providing remedies to victims?

There were credible reports of violence and discrimination targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals. Why had organizations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons been denied formal registration and the right to peaceful assembly? The Kazakhstan Union of Parents had submitted a petition seeking to ban “propaganda” related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons. How had the Government responded to this petition? Public funding had been removed from gender reassignment surgery and the minimum age for such procedures had been raised to 21. How would the Government support persons who sought such surgery?

Another Committee Expert welcomed that Kazakhstan’s law prohibited gender-based discrimination, but expressed concern that women accounted for only 27 per cent of the Mazhilis, and had limited representation in decision-making positions in public and private bodies. There was a major salary gap between men and women, and the law did not ensure equal pay for equal work. What measures had the State party taken to ensure substantive equality between men and women and to address discrimination in access to education, land and property rights? How did the State party promote women’s representation in decision-making bodies and managerial roles? What measures were in place to address the gender pay gap?

The Committee welcomed that the State party had financed gender equality initiatives, but noted that the gender equality strategy had been replaced with the gender and family policy. The 2009 law on domestic violence was limited to violence by immediate family members. What legislative and other measures had been taken to combat violence against women and girls? How had the State party tackled the rise in domestic violence observed during the COVID-19 pandemic? How was it addressing issues such as forced and early marriages and ensuring a victim-centred approach to investigations and prosecutions?

Stigma surrounded reporting of cases of domestic and gender-based violence and police were reportedly reluctant to act on such cases. How did the State party encourage reporting of violence by victims, ensure adequate funding for victim support services, and collect data on complaints, investigations and sentences? What measures were in place to strengthen awareness raising campaigns on violence against women targeting public officials and civil society?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the Covenant was directly applicable in Kazakhstan and took precedence over domestic legislation. Over the past eight years, over 7,000 decisions were handed down by the courts that referenced the Covenant. Training seminars on Covenant rights were held for members of the judiciary. The Government had made good progress on the human rights action plan, having implemented around 75 action points thus far, including actions promoting gender equality and women’s representation in decision-making bodies, as well as the investigation of torture.

The Ombudsperson’s status was enshrined in the Constitution. It did not report to Government bodies and had immunity in carrying out its activities. Its financial independence was guaranteed and it had direct access to all Government bodies. In 2023, the Ombudsperson representatives carried out more than 700 monitoring visits and issued over 600 recommendations, some 70 per cent of which were implemented. An assessment of institutional capacity was carried out in 2023 by the Human Rights Commissioner towards its accreditation with “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

The independent national preventive mechanism consisted of 126 members, a large percentage of whom were representatives of non-governmental organizations. They were elected through a transparent process by the coordination council. The Ombudsperson was working on improving the professional knowledge of the mechanism’s members. Its annual budget was spent exclusively on its needs. It had unlimited access to all detention centres in the country and did not need prior permission to conduct visits.

The Anti-Corruption Agency was independent. It had held several high-level officials accountable for corruption and had seized several millions of dollars in assets from those officials, investing those assets directly in Government programmes such as school construction projects. The Agency provided free consultations with citizens periodically and worked with citizen volunteers who monitored corruption.

The State ensured the safety of journalists who investigated corruption, providing all assistance necessary to those journalists. Journalists had broad rights to receive answers to their questions from public officials and to attend public events.

The concepts of “extremism” and “terrorism” defined in national legislation and the Constitution were in line with those of international law. The State party welcomed the Committee’s recommendations for improving these laws. All inclusions in the list of organizations linked to terrorism financing were based on the sentences of judges. Around 1,000 persons had been removed from the list after review, including persons already serving sentences under the Criminal Code and persons found to have given up extremist views.

Kazakhstan’s Health Code guaranteed the right to reproductive healthcare. Women had the right not to be subjected to forced abortions or sterilisation and had access to all sexual and reproductive health services. Gynaecologists determined whether terminations of pregnancy were necessary. Minors could seek terminations with the written permission of their parents. Family planning and contraception services were provided by the State. Medical, out-patient and in-patient services had been established in rural areas – 308 medical facilities had been built last year. Events were held that promoted reproductive health and aimed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies. Increased access to maternal health services had led to a reduction in maternal mortality and the number of abortions.

The Prosecutor’s Office had conducted investigations into the events of December 2011, as had monitoring bodies from the United Nations. The Government had allowed representatives of non-governmental organizations and the media to attend trials related to these events. Some 1,100 witness testimonies were conducted as part of investigations, which led to the sentencing of 13 officials. All persons who had been arrested were now released. Investigations found that there was no evidence of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of arrested persons by public officials. One official had been charged with granting officers permission to use lethal firearms, which led to the death of 12 persons. These victims’ families had been granted damages by the courts.

Discrimination was not allowed on grounds of sex, ethnicity, race, status, property or religion, among other characteristics. The State party had created a committee promoting inter-ethnic harmony, which had developed guidelines on access to legal remedies for victims of discrimination and recommendations for improving legislation on discrimination.

All citizens were equal before the law and no person could be subject to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community had access to all fundamental rights. The State party had agreed to conduct research on the impact of propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in response to the petition it had received. Sex changes were regulated by domestic law; persons aged 21 or over with legal capacity had the right to change their sex.

Some 87 persons had been convicted for having taking part in mass unrest in 2020 affecting the Dungan community, damaging property and obstructing the actions of the police. All victims had had their property restored.

The law on persons with disabilities granted persons with category two disabilities priority access to public housing. National standards were in place that supported access to infrastructure and services for persons with disabilities. The accessibility level of buildings was mapped by the State party, and more than 124,000 buildings had been adapted to promote accessibility.

In April 2024, a law was adopted that aimed to protect women and girls from violence. There was criminal liability for battery and bodily harm. Police were obliged to investigate all suspected cases of domestic violence, even when there was no report. The punishment for sexual violence had been increased to up to life imprisonment. Forced marriage was punished with up to 10 years imprisonment. Measures were in place to ensure that victims could file complaints. The Government funded a specific unit on combatting domestic violence and provided training to officials on responding to domestic violence. Courts issued restraining orders and instructions relating to behaviour in domestic violence cases as required. Mobile units responded in a timely manner to reports of violence; they had worked with more than 100,000 families.

The share of women in local assemblies was 22.7 per cent. There were three women ministers and eight women vice-ministers, and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a woman. Some 53 per cent of judges were women. The State party was working actively to ensure that the quota of 30 per cent female candidates was respected.

The ideology of the gender equality strategy had not changed. The State party was working with United Nations agencies to promote gender-sensitive budgeting and establish bodies within ministries with gender-related mandates.

Around 15 per cent of senior public officials were women. Since 2018, some 7,000 women had served in military operations and 15 Kazakh women had served in United Nations peacekeeping roles. Equal pay for equal work for men and women was enshrined in the Constitution. Discrimination on any grounds was not allowed. The Labour Code prohibited discrimination on the grounds of gender. Women who felt they had been discriminated against could turn to the courts to seek remedies.

Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert welcomed that the procedure for follow-up on Views had led to legal changes and the payment of compensation to victims. The Expert also welcomed efforts made by the State party to inform the public about the Committee’s work. Another Committee Expert welcomed measures promoting access to registration for civil society organizations. One Committee Expert commended the participation of 15 Kazakh women in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the increasing number of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said he was impressed by the abolition of the death penalty and progress in improving the representation of women, but noted that there were still issues that needed to be addressed.

Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on how the State party promoted the independence of the Ombudsperson, despite the President’s role in appointing its members; investigations into individual cases of killings and claims of torture occurring during December 2011 protests and reparations provided to victims’ families, and whether an official public apology had been issued for these human rights violations; whether the State party would formally recognise the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons to protection from discrimination; details on planned revisions to discrimination legislation; the status of research into propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons; whether a law on gender-based harassment would be promulgated soon; and resistance to laws on violence against women from conservative segments of society.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the national preventive mechanism carried out more than 500 monitoring visits per year. It had issued more than 16,000 recommendations to institutions as of 2020, of which 44 per cent had been implemented.

An investigation was carried out into events related to December 2011 protests. There was no evidence of the acts of torture that were alleged, preventing judicial investigation of those allegations. The investigations into the murder of 12 individuals and the injury of six determined that arms were used with unlawful intent, inflicting grievous bodily harm, but not necessarily murder. One official had refused to provide medical care to an injured person and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

Issues related to discrimination legislation and the petition on propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons would be considered once research into these issues was completed. Civil society was invited to join discussions related to the petition and other Government measures.

National legislation allowed for liability for various forms of harassment. Last year, changes were brought to the Criminal Code banning sexual activity with minors under age 16. The Government was assessing the effectiveness of current legislation on gender-based violence, which would be revised in 2027.

The 2022 constitutional law on the Human Rights Commissioner expanded the powers of the Ombudsperson and the mandate of the Human Rights Commissioner. The findings of the visits of the national preventive mechanism were published in its annual report. As a result of its findings, disciplinary actions had been taken against over 440 officials. In addition to the national preventive mechanism, members of Parliament, judges, prosecutors and the Commissioner for the Rights of the Child could also visit places of detention without prior authorisation.

The Ombudsperson could participate in discussions on national reports for human rights treaty bodies. They had not exercised their right to appeal to the Constitutional Court, as they had been able to address all complaints they had received through other legal recourses. This did not indicate a refusal to exercise this authority.

The Labour Code prohibited discrimination against women and regulated workers’ rights to respect and dignity. Employers were obliged to ensure safe and healthy working conditions. Workers could submit complaints of workplace harassment to the Workplace Ethics Committee or to the police.

There were 170 suicides in prisons between 2017 and 2024. For each case, an investigation was carried out to determine the causes, and around 150 officials had been sanctioned for not fulfilling their care duties. Training was provided to prison guards on identifying at-risk inmates and preventing suicides, and to prisoners on promoting self-confidence and preparing for release. Several additional measures had been implemented in prisons to prevent suicides.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert said the State party did not have a specific law on the use of force and firearms by officials. Did it plan to enact such a law that was in line with international standards? There were allegations of excessive use of force during January 2022 protests, which had led to the death of several peaceful protesters. Did the State party plan to conduct thorough, independent investigations into these allegations, hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies for victims? The mass detention of protesters reportedly led to disappearances, and detainees had been denied access to lawyers and medical care. What further steps would the State party take to ensure that all detainees were informed of their rights, provided access to a lawyer and medical treatment, and to investigate all allegations of mistreatment of detainees and hold those responsible accountable?

Peaceful assemblies held without advanced authorisation were typically dispersed by authorities, with demonstrators arrested. How would the State party bring its administrative detention practices in line with international standards? Courts had a high rate of extending pre-trial detention. How did the State party ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a last resort, and in line with international standards?

Another Committee Expert said that the State party had not sufficiently responded to the Committee’s previous recommendation to align legal definitions of torture with those of the Convention against Torture. Despite the high number of torture cases, few effective punishments were imposed on perpetrators, and some persons who reported torture were punished for the crime of reporting false information. What steps had been taken to bring the definition of torture in the Criminal Code in line with international standards and ensure timely investigations? How many complaints of torture had been filed, legal proceedings launched, and officials punished?

Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval. Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts. Could the delegation comment on these issues? Laws adopted in 2023 and 2024 expanded State control over free speech, resulting in politically motivated trials against journalists and political opposition figures. What steps had been taken to fully decriminalise defamation? Could the State party provide statistics on detentions of journalists and human rights defenders? What had the working group on the protection of human rights defenders achieved?

A Committee Expert commended steps to transfer prison health services from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health. How was the State party supporting drug-dependent inmates and working to ensure the availability of sufficient medical equipment in prisons? Were medical staff trained in detecting torture? Military schools were excluded from the mandate of the national preventive mechanism. Did the State party intend to address this?

The Committee was concerned that the right to conscientious objection to military services was not defined in law. Were there plans to define this in law and establish an alternative to military service? What steps had been taken to revise religious law to ensure full compliance with the Covenant? The Committee was concerned by reports that some individuals had been imprisoned for engaging in non-violent religious expression. How did the State party ensure that persons were not detained solely for expressing religious beliefs?

What steps had been taken to remove complex registration requirements for non-governmental organizations and trade unions, and to prevent excessive State control of the activities of those organizations?

Minorities continued to face discrimination and limited access to decision-making positions. What was the legal and administrative framework covering political parties? What steps had been taken to promote the effective participation of members of the Roma community in political life?

One Committee Expert commended the State party for the 2024 law on combatting trafficking in persons and the amendment to article 128 of the Criminal Code. How did the State party ensure the effective implementation of these reforms? There were reports of a lack of training for labour inspectors on trafficking. How were inspectors trained to detect trafficking? How did the State party ensure that the cases of all potential trafficking victims were assessed before deportation, and that all migrant children were properly registered and documented? The Committee welcomed efforts to enhance trafficking penalties, but was concerned that trafficking offences were often not appropriately classified, leading to lower penalties. Would this be addressed?

There was no de facto procedure for processing asylum applications and authorities were reportedly reluctant to grant asylum to persons of Russian or Uzbek nationality. Reportedly, migrants had been detained without being given access to legal representation. Was the State party addressing these issues? How did it ensure protection against refoulement? Individuals were required to renounce their citizenship to apply for Kazakh nationality. Would the State revise this law to prevent the risk of statelessness?

What State services were provided to victims of domestic violence, including children? Could children obtain these services independently of their parents? The Committee was concerned that the State party had not prohibited all forms of corporal punishment. Would this be done? Could children file complaints of mistreatment with the Human Rights Commissioner? Workers at an orphanage had been caught on video beating children. How was the State party working to prevent such abuse and promoting the foster family system? Children born outside of medical institutions to undocumented parents did not receive birth certificates. Would the State party address this issue?

Another Committee Expert asked how the State party guaranteed the independence of Supreme Court judge candidates, who were nominated by the President, and of lawyers? There were reports of corruption throughout the judicial system. How was the State fighting this? Had any judicial officials been found guilty of corruption? Attorneys were not automatically appointed to suspects, and did not always get access to all case files. How would this be addressed? How were suspects made aware of their rights? How did the State party prevent cases being unduly declared “secret”? What percentage of court cases were now solely held online? How did the State ensure proper proceedings in online cases?

To what extent were spontaneous assemblies possible in Kazakhstan? How did the State party ensure that notification procedures did not create delays or restrictions preventing assemblies? Could people appeal restrictions on assemblies? Foreigners were prohibited from participating in assemblies. How did the State party ensure that foreigners’ assembly rights were respected?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said that in cases of mass violence, the State had the authority to use force to ensure public security. The 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials. Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms. Changing the law on the excessive use of force was unnecessary, as the law functioned effectively. All persons affected by violence related to this incident were provided with appropriate medical assistance, including detainees. Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained. There were 29 minors who had been detained after carrying out serious offences; they had since been released.

There were 1,500 peaceful assemblies organised legally between 2017 and 2024. Some 400 planned demonstrations had been cancelled because authorities had responded to complaints before the demonstration was held. Some 1,000 demonstrations held during the reporting period were deemed unlawful as protesters had failed to respect notification deadlines or to correctly submit notification documents. The State party continued to inform the public about notification procedures; this had led to a two-fold decrease in the number of illegal assemblies between 2022 and 2024. Organisers of such assemblies were brought to court only in exceptional circumstances; in most cases, they were issued fines or warnings. Law enforcement bodies needed to provide alternative proposals if the location for a planned demonstration was already being used by another event.

As of 2019, exemption from liability for torture was not possible in Kazakhstan, nor were suspended sentences for perpetrators of torture. There were 40,000 video cameras placed in detention centres to prevent torture. There had been a downward trend in the number of torture cases reported, from around 800 in 2019 to around 100 in 2024. More than 200 officials had been convicted of torture offences, and no officials found guilty of torture had received amnesties. Housing and compensation payments were provided to the families of victims of torture. The State party intended to increase the amount of compensation provided to victims of torture ten-fold.

This year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed. If it was removed, the site was not blocked. Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events. The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act. It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

Defamation had been downgraded to an administrative offence. There had been a downward trend in the number of cases of defamation in recent years. In 2024, only four cases of spreading misinformation were registered. Journalists and activists were not prosecuted for defaming public officials. Persons could not be charged for defaming public or private institutions.

All persons who entered prisons were provided with a medical assessment. Detainees requiring specialised assistance were brought to outpatient clinics, and they were isolated when they showed symptoms of contagious diseases. Legal amendments were made to allow detainees with serious diseases to serve their sentences in appropriate facilities or to have their sentences commuted.

Over the past few years, there had been an increase in religious practitioners and missionaries, and a decrease in the number of people fined for religious activities. In the first quarter of this year, only 46 people had been fined. Kazakhstan recognised the right to practice and disseminate religion. Only persons who practiced religion for financial or extremist purposes were sanctioned. Legislation on religion was in line with the Covenant. Members of religious institutions could be released from the obligation to carry out military service.

Kazakhstan was a multi-ethnic State. It had a special quota for members of the Senate who were representatives of different ethnic groups. There were no limitations on the political participation of ethnic groups.

The national preventive mechanism operated under the Ombudsperson, but maintained operational independence. Work was underway to expand the national preventive mechanism’s mandate to include facilities under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence. A draft law on the national preventive mechanism was currently under discussion with State authorities.

In 2023, the State adopted a law reducing the number of members needed to form a public association to three. There were no restrictions on organizations receiving foreign funding. To date, 543 trade unions had been registered. Political parties’ activities could be restricted when they threatened public order, but such restrictions were temporary. Liquidation of political parties could only be forced by a court order.

A law on combatting trafficking in persons was introduced in 2024, which aimed to bring the State’s mechanisms for combatting trafficking in line with international standards, and to increase identification and support for victims. New offences had been established linked to trafficking, including related to procuring a minor for prostitution and online trafficking. Some 170 labour inspections had been held thus far this year. These had led to the identification of trafficking victims and the disbanding of organised crime groups, the members of which were held criminally liable. Over 190 victims had been identified and punishments of up to 20 years imprisonment were issued to perpetrators.

