Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English
On 22 January on the margins of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Federal Councillor Guy Parmelin and representatives of Switzerland’s fellow EFTA states Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway signed a free trade agreement with Kosovo, represented by Rozeta Hajdari, Minister of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade. Prime Minister Albin Kurti was also present at the signing ceremony.
Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sarah Burns, Associate Professor of Political Science, Rochester Institute of Technology
In the wake of the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025, many congressional Democrats and a few Republicans have objected to President Donald Trump’s failure to seek congressional approval before conducting military operations.
They note that Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and say that section required Trump to seek prior authorization for military action.
The Trump administration disagrees. “This is not a war against Iran,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Fox News host Maria Bartiromo, implying that the action did not require approval by Congress. That’s the same view held by most modern presidents and their lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel: Article 2 of the Constitution allows the president to use the military in certain situations without prior approval from Congress.
By this reading of the text, presidents, as commander in chief, claim the power to unilaterally order the military to initiate small-scale operations for a short duration. Members of Congress may object to that claim, but they have done little to limit presidents’ unilateralism. What little they have done has not been effective.
As I’ve demonstrated in my research, even though the 1973 War Powers Resolution attempted to constrain presidential power after the disasters of the Vietnam War, it contains many loopholes that presidents have exploited to act unilaterally. For example, it allows presidents to engage in military operations without congressional approval for up to 90 days. And more recent congressional resolutions have broadened executive control even further.
Presidents can even overcome the loopholes in the War Powers Resolution if the operation lasts longer than 90 days. In 2011, a State Department lawyer argued that airstrikes in Libya could continue beyond the War Powers Resolution’s 90-day time limit because there were no ground troops involved. By that logic, any future president could carry out an indefinite bombing campaign with no congressional oversight.
While every president has bristled at congressional restraints on their actions, presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt have successfully circumvented them by citing vague concerns like “national security,” “regional security” or the need to “prevent a humanitarian disaster” when launching military operations. While members of Congress always take issue with these actions, they never hold presidents accountable by passing legislation restraining him.
President Trump’s decision to bomb Iranian nuclear sites without consulting Congress falls in line with precedent from both Democratic and Republican leaders for decades.
Much like his predecessors, Trump did not, and likely will not, provide Congress with more concrete information about the legality of his actions. Nor are congressional lawmakers effectively holding him accountable.
The push-and-pull between Congress and the president over military operations dates back to the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, which led Congress to declare war on Japan. Before then, Congress had prevented the U.S. from joining World War II by enforcing an arms embargo and refusing to help the Allies prior to the attack on Hawaii. But afterward, Congress began allowing the president to take more control over the military.
During the Cold War, rather than returning to a balanced debate between the branches, Congress continued to relinquish those powers.
Congress never authorized the war in Korea; Harry Truman used a U.N. Security Council resolution as legal justification. Congress’ vote explicitly opposing the invasion of Cambodia didn’t stop Richard Nixon from doing it anyway. Even after the Cold War, Bill Clinton regularly acted unilaterally to address humanitarian crises or the continued threat from leaders like Saddam Hussein. He sent the military to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, among other places.
After 9/11, Congress quickly gave up more of its power. A week after those attacks, Congress passed a sweeping Authorization for Use of Military Force, giving the president permission to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”
In a follow-up 2002 authorization, Congress went even further, allowing the president to “use the Armed Forces … as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend national security … against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” This approach provides few, if any, congressional checks on the control of military affairs exercised by the president.
In the two decades since those authorizations, four presidents have used them to justify all manner of military action, from targeted killings of terrorists to the years long fight against the Islamic State group.
Congress regularly discusses terminating those authorizations, but has yet to do so. If Congress did, the loopholes in the original War Powers Resolution would still exist.
While President Biden claimed he supported the repeal of the authorizations, and supported more congressional oversight of military actions, Trump has made no such claims. Instead, he has claimed even more sweeping authority to act without any permission from Congress.
As recently as 2024, Biden used the 2002 authorization as a legal rationale for the targeted killing of Iranian-backed militiamen in Iraq, a strike condemned by Iraqi leaders.
Those actions may have ruffled congressional feathers, but they were in keeping with a long U.S. tradition of targeting members of terrorist groups and protecting members of the military serving in a conflict zone.
During his first presidential term in 2020, Trump ordered a lethal drone strike against a respected member of the Iranian government, Major General Qassim Soleimani, the head of Iran’s equivalent of the CIA, without consulting Congress or publicly providing proof of why the attack was necessary, even to this day.
Tensions – and fears of war – spiked but then slowly faded when Iran responded with missile attacks on two U.S. bases in Iraq.
Now, the U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear sites have revived both fears of war and renewed questions about the president’s authority to unilaterally engage in military action. Presidents since the 1970s, however, have effectively managed to dodge definitive answers to those questions – demonstrating both the power inherent in their position and the unwillingness among members of the legislative branch to reclaim their coequal status.
This article is an updated version of a story published on Jan. 24, 2024.
Sarah Burns does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
– ref. Presidents of both parties have launched military action without Congress declaring war − Trump’s bombing of Iran is just the latest – https://theconversation.com/presidents-of-both-parties-have-launched-military-action-without-congress-declaring-war-trumps-bombing-of-iran-is-just-the-latest-259636
MIL OSI –
Source: International Chamber of Commerce
Headline: World Chambers Federation announces new leadership for 2025–2028
Translation. Region: Russian Federal
Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –
The Novosibirsk State University has completed the InteRussia internship program for foreign engineering specialists, which ran from June 2 to 27. Akademgorodok was visited by 17 students from 14 countries, including Chile, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Albania, Serbia, Bangladesh, Turkmenistan, Belarus, Indonesia, Ecuador, Uzbekistan, and Tanzania. This was the first experience for the university in holding such a long event with the participation of young researchers from different countries.
The internship was organized by the Gorchakov Fund, the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the ANO “Mezhdunarodniki” with the support of the Directorate of the World Youth Festival and the Presidential Grants Fund.
Adelina Kozulina, an employee of the NSU Education Export Department and coordinator of the InteRussia international internship, summed up the results of the project and commented:
— This is our second experience of holding an international internship Interussia together with the Gorchakov Fund. I think that this time the experience was very positive. The guys were friendly and sociable, they really successfully integrated into our team and the academic atmosphere. It was very easy to interact and communicate with them. This time we had a wider geography, the participants came from different countries. For the NSU Education Export Department, this was a very interesting experience.
For a month, young researchers were trained at the university in two promising areas – “Artificial Intelligence and Medicine” and “Modern Quantum and Information Technologies in Electronics and Photonics”. The event resulted in the preparation and presentation of their own scientific project.
Evgeny Pavlovsky, Head of the Laboratory of Streaming Data Analytics and Machine Learning Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of NSU and the head of the Artificial Intelligence and Medicine department, noted at the school’s closing ceremony:
— I am glad that we successfully held and completed this school, which involved very talented young researchers. Thanks to this internship, you not only learned something new, but also got imbued with the special atmosphere of Akademgorodok. You made new contacts and will continue to work together. I am sure that you can become those who will shape our good future with artificial intelligence both in healthcare and in other areas.
Artur Pogosov, professor of the Department of Semiconductor Physics Physics Department of NSU, Head of the Department of General Physics at NSU Physics Department, thanked the participants for their energy, attention and curiosity:
— Quantum mechanics and quantum computing is an amazing and complex field of knowledge, based on deep philosophical ideas. As a rule, our students spend an entire academic year to master this area. For you, it was rather a quick and unexpected jump. But even this short period allowed you to see the complexity, beauty and mystery of the quantum world. I wish you success in your further studies, research, a brilliant career and future.
The school participants thanked the organizers and noted the special friendly atmosphere that had developed during the internship. They also expressed confidence that they would interact and continue their joint research work.
Annageldi Khydyrov, Turkmenistan:
— I work as a leading programmer and developer in the field of AI. This is not my first trip to Russia. This time I chose the direction of “Artificial Intelligence and Medicine”. My experience here will be very helpful for my further research. The professors taught at the highest level, we not only studied theory, but also practiced. Previously, I was little familiar with the use of AI in medicine, thanks to this internship, new horizons of understanding opened up for me. We became very close friends with all the participants, I am sure that we will continue to cooperate.
Bashar Firas Issaf Al-Sayegh, Jordan:
— I chose quantum technologies because I have a basic background in physics and am currently deciding in which area to continue my studies and research. This international internship allowed me to make a choice regarding the topic of my master’s and later doctoral dissertations. This concerns the technical side and training. I would also like to note the social aspect. It was a wonderful experience for all participants. We met people from all over the world, we talked about our cultures, languages, traditions, heritage and religions. This is a unique experience for me as well, because now I know that there are people on this planet who have the same ambitions, needs and human feelings. I am returning home more confident and with a stock of interesting stories.
Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Spain and the Netherlands captured the men’s and women’s titles at the 2025 FIBA 3×3 World Cup in Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia, on Sunday.
Spain’s men’s team defeated Switzerland 21-17 in the final, while the Netherlands edged host Mongolia 15-9 to claim the women’s crown, according to the Mongolian 3×3 Basketball Association.
Serbia delivered a standout performance in the men’s bronze medal game, beating Germany 21-16. In the women’s third-place match, Canada overcame Poland 21-9.
The ninth edition of this prestigious basketball tournament, held on June 23-29, featured 20 men’s and 20 women’s teams from various countries and regions.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Members of the Longyun Martial Arts Group stage a special performance of the Chinese Kung Fu dance drama “11 Warriors” at Bucharest National Opera House in celebration of the International Day of Dialogue among Civilizations in Bucharest, Romania, June 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
A special performance of the Chinese Kung Fu dance drama “11 Warriors” captivated audiences at the Bucharest National Opera House on Saturday evening, in celebration of the International Day of Dialogue among Civilizations.
Co-organized by the Chinese Embassy in Romania, the Bucharest Chinese Cultural Center, and the Romania-China House, the event drew more than 900 attendees, including diplomats, cultural officials, and public figures.
Members of the Longyun Martial Arts Group stage a special performance of the Chinese Kung Fu dance drama “11 Warriors” at Bucharest National Opera House in celebration of the International Day of Dialogue among Civilizations in Bucharest, Romania, June 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
The performance was presented by the Longyun Martial Arts Group, founded by renowned Chinese film star Jackie Chan. Blending martial arts, modern dance, and multimedia, the production traces the evolution of Chinese Kung Fu-from its origins in combat to its philosophical and spiritual depth.
At the conclusion of the show, the audience gave a standing ovation lasting over 10 minutes. “We were overwhelmed,” said performer Cao Jialong. “It made us proud to see Chinese culture embraced so warmly on the world stage.”
Members of the Longyun Martial Arts Group stage a special performance of the Chinese Kung Fu dance drama “11 Warriors” at Bucharest National Opera House in celebration of the International Day of Dialogue among Civilizations in Bucharest, Romania, June 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
Irina Cajal, undersecretary of state at the Romanian Ministry of Culture, hailed the performance as “a shining example of professionalism,” calling it “both professional and academic” and “one of the most impressive performances” she had ever seen.
“I’m sure that in the future, collaborations like this will continue,” she added. “For years, the cooperation between Romania and China has been strong, and this is a major achievement for both sides.”
Members of the Longyun Martial Arts Group stage a special performance of the Chinese Kung Fu dance drama “11 Warriors” at Bucharest National Opera House in celebration of the International Day of Dialogue among Civilizations in Bucharest, Romania, June 28, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
Audience member and martial arts practitioner Maxine Yanscu echoed the sentiment, emphasizing the cultural significance of the art form. “Martial arts represent many of the core values and principles of Chinese culture,” she said. “They express that beautifully through movement.”
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
The Chinese team lost 3-0 to Canada in the 2025 Men’s Volleyball Nations League (VNL) Chicago leg on Sunday.
In the first set, the two teams were tied from 1-1 to 12-12 before Canada pulled away with five straight points to lead 17-12. China closed the gap to 20-21 with blocks from Zhang Zhejia and Li Yongzhen and powerful attacks by Jiang Chuan. However, Canada held on to take the set 25-23 with strong serving and offense.
