Category: Asia Pacific

MIL-OSI Economics: Members review farm policies, food security, technology transfer and transparency issues

Source: World Trade Organization

Updates on agricultural market developments and food security

Members heard updates from observer international organizations, including the International Grains Council (IGC), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Their contributions encompassed the overarching theme of global food security and related challenges, with a particular focus on the unique difficulties faced by least developed countries (LDCs) and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), along with their continuous efforts to mitigate these challenges.

The IGC reported that the prospects for the next grain harvest remain broadly favourable, although an unusually dry winter and early spring has reduced yield potential in parts of East Asia. Including upgrades for the Americas, the global crop projection is boosted by 2 million tonnes, to a record 2,375 million. Due to a slightly lower estimate for feed use, the forecast for total grain consumption has been revised down slightly month-on-month, now standing at 2,372 million tonnes.

With grains and oilseeds markets expected to be comfortably supplied, the IGC emphasized the importance of open trade, noting that global price developments may be strongly influenced by demand-side measures, including trade policies. It also underscored the value of market transparency and drew members’ attention to the Wheat Maritime Trade and Food Security Dashboard, developed jointly with the WTO. This tool supports the monitoring of short-term trends in international wheat maritime trade flows in response to changing market conditions and enables analysis of longer-term developments.

FAO shared with members the main information contained in The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2024. The publication confirmed that global progress towards the goal of ending hunger is not on track, with chronic hunger and food insecurity persisting at elevated levels. After a sharp increase between 2019 and 2021, the prevalence of undernourishment remained well above pre COVID-19 figures, reaching 9.1% in 2023. This means an estimated 713 to 757 million people facing hunger, with a mid-range estimate of 733 million – approximately 152 million more than in 2019.

FAO reminded members that the vast majority of people and countries facing acute food insecurity have remained in that situation for several years, underscoring the protracted nature of the crisis and the importance of resilience-building efforts. FAO also noted that it has been closely monitoring the global food security situation and has developed a dedicated web page – FAO Response to Global Food Security Challenges – which provides detailed information on various aspects of food security.

The WFP stressed that global food insecurity remains alarmingly high, with 295 million people acutely affected. Catastrophic hunger, the most severe form, has surged – rising from 80,000 people in 2018 to 1.9 million in 2024. Conflict remains the primary driver, with 70% of the acutely food insecure living in fragile, violent contexts. Extreme weather, such as droughts and floods, also threatens food security, as do economic factors like inflation, debt and high food prices. Humanitarian operations are further strained by severe funding shortfalls, said the WFP, which in 2025 expects to assist 24 million fewer people than in 2024.

To address this crisis, increased funding, humanitarian access and robust data systems are urgently needed. The WFP thanked WTO members for the Decision adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) to exempt humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions. The decision has improved access to local and regional production, facilitating international and regional movement of commodities and positively impacting the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of WFP operations

Nairobi and Bali decisions – transparency

Regarding the implementation of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, the Chair called on members concerned to make all possible efforts to fully conclude this exercise of aligning export subsidy schedules with the obligations under the Nairobi Decision. The next export competition dedicated discussion is scheduled for the Committee meeting in September. Referring to the Committee’s Decision in G/AG/2/Add.2 of December 2024, the Chair reminded members that 2024 is the last implementation year for which the information required under the export competition questionnaire (ECQ) needs to be provided via a response to the questionnaire.

Starting from the implementation year 2025, members will be required to submit a new annual export competition notification, which consolidates and streamlines existing export competition related notification requirements and formats, including the ECQ. Members were urged to redouble efforts to submit outstanding responses to the ECQ, and to use the ECQ Agriculture Information Management System (AG IMS) on-line facility for this purpose.

The Chair noted that the second triennial review of the operation of the Bali Decision on Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) administration is due in 2025. This topic will remain on the Committee’s agenda all this year. Members shared thoughts on the possible contents and outcomes of this review. The Chair also reminded members of the specific issues raised at the March 2025 Committee meeting and invited them to build on those discussions.

Issues addressed included the need for better follow-up on the first review’s conclusions , improved transparency and completeness of market access notifications, particularly for TRQs with country-specific allocations in the schedule of commitments, as well as the inclusion of tariff data in TRQ notifications. Members also called for action on TRQ underutilization by addressing barriers, such as unrelated licensing requirements, enhancing notification practices, compiling current challenges and exploring ways to reallocate underused quotas to improve TRQ effectiveness and transparency.

Technology transfer

Members expressed interest in advancing discussions on the transfer of technology to developing economies in the food and agricultural sector. Delegations expressed support for continuing discussions on the topic, with calls to shift from educational exchanges to examining how WTO rules could bolster technological development.

To capitalize on this momentum, the Chair encouraged delegations to turn this interest into concrete, substantive ideas for collective exploration, utilizing the Committee’s nearly three decades of experience with the implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture. Despite encouragement from the previous Chair, Anna Leung of Hong Kong, China, at the March 2025 meeting, no written proposals have been submitted.

The Chair suggested convening informal discussions and continuing to include this topic on formal agendas to support ongoing reflection and shape collective guidance.

Agricultural policies review

A total of 180 questions were raised by members concerning individual notifications and specific implementation matters during the meeting. This peer review process allows members to address issues related to the implementation of commitments outlined in the Agreement on Agriculture. Of these, 14 issues were raised for the first time, while 23 were recurring matters from previous Committee meetings.

The 14 new items covered a range of topics, including Australia’s livestock industry funds, Brazil’s rural development efforts, Canada’s involvement in farm and dairy support, and the European Union’s emergency agricultural measures and tariff actions on Russian products.

Other discussions focused on India’s domestic support programmes, sugar policy, and export duties, as well as Indonesia’s agricultural support. Japan’s initiatives to lower carbon emissions and secure fertilizers were also reviewed, along with Paraguay’s rural assistance project, Switzerland’s payments to farmers, Thailand’s debt relief and rice support policies, Türkiye’s tax and pricing systems, the United Kingdom’s schemes to enhance farm productivity, and the United States’ trade programmes, avian flu response, and broad agricultural support measures.

Since the previous meeting in March 2025, a total of 53 individual notifications have been submitted to the Committee: 24 related to market access, 14 concerning domestic support, 11 regarding export competition, and four related to the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs.

The Chair urged members to submit timely and complete notifications and to respond to overdue questions, stressing the critical importance of enhanced transparency.

All questions submitted for the meeting are available in G/AG/W/255. All questions and replies received are available in the WTO’s Agriculture Information Management System.

Next meeting

The next meeting of the Committee on Agriculture is scheduled for 25-26 September 2025.

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MIL OSI Economics –

June 26, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olli Hellmann, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waikato

The winter school holidays will mean families across Aotearoa New Zealand will be looking for indoor activities to entertain children. With millions of visitors each year, museums focused on the country’s history will inevitably play host to local and international visitors.

Museums tend to enjoy a high level of trust among the public. They’re widely seen as neutral, factual sources of historical knowledge.

But like all forms of storytelling, museums present the past in particular ways. They narrate events from a certain group’s or individual’s perspective and explain why events unfolded in the way they did.

In this respect, museums are not so different from historical films. Consider the different ways two recent movies – 1917 and the remake of All Quiet on the Western Front – narrate the first world war.

In 1917, the storyteller takes the British side, encouraging viewers to invest in the bravery and endurance of British soldiers. But All Quiet on the Western Front is narrated from a German perspective, inviting viewers to grieve for German soldiers as victims of a political system that glorified war.

Museum exhibitions tell stories in a similar way. Visitors should be asking not just what story is told, but why.

Spoiler alert: it often has to do with national identity. Museums tell particular stories of the past because these stories support a particular image of New Zealand as a nation.

Four questions for your next museum visit

At its core, every story has two basic ingredients: actors and events. To turn these into a compelling narrative, the storyteller connects the events into a plot, so they build on each other. The storyteller also transforms actors into characters by giving them particular traits — brave, selfish, wise, cruel and the like. Museums do this, too.

As you move through a museum exhibition, try asking yourself the following questions:

1. Which historical events are included — and which are left out?

Every story begins somewhere. Museums choose which events to include and which to leave out, shaping how visitors understand what happened and why.

Take Te Papa’s Gallipoli: The Scale of Our War exhibition. It opens with the landing at ANZAC Cove but skips over events in the lead-up to WWI — such as Britain’s earlier moves to seize Ottoman territories like Cyprus and Egypt.

Leaving these out helps frame Gallipoli as a noble – albeit tragic – “coming of age” for New Zealand. But in reality, ANZAC soldiers were fighting to support Britain’s imperial ambitions in the Middle East.

2. How are events organised into a plot?

Museums don’t just say “this happened, then that happened”. They link events into a larger plot — a chain of cause and effect that explains how one thing led to another. This can happen through text, but also through spatial layout, lighting, sound and other techniques that guide visitors through rising and falling moments of narrative tension.

Often, museums use familiar plot types to connect events. One common example is the quest narrative — a story in which heroes must navigate unknown terrain, and where mistakes are part of the journey and threaten to derail the mission. It’s a bit like The Lord of the Rings: a journey full of challenges, wrong turns and personal growth.

At Te Kōngahu Museum of Waitangi, Aotearoa New Zealand’s Treaty story is told using this quest structure. The Treaty is presented as something unique and unfamiliar and the British, confronted with this unknown, fall back on familiar colonial practices — the “mistake” that led to the New Zealand wars.

Because this misstep is treated as part of the learning curve typical of any quest, the exhibition avoids harder questions about this violent part of history, and instead preserves the image of Aotearoa New Zealand as fundamentally tolerant and respectful.

3. Who are the main actors in the story — and who is missing?

Every story needs protagonists, and whose perspective frames the story matters. In many smaller regional museums, history is still told almost entirely from the viewpoint of European settlers. But what about Māori experiences of colonisation? Or the histories of Chinese communities and other migrants who arrived in the 1800s?

By focusing narrowly on European settlers as the main actors, these museums present a one-sided view of the past and construct an image of New Zealand as a European nation — one that expects others to assimilate.

4. How are the main actors characterised — and how are we meant to feel about them?

It’s not surprising that museums portray some actors positively and others less so. What’s more revealing is how certain individuals are elevated as symbols of the nation and how museums invite us to form personal connections with them.

In Te Papa’s Gallipoli exhibition, visitors can open drawers and boxes containing soldiers’ personal belongings. This intimate activity encourages us to feel close to these figures — not just learning about them, but identifying with them as embodying national qualities: bravery, resilience and a commitment to peace.

Why does this matter?

Historical museum narratives aren’t necessarily inaccurate — but, much like historical movies, they are selective. They highlight certain events, actors and cause-and-effect chains to tell a particular kind of story. Often, that story supports a specific idea of what it means to be an Aotearoa New Zealander.

By reading museum exhibitions with a critical eye, visitors can better understand not just the past, but how storytelling shapes national identity in the present — and imagine how it might be shaped differently.

Olli Hellmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays – https://theconversation.com/whose-story-is-being-told-and-why-4-questions-museum-visitors-should-ask-themselves-this-school-holidays-259538

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Gillibrand Touts Success of Her Military Justice Legislation As Report Finds An Increase In Domestic Violence Convictions In The Armed Services

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for New York Kirsten Gillibrand

Military court data shows that convictions for domestic violence have more than doubled across the armed services since Senator Gillibrand’s military justice reforms were implemented in 2023

Today, U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, released the following statement on reports of a significant increase in domestic violence convictions in the armed services. Military court data shows that convictions for domestic violence have more than doubled across the armed services since Senator Gillibrand’s military justice reforms were implemented in 2023.

“I fought for years to fundamentally reform the way that the military deals with sexual assault and domestic violence within its ranks, and I’m thrilled to see that these reforms have led to a significant increase in convictions for perpetrators. Protecting service members, holding perpetrators accountable, and getting justice for survivors is critical to rebuild trust in the military justice system and give troops the protection they deserve. While there is more work to be done to end the scourge of sexual and domestic violence within the armed services, these new statistics are evidence that our reforms are working. I hope to see continued accountability in the years to come, and I will keep providing oversight of the implementation of military justice reforms.”

Additional information on the convictions is available here.

For nearly a decade, Senator Gillibrand fought alongside survivors, service members, veterans, and legal experts to build a broad bipartisan coalition to fundamentally change the military justice system. In the FY2023 defense bill, Gillibrand successfully incorporated her legislation to remove judicial functions and prosecutorial decisions from the chain of command for certain serious crimes, including sexual assault and domestic violence, and put them in the hands of professional military prosecutors. This bipartisan reform was supported by leading veterans service organizations and advocacy groups—including VFW, IAVA, the American Legion, Vietnam Veterans of America, Protect Our Defenders, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence, SWAN, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCADV), Common Defense, and Veterans Recovery Project—and it has resulted in a significant increase in military sexual assault convictions since its implementation.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Digital sovereignty or digital blockade? Effects of the planned regulation of data centres – E-002451/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002451/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Piotr Müller (ECR)

The Commission has announced a legislative package on data centre energy efficiency to be published in 2026, along with a roadmap for digitalisation and artificial intelligence.

Meanwhile, the European data centre sector is already facing an extremely difficult environment – rising energy costs, severe limits on the availability of connection capacity and increasing administrative requirements that are slowing down the development of new infrastructure.

Instead of supporting a sector which underpins Europe’s digital and technological sovereignty, the Commission is signalling another regulatory wave – with no details, no clear impact assessment and no indication how the EU wants to remain competitive with the United States or Asia.

In light of the above:

1.Is the Commission not concerned that imposing additional burdens will lead to investment flight outside the EU and a weakening of this strategic sector?

2.How does the Commission justify a policy that could permanently limit the development of AI and cloud services in Europe?

3.Given that the policy being pushed through could lead to the digital deindustrialisation of Europe, what economic model is the Commission relying on?

Submitted: 18.6.2025
Last updated: 25 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Implications of the critical evaluation of the European Court of Auditors regarding the Chips Act – E-002412/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002412/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Mathilde Androuët (PfE)

The latest report from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) paints a shocking picture of the Chips Act[1], a plan presented in 2022 as the EU’s flagship tool to achieve ‘technological sovereignty’[2]. It is an utter fiasco:

– completely unrealistic goals, including the goal to achieve a market share of 20 % for semiconductors by 2030, whereas the ECA is instead projecting a share of 11.7 %;

– non-existent coordination among Member States;

– persistent technological dependence on Asian imports[3];

– a concentration of investments among a few giant stakeholders, whereas the big projects that have been announced are frozen[4].

The Commission claims to defend ‘strategic autonomy’, but these observations challenge the relevance of its approach, founded on highly centralised initiatives that do not really fit with national industrial strategies.

1.Can the Commission indicate the measures it intends to take to address the shortcomings pointed out by the ECA, and how does it explain this structural failure?

2.Why did it favour Brussels-led coordination instead of support for coordinated, but sovereign industrial strategies?

3.Does the Commission plan to revise its approach to industrial policy in order to give control back to Member States over the tools, financing and strategic priorities necessary to build a semiconductor industry that is truly European?