Legislation on refugees and asylum seekers was in line with international law. Kazakhstan abided by the principle of non-refoulement. Refugees had the right to seek medical assistance and education, and could apply for permanent or temporary residence in the State. Kazakhstan did not permit the extradition of individuals whose asylum requests were under consideration. Individuals had the right to appeal extradition requests to the Supreme Court. Kazakhstan was a party to the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which included provisions specifying that signatories needed to respect international norms related to non-refoulement.

Only citizens could participate in demonstrations in Kazakhstan; foreigners and stateless persons could not. However, they could pursue other means to lodge complaints with the State. Police did not monitor whether demonstrators were foreigners or not.

The Judicial Office provided free legal assistance to persons involved in court cases. Many court cases took place online. Artificial intelligence helped judges to automate routine cases, allowing for the analysis of millions of cases and for the maintenance of judicial standards. Court materials were provided in accessible formats.

The State party had revised the judiciary’s financing model, allowing the judicial administrative body to set the budget. This had led to a large increase in the judicial budget. There were sanctions imposed for judges who engaged in corrupt practices. Cases of corruption were assessed by a judicial panel.

Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on criteria used to determine whether to send warning letters to citizens regarding online content; alternatives to residential care facilities being developed; plans to prohibit corporal punishment; whether spontaneous protests were possible; whether persons who did not respect notification laws were restricted from filing future notifications; how the judiciary ensured that artificial intelligence was used in a safe manner that protected citizens’ rights; whether the Government intended to abolish the registry of organizations with foreign funding sources; and planned reforms to the registration process for non-governmental organizations.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said there was a specialised structure that monitored the information space and detected violations of Kazakh law. When violations were detected, warning letters were sent to offending parties, often through social network operators, that explained why the content was illegal and needed to be removed.

The State paid particular attention to the rights of children. New legislation discouraged corporal punishment. The number of beatings of children recorded by the State had been falling year-on-year; last year, there were only 250 cases. Thorough investigations were carried out into complaints of corporal punishment in residential homes. Video surveillance tools were installed in schools and kindergartens. There was a hotline for reporting violence and providing consultations to children.

There was no plan to amend the registry of organizations funded by foreign sources, which was developed in line with international principles. The State party did not plan to develop a bill on foreign agents.

All judicial services that used artificial intelligence had been assessed in terms of their implications on security. They were implemented by the judiciary independently. The State party had implemented use of electronic monitoring bracelets in around 1,000 cases as an alternative to pre-trial detention.

Closing Remarks

BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, expressed gratitude to the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and to all those who had facilitated the dialogue. The State party welcomed the 22 alternative reports submitted by Kazakh civil society organizations, which it had reviewed carefully. The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans. The State party thanked the Committee for its contributions to human rights in Kazakhstan and around the world.

CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the constructive dialogue. The delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, the right to peaceful assembly, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics. The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly. It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

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Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CCPR25.010E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Funding of Animal Rebellion – E-001574/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Commission is not aware of any EU funding to the Animal rebellion group under its current name PLANT BASED CAMPAIGNS LTD[1].

A person or entity may be excluded from participating in award procedures or from implementing Union funds if they meet any of the situations outlined in Article 138 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[2].

This regulation provides grounds for exclusion including grave professional misconduct by inciting discrimination, hatred or violence against individuals or groups that are engaging in activities that are contrary to the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union[3].

[1] https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/12064173.

[2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509.

[3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M002.
Last updated: 25 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Protection of Hungarian citizens’ fundamental rights in the context of biometric identification and surveillance at public gatherings – E-002415/2025
Source: European Parliament

Question for written answer E-002415/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Kim Van Sparrentak (Verts/ALE), Brando Benifei (S&D), Svenja Hahn (Renew), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Leila Chaibi (The Left), Maria Walsh (PPE), Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE), Sophie Wilmès (Renew), Sebastian Everding (The Left), Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew), Klára Dobrev (S&D), Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE), Fabienne Keller (Renew), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Nela Riehl (Verts/ALE), Saskia Bricmont (Verts/ALE), Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle (Renew), Damian Boeselager (Verts/ALE), Evin Incir (S&D), Anna Strolenberg (Verts/ALE), Olivier Chastel (Renew), Reinier Van Lanschot (Verts/ALE), Dainius Žalimas (Renew), Thomas Waitz (Verts/ALE), Daniel Freund (Verts/ALE), Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE), Marc Angel (S&D), Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Hanna Gedin (The Left), Rasmus Andresen (Verts/ALE), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE), Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE), Alexandra Geese (Verts/ALE), Maria Ohisalo (Verts/ALE), Rudi Kennes (The Left), Lena Schilling (Verts/ALE), Mounir Satouri (Verts/ALE), Benoit Cassart (Renew), Mélissa Camara (Verts/ALE), Alice Kuhnke (Verts/ALE), Elio Di Rupo (S&D), Sara Matthieu (Verts/ALE), Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus (S&D), Gordan Bosanac (Verts/ALE), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew), Katrin Langensiepen (Verts/ALE), Anja Hazekamp (The Left), David Cormand (Verts/ALE), Per Clausen (The Left), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Benedetta Scuderi (Verts/ALE), Lucia Yar (Renew), Marco Tarquinio (S&D), Majdouline Sbai (Verts/ALE), Diana Riba i Giner (Verts/ALE), Elisabeth Grossmann (S&D)

Recent reports suggest that a new Hungarian law may allow the use of facial recognition technology to identify individuals participating in public demonstrations banned by the government[1].
- 1.Can the Commission assess whether such use complies with the Artificial Intelligence Act’s prohibition on real-time biometric identification[2], applying all legal safeguards and criteria, and confirm that post-remote identification cannot be used to bypass Article 5, which has already entered into force[3]?
- 2.Does the use of remote biometric identification in this situation bring additional risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as freedom of assembly and association, as enshrined in Article 12 of the Charter?
- 3.If the national authorities responsible for oversight are unable or unwilling to act ‘independently, impartially and without bias’, as required by the Artificial Intelligence Act[4], will the Commission commit to taking action – including infringement proceedings if needed – to ensure that Hungarian citizens are effectively protected under the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Charter of Fundamental Rights?
Submitted: 16.6.2025
- [1] Spike, J., ‘Hungary’s new anti-LGBTQ+ law bans Pride events and sparks protests’, Associated Press, 19 March 2025, https://apnews.com/article/hungary-pride-ban-orban-lgbtq-rights-e7a0318b09b902abfc306e3e975b52df.
- [2] Article 5(1), point (c) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
- [3] Article 26(10) of the Artificial Intelligence Act.
- [4] As required by Article 70 of the Artificial Intelligence Act.
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Digital sovereignty or digital blockade? Effects of the planned regulation of data centres – E-002451/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002451/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Piotr Müller (ECR)

The Commission has announced a legislative package on data centre energy efficiency to be published in 2026, along with a roadmap for digitalisation and artificial intelligence.

Meanwhile, the European data centre sector is already facing an extremely difficult environment – rising energy costs, severe limits on the availability of connection capacity and increasing administrative requirements that are slowing down the development of new infrastructure.

Instead of supporting a sector which underpins Europe’s digital and technological sovereignty, the Commission is signalling another regulatory wave – with no details, no clear impact assessment and no indication how the EU wants to remain competitive with the United States or Asia.

In light of the above:

1.Is the Commission not concerned that imposing additional burdens will lead to investment flight outside the EU and a weakening of this strategic sector?

2.How does the Commission justify a policy that could permanently limit the development of AI and cloud services in Europe?

3.Given that the policy being pushed through could lead to the digital deindustrialisation of Europe, what economic model is the Commission relying on?

Submitted: 18.6.2025
Last updated: 25 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU cooperation with OCCRP in the context of USAID termination – E-002383/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002383/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Petr Bystron (ESN)

The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is an influential globalist propaganda network, established in 2007, which maintains close ties with the United States and in the past received substantial funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). According to investigative reports, between 2014 and 2023, OCCRP received approximately USD 1.1 million from the EU, in addition to funding from several individual European countries. This non-transparent and politically biased organisation uses the so-called ‘fight against corruption’ as a pretext for undermining democratic principles and discrediting critical views on various issues such as the war in Ukraine, US foreign policy or the actions of the Commission.

Therefore, we would like to ask the Commission:

1.How much funding has the Commission and its agencies provided to the OCCRP annually since 2020?

2.How does the Commission justify its partnership with a foreign-funded, politically biased organisation that undermines democratic debate under the pretext of anti-corruption efforts?

3.When does the Commission intend to terminate its cooperation with or financial support of OCCRP in light of the recent termination of USAID funding by US President Donald Trump?

Submitted: 12.6.2025
Last updated: 25 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

(2024/2053(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

– having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

– having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

– having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

– having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

– having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

– having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank [1],

– having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

– having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

– having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

– having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

– having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

– having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

– having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

– having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

– having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

– having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

– having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

– having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

– having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

– having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

– having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

– having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

– having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

– having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

– having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 [5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund [6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform [8],

– having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence [9],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed [10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade [11];

L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

General remarks

1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria [13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation [15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

Financing peace, security and defence

28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for 2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation [16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative [17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

Governance: accountability and transparency

61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

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69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

(2025/2024(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [1],

– having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

– having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4. Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

Alignment on foreign policy matters

24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

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32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

(10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

– having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

– having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part [1] (EPCA),

– having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

– having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

– having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

– having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

– having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

– having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

– having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

– having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

– having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

– having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

– having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia [2],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov [3],

– having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

– having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

– having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023 [4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

Regional cooperation and global challenges

16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

°

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56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure – A10-0107/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure

(2025/2007(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 173, 179 and 190 thereof,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025: Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem [1] (the Chips Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union [2] (NIS 2 Directive),

– having regard to the detailed report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) entitled ‘Foresight Cybersecurity Threats For 2030 – Update 2024’, published in March 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements [3] (the Cyber Resilience Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 [4] (the Cybersecurity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents [5] (the Cyber Solidarity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services [6],

– having regard to the Commission White Paper of 21 February 2024 entitled ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (COM(2024)0081),

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2024 entitled ‘State of the Digital Decade 2024’ (COM(2024)0260),

– having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union [8] (the Interoperable Europe Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast)[9],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 [10],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 [11] (the Data Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU [12] (the Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence [13] (the Artificial Intelligence Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 [14],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240 [15],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 [16],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme [17],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 [18],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 [19],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488 [20],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1732 of 17 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 as regards a EuroHPC initiative for start-ups in order to boost European leadership in trustworthy artificial intelligence [21],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (recast)[22],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework [23],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2020 entitled ‘Secure 5G deployment in the EU – Implementing the EU toolbox’ (COM(2020)0050),

– having regard to the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, which commits ‘to promote a European way for the digital transformation, putting people at the centre’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 December 2021 entitled ‘Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) (COM(2021)8481),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0107/2025),

A. whereas technological sovereignty should be seen as the whole value chain from excellence in research to creating better competition and achieving greater European sovereignty;

B. whereas the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80 % of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property;

C. whereas a few technological companies hold concentrated power over key digital markets and control over underlying internet infrastructure, including operating systems, computing, artificial intelligence (AI), search engines, social media capacity, digital advertising and payment services;

D. whereas our technological sovereignty will greatly depend on Europe’s ability to create the market conditions needed for European companies to flourish and compete with each other, thereby increasing the quality of their products;

E. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

F. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

G. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

H. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

I. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

J. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

K. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

L. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

M. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

N. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

O. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

P. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

Q. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

R. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

S. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

T. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

U. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

V. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

W. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

X. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

Y. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

Z. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

AA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

AB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

AC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

AD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

AE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

AF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

AG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

AH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

AI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

AJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

AK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

AL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

AM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

AN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

AO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

AP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

AQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

AR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;

AS. whereas 60 % of EU companies report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and clean technologies, posing a significant barrier to innovation, competitiveness and the green and digital transitions;

AT. whereas current labour market developments, including global lay-offs and political instability outside the EU, create an opportunity to attract high-skilled digital talent to the EU;

AU. whereas increasing competitiveness and resilience require appropriate funding; whereas public funding can act as a catalyst and private investment and competitive market forces are key for the long-term development of digital infrastructure;

AV. whereas a robust, agile and excellence-driven research and innovation (R&I) ecosystem is essential to ensure the EU’s global competitiveness and leadership in strategic technologies, such as quantum and AI;

AW. whereas standardisation is at the core of genuine European digital and technological sovereignty; whereas the importance of standards is growing due to increasing technological competition across the world, particularly with the United States and China;

AX. whereas the EU is committed to negotiating comprehensive digital trade agreements (DTAs) to promote secure, resilient and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries;

AY. whereas the Commission has announced landmark DTAs with South Korea and Singapore, setting an important precedent for future agreements;

AZ. whereas Parliament and the Council have agreed on the ‘EU horizontal provisions on Cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements’, which was endorsed by the Commission and remains an important tool in relation to digital trade and the establishment of new DTAs;

General introduction

1. Underlines that European sovereignty is the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, preventing reliance on foreign actors and single service providers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure; calls for the development of a comprehensive risk assessment framework to monitor and address dependencies across the digital value chain; underlines that such a framework should serve as a basis for ensuring EU preparedness and resilience by enhancing European industrial policy and boosting domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities in strategic technologies;

2. Believes that technological sovereignty is the capacity to design, develop and scale up digital technologies needed for the competitiveness of our economy, the welfare of our citizens and the EU’s open strategic autonomy in a globalised world; believes that this includes ensuring the EU’s ability to make autonomous decisions, engaging with trusted non-EU countries and entities, diversifying and strengthening supply chains and promoting the concept of openness and interoperability to ensure that Europe remains an attractive hub for investment;

3. Recognises the increasing concentration of power in non-EU companies, which constrains Europe’s ability to innovate, compete and maintain control over its digital economy, society and democracy; is concerned by excessive dependencies on non-EU actors in critical areas such as cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity – where market concentration and foreign control threaten to undermine Europe’s competitiveness, democratic resilience and security;

4. Believes that the EU’s industrial tech ambitions should focus on the key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductor technologies or quantum, that contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and are essential for our green, digital and defence transitions;

5. Recognises the shift in the geopolitical landscape and the resulting opportunity for market demand for European products and services; sees this as a window of opportunity to position Europe as a global leader in trusted and secure digital solutions;

6. Underlines the need to foster a supportive regulatory environment that encourages innovation, investment and the development of cutting-edge technologies in Europe, while protecting EU end users from the consequences of extraterritoriality;

7. Recognises the need for a comprehensive European industrial policy for the digital ecosystem, integrating all relevant policy domains such as market access, standardisation, R&D, investment, trade and international cooperation; calls on the Commission to develop this comprehensive policy with the aim of reducing harmful strategic dependencies, strengthening domestic value chains and ensuring a secure, trustworthy and innovation-driven digital ecosystem that adheres to European values;

8. Recalls that the high-tech product and digital services markets depend heavily on external supply chains, posing risks to sovereignty and resilience; stresses the importance of boosting industrial capacity and technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies to support the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

9. Emphasises that boosting Europe’s technological sovereignty in the era of rapid technological development requires enhancing innovation and commercialisation in order to build the necessary capabilities; highlights that Europe must transform itself into a globally attractive and agile business environment by reducing bureaucracy, enhancing regulatory predictability and fostering entrepreneurship and risk-taking;

10. Recognises that open strategic autonomy and democratic resilience must be at the core of the Commission’s agenda and that a comprehensive approach must integrate procurement, funding and long-term institutional frameworks to establish sovereign digital infrastructure in critical domains;

11. Calls on the Commission to analyse and establish a comprehensive list of critical dependencies in digital infrastructure and technologies, assessing, at minimum, storage services, identity and payment systems, communication platforms, as well as the software, protocols and standards that support them, and to propose measures to promote market access for products and services with a strong positive impact on the EU’s technological sovereignty, resilience and sustainability; believes, in that regard, that the use of specific award criteria in public procurement may be promoted in areas where such critical dependencies exist; believes that such criteria can help incentivise competition and strengthen European technological sovereignty by facilitating the procurement of European digital products and services, where possible;

Digital public infrastructure

12. Strongly believes that digital infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and that there should therefore be a base layer of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that ensures sovereignty and a competition-friendly market environment; observes that the market has not developed this base layer in many important areas, which has resulted in monopolies and reliance on foreign actors; underlines that in order to fill this gap, the EU should take the lead in creating a strong foundation for DPI by creating layers of digital technologies consisting of semiconductors, connectivity solutions, cloud infrastructure, software, data and AI; believes that European DPI should be founded on fair and competitive economic models and also use governance models where neither private companies nor governments maintain centralised control; is of the opinion that it should be built on common and open standards, embrace interoperability and interconnectedness, so as to prevent user and vendor ‘lock-ins’, and spur innovation by facilitating new market entrants, and that it should also ensure privacy and security by default;

13. Believes that the deployment of DPI should be focused on areas where critical dependencies exist, as identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list; calls on the Commission to prepare a detailed and comprehensive plan for establishing European DPI by identifying technologies that are best suited to European action, and urges the Commission and the Member States to dedicate appropriate resources to deploying European DPI;

14. Stresses that European DPI should be stimulated by coordinated action at EU level to ensure the presence and competitiveness of European providers as well as a competitive market environment; underlines that these objectives will not be achieved through regulation alone and will require significant public investment; recognises that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF) should therefore include additional funding for this purpose, focusing on EU added value and financing the base layer of European DPI;

15. Recognises that as part of the forthcoming MFF, the EU must commit to increased spending to achieve technological sovereignty; underlines that this should include a dedicated envelope for the development and deployment of the DPI layers identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list, as well as additional funds to ensure a competition-friendly market environment in other digital areas;