Jiang Chuan (R) of China spikes during the Pool 5 match between China and Canada at the Men’s Volleyball Nations League (VNL) 2025 in Chicago, the United States, June 29, 2025. (Photo by Joel Lerner/Xinhua)
China fell behind 4-7 in the second set but responded with four straight points to lead 8-7. The teams stayed close until 16-16, when Canada pulled ahead to win 25-20. China committed more errors, saw a drop in offensive efficiency, and struggled to contain Canada’s momentum.
In the third set, China trailed 6-1 early but narrowed the gap to 8-7 before losing steam. Led by captain Jiang Chuan, the team rallied to 19-17, but Canada held on to win the set 25-23 and seal the match.
Zhang Jingyin missed the match due to a knee injury, while Jiang Chuan returned to the starting lineup. China had opportunities to tie or take the lead in both the first and third sets but fell short in key moments.
The team continues to face challenges with first-pass stability, quick-attack execution from middle blockers, and setter variation.
Ranked 11th in the world, Canada holds a clear advantage over 24th-ranked China. This latest defeat marks China’s fourth straight loss to Canada, compounding a psychological disadvantage.
Jiang expressed his frustration. “Losing four matches in the Chicago leg is a wake-up call. We need to change some things in the next leg and strive for better performance,” he said.
“We didn’t play our best match. One or two players did a good job, a lot of players could not bring what they can do,” said China’s Belgian head coach Vital Heynen. “But (for sports) sometimes you don’t play as good as you are. We have to accept.”
“Seeing our whole situation, injuries, putting players coming back, some players have to take a lot of loads who are not used to do that, and cannot always bring that, that’s normal,” Heynen said. “I blame myself and the team, like we together are not good enough.”
“I think every match is so difficult for us. So we will try next week to win at least one match, to have at least a good ending of this VNL.”
Five national teams from China, the United States, Brazil, Italy and Canada competed in the Chicago leg of the 2025 VNL. China lost all four of its matches.
The VNL group stage spans three weeks, with Chicago hosting the second week. The third week will take place in Gdansk, Poland; Ljubljana, Slovenia; and the Kanto region of Japan. The finals are scheduled for July 30 to August 3 in Ningbo Beilun, east China’s Zhejiang Province.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Serbian legend Novak Djokovic agreed that Wimbledon could offer his best chance to claim a record-extending 25th Grand Slam title.
While attending the pre-Championships press conference on Saturday, the 38-year-old was asked if he believed this year’s Wimbledon could be his best chance to win the 25th Grand Slam title and could it be his last dance at the grass-court Grand Slam this year.
“Whether it could be my last dance, I’m not sure, as I’m not sure about Roland Garros or any other Slam that I play next,” said Djokovic prior to his 20th appearance at Wimbledon.
“My wish is to play for several more years. I would love to be healthy physically and also mentally motivated to keep on playing at the highest level. That’s the goal, but you never know at this stage.”
“And yes, I would probably agree that Wimbledon could be the best chance because of the results I had, because of how I feel, how I play in Wimbledon, just getting that extra push mentally and motivation to perform the best tennis at the highest level,” the seven-time Wimbledon champion continued.
Djokovic ranked Wimbledon “maybe the most consistently successful Grand Slam for me in the last 10 years”, as he reached six finals in the last six editions of the tournament. He won four titles consecutively before being beaten by Spaniard Carlos Alcaraz in the last two years.
“I don’t chase the rankings anymore. I’m trying to play the best tennis in Grand Slams and trying to win Grand Slams. That hasn’t changed,” he said.
Djokovic reached the semifinals at both Australian Open and US Open this year. “I think I still played a decent level of tennis that showed me that I can still play on a very high level at the later stages.”
“That’s what is also giving me an extra motivation to keep going. Obviously clay court probably slightly less chances to win comparing to grass,” he added.
The sixth-seeded veteran will face Frenchman Alexandre Muller in the opening round. If he reaches the semifinals, he could meet world No. 1 Jannik Sinner who defeated him in the French Open semifinals earlier this year.
Source: Government of Canada News
June 28, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada
The foreign ministers of Canada, Spain, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Uruguay today issued the following statement:
“On the occasion of International LGBTQI+ Pride Day 2025, we, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Spain, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Uruguay are speaking and acting as one to champion the rights of LGBTQI+ people.
“At a time when hate speech and hate crimes are on the rise, and in view of efforts to strip LGBTQI+ people of their rights, we reject all forms of violence, criminalization, stigmatization or discrimination, which constitute human rights violations.
“It is our understanding that respect for diversity, equality and tolerance require the support, at the international level, of measures aimed at decriminalization, and at preventing and eliminating harassment of all kinds—including homophobic and transphobic harassment. Also measures to advance the implementation of diversity policies and the fight against discrimination, and to favour the inclusion of LGBTQI+ people, especially transgender people in society and in the workplace.
“We recognize that LGBTQI+ people face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, particularly when they are also part of other historically marginalized groups, communities, and populations, such as indigenous peoples, afro-descendants, people with disabilities, migrants, elderly people, or those who living in poverty. Promoting their full and effective inclusion requires an intersectional approach that structurally addresses these inequalities.
“We are joining forces to work hand in hand for the equal rights of LGBTQI+ people and to bring the criminalization of same-sex relations worldwide to an end.
“We call on all States to join us on this path, repealing discriminatory laws and refusing to adopt new laws that criminalize relations between persons of the same sex or punish people for their sexual orientation or gender identity. We call for an end to the prosecution of LGBTI+ people, and especially to the application of imprisonment and capital punishment. We further call for an end to so-called conversion “therapy” practices intended to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, which can cause psychological and physical pain and suffering and are inherently discriminatory. What is at stake here is a matter of full respect for human rights and human dignity, of strengthening equality, diversity and prosperity, leaving no one behind.
“Therefore, we, the public authorities, must implement policy that, in alignment with international human rights standards, pursues effective equality of LGBTQI+ people and seeks to combat all forms of discrimination. We celebrate sexual diversity and family diversity, in the conviction that inclusive, equitable, and tolerant societies founded on solidarity are also stronger, healthier and more resilient.
“Lastly, we reassert our commitment to respecting the human rights of LGBTQI+ people, to ensuring that their equality before the law is incontestable and that no one is prosecuted or subject to discriminated because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Let us build societies in which all human beings are free to live and love as they choose.”
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
The Chinese Football Association (CFA) announced on Friday the dismissal of national team head coach Branko Ivankovic following China’s failure to secure qualification for the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
The CFA confirmed in an official statement that its contract with Ivankovic has been automatically terminated after China failed to advance into the playoff stage of the World Cup Asian qualifiers.
“The Chinese Football Association expresses gratitude to Mr. Branko Ivankovic and his coaching staff for their dedicated efforts during their tenure with the men’s national team and their contributions to Chinese football. We wish Mr. Ivankovic all the best in his future work and life,” the statement said.
The CFA also announced that Dejan Djurdjevic as caretaker manager of the men’s national team, and the Serbian will lead China’s campaign at the East Asian Football Federation (EAFF) E-1 Football Championship.
In February, Djurdjevic led China’s U-20 national team to the quarterfinals of the AFC U-20 Asian Cup.
Source: Government of Canada News
The Government of Canada announced the implementation of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on imports of steel mill products from non-free trade agreement partners, effective June 27, 2025. This measure will help stabilize the Canadian market and prevent harmful diversion of foreign steel from third countries into Canada while minimizing impacts on Canadian importers and downstream users.
The TRQs will be administered on the basis of five steel product categories: flat, long, pipe and tube, semi-finished, and stainless steel (see Annex A for list of tariff classifications applicable to each category). A 50 per cent surtax will be applied on imports of covered products that exceed the specified quantity threshold from non-FTA partners.
The quotas will be reviewed in 30 days to ensure their appropriateness and effectiveness in light of evolving market circumstances, and periodically thereafter. The reviews will be supported by the newly established industry-government steel task force.
Global Affairs Canada will be responsible for administering the quota of products that may be imported without this additional surtax through the issuance of shipment-specific import permits. To facilitate the administration of the TRQs, the subject products are being added to the Import Control List. Importations made without the applicable shipment-specific import permit will be assessed the 50 per cent surtax by the CBSA. This surtax would be additive to any existing surtaxes or anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures, as well as forthcoming tariff measures based on the country of “melt and pour” for steel or “smelt and cast” for aluminum.
Key elements of the tariff-rate quota include:
See Annex B for additional details on the tariff-rate quota volume and limits.
The TRQs will apply to imports originating in any country that does not have a free trade agreement in force with Canada. The list of countries excluded from the tariff-rate quotas are set out in Annex C.
Global Affairs Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency will be responsible for administering the tariff-rate quota for each steel product category. Additional information on the administration of these measures can be found at the links below:
| Product Category |
Applicable Tariff Classifications |
|---|---|
|
Flat |
7208.10.00; 7208.25.00; 7208.26.00; 7208.27.00; 7208.36.00; 7208.37.00; 7208.38.00; 7208.39.00; 7208.40.00; 7208.51.00; 7208.52.00; 7208.53.00; 7208.54.00; 7208.90.00; 7209.15.00; 7209.16.00; 7209.17.00; 7209.18.00; 7209.25.00; 7209.26.00; 7209.27.00; 7209.28.00; 7209.90.00; 7210.11.00; 7210.12.00; 7210.49.00; 7210.50.00; 7210.61.00; 7210.69.00; 7210.70.00; 7210.90.00; 7211.14.00; 7211.19.00; 7211.23.00; 7211.29.00; 7211.90.00; 7212.10.00; 7212.30.00; 7212.40.00; 7212.50.00; 7225.19.00; 7225.30.00; 7225.40.00; 7225.50.00; 7225.91.00; 7225.92.00; 7225.99.00; 7226.91.00; 7226.92.00; 7226.99.00 |
|
Long |
7213.10.00; 7213.20.00; 7213.91.00; 7213.99.00; 7214.10.00; 7214.20.00; 7214.91.00; 7214.99.00; 7216.10.00; 7216.21.00; 7216.22.00; 7216.31.00; 7216.32.00; 7216.33.00; 7216.40.00; 7216.50.00; 7216.99.00; 7217.10.00; 7217.20.00; 7217.30.00; 7217.90.00; 7224.10.00; 7227.10.00; 7227.20.00; 7227.90.00; 7228.30.00; 7228.40.00; 7228.50.00; 7228.60.00; 7228.70.00; 7228.80.00; 7229.20.00; 7229.90.00; 7301.10.00; 7301.20.00 |
|
Pipe and Tube |
7304.19.00; 7304.22.00; 7304.23.00; 7304.24.00; 7304.29.00; 7304.39.00; 7304.59.00; 7304.90.00; 7305.11.00; 7305.12.00; 7305.19.00; 7305.20.00; 7305.31.00; 7305.39.00; 7305.90.00; 7306.19.00; 7306.29.00; 7306.30.00; 7306.50.00; 7306.61.00; 7306.69.00; 7306.90.00 |
|
Semi-finished |
7206.10.00; 7206.90.00; 7207.11.00; 7207.12.00; 7207.19.00; 7207.20.00; 7224.90.00 |
|
Stainless |
7218.10.00; 7218.91.00; 7218.99.00; 7222.30.00; 7222.40.00; 7304.49.00 |
| Product | Quota for each three-month quarterly period (tonnes) | Maximum Share of Total Quota per Country |
|---|---|---|
| Flat | 186,856 | 36% |
| Long | 178,512 | 28% |
| Pipe and Tube | 117,406 | 47% |
| Semi-finished | 152,383 | 72% |
| Stainless | 5,568 | 91% |
Source: European Central Bank
Basel, 27 June 2025
Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.
First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.
Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.
This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.
Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.
Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]
Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]
Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]
Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.
This raises three pressing issues.
First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.
Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.
Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]
Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.
To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.
At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.
At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.
Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.
The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.
The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.
We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.
A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]
Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.
This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.
Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.
This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.
Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]
We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.
One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]
We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].
Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.
However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.
In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.
In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]
Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.
Let me conclude.
We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.
I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?
First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.
Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.
Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.
Thank you for your attention.
Source: European Central Bank
Basel, 27 June 2025
Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.
First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.
Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.
This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.
Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.
Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]
Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]
Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]
Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.
This raises three pressing issues.
First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.
Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.
Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]
Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.
To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.
At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.
At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.
Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.
The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.
The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.
We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.
A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]
Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.
This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.
Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.
This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.
Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]
We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.
One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]
We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].
Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.
However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.
In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.
In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]
Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.
Let me conclude.
We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.
I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?
First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.
Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.
Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.
