to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Adam Bielan, Charlie Weimers, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Michał Dworczyk, Carlo Fidanza, Alexandr Vondra, Alberico Gambino, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Assita Kanko, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group
B10‑0138/2024
European Parliament resolution on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan
(2024/2891(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous reports, recommendations and resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,
– having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan, passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,
– having regard to the motion of 12 September 2024 passed in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on UN resolution 2758,
– having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 14 October on China’s latest military drills around Taiwan,
– having regard to the UN Charter,
– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas, in the 1970s, in the hope of enhancing prosperity, stability and peace, the PRC was offered a place in the UN; whereas Beijing seized this opportunity, benefiting from close ties with the West, joining the World Trade Organization, enjoying freedom of navigation and experiencing stabilisation in the seas and straits of South-East Asia, all of which opened the door to the country’s unprecedented economic and technological development;
B. whereas, in recent years, through its actions – such as supporting Russia’s barbaric aggression and assertively expanding in the region, particularly with the threat of invading Taiwan – Beijing is failing to uphold the commitments expected of UN Security Council members and the commitments enshrined in the UN Charter; whereas UN resolution 2758 does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and does not determine the future status of Taiwan in the United Nations, nor of Taiwanese participation in UN agencies or international organisations;
C. whereas the PRC has falsely leveraged some interpretations of UN Resolution 2758 to advance its ‘One China’ narrative globally and put pressure on Taiwan, limiting its voice on the international stage and influencing its diplomatic relationships;
D. whereas the Australian and Dutch Parliaments have already decided not to go along with the PRC’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758;
E. whereas the PRC is perpetuating its overly aggressive actions, and trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;
F. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched, without prior warning, a large-scale military drill named Joint Sword 2024-B that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployed 153 aircraft and 36 naval and coastguard ships around Taiwan, setting single-day records;
G. whereas the PLA’s air manoeuvres have increased from under 20 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2019 to 2 459 so far in 2024; whereas the threat is exacerbated by Beijing’s announcement that it was practising for a blockade of Taiwan’s key ports and military bases; whereas the PLA’s primary locus for ADIZ operations has shifted over time from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait; whereas the PLA’s flight activity to the east of Taiwan has increased, demonstrating a shift from training and navigation operations to testing likely combat concepts in the event of a blockade or military invasion of Taiwan;
H. whereas, besides military pressure, the PRC has for years pursued a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks, with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;
I. whereas the PRC under the leadership of Xi Jinping has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;
J. whereas on 25 September 2024 the PRC fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980;
K. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;
L. whereas Beijing’s active support of the Russian Federation’s aggressive actions against Ukraine contradicts the PRC’s claim to be a ‘stabilising power’; whereas the Russian war of aggression is being closely watched by the PRC as a test bed for the possible future invasion of Taiwan and to gauge the likely reaction of the international community;
M. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
N. whereas the PRC is a one-party state controlled and ruled entirely by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); whereas the CCP has used its growing influence in international organisations to reshape the open, rules-based international order to protect and advance its own interests;
O. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from the PRC, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas the EU remains the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan; whereas there is considerable potential for increasing Taiwan’s FDI in the EU; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;
1. Reiterates that Taiwan is an important EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region;
2. Condemns the sustained efforts made by representatives of the PRC to distort the meaning of UN resolution 2758, historical documents and international rules;
3. Remains deeply committed to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy, which does not equate with the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle’;
4. Stresses that nothing in resolution 2758 prevents Taiwan’s participation in international organisations and that it has no bearing on the sovereign choices of other countries with respect to their relationship with Taiwan;
5. Regrets the PRC’s efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation, in line with the key UN principles of universal representation, in relevant international organisations such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to better protect global interests and address the serious challenges facing humanity, such as pandemics, climate change and human rights;
6. Strongly condemns the PRC’s provocative, irresponsible, disproportionate and destabilising military exercises, including the recent exercises of 14 October, as well as its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its aggressive posture in the wider region; expresses its concern about the PRC’s recent launch of an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean, which has contributed to further tensions across the Indo-Pacific region;
7. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;
8. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;
9. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan;
10. Urges the PRC to immediately cease all actions and intrusions into the Taiwanese ADIZ and the airspace violations above Taiwan’s outer islands, and to restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line, all of which also poses a risk to international aviation, and stop all other grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns;
11. Recalls that maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is a core interest for the free world, including the EU and its Member States; stresses that a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not only cause significant economic disruption affecting European interests and prosperity, but would also seriously undermine the rules-based order in the region, as well as democratic governance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law at its core;
12. Recalls Taiwan’s help and assistance during both the COVID-19 pandemic and the humanitarian crises caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;
13. Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight;
14. Reiterates its call for the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs to change the name of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to ‘European Union Office in Taiwan’ to reflect the broad scope of our ties;
15. Reiterates its previous call for the Commission to launch, without delay, an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations on deepening bilateral economic ties;
16. Recommends further deepening cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; condemns any form of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, with regard to the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of the PRC and Taiwan.