16. Believes that the funding under the forthcoming MFF should prioritise active capacity-building in key hardware, software and service areas, including high-performance computing, quantum computing, encryption and communication, connectivity, cloud, data, web and AI ecosystems, and digital libraries;

17. Is of the opinion that European DPI should be based on EU values and remain open to like-minded non-EU partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sustain their efforts and add more impetus to the process with the UN Development Programme on DPI;

18. Recognises e-government services as a key enabler of efficient, secure and accessible public service delivery, which should be designed to facilitate digital identification, government data sharing and public sector payments without distorting markets or undermining existing private sector solutions; emphasises that the EU’s approach to e-government services should focus on strengthening digital government-to-citizen and government-to-business interactions, while ensuring trust, interoperability and accessibility; believes, therefore, that secure and seamless access to public services requires a trustworthy e-identification framework and welcomes the announcement of a ‘business wallet’ aimed at significantly simplifying the interconnection between businesses and public authorities;

19. Calls on the Commission to further develop public interest data platforms, enabling secure cross-border data sharing between public and private entities for use cases, in particular, in healthcare, urban planning and environmental monitoring; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to promote interoperability between public interest and industry-specific data platforms, ensuring the seamless flow of data while minimising administrative burdens; notes that this could be achieved by leveraging existing market-driven solutions that foster innovation, maintain trust and uphold privacy and security standards;

20. Recognises that under the current legal framework, European citizens have the right to control their personal data and that data generated within the EU must be processed in accordance with EU law; stresses that safeguarding privacy and personal data is essential for building trust in the digital economy, allowing European consumers to engage with confidence, regardless of where their data is processed; highlights that European companies – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – must be able to make use of data in a lawful, ethical and secure manner to drive sustainable growth and competitiveness;

Digital infrastructure

21. Highlights that digital infrastructure is the backbone of Europe’s economy and society and that its importance will continue to grow; calls on the Commission to include in the requested list of critical dependencies a comprehensive assessment of the composition of European digital infrastructure in order to adequately analyse the state of play, assess risks and coordinate action;

22. Believes that in order to strengthen digital infrastructure, it is essential to implement capacity-building initiatives in critical areas at EU level; considers that these initiatives should focus on developing a base layer of public infrastructure, such as a network of AI gigafactories and a European web index model; is of the opinion that this base layer will empower companies to develop their business models and boost technological sovereignty; points to the digital solutions created by the EU, such as the EU digital identity, that can offer innovative infrastructure for the EU’s digital economy;

23. Recognises the strategic importance of critical digital infrastructure and the need to strengthen their security and resilience; understands that critical digital infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, cables (terrestrial and submarine), cellular network towers, satellite communication systems, spectrum and radio equipment, cloud servers that contain sensitive information and data centres that process sensitive information, as well as certain software elements, including security software that protects critical networks and data centres;

24. Highlights the need to ensure that this infrastructure falls under EU jurisdiction, meaning that it fully adheres to EU law; stresses the importance of privacy and security-by-design; calls on the Commission. therefore, to introduce legislation to mitigate risks posed by high-risk vendors from non-EU countries, including risks posed by foreign-controlled energy resource providers;

25. Calls on the Commission, while preparing future legislative proposals and the forthcoming MFF, to concentrate efforts on deepening the single market, in line with the recommendations made in Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in Mario Draghi’s report on ‘The future of European competitiveness’, with the aim of unlocking the potential of the digital single market;

26. Takes note of the recommendations laid down in these two reports that the EU needs a paradigm shift from promoting connectivity in the EU to establishing a single market for electronic communications and connectivity; supports a simplified, harmonised and innovation-friendly telecommunications framework that ensures fair competition and the accessibility of infrastructure;

27. Welcomes the Commission’s white paper on how to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs, which outlines three pillars: creating the ‘3C Network’ – ‘Connected Collaborative Computing’, completing the digital single market, and secure and resilient digital infrastructure for Europe;

28. Views the white paper and the subsequent consultation process as part of the preparation of the legislative initiatives planned for this term, including the Digital Networks Act; calls on the Commission to take a more holistic view of digital infrastructure throughout this process and to acknowledge that digital infrastructure comprises many elements beyond mere connectivity; underlines the need to accompany any new digital policy measure with an impact assessment;

29. Urges the Commission to simplify and harmonise telecommunications rules as part of the forthcoming Digital Networks Act and the broader Digital Package;

30. Calls on the Commission to introduce an EU cloud and AI development act to strengthen European data infrastructure and the promotion of European cloud providers; underlines that this act should aim to actively build a European single market for cloud and AI;

31. Acknowledges that deploying cutting-edge digital infrastructure across the EU requires substantial investment and recognises that both public and private funding are essential for achieving this goal; expresses concern over the persistent shortage of venture capital and investment financing in Europe, which undermines technological sovereignty; calls on the Commission to significantly scale up public-private investment instruments, including venture capital, strategic platforms and dedicated funding tools for start-ups and scale-ups in critical technology sectors; highlights the importance of leveraging public procurement to support the deployment and scaling of open and interoperable digital solutions and of ensuring that private capital, competition and innovation become the main drivers of Europe’s digital transformation over the medium and long term;

High-speed connectivity

32. Is of the opinion that the upcoming Digital Networks Act must support the objective of providing all EU consumers with high-quality connectivity by 2030, especially in remote and rural areas, as well as removing administrative barriers for the roll-out of 5G, 6G and secure, high-speed broadband;

33. Recognises the increasing convergence of telecommunications infrastructure with cloud and edge technologies, and sees the potential of open radio access networks to deliver advanced technological solutions, reduce costs and enhance the interoperability of connectivity; believes that the future of connectivity lies in the complementarity of diverse technologies such as 5G/6G, Wi-Fi and satellite, where seamless integration benefits both businesses and consumers;

34. Recognises that with cloud and edge services at the core of their transformation, connectivity networks are evolving rapidly into platforms for innovation and will increasingly depend on cloud computing, AI, virtualisation and other technologies;

35. Calls for ambitious targets in the development and innovation of wireless communication networks, acknowledging the need for a broad-based approach that includes cloud computing, AI, edge computing and quantum computing; emphasises that the innovation ecosystem for electronic communications, especially for vertically integrated telecoms, should remain market-driven, and insists that future regulatory measures be based on thorough, knowledge-based impact assessments of existing regulations;

36. Recognises that competition between operators of all sizes remains a key driver of investment in connectivity networks; calls on the Member States to ensure that copper networks are switched off progressively in favour of fibre-optic or 5G technologies, in particular where regular maintenance or updates of the network are needed, thus ensuring that the shift is carried out in an attainable manner and allowing providers to plan logistically and financially in advance;

37. Stresses that all consumers in the EU should have access to adequate quality, reliable and affordable connectivity, thus contributing to increased demand for connectivity services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand and upgrade digital networks, especially in rural areas, and to support public-private investments in broadband and 5G/6G deployment, while maintaining cybersecurity standards and secure-by-design principles;

38. Is convinced that, as digital connectivity infrastructure such as fibre, 5G and 6G will be crucial for future industrial competitiveness, the forthcoming MFF should include funds for the large-scale deployment of network infrastructure, bridging the existing deployment gap to achieve the 2030 Digital Decade targets, creating pan-European 5G coverage for citizens’ use and ensuring the successful deployment of Industry 4.0 tools;

Fibre

39. Stresses the importance of accelerating the deployment of fibre-optic networks and modern wireless communications systems that can deliver fast, secure and reliable digital services;

40. Recognises that the need to prioritise direct fibre connections for homes, businesses and public institutions is crucial to ensure ultra-fast and reliable connectivity, in addition to network roll-outs with public works, such as roads, water and electricity, to streamline fibre roll-out;

41. Welcomes the introduction of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, which responds to the growing needs for faster, reliable and data-intensive connectivity; recognises the importance of the shared use of ducts and poles for deploying very high capacity networks to optimise resources and reduce costs; urges the Member States to streamline permitting processes and harmonise regulations to lower financial and administrative barriers to the expansion of fibre infrastructure;

5G and 6G

42. Believes that private investments are essential for deployment of electronic communication networks, 5G and 6G that are advanced enough in terms of transmission, speed, storage capacity, edge computing power and interoperability;

43. Stresses that the enforcement and implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act is further necessary for the creation of a one-stop shop for permits and a centralised digital permitting process to reduce delays in infrastructure deployment and to ensure uniform rules for infrastructure access, pricing and environmental impact assessments; calls, in this regard, for strong efforts in this area;

44. Takes the view that the EU needs strong cybersecurity protection in all critical infrastructure sectors, with stricter measures to de-risk high-risk vendors in 5G and 6G networks, ensuring dense deployment of small cells and macro towers, particularly in urban and rural areas with inconsistent coverage, and ensuring the sustainability and energy efficiency of the infrastructure so as to support Europe’s global competitiveness in the digital economy;

Spectrum

45. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards enhanced coordination of spectrum allocations, in particular through earlier identification and the harmonisation of the release of new frequencies, starting with 6 GHz frequencies; calls for a radio spectrum policy that promotes investment in Europe, including through the harmonisation of spectrum assignment policies across the Member States to accelerate 5G deployment based on best practices, the promotion of longer license durations and access to new spectrum such as the upper 6 GHz band in order to meet future demand and enable 6G; believes that a shared effort from public and private entities is necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of Europe and not lag behind the fastest growing networks in the world, i.e. in China and South Korea;

Satellites and satellite communication systems

46. Underlines the importance of satellite-based communications in developing EU digital infrastructure, increasing its resilience, strengthening the capabilities of EU actors, and reducing dependence on non-EU providers, particularly in the area of defence; highlights the need to provide alternative connectivity solutions for consumers in remote and rural areas;

47. Highlights the strategic role of the EU space programme, as one of the pillars of EU sovereignty, in providing state-of-the-art and secure positioning, navigation and timing services for Galileo and EGNOS and cost-effective satellite communication services for GOVSATCOM; notes that this allows the EU and its Member States to have greater sovereignty in their satellite capabilities, including geopositioning, earth observation, space surveillance and connectivity; welcomes, in particular, the EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 programmes, which aim to ensure the short- and long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

48. Deplores the strong dependence on non-EU data for the tracking and surveillance of space objects; stresses the need for Europe to urgently reinforce its own capabilities and infrastructure in space situational awareness (SSA) to ensure open strategic autonomy and security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase investment in EU-owned surveillance and tracking assets, and to develop effective mechanisms for information-sharing among the Member States, enabling Europe to independently monitor and protect its critical space infrastructure;

49. Stresses the importance of private sector involvement in launcher technologies to further accelerate the deployment of IRIS2; stresses the importance of fostering a robust and competitive European space launch sector through greater private sector involvement and support for upstream and downstream industries; calls on the Commission to promote a European space industrial policy that strengthens sovereignty in space technologies and services by reducing strategic dependencies and improving the operational governance of European space programmes;

50. Calls, to this end, for concrete measures to facilitate the provision of satellite services throughout Europe, including by defining common procedures and conditions; calls, in parallel, for fair competition, with clear and enforceable rules for all satellite constellations accessing the EU market;

51. Notes that there are currently several issues with latency in satellite networks and recognises that the integration of satellite networks with 5G and, in the future, 6G technologies is pivotal in extending the reach and reliability of terrestrial networks;

High-performance computing (HPC) systems

52. Recognises the progress made in recent years in enhancing HPC; calls on the Commission to continuously integrate and enhance the computing power at EU HPC centres, in particular, enhancing the training of AI models and preparing for future advancements in supercomputing;

53. Calls on the Commission to develop a coordinated strategy to bridge the gap between Europe’s cutting-edge HPC technology and its practical, scalable deployment across industries, including by creating a public network for supercomputing; notes that this strategy should foster collaboration between public institutions and private sector partners, including SMEs, to ensure that Europe’s HPC capabilities become a key driver of economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty;

54. Highlights that HPC centres must ensure accessibility for developers and deployers of AI foundation models, generative AI and applied AI; notes that EuroHPC Centres should be available for these use cases and particularly for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; emphasises that this must be seamlessly complemented by initiatives to enable the development and deployment of AI in the EU;

55. Welcomes the creation of new AI factories; underlines that AI factories will upgrade EuroHPC supercomputers to deliver computing capacity for AI and support start-ups and scale-ups in the training and large-scale development of general-purpose and trustworthy AI models;

Hardware for computing: semiconductors, chips and quantum chips

56. Believes that urgent action is needed to boost EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, improving supply chain resilience by forming strategic global partnerships, encouraging start-ups and innovation, fostering cross-border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development and providing financial incentives, regulatory support and market access;

57. Emphasises the need for legal certainty to support semiconductor development, ensuring secure supply chains for critical raw materials and avoiding disruptions caused by investment uncertainties;

58. Urges to give utmost political importance to ensuring a sufficient supply of AI chips in the EU and to make it a focal point of EU digital industry policies; notes the increase in demand for AI chips driven by expanding applications in cloud computing, edge devices, autonomous systems and generative AI;

59. Calls on the Commission to react to the new geopolitical realities and the use of digital supply chains as pressure tools; urges the Commission to find a negotiated solution to the US ban on the export of AI chips to 16 EU Member States;

60. Calls on the Commission to put advanced AI chips, including their design and production, at the core of the revision of the Chips Act; calls on the Commission to present the revision this year, featuring a long-term strategy rooted in current geopolitical realities that builds European strategic indispensability through technological leadership, adequate production capabilities and a strong R&D ecosystem, which will be essential to secure European sovereignty in increasingly troubled times; believes that it is crucial to strengthen the interactions among research, training, suppliers and robust public infrastructure to accelerate the path from research, development, testing and finally full-load production;

61. Believes that the EU should enhance its efforts on quantum chip development if it intends to accelerate the time-to-market for EU industrial innovation in quantum technology;

62. Calls on the Commission to support the manufacturing within the EU of widely used chips e.g., for electronic devices and cars; calls for support for the development of chips that reduce the energy consumption of the digital sector;

63. Underlines the need to support the performance of the circular economy and recalls that information and communications technology products and other electronics are part of the priority product groups in the working plan to be adopted by April 2025 under Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 [24];

64. Believes that additional funding under the forthcoming MFF must be allocated to the development of semiconductor production capacities and other next-generation semiconductor technologies and processes (e.g. photonic chips, wide-bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging) within the EU;

Cloud services

65. Recognises that there is a market need for sovereign solutions that offer enhanced levels of control over data for certain categories of sensitive data and acknowledges the risks associated with reliance on single dominant providers; calls for a strategy for reducing reliance on foreign cloud providers, while fostering European alternatives;

66. Notes that the discussions on the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services have not brought any results; points out that there are sovereignty considerations, in particular related to the extraterritoriality of binding legal regimes, that cannot be solved through technical discussions; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned cloud and AI development act;

67. Notes the need to secure data storage and computational power, and distributed computing infrastructure; calls on the Commission to ensure that cloud users have the ability to choose solutions that meet their needs by urgently removing barriers to switching and diversifying providers through multi-cloud strategies, and by fostering a competitive European cloud market, thereby reducing reliance on single providers and enhancing digital sovereignty;

68. Calls on the Commission to leverage initiatives such as 8ra and IPCEI CIS to advance decentralised cloud and edge infrastructure, which are enablers of sovereignty and contribute to reducing reliance on foreign providers and ensuring resilience while enhancing operational flexibility within Europe;

AI systems

69. Welcomes the InvestAI initiative, including the AI gigafactories; emphasises the need for Europe to position itself as a global leader in AI model training, scientific research and quantum computing advancements; is committed to further supporting AI development by launching initiatives such as AI factories to provide computing power for start-ups, scale-ups and researchers;

70. Calls on the Commission to further support the design and development of European AI and to adopt policies and measures that will enable European industrial sectors to benefit from their data and AI deployment;

71. Emphasises that the delayed deployment of AI-driven innovations hinders technological progress, market competitiveness and digital transformation within the EU;

72. Expects that the public-private financing model will unlock unprecedented private investment in AI that will open up access to supercomputers for start-ups and industry to supercomputers;

Quantum

73. Recognises the urgent need to define a clear roadmap for quantum technology development, including quantum computing and quantum encryption, ensuring that public and private investments lead to tangible commercial applications;

74. Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment of existing national quantum sandbox frameworks and how existing legislation applies to them in order to prevent market fragmentation; welcomes the announcement of the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass;

75. Urges the Commission to ensure that the Quantum Act, accompanied by an impact assessment, positions Europe as the leading region for quantum excellence and innovation by investing in R&D and innovation, mobilising funding to scale up the European quantum ecosystem, capabilities and production, and ensuring Europe’s leading quantum research is commercialised in Europe; underlines that it should deliver tangible technological applications by fostering policies that accelerate technological maturity and facilitate the transition from research to commercial success;

76. Calls for targeted investments, industry collaboration and regulatory frameworks that support the development, scaling and market adoption of quantum technologies across key sectors;

77. Calls for a coordinated EU strategy for post-quantum cryptography to protect data from future cyberthreats;

Data centres

78. Calls on the Commission to support ecosystems for sharing industry-specific data within industrial sectors, fostering collaboration and driving innovation, while maintaining data sovereignty and ensuring compliance with EU regulations, as outlined in the Data Act; urges the Commission for strong enforcement to ensure that dominant market players do not impose unfair terms on SMEs and mid-sized enterprises when accessing and sharing data;

79. Believes that there is a need to ensure interconnected infrastructure that would allow data centres to work together efficiently under common standards with high-speed connectivity, while flexibility, security and scalability would be maintained; believes this interconnected system would help in ensuring distributed redundancy so that data and services remain available even in the event of a data centre failure;

