Category: Aviation

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: 2026 FIFA World Cup expansion will have a big climate footprint, with matches from Mexico to Canada – here’s what fans can do

    Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Brian P. McCullough, Associate Professor of Sport Management, University of Michigan

    Lionel Messi celebrates with fans after Argentina won the FIFA World Cup championship in 2022 in Qatar. Michael Regan-FIFA/FIFA via Getty Images

    When the FIFA World Cup hits North America in June 2026, 48 teams and millions of sports fans will be traveling among venues spread across Canada, the United States and Mexico.

    It’s a dramatic expansion – 16 more teams will be playing than in recent years, with a jump from 64 to 104 matches. The tournament, whether you call it soccer or football, is projected to bring in over US$10 billion in revenue. But the expansion will also mean a lot more travel and other activities that contribute to climate change.

    The environmental impacts of giant sporting events like the World Cup create a complex paradox for an industry grappling with its future in a warming world.

    A sustainability conundrum

    Sports are undeniably experiencing the effects of climate change. Rising global temperatures are putting athletes’ health at risk during summer heat waves and shortening winter sports seasons. Many of the 2026 World Cup venues often see heat waves in June and early July, when the tournament is scheduled.

    There is a divide over how sports should respond.

    Some athletes are speaking out for more sustainable choices and have called on lawmakers to take steps to limit climate-warming emissions. At the same time, the sport industry is growing and facing a constant push to increase revenue. The NCAA is also considering expanding its March Madness basketball tournaments from 68 teams currently to as many as 76.

    Park Yong-woo of team Al Ain from Abu Dhabi tries to cool off during a Club World Cup match on June 26, 2025, in Washington, D.C., which was in the midst of a heat wave. Some players have raised concerns about likely high temperatures during the 2026 World Cup, with matches scheduled June 11 to July 19.
    AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson

    Estimates for the 2026 World Cup show what large tournament expansions can mean for the climate. A report from Scientists for Global Responsibility estimates that the expanded World Cup could generate over 9 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, nearly double the average of the past four World Cups.

    This massive increase – and the increase that would come if the NCAA basketball tournaments also expand – would primarily be driven by air travel as fans and players fly among event cities that are thousands of miles apart.

    A lot of money is at stake, but so is the climate

    Sports are big business, and adding more matches to events like the World Cup and NCAA tournaments will likely lead to larger media rights contracts and greater gate receipts from more fans attending the events, boosting revenues. These are powerful financial incentives.

    In the NCAA’s case, there is another reason to consider a larger tournament: The House v. NCAA settlement opened the door for college athletic departments to share revenue with athletes, which will significantly increase costs for many college programs. More teams would mean more television revenue and, crucially, more revenue to be distributed to member NCAA institutions and their athletic conferences.

    When climate promises become greenwashing

    The inherent conflict between maximizing profit through growth and minimizing environmental footprint presents a dilemma for sports.

    Several sport organizations have promised to reduce their impact on the climate, including signing up for initiatives like the United Nations Sports for Climate Action Framework.

    However, as sports tournaments and exhibition games expand, it can become increasingly hard for sports organizations to meet their climate commitments. In some cases, groups making sustainability commitments have been accused of greenwashing, suggesting the goals are more about public relations than making genuine, measurable changes.

    For example, FIFA’s early claims that it would hold a “fully carbon-neutral” World Cup in Qatar in 2022 were challenged by a group of European countries that accused soccer’s world governing body of underestimating emissions. The Swiss Fairness Commission, which monitors fairness in advertising, considered the complaints and determined that FIFA’s claims could not be substantiated.

    Alessandro Bastoni, of Inter Milan and Italy’s national team, prepares to board a flight from Milan to Rome with his team.
    Mattia Ozbot-Inter/Inter via Getty Images

    Aviation is often the biggest driver of emissions. A study that colleagues and I conducted on the NCAA men’s basketball tournament found about 80% of its emissions were connected to travel. And that was after the NCAA began using the pod system, which is designed to keep teams closer to home for the first and second rounds.

    Finding practical solutions

    Some academics, observing the rising emissions trend, have called for radical solutions like the end of commercialized sports or drastically limiting who can attend sporting events, with a focus on fans from the region.

    These solutions are frankly not practical, in my view, nor do they align with other positive developments. The growing popularity of women’s sports shows the challenge in limiting sports events – more games expands participation but adds to the industry’s overall footprint.

    Further compounding the challenges of reducing environmental impact is the amount of fan travel, which is outside the direct control of the sports organization or event organizers.

    Many fans will follow their teams long distances, especially for mega-events like the World Cup or the NCAA tournament. During the men’s World Cup in Russia in 2018, more than 840,000 fans traveled from other countries. The top countries by number of fans, after Russia, were China, the U.S., Mexico and Argentina.

    There is an argument that distributed sporting events like March Madness or the World Cup can be better in some ways for local environments because they don’t overwhelm a single city. However, merely spreading the impact does not necessarily reduce it, particularly when considering the effects on climate change.

    How fans can cut their environmental footprint

    Sport organizations and event planners can take steps to be more sustainable and also encourage more sustainable choices among fans. Fans can reduce their environmental impact in a variety of ways. For example:

    • Avoid taking airplanes for shorter distances, such as between FIFA venues in Philadelphia, New York and Boston, and carpool or take Amtrak instead. Planes can be more efficient for long distances, but air travel is still a major contributing factor to emissions.

    • While in a host city, use mass transit or rent electric vehicles or bicycles for local travel.

    • Consider sustainable accommodations, such as short-term rentals that might have a smaller environmental footprint than a hotel. Or stay at a certified green hotel that makes an effort to be more efficient in its use of water and energy.

    • Engage in sustainable pregame and postgame activities, such as choosing local, sustainable food options, and minimize waste.

    • You can also pay to offset carbon emissions for attending different sporting events, much like concertgoers do when they attend musical festivals. While critics question offsets’ true environmental benefit, they do represent people’s growing awareness of their environmental footprint.

    Through all these options, it’s clear that sports face a significant challenge in addressing their environmental impacts and encouraging fans to be more sustainable, while simultaneously trying to meet ambitious business and environmental targets.

    In my view, a sustainable path forward will require strategic, yet genuine, commitment by the sports industry and its fans, and a willingness to prioritize long-term planetary health alongside economic gains – balancing the sport and sustainability.

    Brian P. McCullough does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. 2026 FIFA World Cup expansion will have a big climate footprint, with matches from Mexico to Canada – here’s what fans can do – https://theconversation.com/2026-fifa-world-cup-expansion-will-have-a-big-climate-footprint-with-matches-from-mexico-to-canada-heres-what-fans-can-do-259437

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: 2026 FIFA World Cup expansion will have a big climate footprint, with matches from Mexico to Canada – here’s what fans can do

    Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Brian P. McCullough, Associate Professor of Sport Management, University of Michigan

    Lionel Messi celebrates with fans after Argentina won the FIFA World Cup championship in 2022 in Qatar. Michael Regan-FIFA/FIFA via Getty Images

    When the FIFA World Cup hits North America in June 2026, 48 teams and millions of sports fans will be traveling among venues spread across Canada, the United States and Mexico.

    It’s a dramatic expansion – 16 more teams will be playing than in recent years, with a jump from 64 to 104 matches. The tournament, whether you call it soccer or football, is projected to bring in over US$10 billion in revenue. But the expansion will also mean a lot more travel and other activities that contribute to climate change.

    The environmental impacts of giant sporting events like the World Cup create a complex paradox for an industry grappling with its future in a warming world.

    A sustainability conundrum

    Sports are undeniably experiencing the effects of climate change. Rising global temperatures are putting athletes’ health at risk during summer heat waves and shortening winter sports seasons. Many of the 2026 World Cup venues often see heat waves in June and early July, when the tournament is scheduled.

    There is a divide over how sports should respond.

    Some athletes are speaking out for more sustainable choices and have called on lawmakers to take steps to limit climate-warming emissions. At the same time, the sport industry is growing and facing a constant push to increase revenue. The NCAA is also considering expanding its March Madness basketball tournaments from 68 teams currently to as many as 76.

    Park Yong-woo of team Al Ain from Abu Dhabi tries to cool off during a Club World Cup match on June 26, 2025, in Washington, D.C., which was in the midst of a heat wave. Some players have raised concerns about likely high temperatures during the 2026 World Cup, with matches scheduled June 11 to July 19.
    AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson

    Estimates for the 2026 World Cup show what large tournament expansions can mean for the climate. A report from Scientists for Global Responsibility estimates that the expanded World Cup could generate over 9 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, nearly double the average of the past four World Cups.

    This massive increase – and the increase that would come if the NCAA basketball tournaments also expand – would primarily be driven by air travel as fans and players fly among event cities that are thousands of miles apart.

    A lot of money is at stake, but so is the climate

    Sports are big business, and adding more matches to events like the World Cup and NCAA tournaments will likely lead to larger media rights contracts and greater gate receipts from more fans attending the events, boosting revenues. These are powerful financial incentives.

    In the NCAA’s case, there is another reason to consider a larger tournament: The House v. NCAA settlement opened the door for college athletic departments to share revenue with athletes, which will significantly increase costs for many college programs. More teams would mean more television revenue and, crucially, more revenue to be distributed to member NCAA institutions and their athletic conferences.

    When climate promises become greenwashing

    The inherent conflict between maximizing profit through growth and minimizing environmental footprint presents a dilemma for sports.

    Several sport organizations have promised to reduce their impact on the climate, including signing up for initiatives like the United Nations Sports for Climate Action Framework.

    However, as sports tournaments and exhibition games expand, it can become increasingly hard for sports organizations to meet their climate commitments. In some cases, groups making sustainability commitments have been accused of greenwashing, suggesting the goals are more about public relations than making genuine, measurable changes.

    For example, FIFA’s early claims that it would hold a “fully carbon-neutral” World Cup in Qatar in 2022 were challenged by a group of European countries that accused soccer’s world governing body of underestimating emissions. The Swiss Fairness Commission, which monitors fairness in advertising, considered the complaints and determined that FIFA’s claims could not be substantiated.

    Alessandro Bastoni, of Inter Milan and Italy’s national team, prepares to board a flight from Milan to Rome with his team.
    Mattia Ozbot-Inter/Inter via Getty Images

    Aviation is often the biggest driver of emissions. A study that colleagues and I conducted on the NCAA men’s basketball tournament found about 80% of its emissions were connected to travel. And that was after the NCAA began using the pod system, which is designed to keep teams closer to home for the first and second rounds.

    Finding practical solutions

    Some academics, observing the rising emissions trend, have called for radical solutions like the end of commercialized sports or drastically limiting who can attend sporting events, with a focus on fans from the region.

    These solutions are frankly not practical, in my view, nor do they align with other positive developments. The growing popularity of women’s sports shows the challenge in limiting sports events – more games expands participation but adds to the industry’s overall footprint.

    Further compounding the challenges of reducing environmental impact is the amount of fan travel, which is outside the direct control of the sports organization or event organizers.

    Many fans will follow their teams long distances, especially for mega-events like the World Cup or the NCAA tournament. During the men’s World Cup in Russia in 2018, more than 840,000 fans traveled from other countries. The top countries by number of fans, after Russia, were China, the U.S., Mexico and Argentina.

    There is an argument that distributed sporting events like March Madness or the World Cup can be better in some ways for local environments because they don’t overwhelm a single city. However, merely spreading the impact does not necessarily reduce it, particularly when considering the effects on climate change.

    How fans can cut their environmental footprint

    Sport organizations and event planners can take steps to be more sustainable and also encourage more sustainable choices among fans. Fans can reduce their environmental impact in a variety of ways. For example:

    • Avoid taking airplanes for shorter distances, such as between FIFA venues in Philadelphia, New York and Boston, and carpool or take Amtrak instead. Planes can be more efficient for long distances, but air travel is still a major contributing factor to emissions.

    • While in a host city, use mass transit or rent electric vehicles or bicycles for local travel.

    • Consider sustainable accommodations, such as short-term rentals that might have a smaller environmental footprint than a hotel. Or stay at a certified green hotel that makes an effort to be more efficient in its use of water and energy.

    • Engage in sustainable pregame and postgame activities, such as choosing local, sustainable food options, and minimize waste.

    • You can also pay to offset carbon emissions for attending different sporting events, much like concertgoers do when they attend musical festivals. While critics question offsets’ true environmental benefit, they do represent people’s growing awareness of their environmental footprint.

    Through all these options, it’s clear that sports face a significant challenge in addressing their environmental impacts and encouraging fans to be more sustainable, while simultaneously trying to meet ambitious business and environmental targets.

    In my view, a sustainable path forward will require strategic, yet genuine, commitment by the sports industry and its fans, and a willingness to prioritize long-term planetary health alongside economic gains – balancing the sport and sustainability.

    Brian P. McCullough does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. 2026 FIFA World Cup expansion will have a big climate footprint, with matches from Mexico to Canada – here’s what fans can do – https://theconversation.com/2026-fifa-world-cup-expansion-will-have-a-big-climate-footprint-with-matches-from-mexico-to-canada-heres-what-fans-can-do-259437

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s economic development zones aim for greater role in reform, opening up

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 14 — During the initial years of China’s historic journey of reform and opening up over four decades ago, the first 14 national-level economic and technological development zones were established in 12 coastal cities. Today, there is a vast network of 232 such zones right across the country, serving as vital engines of development.

    In the latest episode of China Economic Roundtable, an all-media talk show hosted by Xinhua News Agency, a commerce official, a zone administrator and an executive of a foreign-invested company convened to explore the evolving role of these zones in shaping China’s next phase of high-standard opening up, in-depth reform and high-quality development.

    National economic development zones are not only economic powerhouses but also key windows for global engagement, said Ji Xiaofeng, an official in the Ministry of Commerce’s foreign investment department.

    Notably, such zones are home to more than 60,000 foreign-invested enterprises and around 99,000 firms engaged in foreign trade.

    In 2024 alone, national economic development zones accounted for about one-quarter of China’s utilized foreign investment and trade volume. Collectively, they generated a regional GDP of 16.9 trillion yuan (about 2.36 trillion U.S. dollars) and housed over 4.9 million market entities, including 73,000 major industrial enterprises and 85,000 high-tech firms.

    Looking forward, Ji said these zones need to further improve and innovate in areas ranging from development positioning to institutions in a bid to shoulder greater responsibilities in fostering development and expanding opening up.

    To this end, the Ministry of Commerce recently unveiled a work plan with 16 targeted policy measures including developing new quality productive forces, elevating economic openness and deepening reforms of management systems.

    INNOVATION-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT

    China’s national economic development zones have started to speed up their innovation efforts, seeking to foster new growth drivers.

    Suzhou Industrial Park, founded in 1994 in east China’s Jiangsu Province as the first inter-governmental cooperation project between China and Singapore, exemplifies this development trend. This industrial park leverages global partnerships and its free trade status in a quest to become a world-class high-tech park.

    Shen Lei, deputy director of the park’s management committee, highlighted its focus on attracting global resources and integrating technological and industrial innovation.

    National economic development zones now account for 18.3 percent of China’s high-tech enterprises and host more than 700 state-level incubators and innovation spaces.

    “They boast high industrial concentration and solid manufacturing foundations, making them ideal for developing new quality productive forces tailored to local strengths,” Ji said.

    These zones have become powerhouses for strategic emerging industries. In southwest China’s Sichuan Province, for example, the Yibin zone has built the world’s largest single-site power battery production base featuring a 180 GWh capacity. Another zone in northwest China’s Shaanxi Province, meanwhile, boasts complete industrial chains from aviation equipment to satellite applications.

    More efforts will be made to cultivate modern industrial systems in national economic development zones, centered around sectors such as biomedicine, new energy and materials, aerospace, high-end equipment manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI), Ji revealed.

    PIONEERS OF OPENING UP

    Over the past decades, national economic development zones have been trailblazers in institutional innovation, foreign investment and economic growth, setting the pace for China’s reform and opening-up endeavors.

    These zones have explored free trade pilot synergies to foster breakthroughs in areas including resource flows, rights protection and market regulation. Some have also proactively aligned with high-standard international trade rules to enhance their institutional openness, Ji said.

    “The strategic location, industrial chains and policy support of these zones make them highly attractive for Panasonic to make investments in China,” said Zhao Bingdi, president of Panasonic China.

    A 47-year veteran of the Chinese market, Panasonic operates in national economic development zones of eight cities like Beijing, north China’s Tianjin and Shanghai. Its 2024 fiscal year sales in China approached 100 billion yuan — nearly a quarter of Panasonic’s global revenue.

    “China is not just a manufacturing giant but a major consumer and innovation hub, offering vast opportunities for foreign firms,” said Zhao. He added that recent policies supporting technological platforms and the integration between the digital economy and the real economy will facilitate Panasonic’s investments in areas ranging from AI to new energy.

    Experts noted that the latest reform measures concerning China’s national economic development zones will provide foreign firms with a higher-level platform, thereby encouraging increased R&D investment and deeper collaboration with local enterprises. Thanks to improving industrial ecosystems, global companies will be able to seize greater opportunities in China’s vibrant market.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s economic development zones aim for greater role in reform, opening up

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 14 — During the initial years of China’s historic journey of reform and opening up over four decades ago, the first 14 national-level economic and technological development zones were established in 12 coastal cities. Today, there is a vast network of 232 such zones right across the country, serving as vital engines of development.