Submitted: 16.6.2025

[1] Special report 12/2025: The EU’s strategy for microchips, European Court of Auditors, 28 April 2025, https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2025-12

[2] European Chips Act, European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_en

[3] ‘EU microchip strategy “deeply disconnected from reality”, say official auditors’, Lisa O’ Carrol, 28 April 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/apr/28/eu-microchip-strategy-deeply-disconnected-from-reality-say-official-auditors

[4] ‘“Disconnected from reality”, the Chips Act will not reach its goal, finds the European Court of Auditors’, Marion Garreau, 28 April 2025, https://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/deconnecte-de-la-realite-le-chips-act-n-atteindra-pas-son-objectif-juge-la-cour-des-comptes-europeenne.N2231374
Last updated: 25 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

(10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

– having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

– having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part [1] (EPCA),

– having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

– having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

– having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

– having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

– having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

– having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

– having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

– having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

– having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

– having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

– having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia [2],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov [3],

– having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

– having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

– having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023 [4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

Regional cooperation and global challenges

16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

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56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure – A10-0107/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure

(2025/2007(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 173, 179 and 190 thereof,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025: Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem [1] (the Chips Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union [2] (NIS 2 Directive),

– having regard to the detailed report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) entitled ‘Foresight Cybersecurity Threats For 2030 – Update 2024’, published in March 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements [3] (the Cyber Resilience Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 [4] (the Cybersecurity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents [5] (the Cyber Solidarity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services [6],

– having regard to the Commission White Paper of 21 February 2024 entitled ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (COM(2024)0081),

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2024 entitled ‘State of the Digital Decade 2024’ (COM(2024)0260),

– having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union [8] (the Interoperable Europe Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast)[9],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 [10],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 [11] (the Data Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU [12] (the Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence [13] (the Artificial Intelligence Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 [14],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240 [15],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 [16],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme [17],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 [18],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 [19],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488 [20],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1732 of 17 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 as regards a EuroHPC initiative for start-ups in order to boost European leadership in trustworthy artificial intelligence [21],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (recast)[22],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework [23],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2020 entitled ‘Secure 5G deployment in the EU – Implementing the EU toolbox’ (COM(2020)0050),

– having regard to the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, which commits ‘to promote a European way for the digital transformation, putting people at the centre’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 December 2021 entitled ‘Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) (COM(2021)8481),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0107/2025),

A. whereas technological sovereignty should be seen as the whole value chain from excellence in research to creating better competition and achieving greater European sovereignty;

B. whereas the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80 % of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property;

C. whereas a few technological companies hold concentrated power over key digital markets and control over underlying internet infrastructure, including operating systems, computing, artificial intelligence (AI), search engines, social media capacity, digital advertising and payment services;

D. whereas our technological sovereignty will greatly depend on Europe’s ability to create the market conditions needed for European companies to flourish and compete with each other, thereby increasing the quality of their products;

E. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

F. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

G. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

H. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

I. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

J. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

K. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

L. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

M. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

N. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

O. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

P. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

Q. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

R. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

S. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

T. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

U. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

V. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

W. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

X. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

Y. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

Z. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

AA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

AB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

AC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

AD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

AE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

AF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

AG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

AH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

AI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

AJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

AK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

AL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

AM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

AN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

AO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

AP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

AQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

AR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;

AS. whereas 60 % of EU companies report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and clean technologies, posing a significant barrier to innovation, competitiveness and the green and digital transitions;

AT. whereas current labour market developments, including global lay-offs and political instability outside the EU, create an opportunity to attract high-skilled digital talent to the EU;

AU. whereas increasing competitiveness and resilience require appropriate funding; whereas public funding can act as a catalyst and private investment and competitive market forces are key for the long-term development of digital infrastructure;

AV. whereas a robust, agile and excellence-driven research and innovation (R&I) ecosystem is essential to ensure the EU’s global competitiveness and leadership in strategic technologies, such as quantum and AI;

AW. whereas standardisation is at the core of genuine European digital and technological sovereignty; whereas the importance of standards is growing due to increasing technological competition across the world, particularly with the United States and China;

AX. whereas the EU is committed to negotiating comprehensive digital trade agreements (DTAs) to promote secure, resilient and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries;

AY. whereas the Commission has announced landmark DTAs with South Korea and Singapore, setting an important precedent for future agreements;

AZ. whereas Parliament and the Council have agreed on the ‘EU horizontal provisions on Cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements’, which was endorsed by the Commission and remains an important tool in relation to digital trade and the establishment of new DTAs;

General introduction

1. Underlines that European sovereignty is the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, preventing reliance on foreign actors and single service providers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure; calls for the development of a comprehensive risk assessment framework to monitor and address dependencies across the digital value chain; underlines that such a framework should serve as a basis for ensuring EU preparedness and resilience by enhancing European industrial policy and boosting domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities in strategic technologies;

2. Believes that technological sovereignty is the capacity to design, develop and scale up digital technologies needed for the competitiveness of our economy, the welfare of our citizens and the EU’s open strategic autonomy in a globalised world; believes that this includes ensuring the EU’s ability to make autonomous decisions, engaging with trusted non-EU countries and entities, diversifying and strengthening supply chains and promoting the concept of openness and interoperability to ensure that Europe remains an attractive hub for investment;

3. Recognises the increasing concentration of power in non-EU companies, which constrains Europe’s ability to innovate, compete and maintain control over its digital economy, society and democracy; is concerned by excessive dependencies on non-EU actors in critical areas such as cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity – where market concentration and foreign control threaten to undermine Europe’s competitiveness, democratic resilience and security;

4. Believes that the EU’s industrial tech ambitions should focus on the key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductor technologies or quantum, that contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and are essential for our green, digital and defence transitions;

5. Recognises the shift in the geopolitical landscape and the resulting opportunity for market demand for European products and services; sees this as a window of opportunity to position Europe as a global leader in trusted and secure digital solutions;

6. Underlines the need to foster a supportive regulatory environment that encourages innovation, investment and the development of cutting-edge technologies in Europe, while protecting EU end users from the consequences of extraterritoriality;

7. Recognises the need for a comprehensive European industrial policy for the digital ecosystem, integrating all relevant policy domains such as market access, standardisation, R&D, investment, trade and international cooperation; calls on the Commission to develop this comprehensive policy with the aim of reducing harmful strategic dependencies, strengthening domestic value chains and ensuring a secure, trustworthy and innovation-driven digital ecosystem that adheres to European values;

8. Recalls that the high-tech product and digital services markets depend heavily on external supply chains, posing risks to sovereignty and resilience; stresses the importance of boosting industrial capacity and technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies to support the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

9. Emphasises that boosting Europe’s technological sovereignty in the era of rapid technological development requires enhancing innovation and commercialisation in order to build the necessary capabilities; highlights that Europe must transform itself into a globally attractive and agile business environment by reducing bureaucracy, enhancing regulatory predictability and fostering entrepreneurship and risk-taking;

10. Recognises that open strategic autonomy and democratic resilience must be at the core of the Commission’s agenda and that a comprehensive approach must integrate procurement, funding and long-term institutional frameworks to establish sovereign digital infrastructure in critical domains;

11. Calls on the Commission to analyse and establish a comprehensive list of critical dependencies in digital infrastructure and technologies, assessing, at minimum, storage services, identity and payment systems, communication platforms, as well as the software, protocols and standards that support them, and to propose measures to promote market access for products and services with a strong positive impact on the EU’s technological sovereignty, resilience and sustainability; believes, in that regard, that the use of specific award criteria in public procurement may be promoted in areas where such critical dependencies exist; believes that such criteria can help incentivise competition and strengthen European technological sovereignty by facilitating the procurement of European digital products and services, where possible;

Digital public infrastructure

12. Strongly believes that digital infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and that there should therefore be a base layer of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that ensures sovereignty and a competition-friendly market environment; observes that the market has not developed this base layer in many important areas, which has resulted in monopolies and reliance on foreign actors; underlines that in order to fill this gap, the EU should take the lead in creating a strong foundation for DPI by creating layers of digital technologies consisting of semiconductors, connectivity solutions, cloud infrastructure, software, data and AI; believes that European DPI should be founded on fair and competitive economic models and also use governance models where neither private companies nor governments maintain centralised control; is of the opinion that it should be built on common and open standards, embrace interoperability and interconnectedness, so as to prevent user and vendor ‘lock-ins’, and spur innovation by facilitating new market entrants, and that it should also ensure privacy and security by default;

13. Believes that the deployment of DPI should be focused on areas where critical dependencies exist, as identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list; calls on the Commission to prepare a detailed and comprehensive plan for establishing European DPI by identifying technologies that are best suited to European action, and urges the Commission and the Member States to dedicate appropriate resources to deploying European DPI;

14. Stresses that European DPI should be stimulated by coordinated action at EU level to ensure the presence and competitiveness of European providers as well as a competitive market environment; underlines that these objectives will not be achieved through regulation alone and will require significant public investment; recognises that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF) should therefore include additional funding for this purpose, focusing on EU added value and financing the base layer of European DPI;

15. Recognises that as part of the forthcoming MFF, the EU must commit to increased spending to achieve technological sovereignty; underlines that this should include a dedicated envelope for the development and deployment of the DPI layers identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list, as well as additional funds to ensure a competition-friendly market environment in other digital areas;

16. Believes that the funding under the forthcoming MFF should prioritise active capacity-building in key hardware, software and service areas, including high-performance computing, quantum computing, encryption and communication, connectivity, cloud, data, web and AI ecosystems, and digital libraries;

17. Is of the opinion that European DPI should be based on EU values and remain open to like-minded non-EU partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sustain their efforts and add more impetus to the process with the UN Development Programme on DPI;

18. Recognises e-government services as a key enabler of efficient, secure and accessible public service delivery, which should be designed to facilitate digital identification, government data sharing and public sector payments without distorting markets or undermining existing private sector solutions; emphasises that the EU’s approach to e-government services should focus on strengthening digital government-to-citizen and government-to-business interactions, while ensuring trust, interoperability and accessibility; believes, therefore, that secure and seamless access to public services requires a trustworthy e-identification framework and welcomes the announcement of a ‘business wallet’ aimed at significantly simplifying the interconnection between businesses and public authorities;

19. Calls on the Commission to further develop public interest data platforms, enabling secure cross-border data sharing between public and private entities for use cases, in particular, in healthcare, urban planning and environmental monitoring; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to promote interoperability between public interest and industry-specific data platforms, ensuring the seamless flow of data while minimising administrative burdens; notes that this could be achieved by leveraging existing market-driven solutions that foster innovation, maintain trust and uphold privacy and security standards;

20. Recognises that under the current legal framework, European citizens have the right to control their personal data and that data generated within the EU must be processed in accordance with EU law; stresses that safeguarding privacy and personal data is essential for building trust in the digital economy, allowing European consumers to engage with confidence, regardless of where their data is processed; highlights that European companies – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – must be able to make use of data in a lawful, ethical and secure manner to drive sustainable growth and competitiveness;

Digital infrastructure

21. Highlights that digital infrastructure is the backbone of Europe’s economy and society and that its importance will continue to grow; calls on the Commission to include in the requested list of critical dependencies a comprehensive assessment of the composition of European digital infrastructure in order to adequately analyse the state of play, assess risks and coordinate action;

22. Believes that in order to strengthen digital infrastructure, it is essential to implement capacity-building initiatives in critical areas at EU level; considers that these initiatives should focus on developing a base layer of public infrastructure, such as a network of AI gigafactories and a European web index model; is of the opinion that this base layer will empower companies to develop their business models and boost technological sovereignty; points to the digital solutions created by the EU, such as the EU digital identity, that can offer innovative infrastructure for the EU’s digital economy;

23. Recognises the strategic importance of critical digital infrastructure and the need to strengthen their security and resilience; understands that critical digital infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, cables (terrestrial and submarine), cellular network towers, satellite communication systems, spectrum and radio equipment, cloud servers that contain sensitive information and data centres that process sensitive information, as well as certain software elements, including security software that protects critical networks and data centres;

24. Highlights the need to ensure that this infrastructure falls under EU jurisdiction, meaning that it fully adheres to EU law; stresses the importance of privacy and security-by-design; calls on the Commission. therefore, to introduce legislation to mitigate risks posed by high-risk vendors from non-EU countries, including risks posed by foreign-controlled energy resource providers;

25. Calls on the Commission, while preparing future legislative proposals and the forthcoming MFF, to concentrate efforts on deepening the single market, in line with the recommendations made in Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in Mario Draghi’s report on ‘The future of European competitiveness’, with the aim of unlocking the potential of the digital single market;

26. Takes note of the recommendations laid down in these two reports that the EU needs a paradigm shift from promoting connectivity in the EU to establishing a single market for electronic communications and connectivity; supports a simplified, harmonised and innovation-friendly telecommunications framework that ensures fair competition and the accessibility of infrastructure;

27. Welcomes the Commission’s white paper on how to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs, which outlines three pillars: creating the ‘3C Network’ – ‘Connected Collaborative Computing’, completing the digital single market, and secure and resilient digital infrastructure for Europe;

28. Views the white paper and the subsequent consultation process as part of the preparation of the legislative initiatives planned for this term, including the Digital Networks Act; calls on the Commission to take a more holistic view of digital infrastructure throughout this process and to acknowledge that digital infrastructure comprises many elements beyond mere connectivity; underlines the need to accompany any new digital policy measure with an impact assessment;

29. Urges the Commission to simplify and harmonise telecommunications rules as part of the forthcoming Digital Networks Act and the broader Digital Package;

30. Calls on the Commission to introduce an EU cloud and AI development act to strengthen European data infrastructure and the promotion of European cloud providers; underlines that this act should aim to actively build a European single market for cloud and AI;

31. Acknowledges that deploying cutting-edge digital infrastructure across the EU requires substantial investment and recognises that both public and private funding are essential for achieving this goal; expresses concern over the persistent shortage of venture capital and investment financing in Europe, which undermines technological sovereignty; calls on the Commission to significantly scale up public-private investment instruments, including venture capital, strategic platforms and dedicated funding tools for start-ups and scale-ups in critical technology sectors; highlights the importance of leveraging public procurement to support the deployment and scaling of open and interoperable digital solutions and of ensuring that private capital, competition and innovation become the main drivers of Europe’s digital transformation over the medium and long term;

High-speed connectivity

32. Is of the opinion that the upcoming Digital Networks Act must support the objective of providing all EU consumers with high-quality connectivity by 2030, especially in remote and rural areas, as well as removing administrative barriers for the roll-out of 5G, 6G and secure, high-speed broadband;

33. Recognises the increasing convergence of telecommunications infrastructure with cloud and edge technologies, and sees the potential of open radio access networks to deliver advanced technological solutions, reduce costs and enhance the interoperability of connectivity; believes that the future of connectivity lies in the complementarity of diverse technologies such as 5G/6G, Wi-Fi and satellite, where seamless integration benefits both businesses and consumers;

34. Recognises that with cloud and edge services at the core of their transformation, connectivity networks are evolving rapidly into platforms for innovation and will increasingly depend on cloud computing, AI, virtualisation and other technologies;

35. Calls for ambitious targets in the development and innovation of wireless communication networks, acknowledging the need for a broad-based approach that includes cloud computing, AI, edge computing and quantum computing; emphasises that the innovation ecosystem for electronic communications, especially for vertically integrated telecoms, should remain market-driven, and insists that future regulatory measures be based on thorough, knowledge-based impact assessments of existing regulations;

36. Recognises that competition between operators of all sizes remains a key driver of investment in connectivity networks; calls on the Member States to ensure that copper networks are switched off progressively in favour of fibre-optic or 5G technologies, in particular where regular maintenance or updates of the network are needed, thus ensuring that the shift is carried out in an attainable manner and allowing providers to plan logistically and financially in advance;

37. Stresses that all consumers in the EU should have access to adequate quality, reliable and affordable connectivity, thus contributing to increased demand for connectivity services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand and upgrade digital networks, especially in rural areas, and to support public-private investments in broadband and 5G/6G deployment, while maintaining cybersecurity standards and secure-by-design principles;