80. Calls on the Commission to prioritise interoperability across platforms, enabling the seamless integration of data across businesses and sectors, in alignment with the requirements of the Data Act, which mandate data portability and interoperability obligations for cloud and edge services; stresses the need for the robust enforcement of these provisions to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure that European industrial ecosystems can leverage data-driven innovation without technical or contractual barriers;

81. Recalls the Commission’s plan to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by 2030; sees the need to improve the integration of data centres with the energy system, focusing on heat reuse and providing flexibility services to the electricity grid needs; recognises the need to incentivise research for cooling and energy-efficient processors, while special attention should be given to supporting EU data centres; urges the Commission to ensure clear and consistent implementation of existing legal requirements for data centre operators across EU legislation and the Member States;

82. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase and target public investment and to incentivise private investment in digital infrastructure to enable the growth and modernisation of data centres;

Submarine cables

83. Calls on the Commission to take coordinated action to protect submarine cables and reinforce cable security and repair capabilities; stresses the need for continued investment in the construction of new submarine cables to ensure redundancy; welcomes the EU’s role in co-financing such projects to enhance digital infrastructure and connectivity across the Member States; calls on the Commission to explore potential synergies between the maintenance of undersea digital and energy infrastructure;

84. Emphasises the importance of improving EU and Member State repair capabilities and response mechanisms to handle submarine cable disruptions, which are essential for maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications; underlines the importance of international cooperation in repairing sabotaged cables and facilitating the necessary investments, and calls for the establishment of an EU-based rapid-response repair fleet to ensure swift recovery and operational continuity in the event of disruptions; calls on the Commission to carry out an assessment of regulatory measures to ensure fair access and security, regardless of whether the infrastructure is privately or publicly owned;

85. Welcomes the adoption of the action plan on cable security, which will be organised around four pillars: prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence; highlights the importance of its full and timely implementation; urges, in the current geopolitical context, increased investment in technologies to strengthen the security and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure;

86. Calls on the Commission to promote R&I to enable advanced technological innovations in cable security, including early warning systems and AI-driven threat assessments;

87. Urges the Commission to review available instruments designed to better leverage private investments in support of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs); calls on the Commission to include submarine cable projects in the list of IPCEIs; recognises the need to streamline and simplify the application and administrative process governing IPCEIs;

Cybersecurity

88. Recalls the legislative work carried out over the previous legislative term aimed at significantly improving cybersecurity in the EU; welcomes, in particular, the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act and the NIS2 Directive; stresses the need for the harmonised and timely implementation and enforcement of these measures;

89. Calls on the Commission to present an evaluation report on the Cybersecurity Act and to propose a legislative act to review it in order to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity framework, with a particular focus on the interplay between sovereignty and security; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to enhance the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure and prevent foreign interference from entities subject to extraterritorial legislation, as well as accelerating the adoption process for EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls for ENISA’s mandate to be strengthened to coordinate crisis response, oversee cybersecurity certification for critical infrastructure and ensure uniform implementation of cybersecurity standards across the single market;

90. Emphasises the importance of the upcoming European internal security strategy in strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection;

91. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement any restrictions on high-risk suppliers, posing significant security vulnerabilities; calls for the full implementation of the EU toolbox for 5G security in order to reduce reliance on high-risk vendors; calls on the Commission to make the toolbox binding, specifically with regard to high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure;

Simplification

92. Notes that to achieve true technological sovereignty, the EU must have viable commercial alternatives; stresses that the EU must urgently pursue a comprehensive agenda of simplification and bureaucracy reduction to foster an innovation-friendly environment capable of supporting competitive European alternatives to dominant global digital players; underlines that excessive administrative burdens, fragmented regulatory frameworks, an incomplete digital single market and overly complex compliance procedures disproportionately impact European start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs, limiting their capacity to compete at global level; recognises that the EU should therefore prioritise regulatory streamlining and the deepening of the digital single market, ensuring that legislation is proportionate, innovation-driven and does not stifle the development of European technological solutions;

93. Emphasises the need for new legislative proposals to be aligned with better regulation principles, ensuring that any new digital policy measure that affects competitiveness is accompanied by an impact assessment, including a competitiveness, SME and small mid-cap check that evaluates whether a given legislative instrument is necessary, proportionate and does not create unnecessary burdens for businesses, especially SMEs, and thus its effects on competitiveness, investment prospects and consumer welfare;

94. Highlights that the simplification of EU legislation must not endanger any of the fundamental rights of citizens and businesses and thus jeopardise regulatory certainty; believes that any simplification proposal should not be rushed or proposed without proper consideration, consultation and an impact assessment;

95. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to fully implement the principle of burden reduction for companies in EU legislation; calls on the Commission, therefore, to enhance its efforts by aiming to remove more cost and administrative burdens for businesses compared to the benefits that would be derived from any new regulatory requirements introduced at EU level in the same policy area, so that barriers to market entry are removed to help European companies to scale and grow;

96. Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent simplification, implementation and enforcement of EU digital legislation through the Digital Package, streamlining definitions and reporting procedures, assessing ways to alleviate reporting obligations and reducing the gap between industry and government;

97. Believes that supporting companies and innovators to stay in Europe by developing the EU as an attractive and agile business environment is key to enhancing technological sovereignty; emphasises, in that regard, that excessive regulation and administrative burdens should be avoided and that EU rules should be clear, consistent, predictable, proportionate and technologically neutral, thus maintaining a globally competitive regulatory environment; believes that new public procurement methods and the development of regulatory sandboxes and test beds should also contribute to an innovation-friendly framework;

98. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of a 28th legal regime, recognising that a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules will be a game changer for digital investment and innovation; believes that reducing regulatory fragmentation across 27 national legal regimes will boost private investment, lower compliance costs and accelerate the deployment of next-generation digital infrastructure, products and services; encourages the Commission to ensure that this framework specifically addresses regulatory barriers in the digital sector, such as permitting and cross-border data flows, in order to create a true digital single market;

99. Urges the Commission to create a single point of contact to simplify the application process for private-sector access to EU funding mechanisms, ensuring that private companies, SMEs and start-ups can more easily participate in digital investment programmes;

Energy

100. Emphasises that data centres will put additional pressure on electricity grids, making it imperative to reinforce them through anticipatory investments; stresses that data centres can also help stabilise the grid by participating in demand-side flexibility; calls for measures to incentivise such contributions based on the implementation of the revision of the European electricity market reform;

101. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to propose and implement instruments that ensure orderly planning of the escalating energy demand from data centres, facilitating their strategic placement near available energy sources and thus minimising reliance on the broader grid infrastructure;

102. Recognises that fibre is more energy efficient than traditional copper networks; acknowledges the importance of reducing energy consumption in data transmission and ensuring long-term stability and efficiency;

103. Calls on the Commission to ensure a reliable and sufficient clean energy and net-zero technology supply to support the digital infrastructure of the future;

Skills

104. Recognises the urgent need for more skilled professionals in digital fields to meet the EU’s strategic objectives; calls on the Member States to develop national strategies and incentives to retain European talent and attract the world’s best digital professionals, thereby strengthening the EU’s innovation capacity and technological leadership;

105. Stresses the importance of closing the digital and STEM skills gap to enhance technological resilience, innovation capacity and open strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to strengthen investments in digital education, upskilling and reskilling, particularly in areas essential for the green and digital transitions; supports prioritising investments that address digital skills shortages, particularly in AI, cybersecurity, data analysis and clean technologies, in order to support innovation and technological sovereignty;

106. Calls for coordinated strategies at national level to improve access to high-quality STEM education, promote lifelong learning and attract talent to ICT and related fields; encourages partnerships between public institutions, industry and educational providers to ensure alignment between curricula and evolving market needs;

107. Calls for intensified efforts to improve digital literacy and skills across all demographics, focusing on early STEM education, vocational education and training, and lifelong learning in digital technologies; recommends aligning national education and training strategies with the EU Digital Decade goal of 80 % of the population possessing basic digital skills by 2030, with a focus on gender-inclusive policies to increase women’s participation in ICT and STEM fields; calls on the EU institutions to take concrete steps to uphold the commitments referred to in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, both within the EU framework as in the Union’s cooperation with third countries;

108. Supports the establishment of a common EU certification framework for digital and technical skills to improve the recognition and portability of qualifications among the Member States;

109. Encourages the European Investment Bank and national development institutions to support digital talent retention by co-investing in European deep-tech start-ups, ensuring that EU-funded innovation remains within the region and contributes to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

Research and innovation

110. Recognises the importance of bridging the gap between research and commercialisation and calls on the Commission to enhance the valorisation of innovation within the EU;

111. Believes that Europe’s ability to transform research into market-ready solutions is critical for building necessary capabilities and reducing reliance on non-EU technologies;

112. Emphasises that funding needs to be strategically allocated to accelerate the development and market introduction of solutions that strengthen Europe’s technological resilience and drive innovation; underlines the importance of a more agile, excellence-based funding structure, particularly in improving the translation of research into industrial applications; calls for increased investment in R&I to strengthen Europe’s knowledge and technological capabilities and insists that EU research, development and innovation (RDI) funding be based on open competition and excellence;

113. Highlights the need for policies that support industrial innovation, including targeted investment in key strategic technologies where Europe can lead globally, such as quantum computing, in order to build an innovation ecosystem;

114. Believes that private investment in RDI is of utmost importance and calls for the EU to create incentives that effectively leverage private funding for the development of critical technologies, including through public-private partnerships;

115. Stresses the urgent need for stronger incentives to mobilise private sector capital for technology-driven innovation; encourages the Member States to introduce targeted fiscal incentives, regulatory simplification and risk-sharing instruments designed to attract private equity to the technology and digital sectors; highlights the need to streamline cross-border capital flows within the single market to facilitate access to finance for innovative European start-ups;

Standards

116. Strongly believes that promoting interoperability and EU standards is paramount to fostering competitiveness in the technology sector, as it ensures that products can be connected and work with each other, thus fostering innovation and open markets; recalls that both interoperability and common technological standards pave the way for the functioning of the single market;

117. Underlines that the Commission must increase its engagement in existing global standardisation structures and focus on the international uptake of European standards through a bottom-up approach, avoiding centralisation;

Partnerships

118. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to negotiating DTAs that facilitate secure and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries; encourages the Commission to increase efforts in negotiating DTAs with additional partner countries;

119. Calls on the Commission to accelerate technical cooperation in multilateral forums such as the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to develop global standards for digital governance, AI regulation, cross-border data flows and emerging technologies;

120. Urges the Commission to advance negotiations on a permanent solution to the WTO moratorium on e-commerce to prevent the introduction of digital tariffs, ensuring international digital trade remains open, predictable and conducive to innovation;

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121. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

(2025/2017(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part [1],

– having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

– having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

– having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

– having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

– having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

– having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

– having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

– having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

– having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region;

7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

Democratic institutions, media and civil society

8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act [4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

Fundamental rights

20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens;

24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

Rule of law

29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority; urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

Socio-economic reforms

38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive [5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment [6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment [7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

Regional cooperation and foreign policy

55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

°

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61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ4: Smart estate management

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

LCQ4: Smart estate management
Question:

In order to enhance management efficiency and service quality of public rental housing (PRH) estates, the Government is actively promoting smart estate management and has selected ten PRH estates (including Hoi Ying Estate in Sham Shui Po) as pilot sites (pilot estates) for smart estate management. According to an opinion poll, over 90 per cent of the responding PRH tenants hope that the Housing Department expeditiously introduces smart management into the estates where they live. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the details and timetable for implementing smart estate management in various pilot estates;

(2) given that the Government will utilize the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence to facilitate daily management in the pilot estates, and will also introduce robots to carry out tasks such as security patrol and cleansing, of the criteria based on which the Government decides to try out such smart equipment and technologies in the pilot estates; whether it will introduce robots into estates other than the pilot estates, and whether it will consider introducing robots of a more interactive nature to act as goodwill ambassadors to residents by answering their daily enquiries; and

(3) whether it will extend the Smartcard Access Control System for buildings to all PRH estates, enabling residents to enter their buildings with smartcards or personalized QR codes and thus reducing the security risk of leaking building access codes, and install smart home monitoring systems for elderly residents; if so, of the details?

Reply:

President,

Under the theme of Housing???I&T initiative, the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) promotes smart estate management this year so as to enhance efficiency and service quality, strengthen estate security, improve environment, expedite maintenance work, and enhance the sense of well-being and sense of gain of public rental housing (PRH) residents. The HA has selected ten public housing estates as pilot sites for the introduction of innovative technologies to promote smart estate management. In response to the questions raised by the Hon Vincent Cheng, our reply is as follows:

At present, the HA has introduced the following innovative technologies for estate management:

(i) Internet of Things (IoT) sensors

The HA applies a variety of sensors and IoT to digitise various circumstances and information in estates, collect real-time data for analysis and monitoring, and establish early warning systems (such as electricity supply, operation of water pumps and drainage system blockage, etc.) to notify the estate offices immediately for follow-up. Presently, about 700 sets of sensors have been installed in six PRH estates. This would hence enhance the efficiency and service quality and minimise the impact on residents.

(ii) Artificial Intelligence (AI)

AI is able to analyse images to detect irregularities and monitor the common areas of PRH estates in real time, identifying incidents such as objects thrown from height and illegal parking. The AI video analytic system can spare frontline staff from reviewing video footages for long hours, helping staff identify more accurately and efficiently the incidents of objects thrown from height from long videos, thereby shortening the time required for the entire evidence collection process and enhancing the efficiency in handling such incidents. The system has assisted to handle 17 successful point allotment cases.

(iii) Mobile devices

The mobile applications can be used anytime and anywhere by frontline staff, enabling them to record and retrieve information on-site at various locations. The “Mobile Application System for Daily Patrol” developed by the HA trialed in ten pilot estates allows security staff to readily report patrol situation and record in real-time matters requiring cleansing or maintenance services with photos uploaded, replacing the paper reports, reducing the paperwork after patrol duties, and raising the effectiveness of follow-up actions.

(iv) Robots and Small Unmanned Aircrafts (SUAs)

Robots and SUAs have brought significant benefits across various fields. Since mid-2022, maintenance staff of the HA have been utilising SUAs for tasks such as inspecting external walls of 21 estates, lift shafts, trees of 175 estates and 285 green roofs within 22 estates. Not only does the use SUAs save manpower and time, but it also greatly enhances inspection efficiency and avoids the risks brought by scaffold-based inspections. These technologies help complete tasks which are dangerous or difficult for humans to achieve within a short period of time and minimise inconvenience caused to residents. Robots have also been used on a trial basis in three housing estates for routine cleansing and security work to enhance efficiency, reduce conflicts and assist with publicity work. In addition to physical robots, virtual robots also provide considerable assistance to the public. For instance, the public can inquire about information and provide suggestions through interaction with the HA Chatbot.

To further promote innovative technologies in PRH estate management, the HA established a dedicated co-ordination team in mid-2024 to oversee the trial of various technologies across different management functions and review operational models. The co-ordination team also formulates implementation timetable for estates based on their specific conditions, with a view to gradually introducing suitable innovative solutions. For example, security robots are more suitable for use in spacious and flat public spaces. The HA will continue to actively collaborate with the property management sector to explore the implementation of cost-effective projects and maximise outcomes with limited resources. The co-ordination team will adjust its strategies annually based on the pilot results and identify suitable estates for introducing the best new technologies.

In addition, the HA has piloted the use of a smart contactless access control system in Hin Fat Estate, Tuen Mun since September 2024, by using smartcards and mobile QR codes to facilitate control and to monitor the main access of the building. The HA will evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the pilot scheme, the application of the technology and residents’ feedback in the fourth quarter this year. With relevant government departments and research institutions, the HA will also continue to explore other systems, such as the feasibility of applying “iAM Smart” Personal Code to the access control system. Subject to the availability of resources, the HA will trial other smart access control systems in other estates subsequently. Upon analysis and comparison, the HA will gradually extend smart access control systems to suitable PRH estates in phases.

The HA always upholds the values of “caring” and keeps abreast of the times to actively explore measures to address various needs of the elderly residents through the application of innovative technologies. Starting from April this year, the HA launched the pilot scheme of Door Sensor Installation for Elderly Households in Wan Hon Estate in Kwun Tong and Sheung Lok Estate in Ho Man Tin. The elderly households who voluntarily participate in the scheme are equipped with the system which allows designated relatives or friends to keep track of the movement of the elderly in and out of their flats so as to provide timely support when needed. So far, a total of 50 elderly households have participated in the scheme. The Housing Department will actively explore the feasibility of implementing other similar schemes in collaboration with other government departments and social welfare organisations, with a view to benefitting more elderly households in other PRH estates.

Moreover, the HA has also provided subsidy to eligible elderly households to install an emergency alarm system, so that the elderly in need can seek help promptly in case of emergency. A total of about 26 000 applications have been approved since the launch of this scheme. We have also been piloting the installation of smart fall-detection systems in eight accessible toilets in some estates to detect incidents such as falls, faints, or prolonged inactivity.

The HA will continue to listen and make reference to the views of various stakeholders with an open manner and to explore more effective innovative technologies for smart estate management, so as to enhance the service quality and the sense of well-being of the elderly and residents.

Thank you.
Issued at HKT 20:16

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CategoriesMIL-OSI

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Autonomous AI systems can help tackle global food insecurity

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Woo Soo Kim, Professor, Mechatronic Systems Engineering & Founding Director, Global Institute for Agritech, Simon Fraser University

There is a growing and urgent need to address global food insecurity. This urgency is underscored by reports from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which states that nearly 828 million people suffer from hunger worldwide.

Climate change is further escalating these issues, disrupting traditional farming systems and emphasizing the need for smarter, resource-efficient solutions.

But imagine a future where indoor farming systems can operate entirely on their own, managing water, nutrients and environmental conditions without human oversight. Such autonomous systems, driven by artificial intelligence (AI) and powered by robotics, could revolutionize how we produce food, especially in regions with limited arable land.