    In the latest episode of China Economic Roundtable, an all-media talk show hosted by Xinhua News Agency, a commerce official, a zone administrator and an executive of a foreign-invested company convened to explore the evolving role of these zones in shaping China’s next phase of high-standard opening up, in-depth reform and high-quality development.

    National economic development zones are not only economic powerhouses but also key windows for global engagement, said Ji Xiaofeng, an official in the Ministry of Commerce’s foreign investment department.

    Notably, such zones are home to more than 60,000 foreign-invested enterprises and around 99,000 firms engaged in foreign trade.

    In 2024 alone, national economic development zones accounted for about one-quarter of China’s utilized foreign investment and trade volume. Collectively, they generated a regional GDP of 16.9 trillion yuan (about 2.36 trillion U.S. dollars) and housed over 4.9 million market entities, including 73,000 major industrial enterprises and 85,000 high-tech firms.

    Looking forward, Ji said these zones need to further improve and innovate in areas ranging from development positioning to institutions in a bid to shoulder greater responsibilities in fostering development and expanding opening up.

    To this end, the Ministry of Commerce recently unveiled a work plan with 16 targeted policy measures including developing new quality productive forces, elevating economic openness and deepening reforms of management systems.

    INNOVATION-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT

    China’s national economic development zones have started to speed up their innovation efforts, seeking to foster new growth drivers.

    Suzhou Industrial Park, founded in 1994 in east China’s Jiangsu Province as the first inter-governmental cooperation project between China and Singapore, exemplifies this development trend. This industrial park leverages global partnerships and its free trade status in a quest to become a world-class high-tech park.

    Shen Lei, deputy director of the park’s management committee, highlighted its focus on attracting global resources and integrating technological and industrial innovation.

    National economic development zones now account for 18.3 percent of China’s high-tech enterprises and host more than 700 state-level incubators and innovation spaces.

    “They boast high industrial concentration and solid manufacturing foundations, making them ideal for developing new quality productive forces tailored to local strengths,” Ji said.

    These zones have become powerhouses for strategic emerging industries. In southwest China’s Sichuan Province, for example, the Yibin zone has built the world’s largest single-site power battery production base featuring a 180 GWh capacity. Another zone in northwest China’s Shaanxi Province, meanwhile, boasts complete industrial chains from aviation equipment to satellite applications.

    More efforts will be made to cultivate modern industrial systems in national economic development zones, centered around sectors such as biomedicine, new energy and materials, aerospace, high-end equipment manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI), Ji revealed.

    PIONEERS OF OPENING UP

    Over the past decades, national economic development zones have been trailblazers in institutional innovation, foreign investment and economic growth, setting the pace for China’s reform and opening-up endeavors.

    These zones have explored free trade pilot synergies to foster breakthroughs in areas including resource flows, rights protection and market regulation. Some have also proactively aligned with high-standard international trade rules to enhance their institutional openness, Ji said.

    “The strategic location, industrial chains and policy support of these zones make them highly attractive for Panasonic to make investments in China,” said Zhao Bingdi, president of Panasonic China.

    A 47-year veteran of the Chinese market, Panasonic operates in national economic development zones of eight cities like Beijing, north China’s Tianjin and Shanghai. Its 2024 fiscal year sales in China approached 100 billion yuan — nearly a quarter of Panasonic’s global revenue.

    “China is not just a manufacturing giant but a major consumer and innovation hub, offering vast opportunities for foreign firms,” said Zhao. He added that recent policies supporting technological platforms and the integration between the digital economy and the real economy will facilitate Panasonic’s investments in areas ranging from AI to new energy.

    Experts noted that the latest reform measures concerning China’s national economic development zones will provide foreign firms with a higher-level platform, thereby encouraging increased R&D investment and deeper collaboration with local enterprises. Thanks to improving industrial ecosystems, global companies will be able to seize greater opportunities in China’s vibrant market.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s economic development zones aim for greater role in reform, opening up

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 14 — During the initial years of China’s historic journey of reform and opening up over four decades ago, the first 14 national-level economic and technological development zones were established in 12 coastal cities. Today, there is a vast network of 232 such zones right across the country, serving as vital engines of development.

    In the latest episode of China Economic Roundtable, an all-media talk show hosted by Xinhua News Agency, a commerce official, a zone administrator and an executive of a foreign-invested company convened to explore the evolving role of these zones in shaping China’s next phase of high-standard opening up, in-depth reform and high-quality development.

    National economic development zones are not only economic powerhouses but also key windows for global engagement, said Ji Xiaofeng, an official in the Ministry of Commerce’s foreign investment department.

    Notably, such zones are home to more than 60,000 foreign-invested enterprises and around 99,000 firms engaged in foreign trade.

    In 2024 alone, national economic development zones accounted for about one-quarter of China’s utilized foreign investment and trade volume. Collectively, they generated a regional GDP of 16.9 trillion yuan (about 2.36 trillion U.S. dollars) and housed over 4.9 million market entities, including 73,000 major industrial enterprises and 85,000 high-tech firms.

    Looking forward, Ji said these zones need to further improve and innovate in areas ranging from development positioning to institutions in a bid to shoulder greater responsibilities in fostering development and expanding opening up.

    To this end, the Ministry of Commerce recently unveiled a work plan with 16 targeted policy measures including developing new quality productive forces, elevating economic openness and deepening reforms of management systems.

    INNOVATION-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT

    China’s national economic development zones have started to speed up their innovation efforts, seeking to foster new growth drivers.

    Suzhou Industrial Park, founded in 1994 in east China’s Jiangsu Province as the first inter-governmental cooperation project between China and Singapore, exemplifies this development trend. This industrial park leverages global partnerships and its free trade status in a quest to become a world-class high-tech park.

    Shen Lei, deputy director of the park’s management committee, highlighted its focus on attracting global resources and integrating technological and industrial innovation.

    National economic development zones now account for 18.3 percent of China’s high-tech enterprises and host more than 700 state-level incubators and innovation spaces.

    “They boast high industrial concentration and solid manufacturing foundations, making them ideal for developing new quality productive forces tailored to local strengths,” Ji said.

    These zones have become powerhouses for strategic emerging industries. In southwest China’s Sichuan Province, for example, the Yibin zone has built the world’s largest single-site power battery production base featuring a 180 GWh capacity. Another zone in northwest China’s Shaanxi Province, meanwhile, boasts complete industrial chains from aviation equipment to satellite applications.

    More efforts will be made to cultivate modern industrial systems in national economic development zones, centered around sectors such as biomedicine, new energy and materials, aerospace, high-end equipment manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI), Ji revealed.

    PIONEERS OF OPENING UP

    Over the past decades, national economic development zones have been trailblazers in institutional innovation, foreign investment and economic growth, setting the pace for China’s reform and opening-up endeavors.

    These zones have explored free trade pilot synergies to foster breakthroughs in areas including resource flows, rights protection and market regulation. Some have also proactively aligned with high-standard international trade rules to enhance their institutional openness, Ji said.

    “The strategic location, industrial chains and policy support of these zones make them highly attractive for Panasonic to make investments in China,” said Zhao Bingdi, president of Panasonic China.

    A 47-year veteran of the Chinese market, Panasonic operates in national economic development zones of eight cities like Beijing, north China’s Tianjin and Shanghai. Its 2024 fiscal year sales in China approached 100 billion yuan — nearly a quarter of Panasonic’s global revenue.

    “China is not just a manufacturing giant but a major consumer and innovation hub, offering vast opportunities for foreign firms,” said Zhao. He added that recent policies supporting technological platforms and the integration between the digital economy and the real economy will facilitate Panasonic’s investments in areas ranging from AI to new energy.

    Experts noted that the latest reform measures concerning China’s national economic development zones will provide foreign firms with a higher-level platform, thereby encouraging increased R&D investment and deeper collaboration with local enterprises. Thanks to improving industrial ecosystems, global companies will be able to seize greater opportunities in China’s vibrant market.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China reports surge of foreign tourists as summer vacation begins

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 14 — China is witnessing a surge in foreign tourist arrivals as the summer vacation season kicks off, with more international travelers drawn to the country’s unique blend of ancient culture and modern vitality.

    According to official data, Beijing’s ports of entry handled over 640,000 inbound and outbound travelers between July 1 and 10, including 171,000 foreign tourists, marking a 22.1 percent year-on-year increase.

    A total of 2.56 million foreign travelers entered China through Shanghai’s Pudong and Hongqiao international airports in the first half of this year, marking a 44.7 percent year-on-year increase.

    To meet the growing demand, immigration authorities at major border checkpoints have introduced a range of measures to reduce waiting times and improve the travel experience.

    The surge has been driven by China’s continued easing of entry policies for foreign visitors. As of now, China’s 240-hour visa-free transit policy applies to 55 countries, while nationals from 47 countries are eligible for unilateral visa-free entry.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China reports surge of foreign tourists as summer vacation begins

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 14 — China is witnessing a surge in foreign tourist arrivals as the summer vacation season kicks off, with more international travelers drawn to the country’s unique blend of ancient culture and modern vitality.

    According to official data, Beijing’s ports of entry handled over 640,000 inbound and outbound travelers between July 1 and 10, including 171,000 foreign tourists, marking a 22.1 percent year-on-year increase.

    A total of 2.56 million foreign travelers entered China through Shanghai’s Pudong and Hongqiao international airports in the first half of this year, marking a 44.7 percent year-on-year increase.

    To meet the growing demand, immigration authorities at major border checkpoints have introduced a range of measures to reduce waiting times and improve the travel experience.

    The surge has been driven by China’s continued easing of entry policies for foreign visitors. As of now, China’s 240-hour visa-free transit policy applies to 55 countries, while nationals from 47 countries are eligible for unilateral visa-free entry.

    MIL OSI China News

  • AI 171 crash: preliminary report finds no mechanical or maintenance faults, says Air India CEO

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Air India CEO and Managing Director Campbell Wilson on Monday said that the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) preliminary report on AI-171 plane crash in Ahmedabad has not found “mechanical or maintenance issues with the aircraft or engines” and urged people not to draw any “premature conclusions” before the investigation is completed.

    In an internal communication, Wilson said the report confirmed that all mandatory maintenance tasks had been completed and there were no faults with the quality of fuel used. He added that no abnormalities were found in the aircraft’s take-off roll.

    According to the letter, the pilots had passed their mandatory pre-flight breathalyser tests and there were no concerns regarding their medical status.

    “The report has identified no cause nor made any recommendations, so I urge everyone to avoid drawing premature conclusions as the investigation is far from over,” Wilson said. He assured that Air India would continue to fully cooperate with investigators to ensure a thorough and comprehensive inquiry.

    He added that until the final report is released, speculation and sensational headlines are likely to continue, but urged staff to remain focused on their work. “We must stay true to the values that have guided Air India’s transformation over the past three years — integrity, excellence, customer focus, innovation and teamwork,” he said.

    Wilson reiterated that the airline’s priorities remain standing by the bereaved families and the injured, working together as a team, and ensuring a safe and reliable air travel experience for customers.

    The AAIB’s Preliminary Report released on Friday said that both the engines of the aircraft were moved from “run” to “cutoff,” in quick succession, which resulted in the fuel supply to be cut off. The report says that in the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why he did the cutoff, which the other pilot denied ever doing so.

    “The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off,” the preliminary report said.

    The crash of Air India’s Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner in Ahmedabad, Gujarat claimed the lives of 260 people, including 229 passengers, 12 crew members, and 19 people on the ground.

    (Input from agencies)

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Rosaviatsiya is searching for the missing Mi-8 helicopter of APK Vzlet

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Beijing, July 14 /Xinhua/ – Rosaviatsia is searching for a Mi-8 helicopter belonging to APK Vzlet that went missing in Khabarovsk Krai. According to preliminary data, there were five people on board, RIA Novosti reported today.

    “In Khabarovsk Krai, Rosaviatsia is searching for a Mi-8T helicopter from APK Vzlet. The helicopter has an operator’s certificate for performing aviation work,” the agency reported.

    “Preliminary: there are five people on board the Mi-8T /three crew members and two technical specialists/,” they specified there. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    .

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Lack of a prevention and decentralisation strategy in Greece’s civil protection – E-002699/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002699/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Sakis Arnaoutoglou (S&D)

    With the law adopted in June 2025, the Greek Government maintained its centralised approach to civil protection, making no provision for mandatory prevention projects (fire zones, evacuation plans) and without any meaningful involvement of local government or forestry services. The new framework also includes staff on fixed-term contracts, with no prospect for seasonal firefighters and without a plan to strengthen the workforce.

    The AEGIS programme, which is co-financed by the EU, has been presented as the largest investment in civil protection, but to date it has not delivered comprehensive results. Transparency issues have been identified, as well as an excessive emphasis on communication activities and the leasing of aircraft. What is more, critical decentralised coordination projects, such as the 13 Regional Centres, were excluded from the Recovery Fund without sufficient justification.

    In view of the above, can the Commission say:

    • 1.Does it monitor the progress and effectiveness of the AEGIS programme?
    • 2.Did it ask for explanations as to why prevention projects were excluded from the Recovery Fund?
    • 3.How could it help strengthen the role of local authorities in civil protection?

    Submitted: 2.7.2025

    Last updated: 14 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports – P10_TA(2025)0154 – Wednesday, 9 July 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the report of 31 March 2022 by the Wise Persons Group on the Reform of the EU Customs Union entitled ‘Putting More Union in the European Customs: Ten proposals to make the EU Customs Union fit for a Geopolitical Europe’,

    –  having regard to its position of 13 March 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013(1),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ (COM(2025(0037),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937(2),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859(3),

    –  having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’(4),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A10-0133/2025),

    A.  whereas e-commerce has transformed how consumers purchase and engage with businesses worldwide, unlocking unprecedented opportunities; whereas e-commerce presents significant challenges to the EU’s competitiveness and raises concerns over consumer rights and health and safety, particularly as certain product categories raise urgent concerns regarding their impact on vulnerable consumer groups; whereas it has an environmental impact, particularly through increased waste generation and carbon emissions resulting from transportation and logistics; whereas e-commerce has an impact on retailers’ attractiveness and therefore contributes to the hollowing out of city centres; whereas e-commerce also has social implications, particularly concerning working conditions in the warehousing and delivery sector;

    B.  whereas over 75 % of EU consumers shop online; whereas the continued growth of e-commerce enhances consumer access, quality and price competition; whereas e-commerce lowers market entry barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs, fosters digital inclusion, supports underserved communities, and contributes to innovation, productivity and economic growth across the single market;

    C.  whereas, with the surge in e-commerce imports, mainly coming from China, non-compliant sellers evading regulatory costs and undermining law-abiding businesses through means such as counterfeiting, have intensified unfair competition; whereas there is an urgent need to re-establish a level playing field for all businesses, especially SMEs; whereas it is crucial to ensure that enforcement efforts are adequately funded and equipped at both national and EU level, while avoiding excessive delegation of enforcement responsibilities to private actors;

    D.  whereas European companies, namely SMEs, must comply with strict regulations and compete on an unlevel playing field with non-EU e-commerce platforms that avoid these obligations; whereas European companies dedicate material and human resources to ensure regulatory compliance, assuming significant administrative and financial burdens;

    E.  whereas certain non-EU companies fail to comply with European data protection regulations, which guarantee a high level of privacy for consumers, by engaging in consumer profiling practices using personal data; whereas enhanced enforcement and cooperation is required to ensure consistent privacy protections for all consumers;

    F.  whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her 2024-2029 political guidelines, referred to the need to tackle challenges with online platforms to ensure that consumers and businesses alike benefit from a level playing field based on effective customs, tax and safety controls and sustainability standards, and tasked several Executive Vice-Presidents and Commissioners with fulfilling that mission;

    G.  whereas the process of adapting the EU acquis to the online environment began several years ago, and numerous laws on products, consumer protection and product safety now include provisions to ensure robust safeguards in the digital landscape; whereas, notwithstanding these efforts, critical shortcomings persist in empowering authorities to hold the full supply chain accountable and ensure consumer protection, which need to be urgently addressed;

    H.  whereas the Digital Services Act(5) (DSA), the General Product Safety Regulation(6) (GPSR), the Market Surveillance Regulation(7) (MSR) and the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (CPC)(8) contribute to a safer and fair e-commerce environment, if well implemented and enforced; whereas, despite these laws, consumer and other organisations, as well as national authorities, have raised concerns over the large number of unsafe products detected in the EU that fail to comply with EU legislation on product safety and environmental and chemical standards; whereas better funding of and coordination among Member States’ enforcement authorities are essential to address these risks effectively;

    I.  whereas e-commerce may significantly impact consumers by providing them with unparalleled convenience, access to diverse products and competitive pricing; whereas e-commerce also exposes consumers to risks such as unsafe products, a lack of transparency and manipulative practices that exploit their vulnerabilities;

    J.  whereas the protection of consumers is essential to the functioning of the EU’s internal market, as it ensures trust and fairness in commercial practices, thereby enabling sustainable economic growth and innovation; whereas addressing these concerns is important in promoting transparency, fairness and the responsible development of digital services and e-commerce;