Thank you for your attention.
Source: European Central Bank
Basel, 27 June 2025
Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.
First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.
Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.
This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.
Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.
Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]
Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]
Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]
Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.
This raises three pressing issues.
First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.
Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.
Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]
Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.
To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.
At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.
At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.
Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.
The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.
The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.
We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.
A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]
Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.
This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.
Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.
This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.
Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]
We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.
One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]
We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].
Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.
However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.
In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.
In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]
Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.
Let me conclude.
We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.
I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?
First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.
Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.
Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.
Thank you for your attention.
Source: European Central Bank
Basel, 27 June 2025
Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.
First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.
Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.
This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.
Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.
Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]
Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]
Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]
Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.
This raises three pressing issues.
First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.
Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.
Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]
Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.
To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.
At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.
At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.
Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.
The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.
The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.
We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.
A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]
Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.
This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.
Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.
This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.
Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]
We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.
One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]
We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].
Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.
However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.
In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.
In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]
Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.
Let me conclude.
We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.
I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?
First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.
Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.
Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.
Thank you for your attention.
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell
Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, issued the following statement ahead of today’s Senate vote on the Kaine War Powers Resolution:
“Iran’s war against the United States is decades old. Through direct and proxy attacks, it has killed and wounded thousands of Americans.
“Five years ago, President Trump’s correct decision to remove Iran’s terrorist mastermind, Qassem Soleimani, from the battlefield restored a meaningful measure of deterrence. Within weeks, the Senate was forced to defeat an effort to constrain the President’s authority to take similar action in the future.
“Regrettably, under the Biden Administration, this hard-won deterrence eroded away. With the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan came a sobering reminder that the perception of American retreat emboldens our adversaries. Iran and its terrorist network shrugged off empty threats of deterrence and spilled yet more American blood.
“This weekend, the President seized a strategic opportunity to restore deterrence. In response to Iran’s ongoing war, U.S. forces dealt a devastating blow to the regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
“Now, less than a week later, the Senate will again need to defeat an attempt to limit the Commander in Chief’s authority. And once again, the restrainers behind this effort on both sides of the aisle face simple questions:
“In what ways does this discrete and limited exercise of American power exceed the limits within which President Clinton directed operations in Kosovo or President Obama in Libya? In what ways does it differ from the strikes in Syria or Yemen for which President Biden invoked his Article II authorities?
“Was degrading Iran’s nuclear capability without expanding the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East a mistake? Was it wrong to seize the rare opportunity made possible by Israel’s operations over the last 20 months? Did it not demonstrably advance U.S. interests in the region? Or are isolationists correct in suggesting that such interests do not exist?
“I have not heard the frequent flyers on War Powers resolutions reckon seriously with these questions. Until they do, efforts like this will remain divorced from both strategic and constitutional reality.
“I will oppose Senator Kaine’s resolution, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.”
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Bärnthaler, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Ecological Economics, University of Leeds
Industrial policy is back – it’s currently central to the agendas of both the EU and the UK. This resurgence comes amid a polycrisis marked by climate breakdown, social inequality, energy insecurity and geopolitical instability. And it reflects a wider shift. Governments across G20 countries are stepping in more actively to shape their economies, moving away from the idea that markets should be left to run themselves.
This is an important development. But current frameworks for industrial policy risk deepening the crises they are meant to solve.
In our research with Sebastian Mang of the New Economics Foundation, we have found that in the case of the EU, its industrial policy framework is riddled with contradictions.
It seeks resilience, yet fails to strengthen essential public services that underpin stability. It aims for strategic autonomy, yet reinforces resource dependencies. And while it gestures towards sustainability, it remains tethered to private-sector strategies that delay the phase-out of harmful industries.
EU industrial policy aims to strengthen the resilience of the bloc’s single market by preventing supply chain disruptions. It rightly views Europe’s economy as an interconnected ecosystem, where shocks in one sector ripple across others. But it fails to prioritise the foundational sectors that sustain everyday life. These include essential services such as food, utilities, housing, healthcare and public transport.
Two core issues drive this failure. First, deregulation in the single market has often extended to essential services, pushing providers to operate like private businesses. For example, liberalisation of the energy sector has contributed to volatile prices and energy poverty. And EU competition law and state aid rules have historically constrained social housing provision.
Yet social resilience — the capacity of communities to withstand and recover from crises — and, by extension market resilience, rely on these essential services. But affordable housing, universal healthcare and affordable energy for households are often not prioritised.
Second, EU industrial policy lacks a clear definition of which sectors are “critical” and why. This results in inconsistent lists of priority industries and technologies, while foundational sectors like energy and housing often remain overlooked.
These blind spots have real consequences. Around 40% of Europe’s workforce is employed in foundational sectors. These sectors are where low-income households spend about two-thirds of their income. Yet they often remain precarious and undervalued, leaving Europe more exposed to economic shocks.
To build real resilience, industrial policy must reassert public control over essential services and recognise them as priorities. This means redefining what counts as “critical”, supporting jobs in foundational sectors and accelerating public investment. This investment could be enabled through measures such as reforming the fiscal rules and with joint borrowing by member states.
Europe is pushing for strategic autonomy (the capacity of the bloc to act in strategically important areas, without being dependent on non-member countries). The aim is to reduce reliance on imports in key industries such as green technology.
But to make this happen, the EU should put reducing demand for resources and energy at the centre of its industrial policy. Instead, however, its Critical Raw Materials Act foresees skyrocketing consumption of rare earths, lithium and other inputs.
This strategy is self-defeating. It increases the likelihood of European aggression towards the rest of the world and ultimately threatens long-term security and peace for all. These tensions are already surfacing. Export restrictions on things such as nickel, cobalt and rare earth minerals are multiplying. In an era of geopolitical ruptures, these tendencies are likely to intensify.
At the same time, resource conflicts are also escalating within Europe itself. Tensions are emerging in countries including Serbia, Portugal and Greece over lithium and copper, and the environmental and social costs of mining them. And indigenous communities such as the Sámi in northern Europe face threats to their land and rights.
This is not to argue against increasing the extraction of raw materials within Europe. However, without an absolute reduction in energy and material use, these contradictions will deepen. To avoid these problems, the EU must centre industrial policy on reducing unnecessary demand. Some key moves could include investing in public transport instead of subsidising cars, prioritising retrofitting over new building, ending planned obsolescence and backing agro-ecology over industrial farming.
Research shows that this kind of strategy could significantly lower Europe’s energy use. It could also drastically cut reliance on critical imports and contribute to achieving energy independence by 2050. This is all without compromising basic quality of life.
If Europe wants peace and security, demand reduction is a rational approach that must be at the heart of the EU’s industrial strategy. This should be adopted alongside strengthening ties of cooperation and integration with the rest of Eurasia and the global south, rather than ramping up antagonism towards these neighbours.
The EU’s vision of “competitive sustainability” rests on the belief that market incentives and the private sector can drive the green transition. Yet despite decades of efficiency improvements, high-income countries have not decoupled material use and emissions from economic growth at the speed and scale required.
The EU remains reliant on derisking – using public subsidies, guarantees and looser regulations to make green investments attractive to private finance. But as this approach leaves both the pace and direction of change to private capital, it slows the phase-out of harmful industries.
What’s missing is more effective economic planning to restore public control over decarbonisation. Achieving this means building on existing mechanisms capable of delivering change — such as public credit guidance. This sets rules to limit the flow of finance from commercial banks to damaging sectors while directing investment toward sustainable ones.
China offers an example whereby the central bank has used public credit guidance to shift finance to cleaner sectors. The European Central Bank also experimented with credit guidance between 2022 and 2023, introducing climate scores for companies. And post-war France used planned credit to modernise infrastructure over two decades.
Europe and the UK are rearming, climate shocks are intensifying and global power dynamics are shifting. This moment demands a new industrial strategy — one that prioritises foundational sectors and creates fiscal space to build resilience. Reducing demand must be a prerequisite for security, peace and strategic autonomy. And reviving economic planning tools, such as public credit guidance, can accelerate the green transition.
Without these shifts, Europe and the UK face an increasingly unstable future. Industrial policy must change because the stakes are existential.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
– ref. Climate, conflict and energy security – our research shows how the EU’s industrial policy must change to face this polycrisis – https://theconversation.com/climate-conflict-and-energy-security-our-research-shows-how-the-eus-industrial-policy-must-change-to-face-this-polycrisis-259477
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Bärnthaler, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Ecological Economics, University of Leeds
Industrial policy is back – it’s currently central to the agendas of both the EU and the UK. This resurgence comes amid a polycrisis marked by climate breakdown, social inequality, energy insecurity and geopolitical instability. And it reflects a wider shift. Governments across G20 countries are stepping in more actively to shape their economies, moving away from the idea that markets should be left to run themselves.
This is an important development. But current frameworks for industrial policy risk deepening the crises they are meant to solve.
In our research with Sebastian Mang of the New Economics Foundation, we have found that in the case of the EU, its industrial policy framework is riddled with contradictions.
It seeks resilience, yet fails to strengthen essential public services that underpin stability. It aims for strategic autonomy, yet reinforces resource dependencies. And while it gestures towards sustainability, it remains tethered to private-sector strategies that delay the phase-out of harmful industries.
EU industrial policy aims to strengthen the resilience of the bloc’s single market by preventing supply chain disruptions. It rightly views Europe’s economy as an interconnected ecosystem, where shocks in one sector ripple across others. But it fails to prioritise the foundational sectors that sustain everyday life. These include essential services such as food, utilities, housing, healthcare and public transport.
Two core issues drive this failure. First, deregulation in the single market has often extended to essential services, pushing providers to operate like private businesses. For example, liberalisation of the energy sector has contributed to volatile prices and energy poverty. And EU competition law and state aid rules have historically constrained social housing provision.
Yet social resilience — the capacity of communities to withstand and recover from crises — and, by extension market resilience, rely on these essential services. But affordable housing, universal healthcare and affordable energy for households are often not prioritised.
Second, EU industrial policy lacks a clear definition of which sectors are “critical” and why. This results in inconsistent lists of priority industries and technologies, while foundational sectors like energy and housing often remain overlooked.
These blind spots have real consequences. Around 40% of Europe’s workforce is employed in foundational sectors. These sectors are where low-income households spend about two-thirds of their income. Yet they often remain precarious and undervalued, leaving Europe more exposed to economic shocks.
To build real resilience, industrial policy must reassert public control over essential services and recognise them as priorities. This means redefining what counts as “critical”, supporting jobs in foundational sectors and accelerating public investment. This investment could be enabled through measures such as reforming the fiscal rules and with joint borrowing by member states.
Europe is pushing for strategic autonomy (the capacity of the bloc to act in strategically important areas, without being dependent on non-member countries). The aim is to reduce reliance on imports in key industries such as green technology.
But to make this happen, the EU should put reducing demand for resources and energy at the centre of its industrial policy. Instead, however, its Critical Raw Materials Act foresees skyrocketing consumption of rare earths, lithium and other inputs.
This strategy is self-defeating. It increases the likelihood of European aggression towards the rest of the world and ultimately threatens long-term security and peace for all. These tensions are already surfacing. Export restrictions on things such as nickel, cobalt and rare earth minerals are multiplying. In an era of geopolitical ruptures, these tendencies are likely to intensify.
At the same time, resource conflicts are also escalating within Europe itself. Tensions are emerging in countries including Serbia, Portugal and Greece over lithium and copper, and the environmental and social costs of mining them. And indigenous communities such as the Sámi in northern Europe face threats to their land and rights.
This is not to argue against increasing the extraction of raw materials within Europe. However, without an absolute reduction in energy and material use, these contradictions will deepen. To avoid these problems, the EU must centre industrial policy on reducing unnecessary demand. Some key moves could include investing in public transport instead of subsidising cars, prioritising retrofitting over new building, ending planned obsolescence and backing agro-ecology over industrial farming.
Research shows that this kind of strategy could significantly lower Europe’s energy use. It could also drastically cut reliance on critical imports and contribute to achieving energy independence by 2050. This is all without compromising basic quality of life.
If Europe wants peace and security, demand reduction is a rational approach that must be at the heart of the EU’s industrial strategy. This should be adopted alongside strengthening ties of cooperation and integration with the rest of Eurasia and the global south, rather than ramping up antagonism towards these neighbours.
The EU’s vision of “competitive sustainability” rests on the belief that market incentives and the private sector can drive the green transition. Yet despite decades of efficiency improvements, high-income countries have not decoupled material use and emissions from economic growth at the speed and scale required.