Tackling food and water insecurity requires innovative solutions like precision agriculture, using AI and robotics to foster sustainable development.

My research team at Simon Fraser University’s (SFU) School of Mechatronics Systems Engineering has developed a prototype of an AI-powered sensing robot capable of autonomously monitoring the water needs of tomato plants.

Simon Fraser University researchers and students at the Arusha Climate and Environmental Research Centre, Aga Kahn University, a 3700-acre ecological reserve, tested drone technology to improve farming operations in Tanzania.
(Woo Soo Kim)

AI-powered farming

In conventional greenhouses, several water management techniques are used to enhance efficiency and minimize waste. These include drip irrigation and using soil moisture sensors and automated irrigation systems.

Despite their effectiveness, these methods have limitations in responsiveness and accuracy, and can lead to over- or under-watering, wasting resources and impacting crop health.

Agriculture takes up the vast majority of the water humanity uses. As water scarcity affects over two billion people worldwide, it is critical to find innovative ways to more efficiently use water.

At SFU, we’ve built an innovative robot that uses electrical signals from plants, also known as plant electrophysiology responses, as real-time indicators of plant health and hydration needs. The system integrates advanced AI algorithms to interpret these signals and determine when water should be supplied.

This technology eliminates the traditional guesswork and manual labour involved in irrigation, promoting efficient water use and reducing waste while optimizing plant health.

Recent research highlights the potential of integrating AI innovations into agriculture. AI-powered systems can significantly improve water efficiency, reduce chemical runoff and optimize crop yields.

Advances in robotics are also facilitating non-invasive and continuous monitoring of plant health, enabling interventions that are both precise and timely.

Recent advances in plant physiological signal monitoring have shown that sensors capable of capturing electrical signals reflecting plant stress, hydration and overall health can provide highly specific, real-time data.

A research team at SFU has developed an AI-powered sensing robot capable of autonomously monitoring water needs of tomato plants using the plant’s own electrical signals.
(Woo Soo Kim)

Our non-invasive sensing robot improves this process by enabling continuous and efficient monitoring of plant health, making automation more responsive and effective.

When combined with AI, these signals enable precision watering that is dynamically adapted to the plant’s actual needs, representing a significant leap in intelligent plant care.

Furthermore, recent innovations using multi-spectral imaging and machine learning have vastly improved our ability to detect disease and when plants are stressed. This can be integrated with electrical sensing robots like ours to develop comprehensive systems to monitor plant health.

With these improvements fully autonomous agriculture is becoming feasible. This technology goes beyond irrigation, using robotic sensing to interpret plant signals and enable autonomous nutrient management and environmental monitoring.

These multifunctional robots aim to optimize resource use, reduce waste, and increase crop yields, supporting global food security through holistic plant health management.

From greenhouses to fields

Our prototype shows promise in greenhouses. However, the real potential of AI water management lies in scalable, adaptable solutions. Addressing global food and water security requires international collaboration to share knowledge, technology and develop region-specific strategies for areas impacted by scarcity and climate change.

In recent years, our team has engaged deeply with agricultural communities in Tanzania and Asia-Pacific nations such as Singapore, Philippines, Japan and South Korea, understanding their unique challenges.

These regions face acute water shortages, limited access to sophisticated technology and the adverse impacts of climate change. To be effective, solutions developed in controlled environments must be adapted and made accessible to farmers.

This means developing sensor tools that are affordable and simple to use, and scalable AI and robotic systems that can operate effectively under variable environmental and infrastructural conditions.

The real potential of AI water management lies in developing scalable, adaptable solutions.
(Alana McPherson)

International collaboration plays a vital role here. Sharing knowledge through cross-border research partnerships, capacity-building programs and technology transfer initiatives can accelerate the deployment of smart agriculture solutions worldwide.

The Food and Agriculture Organization, the Association of Pacific Rim Universities and the World Bank are actively fostering such collaborations, emphasizing that sustainable agriculture progress depends on integrating cutting-edge technology with local knowledge.

Our goal is to develop affordable, easy-to-deploy AI sensing robots for smallholder farms that can provide real-time plant monitoring to reduce waste and improve yields.

These systems can foster resilient farming ecosystems, and contribute toward meeting the UN’s sustainable development goal of ending hunger and malnutrition.

Ultimately, scaling prototypes like ours from greenhouses to global agriculture requires strong international collaboration. Supportive policies and knowledge sharing will accelerate the deployment of intelligent water management systems. This will empower farmers globally to achieve more sustainable and resilient food production.

Woo Soo Kim receives funding from Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and Mitacs.

– ref. Autonomous AI systems can help tackle global food insecurity – https://theconversation.com/autonomous-ai-systems-can-help-tackle-global-food-insecurity-258788

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Government of Canada opens applications for the AI Compute Access Fund
Source: Government of Canada News (2)

Fund will support Canadian SMEs in accessing high-performance compute capacity

June 25, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to shape our world, the Government of Canada seeks to harness AI’s opportunities, mitigate its risks and foster trust. With strategic government investments and support for responsible AI adoption, Canada will grow its AI ecosystem and enhance productivity across the country.

Today, the Government of Canada opened applications for the AI Compute Access Fund, a key initiative under the Canadian Sovereign AI Compute Strategy. This fund will provide up to $300 million for affordable access to compute power for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to develop made-in-Canada AI products and solutions.

A due diligence assessment of each project proposal will be conducted to evaluate:
- the organization’s capacity and experience to implement the project
- the project’s ability to achieve AI Compute Access Fund objectives
- the viability, impact and benefits of the project to Canada
Investing in AI is vital to building the strongest economy in the G7. The Government of Canada remains steadfast in supporting the nation’s AI ecosystem with strategic investments that will drive both economic growth and responsible technological advancement. With this commitment, the government is unlocking new opportunities for prosperity, resiliency and national security, while strengthening Canada’s leadership position in the global AI landscape.

The Canadian Sovereign AI Compute Strategy, including the Access Fund, will help:
- scale Canada’s AI industry
- increase productivity and drive AI adoption rates across the country
- make high-performance computing more accessible for small and medium-sized businesses
- foster groundbreaking, made-in-Canada AI solutions in sectors such as life sciences, energy and advanced manufacturing
With the AI Compute Access Fund and the broader $2 billion Canadian Sovereign AI Compute Strategy, the government is ensuring that Canadian innovators have the tools they need to compete, drive discoveries and create new jobs in a modern, tech-enabled economy.

MIL OSI Canada News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: “There is no goal to say what is right. We aim to explore variability.”

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

Photo: Maxim Melenchenko

Works at HSE University International Laboratory of Language Convergence, which focuses on the interaction of languages of different peoples living in regions with a mixed multi-ethnic population. Research by HSE scientists helps to better understand the history of language development and study the features of perception and use of languages in a multilingual environment. Georgy Moroz, head of the laboratory, spoke about this in an interview with HSE.Glavnoe.

— How did the laboratory start working?

— It was opened in 2017, Nina Dobrushina became the head, and the scientific director was University of Berkeley professor Johanna Nichols, who is now working remotely. Most of the research staff studied the languages of the peoples of the Caucasus and their interaction: for example, Nina Dobrushina, Mikhail Daniel, Timur Maisak were interested mainly in Dagestan, Yuri Lander and Anastasia Panova studied the Abkhaz-Adyghe languages.

One of the central areas of work is typology. Typological studies in linguistics involve classifying languages by various features (for example, by the number of vowels and consonants). For this purpose, samples are created that can include dozens of languages. Our laboratory is one of the few scientific centers in Russia where such studies are conducted, and perhaps the only one that focuses specifically on the processes of language interaction. The laboratory also continues to study the languages of the Caucasus and create linguistic resources for them.

In the Caucasus, the Russian language comes into contact with languages of different groups: in addition to the Nakh-Dagestani languages, these are the Turkic languages (which include many languages of the peoples of Dagestan, for example Kumyk and Azerbaijani), as well as the Abkhaz-Adyghe languages (Abkhaz, Abaza, Adyghe and Kabardian), Kartvelian (Georgian, Megrelian, Svan and Laz languages) and Indo-European (Armenian, Ossetian, Tat).

The main goal of creating the laboratory is to study the mutual influence of languages on each other. A striking example of such influence is the Ossetian language, which is Indo-European, but unlike other Indo-European languages, it has eruptive consonants. These are sounds in which the vocal cords close and rise during pronunciation, creating a pressure difference, for example, кI, пI, тI, цI, чI. In addition, during an expedition to Azerbaijan, the laboratory staff studied the dialects of the territories bordering Dagestan, and Mikhail Daniel discovered a dialect of the Azerbaijani language that had eruptive sounds (although there were reports of it in previous works). Apparently, this can be explained by the fact that the ancestors of the inhabitants of the village of Ilisu spoke a certain Nakh-Dagestani language, presumably Tsakhur, and then switched to the Azerbaijani language, preserving such an eruptive trace. Most likely, this happened due to language contacts.

Our leader Johanna Nichols put forward a similar hypothesis about the inhabitants of some villages in Dagestan. The fact is that the Avar language is widespread in the north of Dagestan, and it is widespread mainly in the lowlands. However, one can find speakers of the Avar language in highland villages surrounded by non-Avar villages. And here the assumption arises whether they previously spoke languages other than Avar, and then switched to Avar under the influence of its prestige.

The process by which such borrowings and even transitions from one language to another occur, and as a result, the convergence of languages or dialects, is called linguistic convergence. It is important that this process is easier to see in the example of genetically unrelated languages, but a similar phenomenon can also occur with related languages or dialects.

— Is convergence of neighboring languages necessary?

— It happens in most cases, but there are also opposite cases, when languages and their speakers “try” to be different from each other. This process is called divergence. For example, last year we invited John Mansfield to speak at our seminar, who, together with his colleagues, published a typological study of divergent processes based on 42 languages from around the world.

— You mentioned Dagestan, where many languages are spoken. Could you tell us more about this region and your research related to it?

— Dagestan is wonderful for its multilingualism and the mutual influence of local languages on each other; in addition, at some point they began to change under the influence of the active penetration of the Russian language into the local environment.

Recently, my research intern Victoria Zubkova, research assistant Chiara Naccarato and I submitted an article to one of the leading international linguistic journals about the adaptation of Russian borrowings in Andean languages. Earlier borrowings were mainly through the Avar language, through its peculiar mediation. Now words are borrowed directly, and we are trying to model in which languages the influence of Russian is greater and on what factors the degree of its influence depends.

The study revealed that Avar and Botlikh have recently seen fewer phonetic changes in borrowings from Russian than other Andic languages (see, for example, Akhvakh кIебетIи — “kopeck”). The main reason: these languages have already come under the strong influence of Russian. Avar used to play an important role in the north of Dagestan; it was and remains a kind of regional lingua franca. The results of our study show that the process of adaptation of Russian borrowings in other Andic languages was slower than in Avar, but it is obvious that this process has been decreasing over time. Now, of course, any borrowing will most likely enter all of these languages without any phonetic adaptation.

— How do you obtain materials for research?

— We regularly go on expeditions to collect data; for us, this is the most important source of material. Our colleagues recently returned from Armenia, another group – from AdygeyaRecently, we have begun to make more active use of data collected by scientists outside the lab.

Thus, the laboratory collected 10 speech corpora of bilinguals, that is, people for whom Russian is not their native language, but they learned it and regularly use it in everyday life. Their speech – both pronunciation and grammar – differs from the speech of monolinguals.

Corpora of individual dialects of the Russian language are also being created. The main difficulty in collecting such material is that Russian dialectologists were previously reluctant to share their data. Thanks to Nina Dobrushina, this has changed, and now placing some dialect corpora with us is considered a common thing. In total, 26 dialect corpora have been created in the laboratory.

We are also collecting corpora of minor languages of Russia; there are currently 14 of them.

— Can you clarify what a “corpus” is for linguists? How and why do you create new corpora?

— Corpora appeared as written records of speech of various types or simply marked-up collections of texts. A corpus differs from a collection of texts by morphological or other markings. In particular, you can set up a search by categories: for example, which nouns come before infinitives. For example, the National Corpus of the Russian Language is a collection of a large number of texts that can be searched morphologically. When we prepare oral corpora — bilingual and dialectal — we use text transcripts in literary Russian, which makes automatic morphological search possible. Corpora also contain audio recordings, thanks to which we can understand the features of dialects. Sometimes you need to listen to the recordings again to understand more precisely whether certain sounds are used.

The corpus is one of the central tools of modern linguistics. It is by analyzing the frequency of use of different constructions in it that we make certain generalizations, on the basis of which we publish articles.

One of the options for using corpora is to compare dialects or small languages with each other: using vector models, one can obtain intersections of corpora of corresponding languages and thus understand which dialects and languages are closer and which are further from each other.

Thus, according to our observations of bilingual corpora, Karelians, unlike Dagestanis, speak Russian, which is closer to the literary language. In Dagestan, local languages are influenced by both the standard literary Russian and the regional Dagestan Russian that emerged in the republic and is developing in its own unique way. For children, the amount of language use is important. And if, for example, Lezgins speak Lezgin, and Adyghe speak Adyghe or Kabardian and then switch to Russian, then we can ask which Russian exactly – the literary Russian or a specific local version with local features caused by native languages. Such comparisons of features are possible precisely thanks to our corpora.

— What other resources do you create?

— As mentioned above, one of the important resources of the laboratory is the linguistic atlases of small languages of Russia.

We also compile dictionaries of such languages. For example, we recently publishedDictionary of the Kininsky dialect of the Rutul language, whose speakers live in Dagestan and Azerbaijan; the dictionary size is about 1200 words. I analyzed the Zilov dialect, one of the dialects of the Andian language, which for a long time had no written language, and also posted it on the laboratory’s page dictionaryabout 1,500 words. However, this is a significantly smaller volume compared to dictionaries published by linguists from the regions where the corresponding language is spoken. They have a better command of the languages and can usually devote more time to this task.

Dictionaries published in Dagestan include at least 5,000–6,000 units, and recently our colleague Majid Sharipovich Khalilov published a dictionary of the Tsez (Didoi) language containing 11,000 words. For an unwritten language, this is something phenomenal.

— What are the key areas of the laboratory’s current work?

— Our main focus is linguistic typology, within the framework of which research is conducted on a sample of unrelated languages from all over the world.

Another long-term project is the Typological Atlas of the Languages of Dagestan, which already has 58 chapters, each of which is devoted to a separate linguistic phenomenon, such as the presence or absence of some eruptive sounds. Researchers from our laboratory, Samira Verhees and Chiara Naccarato, studied how people speaking different languages greet each other in the morning and wrote a chapter on the subject. It turned out that in 17 languages, the greeting is “Good morning!”; the rhetorical question “Are you awake?” and “Are you up?” are also common greetings, and, for example, in the Lak language, you can find both of these options.

The project of electronic Dagestani dictionaries plays an important role now. We are trying to create a unified database that would contain lexical material of the Nakh-Dagestani languages. The database was created thanks to a series of coursework by students of the educational program “Fundamental and Computer Linguistics”, who digitalized, cleaned up the data, created a transliterator. These works contain phonetic and morphological marking and marking of borrowings from Russian, Arabic, Persian and Turkic languages. Now we have unified materials on the Andic and Avar languages.

This greatly simplifies a number of studies that required looking at different dictionaries. The already mentioned article by Victoria Zubkova and Chiara Naccarato was made possible thanks to this database, which also opens up the field for new research. This is a project with great potential, which I hope will continue.

Another important area is the study of non-standard Russian, in which we study both dialects of Russian and the peculiarities of the Russian language of those for whom it is not native. We call our group DiaL2: dia — dialects and L2 — the standard designation for the second language. We are interested in any variants that are not similar to the literary ones. We do not aim to say which is correct. We seek to study the variability that we observe. Our group includes laboratory researchers and students. For example, our research intern Anna Grishanova recently had an article accepted for publication on the loss of prepositions in the speech of bilinguals whose first native language is Chuvash.

There is a separate one Rutulian project. As part of the “Rediscovering Russia” grant, we visited 12 Rutul villages and releasedatlas, similar to the Typological Atlas of the Languages of Dagestan, which I mentioned earlier. The Rutul Atlas contains 425 separate chapters devoted to various topics of Rutul dialectology: phonetic, grammatical and lexical. For example, one of the chaptersis dedicated to the lexeme hedgehog, which is designated by different variants – both by borrowing from Russian and by our own g’yllentsI, kirpik, zh’uzh’ya or k’yng’yr.

There are also two other small projects: one on the Aramaic languages used in Russia, for which a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (24-28-01009) was received – “Areal-typological description of the neo-Aramaic idioms of Armenia” under the direction of Yuri Koryakov – and the second on the Abkhaz-Adyghe languages.

In general, documenting languages is very important for the culture of the peoples we work with, because some unwritten languages can disappear, and if we manage to somehow record them, then people will be able to see how their grandparents spoke, even if they do not understand their native language.

— How is the laboratory’s work organized?

— One of the pillars of the laboratory seems to me to be ours weekly seminar. It takes place every Tuesday at 16:00. During the laboratory’s operation, more than 230 seminars have been held, with almost 300 papers presented. Almost all seminars are held in English, which allows us to more actively involve foreign colleagues in our work and maintain scientific contacts. We are visited by various well-known linguists, for example, Martin Haspelmath, one of the leading specialists in linguistic typology. During his trip to Moscow last December, he spoke at the HSE with lecture, which attracted great interest. The seminars also show our interns how to give a report, ask questions, and conduct themselves during a report in English. In addition, when I became the head of the department, we began to use the seminars more actively as a platform for discussing new scientific articles. This is due to my deep conviction that it is easy to stop reading or limit reading to only your narrow specialization and switch to churning out articles. It is reading and discussing articles, even those far removed from your research topic, that allows you to keep the general state of modern linguistics in focus, rather than drowning in specifics, as in the parable of the elephant and the blind wise men.