    K.  whereas people from more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, including low-income families and children, are more exposed to the risks posed by unsafe products due to their lower prices, aggressive marketing and widespread distribution;

    L.  whereas concerns over the suitability of customs procedures under the current Union Customs Code(9) for e-commerce were a significant driver of the Commission’s customs reform package, including the legislative proposals on the revision of the Union Customs Code and establishing an EU Customs Authority (UCC reform), and the removal of the EUR 150 exemption threshold (de minimis) for the payment of customs duties and VAT on imported products;

    M.  whereas customs authorities are in need of substantial investments, particularly to ensure a sufficient number of properly trained staff to guarantee the functioning of EU customs systems, which are facing an exponential increase in demand for customs checks; whereas without the necessary investments in staff, digital solutions cannot achieve benefits in terms of efficiency and harmonisation;

    N.  whereas advanced screening technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, could significantly enhance the capacity of customs and market surveillance authorities to flag high-risk shipments and automate compliance checks at scale; whereas investment in such technologies remains fragmented and uneven across Member States; whereas increased EU-level funding, coordination and efforts to ensure interoperability are essential to accelerate their deployment and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms;

    O.  whereas digital tools, such as artificial intelligence and the internet of things, can help track non-compliant products, but must respect consumer privacy and must not lead to the general monitoring of users;

    P.  whereas the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on a comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce, highlights that the volume of e-commerce goods bought by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms is expected to continue growing rapidly, benefiting from the current customs duty exemption for low-value consignments (up to EUR 150);

    The surge in non-compliant goods in e-commerce

    1.  Highlights the increasingly high number of purchases being made by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms in business-to-consumer environments and in emerging manufacturer-to-consumer and direct-to-consumer environments; emphasises, as described in the Letta report on the future of the single market(10), that the circulation of harmful products in the single market is escalating and that EU consumers are wasting EUR 19,3 billion per year buying dangerous products that can lead to injuries and that are detrimental to our economies;

    2.  Notes that 4,6 billion e-commerce items under the EUR 150 exemption threshold were imported into the EU in 2024, 91 % of which originated from China, amounting to up to 12 million small e-commerce items per day and amounting to almost twice the number recorded in 2023 (2,4 billion) and more than triple the number in 2022 (1,4 billion); notes that this surge has exacerbated compliance challenges, especially in product safety, and that market surveillance authorities and independent investigations have reported alarming non-compliance rates;

    3.  Stresses that most unsafe and illegal products are shipped to the EU in large volumes of individual, and often small, parcels sold to EU consumers via online platforms from non-EU countries, in particular China; stresses that such products are difficult to control, in particular for customs authorities at the entry points, which are mostly located at major ports and logistical airports for e-commerce; emphasises that this makes it almost impossible to stop such products from entering the EU and makes it increasingly difficult for market surveillance authorities to detect and remove such products from the internal market and for consumer authorities to do so once the products reach EU consumers;

    4.  Stresses that the rapid growth of e-commerce has significant environmental implications due to issues such as a rise in packaging waste, the larger carbon footprint from low-quality and short life cycle products and their shipment, and problems with waste management and non-recyclable materials; underlines, in this respect, the need to ensure compliance with environmental legislation and to encourage sustainable ways of consuming;

    5.  Stresses that some non-EU online marketplaces are facing allegations regarding the use of forced labour; underlines, in this respect, that Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibits products made with forced labour from entering the EU market, and that it must be effectively enforced after its application, including for online sales;

    6.  Notes that, on 1 December 2025, Regulation (EU) 2023/2411(11) on the protection of geographical indications for craft and industrial products will come into force; notes that, if not accompanied by adequate promotion and protection, especially with respect to the markets of non-EU countries, geographical indications risk remaining ineffective; calls, therefore, on the Commission, together with the customs authorities of the Member States, to strengthen checks aimed at intercepting products that violate the rules on geographical indications;

    7.  Is concerned that the prevailing business model of certain major non-EU online platforms is based on the rapid, large-scale production and distribution of fast fashion and ultra-fast fashion products, prioritising speed and low cost over sustainability, safety and quality; regrets that many such products do not comply with EU legislation, yet non-compliant sellers frequently evade meaningful enforcement or sanctions; stresses that such practices constitute a form of social and environmental dumping, resulting in a persistent and unfair competitive advantage for these non-EU platforms, exerting disproportionate pressure on European undertakings, in particular SMEs and micro-enterprises; emphasises that this hampers the development of the EU’s textile and clothing sector;

    E-commerce crossroads: navigating compliance challenges

    8.  Recognises that the EU has established a robust compliance framework, which also applies to products sold online, but that greater efforts are still needed for the full enforcement of the compliance framework; underlines, in this respect, the importance of the DSA, the DMA, the MSR, the GPSR, consumer protection rules and various product and environmental laws; emphasises that market surveillance authorities face challenges in applying these frameworks to online platforms as evidenced by the Commission’s recently published evaluation report on the implementation of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and, in particular, in cases where large quantities of a product are sold in small consignments; considers that the thorough implementation of the DSA and other regulatory acquis is necessary to combat unsafe, non-compliant and counterfeit products;

    9.  Stresses the need to implement the existing compliance framework and evaluate these measures when considering new legislation, including new obligations for online marketplaces;

    10.  Notes that conducting physical tests is particularly impractical for small parcels sent directly to the final consumer and that customs authorities will therefore continue to rely primarily on checking the documentation, rather than inspecting the products themselves;

    11.  Highlights the significant enforcement gaps caused by the limited resources and insufficient level of digitalisation of customs and market surveillance authorities, the lack of human resources and harmonised and interoperable technological tools across Member States, and the insufficient data sharing and overall lack of cooperation and coordination between customs authorities, platforms and market surveillance entities; acknowledges that physical inspections are unavoidably and inherently limited given the volume of e-commerce parcels entering the EU;

    12.  Considers that mystery shopping exercises by market surveillance authorities, as put forward in the Commission communication on e-commerce, are an important tool to verify compliance for products sold through online platforms; stresses, however, that if sellers are based outside the EU or are not traceable and if fake addresses are used for responsible persons, there is no liable legal entity and it is impossible for market surveillance authorities to take enforcement actions;

    13.  Considers that EU manufacturers and retailers, particularly SMEs, face unfair competition due to non-EU platforms enabling non-EU manufacturers and their non-compliant products to easily enter the EU market, bypassing applicable regulations and standards; highlights that, while EU manufacturers must comply with strict safety, environmental and quality rules, many low-value products sold through these platforms evade customs and market surveillance checks due to the way they are shipped to the EU; raises concerns that some of these platforms and non-EU traders deliberately exploit this loophole, allowing non-compliant imports to enter the EU single market unchecked, putting European manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers at a disadvantage, weakening their competitiveness and hindering their ability to innovate, which could lead to the closure of many micro-enterprises and small enterprises;

    14.  Stresses that EU manufacturers are de facto subject to significantly stricter market surveillance compared to non-EU manufactures that reach EU consumers via e-commerce platforms; deeply regrets the loss of market share and jobs caused by the influx of cheaper products that do not comply with European standards, particularly on safety and quality, as well as other illegal products, shipped from non-EU countries, directly affecting EU SMEs and the strength of EU companies and their capacity to invest and maintain profitability;

    15.  Highlights the difference between online platforms acting as intermediaries and those acting as importers; notes, in particular, that the EU e-commerce platforms that act as importers face compliance costs that increase their retail prices up to 40 %, which has an impact on final consumers; underlines that EU-based importers face stricter obligations and higher costs, while intermediary platforms allow non-EU sellers to ship directly to EU consumers without ensuring compliance;

    16.  Recognises that e-commerce platforms are subject to various obligations under the DSA and the GPSR and may be held liable under the Product Liability Directive(12) (PLD) in specific circumstances; recalls, in this respect, that online platforms are liable if they do not respect their specific obligations as intermediaries; believes, however, that consumer redress must be ensured in all cases; underlines, in this respect, that where the manufacturer is established outside the EU and no importer, authorised representative, or fulfilment service provider can be identified, online marketplaces should provide adequate and proportionate remedies to consumers where they fail to comply with the DSA, particularly with Articles 30 and 31 or with Article 22 of the GPSR;

    17.  Emphasises that online marketplaces are requested to trace their traders (‘know your business customer’) under the DSA, which should discourage traders from selling unsafe or counterfeit goods, and are obliged to comply with the ‘compliance by design’ rules to increase overall traceability; highlights the lack of accountability of online platforms in case of untraceable sellers or sellers based outside the jurisdiction of the EU; notes the considerable level of non-compliance with the ‘know your business customer’ principle and the rise in new selling practices via social media platforms, where this obligation is not effectively applied, allowing non-EU sellers to offer non-compliant goods to EU users directly; stresses, therefore, the need for online platforms to make best efforts to ensure full traceability of sellers and products, preventing listings from appearing without verified product compliance details;

    18.  Highlights the fact that the information of a responsible economic operator in the EU under the GPSR, acting on behalf of a non-EU trader or platform, is often wrong or missing; notes that even when this information is available, the responsible person in the EU may not be accountable, particularly when the responsible person is an authorised representative; is concerned that market surveillance authorities report significant difficulties in contacting these non-EU traders and enforcing EU law, and that even when contact is established, enforcing penalties against them is often unfeasible;

    19.  Considers that creating a database of the responsible persons in the EU to enable real-time cross-checking for verification, along with establishing an accreditation procedure for them, could enhance transparency and reinforce accountability throughout the e-commerce import supply chain;

    20.  Supports research and enforcement actions by consumer organisations and the opening of investigations initiated by consumer authorities in the EU, as part of the CPC network, as well as under the DSA, against non-EU online platforms for potential violations of EU product safety and consumer laws; expresses concern over the slow progress of these investigations and calls for their swift conclusion; underlines the need for enforcement to be a deterrent that includes adequate sanctions to ensure compliance; underlines, in this respect, that particular attention is necessary at national and EU level to address recurrent non-compliance that may have been identified in previous controls of similar products, including via the application of interim measures; stresses that the enforcement and effectiveness of commitments received from online platforms should be closely monitored;

    21.  Urges the Commission and CPC authorities to initiate a structured enforcement dialogue with consumer representatives, traders and other stakeholders to identify systemic infringements requiring stronger enforcement;

    22.  Notes the complexity for EU authorities to enforce EU laws when the economic operators are established outside the EU; highlights the need for enhanced international cooperation agreements, particularly with major e-commerce exporters;

    Strong enforcement policies to combat non-compliant e-commerce products

    Urgent need for short-term measures

    23.  Urges the Member States to increase funding and resources for market surveillance, customs, consumer protection and digital services authorities so that they can better address the challenges posed by unsafe and illicit products; asks the Commission to support stronger cooperation, information sharing and data exchange between competent authorities, including market surveillance and customs authorities, and stresses that cooperation across different sectors should be improved; urges the Member States to ensure effective coordination among different market surveillance authorities in their territories, and to strengthen the powers of the single liaison offices; highlights that the Member States and the EU have the responsibility to ensure that market surveillance and customs authorities are properly resourced, trained and equipped to have the capacity to fulfil their mission, including proper investigative powers;

    24.  Calls on market surveillance authorities to invest more resources in joint or coordinated activities with other Member States or relevant authorities and, in particular, to increase the number and the frequency of coordinated enforcement actions such as sweeps, mystery-shopping exercises and peer-reviews; urges relevant authorities to actively participate in these activities and the Commission to make full use of its coordination powers;

    25.  Welcomes the Commission’s intention to coordinate the control of customs and market surveillance authorities under priority control areas focused on products from non-EU countries that pose significant safety hazards and a risk of non-compliance; emphasises that this initiative should generate valuable risk profile data, which could be used in further enforcement activities and penalties to non-compliant actors; calls on the Commission to strengthen cooperation within the EU Product Compliance Network and to increase EU funding for customs cooperation under the customs programme and for market surveillance operations under the single market programme; stresses that the lack of adequate resources has hindered the effective deployment of tools, such as the widespread use of mystery shopping activities by market surveillance authorities or the use of trusted flaggers under the DSA; points out to the Commission that, in addition to existing testing facilities for toys and radio equipment, more testing facilities for e-commerce goods are urgently needed, such as for batteries, textiles, cosmetics, electrical appliances and other products; asks the Member States to deploy sufficient resources to guarantee an increased capacity of testing facilities and to increase investments in equipment for the detection of unsafe and illegal goods;

    26.  Emphasises that for data and security reasons, Member States should restrict high-risk vendors from operating in their critical infrastructure and border security systems, including for the procurement of security screening and cargo scanning equipment used at airports and ports;

    27.  Highlights the fact that, under the GPSR, online marketplaces are obliged to establish a single point of contact, register with the Safety Gate Portal and indicate the information concerning their single contact point on the portal; asks the Commission to effectively enforce this and other obligations of online marketplaces and to support the Member States’ market surveillance authorities in implementing the GPSR and the MSR; notes that the GPSR introduced direct data exchanges between enforcement authorities and e-commerce platforms; believes, however, that in order for the system to work effectively, a direct link with customs authorities should be provided;

    28.  Notes that the current system is more reactive than preventive, as authorities intervene only after dangerous products have already been sold to consumers, rather than preventing their distribution; recalls that, under the GPSR, online marketplace providers are encouraged to check products against the Safety Gate Portal before listing them on their interfaces; underlines that random sampling testing can only be efficient if it is conducted regularly;

    29.  Emphasises that the swift implementation of the Digital Product Passport (DPP) for several critical products sold online is essential to strengthen the enforcement of existing legislation; urges the Commission to present the necessary secondary legislation on the DPP as soon as possible, in particular for textiles, toys, cosmetics, electronics and other products with high non-compliance rates and associated risks; calls on the Commission to continuously assess the requirements, technical design and operation of the DPP under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation(13) (ESPR) as a priority; calls on the Commission to support businesses, in particular micro-enterprises and SMEs, in the implementation of the DPP;

    30.  Proposes a mandatory DPP with early compliance verification for all products imported via e-commerce, including detailed quality and compliance data, to be integrated directly into the EU customs data hub, allowing authorities to pre-screen information on products before they are placed on the single market;

    31.  Urges the Member States to make substantial efforts to increase customs controls and improve risk analysis, as the detection and removal of non-compliant goods can reduce the harm to EU consumers and protect the economic interests of EU businesses; underlines that the introduction in the customs risk analysis of a presumption of non-compliance for goods identical to those already found non-compliant could facilitate controls by customs authorities and improve cost efficiency; stresses the importance of reinforcing customs centres so they are better equipped to handle the large volume of small parcels that are difficult to control using traditional methods, including advanced screening technologies to identify suspicious packages at entry points; asks for more rigorous compliance checks, as well as random checks by the authorities on high-tonnage transport; urges the Member States, furthermore, to significantly increase the level of digitalisation of import procedures in customs authorities in order to implement existing legislation and accelerate customs procedures, especially in view of the high numbers of parcels;

    32.  Underlines that businesses, particularly SMEs, urgently require clear guidelines from the Commission for the effective implementation of the GPSR, including clarification on its interplay with overlapping legislation, such as the DSA, the MSR, the PLD, and sector-specific laws on toys, cosmetics and detergents; calls on the Commission to issue these guidelines before the end of the first half of 2025 to facilitate businesses’ compliance; considers that the evaluation report on the interaction of the DSA with other legal acts, which is due on 17 November 2025, should take into account different legislation, in particular on product compliance, the obligations of online marketplaces, enforcement rules and possible future improvements on simplification and implementation; calls on the Commission to assess all possible further actions, including the evaluation of sectoral legislation, which is necessary to ensure legal predictability and that no legal loopholes or enforcement gaps are left when it comes to direct imports from non-EU countries via online marketplaces;

    33.  Calls on the relevant national authorities to make full use of the existing and recently adopted enforcement toolbox, especially in relation to provisions on e-commerce set out in the MSR, GPSR and DSA, such as takedown orders, prohibition, restriction on the making available of a product on the market or its removal, recalls and sanctions as measures to counter the rise of illegal and non-compliant imports from non-EU countries;

    34.  Underlines that regulatory enforcement measures taken against non-compliant actors should not put disproportionate burdens on compliant actors or cause unintentional harm to the second-hand market;

    35.  Stresses the need to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights in the light of the increase in non-European counterfeit goods on e-commerce platforms; notes that these practices harm the competitiveness of European companies and pose risks to innovation and the incentives for research and development; calls for stronger measures against the sale of counterfeit goods online; urges the Commission to issue clear guidelines on trusted flaggers and stresses that rights holders should be recognised as eligible trusted flaggers when they meet the criteria outlined in Article 22 of the DSA;

    36.  Points out that the Member States should make better use of the available sets of penalties and sanctions against economic operators, as well as other available tools including interim measures, in order to create a deterrent effect to dissuade economic operators from infringing upon the applicable legislation;

    37.  Urges the Commission to take effective measures, including legislative measures where legal loopholes are clearly identified, without delay to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field for European companies, placing particular emphasis on SMEs;