38. Is convinced that, as digital connectivity infrastructure such as fibre, 5G and 6G will be crucial for future industrial competitiveness, the forthcoming MFF should include funds for the large-scale deployment of network infrastructure, bridging the existing deployment gap to achieve the 2030 Digital Decade targets, creating pan-European 5G coverage for citizens’ use and ensuring the successful deployment of Industry 4.0 tools;

Fibre

39. Stresses the importance of accelerating the deployment of fibre-optic networks and modern wireless communications systems that can deliver fast, secure and reliable digital services;

40. Recognises that the need to prioritise direct fibre connections for homes, businesses and public institutions is crucial to ensure ultra-fast and reliable connectivity, in addition to network roll-outs with public works, such as roads, water and electricity, to streamline fibre roll-out;

41. Welcomes the introduction of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, which responds to the growing needs for faster, reliable and data-intensive connectivity; recognises the importance of the shared use of ducts and poles for deploying very high capacity networks to optimise resources and reduce costs; urges the Member States to streamline permitting processes and harmonise regulations to lower financial and administrative barriers to the expansion of fibre infrastructure;

5G and 6G

42. Believes that private investments are essential for deployment of electronic communication networks, 5G and 6G that are advanced enough in terms of transmission, speed, storage capacity, edge computing power and interoperability;

43. Stresses that the enforcement and implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act is further necessary for the creation of a one-stop shop for permits and a centralised digital permitting process to reduce delays in infrastructure deployment and to ensure uniform rules for infrastructure access, pricing and environmental impact assessments; calls, in this regard, for strong efforts in this area;

44. Takes the view that the EU needs strong cybersecurity protection in all critical infrastructure sectors, with stricter measures to de-risk high-risk vendors in 5G and 6G networks, ensuring dense deployment of small cells and macro towers, particularly in urban and rural areas with inconsistent coverage, and ensuring the sustainability and energy efficiency of the infrastructure so as to support Europe’s global competitiveness in the digital economy;

Spectrum

45. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards enhanced coordination of spectrum allocations, in particular through earlier identification and the harmonisation of the release of new frequencies, starting with 6 GHz frequencies; calls for a radio spectrum policy that promotes investment in Europe, including through the harmonisation of spectrum assignment policies across the Member States to accelerate 5G deployment based on best practices, the promotion of longer license durations and access to new spectrum such as the upper 6 GHz band in order to meet future demand and enable 6G; believes that a shared effort from public and private entities is necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of Europe and not lag behind the fastest growing networks in the world, i.e. in China and South Korea;

Satellites and satellite communication systems

46. Underlines the importance of satellite-based communications in developing EU digital infrastructure, increasing its resilience, strengthening the capabilities of EU actors, and reducing dependence on non-EU providers, particularly in the area of defence; highlights the need to provide alternative connectivity solutions for consumers in remote and rural areas;

47. Highlights the strategic role of the EU space programme, as one of the pillars of EU sovereignty, in providing state-of-the-art and secure positioning, navigation and timing services for Galileo and EGNOS and cost-effective satellite communication services for GOVSATCOM; notes that this allows the EU and its Member States to have greater sovereignty in their satellite capabilities, including geopositioning, earth observation, space surveillance and connectivity; welcomes, in particular, the EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 programmes, which aim to ensure the short- and long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

48. Deplores the strong dependence on non-EU data for the tracking and surveillance of space objects; stresses the need for Europe to urgently reinforce its own capabilities and infrastructure in space situational awareness (SSA) to ensure open strategic autonomy and security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase investment in EU-owned surveillance and tracking assets, and to develop effective mechanisms for information-sharing among the Member States, enabling Europe to independently monitor and protect its critical space infrastructure;

49. Stresses the importance of private sector involvement in launcher technologies to further accelerate the deployment of IRIS2; stresses the importance of fostering a robust and competitive European space launch sector through greater private sector involvement and support for upstream and downstream industries; calls on the Commission to promote a European space industrial policy that strengthens sovereignty in space technologies and services by reducing strategic dependencies and improving the operational governance of European space programmes;

50. Calls, to this end, for concrete measures to facilitate the provision of satellite services throughout Europe, including by defining common procedures and conditions; calls, in parallel, for fair competition, with clear and enforceable rules for all satellite constellations accessing the EU market;

51. Notes that there are currently several issues with latency in satellite networks and recognises that the integration of satellite networks with 5G and, in the future, 6G technologies is pivotal in extending the reach and reliability of terrestrial networks;

High-performance computing (HPC) systems

52. Recognises the progress made in recent years in enhancing HPC; calls on the Commission to continuously integrate and enhance the computing power at EU HPC centres, in particular, enhancing the training of AI models and preparing for future advancements in supercomputing;

53. Calls on the Commission to develop a coordinated strategy to bridge the gap between Europe’s cutting-edge HPC technology and its practical, scalable deployment across industries, including by creating a public network for supercomputing; notes that this strategy should foster collaboration between public institutions and private sector partners, including SMEs, to ensure that Europe’s HPC capabilities become a key driver of economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty;

54. Highlights that HPC centres must ensure accessibility for developers and deployers of AI foundation models, generative AI and applied AI; notes that EuroHPC Centres should be available for these use cases and particularly for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; emphasises that this must be seamlessly complemented by initiatives to enable the development and deployment of AI in the EU;

55. Welcomes the creation of new AI factories; underlines that AI factories will upgrade EuroHPC supercomputers to deliver computing capacity for AI and support start-ups and scale-ups in the training and large-scale development of general-purpose and trustworthy AI models;

Hardware for computing: semiconductors, chips and quantum chips

56. Believes that urgent action is needed to boost EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, improving supply chain resilience by forming strategic global partnerships, encouraging start-ups and innovation, fostering cross-border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development and providing financial incentives, regulatory support and market access;

57. Emphasises the need for legal certainty to support semiconductor development, ensuring secure supply chains for critical raw materials and avoiding disruptions caused by investment uncertainties;

58. Urges to give utmost political importance to ensuring a sufficient supply of AI chips in the EU and to make it a focal point of EU digital industry policies; notes the increase in demand for AI chips driven by expanding applications in cloud computing, edge devices, autonomous systems and generative AI;

59. Calls on the Commission to react to the new geopolitical realities and the use of digital supply chains as pressure tools; urges the Commission to find a negotiated solution to the US ban on the export of AI chips to 16 EU Member States;

60. Calls on the Commission to put advanced AI chips, including their design and production, at the core of the revision of the Chips Act; calls on the Commission to present the revision this year, featuring a long-term strategy rooted in current geopolitical realities that builds European strategic indispensability through technological leadership, adequate production capabilities and a strong R&D ecosystem, which will be essential to secure European sovereignty in increasingly troubled times; believes that it is crucial to strengthen the interactions among research, training, suppliers and robust public infrastructure to accelerate the path from research, development, testing and finally full-load production;

61. Believes that the EU should enhance its efforts on quantum chip development if it intends to accelerate the time-to-market for EU industrial innovation in quantum technology;

62. Calls on the Commission to support the manufacturing within the EU of widely used chips e.g., for electronic devices and cars; calls for support for the development of chips that reduce the energy consumption of the digital sector;

63. Underlines the need to support the performance of the circular economy and recalls that information and communications technology products and other electronics are part of the priority product groups in the working plan to be adopted by April 2025 under Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 [24];

64. Believes that additional funding under the forthcoming MFF must be allocated to the development of semiconductor production capacities and other next-generation semiconductor technologies and processes (e.g. photonic chips, wide-bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging) within the EU;

Cloud services

65. Recognises that there is a market need for sovereign solutions that offer enhanced levels of control over data for certain categories of sensitive data and acknowledges the risks associated with reliance on single dominant providers; calls for a strategy for reducing reliance on foreign cloud providers, while fostering European alternatives;

66. Notes that the discussions on the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services have not brought any results; points out that there are sovereignty considerations, in particular related to the extraterritoriality of binding legal regimes, that cannot be solved through technical discussions; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned cloud and AI development act;

67. Notes the need to secure data storage and computational power, and distributed computing infrastructure; calls on the Commission to ensure that cloud users have the ability to choose solutions that meet their needs by urgently removing barriers to switching and diversifying providers through multi-cloud strategies, and by fostering a competitive European cloud market, thereby reducing reliance on single providers and enhancing digital sovereignty;

68. Calls on the Commission to leverage initiatives such as 8ra and IPCEI CIS to advance decentralised cloud and edge infrastructure, which are enablers of sovereignty and contribute to reducing reliance on foreign providers and ensuring resilience while enhancing operational flexibility within Europe;

AI systems

69. Welcomes the InvestAI initiative, including the AI gigafactories; emphasises the need for Europe to position itself as a global leader in AI model training, scientific research and quantum computing advancements; is committed to further supporting AI development by launching initiatives such as AI factories to provide computing power for start-ups, scale-ups and researchers;

70. Calls on the Commission to further support the design and development of European AI and to adopt policies and measures that will enable European industrial sectors to benefit from their data and AI deployment;

71. Emphasises that the delayed deployment of AI-driven innovations hinders technological progress, market competitiveness and digital transformation within the EU;

72. Expects that the public-private financing model will unlock unprecedented private investment in AI that will open up access to supercomputers for start-ups and industry to supercomputers;

Quantum

73. Recognises the urgent need to define a clear roadmap for quantum technology development, including quantum computing and quantum encryption, ensuring that public and private investments lead to tangible commercial applications;

74. Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment of existing national quantum sandbox frameworks and how existing legislation applies to them in order to prevent market fragmentation; welcomes the announcement of the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass;

75. Urges the Commission to ensure that the Quantum Act, accompanied by an impact assessment, positions Europe as the leading region for quantum excellence and innovation by investing in R&D and innovation, mobilising funding to scale up the European quantum ecosystem, capabilities and production, and ensuring Europe’s leading quantum research is commercialised in Europe; underlines that it should deliver tangible technological applications by fostering policies that accelerate technological maturity and facilitate the transition from research to commercial success;

76. Calls for targeted investments, industry collaboration and regulatory frameworks that support the development, scaling and market adoption of quantum technologies across key sectors;

77. Calls for a coordinated EU strategy for post-quantum cryptography to protect data from future cyberthreats;

Data centres

78. Calls on the Commission to support ecosystems for sharing industry-specific data within industrial sectors, fostering collaboration and driving innovation, while maintaining data sovereignty and ensuring compliance with EU regulations, as outlined in the Data Act; urges the Commission for strong enforcement to ensure that dominant market players do not impose unfair terms on SMEs and mid-sized enterprises when accessing and sharing data;

79. Believes that there is a need to ensure interconnected infrastructure that would allow data centres to work together efficiently under common standards with high-speed connectivity, while flexibility, security and scalability would be maintained; believes this interconnected system would help in ensuring distributed redundancy so that data and services remain available even in the event of a data centre failure;

80. Calls on the Commission to prioritise interoperability across platforms, enabling the seamless integration of data across businesses and sectors, in alignment with the requirements of the Data Act, which mandate data portability and interoperability obligations for cloud and edge services; stresses the need for the robust enforcement of these provisions to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure that European industrial ecosystems can leverage data-driven innovation without technical or contractual barriers;

81. Recalls the Commission’s plan to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by 2030; sees the need to improve the integration of data centres with the energy system, focusing on heat reuse and providing flexibility services to the electricity grid needs; recognises the need to incentivise research for cooling and energy-efficient processors, while special attention should be given to supporting EU data centres; urges the Commission to ensure clear and consistent implementation of existing legal requirements for data centre operators across EU legislation and the Member States;

82. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase and target public investment and to incentivise private investment in digital infrastructure to enable the growth and modernisation of data centres;

Submarine cables

83. Calls on the Commission to take coordinated action to protect submarine cables and reinforce cable security and repair capabilities; stresses the need for continued investment in the construction of new submarine cables to ensure redundancy; welcomes the EU’s role in co-financing such projects to enhance digital infrastructure and connectivity across the Member States; calls on the Commission to explore potential synergies between the maintenance of undersea digital and energy infrastructure;

84. Emphasises the importance of improving EU and Member State repair capabilities and response mechanisms to handle submarine cable disruptions, which are essential for maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications; underlines the importance of international cooperation in repairing sabotaged cables and facilitating the necessary investments, and calls for the establishment of an EU-based rapid-response repair fleet to ensure swift recovery and operational continuity in the event of disruptions; calls on the Commission to carry out an assessment of regulatory measures to ensure fair access and security, regardless of whether the infrastructure is privately or publicly owned;

85. Welcomes the adoption of the action plan on cable security, which will be organised around four pillars: prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence; highlights the importance of its full and timely implementation; urges, in the current geopolitical context, increased investment in technologies to strengthen the security and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure;

86. Calls on the Commission to promote R&I to enable advanced technological innovations in cable security, including early warning systems and AI-driven threat assessments;

87. Urges the Commission to review available instruments designed to better leverage private investments in support of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs); calls on the Commission to include submarine cable projects in the list of IPCEIs; recognises the need to streamline and simplify the application and administrative process governing IPCEIs;

Cybersecurity

88. Recalls the legislative work carried out over the previous legislative term aimed at significantly improving cybersecurity in the EU; welcomes, in particular, the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act and the NIS2 Directive; stresses the need for the harmonised and timely implementation and enforcement of these measures;

89. Calls on the Commission to present an evaluation report on the Cybersecurity Act and to propose a legislative act to review it in order to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity framework, with a particular focus on the interplay between sovereignty and security; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to enhance the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure and prevent foreign interference from entities subject to extraterritorial legislation, as well as accelerating the adoption process for EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls for ENISA’s mandate to be strengthened to coordinate crisis response, oversee cybersecurity certification for critical infrastructure and ensure uniform implementation of cybersecurity standards across the single market;

90. Emphasises the importance of the upcoming European internal security strategy in strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection;

91. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement any restrictions on high-risk suppliers, posing significant security vulnerabilities; calls for the full implementation of the EU toolbox for 5G security in order to reduce reliance on high-risk vendors; calls on the Commission to make the toolbox binding, specifically with regard to high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure;

Simplification

92. Notes that to achieve true technological sovereignty, the EU must have viable commercial alternatives; stresses that the EU must urgently pursue a comprehensive agenda of simplification and bureaucracy reduction to foster an innovation-friendly environment capable of supporting competitive European alternatives to dominant global digital players; underlines that excessive administrative burdens, fragmented regulatory frameworks, an incomplete digital single market and overly complex compliance procedures disproportionately impact European start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs, limiting their capacity to compete at global level; recognises that the EU should therefore prioritise regulatory streamlining and the deepening of the digital single market, ensuring that legislation is proportionate, innovation-driven and does not stifle the development of European technological solutions;

93. Emphasises the need for new legislative proposals to be aligned with better regulation principles, ensuring that any new digital policy measure that affects competitiveness is accompanied by an impact assessment, including a competitiveness, SME and small mid-cap check that evaluates whether a given legislative instrument is necessary, proportionate and does not create unnecessary burdens for businesses, especially SMEs, and thus its effects on competitiveness, investment prospects and consumer welfare;

94. Highlights that the simplification of EU legislation must not endanger any of the fundamental rights of citizens and businesses and thus jeopardise regulatory certainty; believes that any simplification proposal should not be rushed or proposed without proper consideration, consultation and an impact assessment;

95. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to fully implement the principle of burden reduction for companies in EU legislation; calls on the Commission, therefore, to enhance its efforts by aiming to remove more cost and administrative burdens for businesses compared to the benefits that would be derived from any new regulatory requirements introduced at EU level in the same policy area, so that barriers to market entry are removed to help European companies to scale and grow;

96. Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent simplification, implementation and enforcement of EU digital legislation through the Digital Package, streamlining definitions and reporting procedures, assessing ways to alleviate reporting obligations and reducing the gap between industry and government;