— How actively do you collaborate with other universities and HSE campuses?

— As part of the project “Mirror Laboratories» We collaborated with the Southern Federal University in 2022–2024. It included three subprojects: a project to study Russian as a foreign language, a dialectological project, thanks to which we have a corpus of Don dialects, which we support and, if necessary, can continue to study dialects, as well as a digital humanities research project, or Digital Humanities (DH).

The current inter-campus project with the National Research University Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg is focused on DH: my colleagues and I are engaged in applied computational linguistics. In particular, in St. Petersburg we created a corpus of Russian short stories from the 1930s to 2000s, a corpus of Soviet songs, and even developed a chatbot for the Hermitage.

— How does this chatbot work?

— For example, a visitor asks to show a painting of a woman with her head on a plate, meaning Judith with the head of Holofernes; the bot is supposed to give the desired painting. But hardly anyone will be surprised if it is Herodias with the head of John the Baptist.

— What other applied work can you imagine?

— We have various applied research. For example, we have started developing transliterators for the Nakh-Dagestani languages. We dream of creating a hub where transliterators of texts in different languages would be presented, which would be very useful for linguists.

In addition, we are developing morphological analyzers for small languages, collecting corpora and dictionaries. All this is ultimately rich material for verifying machine learning models of various modalities: both audio and text. Such models often suffer from a lack of expert data labeling.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: CADDXFPV: The Innovation Leader in FPV Drone Technology

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Shenzhen, China, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In the fast-evolving landscape of technology, where drone innovators shine like stars, CADDXFPV stands out as a heavyweight in first-person view (FPV) drone technology and video transmission systems. Founded on August 7, 2017, in Longgang, Shenzhen, this Chinese tech firm has anchored itself in the FPV domain since day one, embarking on a passionate journey of technological deep-diving.

Encouraging Development in FPV Ecosystem Expansion

With technology as its anchor, CADDXFPV has built a global R&D network spanning Shenzhen, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Eighty percent of its 100+ R&D team hail from top universities like Harbin Institute of Technology and Fudan University, infusing academic wisdom into product DNA and making technological breakthroughs the norm:

2018: Partner of Drone Racing Association, stepping onto the international stage.

2019: Co-launched the Vista system with DJI, gaining global recognition through technical prowess.

2020: Entered the lightweight market with nano-sized FPV cameras, filling a niche gap.

2021–2023: Released the Polar night-vision camera, and joined industry associations—advancing technology and ecosystem development in parallel.

2024: Partner of FAI World Drone Racing Championship , and participation in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area “Fly Valley” initiative—deepening its reach from hardware to ecosystem.

Notably, CADDXFPV has invested six consecutive years (2019–2024) in global racing events. This isn’t just a brand-building move; it’s a way to refine technology in extreme scenarios, keeping products at the forefront in core metrics like “racing-level stability” and “low latency.”

Today, CADDXFPV products reach over 100 countries, supported by a network of 400+ dealers and used by 500,000 users worldwide, all witnessing technological iterations firsthand.

Full Industrial Chain Technology Matrix

Unlike single-product players, CADDXFPV has constructed a full industrial chain matrix of “digital video transmission systems – intelligent imaging – complete drone solutions,” leveraging technical synergy to serve diverse scenarios from racing to aerial photography and industrial inspection.

1. FPV Digital Transmission Systems: Redefining “HD & Low Latency”

CADDX Vista: A benchmark collaboration with DJI, achieving triple breakthroughs in “low latency + HD transmission + ecosystem compatibility “—crafting a “plug-and-play” experience for entry-level pilots.

Walksnail Avatar: An in-house “industry disruptor” with 1080P/60FPS resolution, 10–50 km transmission range, and cutting-edge tech like HD video transmission SOC chips, low-latency coding algorithms, and multi-sensor fusion navigation—rewriting industry transmission standards.

Walksnail’s air units offer series like 1S, V2, V3, HD PRO, Moonlight, and GT, covering all scenarios from indoor flying to racing freestyle, night vision, and long-range voyages. Their ultimate video transmission efficiency and HD quality have propelled users from the “analog flight” era to “digital HD.”

2. Walksnail Ground Units: Crafting “Immersive Flight Terminals”

Goggles L: A budget-friendly breakthrough with “high cost-performance + strong interactivity”—4.5-inch LCD for clarity, head tracking enabling “look-to-zoom,” directional antennas for signal optimization, and multi-device compatibility, elevating “economy goggles” to flagship experience.

Goggles X: featuring OLED screens for 1080P/100fps output, HDMI/AV ports, diopter adjustment, and modular design—leaving room for tech upgrades and evolving users from “product buyers” to “ecosystem players.”

Walksnail VRX: It is compatible with analog goggles and provides real – time signals for converting from analog to digital HD..

3. FPV Intelligent Imaging: All-Scenario Image “Enhancers”

Tailored for diverse environments, CADDXFPV’s imaging matrix covers “dim light – no light – full color”:

Ratel Camera: The go-to for night and low-light scenarios, with blacklight sensor + WDR tech, capturing clear details in pitch darkness.

Infra Series: Designed for security and industrial monitoring, using AI image enhancement boxes to break through “total darkness”—applying FPV tech to professional inspection.

Ant Camera: The “eyes” of racing pilots, with 1/3 inch CMOS + 165° FOV, balancing clarity and wide view for extreme maneuvers.

Gazer Camera: Full-color night vision + 3x zoom, with AI enhancement for day details and night clarity.

Farsight Camera: Merging optics, digital tech, and AI algorithms for 8x intelligent zoom—upgrading FPV shooting from “recording” to “creation.”

4. FPV Drone: Gofilm 20—The “Night Eye” for Aerial Photographers

A flagship for low-light aerial photography: 4K starlight camera + 4K DVR, enabling 4K/60FPS recording; 5mg dynamic balance precision + intelligent hovering + vibration isolation tech eliminate “shaky focus” and “frame cropping,” delivering cinematic shots even in dim light.

Committed to In-House R&D, Constantly Disrupting

In R&D, over 110 patents stand as testimony—from transmission algorithms to image enhancement, flight control logic to hardware design, CADDXFPV continues to fill FPV technology gaps, making “Chinese R&D” a benchmark for industry innovation.

In the market, the global FPV sector’s $450 million scale in 2023 and projected $1.206 billion by 2030 validates its potential. Against giants like DJI, CADDXFPV charts a differentiated path: full industrial chain layout for technical synergy, deep engagement in events to hone extreme-scenario performance, and niche-scenario focus to fill multiple gaps.

Today, it’s no longer just a “product manufacturer” but a “tech ecosystem builder,” pioneering new frontiers in the FPV blue ocean. With the “Fly Valley” initiative and innovation park on the horizon, CADDXFPV will continue driving forward with “tech innovation + ecosystem collaboration,” upgrading global users’ experience from “flight” to “creation”—transforming FPV from a sport into an “aerial perspective” lifestyle.

The MIL Network –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: XRP Weakness Will Pass, PFMCrypto Launches XRP Mining Contracts to Turn Market Slump into Opportunity

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

TRENTON, N.J., June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — As XRP struggles to hold above the critical $2 resistance level, investors are increasingly exploring alternative strategies to navigate the volatility. Among the most prominent is PFMCrypto—a pioneering AI-powered cloud mining platform that’s making headlines with its newly launched XRP mining contracts, giving holders a fresh way to earn daily income.
Though analysts warn that XRP may retrace to as low as $1.18, its long-term fundamentals remain strong. Many XRP holders—both institutional and retail—are now turning to PFMCrypto’s short-term contracts to secure stable returns even amid bearish market sentiment.

Click here to explore the PFMCrypto official website.

PFMCrypto Offers Practical Hedging Tool for XRP Holders During Downturns
Amid shifting market sentiment, PFMCrypto has launched a series of short-term XRP mining contracts that require no hardware, no technical setup, and very low entry capital.
A highlight is the 1-day XRP contract—completely free for new users. This low-risk, instant-return plan is backed by robust AI infrastructure, enabling holders to earn daily income regardless of price direction.

XRP Mining Contracts Now Available on PFMCrypto
PFMCrypto provides a range of XRP cloud mining plans tailored to every investor, from passive holders to short-term traders seeking hedging opportunities:
1-Day Plan – $0 (Free for new users) – Return: $0.66
2-Day Plan – $100 – Daily Return: $3.00 + $2.00 Bonus
9-Day Plan – $1,000 – Daily Return: $13.10
30-Day Plan – $5,000 – Daily Return: $78.50
All plans come with full capital protection, ensuring that the initial principal is fully refunded at the end of the contract term—providing liquidity and peace of mind.

Click here to explore more XRP mining contracts.

Why More XRP Holders Are Turning to PFMCrypto in 2025?
PFMCrypto stands out for its ultra-low entry barrier, AI-optimized yield system, and maintenance-free mining model. Users can start earning within minutes—no mining hardware or technical knowledge needed.
Key Features:
1. 100% Remote Access – No hardware, no technical skill required—just log in and activate your plan.
2. Capital Protection – Full principal refund at contract maturity.
3. AI-Powered Yield Optimization – Smart algorithms ensure consistent profits even in sideways or bearish markets.
4. Daily Rewards – Predictable XRP payouts improve cash flow and mitigate volatility risks.
In just the past week, PFMCrypto reported a 240% surge in new XRP miner signups, as users seek stable income strategies in turbulent market conditions.

How to Start XRP Cloud Mining on PFMCrypto？
1. Register: Sign up and receive a $10 welcome bonus + $0.60 in daily login rewards.
Click here to register and claim your bonus now.
2. Choose a Contract: Pick from over 10 XRP mining plans, starting with the free 1-day option.
3. Start Earning: Activate your contract and begin earning daily rewards—no setup required.

About PFMCrypto
Founded in 2018, PFMCrypto is a global leader in AI-powered cloud mining services. The platform supports mining for XRP, BTC, ETH, LTC, DOGE, and SOL, serving more than 9.2 million users across 192 countries and regions. PFMCrypto is redefining how cryptocurrency holders earn sustainable returns, whether in bull markets or short-term corrections.
As XRP begins to emerge from its short-term weakness, PFMCrypto offers a practical, low-risk solution for those focused on long-term value creation.
Full details and participation options available at: https://pfmcrypto.net

Media Contact:

Amelia Elspeth
PFMcrypto
info@pfmcrypto.net

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/224e2a95-816d-44b5-ae10-c3e0e09643e6

The MIL Network –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: XRP Losing Momentum? PFMCrypto Launches Regulated XRP Mining Contracts, Attracting Hundreds of Thousands of XRP Holders
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Farington, England, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — With XRP trading sideways in a prolonged consolidation range, a growing number of holders are seeking new ways to generate profit. In this context, PFMCrypto has emerged as a top choice thanks to its innovative cloud mining platform, offering passive income with high daily payouts—without the need for hardware or technical expertise.

According to official data, users mining XRP through PFMCrypto earn between $100 and $1,800 per day.These performance figures are not forecasts—they reflect real-world results from millions of users. This is made possible by PFMCrypto’s AI-powered profit optimization and results-focused mining model.. For many XRP holders, this opportunity has become a financial safe haven amid uncertain price action.

Click here to visit the official site: https://pfmcrypto.net

What Is PFMCrypto XRP Cloud Mining?

PFMCrypto Cloud Mining is a remote digital asset mining platform that allows users to rent eco-friendly, high-performance mining infrastructure and earn cryptocurrency rewards. The platform supports a wide range of assets—including XRP, DOGE, BTC, ETH, BCH, LTC, and SOL—removing both the technical and financial barriers of traditional mining.

With a 100% remote setup, users don’t need to buy expensive equipment or understand blockchain mechanics. Simply register, select a plan, and start earning daily rewards.

Key Benefits of PFMCrypto XRP Mining Contracts:

– Daily High-Yield Income: Advanced contracts deliver between $600 and $1,800 in daily returns

– Principal Protection: Full capital is returned at contract maturity

– Multi-Crypto Support: In addition to XRP, users can also mine DOGE, BTC, ETH, BCH, LTC, SOL, etc.

– AI-Driven Optimization: The platform uses AI to dynamically adjust mining efficiency based on market conditions

Flexible XRP Mining Plans for All Investors

PFMCrypto offers more than 10 different contract options, allowing users to choose a plan that fits their goals and budget:

$10 Mining Plan – 1-Day Term – Earn $0.60

$100 Mining Plan – 2-Day Term – Earn $3.00 per day

$1,000 Mining Plan – 9-Day Term – Earn $13.10 per day

$5,000 Mining Plan – 30-Day Term – Earn $78.50 per day

These flexible and innovative plans help long-term XRP holders generate stable income—even in sideways or corrective market conditions.

Click here to explore more mining contracts.

“XRP may not see a breakout in the short term, but that doesn’t mean investors have to sit idle,” said a PFMCrypto marketing executive. “Our platform allows XRP holders to continue earning daily income while maintaining their XRP exposure.”

What Makes These XRP Mining Contracts Stand Out?

– 100% Remote Access: No hardware or technical skills required—just log in and activate your plan

– Capital Safety: Full principal is returned at contract maturity

– AI-Powered Returns: Smart optimization ensures profitability even during price stagnation

– Predictable Daily Rewards: Improve cash flow and reduce volatility risks with fixed XRP payouts

New users receive a $10 sign-up bonus and daily login rewards to boost earnings right from the start.

Click here to become a new user of PFMCrypto.

How to Start XRP Mining with PFMCrypto:
1. Register: Create your account and get a $10 welcome bonus plus $0.66 in daily login rewards
2. Choose a Contract: Use your bonus to activate a plan or select a different option to match your strategy
3. Start Mining: Once your contract is live, PFMCrypto handles the rest. Rewards are automatically credited to your account
About PFMCrypto

Founded in 2018, PFMCrypto is committed to reshaping the traditional crypto mining landscape. For years, mining was reserved for tech-savvy users with custom rigs and access to cheap power. PFMCrypto has made mining accessible to everyday users—allowing them to earn BTC, XRP, and more without any prior experience or large upfront investment.

For casual investors and crypto veterans alike, PFMCrypto provides a secure and legitimate way to increase crypto holdings and generate steady returns—even in turbulent market conditions.

Explore the future of XRP mining today at: https://pfmcrypto.net

Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release does not constitute an investment solicitation, nor does it constitute investment advice, financial advice, or trading recommendations. Cryptocurrency mining and staking involve risks and the possibility of losing funds. It is strongly recommended that you perform due diligence before investing or trading in cryptocurrencies and securities, including consulting a professional financial advisor.

The MIL Network –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: XRP Losing Momentum? PFMCrypto Launches Regulated XRP Mining Contracts, Attracting Hundreds of Thousands of XRP Holders
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Farington, England, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — With XRP trading sideways in a prolonged consolidation range, a growing number of holders are seeking new ways to generate profit. In this context, PFMCrypto has emerged as a top choice thanks to its innovative cloud mining platform, offering passive income with high daily payouts—without the need for hardware or technical expertise.

According to official data, users mining XRP through PFMCrypto earn between $100 and $1,800 per day.These performance figures are not forecasts—they reflect real-world results from millions of users. This is made possible by PFMCrypto’s AI-powered profit optimization and results-focused mining model.. For many XRP holders, this opportunity has become a financial safe haven amid uncertain price action.

Click here to visit the official site: https://pfmcrypto.net

What Is PFMCrypto XRP Cloud Mining?

PFMCrypto Cloud Mining is a remote digital asset mining platform that allows users to rent eco-friendly, high-performance mining infrastructure and earn cryptocurrency rewards. The platform supports a wide range of assets—including XRP, DOGE, BTC, ETH, BCH, LTC, and SOL—removing both the technical and financial barriers of traditional mining.

With a 100% remote setup, users don’t need to buy expensive equipment or understand blockchain mechanics. Simply register, select a plan, and start earning daily rewards.

Key Benefits of PFMCrypto XRP Mining Contracts:

– Daily High-Yield Income: Advanced contracts deliver between $600 and $1,800 in daily returns

– Principal Protection: Full capital is returned at contract maturity

– Multi-Crypto Support: In addition to XRP, users can also mine DOGE, BTC, ETH, BCH, LTC, SOL, etc.

– AI-Driven Optimization: The platform uses AI to dynamically adjust mining efficiency based on market conditions

Flexible XRP Mining Plans for All Investors

PFMCrypto offers more than 10 different contract options, allowing users to choose a plan that fits their goals and budget:

$10 Mining Plan – 1-Day Term – Earn $0.60

$100 Mining Plan – 2-Day Term – Earn $3.00 per day

$1,000 Mining Plan – 9-Day Term – Earn $13.10 per day

$5,000 Mining Plan – 30-Day Term – Earn $78.50 per day

These flexible and innovative plans help long-term XRP holders generate stable income—even in sideways or corrective market conditions.

Click here to explore more mining contracts.

“XRP may not see a breakout in the short term, but that doesn’t mean investors have to sit idle,” said a PFMCrypto marketing executive. “Our platform allows XRP holders to continue earning daily income while maintaining their XRP exposure.”

What Makes These XRP Mining Contracts Stand Out?

– 100% Remote Access: No hardware or technical skills required—just log in and activate your plan

– Capital Safety: Full principal is returned at contract maturity

– AI-Powered Returns: Smart optimization ensures profitability even during price stagnation

– Predictable Daily Rewards: Improve cash flow and reduce volatility risks with fixed XRP payouts

New users receive a $10 sign-up bonus and daily login rewards to boost earnings right from the start.

Click here to become a new user of PFMCrypto.