The EU remains reliant on derisking – using public subsidies, guarantees and looser regulations to make green investments attractive to private finance. But as this approach leaves both the pace and direction of change to private capital, it slows the phase-out of harmful industries.
What’s missing is more effective economic planning to restore public control over decarbonisation. Achieving this means building on existing mechanisms capable of delivering change — such as public credit guidance. This sets rules to limit the flow of finance from commercial banks to damaging sectors while directing investment toward sustainable ones.
China offers an example whereby the central bank has used public credit guidance to shift finance to cleaner sectors. The European Central Bank also experimented with credit guidance between 2022 and 2023, introducing climate scores for companies. And post-war France used planned credit to modernise infrastructure over two decades.
Europe and the UK are rearming, climate shocks are intensifying and global power dynamics are shifting. This moment demands a new industrial strategy — one that prioritises foundational sectors and creates fiscal space to build resilience. Reducing demand must be a prerequisite for security, peace and strategic autonomy. And reviving economic planning tools, such as public credit guidance, can accelerate the green transition.
Without these shifts, Europe and the UK face an increasingly unstable future. Industrial policy must change because the stakes are existential.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
– ref. Climate, conflict and energy security – our research shows how the EU’s industrial policy must change to face this polycrisis – https://theconversation.com/climate-conflict-and-energy-security-our-research-shows-how-the-eus-industrial-policy-must-change-to-face-this-polycrisis-259477
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham
When Moldovans go to the polls in parliamentary elections on September 28, it will be the third time in less than a year – after a referendum on future EU membership and presidential elections last autumn.
In both of the recent elections pro-European forces scraped to victory, thanks to a strong turnout among Moldovan diaspora voters, primarily in western Europe and north America. And in both elections, Russian interference was a significant factor. This is unlikely to change in the upcoming parliamentary vote. Moldova is too important a battleground in Russia’s campaign to rebuild a Soviet-style sphere of influence in eastern Europe.
Wedged between EU and Nato member Romania to the west and Ukraine to the east, Moldova has its own aspirations for EU accession. But with a breakaway region in Transnistria, which is host to a Russian military base and “peacekeeping force” and whose population is leaning heavily towards Russia, this will not be a straightforward path to membership.
What’s more, a Euro-sceptic and Moscow-friendly government after the next elections might allow the Kremlin to increase its military presence in the region and thereby pose a threat not only to Ukraine but also to Romania. While not quite equivalent to Russia’s unsinkable aircraft carrier of Kaliningrad, a more Russia-friendly Moldovan government would be a major strategic asset for Moscow.
Unsurprisingly, Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, and her Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky have little doubt that further destabilisation is at the top of Russia’s agenda. Fears about a Russian escalation in the months before the elections are neither new nor unfounded.
There were worries that Moldova and Transnistria might be next on the Kremlin’s agenda as far back as the aftermath of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These worries resurfaced when Moscow, rather prematurely, announced the beginning of stage two of its war against Ukraine in late April, 2022.
Russia’s hopes of capturing all of southern Ukraine may not have materialised yet, but they are not off the Kremlin’s agenda. And a track record of false-flag operations in Transnistria and a coup attempt in Moldova do not bode well in the run-up to the elections.
Knife-edge elections are nothing new in Moldova. The country is not only physically divided along the river Nistru, but even in the territory controlled by the government, opinions over its future geopolitical orientation remain split.
With no pre-1991 history of independent statehood, parts of Moldova were part of Ukraine, Romania and the Soviet Union. Russian is widely spoken and, while declining in number, Moldovan labour migrants to Russia remain important contributors of remittances, which accounted for over 12 percent of the country’s GDP in 2023.
A large number of Moldovans are, therefore, not keen on severing all ties with Russia. This does not mean they are supporters of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine or opponents of closer relations with the European Union. But as the referendum and presidential elections in October 2024, if pushed to make a choice between Russia and Europe and manipulated by Russian fear-mongering and vote buying, pro-European majorities remain slim.
This is despite the significant support that the EU has provided to Moldova, including €1.9 billion (£1.6 billion) in financial support to facilitate reforms as part of the country’s efforts to join the EU. And there’s also nearly €200 million in military assistance over the past four years, including a €20 million package for improved air defences announced in April.
The EU has also provided several emergency aid packages to assist the country’s population during repeated energy crises triggered by Russia. Since then, the Moldovans and Brussels have agreed on comprehensive energy strategy that will make the country immune to Russian blackmail.
This pattern of competitive influence seeking by Russia and the EU is long-standing and has not produced any decisive, lasting breakthroughs for either side.
When the current president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, won in 2020, she defeated her opponent, Igor Dodon, by a decisive 58% to 42% margin, equivalent to some 250,000 votes that separated the candidates in the second round. Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) obtained almost 53% of votes in the 2021 parliamentary elections and gained 63 seats in the 101-seat parliament. Not since the 2005 elections, won by the communist party under then-president Vladimir Voronin, had there been a a majority single-party government in Moldova. According to current opinion polls, PAS remains the strongest party with levels of support between 27% and 37%.
In a crowded field of political parties and their leaders in which disappointment and doubt are the prevailing negative emotions among the electorate, Sandu and PAS remain the least unpopular choices. They have weathered the fall-out from the war in Ukraine well so far – managing the influx of refugees, keeping relations with Transnistria stable, and steering Moldova through a near-constant cost-of-living and energy crisis. Anti-government protests in 2022-23 eventually fizzled out.
Russia’s election interference in 2024 was ultimately not successful in cheating pro-European voters out of their victories in the presidential elections and the referendum on future EU membership. But this is unlikely to stop the Kremlin from trying again in the run-up to parliamentary elections in September.
Moscow will try to disrupt and delay Moldova’s already bumpy road to EU membership. A weakened pro-European government after parliamentary elections would be a very useful tool for Russia. Moldova and its European allies are in for an unusually hot summer.
Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
– ref. Why experts expect Russian interference in upcoming election on Ukraine’s borders – https://theconversation.com/why-experts-expect-russian-interference-in-upcoming-election-on-ukraines-borders-258445
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Vincent K.L. Chang, Assistant Professor of the History and International Relations of Modern China, Leiden University
A tour guide competition was held in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in late May. This was not some fun contest. According to Chinese state media, it was a carefully conceived effort to “attract and cultivate a group of politically firm and professionally skilled storytellers of heroes and martyrs in the new era”.
It symbolises the ambitious and far-reaching campaign launched by the Chinese state to revive the country’s pantheon of national heroes and martyrs. The aim is to unite and mobilise the nation in what Chinese leadership see as the crucial final phase in the quest to become a modern global superpower.
On the same day as the Wuhan competition, but 750 miles further inland in Sichuan province, children from a kindergarten gathered with martyrs’ family members to engage in traditional crafts. The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist party, the People’s Daily, explained how this activity helped “pass on the torch of heroes” to young generations.
And two weeks earlier, in China’s eastern province of Shandong, representatives from the official state news agency, Xinhua, attended an immersive training session on hero spirit. By coming “face to face” with heroes of the past, the trainees were able to grasp the “spirit” that had guided the extraordinary deeds of these ordinary people.
This “facing up” to past heroes increasingly takes place through digital means. Thanks to developments in AI, and with the help of universities, museums and various government units, numerous Chinese people have now been “reunited” or become “acquainted” with family members martyred decades ago.
Activities such as these have become commonplace in recent years. They are encouraged, guided and overseen by an expanding architecture of laws and regulations. There are at least two reasons why the campaign to build a new “spirit” of heroism and sacrifice requires attention beyond China-watchers.
The first reason is the increasingly global reach of the campaign. Just as China’s economic statecraft is affecting global trade and finance, so too are Chinese memory politics spreading across the globe and reshaping the transnational memory landscape.
Beijing has become an active sponsor of commemorations that are concerned more with shaping the future than looking into the past. Recent examples include Victory Day celebrations in Moscow and Minsk, and joint commemorations in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, of the Chinese “martyrs” of Nato’s bombing of the Chinese embassy there in 1999.
Read more:
Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out
China is also fostering bilateral memory partnerships in south-east Asia and Africa. And it has even resorted to memory diplomacy in seeking improved relations with the US by invoking the spirit of Sino-US cooperation during the second world war.
China’s historical statecraft operates globally in the legal realm, too. Laws have come into effect that aim to promote patriotism and spread “core socialist values” among Chinese communities worldwide.
Chinese embassies and consulates are required to locate Chinese martyrs buried in their host jurisdictions, and erect and maintain memorials for them. They are also expected to organise commemorations involving local Chinese diasporic and expat communities.
Recent laws have been used to detain Chinese citizens living abroad. One example is Chinese artist Gao Zhen. Gao had been a permanent US resident for 13 years when he was detained in China in 2024 for his critical depictions of Mao Zedong a decade earlier.
Gao was charged with the crime of “slandering China’s heroes and martyrs” under a law that did not exist when he created and exhibited his artwork.
The second reason why China’s martyrs and heroes campaign matters globally is possibly more disturbing. China has become an example of a growing body of cases where state actors seek to shape and control historical memory.
With several democracies beginning to show signs of democratic backsliding, the Chinese case is one of many that show that polar distinctions between “liberal” and “illiberal” systems are untenable.
Perhaps the most obvious example of a democracy in democratic recession is the US. Donald Trump, a constitutionally elected president, is relying on a series of executive orders to consolidate power and hamper critical debate.
One such directive, issued late in Trump’s first term, entails a proposal to build a so-called “national garden of American heroes”. The proposal was revived recently with an executive order on “restoring truth and sanity to American history”.
The order aims to remove what the administration deems divisive and anti-American ideologies from national museums and public monuments.
Washington’s efforts to control how history is presented seem to come straight out of Beijing’s playbook. In 2020, during his July 4 address, Trump claimed: “Our nation is witnessing a merciless campaign to wipe out our history, defame our heroes, erase our values, and indoctrinate our children.”
These words eerily resemble those used previously by Chinese president Xi Jinping to justify his campaign against what he calls “historical nihilism” – attempts to “destroy” the Chinese nation by eradicating its history.
Memory laws have also been adopted across Europe. The European Parliament, for example, has codified its own historical interpretations of the causes of the second world war in an attempt to counter what it labels Russian disinformation.
The causes and consequences of war have always been and will continue to be hotly debated among historians, and there is no need for the EU’s bureaucracy to unilaterally “resolve” these debates.
A problem with these bureaucratic efforts to codify historical interpretation is that they feed memory wars and fuel escalation. Even more damaging is that they emulate authoritarian practices of “dictating” history and restricting debate.
These examples show that distinctions between authoritarian and democratic regimes are not as pristine as is often claimed. Increasingly, global memory practices are evolving and possibly converging on a fluid spectrum between these two poles.
China’s new hero cult is an important case for shedding light on these dynamics.
Vincent K.L. Chang receives research funding from the Dutch government.
– ref. China is constructing a new hero cult – here’s why that matters – https://theconversation.com/china-is-constructing-a-new-hero-cult-heres-why-that-matters-259075
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Vincent K.L. Chang, Assistant Professor of the History and International Relations of Modern China, Leiden University
A tour guide competition was held in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in late May. This was not some fun contest. According to Chinese state media, it was a carefully conceived effort to “attract and cultivate a group of politically firm and professionally skilled storytellers of heroes and martyrs in the new era”.
It symbolises the ambitious and far-reaching campaign launched by the Chinese state to revive the country’s pantheon of national heroes and martyrs. The aim is to unite and mobilise the nation in what Chinese leadership see as the crucial final phase in the quest to become a modern global superpower.
On the same day as the Wuhan competition, but 750 miles further inland in Sichuan province, children from a kindergarten gathered with martyrs’ family members to engage in traditional crafts. The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist party, the People’s Daily, explained how this activity helped “pass on the torch of heroes” to young generations.
And two weeks earlier, in China’s eastern province of Shandong, representatives from the official state news agency, Xinhua, attended an immersive training session on hero spirit. By coming “face to face” with heroes of the past, the trainees were able to grasp the “spirit” that had guided the extraordinary deeds of these ordinary people.
This “facing up” to past heroes increasingly takes place through digital means. Thanks to developments in AI, and with the help of universities, museums and various government units, numerous Chinese people have now been “reunited” or become “acquainted” with family members martyred decades ago.