97. Believes that supporting companies and innovators to stay in Europe by developing the EU as an attractive and agile business environment is key to enhancing technological sovereignty; emphasises, in that regard, that excessive regulation and administrative burdens should be avoided and that EU rules should be clear, consistent, predictable, proportionate and technologically neutral, thus maintaining a globally competitive regulatory environment; believes that new public procurement methods and the development of regulatory sandboxes and test beds should also contribute to an innovation-friendly framework;

98. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of a 28th legal regime, recognising that a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules will be a game changer for digital investment and innovation; believes that reducing regulatory fragmentation across 27 national legal regimes will boost private investment, lower compliance costs and accelerate the deployment of next-generation digital infrastructure, products and services; encourages the Commission to ensure that this framework specifically addresses regulatory barriers in the digital sector, such as permitting and cross-border data flows, in order to create a true digital single market;

99. Urges the Commission to create a single point of contact to simplify the application process for private-sector access to EU funding mechanisms, ensuring that private companies, SMEs and start-ups can more easily participate in digital investment programmes;

Energy

100. Emphasises that data centres will put additional pressure on electricity grids, making it imperative to reinforce them through anticipatory investments; stresses that data centres can also help stabilise the grid by participating in demand-side flexibility; calls for measures to incentivise such contributions based on the implementation of the revision of the European electricity market reform;

101. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to propose and implement instruments that ensure orderly planning of the escalating energy demand from data centres, facilitating their strategic placement near available energy sources and thus minimising reliance on the broader grid infrastructure;

102. Recognises that fibre is more energy efficient than traditional copper networks; acknowledges the importance of reducing energy consumption in data transmission and ensuring long-term stability and efficiency;

103. Calls on the Commission to ensure a reliable and sufficient clean energy and net-zero technology supply to support the digital infrastructure of the future;

Skills

104. Recognises the urgent need for more skilled professionals in digital fields to meet the EU’s strategic objectives; calls on the Member States to develop national strategies and incentives to retain European talent and attract the world’s best digital professionals, thereby strengthening the EU’s innovation capacity and technological leadership;

105. Stresses the importance of closing the digital and STEM skills gap to enhance technological resilience, innovation capacity and open strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to strengthen investments in digital education, upskilling and reskilling, particularly in areas essential for the green and digital transitions; supports prioritising investments that address digital skills shortages, particularly in AI, cybersecurity, data analysis and clean technologies, in order to support innovation and technological sovereignty;

106. Calls for coordinated strategies at national level to improve access to high-quality STEM education, promote lifelong learning and attract talent to ICT and related fields; encourages partnerships between public institutions, industry and educational providers to ensure alignment between curricula and evolving market needs;

107. Calls for intensified efforts to improve digital literacy and skills across all demographics, focusing on early STEM education, vocational education and training, and lifelong learning in digital technologies; recommends aligning national education and training strategies with the EU Digital Decade goal of 80 % of the population possessing basic digital skills by 2030, with a focus on gender-inclusive policies to increase women’s participation in ICT and STEM fields; calls on the EU institutions to take concrete steps to uphold the commitments referred to in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, both within the EU framework as in the Union’s cooperation with third countries;

108. Supports the establishment of a common EU certification framework for digital and technical skills to improve the recognition and portability of qualifications among the Member States;

109. Encourages the European Investment Bank and national development institutions to support digital talent retention by co-investing in European deep-tech start-ups, ensuring that EU-funded innovation remains within the region and contributes to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

Research and innovation

110. Recognises the importance of bridging the gap between research and commercialisation and calls on the Commission to enhance the valorisation of innovation within the EU;

111. Believes that Europe’s ability to transform research into market-ready solutions is critical for building necessary capabilities and reducing reliance on non-EU technologies;

112. Emphasises that funding needs to be strategically allocated to accelerate the development and market introduction of solutions that strengthen Europe’s technological resilience and drive innovation; underlines the importance of a more agile, excellence-based funding structure, particularly in improving the translation of research into industrial applications; calls for increased investment in R&I to strengthen Europe’s knowledge and technological capabilities and insists that EU research, development and innovation (RDI) funding be based on open competition and excellence;

113. Highlights the need for policies that support industrial innovation, including targeted investment in key strategic technologies where Europe can lead globally, such as quantum computing, in order to build an innovation ecosystem;

114. Believes that private investment in RDI is of utmost importance and calls for the EU to create incentives that effectively leverage private funding for the development of critical technologies, including through public-private partnerships;

115. Stresses the urgent need for stronger incentives to mobilise private sector capital for technology-driven innovation; encourages the Member States to introduce targeted fiscal incentives, regulatory simplification and risk-sharing instruments designed to attract private equity to the technology and digital sectors; highlights the need to streamline cross-border capital flows within the single market to facilitate access to finance for innovative European start-ups;

Standards

116. Strongly believes that promoting interoperability and EU standards is paramount to fostering competitiveness in the technology sector, as it ensures that products can be connected and work with each other, thus fostering innovation and open markets; recalls that both interoperability and common technological standards pave the way for the functioning of the single market;

117. Underlines that the Commission must increase its engagement in existing global standardisation structures and focus on the international uptake of European standards through a bottom-up approach, avoiding centralisation;

Partnerships

118. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to negotiating DTAs that facilitate secure and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries; encourages the Commission to increase efforts in negotiating DTAs with additional partner countries;

119. Calls on the Commission to accelerate technical cooperation in multilateral forums such as the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to develop global standards for digital governance, AI regulation, cross-border data flows and emerging technologies;

120. Urges the Commission to advance negotiations on a permanent solution to the WTO moratorium on e-commerce to prevent the introduction of digital tariffs, ensuring international digital trade remains open, predictable and conducive to innovation;

°

° °

121. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Cluster of Candida auris cases found in Kowloon Hospital
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

The following is issued on behalf of the Hospital Authority:

The spokesperson for Kowloon Hospital (KH) made the following announcement today (June 25):

A 77-year-old female patient in a rehabilitation and extended care ward was confirmed to be carrying Candida auris on June 12 without signs of infection. In accordance with the prevailing infection control guidelines, the hospital commenced a contact tracing investigation. Four more female patients (aged 85 to 99) from the same ward were subsequently confirmed to be carrying Candida auris without signs of infection. Among the five patients, two patients have been discharged. One patient is in critical condition due to her underlying disease. The remaining two patients are now being treated in isolation at KH and are in stable condition.

The ward concerned has adopted the following enhanced infection control measures:
1. Enhanced patient and environmental screening procedures;
2. Applied stringent contact precautions and enhanced hand hygiene of staff and patients; and
3. Thorough cleaning and disinfection of the ward concerned.
The hospital will continue the enhanced infection control measures and closely monitor the situation in the ward. The cases have been reported to the Hospital Authority Head Office and the Centre for Health Protection for necessary follow-up.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ4: Smart estate management

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

LCQ4: Smart estate management
Question:

In order to enhance management efficiency and service quality of public rental housing (PRH) estates, the Government is actively promoting smart estate management and has selected ten PRH estates (including Hoi Ying Estate in Sham Shui Po) as pilot sites (pilot estates) for smart estate management. According to an opinion poll, over 90 per cent of the responding PRH tenants hope that the Housing Department expeditiously introduces smart management into the estates where they live. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the details and timetable for implementing smart estate management in various pilot estates;

(2) given that the Government will utilize the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence to facilitate daily management in the pilot estates, and will also introduce robots to carry out tasks such as security patrol and cleansing, of the criteria based on which the Government decides to try out such smart equipment and technologies in the pilot estates; whether it will introduce robots into estates other than the pilot estates, and whether it will consider introducing robots of a more interactive nature to act as goodwill ambassadors to residents by answering their daily enquiries; and

(3) whether it will extend the Smartcard Access Control System for buildings to all PRH estates, enabling residents to enter their buildings with smartcards or personalized QR codes and thus reducing the security risk of leaking building access codes, and install smart home monitoring systems for elderly residents; if so, of the details?

Reply:

President,

Under the theme of Housing???I&T initiative, the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) promotes smart estate management this year so as to enhance efficiency and service quality, strengthen estate security, improve environment, expedite maintenance work, and enhance the sense of well-being and sense of gain of public rental housing (PRH) residents. The HA has selected ten public housing estates as pilot sites for the introduction of innovative technologies to promote smart estate management. In response to the questions raised by the Hon Vincent Cheng, our reply is as follows:

At present, the HA has introduced the following innovative technologies for estate management:

(i) Internet of Things (IoT) sensors

The HA applies a variety of sensors and IoT to digitise various circumstances and information in estates, collect real-time data for analysis and monitoring, and establish early warning systems (such as electricity supply, operation of water pumps and drainage system blockage, etc.) to notify the estate offices immediately for follow-up. Presently, about 700 sets of sensors have been installed in six PRH estates. This would hence enhance the efficiency and service quality and minimise the impact on residents.

(ii) Artificial Intelligence (AI)

AI is able to analyse images to detect irregularities and monitor the common areas of PRH estates in real time, identifying incidents such as objects thrown from height and illegal parking. The AI video analytic system can spare frontline staff from reviewing video footages for long hours, helping staff identify more accurately and efficiently the incidents of objects thrown from height from long videos, thereby shortening the time required for the entire evidence collection process and enhancing the efficiency in handling such incidents. The system has assisted to handle 17 successful point allotment cases.

(iii) Mobile devices

The mobile applications can be used anytime and anywhere by frontline staff, enabling them to record and retrieve information on-site at various locations. The “Mobile Application System for Daily Patrol” developed by the HA trialed in ten pilot estates allows security staff to readily report patrol situation and record in real-time matters requiring cleansing or maintenance services with photos uploaded, replacing the paper reports, reducing the paperwork after patrol duties, and raising the effectiveness of follow-up actions.

(iv) Robots and Small Unmanned Aircrafts (SUAs)

Robots and SUAs have brought significant benefits across various fields. Since mid-2022, maintenance staff of the HA have been utilising SUAs for tasks such as inspecting external walls of 21 estates, lift shafts, trees of 175 estates and 285 green roofs within 22 estates. Not only does the use SUAs save manpower and time, but it also greatly enhances inspection efficiency and avoids the risks brought by scaffold-based inspections. These technologies help complete tasks which are dangerous or difficult for humans to achieve within a short period of time and minimise inconvenience caused to residents. Robots have also been used on a trial basis in three housing estates for routine cleansing and security work to enhance efficiency, reduce conflicts and assist with publicity work. In addition to physical robots, virtual robots also provide considerable assistance to the public. For instance, the public can inquire about information and provide suggestions through interaction with the HA Chatbot.

To further promote innovative technologies in PRH estate management, the HA established a dedicated co-ordination team in mid-2024 to oversee the trial of various technologies across different management functions and review operational models. The co-ordination team also formulates implementation timetable for estates based on their specific conditions, with a view to gradually introducing suitable innovative solutions. For example, security robots are more suitable for use in spacious and flat public spaces. The HA will continue to actively collaborate with the property management sector to explore the implementation of cost-effective projects and maximise outcomes with limited resources. The co-ordination team will adjust its strategies annually based on the pilot results and identify suitable estates for introducing the best new technologies.

In addition, the HA has piloted the use of a smart contactless access control system in Hin Fat Estate, Tuen Mun since September 2024, by using smartcards and mobile QR codes to facilitate control and to monitor the main access of the building. The HA will evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the pilot scheme, the application of the technology and residents’ feedback in the fourth quarter this year. With relevant government departments and research institutions, the HA will also continue to explore other systems, such as the feasibility of applying “iAM Smart” Personal Code to the access control system. Subject to the availability of resources, the HA will trial other smart access control systems in other estates subsequently. Upon analysis and comparison, the HA will gradually extend smart access control systems to suitable PRH estates in phases.

The HA always upholds the values of “caring” and keeps abreast of the times to actively explore measures to address various needs of the elderly residents through the application of innovative technologies. Starting from April this year, the HA launched the pilot scheme of Door Sensor Installation for Elderly Households in Wan Hon Estate in Kwun Tong and Sheung Lok Estate in Ho Man Tin. The elderly households who voluntarily participate in the scheme are equipped with the system which allows designated relatives or friends to keep track of the movement of the elderly in and out of their flats so as to provide timely support when needed. So far, a total of 50 elderly households have participated in the scheme. The Housing Department will actively explore the feasibility of implementing other similar schemes in collaboration with other government departments and social welfare organisations, with a view to benefitting more elderly households in other PRH estates.

Moreover, the HA has also provided subsidy to eligible elderly households to install an emergency alarm system, so that the elderly in need can seek help promptly in case of emergency. A total of about 26 000 applications have been approved since the launch of this scheme. We have also been piloting the installation of smart fall-detection systems in eight accessible toilets in some estates to detect incidents such as falls, faints, or prolonged inactivity.

The HA will continue to listen and make reference to the views of various stakeholders with an open manner and to explore more effective innovative technologies for smart estate management, so as to enhance the service quality and the sense of well-being of the elderly and residents.

Thank you.
Issued at HKT 20:16

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: InvestHK signs MOU with Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Zhejiang University to support Zhejiang enterprises in global expansion (with photos)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

InvestHK signs MOU with Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Zhejiang University to support Zhejiang enterprises in global expansion
    The Director-General of Investment Promotion at InvestHK, Ms Alpha Lau, said, “Hong Kong and Zhejiang have always maintained close ties and are important partners in economic as well as innovation and technology sectors. Hong Kong is the largest source of foreign investment for Zhejiang and serves as a key platform for Zhejiang enterprises to explore overseas markets. As a vital bridge between the Mainland and international markets, Hong Kong is committed to providing comprehensive support to Mainland innovative enterprises. We are delighted to collaborate with the Institute. By combining our complementary strengths, we will support high-quality enterprises in the Institute to expand globally through Hong Kong, fostering new opportunities for innovation and co-operation.”

     The Dean of the Institute, Ms Wang Lingling, said, “Hong Kong’s international platform and professional service ecosystem will provide crucial support for the innovative development of enterprises in our Institute. We look forward to this collaboration strengthening Zhejiang University’s industrial ties with Hong Kong and help more outstanding enterprises to go global.”
     Looking ahead, InvestHK and the Institute will continue to deepen their co-operation, promoting synergistic development in innovation and entrepreneurship, business incubation, and international expansion between Zhejiang and Hong Kong. Together, they aim to support enterprises in “going global” and build a bridge for innovation and technology resource connectivity between the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and the Yangtze River Delta, jointly creating a globally influential hub for enterprise internationalisation.
Issued at HKT 19:30

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ11: Site safety and contractor management

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by the Hon Carmen Kan and a written reply by the Secretary for Development, Ms Bernadette Linn, in the Legislative Council today (June 25):

Question:

It is reported that fatal industrial accidents and incidents of serious non-compliance committed by contractors have repeatedly occurred in the construction industry in recent years. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the following information on the contractors with poor performance in relation to industrial accidents and site safety in the construction industry in each of the past five years (set out in a table):

(i) the numbers of fatal and non-fatal industrial accidents (set out by type of operations) and, among which, the numbers of those involving “bamboo scaffolding” or “metal scaffolding” works (set out by cause of accidents);

(ii) in respect of public works projects, the number of government project consultants/contractors with performance ratings of (a)‍ “Poor” or “Very Poor” in site safety and (b) “Poor” or “Very Poor” in overall performance, and among which, the number of consultants and contractors who have been suspended from tendering or removed from the lists concerned (set out by type of non-compliance);

(iii) the numbers of prosecutions instituted by the Government in respect of fatal industrial accidents and the cases convicted and the penalty imposed on each of the convicted cases; and

(iv) the application situation for legal aid in each case of industrial accident involving civil claims (set out by fatal and non-fatal accidents);

(2) given that according to the direct investigation operation report of the Office of The Ombudsman released in April this year in relation to the Government’s regulation of occupational safety and health in the construction industry, from 2018 to 2023, fatal industrial accidents in the construction industry accounted for more than 80 per cent of fatal industrial accidents in all industries, and the Office found that some “competent persons” have failed to properly inspect the safety of bamboo scaffolds before signing the prescribed form (i.e. Form 5), how the authorities will improve the monitoring mechanism and step up enforcement efforts to ensure that the competent persons will strictly discharge their duties;

(3) given that according to the report mentioned in (2), the industrial accidents involving bamboo scaffolding works are related to the unauthorised issue of the prescribed form, whether the Government will review afresh the policy direction of reducing the use of bamboo scaffolds in public works projects; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(4) in respect of cases of public works projects in which contractors/consultants with performance ratings of “Poor” or “Very Poor” in overall performance were not suspended from tendering in the end, of the Government’s reasons for making such decisions (set out by cases); whether it will, from the perspective of value for money, review the weightings of the various scores for assessing the performance of contractors/consultants; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and

(5) of the measures in place to prevent the relevant personnel of contractors who were removed from the register of general building contractors by the Government due to serious non-compliance from undertaking the Government’s public works projects by means of setting up new companies?