    The need for regulatory reforms

    38.  Calls for the removal of barriers to enforcing consumer rights, such as legal warranty claims and the right to return items; calls on the Commission to review the CPC Regulation without delay as this will be fundamental for a more effective cross-border enforcement of EU consumer law and the fight against unsafe products; asks the Commission, in this context, to provide for clear measures to further strengthen enforcement powers over non-EU traders and platforms and ensure better coordination of EU and national actions and the exchange of information among authorities, as well as with authorities in non-EU countries; highlights that the structure of the European Competition Network could be used as an example to follow for enforcement and information exchange in the case of suspected violations impacting multiple Member States, especially to combat non-compliant products effectively; stresses the importance of granting the Commission direct powers to investigate and sanction certain high impact breaches of consumer law, thus ensuring more effective, simultaneous and uniform enforcement and sanctions under EU consumer law;

    39.  Notes that the CPC Regulation already empowers enforcement authorities to act against non-compliant traders and even gives the possibility for Member States to impose penalties and interim measures such as restricting access to the website; acknowledges, however, that the limitation is that this action must be taken on a country-by-country basis rather than at EU level, with each country applying its own penalties, making the consequences of violations uneven;

    40.  Notes that enforcement in the Member States is fragmented, which leads to inefficiencies; calls for better coordination of enforcement and compliance oversight effective information exchange between Member States and for a more uniform application of the EU acquis; calls on the Commission to assess the MSR, particularly the need for an EU Market Surveillance Authority that would ensure consistency and provide operational support to the activities conducted by the relevant national market surveillance authorities and foster cooperation with the new EU Customs Authority (EUCA), as well as the implementation of Article 4 of the MSR, defining the responsible economic operators in the EU for product compliance; stresses that, to date, the designated responsible economic operator often lacks the capacity to provide redress or compensation to consumers, in particular when being an authorised representative;

    41.  Supports the Commission’s ambition to swiftly advance the upcoming interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament and the Council on the UCC reform and the two proposals for Council acts on removing the exemption threshold on customs duties for goods valued under EUR 150; urges, therefore, the Member States to accelerate the negotiation procedure in the Council, recognising the urgency of the customs reform for EU competitiveness and the protection of EU consumers; underlines, however, that removing the threshold is a necessary step but not a stand-alone solution, as customs authorities will still only be able to inspect a limited percentage of parcels; stresses that immediate removal of the customs duty exemption is necessary for high-risk imports from product and consumer safety perspectives; emphasises the need for the customs reform to ensure coherence across regulatory frameworks, particularly avoiding duplication or conflicts with the DSA, and highlights the essential role customs authorities play in detecting non-compliant and unsafe products;

    42.  Stresses that the UCC reform will provide the necessary tools for customs authorities to better supervise and control the goods entering the EU, help to strengthen the single market and customs union, improve the detection of unsafe and illicit products, and contribute to a level playing field among economic operators; welcomes, in this respect, the proposal under the UCC Regulation to establish the cooperation mechanism with market surveillance authorities that will improve the effectiveness of product controls; emphasises the importance of enhancing customs infrastructure and staffing to manage e-commerce effectively; highlights the need for simplified compliance processes tailored specifically to SMEs; calls on the Member States to introduce automated, forward-looking customs clearing systems, for instance by obliging platforms to enrol and clear customs automatically at the point of sales;

    43.  Is concerned that some non-EU traders are circumventing EU customs checks by clearing goods by customs at the point of origin; stresses that those non-EU trading companies often prefer to pay penalties rather than open packages upon arrival at EU customs, aiming to unload shipments and depart immediately; is deeply concerned that customs authorities find that many packages are either undeclared or incorrectly declared and are sometimes fraudulently labelled; highlights that the UCC reform should also address these aspects;

    44.  Takes note of the concern expressed by the ECC network regarding the drop-shipping business model, which raises challenges in consumer protection, product safety and regulatory compliance; regrets that consumers often face misleading practices, difficulties in returning products, and unexpected import duties, while a significant share of drop-shipped products fail to comply with EU safety standards; stresses that drop-shipping complicates enforcement due to untraceable businesses and cross-border complexities, while VAT and data protection compliance remain key concerns; notes that when combined with influencer marketing, drop-shipping may exacerbate transparency issues, reputational risks and inconsistent outcomes; calls on the Commission to assess how to address drop-shipping-related issues;

    45.  Highlights the fact that the concept of a ‘deemed importer’ aims to ensure a level playing field for both EU and non-EU online platforms; notes that, in the context of an online sale from outside the EU, this measure would relieve customers of non-EU online platforms from being considered importers, as they are under the current UCC, while a non-EU platform or trader would instead be considered the ‘deemed importer’; believes that ‘deemed importer’ responsibilities should be clearly defined and consistent with the provisions of the DSA; emphasises that platforms being responsible for ensuring that VAT and customs duties are collected at the point of sale, rather than upon entry into the EU, will reduce fraud and tax evasion;

    46.  Expresses concern about the optional nature of the Import One-Stop Shop (IOSS) scheme for all online operators, which deviates from the original objectives of the VAT in the digital age (ViDA) initiative; underlines the necessity of additional actions to strengthen the system’s robustness and curb potential misuse; urges the Commission to engage closely with stakeholders to establish safeguards for the IOSS against fraudulent practices; recommends that such safeguards be both comprehensive and streamlined to effectively deter fraud while avoiding excessive administrative burdens; stresses the necessity of extending the IOSS applicability to goods beyond the customs duty exemption threshold of EUR 150 to prevent undervaluation and ensure fair competition;

    47.  Calls for the establishment of a new EUCA in 2026 to provide expert support to the Member States’ customs authorities; underlines that the EUCA should in its coordination role also map testing and control capabilities of customs and market surveillance authorities in and across the Member States and be mandated to execute unannounced inspections to detect possible unsafe or non-compliant products and issue sanctions in case of non-compliance; notes that the new EU customs data hub will allow for enhanced cooperation between the EUCA and customs and other authorities through data exchange and the interoperability of national IT systems, and thus facilitate coordinated controls and the detection of non-compliant products; considers that it is essential to fully integrate the functionalities of the Customs Single Window into the EU customs data hub; notes in the context of the proposed EUCA, the importance of regularly consulting representatives of various stakeholders to provide early warning to the EUCA;

    48.  Stresses that, given the urgency, the entry into force of different obligations planned in the UCC revision should be accelerated, such as the establishment of the EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to immediately start the preparatory work necessary for the establishment of the EU customs data hub, so as to speed up the preparation of its e-commerce functions in 2026;

    49.  Urges the Commission to carry out an impact assessment regarding the idea of e-commerce items being shipped to the EU in bulk and, in turn, the establishment of warehouses in the EU by non-EU traders for such goods before they are put into parcels for delivery to customers; recognises that such shipments of e-commerce items in bulk and their storage in warehouses in the EU might increase the oversight of customs and market surveillance authorities and improve their controls and detection of non-compliant goods compared to single parcel shipments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all possible options to incentivise such practices, including a simplified status for trust and check traders and cost-benefit assessments for incentive schemes; further notes that bulk shipping may not be feasible for all non-EU traders, particularly those operating consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or second-hand models; emphasises that this approach should strike a balance between the compliance advantages and the practical requirements of e-commerce operators, ensuring that it avoids creating logistical bottlenecks or placing an undue burden on varying business models;

    50.  Acknowledges that the Commission has released a non-paper outlining the introduction of a non-discriminatory handling fee on e-commerce items, to be charged by customs authorities for goods sold in distance sales with the aim of covering the increased supervisory costs of custom authorities, namely the checking of the data, carrying out risk analysis, performing documentary and physical controls and specifically the financing of the EUCA and the data hub; insists that Member States should avoid unilateral fees to avoid a fragmentation of the customs union; underlines that the proposal suggests a flat EUR 2 rate per item delivered directly to the customer or a smaller 50 cent fee for Trust and Check Traders operating a business model of a customs warehouse for distance sales within the EU; calls on the Commission to conduct a proper evaluation of whether the proposed amount complies with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and whether it is sufficient and proportionate to reach the objectives; insists that this handling fee not be incurred by the consumer;

    51.  Notes the enormous waste management and product destruction cost arising from the huge amount of non-compliant and unsafe products imported via non-EU country e-commerce; underlines that a large share of these products is non-recyclable, environmentally harmful or non-compliant with applicable chemicals legislation, further driving up environmental costs for public authorities; calls therefore on the Commission to evaluate the necessary measures to mitigate the environmental impact of non-EU countries’ e-commerce activities including the feasibility of a waste management fee on all products sold via non-EU countries’ online marketplaces to ensure that environmental costs are not supported by EU taxpayers;

    52.  Stresses that inconsistent penalties and different enforcement strategies for non-compliance in different Member States lead to ‘border shopping’ or ‘customs shopping’; supports the minimum harmonisation of infringements and non-criminal sanctions for non-compliance across the Member States and through the EUCA as this would avoid creating weak entry points in the EU customs territory; stresses that this should entail a common framework for minimum harmonisation to close existing loopholes and thus tackle e-commerce challenges; underlines that Member States can impose additional sanctions tailored to national contexts;

    53.  Notes that the Commission is scrutinising certain non-EU online marketplaces for employing manipulative practices, including dark patterns, addictive design features, deceptive influencer marketing, and the dissemination of fake or misleading online reviews; recognises that, according to the Digital Fairness Fitness Check report, unfair commercial practices cost consumers nearly EUR 8 billion annually, and that the use of unfair techniques to pressure consumers, especially vulnerable ones and children, into impulse purchases leads to overconsumption and overspending; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act, unless they are already covered by existing legislation, with a view to effectively tackling unfair practices and closing existing legal loopholes, while staying consistent with existing legal frameworks and avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens;

    54.  Emphasises the need to ensure that any new initiatives proposed by the Commission in the area of customs enforcement or compliance do not result in additional administrative burdens for European businesses, particularly SMEs;

    55.  Stresses the importance of the role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in the field of cross-border investigations of customs offences, which notably include fraud, for example the illicit undervaluing of the price of products in order to avoid paying the import taxes; emphasises that the large-scale circumvention of customs duties, including fraudulent e-commerce declarations and undervaluation, as well as the avoidance of controls and ‘forum shopping,’ must be effectively combated through criminal law investigations conducted by the EPPO, with the support of customs authorities; stresses that the EPPO’s robust legal framework for cross-border investigations should be leveraged to dismantle the criminal networks behind such operations;

    Additional enforcement actions

    56.  Calls on the Commission and the national competent authorities to strongly enforce the DSA with regard to the responsibility of online marketplaces, in particular their obligations in terms of recommender systems, interface design, right to information, the compliance by design rules to increase the overall traceability, and their ‘know your business customer’ obligation; highlights that compliance with these obligations should dissuade non-compliant traders from offering their products in the EU through marketplaces or shopping services of social media falling in this category, and calls on the Commission to provide practical support in tracing traders that do not abide by EU rules; stresses the need for a DSA-based network of trusted flaggers for illegal products and e-commerce to ensure that platforms fulfil their obligations effectively;

    57.  Stresses that the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with national competent authorities is crucial; asks for more cooperation among all relevant authorities, such as Member State authorities, customs authorities, and consumer protection authorities, and for stronger coordination among all established expert groups; stresses that, under the DSA, the investigative actions against non-compliant online marketplaces need to yield results and lead to deterrent sanctions in order to prevent the offer of non-compliant products; emphasises the importance of these investigations in addressing systemic risks, compliance failures, illegal content dissemination, addictive design features, dark patterns and the use of influencers for manipulative advertising;

    58.  Calls on enforcement authorities to strengthen monitoring and enforcement actions targeting new sales channels; recommends that competent authorities be equipped with adequate resources, technological tools, and cross-border cooperation mechanisms to effectively identify and take action against non-compliant traders operating via social media and other emerging platforms;

    59.  Suggests that online marketplace sellers must provide a reshipping address and contact point within the EU to allow consumers to easily return non-compliant goods without undue costs and to allow authorities to inspect goods; believes that online marketplaces should be responsible for checking this and should be held accountable for enforcement;

    60.  Calls for an urgent in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the provision of the ‘responsible person for products placed on the Union market’, particularly those of non-EU traders, building on the results of the evaluation report on Article 4 of the MSR; calls on the Commission to consider among its future actions the introduction of a mandatory requirement for non-EU traders to appoint a responsible person in the EU with increased legal and financial liability;

    61.  Notes that postal and other delivery services are undergoing significant transformations due to the rapid growth of e-commerce; raises concerns that the Universal Postal Union’s terminal dues system in practice does not apply to e-commerce flows; notes that, as a result, Chinese e-commerce businesses, due to shipment volumes, enter into commercial agreements directly with the EU postal operators for exceptionally attractive delivery rates that are lower than those for goods manufactured within the EU, leading to deeper fragmentation of the single market for postal services; urges the Commission to evaluate the impact of e-commerce on postal services and the internal market, and to consider how postal services can contribute to strengthening the single market and benefiting consumers, and to the overall competitiveness of the EU;

    62.  Welcomes the approval of the ViDA reforms, which represent a significant step towards modernising VAT collection in the e-commerce sector; emphasises the importance of the Single VAT ID for online marketplaces and for European manufacturers, enabling them to compete on a level playing field by simplifying VAT compliance across the Member States; highlights that this measure can also facilitate in-bulk importation and the warehousing of goods within the EU, reducing reliance on fragmented cross-border shipments and ensuring that value-added services, such as fulfilment and logistics, take place within the single market; stresses that these reforms will enhance tax compliance, reduce administrative burdens, and improve enforcement while supporting fair competition and strengthening EU supply chains; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of these measures to maximise their benefits for European businesses and consumers;

    63.  Calls on the Commission to consider measures aimed at reducing the unnecessary regulatory and administrative compliance burden for EU manufacturers, in particular for SMEs, in order to level the playing field and enable them to better compete with global competitors operating under more efficient compliance standards;

    64.  Calls on the Commission to enhance international cooperation with other like-minded countries to exchange best practices, identify common challenges and risks and develop joint actions on e-commerce;

    65.  Welcomes, in this regard, the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce; notes that the agreement will benefit consumers and businesses by facilitating cross-border electronic transactions, reducing barriers to digital trade and promoting innovation in e-commerce; underlines, however, that the agreement is only a foundation and encourages the Commission to pursue ambitious trade agreements in negotiations with partners to ensure binding provisions on e-commerce;

    Increased use of IT tools

    66.  Welcomes the fact that the Commission is preparing a project to streamline existing databases, including the Information and Communication System on Market Surveillance, the EU Safety Gate and the Customs Risk Management System, into a common interoperable system gathering all information on the safety of products, counterfeit product tracking and notifications of accidents and to ensure interoperability with the DPP and the future EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to publish information regarding the implementation timeline and the resource requirements of this initiative;

    67.  Supports the Commission’s aim to provide market surveillance authorities with the e-Surveillance WebCrawler tool to flag reappearing dangerous products; asks the Commission to make available another web crawler for detecting new listings as soon as possible, in order to flag non-compliant products before they reach consumers;

    68.  Supports the responsible use of artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things for scanning and analysing product listings on e-commerce platforms, automating customs and market surveillance inspections and risk identification and integrating product compliance databases for real-time checks between market surveillance and customs authorities, in line with EU and national laws; notes, however, that the high implementation costs of these technologies remain a barrier; underlines that the full uptake of these technologies will make handling more efficient, especially for low-value goods, and that the high volume of parcels containing many different items faces limited inspection capabilities;

    69.  Demands that the Commission and the Member States exchange best practices and find incentives to provide the necessary funding and support for national authorities in order to increase the responsible use of technological solutions; suggests that artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things could be used to scan and analyse product listings on e-commerce platforms, automate inspections and risk profiling, and integrate product compliance databases for real-time checks by several authorities;

    70.  Underlines that Member States should reinforce customs checks in particular with low-value shipments by implementing risk-based assessment systems and digital tracking to prevent non-compliant products from bypassing customs controls; calls on the Member States to increase the level of automated processes, such as automated scans of labels when processing parcels at customs;

    71.  Recognises that some online marketplaces also use a number of IT tools to detect and remove unsafe and illicit products that are found on their platforms; highlights, however, the fact that online marketplaces need to further invest in and increase their use of these IT tools to effectively avoid the offer and sale of unsafe and illicit products; calls on the Commission to further incentivise the use of IT tools by online marketplaces in this regard, while ensuring full compliance with Article 8 of the DSA, which provides that there is no general obligation to monitor the information that providers of intermediary services transmit or store;

    72.  Suggests that, without prejudice to the principle enshrined in the DSA that providers of intermediary services online should not be subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of general nature, online intermediaries engaged in the sale, promotion or distribution of products within the EU market should consider on their own the use of risk-based digital monitoring systems to identify and prevent the presence of illegal content (presentation, description or offering for sale of illegal or dangerous products); stresses the importance of implementing swift response mechanisms to ensure the permanent removal of specific illegal content as soon as providers of intermediary services online have actual knowledge of such illegal content being presented on their interfaces, as well as the necessity for hosting service providers to take all necessary measures to prevent the reappearance of the same or equivalent illegal content on their platform;