Activities such as these have become commonplace in recent years. They are encouraged, guided and overseen by an expanding architecture of laws and regulations. There are at least two reasons why the campaign to build a new “spirit” of heroism and sacrifice requires attention beyond China-watchers.
The first reason is the increasingly global reach of the campaign. Just as China’s economic statecraft is affecting global trade and finance, so too are Chinese memory politics spreading across the globe and reshaping the transnational memory landscape.
Beijing has become an active sponsor of commemorations that are concerned more with shaping the future than looking into the past. Recent examples include Victory Day celebrations in Moscow and Minsk, and joint commemorations in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, of the Chinese “martyrs” of Nato’s bombing of the Chinese embassy there in 1999.
Read more:
Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out
China is also fostering bilateral memory partnerships in south-east Asia and Africa. And it has even resorted to memory diplomacy in seeking improved relations with the US by invoking the spirit of Sino-US cooperation during the second world war.
China’s historical statecraft operates globally in the legal realm, too. Laws have come into effect that aim to promote patriotism and spread “core socialist values” among Chinese communities worldwide.
Chinese embassies and consulates are required to locate Chinese martyrs buried in their host jurisdictions, and erect and maintain memorials for them. They are also expected to organise commemorations involving local Chinese diasporic and expat communities.
Recent laws have been used to detain Chinese citizens living abroad. One example is Chinese artist Gao Zhen. Gao had been a permanent US resident for 13 years when he was detained in China in 2024 for his critical depictions of Mao Zedong a decade earlier.
Gao was charged with the crime of “slandering China’s heroes and martyrs” under a law that did not exist when he created and exhibited his artwork.
The second reason why China’s martyrs and heroes campaign matters globally is possibly more disturbing. China has become an example of a growing body of cases where state actors seek to shape and control historical memory.
With several democracies beginning to show signs of democratic backsliding, the Chinese case is one of many that show that polar distinctions between “liberal” and “illiberal” systems are untenable.
Perhaps the most obvious example of a democracy in democratic recession is the US. Donald Trump, a constitutionally elected president, is relying on a series of executive orders to consolidate power and hamper critical debate.
One such directive, issued late in Trump’s first term, entails a proposal to build a so-called “national garden of American heroes”. The proposal was revived recently with an executive order on “restoring truth and sanity to American history”.
The order aims to remove what the administration deems divisive and anti-American ideologies from national museums and public monuments.
Washington’s efforts to control how history is presented seem to come straight out of Beijing’s playbook. In 2020, during his July 4 address, Trump claimed: “Our nation is witnessing a merciless campaign to wipe out our history, defame our heroes, erase our values, and indoctrinate our children.”
These words eerily resemble those used previously by Chinese president Xi Jinping to justify his campaign against what he calls “historical nihilism” – attempts to “destroy” the Chinese nation by eradicating its history.
Memory laws have also been adopted across Europe. The European Parliament, for example, has codified its own historical interpretations of the causes of the second world war in an attempt to counter what it labels Russian disinformation.
The causes and consequences of war have always been and will continue to be hotly debated among historians, and there is no need for the EU’s bureaucracy to unilaterally “resolve” these debates.
A problem with these bureaucratic efforts to codify historical interpretation is that they feed memory wars and fuel escalation. Even more damaging is that they emulate authoritarian practices of “dictating” history and restricting debate.
These examples show that distinctions between authoritarian and democratic regimes are not as pristine as is often claimed. Increasingly, global memory practices are evolving and possibly converging on a fluid spectrum between these two poles.
China’s new hero cult is an important case for shedding light on these dynamics.
Vincent K.L. Chang receives research funding from the Dutch government.
– ref. China is constructing a new hero cult – here’s why that matters – https://theconversation.com/china-is-constructing-a-new-hero-cult-heres-why-that-matters-259075
Source: European Central Bank
Basel, 27 June 2025
Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.
First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.
Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.
This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.
Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.
Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]
Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]
Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]
Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.
This raises three pressing issues.
First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.
Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.
Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]
Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.
To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.
At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.
At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.
Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.
The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.
The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.
We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.
A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]
Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.
This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.
Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.
This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.
Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]
We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.
One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]
We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].
Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.
However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.
In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.
In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]
Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.
Let me conclude.
We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.
I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?
First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.
Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.
Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.
Thank you for your attention.
Source: European Central Bank
Basel, 27 June 2025
Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.
First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.
Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.
This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.
Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.
Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]
Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]
Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]
Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.
This raises three pressing issues.
First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.
Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.
Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]
Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.
To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.
At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.
At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.
Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.
The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.
The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.
We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.
A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]
Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.
This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.
Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.
This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.
Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]
We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.
One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]
We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].
Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.
However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.
In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.
In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]
Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.
Let me conclude.
We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.
I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?
First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.
Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.
Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.
Thank you for your attention.
Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
As it prepares to hold elections, the Central African Republic stands at a delicate juncture, and international support is key to consolidate its unique opportunity to strengthen democracy and national reconciliation, the Security Council heard today from the top UN peacekeeping official, as well as the country’s representative.
“This year is of particular significance for the Central African Republic as the country is preparing to organize local, presidential and legislative elections,” Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations said. He highlighted the efforts of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to assist the Government’s electoral preparations.
Elections are a key component of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, he pointed out. However — and despite significant political will — local elections were postponed on several occasions due to financial, technical and logistical challenges. “The electoral process is at a turning point and there’s a critical need to safeguard and preserve the progress that has been achieved.” The international community must mobilize resources to prevent any backsliding.
“The political situation remains punctuated by mistrust and tensions” between the majority in power and the opposition, he said, while noting efforts to implement the peace agreement reached on 19 April between the Government, and the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique, or UPC and Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation, or 3R. Despite progress in expanding the authority of the State, violence by armed groups and militias continues to compromise stability. The Government is collaborating with MINUSCA to improve border security, he said, noting the spillover of the Sudanese conflict in the north-east. He also noted an attack on 28 March near Tabane, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, which took the life of a Kenyan military observer.
On the humanitarian front, “urgent needs continue to outpace available resources”, he said, noting the suspension of critical services of some of the most vulnerable populations. Also noting persistent conflict-related sexual violence and violations of children’s rights, he said the Government, supported by the Mission, is making efforts to advance transitional justice mechanisms. Further, the Special Criminal Court is playing a significant role in the fight against impunity and transitional justice, and requires financial and human resources to sustain its activities.
Calling on the Council to help consolidate the gains made by the country, he said: “If these efforts are sustained in the spirit of partnership and shared responsibility, the Central African Republic has the potential to become a true success story, not only for Central Africans, but also for peacekeeping and for this Security Council.”
He also recalled the tragic fire that occurred on Wednesday at Barthelemy Boganda High School in Bangui and expressed condolences to all the affected families. Further, six days ago a MINUSCA patrol was attacked during an operation in response to signaling of attacks by armed Sudanese elements, resulting in the tragic loss of a Zambian blue helmet, he said, condemning that attack.
In the ensuing discussion, speakers expressed their condolences for both events, and several called for an investigation into the attack on the MINUSCA patrol.
The representative of the Central African Republic called for a moment of silence in honor of the victims of these incidents. “Recent progress reflects steadfast political will to end the cycle of violence” in his country, he said. The inclusive political dialogue supported by the President and the 19 April ceasefire agreement providing for the dissolution of certain armed groups are examples of this. Also detailing Government efforts to re-establish authority throughout the country, he said that the “triptych” of State authority, security and justice “represents our vision for national reconstruction”. Further, he said, the lifting of the arms embargo in July 2024 was a “turning point”, which allowed national forces to be equipped through a legal, transparent framework.
“However, force alone is not enough,” he observed, detailing additional Government efforts to establish peace, hold elections, uphold the rule of law and assist victims of sexual violence. Nevertheless, the Sudanese conflict is a “genuine” threat, he said, reporting that a joint force established by his country and Chad in March aims to address its spillover. “This mechanism,” he stated, “is part of a new generation of bilateral African cooperation in the service of collective security.” For its part, he called on the Council to provide political, institutional, security and financial support. He added that his country is not an “emergency situation”; rather, “it is a promise of rebirth”.
Council members welcomed these positive developments, with the representative of Guyana, Council President for June, speaking in her national capacity and also for Somalia, Algeria and Sierra Leone, hailing the ongoing implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, the integration of 9 of 14 armed groups and the continued expansion of State authority across the country. Also underscoring “the importance of the upcoming local and national elections as a milestone for democratic consolidation”, she said the international community must help address the significant funding gap affecting the electoral process.
However, she also expressed concern about the ineffective implementation of the arms embargo and the persistent insecurity in various regions. This is “exacerbated by armed groups competing over natural resources and trade routes”, she said, calling on non-signatory armed groups to join the peace process. Noting the spillover effects from the Sudan conflict, she condemned the incursions by the Rapid Support Forces into Central African Republic territory and their reported collaboration with local armed groups. MINUSCA’s resource constraints, including unpaid assessed contributions, stand at over $400 million, she said, stressing that adequate and timely financing is essential for the Mission to deliver on its mandate, especially during this critical electoral period.
Agreeing, the speaker for Slovenia, welcoming MINUSCA’s “proactive peacekeeping posture”, said it should be equipped with adequate support to ensure the safety of civilians and its own personnel. The representative of Pakistan said that his country is proud to have 1,400 troops serving in MINUSCA. “We will soon deploy a level-two field hospital in the Mission, which will provide medical facilities to uniformed personnel, civilian staff, Government officials and the local population,” he added. However, pointing out that MINUSCA’s operational capacity is “crippled” by unpaid contributions, he urged Member States to pay in full and on time.
Panama’s delegate added: “Experience has taught us that withdrawing from a peace mission too soon may end up being more costly than sustaining it.” Welcoming the Government’s efforts towards security sector reform, he urged finalization of the “military programming law”, which will “allow for clearer articulation of the needs of the defence sector”.
“The Central African Republic is on the path of returning to peace and security,” said France’s representative, as he asked the Council to continue assisting the Government in its fight against arms trafficking and combatants. He pledged that his country would work together with all Council members and the Central African Republic on the renewal of the coercive measures against the armed groups outlined in resolution 2745 (2024).
The representative of the United States said his delegation looks forward to engaging with Member States on renewing that sanctions regime. He also expressed concern that Government regulations on fuel imports restrict MINUSCA’s operations, emphasizing that forcing the Mission to rely solely on Government-designated importers results in inflated fuel prices. “This must stop,” he declared, urging the Government to uphold the status-of-forces agreement.
“There is no room here for the obsolete, discredited colonialist practices, nor for their contemporary manifestations thereof,” warned the representative of the Russian Federation. She voiced confidence in Bangui’s ability to translate security gains into socioeconomic progress, emphasizing that normalization — supported by the UN and international financial institutions — can become “irreversible” if grounded in respect for sovereignty and non-interference. The Government now controls nearly the entire national territory and the capabilities of the national armed forces are growing. Armed groups must seize this opportunity to engage constructively with the authorities. “The abandonment of armed struggle is the only path,” she said, warning: “The alternative to this is well known — that is a one-way ticket.”
“The Central African Republic stands at a pivotal point in its transition from post-conflict recovery to sustainable development,” said the representative of the Republic of Korea, urging the Government to uphold its commitment to ensure timely, orderly and inclusive local, legislative and presidential elections, a call taken up by several speakers today.
The representative of Denmark commended the work of the Government, National Elections Authority, MINUSCA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in advancing preparations for elections. She added: “It is essential that all groups in society — especially women, young voters and internally displaced persons — can participate fully and freely.” The representative of the United Kingdom, called on the Government — with MINUSCA’s support — to ensure a safe environment during all stages of the electoral cycle. Greece’s delegate pointed out that “an expanding political and civic space is the most trustworthy pathway towards a demonstrated commitment by all stakeholders for further implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.”
While the Central African Republic is entering a critical phase of economic recovery, China’s delegate said, it continues to face significant challenges, including a widening fiscal deficit, high inflation and power shortages. The international community should prioritize helping countries, like this, achieve sustainable development by providing support in key areas, such as infrastructure, education and employment — aligned with the priorities outlined in the country’s National Development Action Plan. “This,” he emphasized, “will in turn help consolidate the foundation for peace”. At the recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing announced zero tariffs on 100 per cent of products from 53 African countries with diplomatic ties to China, he added.
Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
As it prepares to hold elections, the Central African Republic stands at a delicate juncture, and international support is key to consolidate its unique opportunity to strengthen democracy and national reconciliation, the Security Council heard today from the top UN peacekeeping official, as well as the country’s representative.
“This year is of particular significance for the Central African Republic as the country is preparing to organize local, presidential and legislative elections,” Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations said. He highlighted the efforts of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to assist the Government’s electoral preparations.
Elections are a key component of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, he pointed out. However — and despite significant political will — local elections were postponed on several occasions due to financial, technical and logistical challenges. “The electoral process is at a turning point and there’s a critical need to safeguard and preserve the progress that has been achieved.” The international community must mobilize resources to prevent any backsliding.
“The political situation remains punctuated by mistrust and tensions” between the majority in power and the opposition, he said, while noting efforts to implement the peace agreement reached on 19 April between the Government, and the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique, or UPC and Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation, or 3R. Despite progress in expanding the authority of the State, violence by armed groups and militias continues to compromise stability. The Government is collaborating with MINUSCA to improve border security, he said, noting the spillover of the Sudanese conflict in the north-east. He also noted an attack on 28 March near Tabane, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, which took the life of a Kenyan military observer.
On the humanitarian front, “urgent needs continue to outpace available resources”, he said, noting the suspension of critical services of some of the most vulnerable populations. Also noting persistent conflict-related sexual violence and violations of children’s rights, he said the Government, supported by the Mission, is making efforts to advance transitional justice mechanisms. Further, the Special Criminal Court is playing a significant role in the fight against impunity and transitional justice, and requires financial and human resources to sustain its activities.
Calling on the Council to help consolidate the gains made by the country, he said: “If these efforts are sustained in the spirit of partnership and shared responsibility, the Central African Republic has the potential to become a true success story, not only for Central Africans, but also for peacekeeping and for this Security Council.”
He also recalled the tragic fire that occurred on Wednesday at Barthelemy Boganda High School in Bangui and expressed condolences to all the affected families. Further, six days ago a MINUSCA patrol was attacked during an operation in response to signaling of attacks by armed Sudanese elements, resulting in the tragic loss of a Zambian blue helmet, he said, condemning that attack.
In the ensuing discussion, speakers expressed their condolences for both events, and several called for an investigation into the attack on the MINUSCA patrol.
The representative of the Central African Republic called for a moment of silence in honor of the victims of these incidents. “Recent progress reflects steadfast political will to end the cycle of violence” in his country, he said. The inclusive political dialogue supported by the President and the 19 April ceasefire agreement providing for the dissolution of certain armed groups are examples of this. Also detailing Government efforts to re-establish authority throughout the country, he said that the “triptych” of State authority, security and justice “represents our vision for national reconstruction”. Further, he said, the lifting of the arms embargo in July 2024 was a “turning point”, which allowed national forces to be equipped through a legal, transparent framework.
“However, force alone is not enough,” he observed, detailing additional Government efforts to establish peace, hold elections, uphold the rule of law and assist victims of sexual violence. Nevertheless, the Sudanese conflict is a “genuine” threat, he said, reporting that a joint force established by his country and Chad in March aims to address its spillover. “This mechanism,” he stated, “is part of a new generation of bilateral African cooperation in the service of collective security.” For its part, he called on the Council to provide political, institutional, security and financial support. He added that his country is not an “emergency situation”; rather, “it is a promise of rebirth”.
Council members welcomed these positive developments, with the representative of Guyana, Council President for June, speaking in her national capacity and also for Somalia, Algeria and Sierra Leone, hailing the ongoing implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, the integration of 9 of 14 armed groups and the continued expansion of State authority across the country. Also underscoring “the importance of the upcoming local and national elections as a milestone for democratic consolidation”, she said the international community must help address the significant funding gap affecting the electoral process.
However, she also expressed concern about the ineffective implementation of the arms embargo and the persistent insecurity in various regions. This is “exacerbated by armed groups competing over natural resources and trade routes”, she said, calling on non-signatory armed groups to join the peace process. Noting the spillover effects from the Sudan conflict, she condemned the incursions by the Rapid Support Forces into Central African Republic territory and their reported collaboration with local armed groups. MINUSCA’s resource constraints, including unpaid assessed contributions, stand at over $400 million, she said, stressing that adequate and timely financing is essential for the Mission to deliver on its mandate, especially during this critical electoral period.
Agreeing, the speaker for Slovenia, welcoming MINUSCA’s “proactive peacekeeping posture”, said it should be equipped with adequate support to ensure the safety of civilians and its own personnel. The representative of Pakistan said that his country is proud to have 1,400 troops serving in MINUSCA. “We will soon deploy a level-two field hospital in the Mission, which will provide medical facilities to uniformed personnel, civilian staff, Government officials and the local population,” he added. However, pointing out that MINUSCA’s operational capacity is “crippled” by unpaid contributions, he urged Member States to pay in full and on time.
Panama’s delegate added: “Experience has taught us that withdrawing from a peace mission too soon may end up being more costly than sustaining it.” Welcoming the Government’s efforts towards security sector reform, he urged finalization of the “military programming law”, which will “allow for clearer articulation of the needs of the defence sector”.
“The Central African Republic is on the path of returning to peace and security,” said France’s representative, as he asked the Council to continue assisting the Government in its fight against arms trafficking and combatants. He pledged that his country would work together with all Council members and the Central African Republic on the renewal of the coercive measures against the armed groups outlined in resolution 2745 (2024).
The representative of the United States said his delegation looks forward to engaging with Member States on renewing that sanctions regime. He also expressed concern that Government regulations on fuel imports restrict MINUSCA’s operations, emphasizing that forcing the Mission to rely solely on Government-designated importers results in inflated fuel prices. “This must stop,” he declared, urging the Government to uphold the status-of-forces agreement.
“There is no room here for the obsolete, discredited colonialist practices, nor for their contemporary manifestations thereof,” warned the representative of the Russian Federation. She voiced confidence in Bangui’s ability to translate security gains into socioeconomic progress, emphasizing that normalization — supported by the UN and international financial institutions — can become “irreversible” if grounded in respect for sovereignty and non-interference. The Government now controls nearly the entire national territory and the capabilities of the national armed forces are growing. Armed groups must seize this opportunity to engage constructively with the authorities. “The abandonment of armed struggle is the only path,” she said, warning: “The alternative to this is well known — that is a one-way ticket.”
“The Central African Republic stands at a pivotal point in its transition from post-conflict recovery to sustainable development,” said the representative of the Republic of Korea, urging the Government to uphold its commitment to ensure timely, orderly and inclusive local, legislative and presidential elections, a call taken up by several speakers today.
The representative of Denmark commended the work of the Government, National Elections Authority, MINUSCA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in advancing preparations for elections. She added: “It is essential that all groups in society — especially women, young voters and internally displaced persons — can participate fully and freely.” The representative of the United Kingdom, called on the Government — with MINUSCA’s support — to ensure a safe environment during all stages of the electoral cycle. Greece’s delegate pointed out that “an expanding political and civic space is the most trustworthy pathway towards a demonstrated commitment by all stakeholders for further implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.”
While the Central African Republic is entering a critical phase of economic recovery, China’s delegate said, it continues to face significant challenges, including a widening fiscal deficit, high inflation and power shortages. The international community should prioritize helping countries, like this, achieve sustainable development by providing support in key areas, such as infrastructure, education and employment — aligned with the priorities outlined in the country’s National Development Action Plan. “This,” he emphasized, “will in turn help consolidate the foundation for peace”. At the recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing announced zero tariffs on 100 per cent of products from 53 African countries with diplomatic ties to China, he added.
Source: United Nations MIL OSI
In the wake of unprecedented violence against children in 2024, the Security Council heard today that the world is failing to protect them from the horrors of war — and that urgent action is needed to correct this course — during a day-long debate on children and armed conflict.
“The year 2024 marked a devastating new record,” reported Virginia Gamba, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, as the UN verified 41,370 grave violations against children — a “staggering” 25 per cent increase from 2023. “Behind these numbers are the shattered stories, dreams and futures of 22,495 children, each of them profoundly affected by war, displacement and the collapse of protection systems that should have served as their shield,” she stressed. Spotlighting the “sharp” rise in the number of children subjected to multiple grave violations — 3,137 in total — she said this is a “stark reminder of the compounded vulnerabilities children face in conflict settings”.
Detailing “the six grave violations the Security Council entrusted to my office”, she said that, in 2024, 11,967 children were killed or maimed — the highest number “since this mandate was established over two decades ago”. Further, there were 7,402 cases of recruitment and use; 1,982 cases of sexual violence; 2,374 cases of attacks on schools and hospitals; thousands of children were forcibly abducted; and denied humanitarian access is now one of the greatest obstacles to protecting children in conflict zones. “These atrocities against children span the globe,” she underscored, which demonstrates the universal, indiscriminate nature of these grave violations.
Also noting that Government forces “remained the principal perpetrators” of the killing and maiming of children, attacks on schools and hospitals, and the denial of humanitarian access, she stressed: “We cannot continue to stand by and watch with no action what is happening to the children globally — and especially in Gaza.” She therefore urged the international community, inter alia, to call on all parties to conflict to engage with the UN to develop, sign and fully implement action plans that end and prevent these violations. Adding that the children and armed conflict mandate has proven its value, she urged: “Let us prove that it matters — that they, our children, matter.”
Also briefing the Council was Sheema Sen Gupta, Director of Child Protection and Migration of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), who stated that today’s report “once again confirms what too many children already know — that the world is failing to protect them from the horrors of war”. She highlighted two “deeply disturbing” trends. First, the increased use of explosive weapons in populated areas is now the leading cause of child casualties in many of the world’s conflicts, accounting for over 70 per cent of all incidents of killing and maiming. Second is the surge in sexual violence, and she reported that verified cases of such violence against children increased by 35 per cent in 2024.
On that, she noted that nearly 10,000 cases of sexual violence were reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the first two months of 2025, with children constituting over 40 per cent of those affected. Nevertheless, this agenda “remains a source of hope”, with over 16,000 children receiving protection and reintegration support in 2024. Calling on all parties to conflict to stop the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, she also underlined the need to protect and expand humanitarian space. “Fund this agenda,” she added, stressing: “Children are not collateral damage.”
Next, Sila — a 17-year-old girl from Idlib, Syria — said that she is part of a generation of thousands of children that has lived through war and knows nothing of safety. “Rather, I know nothing but smoke, shelling, displacement and fear,” she said. Stating that she came to the Council to talk about the pain that remains after war, she described a childhood in which her home was a suitcase as bombings forced her family to constantly move. “My childhood was full of fear and anxiety, and I was deprived of people I loved,” she said. She added: “Imagine that you go to school, and you hear the sound of the plane over your head, and you don’t know if the projectile will hit your school or your home.”
War does not end when the bombing stops, she added. “The real danger remains after the war — the landmines, the unexploded shells and the life that turns into death traps,” she said, pointing out that “many people lost their limbs — or even their lives — without participating in any battle”. Now, she works with a humanitarian organization to raise awareness about the dangers posed by remnants of war. “It’s our turn to speak and raise our voices, and to educate others,” she said. She stressed: “Today, I did not come as a victim — I came as a witness.” As such, she asked for the international community’s support so that children can achieve their dreams and opportunities.
“It is my fervent hope that today’s debate will be an opportunity not just to express outrage, but to follow through with tangible action,” stressed Vindhya Vasini Persaud, Minister for Human Services and Social Security of Guyana and Council President for June, speaking in her national capacity as the floor opened. Similarly, Greece’s representative, Chair of the Working Group on this agenda item, welcomed today’s report as a call “not just for reflection on one of the gravest affronts to international law, but also for action”. He asked those present: “Do we live up to our promises to children?”
Most statements suggested otherwise. Algeria’s representative posed his own question: “How can we ignore the 7,188 verified grave violations attributed to Israeli forces?” Stressing that the response of the Special Representative’s office to this matter has been “strikingly insufficient”, he said that its statements “fall critically short of the decisive and sustained condemnation warranted by the immense scale of the crisis”. He concluded: “The protection of children in conflict demands a more vigorous — a more vocal — response to the unparalleled crisis in Gaza.”