Reply:

President,

The Government attaches great importance to site safety. The Labour Department (LD) has been closely monitoring the levels and changes of occupational safety and health (OSH) risks in various industries, including the construction industry. Pursuant to the risk-based principle, the LD formulates and adjusts strategies for inspection and enforcement, publicity and promotion, as well as education and training to uplift the OSH performance. The Development Bureau (DEVB) from time to time reviews the safety management system of public works, being part of the construction industry, and adopts a multi-pronged approach by implementing measures on various fronts, including project design, tender evaluation, contract provisions, works supervision, technology application, regulation of contractors, as well as publicity and promotion, with a view to uplifting site safety performance of public works.

Having consulted the LD and the Legal Aid Department (LAD), the reply to various parts of the question is as follows:

(1) (i) According to the OSH statistics analysed by the type of accidents by the LD, the breakdown of the numbers of fatal and non-fatal industrial accident cases in the construction industry from 2020 to 2024 (by type of accidents) is at Annex 1.

Among the fatal industrial accident cases, the relevant statistics involving working on bamboo scaffolds and metal scaffolds are at Annex 2. The LD does not maintain relevant statistics on non-fatal industrial accident cases involving bamboo scaffolds and metal scaffolds.
The LAD is not in position to disclose the details of each individual case because of the restriction under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance and the Legal Aid Ordinance also contains provisions maintaining confidentiality of information relating to an applicant or aided person.
The LD is planning to develop a “scaffold inspection checklist” for use by competent persons when inspecting scaffolds in order to strengthen the regulation of their inspection work under the OSH legislation and reduce the chance of making false statements on the approved forms.
To further promote the adoption of metal scaffolds, the DEVB recently required 50 per cent of new public works building works contracts of the Government, with tenders to be invited on or after March 21, 2025, to adopt metal scaffolds. Based on the new public works building works contracts in 2025, 50 per cent of new contracts means one to two new building works contracts. With experience gained, the DEVB will continue to maintain close communication with the construction industry and adopt a pragmatic attitude to encourage the industry to keep pace with the times and adopt metal scaffolds in a progressive manner. The Government has no intention to ban bamboo scaffolds and will continue to engage the industry and other relevant stakeholders to jointly explore measures from various aspects (including the application of technology) to enhance work safety of bamboo scaffolds.
In respect of regulating actions, if a contractor is involved in serious site safety incidents (irrespective of whether they occurred on public works sites or those of other public or private sector organisations), we will immediately suspend the contractor from tendering for public works contracts in accordance with the current regulating mechanism. Any tenders that the contractor has already submitted for public works contracts will not be considered during the regulating period. Following this, a Panel of Enquiry will be held to determine the need for further regulating actions against the contractor, including suspension from tendering or even removal from the approved lists.

In addition, if a contractor’s site safety performance is rated as “Very Poor” in the quarterly performance evaluation, its overall performance in the performance report will also be rated as “Very Poor”. If a contractor’s overall performance is rated as “Very Poor” for two consecutive quarters, we will suspend the contractor from tendering for public works contracts until its performance consistently meets satisfactory level. In general, upon receiving a “Very Poor” report, a contractor will implement effective improvement measures immediately. As for engineering consultants, we have a similar regulating mechanism in place as well.

Although some contractors or engineering consultants have been rated as having “Poor” or “Very Poor” overall performance, their performance has not yet met the threshold for triggering suspension of their tendering qualifications. However, under the current tender evaluation mechanism, a contractor’s past site safety performance, accident rate in public works contracts, and its records of serious site safety incidents (regardless of whether they occurred on public works sites or those of other public or private sector organisations) are key attributes assessed. These attributes make up about 30 per cent of the overall technical score. Therefore, if a contractor’s site safety performance is rated as “Poor” or “Very Poor”, the overall technical score of its tender will be lower, directly impacting its chance of winning future public works contracts. We will continue to review and enhance the performance evaluation and regulating systems for public works contractors and engineering consultants as needed.
When applying for admission to the approved lists, a contractor must fulfil a series of admission criteria, including project experience, site safety, financial capability, management, staff employment, and integrity, etc. In reviewing an application for admission, we consider the contractor’s relevant project experience, senior management, safety personnel and technical staff employed, financial capability (such as employed capital and working capital as reflected in audited financial statements in the past three years), and the past site safety performance of the company and relevant responsible persons. Therefore, it is not possible for a delisted contractor to easily regain approval simply by establishing a new company.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Government welcomes passage of Trade Unions (Amendment) Bill 2025

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4

The Government today (June 25) welcomed the passage of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Bill 2025 by the Legislative Council, which amends the Trade Unions Ordinance (Chapter 332) to better safeguard national security and improve the trade union regulatory regime.

The Bill strengthens the statutory powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions to supervise and regulate trade unions, thereby better fulfilling the duty of safeguarding national security. In tandem, the amendments give due regard to the freedom and right of Hong Kong residents to form and join trade unions and will not adversely affect the operation of law-abiding trade unions.

A Government spokesman said, “The amended Trade Unions Ordinance can ensure that trade unions uphold the principal object of safeguarding and promoting the occupational interests of their members, which will be conducive to the healthy development of trade unions.”

The Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance 2025 will be gazetted on July 4, 2025, and will come into operation on January 5, 2026. During this period, the Labour Department will step up publicity and publish reference materials to help trade unions understand and comply with the new requirements.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Missing woman in Kwai Chung located

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

A woman who went missing in Kwai Chung has been located.

Li Shimin, aged 25, went missing after she left her residence in Hong Yam House, On Yam Estate on June 19 morning. Her family made a report to Police on June 22.

The woman was located in a shopping mall on Portland Street, Mong Kok this afternoon (June 25). She sustained no injuries and no suspicious circumstances were detected.

Ends/Wednesday, June 25, 2025
Issued at HKT 20:50

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Autonomous AI systems can help tackle global food insecurity

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Woo Soo Kim, Professor, Mechatronic Systems Engineering & Founding Director, Global Institute for Agritech, Simon Fraser University

There is a growing and urgent need to address global food insecurity. This urgency is underscored by reports from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which states that nearly 828 million people suffer from hunger worldwide.

Climate change is further escalating these issues, disrupting traditional farming systems and emphasizing the need for smarter, resource-efficient solutions.

But imagine a future where indoor farming systems can operate entirely on their own, managing water, nutrients and environmental conditions without human oversight. Such autonomous systems, driven by artificial intelligence (AI) and powered by robotics, could revolutionize how we produce food, especially in regions with limited arable land.

Tackling food and water insecurity requires innovative solutions like precision agriculture, using AI and robotics to foster sustainable development.

My research team at Simon Fraser University’s (SFU) School of Mechatronics Systems Engineering has developed a prototype of an AI-powered sensing robot capable of autonomously monitoring the water needs of tomato plants.

Simon Fraser University researchers and students at the Arusha Climate and Environmental Research Centre, Aga Kahn University, a 3700-acre ecological reserve, tested drone technology to improve farming operations in Tanzania.
(Woo Soo Kim)

AI-powered farming

In conventional greenhouses, several water management techniques are used to enhance efficiency and minimize waste. These include drip irrigation and using soil moisture sensors and automated irrigation systems.

Despite their effectiveness, these methods have limitations in responsiveness and accuracy, and can lead to over- or under-watering, wasting resources and impacting crop health.

Agriculture takes up the vast majority of the water humanity uses. As water scarcity affects over two billion people worldwide, it is critical to find innovative ways to more efficiently use water.

At SFU, we’ve built an innovative robot that uses electrical signals from plants, also known as plant electrophysiology responses, as real-time indicators of plant health and hydration needs. The system integrates advanced AI algorithms to interpret these signals and determine when water should be supplied.

This technology eliminates the traditional guesswork and manual labour involved in irrigation, promoting efficient water use and reducing waste while optimizing plant health.

Recent research highlights the potential of integrating AI innovations into agriculture. AI-powered systems can significantly improve water efficiency, reduce chemical runoff and optimize crop yields.

Advances in robotics are also facilitating non-invasive and continuous monitoring of plant health, enabling interventions that are both precise and timely.

Recent advances in plant physiological signal monitoring have shown that sensors capable of capturing electrical signals reflecting plant stress, hydration and overall health can provide highly specific, real-time data.

A research team at SFU has developed an AI-powered sensing robot capable of autonomously monitoring water needs of tomato plants using the plant’s own electrical signals.
(Woo Soo Kim)

Our non-invasive sensing robot improves this process by enabling continuous and efficient monitoring of plant health, making automation more responsive and effective.

When combined with AI, these signals enable precision watering that is dynamically adapted to the plant’s actual needs, representing a significant leap in intelligent plant care.

Furthermore, recent innovations using multi-spectral imaging and machine learning have vastly improved our ability to detect disease and when plants are stressed. This can be integrated with electrical sensing robots like ours to develop comprehensive systems to monitor plant health.

With these improvements fully autonomous agriculture is becoming feasible. This technology goes beyond irrigation, using robotic sensing to interpret plant signals and enable autonomous nutrient management and environmental monitoring.

These multifunctional robots aim to optimize resource use, reduce waste, and increase crop yields, supporting global food security through holistic plant health management.

From greenhouses to fields

Our prototype shows promise in greenhouses. However, the real potential of AI water management lies in scalable, adaptable solutions. Addressing global food and water security requires international collaboration to share knowledge, technology and develop region-specific strategies for areas impacted by scarcity and climate change.

In recent years, our team has engaged deeply with agricultural communities in Tanzania and Asia-Pacific nations such as Singapore, Philippines, Japan and South Korea, understanding their unique challenges.

These regions face acute water shortages, limited access to sophisticated technology and the adverse impacts of climate change. To be effective, solutions developed in controlled environments must be adapted and made accessible to farmers.

This means developing sensor tools that are affordable and simple to use, and scalable AI and robotic systems that can operate effectively under variable environmental and infrastructural conditions.

The real potential of AI water management lies in developing scalable, adaptable solutions.
(Alana McPherson)

International collaboration plays a vital role here. Sharing knowledge through cross-border research partnerships, capacity-building programs and technology transfer initiatives can accelerate the deployment of smart agriculture solutions worldwide.

The Food and Agriculture Organization, the Association of Pacific Rim Universities and the World Bank are actively fostering such collaborations, emphasizing that sustainable agriculture progress depends on integrating cutting-edge technology with local knowledge.

Our goal is to develop affordable, easy-to-deploy AI sensing robots for smallholder farms that can provide real-time plant monitoring to reduce waste and improve yields.

These systems can foster resilient farming ecosystems, and contribute toward meeting the UN’s sustainable development goal of ending hunger and malnutrition.

Ultimately, scaling prototypes like ours from greenhouses to global agriculture requires strong international collaboration. Supportive policies and knowledge sharing will accelerate the deployment of intelligent water management systems. This will empower farmers globally to achieve more sustainable and resilient food production.

Woo Soo Kim receives funding from Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and Mitacs.

– ref. Autonomous AI systems can help tackle global food insecurity – https://theconversation.com/autonomous-ai-systems-can-help-tackle-global-food-insecurity-258788

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Bentz Statement on Public Lands

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Cliff Bentz (R-Ontario)

WASHINGTON, D.C.– To be clear – I do support and encourage sale or exchange of parcels of federal land when there is a clear economic or social demand for such disposition, and when that disposition follows appropriate procedure and is generally supported by those affected. I include congressional action as an appropriate procedure. I do not support a mandated disposition of millions of acres of federal land, the amount of which was arbitrarily established, the primary goal not being to respond to demand, but instead being the removal of land from federal ownership.

A policy to permanently dispose of massive amounts of land currently owned and managed for multiple use by the federal government should not be included in a reconciliation package where debate, by design, is truncated or completely avoided. A decision to irreversibly divest the nation of federally owned land is an important policy issue that must be carefully discussed with and designed by those of us representing states impacted by this policy.

Of particular concern in making any decision to sell public land is the sale’s impact on those who have rights in the land or currently have some type of use of the land. Indian Tribes, neighbors, grazing permittees, those utilizing public access across the land, hunters, watershed function, holders of easements, and environmental impact are some of the issues that must be taken into account in making a decision to alter ownership. These realities make the process used in selecting parcels of federal land offered for sale extremely important.

Some might argue that the abject failure of the federal government to adequately manage BLM and Forest Service land justifies its sale. But sale of this land to someone else is no way to assure it’s proper management. The best way to protect this land is to identify and correct the reasons these agencies are failing in their mission. The easiest observation to make is that environmental organizations, using the ESA, CWA, CAA, and other environmental laws, compliant federal judges, and the Access to Justice Act, (an act that pays the attorney fees of plaintiffs who successfully sue the federal government) through protracted and expensive litigation, make a mockery of agency’s attempts to craft management plans. If our nation is to be a landowner (and it is), it must take care of that land. This means that the laws that are being perverted to line the pockets of environmental organizations at the expense of the taxpayer and our forests and rangelands, must be changed so that such perversion is stopped.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Government Technology recognizes 2024 Oregon Summer EBT for best practices

Source: US State of Oregon

he Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) was recognized in a national Government Technology Case Study for its excellence in the use of smart technology in rolling out the Summer EBT program. As a result, more than 362,000 children were able to get more food during summer 2024.

About Summer EBT

Thousands of children in Oregon rely on free or reduced-price school meals. But what happens in the summer months when these meals are gone? This is called the summer hunger gap. To address this gap, the federal government last year rolled out a new program to provide food to school-aged children during the summer months.

Oregon was one of 35 states to pick up on the federal Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) program, which provided a total of $120 in nutrition benefits for each eligible child when school is out.

Summer EBT qualification is based on income. For families to qualify, the household income needs to be under 185 percent of the federal poverty level.

“The majority of the people we served are working. It could be part time or they’re just starting off – they are bringing in income but it’s just not enough. The Summer EBT helps supplement their food budget for their children,” Singer said.

A tight timeline

It was go-time for ODHS in early 2024. There was only 16 weeks to set up a new program, bring in community partners, identify and reach out to eligible families, create communication plans and products, and establish the innovative technology needed to accomplish this task. ODHS is the lead agency and administers this program in partnership with the Oregon Department of Education (ODE).

“It was a very short amount of time to build an entire system. The challenge was to quickly build a system to deliver quality services not only for this year but next year also,” Nate Singer, ODHS Oregon Eligibility Partnership (OEP) Director, said. OEP is responsible for determining eligibility for people applying for benefits and processing applications to deliver those benefits.