    Improvement of consumer awareness and information

    73.  Emphasises that EU consumers and European SMEs engaged in importing activities often lack sufficient information on the possible dangers of potentially unsafe products and the harm they can cause; stresses that consumers are increasingly targeted by traders who, despite their legal obligations, often do not inform consumers that their products are made and shipped from outside of the EU; acknowledges that there is demand among EU consumers for cheaper products, which are purchased on non-EU online marketplaces due to their much lower production costs and uncompetitive conditions for EU businesses and online platforms; stresses that online marketplaces may use manipulative design techniques (dark patterns) to influence purchasing decisions; warns against the risks associated with compulsive purchasing behaviours, financial difficulties and the accumulation of unnecessary goods; calls on the Commission and the Member States to organise information and awareness-raising campaigns on the purchase of unsafe products online and their possible health, privacy, environmental and competitiveness consequences, with a special focus on vulnerable consumers and at peak consumption times;

    74.  Recommends fostering second-hand consumption as a sustainable approach to addressing EU consumers’ need for affordable goods; stresses the importance of promoting and incentivising the reuse of second-hand products as an important driver for unlocking the potential of the circular economy;

    75.  Asks the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the ecodesign requirements for textiles and other products under the ESPR, as well as the provisions of the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition(14) in order to make sure that consumers are better informed about sustainability aspects, such as environmental impacts, energy use, reparability and durability of products purchased on online marketplaces;

    76.  Considers that consumer authorities, organisations, industry associations and chambers of commerce should be encouraged to conduct large, coordinated awareness-raising campaigns on consumer rights, potential risks, including the possibilities for collective redress, and redress mechanisms when purchasing online, in particular on non-EU online platforms; stresses the need to also raise awareness about the environmental, health and social impacts of unsustainable business practices and to alert consumers about the role of new advertising techniques, such as influencers and digital opinion leaders, in shaping perceptions of product safety and reliability; calls on the Commission to take a coordinating role as mentioned in the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on e-commerce and to explore possibilities to finance cross-border information campaigns developed in cooperation with researchers, civil society and other relevant stakeholders;

    Trade and development considerations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to implement its level of ambition in agreements with international partners at the multilateral level, as unsafe products constitute not only a European, but also a global challenge; reiterates that, as set out in Parliament’s position on the UCC revision, the EUCA should establish working arrangements with the authorities of non-EU countries and international organisations; stresses that such arrangements should enable the EUCA to exchange information, including best practices, with non-EU authorities and international organisations, and to carry out joint activities; supports continued engagement in the UN Trade and Development working group on consumer product safety, which plays a crucial role in developing best practices for cross-border enforcement;

    78.  Calls on the Commission to step up cooperation with international partners, within forums such as the WTO, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the G7, to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure reciprocity and rules-based trade; calls on the Commission to explicitly incorporate robust and enforceable obligations addressing forced labour when reviewing and renegotiating current trade and investment agreements; underscores the need for stronger EU-China cooperation mechanisms and transparent certification requirements to ensure compliance;

    79.  Highlights the need to consider service and product safety and regulatory compliance provisions when negotiating future EU trade agreements; stresses the importance of specific regulatory dialogues and cooperation through administrative arrangements, improved customs enforcement cooperation, the traceability of shipments to the highest standards and enhanced data-sharing arrangements between customs authorities to effectively tackle non-compliant imports;

    80.  Urges the Commission to be proactive and swiftly deploy targeted trade defence instruments, including anti-subsidy investigations, to address the adverse impacts on European businesses; emphasises that such actions must be coordinated closely with key international partners, to ensure effective global enforcement and reciprocal market fairness;

    81.  Encourages the Commission to enhance diplomatic efforts and cooperation within international forums, particularly the WTO, the WCO and the G7, to counterbalance China’s strategic expansion into digital governance frameworks, including its Digital Silk Road initiative; stresses the need for open, more transparent and responsible digital trade rules in international standard-setting bodies to prevent internet fragmentation and mitigate the risks posed by restrictive digital governance models;

    82.  Welcomes the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce as a vital step towards global digital trade rules; stresses, however, its current limitations, especially regarding customs transparency; urges the Commission to advocate stronger binding provisions to ensure its effective implementation and integration into the WTO legal framework, and to ensure enhanced global compliance standards;

    83.  Emphasises the need for international capacity-building initiatives to support the sustainable and compliant participation of developing countries in digital trade; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with international organisations, especially the WTO, to enhance regulatory frameworks and technical assistance for e-commerce in developing countries;

    o
    o   o

    84.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ C, C/2025/1035, 27.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1035/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2024/3015, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3015/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1760, 5.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj.
    (4) Letta, E., ‘Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’, April 2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf.
    (5) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety, amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and the Council, and repealing Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 87/357/EEC (OJ L 135, 23.5.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/988/oj).
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on market surveillance and compliance of products and amending Directive 2004/42/EC and Regulations (EC) No 765/2008 and (EU) No 305/2011 (OJ L 169, 25.6.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1020/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj).
    (9) Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/952/oj).
    (10) Letta, E., ‘Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’, April 2024.
    (11) Regulation (EU) 2023/2411 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on the protection of geographical indications for craft and industrial products and amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1001 and (EU) 2019/1753 (OJ L, 2023/2411, 27.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2411/oj).
    (12) Directive (EU) 2024/2853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on liability for defective products and repealing Council Directive 85/374/EEC (OJ L, 2024/2853, 18.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2853/oj).
    (13) Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, amending Directive (EU) 2020/1828 and Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 and repealing Directive 2009/125/EC (OJ L, 2024/1781, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1781/oj).
    (14) Directive (EU) 2024/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and through better information (OJ L, 2024/825, 6.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/825/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Fatal helicopter incident – Gapuwiyak

    Source: Northern Territory Police and Fire Services

    Northern Territory Police are investigating a fatal helicopter incident that occurred in Gapuwiyak this afternoon.

    Around 2:00pm, the Joint Emergency Services Communication Centre received reports that a helicopter carrying two occupants had made an emergency landing at the Lake Evella airstrip after the aircraft struck a bird. The impact allegedly caused the bird to fatally strike a 44-year-old male passenger.

    The pilot was able to land the aircraft safely and was uninjured.

    Police and St John Ambulance attended the scene; however, the 44-year-old male was declared deceased.

    A report will be prepared for the coroner.

    NT WorkSafe and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) have been notified.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Was the Air India crash caused by pilot error or technical fault? None of the theories holds up – yet

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Guido Carim Junior, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, Griffith University

    Over the weekend, the Indian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau released a preliminary report on last month’s crash of Air India flight 171, which killed 260 people, 19 of them on the ground.

    The aim of a preliminary report is to present factual information gathered so far and to inform further lines of inquiry. However, the 15-page document has also led to unfounded speculation and theories that are currently not supported by the evidence.

    Here’s what the report actually says, why we don’t yet know what caused the crash, and why it’s important not to speculate.

    What the preliminary report does say

    What we know for certain is that the aircraft lost power in both engines just after takeoff.

    According to the report, this is supported by video footage showing the deployment of the ram air turbine (RAT), and the examination of the air inlet door of the auxiliary power unit (APU).

    The RAT is deployed when both engines fail, all hydraulic systems are lost, or there is a total electrical power loss. The APU air inlet door opens when the system attempts to start automatically due to dual engine failure.

    The preliminary investigation suggests both engines shut down because the fuel flow stopped. Attention has now shifted to the fuel control switches, located on the throttle lever panel between the pilots.

    This is what the fuel switches look like, with the throttle lever above them.
    Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

    Data from the enhanced airborne flight recorder suggests these switches may have been moved from “run” to “cutoff” three seconds after liftoff. Ten seconds later, the switches were moved back to “run”.

    The report also suggests the pilots were aware the engines had shut down and attempted to restart them. Despite their effort, the engines couldn’t restart in time.

    We don’t know what the pilots did

    Flight data recorders don’t capture pilot actions. They record system responses and sensor data, which can sometimes lead to the belief they’re an accurate representation of the pilot’s actions in the cockpit.

    While this is true most of the time, this is not always the case.

    In my own work investigating safety incidents, I’ve seen cases in which automated systems misinterpreted inputs. In one case, a system recorded a pilot pressing the same button six times in two seconds, something humanly impossible. On further investigation, it turned out to be a faulty system, not a real action.

    We cannot yet rule out the possibility that system damage or sensor error led to false data being recorded. We also don’t know whether the pilots unintentionally flicked the switches to “cutoff”. And we may never know.

    As we also don’t have a camera in the cockpit, any interpretation of pilots’ actions will be made indirectly, usually through the data sensed by the aircraft and the conversation, sound and noise captured by the environmental microphone available in the cockpit.

    We don’t have the full conversation between the pilots

    Perhaps the most confusing clue in the report was an excerpt of a conversation between the pilots. It says:

    In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.

    This short exchange is entirely without context. First, we don’t know who says what. Second, we don’t know when the question was asked – after takeoff, or after the engine started to lose power? Third, we don’t know the exact words used, because the excerpt in the report is paraphrased.

    Finally, we don’t know whether the exchange referred to the engine status or the switch position. Again, we may never know.

    What’s crucial here is that the current available evidence doesn’t support any theory about intentional fuel cutoff by either of the pilots. To say otherwise is unfounded speculation.

    We don’t know if there was a mechanical failure

    The preliminary report indicates that, for now, there are no actions required by Boeing, General Electric or any company that operates the Boeing 787-8 and/or GEnx-1B engine.

    This has led some to speculate that a mechanical failure has been ruled out. Again, it is far too early to conclude that.

    What the preliminary report shows is that the investigation team has not found any evidence to suggest the aircraft suffered a catastrophic failure that requires immediate attention or suspension of operations around the world.

    This could be because there was no catastrophic failure. It could also be because the physical evidence has been so badly damaged that investigators will need more time and other sources of evidence to learn what happened.

    Why we must resist premature conclusions

    In the aftermath of an accident, there is much at stake for many people: the manufacturer of the aircraft, the airline, the airport, civil aviation authority and others. The families of the victims understandably demand answers.

    It’s also tempting to latch onto a convenient explanation. But the preliminary report is not the full story. It’s based on very limited data, analysed under immense pressure, and without access to every subsystem or mechanical trace.

    The final report is still to come. Until then, the responsible position for regulators, experts and the public is to withhold judgement.

    This tragedy reminds us that aviation safety depends on patient and thorough investigation – not media soundbites or unqualified expert commentary. We owe it to the victims and their families to get the facts right, not just fast.

    Guido Carim Junior has received funding from Boeing R&D Australia to conduct research projects in the past five years.

    ref. Was the Air India crash caused by pilot error or technical fault? None of the theories holds up – yet – https://theconversation.com/was-the-air-india-crash-caused-by-pilot-error-or-technical-fault-none-of-the-theories-holds-up-yet-261102

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Was the Air India crash caused by pilot error or technical fault? None of the theories holds up – yet

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Guido Carim Junior, Senior Lecturer in Aviation, Griffith University

    Over the weekend, the Indian Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau released a preliminary report on last month’s crash of Air India flight 171, which killed 260 people, 19 of them on the ground.

    The aim of a preliminary report is to present factual information gathered so far and to inform further lines of inquiry. However, the 15-page document has also led to unfounded speculation and theories that are currently not supported by the evidence.

    Here’s what the report actually says, why we don’t yet know what caused the crash, and why it’s important not to speculate.

    What the preliminary report does say

    What we know for certain is that the aircraft lost power in both engines just after takeoff.

    According to the report, this is supported by video footage showing the deployment of the ram air turbine (RAT), and the examination of the air inlet door of the auxiliary power unit (APU).

    The RAT is deployed when both engines fail, all hydraulic systems are lost, or there is a total electrical power loss. The APU air inlet door opens when the system attempts to start automatically due to dual engine failure.

    The preliminary investigation suggests both engines shut down because the fuel flow stopped. Attention has now shifted to the fuel control switches, located on the throttle lever panel between the pilots.

    This is what the fuel switches look like, with the throttle lever above them.
    Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

    Data from the enhanced airborne flight recorder suggests these switches may have been moved from “run” to “cutoff” three seconds after liftoff. Ten seconds later, the switches were moved back to “run”.

    The report also suggests the pilots were aware the engines had shut down and attempted to restart them. Despite their effort, the engines couldn’t restart in time.

    We don’t know what the pilots did

    Flight data recorders don’t capture pilot actions. They record system responses and sensor data, which can sometimes lead to the belief they’re an accurate representation of the pilot’s actions in the cockpit.

    While this is true most of the time, this is not always the case.

    In my own work investigating safety incidents, I’ve seen cases in which automated systems misinterpreted inputs. In one case, a system recorded a pilot pressing the same button six times in two seconds, something humanly impossible. On further investigation, it turned out to be a faulty system, not a real action.

    We cannot yet rule out the possibility that system damage or sensor error led to false data being recorded. We also don’t know whether the pilots unintentionally flicked the switches to “cutoff”. And we may never know.

    As we also don’t have a camera in the cockpit, any interpretation of pilots’ actions will be made indirectly, usually through the data sensed by the aircraft and the conversation, sound and noise captured by the environmental microphone available in the cockpit.

    We don’t have the full conversation between the pilots

    Perhaps the most confusing clue in the report was an excerpt of a conversation between the pilots. It says:

    In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.

    This short exchange is entirely without context. First, we don’t know who says what. Second, we don’t know when the question was asked – after takeoff, or after the engine started to lose power? Third, we don’t know the exact words used, because the excerpt in the report is paraphrased.

    Finally, we don’t know whether the exchange referred to the engine status or the switch position. Again, we may never know.

    What’s crucial here is that the current available evidence doesn’t support any theory about intentional fuel cutoff by either of the pilots. To say otherwise is unfounded speculation.

    We don’t know if there was a mechanical failure

    The preliminary report indicates that, for now, there are no actions required by Boeing, General Electric or any company that operates the Boeing 787-8 and/or GEnx-1B engine.

    This has led some to speculate that a mechanical failure has been ruled out. Again, it is far too early to conclude that.

    What the preliminary report shows is that the investigation team has not found any evidence to suggest the aircraft suffered a catastrophic failure that requires immediate attention or suspension of operations around the world.

    This could be because there was no catastrophic failure. It could also be because the physical evidence has been so badly damaged that investigators will need more time and other sources of evidence to learn what happened.

    Why we must resist premature conclusions

    In the aftermath of an accident, there is much at stake for many people: the manufacturer of the aircraft, the airline, the airport, civil aviation authority and others. The families of the victims understandably demand answers.

    It’s also tempting to latch onto a convenient explanation. But the preliminary report is not the full story. It’s based on very limited data, analysed under immense pressure, and without access to every subsystem or mechanical trace.

    The final report is still to come. Until then, the responsible position for regulators, experts and the public is to withhold judgement.

    This tragedy reminds us that aviation safety depends on patient and thorough investigation – not media soundbites or unqualified expert commentary. We owe it to the victims and their families to get the facts right, not just fast.

    Guido Carim Junior has received funding from Boeing R&D Australia to conduct research projects in the past five years.

    ref. Was the Air India crash caused by pilot error or technical fault? None of the theories holds up – yet – https://theconversation.com/was-the-air-india-crash-caused-by-pilot-error-or-technical-fault-none-of-the-theories-holds-up-yet-261102

    MIL OSI

  • Nigeria’s former President Muhammadu Buhari dies in London, PM Modi offers condolences

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Nigeria’s former president, Muhammadu Buhari, who led Africa’s most populous country from 2015 to 2023 and was the first Nigerian president to oust an incumbent through the ballot box, died in London on Sunday, a presidential spokesperson said.

    “President Buhari died today in London at about 4:30 p.m. (1530 GMT), following a prolonged illness,” President Bola Tinubu’s spokesperson said in a statement.

    The spokesperson said Tinubu had directed Vice President Kashim Shettima and his chief of staff to travel to London to collect and accompany Buhari’s body back to Nigeria for burial.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed grief over Buhari’s demise.

    In a post on X, PM Modi said, “Deeply saddened by the passing of former President of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari. I fondly recall our meetings and conversations on various occasions. His wisdom, warmth and unwavering commitment to India–Nigeria friendship stood out. I join the 1.4 billion people of India in extending our heartfelt condolences to his family, the people and the government of Nigeria.

    A Muslim, Buhari was expected to be buried according to Muslim rites in his home state of northwestern Katsina, government officials said.

    Buhari, 82, first led the country as a military ruler after a coup in the 1980s. He earned a devoted following for his brand of anti-corruption conviction politics.

    He referred to himself as a “converted democrat” and swapped his military uniform for kaftans and prayer caps.

    “I belong to everybody and I belong to nobody,” was a constant refrain Buhari told supporters and critics alike.

    Buhari defeated Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 in what was judged to be Nigeria’s fairest election to date. Many hoped the retired major general would crack down on armed groups, just as he had as the country’s military head of state.

    Instead, violence that had mostly been confined to the northeast spread. That left swathes of Nigeria outside the control of its security forces as gunmen in the northwest, armed separatists and gangs in the southeast roamed unchecked.

    Much of his appeal lay in the anti-corruption ethos that was a central plank of his agenda both as a military and civilian ruler. He said endemic corruption in Nigeria’s political culture was holding people back.

    ‘BABA GO SLOW’

    But Buhari quickly disappointed after his 2015 win.

    He took power as Nigeria was reeling from jihadist group Boko Haram’s kidnapping of nearly 300 schoolgirls from the northeastern town of Chibok.