How to Start XRP Mining with PFMCrypto:
1. Register: Create your account and get a $10 welcome bonus plus $0.66 in daily login rewards
2. Choose a Contract: Use your bonus to activate a plan or select a different option to match your strategy
3. Start Mining: Once your contract is live, PFMCrypto handles the rest. Rewards are automatically credited to your account
About PFMCrypto

Founded in 2018, PFMCrypto is committed to reshaping the traditional crypto mining landscape. For years, mining was reserved for tech-savvy users with custom rigs and access to cheap power. PFMCrypto has made mining accessible to everyday users—allowing them to earn BTC, XRP, and more without any prior experience or large upfront investment.

For casual investors and crypto veterans alike, PFMCrypto provides a secure and legitimate way to increase crypto holdings and generate steady returns—even in turbulent market conditions.

Explore the future of XRP mining today at: https://pfmcrypto.net

Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release does not constitute an investment solicitation, nor does it constitute investment advice, financial advice, or trading recommendations. Cryptocurrency mining and staking involve risks and the possibility of losing funds. It is strongly recommended that you perform due diligence before investing or trading in cryptocurrencies and securities, including consulting a professional financial advisor.

The MIL Network –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: From potholes to personalization: What Abu Dhabi is teaching us about AI-powered smart cities
Source: Microsoft

Headline: From potholes to personalization: What Abu Dhabi is teaching us about AI-powered smart cities

If you ask many city government leaders how to win the hearts of citizens, the answer might very well be “potholes,” or, more specifically, fixing them.

“Potholes not only tell you about the state of your infrastructure,” noted a Harvard researcher in 2019, “they also tell you about the nature of participation in your city.”¹ A city that fixes a pothole promptly is not just responsive, its constituents feel empowered to engage with government.

In recent years, expectations have only risen on what governments need to deliver, leaving many cities struggling to deliver services in ways people prefer while also running a gauntlet of budgetary, regulatory, and societal challenges. On the one hand, citizens want to access great city services on par with how they do their banking or shopping—that is, secure, personalized experiences on smartphones and computing devices, rather than exclusively in-person. On the other hand, governments face unprecedented pressures in terms of funding, regulations, staffing, and cybercrime.

Achieve your mission with Microsoft for government

To bridge this gap, more and more city governments are looking to use the force-multiplying power of generative AI. Its ability to converse in natural language and reason over vast stores of data, then find answers, compose messages, and orchestrate actions is not only solving longstanding modernization challenges, it’s also opening incredible new frontiers in city services.

Helping city governments evaluate, explore, and successfully deploy high-impact solutions with AI is now the primary focus of our work at Microsoft for government. In cities around the world, we have seen dramatic acceleration in generative AI innovation, with new solutions that are helping cities to:
- Deliver personalized services.
- Empower the professionals who serve the public.
- Derive better insights and greater value from data.
The future of the smart city is already here—in Abu Dhabi

The President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, launched an ambitious drive around 15 years ago to make government services more accessible and service-oriented. In Abu Dhabi, the nation’s capital, those efforts took a giant leap with the advent of AI, accelerating innovation that led to the launch of a new AI-powered government services platform in October 2024.

Aptly called TAMM—which in Arabic translates to “consider it done!”—the platform began as a centralized portal several years ago and was revised to expand service offerings. With the application of new AI capabilities, it is now a one-stop digital hub, offering access to nearly 950 government services for citizens, residents, visitors, and investors.

Built on Microsoft Azure OpenAI service, TAMM uses advanced AI to deliver new classes of benefits. The platform offers real-world examples of how AI can transform smart cities by unifying services and inviting engagement in new and powerful ways.

Here are three noteworthy ways that TAMM improves city service delivery.

1. Serve people as they like, with personalized interactions

TAMM is designed to remove barriers between government services and the people who need them. In many cases, that means no longer forcing them to go to government buildings to get things done.

The new TAMM includes a generative AI assistant that provides every day service, offering personalized access to services such as license renewals, utility bill payments, permit applications, healthcare, and more. There’s even a new photo reporting app, where people can take a snapshot of a problem they come across (including, yes, a pothole) and the assistant helps to fill out a report and later sends updates on the progress of repairs.

TAMM also helps to untangle bureaucracy to simplify common yet complicated tasks. The process of registering a car, for instance, was dramatically simplified. What previously required days of visiting buildings and standing in lines can now be done quickly through the app—which also recommends the right type of insurance policy and synchronizes it with registration.

2. Deliver better results with a more energized and empowered workforce

Because TAMM handles so many more routine tasks than before (such as responding to basic questions on services issues or applications), city employees can focus more on high-value service delivery. With live services including video and audio options, agents can deliver high-touch assistance while still maintaining user privacy.

A good example of this is the case of a foreign worker who lived in Abu Dhabi for 10 years and was told by an immigration agent that she couldn’t leave the country due to visa issues. In tears, she opened the TAMM app on her phone and was connected to a helpline, where an agent quickly eased her anxieties. “I said I don’t know what to do, and the agent was literally amazing,” the woman said. “[The agent] said, ‘Don’t worry, it’s getting updated now’—and I was on my way.”

The approach to innovation behind TAMM also reflects an important trend: equipping public servants to work like product teams so that city services evolve like platforms. The TAMM organization operates in a unique “factory” in Abu Dhabi that operates like a startup—agile, data-driven, and obsessed with user satisfaction. The city’s employees don’t just execute services; they co-innovate with citizens and stakeholders to create them. Real-time dashboards, productivity-enhancing agents, and a culture of continuous iteration are driving success and proving that empowering the workforce is the foundation of smarter cities.

3. Keep cities moving with services that listen, learn, and protect

TAMM is designed to help people better navigate government services by understanding and responding to user needs almost instantly. It recognizes multiple languages and offers the option for spoken conversations, intelligently walking people through a broad range of complex processes. For example, for a family with a person who has a disability, TAMM can help navigate special services, significantly streamlining a qualification process that previously took weeks.

TAMM not only remembers previous conversations and knows the status of an issue or process, it is also deeply integrated across major government entities in the city. Service can be coordinated with in-person service centers or agencies who help housebound people in their homes.

The TAMM platform is powered by Microsoft Azure OpenAI service and G42 Compass 2.0, a next-generation enterprise AI platform that provides sovereign cloud services. It also uses open-source models, including JAIS, a high-performing Arabic Large Language Model, and Azure OpenAI GPT-4.

The TAMM app now assists Abu Dhabi’s 2.5 million citizens to conduct than 10 million transactions a year. Helping to protect data and ensure privacy within these transactions is the world class cloud security provided by the Microsoft platform—reflecting our commitment to security above all in delivering AI services, as codified in our Secure Futures Initiative.

Keys for building a foundation of success with AI

The noteworthy innovation happening in Abu Dabhi is a great example of a city realizing the transformative potential offered by generative AI. Many others are following the trend, and the results are exciting.

As we look across the global landscape, we note a set of common factors that consistently underpin successful AI adoption. We would advise every city to consider the following:
- A mission-first mindset drives smarter AI adoption. Cities that anchor AI initiatives in clearly defined public outcomes—such as reducing response times to citizen queries or improving access to social services—are better equipped to prioritize high-impact use cases and rigorously measure results. Aligning AI innovation with policy goals improves clarity and can also boost community trust.
- AI literacy must span the entire workforce. Successful implementations include investments to build AI literacy across all levels of the public workforce—from IT and data science teams to case workers and city clerks. With effective training and a culture of learning and sharing, cities have more empowered workforces and enjoy better outcomes.
- Strong data foundations are critical. Cities that proactively clean, integrate, and govern their data estates—including structured, unstructured, and semi-structured data—are better able to operationalize AI faster, more securely, and at scale. A modern data platform emphasizes robust privacy and access protections as prerequisites for AI success, helping civic leaders avoid common pitfalls such as model bias, incomplete datasets, or compliance gaps.
Learn more about AI technology for governments

To help your city government make the most of modern cloud and AI technology, contact your local Microsoft representative or certified technology partner. Together, we can help you explore options, identify use cases, and transform your ideas into meaningful solutions.
- For in-depth guidance and resources on designing, deploying, and sustaining AI-powered solutions in city government, visit the Public Sector Center for Digital Skills.
- For workforce development and training resources and guidance tailored to cities and other government organizations, visit Microsoft Learn for Government.
- For more on how Microsoft is helping to empower governments with AI, read our blogs.
Microsoft for governments

Solutions that empower governments

Sources:

¹ Harvard Griffin GSAS, “Pothole Politics”, January 2019.
MIL OSI Economics –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Who called Shakespeare ‘upstart crow’? Our study points to his co-author, Thomas Nashe

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Brett Greatley-Hirsch, Professor of Renaissance Literature and Textual Studies, University of Leeds

Left: A polemical woodcut deriding Nashe as jailbird (1597). Right: A copper engraving of Shakespeare from the title page of the First Folio (1623). Folger Shakespeare Library (left) and Yale Beinecke Library (right).

London, September 1592. Robert Greene, a popular writer of romances, plays, and pamphlets – with an apparent predilection for pickled herring and Rhenish wine in prodigal excess – has died.

Three pamphlets are published soon afterwards, each purporting to be Greene’s autobiographical deathbed repentance. The first to appear, Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit, contains a letter addressed to “those gentlemen … that spend their wits in making plays”. They were most likely George Peele, Christopher Marlowe, and Thomas Nashe, three fellow playwrights who, like Greene, could boast a university education – and who are entreated to find “more profitable courses” for their wits.

Woodcut from 1598 depicting Robert Greene at his writing desk.
Public Domain Review

After first rehashing (or parodying?) common Puritanical attitudes towards the theatres (idolatrous places where male actors dressed as women and audiences were not only distracted from their prayers but also frequently pickpocketed), our author then changes his focus.

He warns his fellow “university wits” against “an upstart crow beautified with our feathers that, with his tiger’s heart wrapped in a player’s hide, supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as the best of you, and, being an absolute Johannes factotum, is in his own conceit the only Shake-scene in a country”.

This sentence appears to be the first reference to Shakespeare’s writing for the stage. That’s why it has assumed such importance and why the phrase “upstart crow” has become so well known.

Read more:
Upstart Crow: Shakespeare sitcom is really quite educational

It seems likely that the author of the letter was criticising Shakespeare. Perhaps they intended to denigrate him as a jack-of-all-trades player-turned-playwright who, as far as we know, never attended university and – worst of all – attempted to write above his station, when he should have stuck to acting. The thrust of the comment seems clear enough: but who actually wrote the insult?

Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

Readers at the time evidently had doubts about the authenticity of Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit and two prime suspects soon emerged. First, Henry Chettle, a printer and playwright who claimed to have acted as Greene’s literary executor. His role in the publishing trade may have given him the opportunity to intervene and slip in the attack.

The second was Thomas Nashe, a “university wit” like Greene. He was a poet, playwright and satirist who first rose to prominence as a polemical author employed, alongside Greene, to defend the bishops against a series of Puritanical tracts.

Both men, who seem to have been on friendly terms, were quick to deny any authorship of the Groatsworth. Nashe swore not “the least word or syllable … proceeded from my pen” and Chettle, while admitting he supplied the manuscript copy to the publisher, protested the work “was all Greene’s, not mine nor Master Nashe’s, as some unjustly have affirmed”.

Should we take these assertions at face value or, should we wonder whether they are duplicitous, instances of protesting too much, as Shakespeare would have it?

Our investigation

Some critics maintain the Groatsworth to be an authentic Greene piece. But a convincing case has been made that any Greene material was at least edited, if not forged outright, by Chettle. In her 2001 revisionist biography of Shakespeare, however, professor of literature Katherine Duncan-Jones, often an astute guide, argued that Nashe was “by far the stronger suspect, at least as far as the ‘upstart crow’ passage is concerned”.

The title page of Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit.
Internet Archive

Our new investigation, published in Shakespeare Quarterly, suggests that Duncan-Jones’s intuition was correct.

Using a variety of computational methods to analyse digitised samples of writing by Chettle, Greene, and Nashe, we were able to confirm her suspicions with quantitative evidence. We performed three tests, each employing different methods to analyse different linguistic features, thereby providing independent confirmation of our findings.

We first used Delta, a standard distance metric in authorship attribution study, to compare Chettle, Greene and Nashe in their typical use of “function” words (which serve primarily or exclusively grammatical functions) with the Groatsworth. The results showed Nashe to be a stylistically closer match for the letter containing the “upstart crow” insult. Chettle was a closer match for most of the remaining segments of the pamphlet.

Our second test employed Support Vector Machines, a machine learning technique commonly used for classification problems. We trained it to classify writing as Chettle’s, Greene’s, or Nashe’s using a selection of “middling” words, mostly lexical or “content” words, which are neither ubiquitous nor exclusive to any of our authors. When we introduced the Groatsworth segments to the classifier, the letter containing “upstart Crow” was predicted to be Nashe’s.

Finally, we used Zeta, another machine learning technique, to find syntactical patterns comprising three-word sequences that distinguish Nashe’s writing from Chettle’s and Greene’s combined. Again, the “upstart crow” letter was a closer match for Nashe. We have made our data available to allow others to test and validate our findings.

Why should Nashe have insulted Shakespeare in this way? Recent scholarship has shown Nashe to have been part of a group of playwrights responsible for co-authoring I Henry VI, a play that Shakespeare subsequently revised.

William Shakespeare by John Taylor (1611).
National Portrait Gallery

Did Nashe resent the “upstart crow” for having the gall to revise his work, assuming, as has been suggested, that Shakespeare was employed to adapt 1 Henry VI to turn his existing two-part play about Henry VI into a trilogy?

Was this an attack on what he saw as Shakespeare’s undeserved literary reputation? An attack he believed could be launched in relative safety by adopting the persona of his recently deceased friend and collaborator, Greene?

Or, as Nashe was frequently wont to do, was this simply too good an opportunity to generate controversy to pass up?

If we take the first option then Nashe was an angry, jealous critic, eager to defend his reputation and excoriate those who trespassed on his patch. If we assume the second, then Nashe may have had no particular animus against Shakespeare, but was merely playing the literary marketplace, realising that controversy generates readers.

As Nashe praises Shakespeare’s Henry VI Part One in his long pamphlet, Pierce Pennilesse, His Supplication to the Devil, published the same year as Groatsworth, perhaps we should assume that the second option is more plausible. Particularly as his forays into a different genres and subject matter under different pseudonyms suggest that cultivating a consistent literary reputation worth defending was not Nashe’s priority.

These new findings force us to reevaluate long-held assumptions about Shakespeare’s early literary reputation. And to reexamine the perceived enmity between him and Greene, and reconsider both authors’ relationships with Nashe. Our method also serves as a timely demonstration of the ways that computational techniques, combined with newly available digitised texts, can help shed light on long-standing literary questions.

Brett Greatley-Hirsch has received funding for this research from the AHRC and the British Academy/Jisc.

Andrew Hadfield and Rachel White do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who called Shakespeare ‘upstart
crow’? Our study points to his co-author, Thomas Nashe – https://theconversation.com/who-called-shakespeare-upstart-crow-our-study-points-to-his-co-author-thomas-nashe-259713

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Mattel and OpenAI have partnered up – here’s why parents should be concerned about AI in toys

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew McStay, Professor of Technology & Society, Bangor University

Savanevich Viktar/Shutterstock

Mattel may seem like an unchanging, old-school brand. Most of us are familiar with it – be it through Barbie, Fisher-Price, Thomas & Friends, Uno, Masters of the Universe, Matchbox, MEGA or Polly Pocket.

But toys are changing. In a world where children grow up with algorithm-curated content and voice assistants, toy manufacturers are looking to AI for new opportunities.

Mattel has now partnered with OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, to bring generative AI into some of its products. As OpenAI’s services are not designed for children under 13, in principle Mattel will focus on products for families and older children.

But this still raises urgent questions about what kind of relationships children will form with toys that can talk back, listen and even claim to “understand” them. Are we doing right by kids, and do we need to think twice before bringing these toys home?

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For as long as there have been toys, children have projected feelings and imagined lives onto them. A doll could be a confidante, a patient or a friend.

But over recent decades, toys have become more responsive. In 1960, Mattel released Chatty Cathy, which chirped “I love you” and “Let’s play school”. By the mid-1980s, Teddy Ruxpin had introduced animatronic storytelling. Then came Furby and Tamagotchi in the 1990s, creatures requiring care and attention, mimicking emotional needs.

The 2015 release of “Hello Barbie”, which used cloud-based AI to listen to and respond to children’s conversations, signalled another important, albeit short-lived, change. Barbie now remembered what children told her, sending data back to Mattel’s servers. Security researchers soon showed that the dolls could be hacked, exposing home networks and personal recordings.

Putting generative AI in the mix is a new development. Unlike earlier talking toys, such systems will engage in free-flowing conversation. They may simulate care, express emotion, remember preferences and give seemingly thoughtful advice. The result will be toy that don’t just entertain, but interact on a psychological level. Of course, they won’t really understand or care, but they may appear to.

Details from Mattel or Open AI are scarce. One would hope that safety features will be built in, including limitations on topics and pre-scripted responses for sensitive themes and when conversations go off course.

But even this won’t be foolproof. AI systems can be “jailbroken” or tricked into bypassing restrictions through roleplay or hypothetical scenarios. Risks can only be minimised, not eradicated.

What are the risks?

The risks are multiple. Let’s start with privacy. Children can’t be expected to understand how their data is processed. Parents often don’t either – and that includes me. Online consent systems nudge us all to click “accept all”, often without fully grasping what’s being shared.

Then there’s psychological intimacy. These toys are designed to mimic human empathy. If a child comes home sad and tells their doll about it, the AI might console them. The doll could then adapt future conversations accordingly. But it doesn’t actually care. It’s pretending to, and that illusion can be powerful.

Children often have close relationship with their toys.
Ulza/Shutterstock

This creates potential for one-sided emotional bonds, with children forming attachments to systems that cannot reciprocate. As AI systems learn about a child’s moods, preferences and vulnerabilities, they may also build data profiles to follow children into adulthood.

These aren’t just toys, they’re psychological actors.