Goal setting

Initial estimates in 2024 projected that Oregon would provide Summer EBT to at least 294,000 children.

“The one thing I wanted for the project was to exceed that expectation because that would mean we would be providing more services for families and we could increase our outreach for all the of the services ODHS offers,” said Christine Doody, Self-Sufficiency Programs Policy Business Manager and Program Manager for Summer EBT.

The expectation was exceeded about 68,000, meaning more than 362,000 children were able to get food benefits last summer.

Innovation in action

To identify eligible children, OEP used data from ODHS and ODE. Most children who received the benefit were “automatically eligible” because they receive other benefits. These families didn’t need to apply, and the benefit was automatically added to their Oregon EBT card.

Other families needed to apply. ODHS brought in contractors Amazon Web Services and Deloitte Consulting to help with the technology and planning to make applying easy.

“We tried to make it simple as possible. People could apply with a paper application or online. The online application could be done on a mobile phone. If someone had questions about whether they needed to apply or needed help to apply, they could call the Summer EBT Call Center to talk to someone. The call wait time was below five minutes. People could hear right then, on the phone, they would get their benefits if they applied. It took minutes,” Singer said.

The Oregon Summer EBT Call Center included an Interactive Voice Response system offering self-service options for supported languages: English, Spanish, Russian, Vietnamese, Somali, Mandarin, Cantonese, Arabic, Ukrainian, and Chuukese. For other languages, or for other assistance, the calls could be routed to help.

“This gave families the ability to take control of their case. They could use voice activation to say, ‘I want text messages’ from us, or they could change their demographic information or ask for a new card. The family could do that on their own,” Doody said.

This population of customers – families with children in school – are used to getting texts and email from their schools, so they were already familiar with getting information this way. In fact, 99 percent of families that needed to apply chose to use the online application rather than a paper application. Those that used the online caption reported a 96 percent satisfaction rating.

Communications and community engagement

There was also communications and community engagement support, as well as an effective feedback loop. A workgroup with community representatives, such as the Oregon Food Bank and Partners for a Hunger Free Oregon, was in place. The community partners advised on all communication products such as news releases, the application design and social media kits.

“We worked together to get the information as far out to communities as we could. We were also able to get good data from the Call Center to let us know how we were doing. We had a strong feedback loop that we responded to quickly,” Christy Sinatra, ODHS Senior Communications Advisor, said.

For example, people asked if children in charter, private schools, or home schools could be included in Summer EBT. The answer was, yes, if they are found to be eligible. It was also important to communicate to people that the Summer EBT benefits expired after 122 days – so it was important to use them before then.

“We are trying to increase equity and access. There’s not just one approach. We pushed many communications and engagement levers – technology, in-person outreach, digital communications, community partnerships, media exposure. All those things working together to make the program successful and making sure every eligible kid gets this,” Sinatra said.

“The Oregon Summer EBT program demonstrated the strength of cross-agency collaboration and intentional program design. Staff were equipped with thoughtful tools and invited to shape how the program would operate, ensuring that those on the ground had a voice in critical decisions. That partnership—from planning to implementation—meant that families and children not only received meaningful support but also felt seen, heard, and cared for. The feedback from the community speaks volumes about the impact of that collective effort,” Singer said.

“The project was just overwhelmingly amazing. I just hope that people read this and apply for this summer,” Doody said.

2025 Summer EBT began May 22

The 2025 Summer EBT launched Thursday, May 22, 2025. Applications will be accepted through Wednesday, September 3, 2025.

ODHS will be running the whole program this summer – setting a goal of serving 375,000 children.

“We will be doing additional outreach, based on data and staff feedback, and providing new ways to engage with people such as going out to more schools and community events,” Doody said.

The program is set to: expand tactics to better reach people and communities that data showed were underserved; help schools connect families to Summer EBT; and increase strategic partnerships that serve priority audiences.

Resources:

Learn more about Summer EBT including how to apply for this benefit for your children: https://www.oregon.gov/odhs/food/pages/sebt.aspx.

Double Up Food Bucks Oregon: Visit https://doubleuporegon.org/ to learn how to double your SNAP and Summer EBT dollars at farmer’s markets, produce stands, community supported agriculture programs and grocery stores.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

Is there voter backing?

Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

Is there voter backing?

Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caleb H. Wheeler, Senior Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University

The recent US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites has prompted renewed questions about whether the UN charter’s prohibition on the use of force is meaningful.

Considered one of the keystones of international law, article 2(4) of the charter specifically forbids member states from using force – or threatening to do so – against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.

A significant amount of commentary exists about what the prohibition entails. This tries to clarify ambiguities around the terms “force”, “threats of force”, “territorial integrity” and “political independence”. Although no absolute consensus has been reached, it is commonly thought that member states are prohibited from launching armed attacks against other states, or threatening to do so, unless acting in self-defence or with the authorisation of the UN security council.

Other exceptions have been suggested. These include use of force as part of a larger humanitarian intervention operation. There’s also a question of whether it’s permissible when a state is rescuing its nationals abroad. But the legality of either of these situations is contentious and remains unsettled.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

Early in its existence, the UN made concerted efforts to protect and respect article 2(4) and to comply with its provisions. In 1950, the security council authorised UN member states to provide South Korea with the assistance necessary to repel the armed attack launched by North Korea, triggering the increased internationalisation of the Korean war.

While article 2(4) was not explicitly mentioned in resolution 83, it was alluded to through repeated references to North Korea’s “armed attack” against South Korea. As such, it can be interpreted as an effort by the security council to use its authority to address a violation of article 2(4), even if it did not clearly frame it in those terms.

The security council also authorised member states in 2011 to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the member states may have exceeded their authority in Libya and carried out acts that could themselves be construed as violations of the UN charter.

Rather than just protecting civilians, as the security council resolution instructed, legal experts were concerned they had effectively intervened in a civil war. Any possible violations went unpunished by the security council.

Security council actions taken with regard to Korea were, in many ways, the high watermark for the prohibition of the use of force, given the scale of the conflict. There are two reasons for that. First, a significant proportion of the wars taking place after 1945 have been domestic and not subject to the provisions of article 2(4). The prohibition specifically applies to a member state’s international relations so is not inapplicable when a member state attacks a group within its own borders.

Second, the UN has failed to address many of the acts occurring after 1945 that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4). The reason for this inaction lies primarily in the flawed structure on which the UN is built.

Chapter VII of the charter makes the security council responsible for addressing acts of aggression that would constitute uses of force under article 2(4). But it has repeatedly failed to fill that role, allowing states to commit these acts without meaningful response.

The UN veto problem

UN security council decisions can only be enacted when at least nine members vote in favour. This must also include the affirmative vote or abstention of all five of the permanent members: the US, Russia, China, the UK and France. This essentially gives each of the permanent members the right to veto security council resolutions.

Permanent members have commonly used the threat of their veto in their own political interests. This can be seen in a variety of instances, most notably the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both situations clearly involved uses of force prohibited by article 2(4), and in both situations the security council was prevented from acting by some of its permanent members.

This inaction is consistent with the UN’s failure to address many other acts that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4), including US involvement in south-east Asia in the 1960s and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The security council’s failure to adequately perform its role has caused some to try and find a workaround. The Council of Europe, disappointed at the lack of accountability for Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine, has entered into an agreement with Ukraine to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

In the special tribunal’s draft statute, an act of aggression is defined to almost exactly mirror the type of conduct that would constitute a use of force under the UN charter.

Bombing Iran

Which brings us to the current situation in Iran. There is little question that the US violated article 2(4) when it bombed Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan on the evening of Saturday June 21. This is a clear use of force against the territory of another state.

But even if the attacks themselves were not enough to establish a violation, they were also accompanied by US president Donald Trump’s suggestion that a regime change in Iran might be appropriate. These comments, coming immediately after the initial attack, could be construed as a threat of further force against Iran’s political independence should such a change not occur.

Under the UN charter, such threats and uses of force should elicit a response from the security council. But just as with Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine in 2022, none will probably be forthcoming as the US will block any efforts to hold it to account.

But equally chilling is the lack of condemnation of the US actions by its allies. German chancellor Friedrich Merz saw “no reason to criticise” the bombings, and Nato secretary general Mark Rutte insisted that the bombings did not violate international law.

As the respected Dutch scholar of international law André Nollkaemper suggests, this refusal to condemn a clear violation of the prohibition of the use of force creates a real danger that the bar for when a state can legally use force will be lowered.

Should that be allowed to happen it could further hollow out the prohibition, effectively making it less likely that states will be held to account for violating international law. Further, it could also lead to the return of a world where “might makes right”. This would undo more than a century of legal evolution.

Caleb H. Wheeler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed? – https://theconversation.com/bombing-iran-has-the-un-charter-failed-259751

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Blane Savage, Lecturer in MA Creative Media Practice and BA(Hons) Graphic Art & Moving Image, University of the West of Scotland

Artist, writer, playwright, illustrator – and the man who made the Oscar-winning film Poor Things possible – Alasdair Gray was one of Scotland’s great creative polymaths and eccentrics, now celebrated every year on “Gray Day” (February 25). A new exhibition at the Kelvingrove Art Gallery in Glasgow has opened to reveal a selection of nine previously unseen artworks from The Morag McAlpine Bequest.

This is the first time works have been on display from the bequest gifted by him to Glasgow Life Museums following the death of his wife in 2014, which comprises artworks he created for her on anniversaries, birthdays and Christmas.

A small show like this cannot fully do justice to the vibrancy and volume of Gray’s output, but these nine pieces give a broad flavour of the artist’s working style and idiosyncratic idea development.

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Gray was a graduate of Glasgow School of Art where he specialised in murals and stained glass. In addition to being a talented artist and writer, he was also a professor of creative writing at Glasgow University.

His landmark novel Lanark: A Life in Four Books (1981), a story within a story of adolescence, with the mythical Unthank standing in for Glasgow, has been praised as a modern classic.

His influence on the Scottish art and literary scene was a powerful one. Regarded as the father figure of the Scottish Renaissance in art and literature, Gray’s postmodern work was a merging of realism, fantasy and science fiction, interwoven with his socialist political views. This was supported by his own book illustrations and typography. He inspired many young Scottish writers, including Irvine Welsh and Iain Banks.

Gray was also a strong Scottish nationalist. Inspired by a poem by Dennis Lee, Gray’s epigram, “Work as if you live in the early days of a better nation” was inscribed on the wall of the new Scottish Parliament building when it opened in 2004.

His creative works are deeply embedded in the psyche of the west end of Glasgow. Several of his murals are on display there, such as the one at the top of the escalators in Hillhead subway station, the surreal collages in The Ubiquitous Chip restaurant and the extraordinary night-sky ceiling fresco in Òran Mór, a church-turned-bar. These murals are a hybrid of styles, often black and white linear illustrations filled with colour, traditional painting and printmaking techniques.

These “new” artworks on display show different aspects, stages and details of Gray’s creative practice when designing artwork for print, such as the Tippex-infused works that allowed him to merge disparate elements of his cut-out collages.

The highlights of the show include the original artwork for his novel Poor Things, a subversive post-modern rewrite of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, set in and around Glasgow, and adapted by filmmaker Yorgos Lanthimos in 2023.

Read more:
Poor Things: meet the radical Scottish visionary behind the new hit film

The illustration features the anti-hero Godwin Baxter hugging two smaller figures – the reanimated Bella Baxter and Archibald McCandless MD, the primary narrator of the novel. They are surrounded by anatomical illustrations of body parts and in the centre a woman’s head has been cut open revealing her brain. Gray’s illustrative style utilises bold ink outlines, watercolour washes and solid blocks of colour.

The front cover illustration of Agnes Owen’s A Working Mother (1994) with black line work and solid acrylic colour washes, reflects Gray’s interest in everyday life and how alcohol smooths over the cracks. Hung beside it are two versions of working class figurative character sketches for People Like That (1996), in a similar style.

A black and white illustrated jacket design for Old Negatives (1989), Gray’s four-verse sequence describing aspects of love in its “absences and reverses”, has been designed using solid blocks of black with repeating motifs engraved within them.

Also included is a self-portrait of Gray as playwright, together with a series of 12 small black-and-white portraits of the performers of his play in Working Legs: A Play for Those Without Them (1997) performed by the Bird of Paradise Theatre Company. Set in a world of wheelchair users, those who can walk are monitored by the welfare state.

Gray was known for illustrating friends and family as revealed in his artwork Simon Berry and Bill MacLellan, Glasgow Publishers, Jim Taylor, Australian Writer and Printer, Shelley Killen, USA artist, where are all the figures of the title are roughly drawn with pencil and ink. The solid blue background is painted in acrylic, overlaid with Gray’s inked observations of each.

On the ground floor is what Gray called “my best big oil painting”, of a Cowcaddens streetscape in the 1950s which is by far the strongest piece on display here. Gray takes a wide-angled, almost fish-eye lens perspective to capture a famous Glasgow neighbourhood that was partially demolished and modernised in postwar development.

St Aloysius Church in Garnethill and Speir’s Wharf at Port Dundas can still be clearly seen, connecting us to the Glasgow of the present day. Gray’s narrative-driven imagery of daily life plays out, with local characters, playing children and besuited pals going out for the evening, all framed by street lamps and tenements immersed in a dark foreboding industrialised landscape.

Gray’s illustrations and artworks resonate not only with a celebration of Glasgow’s places, characters and life, they also give us insights into the intensely personal psyche of a creative genius. It’s a shame that more of this particular bequest could not have been displayed, but an opportunity to see these previously unseen works is most welcome.

Alasdair Gray: Works from the Morag McAlpine Bequest will be on show at the Fragile Gallery, Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum, Glasgow until June 2026

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

Blane Savage does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist – https://theconversation.com/alasdair-gray-unseen-artworks-offer-insight-into-a-profoundly-creative-and-original-artist-259470

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to observational study linking nitrate in drinking water to pre-term birth rates

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

June 25, 2025

A observational study published in PLOS Water looks at the link between nitrate in drinking water and premature births.

Prof Oliver Jones, Professor of Chemistry, RMIT University, said:

“The headline on this research may sound scary; however, to my mind, there are several issues with this paper.

“Firstly, the data are from 1970-1988 and so are not current. Secondly, the author did not perform any measurements themselves but instead used public health data and water quality data. The water quality data was self-reported and so may not be accurate, and it only comes from one place in the USA, so it does not reflect conditions elsewhere.

“This data was used to show a very weak possible association between estimated early prenatal nitrate exposure and birth outcomes. An association between two factors does not mean one causes the other. The apparent relationship can be due to a range of different factors that have nothing to do with the two variables being considered. I am inclined to think that this is the case here because there is a large overlap in the data and because the effect disappears above 10 mg/L, which does not make sense from a toxicological point of view. Other factors that may affect health, such as the mother’s health or diet, were not available, so could not be taken into account. This is quite important in this case since at concentrations of less than 10 mg/L, the main source of nitrate is actually food, not water. It is thus possible that the results reflect diet, not nitrate.

“Arguing that a policy change is needed on a very well-studied compound based on a single paper that at best only found a weak statistical association from 40-year old data from one part of the USA and which shows no increased risk at the higher exposure concentrations, is, in my view, possibly a little overzealous.”

‘Early prenatal nitrate exposure and birth outcomes: A study of Iowa’s public drinking water (1970-1988) by Semprini was published in PLOS Water at 19:00 UK time on Wednesday 25^th June.

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pwat.0000329

Declared Interests

Prof Oliver Jones “I am a Professor of Chemistry at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. I have no direct conflicts of interest to declare; however, I have received research funding from the Water Industry and EPA Victoria for research on environmental pollution in the past.”