The representative of the United Kingdom, for his part, pointed to the Palestinians killed trying to reach “the few aid sites permitted by Israel”. “This is unacceptable,” he stated, calling on Israel to abide by its obligations to protect children and to enable aid to enter Gaza at scale. China’s representative also called on Israel to lift its humanitarian blockade. The representative of Sierra Leone — expressing similar concern over the “appalling humanitarian situation confronting children in Gaza” — emphasized that it is States — especially those exercising territorial control — that must ensure the protection of civilians.
The representative of the Russian Federation also emphasized States’ leading role in this context, emphasizing: “This is why this theme — more than any other theme — requires intergovernmental cooperation and must, under no circumstances, be politicized.” However, he said that the structures assisting the Council in this regard “have not demonstrated themselves to be paragons of impartiality”, as the report continues to include “unverified figures about children in Ukraine”. Further spotlighting a “continuous reduction in Russian child victims in the report”, he said that it does not include figures of the children killed or maimed by Ukraine’s armed forces.
Pakistan’s representative, meanwhile, pointed out that it took the killing of thousands of Palestinian children in Gaza for the situation to be included in the last year’s report. And while welcoming this year’s removal of references to his country as a situation of concern — “a long-overdue correction” — he expressed regret that the previously documented plight of children in “the Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir” was omitted without justification.
Nevertheless, the representative of the United States said that the report is a “sobering snapshot”, which “serves as a poignant reminder of the urgency and necessity of strengthening the international community’s child-protection capacity”. Observing that “alarm bells should be ringing everywhere”, Slovenia’s representative stressed: “We need to do better.” Panama’s representative said that there is an “urgent need to broaden social-integration programmes with a focus on young people to rebuild their futures”. The representative of France called for capacity-building to protect children in peacekeeping operations.
Offering another proposal, the representative of the Republic of Korea said that “listening to and empowering survivors must be the starting point of any survivor-centred response”, for which he expressed support. To that end, Seoul has contributed $8.6 million to prevent gender-based violence and assist survivors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that vein, Denmark’s representative urged that all monitoring, prevention and response efforts account for the gendered impact of grave violations, as they have “distinct and profound effects on girls and boys”.
Somalia’s representative, however, concluded: “It is only by striving to end wars — and by investing earnestly in the prevention of new ones — that we can hope to guarantee a world where no child is left to bear the wounds of war.” Similarly, Ukraine’s representative said that “one simple thing” is needed to stop the Russian Federation from killing and maiming children in Ukraine — “a full, unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days as a first step towards just and lasting peace”. The representative of Lebanon, too, said that children have suffered from the ravages of numerous wars that have broken out on Lebanese territory: “They pay a hefty toll for the mistakes of adults.”
He, along with other Member States, also drew attention to the high number of violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. “What is happening in Gaza now is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and humanitarian values,” said Saudi Arabia’s representative. However, Israel’s representative — pointing to “one of the most outrageous statements I have ever seen in official UN documents” — noted that the Secretary-General has called on Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to develop action plans with the UN, and on Israel to sign a matching one. Adding that the report “switches the roles of victim and aggressor”, he rejected the “grotesque false equivalence between a sovereign democracy and a terror regime”.
Yet, there were positive notes. The observer for the African Union reported that the bloc has adopted a comprehensive legal and policy framework for protecting children, particularly in conflict situations. El Salvador’s representative pointed to her country’s “drastically” reduced homicide rates and provision of psychosocial care, education and reintegration programmes to victims of violence. The representative of the Philippines, for her part, welcomed the removal of her country as a situation of concern in the next report, which is a testament to its whole-of-Government approach and sustained, strategic collaboration with the UN. She stated: “We hope that the Philippines’ story will serve as an inspiration of what we, as a global community, can do for children everywhere — to let children be children.”
Source: United Nations MIL OSI
In the wake of unprecedented violence against children in 2024, the Security Council heard today that the world is failing to protect them from the horrors of war — and that urgent action is needed to correct this course — during a day-long debate on children and armed conflict.
“The year 2024 marked a devastating new record,” reported Virginia Gamba, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, as the UN verified 41,370 grave violations against children — a “staggering” 25 per cent increase from 2023. “Behind these numbers are the shattered stories, dreams and futures of 22,495 children, each of them profoundly affected by war, displacement and the collapse of protection systems that should have served as their shield,” she stressed. Spotlighting the “sharp” rise in the number of children subjected to multiple grave violations — 3,137 in total — she said this is a “stark reminder of the compounded vulnerabilities children face in conflict settings”.
Detailing “the six grave violations the Security Council entrusted to my office”, she said that, in 2024, 11,967 children were killed or maimed — the highest number “since this mandate was established over two decades ago”. Further, there were 7,402 cases of recruitment and use; 1,982 cases of sexual violence; 2,374 cases of attacks on schools and hospitals; thousands of children were forcibly abducted; and denied humanitarian access is now one of the greatest obstacles to protecting children in conflict zones. “These atrocities against children span the globe,” she underscored, which demonstrates the universal, indiscriminate nature of these grave violations.
Also noting that Government forces “remained the principal perpetrators” of the killing and maiming of children, attacks on schools and hospitals, and the denial of humanitarian access, she stressed: “We cannot continue to stand by and watch with no action what is happening to the children globally — and especially in Gaza.” She therefore urged the international community, inter alia, to call on all parties to conflict to engage with the UN to develop, sign and fully implement action plans that end and prevent these violations. Adding that the children and armed conflict mandate has proven its value, she urged: “Let us prove that it matters — that they, our children, matter.”
Also briefing the Council was Sheema Sen Gupta, Director of Child Protection and Migration of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), who stated that today’s report “once again confirms what too many children already know — that the world is failing to protect them from the horrors of war”. She highlighted two “deeply disturbing” trends. First, the increased use of explosive weapons in populated areas is now the leading cause of child casualties in many of the world’s conflicts, accounting for over 70 per cent of all incidents of killing and maiming. Second is the surge in sexual violence, and she reported that verified cases of such violence against children increased by 35 per cent in 2024.
On that, she noted that nearly 10,000 cases of sexual violence were reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the first two months of 2025, with children constituting over 40 per cent of those affected. Nevertheless, this agenda “remains a source of hope”, with over 16,000 children receiving protection and reintegration support in 2024. Calling on all parties to conflict to stop the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, she also underlined the need to protect and expand humanitarian space. “Fund this agenda,” she added, stressing: “Children are not collateral damage.”
Next, Sila — a 17-year-old girl from Idlib, Syria — said that she is part of a generation of thousands of children that has lived through war and knows nothing of safety. “Rather, I know nothing but smoke, shelling, displacement and fear,” she said. Stating that she came to the Council to talk about the pain that remains after war, she described a childhood in which her home was a suitcase as bombings forced her family to constantly move. “My childhood was full of fear and anxiety, and I was deprived of people I loved,” she said. She added: “Imagine that you go to school, and you hear the sound of the plane over your head, and you don’t know if the projectile will hit your school or your home.”
War does not end when the bombing stops, she added. “The real danger remains after the war — the landmines, the unexploded shells and the life that turns into death traps,” she said, pointing out that “many people lost their limbs — or even their lives — without participating in any battle”. Now, she works with a humanitarian organization to raise awareness about the dangers posed by remnants of war. “It’s our turn to speak and raise our voices, and to educate others,” she said. She stressed: “Today, I did not come as a victim — I came as a witness.” As such, she asked for the international community’s support so that children can achieve their dreams and opportunities.
“It is my fervent hope that today’s debate will be an opportunity not just to express outrage, but to follow through with tangible action,” stressed Vindhya Vasini Persaud, Minister for Human Services and Social Security of Guyana and Council President for June, speaking in her national capacity as the floor opened. Similarly, Greece’s representative, Chair of the Working Group on this agenda item, welcomed today’s report as a call “not just for reflection on one of the gravest affronts to international law, but also for action”. He asked those present: “Do we live up to our promises to children?”
Most statements suggested otherwise. Algeria’s representative posed his own question: “How can we ignore the 7,188 verified grave violations attributed to Israeli forces?” Stressing that the response of the Special Representative’s office to this matter has been “strikingly insufficient”, he said that its statements “fall critically short of the decisive and sustained condemnation warranted by the immense scale of the crisis”. He concluded: “The protection of children in conflict demands a more vigorous — a more vocal — response to the unparalleled crisis in Gaza.”
The representative of the United Kingdom, for his part, pointed to the Palestinians killed trying to reach “the few aid sites permitted by Israel”. “This is unacceptable,” he stated, calling on Israel to abide by its obligations to protect children and to enable aid to enter Gaza at scale. China’s representative also called on Israel to lift its humanitarian blockade. The representative of Sierra Leone — expressing similar concern over the “appalling humanitarian situation confronting children in Gaza” — emphasized that it is States — especially those exercising territorial control — that must ensure the protection of civilians.
The representative of the Russian Federation also emphasized States’ leading role in this context, emphasizing: “This is why this theme — more than any other theme — requires intergovernmental cooperation and must, under no circumstances, be politicized.” However, he said that the structures assisting the Council in this regard “have not demonstrated themselves to be paragons of impartiality”, as the report continues to include “unverified figures about children in Ukraine”. Further spotlighting a “continuous reduction in Russian child victims in the report”, he said that it does not include figures of the children killed or maimed by Ukraine’s armed forces.
Pakistan’s representative, meanwhile, pointed out that it took the killing of thousands of Palestinian children in Gaza for the situation to be included in the last year’s report. And while welcoming this year’s removal of references to his country as a situation of concern — “a long-overdue correction” — he expressed regret that the previously documented plight of children in “the Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir” was omitted without justification.
Nevertheless, the representative of the United States said that the report is a “sobering snapshot”, which “serves as a poignant reminder of the urgency and necessity of strengthening the international community’s child-protection capacity”. Observing that “alarm bells should be ringing everywhere”, Slovenia’s representative stressed: “We need to do better.” Panama’s representative said that there is an “urgent need to broaden social-integration programmes with a focus on young people to rebuild their futures”. The representative of France called for capacity-building to protect children in peacekeeping operations.
Offering another proposal, the representative of the Republic of Korea said that “listening to and empowering survivors must be the starting point of any survivor-centred response”, for which he expressed support. To that end, Seoul has contributed $8.6 million to prevent gender-based violence and assist survivors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that vein, Denmark’s representative urged that all monitoring, prevention and response efforts account for the gendered impact of grave violations, as they have “distinct and profound effects on girls and boys”.
Somalia’s representative, however, concluded: “It is only by striving to end wars — and by investing earnestly in the prevention of new ones — that we can hope to guarantee a world where no child is left to bear the wounds of war.” Similarly, Ukraine’s representative said that “one simple thing” is needed to stop the Russian Federation from killing and maiming children in Ukraine — “a full, unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days as a first step towards just and lasting peace”. The representative of Lebanon, too, said that children have suffered from the ravages of numerous wars that have broken out on Lebanese territory: “They pay a hefty toll for the mistakes of adults.”
He, along with other Member States, also drew attention to the high number of violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. “What is happening in Gaza now is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and humanitarian values,” said Saudi Arabia’s representative. However, Israel’s representative — pointing to “one of the most outrageous statements I have ever seen in official UN documents” — noted that the Secretary-General has called on Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to develop action plans with the UN, and on Israel to sign a matching one. Adding that the report “switches the roles of victim and aggressor”, he rejected the “grotesque false equivalence between a sovereign democracy and a terror regime”.
Yet, there were positive notes. The observer for the African Union reported that the bloc has adopted a comprehensive legal and policy framework for protecting children, particularly in conflict situations. El Salvador’s representative pointed to her country’s “drastically” reduced homicide rates and provision of psychosocial care, education and reintegration programmes to victims of violence. The representative of the Philippines, for her part, welcomed the removal of her country as a situation of concern in the next report, which is a testament to its whole-of-Government approach and sustained, strategic collaboration with the UN. She stated: “We hope that the Philippines’ story will serve as an inspiration of what we, as a global community, can do for children everywhere — to let children be children.”
Source: United Nations MIL OSI
As the General Assembly marked the twentieth anniversary of the responsibility to protect, the UN Chief emphasized that the principle remains a moral imperative amid growing global turmoil, escalating identity-based violence, widespread breaches of international law and deepening impunity.
Opening the session, Philémon Yang (Cameroon), President of the General Assembly, recalled that, 20 years ago, at the 2005 World Summit, world leaders affirmed the responsibility of individual States to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Born from the horrors of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, that commitment represented a pledge that “never again would the international community stand silent as innocent lives were destroyed by the gravest crimes”.