    He took six months to name his cabinet. During that time, the oil-dependent economy was hobbled by low crude prices, prompting people to call him “Baba Go Slow”.

    He retained his popularity in poor, largely Muslim northern Nigeria, where voters propelled him to his second victory in 2019, despite his first term being blighted by Nigeria’s first recession in a generation, militant attacks on oilfields, and repeated hospital stays for an undisclosed illness.

    On the economy, Buhari applied the same approach that failed when he was in power in the 1980s – keeping the currency artificially high, as a matter of national pride. Just as in his first stint in power, the president ignored the IMF’s advice to devalue the naira.

    In 2022 the production of oil – by far Nigeria’s greatest export – fell to its lowest level in more than two decades due to crude theft in the Niger Delta.

    His anti-corruption crackdown also ran into criticism and failed to yield high-profile convictions.

    Rights groups said Buhari never let go of his autocratic tendencies. In a major flashpoint, unarmed demonstrators protesting against police brutality were gunned down in 2020. Nationwide street violence followed, marking some of the most widespread civil unrest since military rule ended in 1999.

    KIDNAP PLOT

    Born on December 17, 1942, in Daura, Katsina State, Buhari enrolled in the army at 19. He would eventually rise to the rank of major-general.

    He seized power in 1983 as a military ruler, promising to revitalise a mismanaged country. He took a tough line on everything from the conditions sought by the International Monetary Fund to unruliness in bus queues.

    In 1984, his administration attempted to kidnap a former minister and vocal critic living in Britain. The plot failed when London airport officials opened the crate containing the abducted politician.

    His first stint in power was short-lived. He was removed after only 18 months by another military officer, Ibrahim Babangida.

    Buhari spent much of the following 30 years in fringe political parties and trying to run for president until his eventual victory over Jonathan in 2015.

    Buhari said he aimed to improve the lives of Nigerians through social welfare programmes, the construction of train lines, roads, dams, airports and power infrastructure.

    The infrastructure projects laid the foundation for a strong Nigerian economy, he said.

    (With inputs from Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: 1st official taxi fleet licence issued

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    An official Taxi Fleet Licence has been issued to SynCab Taxi (mixed fleet), operated by SynCab Service, in accordance with the Road Traffic (Public Service Vehicles) Regulations for a period of five years, with the fleet starting services, including online hailing services, today.

    The Transport Department said it has approved the taxi livery design and markings of the fleet which has to display fleet taxi plates at the front and rear as well as a fleet taxi certificate on the windscreen.

    Fleet taxis may customise fares for pre-arranged journeys, charging a booking fee on top of the metered fare or charging a lump sum fare before the journey starts. Both must be agreed with the hirer in advance.

    The fares of fleet taxis may vary for pre-arranged journeys, depending on the time of booking and the types of taxis the passengers request. Higher fares may be charged during peak hours or when the passenger requests a premium taxi.

    For street-hailing trips, fleet taxis shall charge according to the same fare schedule as general taxis. The department has set up a website, providing information on the taxi fleet service.

    There are about 80 designated fleet taxi stopping places at 13 locations such as the airport, certain boundary control points and Airport Express stations, Hong Kong West Kowloon Station of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link, Kai Tak Cruise Terminal and Hong Kong Disneyland.

    Information plates will be installed at these locations. The department will put up signage and display panels at some of the locations, and display online hailing QR codes via leaflets and posters for the public and tourists to make their bookings.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • Kentucky church shooting leaves three dead, including suspect

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    A gunman killed two women at a church in Kentucky and shot and wounded a state trooper outside an airport on Sunday before police were able to shoot him to death, authorities said.

    The women were killed at the Richmond Road Baptist Church in Lexington. Two men were also wounded there, including one who was in critical condition, Lexington Police Chief Lawrence Weathers told an afternoon press conference.

    Authorities did not provide the suspect’s name or age.

    “There are days like today that are extremely difficult,” Weathers said. “Sometimes things happen, you just don’t have a reason why.”

    The suspect fired at the trooper after being pulled over near Blue Grass Airport at about 11:30 a.m. in Fayette County, Weathers said. The shooting happened on a road that rings the airport but was not connected to its operations, police said.

    The trooper was being treated at a nearby hospital and was in stable condition.

    The suspect then carjacked a vehicle about 10 miles (16 km) from the airport and fled to Richmond Road Baptist Church, where the individual began firing at people on the church grounds.

    Police tracked the location of the carjacked vehicle to the church.

    The police chief did not offer any motive for the shootings, but said there was some indication that the suspect may have known some of the people at the church.

    Weathers said Lexington police would conduct an internal review of the shooting, as required by department policies.

    The Blue Grass Airport posted on X at 1 p.m. ET (1700 GMT) that there was a law enforcement investigation affecting a portion of an airport road, but that all flights and operations were now proceeding normally.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-Evening Report: Washington’s war demands – Australia right to refuse committing to a hypothetical conflict with China over Taiwan

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

    Andy. LIU/Shutterstock

    The United States can count on Australia as one of its closest allies.

    Dating back to the shared experiences in the second world war and the ANZUS Treaty signed in 1951, Australia has steadfastly worked to help ensure the US remains the principal security guarantor in the Indo-Pacific.

    Australia’s track record speaks for itself. Yet additional demands are being placed that rankle.

    The Pentagon wants to know how Australia – and other allies such as Japan – would respond in the event of a war with China over Taiwan.

    Making these demands – which are being sought as part of the review of the AUKUS nuclear submarine agreement – is both unjustified and unreasonable.

    ‘100 years of mateship’

    Since federation in 1901, Australians have found themselves alongside US counterparts in almost all the major conflicts of the 20th century and beyond.

    It is this shared experience that led former Ambassador to Washington, Joe Hockey, to coin the term “100 years of mateship”.

    The pinnacle of the security relationship is the ANZUS Treaty which is a loosely worded document barely 800 words long.

    However, it is important to remember AUKUS is just that – a technical agreement, albeit premised on the century-spanning trusted collaboration across the full spectrum of national security ties.

    Goldilocks solution

    More recently, the US administration has made demands of allies, including Australia, the likes of which have not been seen in living memory.

    This spans not just tariffs, but also increased defence spending. American policymakers appear oblivious or unconcerned about the blowback they are generating.

    It is this context which makes the US demands for a broad-ranging and largely open-ended commitment over the defence of Taiwan, in advance of any conflict, so extraordinary and unhelpful.

    Under-secretary of defence for policy Elbridge Colby who wants a clear sense of how Australia would act in a potential war over Taiwan.
    Supplied by US Department of Defence, CC BY

    Australia has long had a fear of abandonment. Ever since the searing experience of the fall of Singapore in 1942, officials have been eager to burnish ties with US counterparts. Conversely, there has always been a strong element in the community that has feared entrapment in yet another US-led war in Asia.

    The experience in the Korean and Vietnam wars, let alone Afghanistan and Iraq, left many guarded about the efficacy of hitching the wagon to US-led military campaigns.

    In essence, though, Australian policymakers have long sought the Goldilocks solution: not too enthusiastic to trigger entrapment and not too lukewarm to trigger abandonment.

    No guarantees

    Now Australia, Japan and others face a surprising new push by American officials for a commitment to a hypothetical conflict, under open-ended circumstances.

    The irony is that American demands for a commitment fly in the face of the loosely worded ANZUS alliance – which stipulates an agreement to consult, but little more than that.

    The AUKUS agreement includes no such guarantees either. The overt and confronting nature of Washington’s demands means Prime Minister Anthony Albanese effectively has no option but to push back:

    We support the status quo when it comes to Taiwan. We don’t support any unilateral action […] we want peace and security in our region.

    Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy was adamant Australia would not be committing forces ahead of any “hypothetical” conflict:

    The decision to commit Australian troops to a conflict will be made by the government of the day, not in advance, but by the government of the day.

    A further irony is Australia, like Japan, is already hugely invested in its US military relationship, particularly through its military technology.

    The purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, for instance, was meant to help enable the generation of interoperable forces, yet no such demand has been made when it comes to an advance commitment over their use in support of US ambitions.

    So why invoke AUKUS in such a way?

    Evidently, the way the US is trying to stand over Japan and Australia is harmful to its own interests. Such adversarial and unduly transactional behaviour could provoke a popular backlash in Australia and elsewhere.

    The government has rightly rebuffed the calls saying it would be up to the government of the day to make such a decision. It is likely this will not be well received by the Trump administration. The PM is right though, to say it’s hypothetical and not worthy of a public endorsement.

    Strategic ambiguity

    Yet a further irony is that this is mostly a moot point.

    The key benefit of alliance collaboration is already in place – and that relates to the efforts to deter China from ever acting on its desire to change the status quo in the first place.

    As former PM and now ambassador to Washington, Kevin Rudd explained in his book, The Avoidable War, geo-political disaster is still avoidable, particularly if the US and China can find a way to coexist without betraying their core interests through managed strategic competition.

    This strategic ambiguity is meant to complicate a potential adversary’s military planners and political decision makers’ thought processes over the advantages and disadvantages of going to war.

    China already knows a clash over Taiwan would mean US allies like Japan and Australia would find it virtually impossible to avoid being entangled. The strategic ambiguity can be maintained ad infinitum, so long as an outright invasion is averted.

    And the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan? I remain sanguine that conflict can be avoided.

    But to do so would involve clear and compelling messaging: both through diplomatic channels and through the demonstration of robust military capabilities that war would be too costly.

    John Blaxland received funding (2015–2018) from the US DoD Minerva Research Initiative.

    ref. Washington’s war demands – Australia right to refuse committing to a hypothetical conflict with China over Taiwan – https://theconversation.com/washingtons-war-demands-australia-right-to-refuse-committing-to-a-hypothetical-conflict-with-china-over-taiwan-261076

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Transport Department issues first official Taxi Fleet Licence (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Transport Department (TD) announced today (July 14) that an official Taxi Fleet Licence has been issued to SynCab Taxi (mixed fleet), operated by SynCab Service Limited, in accordance with regulation 12E(1) of the Road Traffic (Public Service Vehicles) Regulations (Cap. 374D) for a period of five years. The fleet officially commenced services today.

         The TD has approved the taxi livery design and markings of the fleet. For easy identification by passengers, all fleet taxis are required to display fleet taxi plates (see Annex) at the front and rear of the taxi bodies, and a fleet taxi certificate on the windscreens of the taxis.

         All fleets provide online hailing services. Fleet taxis may customise fares for pre-arranged journeys, charging a booking fee on top of the metered fare or charging a lump sum fare before the journey starts. Both must be agreed with the hirer in advance. The fares of fleet taxis may vary for pre-arranged journeys depending on the circumstances at the time of booking and the types of taxis requested by the passenger. For example, higher fares may be charged during peak hours or when the passenger requests a premium taxi. For street-hailing trips, fleet taxis shall charge according to the same fare schedule as general taxis.

         The TD has set up a taxi fleet thematic website. It will also introduce information of the taxi fleet service to the public and tourists through various online and offline channels, including the TD’s HKeMobility mobile application, and the collaboration with the Hong Kong Tourism Board, the Airport Authority Hong Kong, the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal operator and Hong Kong Talent Engage.

         In addition, the TD has set up about 80 designated fleet taxi stopping places across 13 locations, such as the airport, certain boundary control points, the Hong Kong West Kowloon Station of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link, some Airport Express stations, the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal and the Hong Kong Disneyland. Information plates will be installed at these locations. The TD will also put up signage and display panels at some of these locations, and display online hailing QR codes via leaflets and posters for the public and tourists to make their bookings.

         The TD will monitor the fleet’s operations and continue to actively promote the remaining fleets to commence operations as soon as possible.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Washington’s war demands – Australia right to refuse being dragged into a potential conflict with China over Taiwan

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

    Andy. LIU/Shutterstock

    The United States can count on Australia as one of its closest allies.

    Dating back to the shared experiences in the second world war and the ANZUS Treaty signed in 1951, Australia has steadfastly worked to help ensure the US remains the principal security guarantor in the Indo-Pacific.

    Australia’s track record speaks for itself. Yet additional demands are being placed that rankle.

    The Pentagon wants to know how Australia – and other allies such as Japan – would respond in the event of a war with China over Taiwan.

    Making these demands – which are being sought as part of the review of the AUKUS nuclear submarine agreement – is both unjustified and unreasonable.

    ‘100 years of mateship’

    Since federation in 1901, Australians have found themselves alongside US counterparts in almost all the major conflicts of the 20th century and beyond.

    It is this shared experience that led former Ambassador to Washington, Joe Hockey, to coin the term “100 years of mateship”.

    The pinnacle of the security relationship is the ANZUS Treaty which is a loosely worded document barely 800 words long.

    However, it is important to remember AUKUS is just that – a technical agreement, albeit premised on the century-spanning trusted collaboration across the full spectrum of national security ties.

    Goldilocks solution

    More recently, the US administration has made demands of allies, including Australia, the likes of which have not been seen in living memory.

    This spans not just tariffs, but also increased defence spending. American policymakers appear oblivious or unconcerned about the blowback they are generating.

    It is this context which makes the US demands for a broad-ranging and largely open-ended commitment over the defence of Taiwan, in advance of any conflict, so extraordinary and unhelpful.

    Under-secretary of defence for policy Elbridge Colby who wants a clear sense of how Australia would act in a potential war over Taiwan.
    Supplied by US Department of Defence, CC BY

    Australia has long had a fear of abandonment. Ever since the searing experience of the fall of Singapore in 1942, officials have been eager to burnish ties with US counterparts. Conversely, there has always been a strong element in the community that has feared entrapment in yet another US-led war in Asia.

    The experience in the Korean and Vietnam wars, let alone Afghanistan and Iraq, left many guarded about the efficacy of hitching the wagon to US-led military campaigns.

    In essence, though, Australian policymakers have long sought the Goldilocks solution: not too enthusiastic to trigger entrapment and not too lukewarm to trigger abandonment.

    No guarantees

    Now Australia, Japan and others face a surprising new push by American officials for a commitment to a hypothetical conflict, under open-ended circumstances.

    The irony is that American demands for a commitment fly in the face of the loosely worded ANZUS alliance – which stipulates an agreement to consult, but little more than that.

    The AUKUS agreement includes no such guarantees either. The overt and confronting nature of Washington’s demands means Prime Minister Anthony Albanese effectively has no option but to push back:

    We support the status quo when it comes to Taiwan. We don’t support any unilateral action […] we want peace and security in our region.

    Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy was adamant Australia would not be committing forces ahead of any “hypothetical” conflict:

    The decision to commit Australian troops to a conflict will be made by the government of the day, not in advance, but by the government of the day.

    A further irony is Australia, like Japan, is already hugely invested in its US military relationship, particularly through its military technology.

    The purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, for instance, was meant to help enable the generation of interoperable forces, yet no such demand has been made when it comes to an advance commitment over their use in support of US ambitions.

    So why invoke AUKUS in such a way?

    Evidently, the way the US is trying to stand over Japan and Australia is harmful to its own interests. Such adversarial and unduly transactional behaviour could provoke a popular backlash in Australia and elsewhere.

    The government has rightly rebuffed the calls saying it would be up to the government of the day to make such a decision. It is likely this will not be well received by the Trump administration. The PM is right though, to say it’s hypothetical and not worthy of a public endorsement.

    Strategic ambiguity

    Yet a further irony is that this is mostly a moot point.

    The key benefit of alliance collaboration is already in place – and that relates to the efforts to deter China from ever acting on its desire to change the status quo in the first place.

    As former PM and now ambassador to Washington, Kevin Rudd explained in his book, The Avoidable War, geo-political disaster is still avoidable, particularly if the US and China can find a way to coexist without betraying their core interests through managed strategic competition.

    This strategic ambiguity is meant to complicate a potential adversary’s military planners and political decision makers’ thought processes over the advantages and disadvantages of going to war.

    China already knows a clash over Taiwan would mean US allies like Japan and Australia would find it virtually impossible to avoid being entangled. The strategic ambiguity can be maintained ad infinitum, so long as an outright invasion is averted.

    And the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan? I remain sanguine that conflict can be avoided.

    But to do so would involve clear and compelling messaging: both through diplomatic channels and through the demonstration of robust military capabilities that war would be too costly.

    John Blaxland received funding (2015–2018) from the US DoD Minerva Research Initiative.

    ref. Washington’s war demands – Australia right to refuse being dragged into a potential conflict with China over Taiwan – https://theconversation.com/washingtons-war-demands-australia-right-to-refuse-being-dragged-into-a-potential-conflict-with-china-over-taiwan-261076

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Washington’s war demands – Australia right to refuse being dragged into a potential conflict with China over Taiwan

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

    Andy. LIU/Shutterstock

    The United States can count on Australia as one of its closest allies.

    Dating back to the shared experiences in the second world war and the ANZUS Treaty signed in 1951, Australia has steadfastly worked to help ensure the US remains the principal security guarantor in the Indo-Pacific.

    Australia’s track record speaks for itself. Yet additional demands are being placed that rankle.

    The Pentagon wants to know how Australia – and other allies such as Japan – would respond in the event of a war with China over Taiwan.

    Making these demands – which are being sought as part of the review of the AUKUS nuclear submarine agreement – is both unjustified and unreasonable.