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: MINEX Central Asia 2025 forum held in Tashkent

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Tashkent, June 25 (Xinhua) — The MINEX Central Asia 2025 forum on “Enhancing the Role of Central Asia in Ensuring the Security of Critical Mineral Resources” was held in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, from June 24 to 25.

The event was initiated by the Ministry of Mining and Geology of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek Technological Metals Plant.

The forum discussed legislative reforms in the mining sector and incentives established for investors in Uzbekistan in recent years. In addition, it considered how governments and financial institutions can reduce investment risks, adapt the regulatory system to international standards, strengthen institutional capacity and increase investor confidence through open, consistent and reliable processes.

The forum participants paid special attention to issues of regional cooperation, financing of infrastructure projects and creation of added value at the local level. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK partners with Gavi to help save up to eight million lives by 2030
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

Press release

UK partners with Gavi to help save up to eight million lives by 2030

New UK support will see millions of children vaccinated against some of the world’s deadliest diseases, Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced today at Gavi’s global summit in Brussels.
The UK will support Gavi as a leading investor in the Vaccine Alliance, committing £1.25 billion to vaccinate millions of children between 2026-2030.

The commitment will help Gavi protect up to 500 million children from some of the world’s deadliest diseases like meningitis, cholera and measles.

Gavi’s global vaccination work prevents the spread of dangerous infectious diseases while boosting investment and jobs in UK science as part of the Government’s Plan for Change.

New UK support will see millions of children vaccinated against some of the world’s deadliest diseases, Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced today at Gavi’s global summit in Brussels.

The UK’s new £1.25 billion pledge to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, extends a close 25-year partnership which has helped to vaccinate over one billion children globally against diseases like meningitis, to prevent more than 18 million lives being lost, and to improve countries economic prospects. Since 2000, when the UK was a founding member, Gavi has generated $250 billion in economic benefits through reduced death and disability. Gavi now receives investment from 56 countries and over 60 organisations. 19 countries have graduated from Gavi support, including India and Indonesia who have now become donors to Gavi.

Today’s pledge will help Gavi in their mission to protect up to 500 million children between 2026-2030 and save up to eight million more lives.

It will also have a positive impact at home, creating British jobs and growth, through partnerships with health companies like GSK, which employs about 14,000 people in the UK, as the government delivers on its Plan for Change to boost economic growth.

Gavi helps strengthen the UK’s health security by preventing the spread of dangerous infectious diseases before they reach our borders. This reduces pressures on our hospitals and health workers, enabling an NHS fit for the future.

UK Foreign Secretary, David Lammy said:

Gavi’s global impact is undeniable. Over 1 billion children vaccinated, over 18 million lives saved, over $250 billion injected into the global economy.

I’m immensely proud of the role the UK has played in reaching these milestones. Our ongoing partnership with Gavi will give millions of children a better start, save lives and protect us all from the spread of deadly diseases.

GSK is a leading supplier to Gavi, providing vaccines for diseases like malaria and human papillomavirus (HPV). Their partnership supports UK research, science and innovation.

Earlier this week, Minister for Development Baroness Chapman visited GSK’s research campus in Stevenage, alongside the Gavi CEO, Dr Sania Nishtar and and GSK’s President of Global Health, Deborah Waterhouse. Together they discussed some of the world-leading research being conducted by British scientists, including on new malaria and TB vaccines.

UK Minister for Development, Jenny Chapman said:

Our modern approach to development means focussing on where we can have the biggest impact, and on areas the UK can lead. We must ensure every pound delivers for the UK taxpayer and the people we support.

Our partnership with Gavi does just that. It will save the lives of millions of children around the world, to grow up safe from deadly diseases like cholera and measles. And it will make the world and the UK healthier and safer, helping prevent future pandemics.

It is partnership based on the UK’s world-leading expertise, not just money. By rolling out vaccines developed by British scientists, Gavi puts our best brains and their innovations on the world stage, and supports UK jobs and growth.

CEO of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Dr Sania Nishtar said:

The United Kingdom is one of Gavi’s longest and most committed partners. This pledge for our next strategic period reaffirms its status as a leader in global health and I am delighted that we will be able to count on its support in our next strategic period, working together and leveraging some of the best in British science and innovation as we save lives and fight outbreaks around the world.

President Global Health at GSK, Deborah Waterhouse said:

The UK’s world-class infectious disease research continues to inform our work at GSK and combined with our scientific expertise, is enabling GSK to advance malaria prevention and control, directly impacting global health agendas and access strategies.

As a longstanding partner of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance – an organisation that plays a vital role in delivering vaccines to children in lower-income countries – we welcome the UK Government’s new pledge to Gavi, to help save up to eight million lives by 2030 and get ahead of disease together.

Media enquiries

Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

Telephone 020 7008 3100

Email the FCDO Newsdesk (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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Published 25 June 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Governor Stein Celebrates Exceptional North Carolinians at Long Leaf Pine Presentation
Source: US State of North Carolina

Headline: Governor Stein Celebrates Exceptional North Carolinians at Long Leaf Pine Presentation

Governor Stein Celebrates Exceptional North Carolinians at Long Leaf Pine Presentation
lsaito
Wed, 06/25/2025 – 14:09

Raleigh, NC
Today, Governor Josh Stein inducted nine North Carolinians into the Order of the Long Leaf Pine for their contributions to our state.

“I am proud to honor this group of outstanding North Carolinians who have made important contributions to our state and its people,” said Governor Stein. “They exemplify the best of North Carolina through their storied careers in government, education, and advocacy.”

The Order of the Long Leaf Pine honorees are as follows:
- Bobby Kimbrough – Forsyth County Sheriff
- Maggie Kane – Founder and Executive Director, A Place at the Table
- Karen Amspacher – Director, Core Sound Waterfowl Museum and Heritage Center
- Dr. Otis Smallwood – Superintendent of Bertie County Schools
- Reuben Blackwell – Former CEO of Opportunities Industrialization Center of Rocky Mount
- Rev. Pauli Murray – Civil rights activist and author (Posthumous)
- Ricky Hurtado – Chair of the Governor’s Advisory Council on Hispanic/Latino Affairs and former North Carolina Representative
- Chavi Koneru – Co-founder and Executive Director of North Carolina Asian Americans Together
- Phil Ford, Jr. — Former UNC basketball player, NBA player, and UNC assistant coach
Jun 25, 2025

MIL OSI USA News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: CADDXFPV: The Innovation Leader in FPV Drone Technology

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Shenzhen, China, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In the fast-evolving landscape of technology, where drone innovators shine like stars, CADDXFPV stands out as a heavyweight in first-person view (FPV) drone technology and video transmission systems. Founded on August 7, 2017, in Longgang, Shenzhen, this Chinese tech firm has anchored itself in the FPV domain since day one, embarking on a passionate journey of technological deep-diving.

Encouraging Development in FPV Ecosystem Expansion

With technology as its anchor, CADDXFPV has built a global R&D network spanning Shenzhen, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Eighty percent of its 100+ R&D team hail from top universities like Harbin Institute of Technology and Fudan University, infusing academic wisdom into product DNA and making technological breakthroughs the norm:

2018: Partner of Drone Racing Association, stepping onto the international stage.

2019: Co-launched the Vista system with DJI, gaining global recognition through technical prowess.

2020: Entered the lightweight market with nano-sized FPV cameras, filling a niche gap.

2021–2023: Released the Polar night-vision camera, and joined industry associations—advancing technology and ecosystem development in parallel.

2024: Partner of FAI World Drone Racing Championship , and participation in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area “Fly Valley” initiative—deepening its reach from hardware to ecosystem.

Notably, CADDXFPV has invested six consecutive years (2019–2024) in global racing events. This isn’t just a brand-building move; it’s a way to refine technology in extreme scenarios, keeping products at the forefront in core metrics like “racing-level stability” and “low latency.”

Today, CADDXFPV products reach over 100 countries, supported by a network of 400+ dealers and used by 500,000 users worldwide, all witnessing technological iterations firsthand.

Full Industrial Chain Technology Matrix

Unlike single-product players, CADDXFPV has constructed a full industrial chain matrix of “digital video transmission systems – intelligent imaging – complete drone solutions,” leveraging technical synergy to serve diverse scenarios from racing to aerial photography and industrial inspection.

1. FPV Digital Transmission Systems: Redefining “HD & Low Latency”

CADDX Vista: A benchmark collaboration with DJI, achieving triple breakthroughs in “low latency + HD transmission + ecosystem compatibility “—crafting a “plug-and-play” experience for entry-level pilots.

Walksnail Avatar: An in-house “industry disruptor” with 1080P/60FPS resolution, 10–50 km transmission range, and cutting-edge tech like HD video transmission SOC chips, low-latency coding algorithms, and multi-sensor fusion navigation—rewriting industry transmission standards.

Walksnail’s air units offer series like 1S, V2, V3, HD PRO, Moonlight, and GT, covering all scenarios from indoor flying to racing freestyle, night vision, and long-range voyages. Their ultimate video transmission efficiency and HD quality have propelled users from the “analog flight” era to “digital HD.”

2. Walksnail Ground Units: Crafting “Immersive Flight Terminals”

Goggles L: A budget-friendly breakthrough with “high cost-performance + strong interactivity”—4.5-inch LCD for clarity, head tracking enabling “look-to-zoom,” directional antennas for signal optimization, and multi-device compatibility, elevating “economy goggles” to flagship experience.

Goggles X: featuring OLED screens for 1080P/100fps output, HDMI/AV ports, diopter adjustment, and modular design—leaving room for tech upgrades and evolving users from “product buyers” to “ecosystem players.”

Walksnail VRX: It is compatible with analog goggles and provides real – time signals for converting from analog to digital HD..

3. FPV Intelligent Imaging: All-Scenario Image “Enhancers”

Tailored for diverse environments, CADDXFPV’s imaging matrix covers “dim light – no light – full color”:

Ratel Camera: The go-to for night and low-light scenarios, with blacklight sensor + WDR tech, capturing clear details in pitch darkness.

Infra Series: Designed for security and industrial monitoring, using AI image enhancement boxes to break through “total darkness”—applying FPV tech to professional inspection.

Ant Camera: The “eyes” of racing pilots, with 1/3 inch CMOS + 165° FOV, balancing clarity and wide view for extreme maneuvers.

Gazer Camera: Full-color night vision + 3x zoom, with AI enhancement for day details and night clarity.

Farsight Camera: Merging optics, digital tech, and AI algorithms for 8x intelligent zoom—upgrading FPV shooting from “recording” to “creation.”

4. FPV Drone: Gofilm 20—The “Night Eye” for Aerial Photographers

A flagship for low-light aerial photography: 4K starlight camera + 4K DVR, enabling 4K/60FPS recording; 5mg dynamic balance precision + intelligent hovering + vibration isolation tech eliminate “shaky focus” and “frame cropping,” delivering cinematic shots even in dim light.

Committed to In-House R&D, Constantly Disrupting

In R&D, over 110 patents stand as testimony—from transmission algorithms to image enhancement, flight control logic to hardware design, CADDXFPV continues to fill FPV technology gaps, making “Chinese R&D” a benchmark for industry innovation.

In the market, the global FPV sector’s $450 million scale in 2023 and projected $1.206 billion by 2030 validates its potential. Against giants like DJI, CADDXFPV charts a differentiated path: full industrial chain layout for technical synergy, deep engagement in events to hone extreme-scenario performance, and niche-scenario focus to fill multiple gaps.

Today, it’s no longer just a “product manufacturer” but a “tech ecosystem builder,” pioneering new frontiers in the FPV blue ocean. With the “Fly Valley” initiative and innovation park on the horizon, CADDXFPV will continue driving forward with “tech innovation + ecosystem collaboration,” upgrading global users’ experience from “flight” to “creation”—transforming FPV from a sport into an “aerial perspective” lifestyle.

The MIL Network –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: American Rebel Light Beer Recaps Successful Title Sponsorship of American Rebel Light Virginia NHRA Nationals
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

American Rebel Light and NHRA Exceed Expectations with Brand Building and Product Penetration as American Rebel Light Outsells Top 2 National Brands Combined

NASHVILLE, TN, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) (“American Rebel” or the “Company”), creator of American Rebel Beer (americanrebelbeer.com) and a designer, manufacturer, and marketer of branded safes, personal security and self-defense products and apparel, reports that the American Rebel Light Beer title sponsorship of the American Rebel Light Virginia NHRA Nationals June 20 – 22 at Virginia Motorsports Park in Richmond, VA exceeded expectations. American Rebel Light was available at all concession locations selling beer at Virginia Motorsports Park as well as in the American Rebel Light Party Tent and the American Rebel Light Trackside Bar. CEO Andy Ross performed two concerts during the race weekend and the Sunday concert was covered on the FOX broadcast. The American Rebel Light Virginia NHRA Nationals Finals were broadcast on the FOX broadcast network on Sunday, June 22, and re-aired Monday, June 23 and Wednesday, June 25. Additional re-airings of the American Rebel Light Virginia NHRA Nationals are scheduled for Thursday, June 26 from 9 – 11 pm Eastern on FS2 and Friday, June 27 from 3 – 5 am Eastern on FS1. Viewership of the American Rebel Light Virginia NHRA Nationals is expected to approach two million.

American Rebel Light Beer outsold the top 2 national brands during the race weekend at Virginia Motorsports Park, benefiting from the trackside signage and brand integrations throughout the track. The American Rebel Party Tent was a huge success as race fans escaped from the heat to enjoy a cold Rebel Light. The FOX broadcast announcers and the track PA announcers made frequent references to American Rebel Light and the NHRA drivers were very complimentary of the American Rebel Light title sponsorship during their on-camera interviews and the drivers and crew spotlighted American Rebel Light beer in victory lane celebrations.

“The NHRA does it right,” said American Rebel CEO Andy Ross. “Everyone is very appreciative of our involvement as title sponsor and everyone from the drivers, their teams and the track express their thanks to American Rebel Light and make sure they have our beer visible and they all are brand ambassadors for us. Everyone knows the sponsor needs to get value for their investment, and they deliver. The buzz at the track and the FOX nationwide broadcasts generate significant interest from potential distributors, bar owners, alcohol buyers for retail and convenience chains and the end customer walking into their local stores and asking for American Rebel Light by name.”

“The success of this weekend will continue after we leave town,” said American Rebel Beverage President Todd Porter. “Our neon signs and product integration will stay in place and we’ll continue to benefit from this weekend the rest of this racing season and beyond. We were the title sponsor for the American Rebel Light NHRA 4-Wide Nationals at the Charlotte Motor Speedway in late April and they are still selling our beer very well, one of their top sellers.”

Race fans aged 21 and older had the chance to enjoy American Rebel Light – America’s Patriotic, God Fearing, Constitution Loving, National Anthem Singing, Stand Your Ground Beer at the track concession stands that sold beer. The American Rebel Light Virginia NHRA Nationals introduced American Rebel Light to the state of Virginia and laid a foundation for the expansion of distribution throughout the state.

American Rebel Light Beer debuted their new television commercial during the FOX Qualifying and Finals broadcasts, airing eight times over the weekend.

“The support from FOX and the NHRA has been great,” said Andy Ross. “When I watched the re-air of the Finals, I was blown away that the band and I got some coverage. We get lots of compliments from the NHRA and the drivers and their teams for providing entertainment during some of the breaks. It’s really an honor to play for race fans. They are the perfect demographic for the American Rebel brand.”

About American Rebel Light Beer

American Rebel Light is more than just a beer – it’s a celebration of freedom, passion, and quality. Brewed with care and precision, our light beer delivers a refreshing taste that’s perfect for every occasion.