A UK national survey I conducted with colleagues in 2021 about possibilities of AI in toys that profile child emotion found that 80% of parents were concerned about who would have access to their child’s data. Other privacy questions that need answering are less obvious, but arguably more important.

When asked whether toy companies should be obliged to flag possible signs of abuse or distress to authorities, 54% of UK citizens agreed – suggesting the need for a social conversation with no easy answer. While vulnerable children should be protected, state surveillance into the family domain has little appeal.

Yet despite concerns, people also see benefits. Our 2021 survey found that many parents want their children to understand emerging technologies. This leads to a mixed response of curiosity and concern. Parents we surveyed also supported having clear consent notices, printed on packaging, as the most important safeguard.

My more recent 2025 research with Vian Bakir on online AI companions and children found stronger concerns. Some 75% of respondents were concerned about children becoming emotionally attached to AI. About 57% of people thought that it is inappropriate for children to confide in AI companions about their thoughts, feelings or personal issues (17% thought it is appropriate, and 27% were neutral).

Our respondents were also concerned about the impact on child development, seeing scope for harm.

In other research, we have argued that current AI companions are fundamentally flawed. We provide seven suggestions to redesign them, involving remedies for over-attachment and dependency, removal of metrics based on extending engagement though personal information disclosure and promotion of AI literacy among children and parents (which represents a huge marketing opportunity by positively leading social conversation).

What should be done?

It’s hard to know how successful the new venture will be. It might be that that Empathic Barbie goes the way of Hello Barbie, to toy history. If it does not, the key question for parents is this: whose interests is this toy really serving, your child’s or that of a business model?

Toy companies are moving ahead with empathic AI products, but the UK, like many countries, doesn’t yet have a specific AI law. The new Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 updates the UK’s data protection and privacy and electronic communications regulations, recognising need for strong protections for children. The EU’s AI Act also makes important provisions.

International governance efforts are vital. One example is IEEE P7014.1, a forthcoming global standard on the ethical design of AI systems that emulate empathy (I chair the working group producing the standard).

The organisation behind the standard, the IEEE, ultimately identifies potential harms and offers practical guidance on what responsible use looks like. So while laws should set limits, detailed standards can help define good practice.

The Conversation approached Mattel about the issues raised in this article and it declined to comment publicly.

Andrew McStay is funded by EPSRC Responsible AI UK (EP/Y009800/1) and is affiliated with IEEE.

– ref. Mattel and OpenAI have partnered up – here’s why parents should be concerned about AI in toys – https://theconversation.com/mattel-and-openai-have-partnered-up-heres-why-parents-should-be-concerned-about-ai-in-toys-259500

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Government of Canada celebrates AI and Tech Innovation in Toronto

Source: Government of Canada News (2)

Minister Solomon meets with leaders in innovation during Toronto Tech Week

June 25, 2025 – Toronto, Ontario

Today, the Honourable Evan Solomon, Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation and Minister responsible for the Federal Economic Development Agency for Southern Ontario (FedDev Ontario), attended Frontiers of AI, co-hosted by MaRS Discovery District (MaRS), Vector Institute (Vector) and the University of Toronto, to discuss the future of Canada’s AI economy.

Minister Solomon began the day at MaRS, a leading innovation hub supporting science and technology startups and scaleups, where he highlighted Canada’s leadership in AI development. He reiterated the Government of Canada’s commitment to working alongside innovators to drive growth, create jobs, and scale Canada’s AI industry at home and on the world stage.

Minister Solomon also met with a number of businesses, including FedDev Ontario-supported Ecopia AI (Ecopia), a Canadian technology company using AI to create high-precision mapping data for critical applications around the world.

Vector’s world-class research community is pushing the boundaries of AI science, from accelerating equitable access to liver transplants to improving cancer care, and through its secure health AI network, is enabling data-driven solutions to critical issues like staffing shortages, wait times, and patient outcomes. This afternoon, Minister Solomon announced an investment of $3.5 million for Vector to deliver HealthSpark – an initiative to fast-track AI innovation in Canadian health care and services. With this support, high-potential scaleups and startups will receive training, mentorship and access to key networks and AI engineering expertise, as they develop AI solutions to tackle some of our most pressing healthcare challenges.

The Government of Canada is making strategic investments to support AI adoption to foster real solutions, improve lives, reshape industries and reimagine what is possible.

MIL OSI Canada News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Fighting cybercrime in a connected world

Source: Interpol (news and events)

Europol-INTERPOL Cybercrime Conference examined latest cyber threats, trends and strategies

THE HAGUE, The Netherlands – In our increasingly interconnected world, the impacts of cybercrime can be far-reaching, fast moving and devastating to its victims.

To address the challenges for police in preventing and investigating cybercrime globally, the 7th Europol-INTERPOL Cybercrime Conference brought together cyber experts from law enforcement, private industry, international organizations and academia for in-depth discussions on the latest cyber threats, trends and strategies.

Under the theme of ‘Law enforcement in a connected future’, the three-day (9 – 11 October) conference focused on new developments in technology which could be exploited by criminals but also used to the benefit of police.

Opening the 7th Europol-INTERPOL Cybercrime Conference.

The annual conference had the theme ‘Law enforcement in a connected future’.

Key themes included the benefits and challenges of Artificial Intelligence for police; the potential impacts of 5G technology; cross-border access to electronic evidence; obstacles to international cooperation on cybercrime investigations; the importance of cyber capacity building; cryptocurrency trends and challenges; the use of open-source intelligence and privacy considerations.

With cybercriminals constantly evolving and transforming their tactics, INTERPOL’s Director of Cybercrime Craig Jones said the traditional model of policing is ‘being challenged like never before’.

“The cybercriminal world is agile and adapting, connecting and cooperating in ways we never imagined even just a few years ago,” said Mr Jones.

“Law enforcement must adapt to this ever-changing criminal environment in order to effectively protect our communities in the cyber domain,” he concluded.

During the opening ceremony, Mr Jones launched INTERPOL’s ‘#BECareful’ global public awareness campaign on business email compromise (BEC) fraud. The campaign, which will run for one month, will inform the public about this growing type of fraud and provide prevention tips for how to stay safe.

INTERPOL also presented the findings of its first cybercrime threat assessment during the conference. The report provides an analysis of the latest cybercrime trends identified in different regions using information provided by member countries, private partners and open source intelligence.

One trend identified is a shift from malware targeting computers to attacks targeting mobile devices, due to the fact that mobile devices are being used more and more frequently as payment platforms.

In response to a rise in cases of cryptojacking – where criminals remotely accesses victims’ system using malware to hijack their computing power to create cryptocurrency – INTERPOL has disseminated more than 170 Cyber Activity Reports providing recommendation for prevention and mitigation.

Steven Wilson, Head of Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) said: “Three days of conference with partners from law enforcement, industry and academia have shown what we can achieve when we work closely together to tackle the global issue of cybercrime.”

“We must make progress in prevention, legislation, enforcement and prosecution.” Steven Wilson, Head of Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)

“All of these elements are necessary in order to disrupt organized crime activity and reduce the online threat to businesses, governments and, above all, EU citizens. I look forward to building on our trusted relationships to deliver an improved international response to this ever increasing challenge,” added Mr Wilson.

The conference, which gathered some 400 delegates from 70 countries, also provides an opportunity for Europol and INTERPOL to reconfirm their strong commitment to continue their collaboration in the fight against cybercrime.

The Europol-INTERPOL Cybercrime Conference is a joint initiative launched in 2013. Held annually, it is hosted in alternate years by Europol and INTERPOL.

MIL Security OSI –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: NHS App overhaul will break down barriers to healthcare and reduce inequalities
Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

Press release

NHS App overhaul will break down barriers to healthcare and reduce inequalities

The NHS App will be transformed so it gives every patient information, choice and control of their own healthcare.
Upgraded NHS App will help tackle nation’s health inequalities and give patients access to the best care

New tool will give everyone choice based on patient satisfaction, waiting times and healthcare outcomes

Healthcare democratised through new tool, with information about conditions and procedures at the touch of a button

The NHS App will be transformed so it gives every patient – whatever their postcode or background – information, choice, and control of their own healthcare so they have the best information at their fingertips, as the government’s 10 Year Health Plan closes the stark health inequalities faced by millions of people.

Under the current system, wealthier patients often have more information about the country’s hospitals and access to better care. The improved NHS App will democratise care, so everyone, including those from working class communities, has the information they need about their conditions or procedures they’re due to go through.

Using AI, the new My Companion tool will give patients direct access to trusted health information, so there are always 2 experts in every consulting room – the clinician and the patient. It will help patients articulate their health needs and preferences confidently – providing information about a health condition if they have one, or a procedure if they need one. It will support patients to ask questions, including any they may have forgotten about or felt too embarrassed to raise at an in-person appointment.

A new feature called My Choices will help people find everything from their nearest pharmacy, to the best rated providers for heart, hip or knee surgery – all on the app. It will provide a range of data on providers across the country – such as which delivers the shortest waits, has the best patient outcomes, the best patient satisfaction scores, or is simply closest to home – so anyone, anywhere, can pick care based on their own preferences. People who just want to be sent to their local provider will be as a default.

This will end the ‘one size fits all’ approach, which often misses the distinct needs of different people, including women, people from ethnic minority backgrounds or people who live in more rural communities, among many others.

It comes as the Health Secretary today unveiled a radical package of measures under the 10 Year Health Plan to tackle health inequalities, freeing up billions of pounds to move critical resources like medicines and equipment to the communities that most need them, alongside changes to the way GP funding is distributed to help working class communities and coastal areas.

Speaking in Blackpool today, Health and Social Care Secretary, Wes Streeting, said:

The NHS feels increasingly slow and outdated to the generation that organises their lives at the touch of a button. If you get annoyed at Deliveroo not getting your dinner to you in less than an hour, how will you feel being told to wait a year for a knee operation? A failure to modernise risks this generation walking away from the NHS, first for their healthcare, and then with their taxes.

People won’t accept paying higher and higher taxes to fund a health service that no longer meets their needs. And the lack of control people feel over their own lives is made worse by an analogue, ‘computer says no’, NHS. We can only close this inequality and shut down this risk to the NHS’s future, through a revolution in patient power.

The ambition of our 10 Year Health Plan is nothing less than to provide NHS patients with the same ease and convenience that’s afforded to private patients. The good news is that technology gives us the opportunity to democratise healthcare in a way never before possible. It can empower patients with choice and control and make managing our healthcare as convenient as doing our shopping or banking online.

Technology can be the great leveller. Look at what Martin Lewis, the Money Saving Expert, has done for personal finances. For ordinary people – who could never afford their own financial adviser – it is simple and easy to make your hard-earned money go further. Our 10 year plan for health will do the same for NHS patients – giving them easy access to information, to help them improve their health.

Dr Vin Diwakar, NHS National Director of Transformation, said:

The shift from analogue to digital set out in the 10 Year Health Plan will transform the services we offer through the NHS App, making it the single most important tool patients use to get health information and control their care.

These exciting reforms will be invaluable in combating health disparities and providing world-leading access to those who have not previously been able to get care on their own terms – by providing transparent data about services or supporting carers to manage the care of loved ones. We will co-design these with patients and carers to ensure that the app can be accessed by everyone.

All this and more will be available from your pocket, making controlling your own healthcare as easy as placing an online shopping order.

The government has already exceeded its target to increase the number of hospitals allowing patients to view appointment information on the NHS App up to 85% by the end of March 2025. This has now reached 87%, up from 68% in July 2024. It means millions of patients are already starting to benefit from greater choice and flexibility in the way they access healthcare.

Since July 2024, these features have saved almost 5.7 million hours of staff time, including 1.26 million clinical hours across health settings – together with the 1.5 million missed appointments avoided, the shift to the NHS App has helped save the equivalent of £622 million.

The Health and Social Care Secretary also announced today that people from traditionally working-class communities, unpaid carers and over 50s will be among those supported onto the NHS career ladder, as the government’s Plan for Change tackles rampant health inequalities and gets Britain working. The government has confirmed a new pilot to recruit an initial 1,000 people from groups or areas worst hit by unemployment.

Backed by £5 million, the new recruitment scheme will target those who historically face barriers into employment, including young people not in education or training, unpaid carers, care leavers, people with special educational needs and disabilities, people with long-term health conditions or disabilities, ethnic minority groups with no/low level qualifications, refugees, asylum seekers and prison leavers.

Covering communities across the country, the programme may teach important skills to support a move into the health and care sector, alongside support with job applications and preparing for interviews. Participants will also have the opportunity to undertake a work placement in a local health and care employer.

Many will then move onto important roles, such as health support workers, facilities management, administrative positions, nursing support roles and pharmacy support roles, kickstarting an exciting, long-term career within health and care.

Through our Plan for Change, this government is committed to raising living standards, driving growth and productivity, and tackling inequalities.

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Published 25 June 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Accelerating AI adoption in the Civil Service
Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

News story

Accelerating AI adoption in the Civil Service

The Open Innovation Team is offering new services to help civil servants use AI to solve problems and do their best work
The Open Innovation Team (OIT) has launched the AI Adoption Accelerator – a practical, people-first programme that helps civil servants turn curiosity about generative AI into safer, faster and higher-quality ways of working. Rooted in our experience of delivering more than 150 policy projects for departments since 2016, the Accelerator combines expert guidance with hands-on coaching so teams can adopt AI responsibly and build lasting capability.

Why now?

Civil servants are experimenting with AI, but without structured support many see patchy results, new security risks and concerns about deskilling. By showing officials how to test AI on their real tasks – and how to judge its output critically – we bridge the gap between enthusiasm and reliable delivery.

What we offer

Our modular support can be booked individually or as a package:

Planning and strategy – senior workshops to set clear guard-rails, align tools with priorities and address obstacles.

Hands-on support – facilitated sessions where teams practice prompting on live cases and refine workflows.

Resources and tools – practical guides covering effective prompting, stakeholder analysis and safe data handling.

AI Pioneers bootcamps – two-day intensive sessions that train internal champions to support colleagues long after we leave.

Early results

Discovery workshops with the Department for Education have already boosted confidence and identified tangible use cases for policy and operations. Alice Douglas, Deputy Director for Support and Rewarding Teachers and Leaders, said:

The workshop was well tailored to our work, with examples that rang true and reflected day to day tasks. We all learnt a huge amount both about the possibilities but also the risks and how to put guard rails around our AI use.

If you’re interested in exploring how AI could help your team work more effectively, email us at enquiries@openinnovation.gov.uk to arrange a 30 minute chat

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Published 25 June 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: In Ituri, authorities and armed groups seek to reinforce the 2023 peace accord

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In Aru, a new round of peace talks is building on earlier efforts to bring stability to Ituri province. The dialogue, known as “Aru 2”, brings together authorities, armed groups, local leaders, and civil society to reinforce the process launched in 2023.

That previous initiative, supported by MONUSCO, led to the signing of a peace protocol by several armed groups including CODECO, ZAIRE, FRPI, FPIC, TCHINI YA TUNA, and MAPI pledged to cease hostilities and work towards peace, security and cohesion in the province.

Their commitment to end hostilities resulted in tangible gains: displaced families returned home, local markets reopened, and roads such as the Nizi-Mongbwalu route became passable again. This new round of discussions aims to safeguard and expand those gains .

At Aru, the participants now intend to build on these achievements. For five days, they will review the commitments made in 2023. “Aru 1 was half a success. Not all commitments were met, but progress was made,” says Firmin Kone Massagnou of MONUSCO’s Civil Affairs section.

Renewed Expectations

Over the course of five days, participants are reviewing past commitments and negotiating a new ceasefire. “We must also restart socio-economic activities to support the lasting return of displaced communities.” said Massagnou.

Civil society representative Jean-Marie Ezadri urged local leaders to encourage fighters to disarm and join the national reintegration programme (PDDRC-S). Sarah Muderwa, from Synergie des jeunes filles de l’Ituri, said she hoped this renewed engagement would help stop sexual violence.

Another priority is the return of traditional and administrative authorities to their communities, seen as essential for restoring local governance.

At the launch of the talks, General Antoine David Mushimba, commander of the 32nd military region, appealed to armed youth to embrace peace. MONUSCO reiterated its commitment to supporting this process alongside national institutions, in line with its mandate to protect civilians.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO).

MIL OSI Africa –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: ILLEGAL ALIEN CHARGED WITH POSSESSING A GUN AND AMMUNITION IN FLORIDA

Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA – Camerino Perez Perez, a/k/a “Squirrel,” 41, of Levy County, FL, was indicted by a federal grand jury this week charging him with one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien. John P. Heekin, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida, announced the charge today.

Perez is scheduled for his arraignment in federal court before United States Magistrate Judge Midori Lowry on July 1, 2025, at 2:30 p.m. in Gainesville, Florida.

If convicted, Perez faces up to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives investigated the case. Assistant United States Attorney Adam Hapner is prosecuting the case.

An indictment is merely an allegation by a grand jury that a defendant has committed a violation of federal criminal law and is not evidence of guilt. All defendants are presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial, during which it will be the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

This case is part of Operation Take Back America (https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1393746/dl?inline ) a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida is one of 94 offices that serve as the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General. To access available public court documents online, please visit the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida website. For more information about the United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Florida, visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/fln/index.html.

MIL Security OSI –

June 26, 2025

Category: Artificial Intelligence

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

AI-powered farming

From greenhouses to fields

The future of the smart city is already here—in Abu Dhabi

1. Serve people as they like, with personalized interactions

2. Deliver better results with a more energized and empowered workforce

3. Keep cities moving with services that listen, learn, and protect

Keys for building a foundation of success with AI

Learn more about AI technology for governments

Microsoft for governments

Our investigation

What are the risks?

What should be done?

NHS App overhaul will break down barriers to healthcare and reduce inequalities

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Accelerating AI adoption in the Civil Service

Why now?

What we offer

Early results

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