    ‘100 years of mateship’

    Since federation in 1901, Australians have found themselves alongside US counterparts in almost all the major conflicts of the 20th century and beyond.

    It is this shared experience that led former Ambassador to Washington, Joe Hockey, to coin the term “100 years of mateship”.

    The pinnacle of the security relationship is the ANZUS Treaty which is a loosely worded document barely 800 words long.

    However, it is important to remember AUKUS is just that – a technical agreement, albeit premised on the century-spanning trusted collaboration across the full spectrum of national security ties.

    Goldilocks solution

    More recently, the US administration has made demands of allies, including Australia, the likes of which have not been seen in living memory.

    This spans not just tariffs, but also increased defence spending. American policymakers appear oblivious or unconcerned about the blowback they are generating.

    It is this context which makes the US demands for a broad-ranging and largely open-ended commitment over the defence of Taiwan, in advance of any conflict, so extraordinary and unhelpful.

    Under-secretary of defence for policy Elbridge Colby who wants a clear sense of how Australia would act in a potential war over Taiwan.
    Supplied by US Department of Defence, CC BY

    Australia has long had a fear of abandonment. Ever since the searing experience of the fall of Singapore in 1942, officials have been eager to burnish ties with US counterparts. Conversely, there has always been a strong element in the community that has feared entrapment in yet another US-led war in Asia.

    The experience in the Korean and Vietnam wars, let alone Afghanistan and Iraq, left many guarded about the efficacy of hitching the wagon to US-led military campaigns.

    In essence, though, Australian policymakers have long sought the Goldilocks solution: not too enthusiastic to trigger entrapment and not too lukewarm to trigger abandonment.

    No guarantees

    Now Australia, Japan and others face a surprising new push by American officials for a commitment to a hypothetical conflict, under open-ended circumstances.

    The irony is that American demands for a commitment fly in the face of the loosely worded ANZUS alliance – which stipulates an agreement to consult, but little more than that.

    The AUKUS agreement includes no such guarantees either. The overt and confronting nature of Washington’s demands means Prime Minister Anthony Albanese effectively has no option but to push back:

    We support the status quo when it comes to Taiwan. We don’t support any unilateral action […] we want peace and security in our region.

    Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy was adamant Australia would not be committing forces ahead of any “hypothetical” conflict:

    The decision to commit Australian troops to a conflict will be made by the government of the day, not in advance, but by the government of the day.

    A further irony is Australia, like Japan, is already hugely invested in its US military relationship, particularly through its military technology.

    The purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, for instance, was meant to help enable the generation of interoperable forces, yet no such demand has been made when it comes to an advance commitment over their use in support of US ambitions.

    So why invoke AUKUS in such a way?

    Evidently, the way the US is trying to stand over Japan and Australia is harmful to its own interests. Such adversarial and unduly transactional behaviour could provoke a popular backlash in Australia and elsewhere.

    The government has rightly rebuffed the calls saying it would be up to the government of the day to make such a decision. It is likely this will not be well received by the Trump administration. The PM is right though, to say it’s hypothetical and not worthy of a public endorsement.

    Strategic ambiguity

    Yet a further irony is that this is mostly a moot point.

    The key benefit of alliance collaboration is already in place – and that relates to the efforts to deter China from ever acting on its desire to change the status quo in the first place.

    As former PM and now ambassador to Washington, Kevin Rudd explained in his book, The Avoidable War, geo-political disaster is still avoidable, particularly if the US and China can find a way to coexist without betraying their core interests through managed strategic competition.

    This strategic ambiguity is meant to complicate a potential adversary’s military planners and political decision makers’ thought processes over the advantages and disadvantages of going to war.

    China already knows a clash over Taiwan would mean US allies like Japan and Australia would find it virtually impossible to avoid being entangled. The strategic ambiguity can be maintained ad infinitum, so long as an outright invasion is averted.

    And the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan? I remain sanguine that conflict can be avoided.

    But to do so would involve clear and compelling messaging: both through diplomatic channels and through the demonstration of robust military capabilities that war would be too costly.

    John Blaxland received funding (2015–2018) from the US DoD Minerva Research Initiative.

    ref. Washington’s war demands – Australia right to refuse being dragged into a potential conflict with China over Taiwan – https://theconversation.com/washingtons-war-demands-australia-right-to-refuse-being-dragged-into-a-potential-conflict-with-china-over-taiwan-261076

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Openness, fair competition power China’s unified national market

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    A drone photo taken on July 2, 2025 shows an electric vertical take-off-and-landing (eVTOL) aircraft performing flight demonstration at Luogang Park in Hefei, east China’s Anhui Province. (Xinhua/Zhou Mu)

    At Hefei’s urban air mobility hub, the rotor blades of an electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft hum to life before it glides smoothly into the summer sky.

    Known as a “flying taxi,” this innovative vehicle is operated by Hefei Heyi Aviation Co., which in March became one of China’s first companies to receive an operating certificate for passenger-grade civil unmanned aircraft.

    “Chinese companies have long been capable of designing and building these aircraft, but operating them was challenging due to regulatory restrictions,” said Li Xiaona, general manager of the company in east China’s Anhui Province.

    Following the breakthrough in airworthiness certification, the commercialization of passenger-grade unmanned aircraft in China has accelerated, with government agencies working closely with industry bodies to set clear standards and define responsibilities.

    By clearly defining “how to enter” and “how to regulate,” China’s low-altitude economy has hit the fast-forward button. Data show that over 80,000 companies are now operating nationwide, with the market continuing to expand rapidly.

    This exemplifies the Chinese government’s efforts to streamline administrative approvals and boost market vitality. China’s vast and rapidly growing market provides a crucial advantage and a stable foundation amid global uncertainties. To drive high-quality growth and establish a new development model, building a unified national market is vital, and government authorities nationwide are stepping up efforts to make this vision a reality.

    Beyond aviation, China has steadily enhanced its market access regulations, opening more sectors to private and foreign investment, thereby driving innovation and fostering competition.

    In April, the country released a new edition of its national market access negative list, cutting the number of restricted items to 106 from 151 in 2018, a move designed to provide businesses with clearer expectations and greater certainty.

    With market entry barriers lowered, private and foreign businesses are discovering fresh opportunities across various sectors.

    In Beijing, Minospace recently secured an 804 million yuan (about 112 million U.S. dollars) contract to develop and launch a network of 10 remote-sensing microsatellites. For a privately owned company founded in 2017, the scale of this order is especially significant, underscoring how private players are becoming more deeply involved in driving growth in China’s aerospace sector.

    In February, China approved 13 foreign companies to operate pilot value-added telecommunications services. In May, Hong Kong Cell Valley launched operations in Shenzhen under a new Guangdong pilot program that permits overseas investors to develop and apply technologies related to human stem cells, as well as gene diagnosis and treatment.

    Guo Liyan, deputy head of the Economic Research Institute at the National Development and Reform Commission, said that alongside the streamlining of the negative list, reforms in approvals, registration and supervision are progressing simultaneously to ensure a level playing field for all businesses.

    In south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, local authorities have removed discriminatory licensing restrictions in the shared e-bike sector, opening the market to more brands. Meanwhile, in Wuhan, capital city of central Hubei Province, automakers and suppliers have formed an industry alliance to develop automotive-grade chips, fostering greater collaboration across the supply chain.

    Similar efforts to eliminate market entry barriers have increased bidding success rates of private firms and fostered the growth of new business models, emerging industries and innovative application scenarios.

    Government authorities across the country have also been working to improve infrastructure connectivity, strengthen industrial coordination and enhance data sharing, building a more standardized and fair market environment to support stronger business capabilities and unlock the full potential of the national market.

    “A large market does not automatically generate scale effects. Reforms are essential to consolidate and expand market resources and create synergy between large factories and a unified market,” said Dong Yu, executive vice dean of the China Institute for Development Planning at Tsinghua University.

    Going ahead, China is expected to implement more robust measures to refine market access rules and enhance the business environment, developing a unified national market where innovation will thrive and growth momentum can be further unleashed. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Washington’s war demands – Australia risks being dragged into a conflict with China over Taiwan

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

    Andy. LIU/Shutterstock

    The United States can count on Australia as one of its closest allies.

    Dating back to the shared experiences in the second world war and the ANZUS Treaty signed in 1951, Australia has steadfastly worked to help ensure the US remains the principal security guarantor in the Indo-Pacific.

    Australia’s track record speaks for itself. Yet additional demands are being placed that rankle.

    The Pentagon wants to know how Australia – and other allies such as Japan – would respond in the event of a war with China over Taiwan.

    Making these demands – which are being sought as part of the review of the AUKUS nuclear submarine agreement – is both unjustified and unreasonable.

    ‘100 years of mateship’

    Since federation in 1901, Australians have found themselves alongside US counterparts in almost all the major conflicts of the 20th century and beyond.

    It is this shared experience that led former Ambassador to Washington, Joe Hockey, to coin the term “100 years of mateship”.

    The pinnacle of the security relationship is the ANZUS Treaty which is a loosely worded document barely 800 words long.

    However, it is important to remember AUKUS is just that – a technical agreement, albeit premised on the century-spanning trusted collaboration across the full spectrum of national security ties.

    Goldilocks solution

    More recently, the US administration has made demands of allies, including Australia, the likes of which have not been seen in living memory.

    This spans not just tariffs, but also increased defence spending. American policymakers appear oblivious or unconcerned about the blowback they are generating.

    It is this context which makes the US demands for a broad-ranging and largely open-ended commitment over the defence of Taiwan, in advance of any conflict, so extraordinary and unhelpful.

    Under-secretary of defence for policy Elbridge Colby who wants a clear sense of how Australia would act in a potential war over Taiwan.
    Supplied by US Department of Defence, CC BY

    Australia has long had a fear of abandonment. Ever since the searing experience of the fall of Singapore in 1942, officials have been eager to burnish ties with US counterparts. Conversely, there has always been a strong element in the community that has feared entrapment in yet another US-led war in Asia.

    The experience in the Korean and Vietnam wars, let alone Afghanistan and Iraq, left many guarded about the efficacy of hitching the wagon to US-led military campaigns.

    In essence, though, Australian policymakers have long sought the Goldilocks solution: not too enthusiastic to trigger entrapment and not too lukewarm to trigger abandonment.

    No guarantees

    Now Australia, Japan and others face a surprising new push by American officials for a commitment to a hypothetical conflict, under open-ended circumstances.

    The irony is that American demands for a commitment fly in the face of the loosely worded ANZUS alliance – which stipulates an agreement to consult, but little more than that.

    The AUKUS agreement includes no such guarantees either. The overt and confronting nature of Washington’s demands means Prime Minister Anthony Albanese effectively has no option but to push back:

    We support the status quo when it comes to Taiwan. We don’t support any unilateral action […] we want peace and security in our region.

    Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy was adamant Australia would not be committing forces ahead of any “hypothetical” conflict:

    The decision to commit Australian troops to a conflict will be made by the government of the day, not in advance, but by the government of the day.

    A further irony is Australia, like Japan, is already hugely invested in its US military relationship, particularly through its military technology.

    The purchase of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, for instance, was meant to help enable the generation of interoperable forces, yet no such demand has been made when it comes to an advance commitment over their use in support of US ambitions.

    So why invoke AUKUS in such a way?

    Evidently, the way the US is trying to stand over Japan and Australia is harmful to its own interests. Such adversarial and unduly transactional behaviour could provoke a popular backlash in Australia and elsewhere.

    The government has rightly rebuffed the calls saying it would be up to the government of the day to make such a decision. It is likely this will not be well received by the Trump administration. The PM is right though, to say it’s hypothetical and not worthy of a public endorsement.

    Strategic ambiguity

    Yet a further irony is that this is mostly a moot point.

    The key benefit of alliance collaboration is already in place – and that relates to the efforts to deter China from ever acting on its desire to change the status quo in the first place.

    As former PM and now ambassador to Washington, Kevin Rudd explained in his book, The Avoidable War, geo-political disaster is still avoidable, particularly if the US and China can find a way to coexist without betraying their core interests through managed strategic competition.

    This strategic ambiguity is meant to complicate a potential adversary’s military planners and political decision makers’ thought processes over the advantages and disadvantages of going to war.

    China already knows a clash over Taiwan would mean US allies like Japan and Australia would find it virtually impossible to avoid being entangled. The strategic ambiguity can be maintained ad infinitum, so long as an outright invasion is averted.

    And the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan? I remain sanguine that conflict can be avoided.

    But to do so would involve clear and compelling messaging: both through diplomatic channels and through the demonstration of robust military capabilities that war would be too costly.

    John Blaxland received funding (2015–2018) from the US DoD Minerva Research Initiative.

    ref. Washington’s war demands – Australia risks being dragged into a conflict with China over Taiwan – https://theconversation.com/washingtons-war-demands-australia-risks-being-dragged-into-a-conflict-with-china-over-taiwan-261076

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: ECRL mega rail project marks another milestone with breakthrough of Genting Tunnel

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    A drone photo taken on July 12, 2025 shows entrances to the Genting Tunnel of the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) in Pahang state, Malaysia. [Photo/Xinhua]

    The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), a mega rail project in Malaysia being built by the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), marked another key milestone on Saturday with the breakthrough of the 16.39-kilometer Genting Tunnel.

    The breakthrough represents a significant achievement in itself, situated beneath more than 750 meters of mountainous terrain, the company said in a statement following a ceremony to mark the occasion.

    Malaysian Transport Minister Anthony Loke Siew Fook, who officiated the ceremony, told a press briefing that the breakthrough also highlights the successful cooperation between the two countries in the field of railway engineering.

    “The ECRL is also touted as a ‘game changer’ for the movement of passengers and freight in Peninsular Malaysia, as this rail infrastructure will link state capitals, major urban centres, industrial hubs, seaports, airports, and tourism zones while interchanging with existing railway lines along the ECRL corridor,” he added.

    “The Genting Tunnel breakthrough also signals the completion of excavation works for all 41 ECRL tunnels along the 665-km alignment. This major milestone highlights the strong collaboration and dedication among ECRL personnel at all levels in carrying out tunnel excavation works with meticulous planning and robust safety protocols,” Malaysia Rail Link Sdn Bhd (MRL) Chief Executive Officer Darwis Abdul Razak noted.

    Located within the Titiwangsa mountain range, the Genting Tunnel was the most technically challenging of the 41 tunnels constructed along the ECRL alignment, being constructed with the use of advanced tunnel boring machines (TBMs) and drill-and-blast techniques in highly complex and varied geological conditions.

    Explaining the challenges of working under these conditions and the use of high-technology methods to overcome them, Chen Jianfeng, deputy general manager of CCCC Second Highway Engineering Co., Ltd., told Xinhua that China’s TBM technology is among the world’s most advanced and well-suited to handle these challenges.

    “The Genting Tunnel has highly complex geological conditions, including water ingress, rock bursts, soft surrounding rock, and six fault zones along the alignment. Due to these challenges, we chose the TBM method, which offers greater safety, stability, and efficiency for tunneling under such difficult conditions,” he said.

    He also emphasized that the Chinese side has worked well with the Malaysian side to share knowledge and integrate processes, not only by bringing in advanced machinery and expertise but also by incorporating localization.

    “Throughout the construction process in Malaysia, we have placed strong emphasis on localization while continuously working towards the integration of Chinese and Malaysian standards — a key focus of our efforts. During the project, we incorporated a wide range of local Malaysian elements and actively nurtured local talent,” he said.

    “Many Malaysian technical personnel have been sent to China for training. Looking ahead, the ECRL will be operated through a joint China-Malaysia partnership, with both parties working together as part of an integrated operation and maintenance team,” he added.

    With the completion of all tunnelling works, the ECRL project now moves into its next phase, which includes track installation, electrification, signaling and communication systems, as well as station interior fit-outs. All works remain on schedule and aligned with the project’s master timeline.

    The ECRL extends from Malaysia’s largest transport hub, Port Klang, and runs across the peninsula to the northeastern Kelantan state. The railway is expected to greatly enhance connectivity and bring more balanced growth to the country by linking its less-developed region on the east coast to the economic heartland on the west coast. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China says response to Japanese planes’ actions reasonable, professional 2025-07-13 16:37:08 The response of Chinese military aircraft to the Japanese planes repeatedly conducting close reconnaissance in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone was entirely reasonable and professional, a Chinese defense spokesman said on Sunday morning.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense

      By JIANG CHENGLONG

      The response of Chinese military aircraft to the Japanese planes repeatedly conducting close reconnaissance in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone was entirely reasonable and professional, a Chinese defense spokesman said on Sunday morning.

      In a statement, Defense Ministry spokesman Jiang Bin noted that recently, Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s reconnaissance planes entered China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea for close-in reconnaissance multiple times.

      “Chinese aircraft responded by verifying, identifying, following, and monitoring them according to the law,” he said, highlighting that those actions were “fully justified, reasonable, professional and standardized”.

      Jiang emphasized that the Japanese aircraft’s close-in reconnaissance and interference were the root causes of Sino-Japanese air and sea safety risks.

      The spokesman expressed hope that the Japanese side will work with the Chinese side to create a proper atmosphere for the stable development of bilateral relations.