Since its launch in September 2024, American Rebel Light Beer has rolled out in Tennessee, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Iowa, Missouri, North Carolina, Florida, Indiana and now Virginia and is adding new distributors and territories regularly. For more information about the launch events and the availability of American Rebel Beer, please visit americanrebelbeer.com or follow us on our social media platforms (@americanrebelbeer).

American Rebel Light is a Premium Domestic Light Lager Beer – All Natural, Crisp, Clean and Bold Taste with a Lighter Feel. With approximately 100 calories, 3.2 carbohydrates, and 4.3% alcoholic content per 12 oz serving, American Rebel Light Beer delivers a lighter option for those who love great beer but prefer a more balanced lifestyle. It’s all natural with no added supplements and importantly does not use corn, rice, or other sweeteners typically found in mass produced beers.

For more information about American Rebel Light Beer follow us on social media @AmericanRebelBeer.

For more information, visit americanrebelbeer.com.

About American Rebel Holdings, Inc.

American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) has operated primarily as a designer, manufacturer and marketer of branded safes and personal security and self-defense products and has recently transitioned into the beverage industry through the introduction of American Rebel Light Beer. The Company also designs and produces branded apparel and accessories. To learn more, visit americanrebelbeer.com. For investor information, visit americanrebel.com/investor-relations.

Watch the American Rebel Story as told by our CEO Andy Ross visit The American Rebel Story

Media Inquiries:
Matt Sheldon
Matt@Precisionpr.co
917-280-7329

American Rebel Holdings, Inc.
info@americanrebel.com
ir@americanrebel.com

American Rebel Beverages, LLC
Todd Porter, President
tporter@americanrebelbeer.com

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. American Rebel Holdings, Inc., (NASDAQ: AREB; AREBW) (the “Company,” “American Rebel,” “we,” “our” or “us”) desires to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and is including this cautionary statement in connection with this safe harbor legislation. The words “forecasts” “believe,” “may,” “estimate,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “should,” “plan,” “could,” “target,” “potential,” “is likely,” “expect” and similar expressions, as they relate to us, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. We have based these forward-looking statements primarily on our current expectations and projections about future events and financial trends that we believe may affect our financial condition, results of operations, business strategy, and financial needs. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ from those in the forward-looking statements include benefits of our continued sponsorship of high profile events, success and availability of the promotional activities, our ability to effectively execute our business plan, and the Risk Factors contained within our filings with the SEC, including our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024 and our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2025. Any forward-looking statement made by us herein speaks only as of the date on which it is made. Factors or events that could cause our actual results to differ may emerge from time to time, and it is not possible for us to predict all of them. We undertake no obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future developments or otherwise, except as may be required by law.

Attachment
- American Rebel Holdings Inc
The MIL Network –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Moving Notting Hill Carnival to Hyde Park would wrench it from the community and history at its heart

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Maggie Inchley, Reader in Contemporary Theatre and Performance, Queen Mary University of London

Shutterstock/JessicaGirvan

Today’s Notting Hill Carnival, first held in its streets in 1966 when it was led by a Trinidadian steel band, is a glorious cultural blend. It’s a hotch-potch of traditions, music, dancing and food which commemorates the history of black British communities and integrates others.

But the future of Notting Hill Carnival is now in doubt amid concerns that the event doesn’t have the funding to ensure the safety of attendees.

One touted solution is to move the carnival to another location. Writing in the Guardian last year, retired black Met superintendent Leroy Logan recommended a more open space, such as Hyde Park. Policing would be far easier there, with walled boundaries removing escape routes for potential “trouble makers”.

But holding the carnival in Hyde Park could alter the way that the carnival is enjoyed in ways that would be fundamental to the community it comes from.

My research in creative performance with communities explores the joy that comes from participating in events and activities that celebrate our collective strengths and differences. I look at the important issues of lived experiences and cultural heritage in events like Carnival.

This article is part of our State of the Arts series. These articles tackle the challenges of the arts and heritage industry – and celebrate the wins, too.

The Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) wrote of a “carnival sense of the world”. For Bakhtin, carnival was an unleashing of energies, in which hierarchies disappeared, and people were free to mix with each other.

For his critics, the liberating energy that Bakhtin describes can be too easily co-opted to dominant cultures, especially where carnival can be made to serve the market’s insatiable appetite. While the democratising dynamics of carnival are valuable, it is also important to consider the particular histories and places in which its traditions and practices have developed. Even joy is contingent on place and context.

The Notting Hill Carnival is currently free to over 1.5 million visitors. Controlling access would severely contract its size and almost certainly lead to commercial exploitation, reducing its renowned inclusivity.

What’s more, the right to be publicly seen and heard carries intense symbolic significance for the Caribbean community. This is profoundly important in the wake of the 2018 Windrush scandal, in which the government tried to remove many black citizens who had lawfully lived and worked in Britain for decades under the terms of the British Nationality act of 1948.

Read more:
Unravelling the Windrush myth: the confidential government communications that reveal authorities did not want Caribbean migrants to come to Britain

Many of this Windrush generation, a large number of whom lived in Notting Hill and north Kensington, made a huge contribution to the rebuilding of the British economy, having been invited to the country in the wake of the second world war. In their daily lives however, they suffered racism and harassment which undermined the right they had to make their homes as British citizens.

The history of the carnival

It is important to recognise that the sights and sounds of the Notting Hill Carnival are tied to the history of black people’s displacement and exploitation by white enslavers and colonialists. An exuberant street presence is a culturally distinctive statement of resistance and heritage.

Author Dan Hancox has written about the fact that enslaved people in the Caribbean were not permitted to take part in the European colonialists’ Mardis Gras balls.

Crowds at the Notting Hill Carnival.
Shutterstock/Turgut Cetinkaya

In 18th century Trinidad, a ritual called Cannes Brulees (sugarcane burning), in which sticks were used to perform the rhythms of African drumming, reconnected these transplanted peoples with their places of origin, and sounded an act of resistance.

Liberation is still enacted today in the right to make music and dance through the streets. Interviewed by Hancox in 2023, CEO of the Notting Hill Carnival Trust, Matthew Philip, pointed to the significance of the newly emancipated black presence in Trinidad’s streets, from which they had been banned by their colonial masters, and their joyful mockery of the white governing class.

Any considerations of safety at the Notting Hill Carnival must also consider how – despite this exuberantly joyful community celebration of black diasporic culture – the event has been commonly portrayed as a flash-point of racial tensions.

Social geographer Peter Jackson has pointed to the racialised media representation of “black youth” after unrest in 1976, during which carnival goers clashed violently with a heavy police presence.

Steve McQueen’s 2020 drama Mangrove portrayed the tensions with the police in the 1970s. In a notable scene outside Trinidadian immigrant Frank Crichlow’s restaurant, the film captured the combination of resistance and joy expressed in West Indian music and dancing. Crichlow was part of the Mangrove Nine, the group of black activists who were tried in 1971 at the Old Bailey for inciting a riot, after repeated police raids on Crichlow’s restaurant.

The trailer for Mangrove.

The group’s acquittal was an important milestone in the history of the rights of black people to live and work without harassment in the London area they were trying to make their home under difficult conditions.

When West Indian migrants came to Notting Hill they were housed in slum conditions. They were charged extortionate rents, often in dilapidated properties once built for the wealthy. Having lived through this and built a thriving community, black residents have in recent decades been forced to move out following the area’s “regentrification”. The trend again points to the displacement of black and working class populations, this time at the housing market’s convenience.

To relocate the carnival from the streets of Notting Hill would risk continuing these histories of displacement of black communities, and ignore the huge symbolic significance of street celebration to black people in Britain and beyond.

Unquestionably, the government must act in the interest of public safety. As it considers the best ways to protect attendees, it will no doubt also assess the carnival’s considerable social and economic benefits

To guarantee these, officials must work with communities whose heritage and citizenship is bound up with the carnival. They need to balance issues of safety with those of access and heritage, and with the need to express a joy that emerges not entirely spontaneously, but from long and complex histories of displacement, relocation and resistance.

Maggie Inchley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Moving Notting Hill Carnival to Hyde Park would wrench it from the community and history at its heart – https://theconversation.com/moving-notting-hill-carnival-to-hyde-park-would-wrench-it-from-the-community-and-history-at-its-heart-259587

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to false claims regarding Taiwan in joint statement between Central Asian nations and China
Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFA response to false claims regarding Taiwan in joint statement between Central Asian nations and China
- Date：2025-06-19
- Data Source：Department of West Asian and African Affairs
June 19, 2025

Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan from June 16 to 18 at the second China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. Following the summit, these nations and China jointly issued the Astana Declaration, which contains the spurious claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs solemnly refutes this statement and sternly protests against the Chinese communist regime for its repeated use of meetings with other nations’ leaders to publicly undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty as well as central Asian nations for uncritically accepting China’s statements that run contrary to the facts in downgrading Taiwan’s sovereignty.

MOFA reiterates that neither the Republic of China (Taiwan) nor the People’s Republic of China is subordinate to the other, that the Chinese communist regime has never governed Taiwan, and that no nation has the right or power to deny Taiwan’s existence via so-called joint statements. MOFA calls on Kazakhstan and other central Asian nations not to support false statements and endorse China’s aggressive intentions to disrupt regional peace and stability.

Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to its people, and it is the people of Taiwan who will determine Taiwan’s future. Moreover, peace, stability, and prosperity must be jointly upheld by all nations of the world. Taiwan is a force for good in the international community and will continue to staunchly defend the values of freedom and democracy as it strengthens collaboration with democratic nations to halt authoritarian expansionism, defend cross-strait peace and security, and maintain a free and stable Indo-Pacific region.

MIL OSI China News –
June 26, 2025
PM Modi chairs 48th PRAGATI meeting; urges health infra push in remote areas, stresses self-reliance in defence

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Wednesday chaired the 48th edition of PRAGATI — the Centre’s multi-level, ICT-enabled platform aimed at ensuring proactive governance and timely implementation of key schemes and projects.

During the session, the Prime Minister reviewed critical infrastructure projects across the Mines, Railways, and Water Resources sectors. These projects were examined with a focus on timelines, coordination among agencies, and resolution of pending issues.

The PM stressed that delays in project execution result in escalating costs and deprive citizens of timely access to services and infrastructure. He urged officials across ministries and state governments to adopt a result-oriented approach, calling for stronger inter-agency coordination and time-bound delivery.

The PM reiterated the importance of equitable access to healthcare for marginalised and underserved populations, describing PM-ABHIM as a key opportunity for states to strengthen health infrastructure at the block, district, and state levels. “This is a golden opportunity to bridge the gaps in primary, tertiary, and specialised health services,” the PM said.

PM Modi also reviewed efforts made by ministries and states in promoting self-reliance in the defence sector. He praised initiatives that foster indigenous manufacturing and innovation, citing the recent Operation Sindoor — carried out using homegrown capabilities — as an example of the strides being made in the sector.

The Prime Minister urged states to tap into the growing ecosystem by supporting local innovation and contributing to the broader push for self-reliance in defence.

Launched in 2015, PRAGATI (Pro-Active Governance and Timely Implementation) is a platform through which the Prime Minister directly engages with top officials of central and state governments to review key projects and address bottlenecks in real time.

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: The Competition Bureau wants more airline competition, but it won’t solve Canada’s aviation challenges

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Geraint Harvey, DANCAP Private Equity Chair in Human Organization, Western University

A recent market study by the Competition Bureau is calling for more airline competition in Canada’s airline industry to reduce fares, increase service quality and provide better services to remote communities.

The study reiterates that Canada’s domestic air travel market is largely dominated by just two carriers, Air Canada and WestJet. Together, they account for between 56 per cent to 78 per cent of all domestic passenger traffic. This concentration limits passenger choice, and many Canadians feel airfares are high and quality of service is low as a consequence.

Increased competition has lowered air fares elsewhere, like in Europe, for example, where low-fares airlines dominate the continental market. However, there have been negative outcomes for consumers.

While the bureau positions competition as the solution to the many issues plaguing the industry, it overlooks how an increase in competition can fall short, particularly when it comes to transparency, service quality, labour conditions and regional connectivity.

Cost transparency not likely to improve

One of the Competition Bureau’s key criticisms of Canada’s airline industry is the lack of cost transparency when booking flights. Hidden fees and complex fare structures make it difficult for travellers to effectively make comparisons among airlines.

But it’s unreasonable to expect increased competition — when airlines seek to make their offering more attractive than their competitors — to lead to greater transparency in Canada. In fact, competition has been linked theoretically and empirically to dishonest practices.

Europe provides a cautionary example. Increased competition has not led to greater air fare transparency in Europe. Airlines like Ryanair, a low-fare airline and the continent’s largest airline by passengers carried, have been accused of hiding fees for passengers.

Service quality and workers

The bureau’s study also found that many Canadians are dissatisfied with the quality of service offered by domestic airlines. Yet increased competition is unlikely to raise service standards. As airlines compete to offer the lowest fares, they often look to reduce operating costs, typically at the expense of service quality.

Those who suffer the most from airlines minimizing costs are employees, since labour represents one of the few areas where airlines can cut back.

The morality and safety implications of introducing wage and employment insecurity to workers within high reliability organizations aside, reducing the quality of employment terms and conditions for workers in such an important industry is short-sighted.

Claims of a pilot shortage are contested, and making employment in Canadian aviation less attractive for a highly skilled and crucial occupational group like pilots is a strategic faux pas that could have long-term consequences for the industry’s stability.

Read more:
Potential Air Canada pilot strike: Key FAQs and why the anger at pilots is misplaced

Remote communities left behind

Canada’s unique geography means that many remote regions rely on airlines for goods and transport. Yet these areas are not effectively served by the commercial aviation industry. The bureau suggests greater competition could help, but that claim is questionable.

The reason existing airlines are not providing a greater number of flights between remote communities and larger airports is because these routes aren’t profitable. Rather than expanding service, a more competitive market could shrink route availability because airlines could abandon less profitable routes or refuse to compete on routes where a market leader emerges.

To its credit, the bureau offers several recommendations for northern and remote communities. But these communities are unlikely to benefit from competition alone. In fact, increased competition would likely mean airlines will focus on profitable routes and remove those that don’t yield high profits.

Europe’s airline industry is once again instructive. Eurocontrol, a pan-European organization dedicated to the success of commercial aviation in Europe, states that “domestic aviation in Europe has experienced a substantial and persistent decline over the past two decades,” including the demise of regional operators serving lower-density routes.

Where routes have been maintained — in Norway, for example — it’s as a consequence of public service obligations that guarantee essential routes are maintained through government support.

It’s because of public service obligations, not competition, that the Canadian government can serve remote communities. Without such safeguards, increased competition has the potential to do more harm than good.

Risks of relaxing foreign ownership

The bureau also recommended relaxing rules around foreign ownership within the Canadian airline industry so that a wholly foreign owned airline can compete domestically.

But not all airlines are equal. Some, like Qatar Airways, are backed by the government of their home state. Qatar Airways has purchased stakes in airlines in Asia Pacific and Africa.

Competition with airlines such as Qatar Airways is inherently unfair because of the huge financial support it receives. Allowing such state-backed carriers into the Canadian market could place domestic airlines at a significant competitive disadvantage. This could not only weaken Canadian airlines, but also be detrimental to the Canadian economy if domestic carriers are pushed out.

Competition may reduce fares, but it always comes at a cost. Canadians must be certain that lower fares are worth the cost.

Geraint Harvey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The Competition Bureau wants more airline competition, but it won’t solve Canada’s aviation challenges – https://theconversation.com/the-competition-bureau-wants-more-airline-competition-but-it-wont-solve-canadas-aviation-challenges-259498

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025