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    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China defends approach by military aircraft after Japan complaint

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    A Chinese defense spokesperson on Sunday dismissed Japanese claims that Chinese military aircraft had flown “abnormally close” to its planes, saying China’s response was legitimate and professional.

    Japanese Air Self-Defense Force intelligence-gathering aircraft had engaged in repeated close-in surveillance efforts in China’s air defense identification zone over the East China Sea, said Jiang Bin, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, in response to a question from the media.

    Chinese aircraft took measures to identify, track and monitor the Japanese planes in accordance with the law, Jiang said. “Our response was entirely legitimate, reasonable, and conducted in a professional and standard manner.”

    Close-in reconnaissance and harassment by Japanese military vessels and aircraft are sources of maritime and air security risks between China and Japan, said the spokesperson.

    “We urge the Japanese side to work with China to foster an atmosphere conducive to the stable development of bilateral ties,” Jiang added.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China denies Japanese claims Chinese military jets flew ‘abnormally close’ to Japanese aircraft

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 13 (Xinhua) — Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Jiang Bin on Sunday denied Japanese claims that Chinese military aircraft flew “abnormally close” to Japanese aircraft, saying China’s actions were legal and professional.

    Japan Air Self-Defense Force reconnaissance aircraft have repeatedly entered China’s air defense identification zone over the East China Sea to conduct close-range reconnaissance, Jiang Bin said.

    Jiang Bin said Chinese military aircraft had taken measures to identify, track and monitor the Japanese aircraft in accordance with the law. “Our response was completely legal, reasonable and professional in accordance with standards,” he said.

    The interference caused by Japanese military vessels and aircraft to the Chinese side during close-range reconnaissance and pursuit is a source of security threats in the maritime and airspace between China and Japan, Jiang Bin said.

    “We call on the Japanese side to work with China to create an atmosphere conducive to the stable development of bilateral relations,” the Chinese defense official added. -0-

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    .

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  • MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth Secures Several Key Priorities in Committee-Passed NDAA To Expand IVF Coverage, Strengthen Oversight of Domestic Military Deployments, Boost American Manufacturing and More

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth

    July 11, 2025

    [WASHINGTON, D.C.] — Combat Veteran and U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL)—who served in the Reserve Forces for 23 years and is a member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)—secured several important provisions to support servicemembers and boost American competitiveness and national security in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that SASC approved this week and the full Senate will now consider. Among the provisions that the Senator secured in the Committee-passed legislation, Duckworth successfully led a provision to expand IVF access for uniformed servicemembers and ensure military families have the same level of coverage that Members of Congress and other federal employees already have. As President Donald Trump continues to misuse our military to intimidate American citizens across our nation, Duckworth also successfully secured provisions that would safeguard Americans’ civil rights when servicemembers assist law enforcement on U.S. soil.

    “The brave men and women in uniform who serve our nation at home and abroad deserve to know that our country fully supports them as they and their families sacrifice to defend our country and our Constitution,”?said Duckworth.?“While I don’t support every provision included in this bill, I’m proud that it includes several of my provisions to support our servicemembers and their families, boost American manufacturing, improve Americans’ faith in their military as well as rein in the Trump Administration. I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to continue improving this NDAA and ensure Congress passes a strong final bill that lets our troops know we have their backs.”  

    NDAAs set our nation’s defense policy and laws, authorize funding for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and ensure that our servicemembers have the tools they need to defend our nation. Additionally, this year’s committee-passed legislation authorizes funding to support a 3.8 percent pay raise for military members.

    Key Duckworth-led provisions secured in this year’s Committee-passed NDAA would:

    • Expand access to IVF for military families by requiring TRICARE to cover fertility treatment services, including IVF, to ensure servicemembers and their families have the same level of coverage that Members of Congress already receive. This is the second time Senator Duckworth secured this provision in the committee-passed version of an NDAA bill.  
      • Regarding this provision, Duckworth said: “Even before I was wounded, I had made the difficult decision to delay building a family because I knew getting pregnant would impact my ability to be an Army aviator—and to advance in the career I loved. Because of the miracle of IVF—and my access to reproductive healthcare through the VA—I’m now a mom to two beautiful girls. The reality is that the men and women of the uniformed services face unique challenges when trying to start or build a family, and studies show that servicemembers and Veterans have higher rates of infertility compared to the general population. After successfully securing this provision in last year’s Committee-passed bill, I’m so proud my colleagues helped me build on this progress by including it in this year’s bill as well. It’s past time our nation provides our military families with the same access to IVF that all Members of Congress already have and ensure our heroes can start the families they’ve dreamed of.” 
    • Strengthen public trust of the military and enhance civil rights by requiring that servicemembers identify themselves as part of the military when assisting federal law enforcement in the United States. As the Trump Administration continues to send federal agents and our nation’s military into our communities to intimidate their fellow Americans, this provision ensures that servicemembers identify themselves properly—to avoid public misunderstanding about who is providing logistical support versus conducting arrests or law enforcement duties.  
      • Regarding this provision, Duckworth said: “In my own experience serving in the National Guard, I saw firsthand the difference drawing a bright line between the roles of our military and law enforcement can make in terms of maintaining public trust in our military. I’m proud my colleagues agreed that this is a necessary requirement to provide accountability to the public during tense moments when troops might be interacting with citizens, from protests to natural disasters to humanitarian crises, and I hope the rest of my colleagues in the Senate do too.” 
    • Ensure all servicemembers know their legal obligations during deployments both at home and abroad by mandating legal training to all servicemembers, including a refresher within 90 days of any mobilization or deployment, on their responsibilities under the law of armed conflict, rules of engagement, defense support for civil authorities and standing rules for the use of force within the United States. In light of the Trump Administration’s increasing use of troops to support law enforcement within the United States, this provision will ensure troops know how to responsibly operate within the bounds of domestic laws and protect American civil rights.
    • Establish a senior leader of DoD Programs for military to civilian transition efforts by directing DoD to appoint a senior official to oversee policy and programs related to the transition of servicemembers to civilian life or to the reserves. This would elevate and strengthen DoD’s attention on services to assist troops as they leave service and enter civilian life, providing a streamlined conduit for coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs. 
    • Explore international co-production of auxiliary vessels by requiring DoD to identify opportunities to enter joint ventures between U.S. military, U.S. companies and foreign partners to co-produce auxiliary vessels and small boats. Senator Duckworth’s effort aims to increase our nation’s sealift capacity and shipbuilding workforce through leveraging the strengths of our allies and partners in constructing smaller vessels as well as building our ability to surge production of these vessels closer to the point of need in the event of conflict. 
    • Enhance Congressional oversight of the military justice system by requiring the President and DoD to notify Congress of any removal of Judge Advocates General, to ensure that military commanders have the legal advice they need to make their difficult decisions. In addition to notice, the President and DoD must provide a justification for the involuntary removal of any of the top Judge Advocates General (JAG) at least five days before the JAG is removed. This follows Secretary Hegseth’s unceremonious firing of JAGs, which are our military’s legal experts on everything from administrative and domestic protections to international law.  
    • Protect servicemembers from dangerous PFAS in their protective garments by requiring the DoD’s to articulate its plan for acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat protective garments free from toxic PFAS chemicals as soon as possible. 
    • Enable the nonpartisan, Duckworth-created Afghanistan War Commission to finish its final report by authorizing DoD to provide non-reimbursable support services—like staff, facilities and funding—and authorizing the Commission to enter into contracts to obtain essential goods and servicesauthor, including the ability to publish its final report through a private publisher. These provisions align its authorities with similar commissions, including the 9/11 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 
    • Expand the successful Southeast Asia Cyber Pilot Program to allow U.S. forces to work with the Pacific Island nations to improve their cyber capabilities and reduce vulnerabilities, building resilience against threats in DoD’s priority region. 
    • Expand exchange opportunities for allies and partners by authorizing DoD to offer exchange opportunities at universities with ROTC programs for servicemembers from partner nations, creating a cost-effective way to train future leaders of key partner militaries.  
    • Ensure fairness in Special and Incentive Pay for Reservists by directing DoD to deliver a special and incentive pay assessment framework – which was required in the FY24 NDAA — by June 1, 2026, and also requiring DoD to make a specific determination about the percentage of aviation incentive pay that goes to maintaining skill proficiency. This provision is essential to ensuring Reservists are paid fairly when they are required to maintain skills and certifications that are expensive to maintain. 
    • Direct a GAO Report on Aviation Safety to review DoD policies and procedures for data gathering, risk assessment and risk mitigation of U.S. military flights, especially as in U.S. domestic civilian airspace. This provision follows investigations into the tragic crash at Reagan National Airport and close calls with military flights throughout civilian airspace.  
    • Bolster our nation’s aviation supply chain by encouraging the use of domestically manufactured helicopters in Initial Entry Rotary Wing pilot training by the Army. 
    • Improve servicemember mental health services and confidentiality by emphasizing support for consistent compliance with suicide prevention policy and confidential access to mental health care without retaliation for all servicemembers and across all branches. The Senator helped secure this provision alongside U.S. Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ).  
    • Expand robotic enhancements for armaments manufacturing by authorizing an additional $5 million for the Secretary of the Army to expand prototyping and production capacity by integrating robotics, automation and digital manufacturing into the munitions industrial base. 
    • Use advanced manufacturing to improve the rapid repair of equipment in forward-based locations by authorizing digital manufacturing as part of the prototyping program for contested logistics and removing the sunset for the program. This provision would allow DoD to develop best practices regarding forward-based commercial, advanced digital manufacturing facilities for rapid, distributed parts production closer to the point of use. 
    • Elevate research on total force optimization by expressing support for investments in biomechanical, physiological, and psychological research to mitigate injury risks and improve physical resilience in combat operations.
    • Improve equipment connectivity for military airfields by encouraging the Air Force to integrate connectivity solutions for flightline support equipment, such as generators, light carts, and support vehicles, that are critical for ensuring our military aircraft can safely take off and land. This will improve equipment readiness to ensure our Airmen are prepared for expeditionary flightline operations in contested environments. 
    • Advance U.S. bio-industrial manufacturing innovation by supporting the innovative work being done at advanced facilities like the University of Illinois’s Fermentation and Agriculture Biomanufacturing Hub (iFAB) by requiring more information on how DoD is investing in this technology critical for national security. 
    • Illuminate gaps in the military footwear industrial base by requesting DoD provide data and analysis on the necessary war reserves for footwear and textiles, and the accompanying surge needs in the event of crisis or conflict. This report language is a modified version of the Senator’s Better Outfitting Our Troops (BOOTS) Act, which recognizes that our defense industrial base for combat boots needs investment in order for it to support our troops and help ensure they have the sturdiest and most protective boots in a possible war.  
    • Strengthen domestic suppliers of critical uniform components by prohibiting the DoD from sourcing clothing, fabrics or components from countries of concern—such as China, Iran, North Korea and Russia—when using domestic sourcing waivers under the Berry Amendment, to prevent further weakening of the U.S. clothing and textile industrial base.? 
    • Allow the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) to explore investments in nuclear energy and Printed Circuit Board (PCB) manufacturing by authorizing inclusion of nuclear energy as a covered technology under Section 149 of Title 10 and directing OSC to explore the value of investments in PCBs. This change would enable DoD to explore new investments with these key industries critical for our national security.  
    • Accelerate commercially-useful Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computers (FTQC) by recognizing the importance of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative (QBI) program, which aims to build a commercially useful FTQC by 2033, and encouraging the Department to concurrently prepare algorithms to operate those machines, while the hardware is being built. This provision recognizes the importance of the development of the first FTQC, which is being built at the Illinois Quantum and Microelectronics Park in Chicago, Illinois. 
    • Improve cross-state medical license reciprocity for Title 32 National Guard medical providers by requiring DoD to analyze any barriers to ensuring medical license reciprocity for Guardsmen to train under Title 32 status. This follows reports from National Guardsmen medical providers that they struggle to get the permissions necessary to conduct essential training across state lines, especially in specialized hospitals for trauma care – vital kinds of training for combat care. 
    • Protect Rock Island Arsenal by restricting the Secretary of the Army from using any funds authorized for restructuring Army commands until the Army provides more information about their proposed plan to integrate Joint Munitions Command and Army Sustainment Command, ensuring operations at Rock Island Arsenal are not unnecessarily affected. 
    • Improve Arsenal Workload Sustainment by establishing a 5-year pilot program requiring DoD to give preference to public-private partnerships in arsenals, especially those non-public partners that ensure equitable workshare to DoD employees to protect critical skills. This provision is a modified version of the  Arsenal Workload Sustainment Act that Duckworth introduced alongside U.S. Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL), Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Joni Ernst (R-IA) as well as U.S. Representative Eric Sorensen (D-IL-17) to help ensure Army arsenals and factories remain active and viable while preserving the skilled workforce, equipment and production capacity critical to our nation’s defense industrial base. 
    • Improve the governance of the organic industrial base by directing the Army to analyze the effectiveness of their current governance and resourcing model for the Army’s arsenals, depots as well as ammunition plants and identify opportunities for changes to ensure the enterprise and its workforce can support the military’s munitions and sustainment requirements now and in the future. The Senator helped secure this provision alongside Senator Tom Cotton (R-AK).  
    • Improve predictive manufacturing analytics at Army Arsenals by urging the continued implementation of industrial control networks across our Army’s arsenals to enable the collection, aggregation and analysis of data associated with the manufacture and repair of equipment and supplies. 
    • Ensure Lovell Federal Health Care Center (FHCC)’s continued success by securing a one-year extension of the Joint Medical Facility Demonstration Fund, which supports the operations of the North Chicago-based Lovell FHCC. This provision, led with Senator Durbin, will help safeguard continued access to vital services for military families and Veterans in the area. 
    • Improve the “Warm Hand-off Process” for Servicemembers by changing the current “opt-in” option on the DD-2648 form for sending servicemembers’ information to state veterans’ agencies to an “opt-out” option, aiming to streamline information flow to state services and improve the “warm hand-off” process for servicemembers when they separate or retire from the military service. The Senator helped secure this provision alongside U.S. Senators Angus King (I-ME) and Kevin Cramer (R-ND). 
    • Support the construction of a Child Development Center at Rock Island Arsenal by authorizing $50 million in Major Construction funds for a new addition to the Child Development Center at Rock Island Arsenal and to consolidate the existing facilities into a single building and make upgrades to meet DoD guidelines and safety requirements. This project will provide a necessary service to the Arsenal and surrounding community.
    • Support the design of a new Aircraft Maintenance Hangar at Scott Air Force Base by authorizing $6 million in Planning and Design funds for the construction of a new aircraft maintenance hangar to support the training and operational mission of the 126th Aerial Refueling Wing at Scott Air Force Base. The current hangar was constructed in 1956, remains in disrepair and no longer meets Department of Defense standards or mission requirements, making a new hangar critical to the Wing’s mission.
    • Support the design renovation to General Jones Readiness Center by authorizing $5 million in Planning and Design funds for major alternations to the General Richard L. Jones National Guard Readiness Center in Chicago. This facility was built in 1931 and remains one of the largest readiness centers in the country. Renovating it to meet mission requirements is a top priority for the Illinois National Guard.
    • Improving the Tactical Vehicle Fleet by authorizing an additional $168 million to speed up replacement of Marine Corps HMMWVs with modernized vehicles to improve readiness for global missions.

    In addition to these provisions, Duckworth also successfully worked to protect Universities across the country from having their DoD funding for critical technological research cut unnecessarily. 



    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russian and North Korean Foreign Ministers Hold Second Round of Strategic Dialogue Talks

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, July 12 /Xinhua/ — Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hee in the city of Wonsan in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Saturday as part of the second round of strategic dialogue, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported.

    “The heads of the foreign policy departments thoroughly discussed current issues of developing bilateral relations, including the schedule of upcoming political contacts. Particular attention was paid to the prospects for further cooperation in practical areas,” the statement published on the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry noted.

    As stated in the report, a keen exchange of views took place on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia (NEA). Mutual commitment to a political and diplomatic solution to the problems existing there was confirmed. The parties emphasized their determination to jointly counter the hegemonic aspirations of extra-regional players, which are leading to escalating tensions in NEA and the entire Asia-Pacific region.

    Following the negotiations, a Plan for Inter-Ministerial Exchanges between Russia and the DPRK for 2026-2027 was signed.

    According to the Korean Central News Agency, S. Lavrov arrived at Wonsan airport on Friday night, beginning his visit to the DPRK. His visit will last from July 11 to 13. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: International passenger flights resumed at Erenhot airport

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HOHHOT, July 12 (Xinhua) — Flight MR861 from Ulaanbaatar to Erenhot in north China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region landed successfully at Erenhot Saiwusu International Airport on Thursday, marking the official resumption of international passenger flights at Erenhot air port after a hiatus of more than five years.

    Since 2013, the Erenhot air checkpoint has successively opened international air routes between Erenhot and cities such as Ulaanbaatar in Mongolia, Ulan-Ude and Irkutsk in Russia. During this period, a total of 2,342 international flights were guaranteed, and 134,000 people crossed the state border through this border crossing.

    To ensure the smooth operation of international passenger air routes, Erenhot Customs promotes the construction of intelligent inspection systems, improves the efficiency of on-site supervision and control, and ensures safe, efficient and fast customs clearance at the airport. -0-

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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