Nevertheless, today, two decades later, “we must ask ourselves how we have allowed ourselves to fall short”, he said. From Gaza to Ukraine, from Sudan to Myanmar, there is blatant disregard for human rights, early warnings are ignored and the Security Council is failing to act.
Also acknowledging commendable gains, he noted the establishment of international mechanisms for atrocity prevention. Prevention and protection strategies have been implemented across peacekeeping operations. “We must find ways to deliver on the promise of ‘never again’,” he stressed.
Picking up that thread, UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasized that the world is witnessing the highest number of armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War. Further, conflicts are becoming more protracted, complex and interconnected, while emerging threats such as the weaponization of new technologies and the proliferation of advanced weaponry require a constant adaptation to prevent the commission of atrocity crimes and to protect populations.
However, he continued, too often, early warnings go unheeded, and alleged evidence of crimes committed by States and non-State actors is met with denial, indifference, or repression. “Responses are often too little, too late, inconsistent or undermined by double standards,” he said, adding that “civilians are paying the highest price”.
“We must recognize that the responsibility to protect is more than a principle — it is a moral imperative, rooted in our shared humanity and the UN Charter,” he emphasized, spotlighting the seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect.
The report highlights efforts achieved through national prevention mechanisms or under regional leadership, demonstrating that early diplomacy, early warning and institutional innovation can be effective in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes. It also underscores the need to mainstream atrocity prevention across the United Nations system — from humanitarian action to peacekeeping to human rights. Additionally, it calls for integrating early warning, supporting national prevention mechanisms and embedding atrocity prevention in the broader agendas of sustaining peace, human rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
“No society is immune from the risk of atrocity crimes,” he asserted, emphasizing that “prevention must begin at home — with leadership that protects rights, embraces diversity and upholds the rule of law”. And it must be supported globally through multilateral cooperation, principled diplomacy, and early and decisive action to effectively protect populations. Two decades on, the responsibility to protect remains both an urgent necessity and an unfulfilled promise. “Let us keep the promise, deepen our commitment, strengthen our cooperation and ensure that atrocity-prevention and protecting populations becomes a permanent and universal practice,” he stated.
In the ensuing debate, numerous Member States emphasized that — amid growing violence against civilians and worsening humanitarian crises — the responsibility to protect must remain central to efforts aimed at promoting peace and security.
Speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Responsibility to Protect, the representative of Morocco expressed concern that, despite unanimous support for ending atrocity crimes, serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law persist. “This growing gap between rhetoric and action is especially concerning given the international community’s improved understanding of risk factors and increased capacity to respond,” he pointed out. He also acknowledged the key role of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in advancing this principle.
Expressing concern about the increased use of the veto in the Council, the representative of the European Union, speaking in its capacity as observer, said all Member States — especially those holding veto power — must support both the Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, as well as the French-Mexican initiative on refraining from the use of veto in the case of mass atrocities.
“While some advances in military technology can bring increased precision and a reduction of civilian harm,” she said, the recent evolution of warfare, including the use of artificial intelligence (AI), may lead to diluted human control and increased brutality in conflict. Further, “when prevention fails, we need to make every effort to ensure that the perpetrators of atrocity crimes are held accountable,” she said, reaffirming support for the International Criminal Court.
Relatedly, Denmark’s delegate, also speaking for Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden, urged the Council “to renew and strengthen its focus on prevention” and acknowledged the efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, as well as civil society experts. Stressing the importance of the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, she added: “Independent and impartial international courts and tribunals, in particular the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court, are central to accountability for the most serious crimes.”
Slovenia’s delegate stressed that the veto power in the Council should not be used in situations where there is a clear threat of mass atrocity crimes, as it hinders effective decision–making and prevents action that would help to protect populations in a timely and effective manner. Her country was among the first to appoint a national Responsibility to Protect Focal Point, she said, highlighting the Ljubljana-Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and Other International Crimes. “This is the first major international treaty in the field of international criminal law since the Rome Statute that enables States to cooperate effectively internationally in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes by filling legal gaps in the fields of international legal assistance and extradition,” she pointed out.
The representative of France, speaking also for Mexico, said that while civilians worldwide are victims of large-scale violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, “the Council is too often paralysed by the use of the veto”. He welcomed the mention in the Secretary-General’s report of the French-Mexican initiative on the voluntary regulation of the use of the veto in the Council in cases of mass atrocities. “The veto is not a privilege but a responsibility,” he said, noting that this proposal is already supported by over 100 States and inviting all other States to join this commitment, starting with the Council’s elected and permanent members. He also emphasized the crucial role of national human rights institutions, civil society and the Human Rights Council’s mechanisms as essential tools for early warning, prevention and accountability.
“Now, more than ever, we must continue to promote and defend our collective political commitment to [the] responsibility to protect and its implementation,” said Australia’s delegate, speaking also on behalf of Canada and New Zealand. The world is facing the highest level of conflict since the Second World War, with reported violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. “We cannot allow impunity,” he asserted, calling for full accountability for atrocity crimes through appropriate national and international investigative and justice mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
However, other delegates voiced concern that the responsibility to protect principle is increasingly being instrumentalized to justify interventions under a humanitarian pretext, or to undermine States’ sovereignty through the application of unilateral coercive measures.
Among them was the representative of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations, who cited the notion as “non-consensual and controversial”. Accordingly, he voiced concern over the principle “selective and politically motivated” application.
Paradoxically, at the same time, the world is witnessing a “resounding failure” to ensure the protection of civilians caught in the armed conflict in Gaza, where the Palestinian people are suffering an increasingly brutal Israeli occupation, which represents a systematic violation of international law and requires urgent action to protect and save civilian lives, in accordance with international humanitarian law.
Poland’s representative emphasized that invoking the responsibility to protect to justify military aggression — such as the Russian Federation’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine — constitutes a deliberate distortion of the principle. In March 2022, the International Court of Justice issued a preliminary ruling finding that Moscow did not have grounds to attack Ukraine based on claims of genocide, he noted. He also expressed support for the mandates of the Special Advisers on Genocide Prevention and on the Responsibility to Protect.
Other delegates highlighted their countries’ experiences with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
“The crisis in Myanmar is the heartbreaking case in point,” said that country’s representative, adding that the military junta continues to commit widespread atrocities with impunity, violating the core principles of the responsibility to protect. Noting that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court applied in 2024 for an arrest warrant against Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, he said a swift decision is vital. He also called for the issuance of the arrest warrant against Min Aung Hlaing “to save lives and protect the people of Myanmar from the military junta’s further heinous crimes”. The Security Council must act decisively, he asserted, noting that a follow-up to resolution 2669 (2022) should include monitoring and enforcement.
Noting that the application of the responsibility to protect principle “remains uneven”, Burundi’s delegate emphasized that it “cannot be selective on the basis of temporal or material considerations”. Drawing attention to the 1972 genocide committed against the Hutu ethnic group, he said that, during this “massacre of terrible proportions”, which occurred between April and July 1972, hundreds of thousands of Burundians of the Hutu ethnic group were hunted down, arrested, executed without trial and very often buried in mass graves.
“This has a name in international law: genocide,” he said. And while Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission officially described the events of 1972 as such, identifying over 4,000 potential mass graves and collecting thousands of witness testimonies, “no international body has recognized this crime as such”. Citing this silence as “a form of abandoning innocent victims whose souls need to be put to rest”, he underscored that “the responsibility to protect is not a slogan”, but a “legal, moral and political commitment”.
Source: United Nations MIL OSI
As the General Assembly marked the twentieth anniversary of the responsibility to protect, the UN Chief emphasized that the principle remains a moral imperative amid growing global turmoil, escalating identity-based violence, widespread breaches of international law and deepening impunity.
Opening the session, Philémon Yang (Cameroon), President of the General Assembly, recalled that, 20 years ago, at the 2005 World Summit, world leaders affirmed the responsibility of individual States to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Born from the horrors of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, that commitment represented a pledge that “never again would the international community stand silent as innocent lives were destroyed by the gravest crimes”.
Nevertheless, today, two decades later, “we must ask ourselves how we have allowed ourselves to fall short”, he said. From Gaza to Ukraine, from Sudan to Myanmar, there is blatant disregard for human rights, early warnings are ignored and the Security Council is failing to act.
Also acknowledging commendable gains, he noted the establishment of international mechanisms for atrocity prevention. Prevention and protection strategies have been implemented across peacekeeping operations. “We must find ways to deliver on the promise of ‘never again’,” he stressed.
Picking up that thread, UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasized that the world is witnessing the highest number of armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War. Further, conflicts are becoming more protracted, complex and interconnected, while emerging threats such as the weaponization of new technologies and the proliferation of advanced weaponry require a constant adaptation to prevent the commission of atrocity crimes and to protect populations.
However, he continued, too often, early warnings go unheeded, and alleged evidence of crimes committed by States and non-State actors is met with denial, indifference, or repression. “Responses are often too little, too late, inconsistent or undermined by double standards,” he said, adding that “civilians are paying the highest price”.
“We must recognize that the responsibility to protect is more than a principle — it is a moral imperative, rooted in our shared humanity and the UN Charter,” he emphasized, spotlighting the seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect.
The report highlights efforts achieved through national prevention mechanisms or under regional leadership, demonstrating that early diplomacy, early warning and institutional innovation can be effective in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes. It also underscores the need to mainstream atrocity prevention across the United Nations system — from humanitarian action to peacekeeping to human rights. Additionally, it calls for integrating early warning, supporting national prevention mechanisms and embedding atrocity prevention in the broader agendas of sustaining peace, human rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
“No society is immune from the risk of atrocity crimes,” he asserted, emphasizing that “prevention must begin at home — with leadership that protects rights, embraces diversity and upholds the rule of law”. And it must be supported globally through multilateral cooperation, principled diplomacy, and early and decisive action to effectively protect populations. Two decades on, the responsibility to protect remains both an urgent necessity and an unfulfilled promise. “Let us keep the promise, deepen our commitment, strengthen our cooperation and ensure that atrocity-prevention and protecting populations becomes a permanent and universal practice,” he stated.
In the ensuing debate, numerous Member States emphasized that — amid growing violence against civilians and worsening humanitarian crises — the responsibility to protect must remain central to efforts aimed at promoting peace and security.
Speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Responsibility to Protect, the representative of Morocco expressed concern that, despite unanimous support for ending atrocity crimes, serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law persist. “This growing gap between rhetoric and action is especially concerning given the international community’s improved understanding of risk factors and increased capacity to respond,” he pointed out. He also acknowledged the key role of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in advancing this principle.
Expressing concern about the increased use of the veto in the Council, the representative of the European Union, speaking in its capacity as observer, said all Member States — especially those holding veto power — must support both the Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, as well as the French-Mexican initiative on refraining from the use of veto in the case of mass atrocities.
“While some advances in military technology can bring increased precision and a reduction of civilian harm,” she said, the recent evolution of warfare, including the use of artificial intelligence (AI), may lead to diluted human control and increased brutality in conflict. Further, “when prevention fails, we need to make every effort to ensure that the perpetrators of atrocity crimes are held accountable,” she said, reaffirming support for the International Criminal Court.
Relatedly, Denmark’s delegate, also speaking for Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden, urged the Council “to renew and strengthen its focus on prevention” and acknowledged the efforts of the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, as well as civil society experts. Stressing the importance of the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, she added: “Independent and impartial international courts and tribunals, in particular the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court, are central to accountability for the most serious crimes.”
Slovenia’s delegate stressed that the veto power in the Council should not be used in situations where there is a clear threat of mass atrocity crimes, as it hinders effective decision–making and prevents action that would help to protect populations in a timely and effective manner. Her country was among the first to appoint a national Responsibility to Protect Focal Point, she said, highlighting the Ljubljana-Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and Other International Crimes. “This is the first major international treaty in the field of international criminal law since the Rome Statute that enables States to cooperate effectively internationally in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes by filling legal gaps in the fields of international legal assistance and extradition,” she pointed out.
The representative of France, speaking also for Mexico, said that while civilians worldwide are victims of large-scale violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, “the Council is too often paralysed by the use of the veto”. He welcomed the mention in the Secretary-General’s report of the French-Mexican initiative on the voluntary regulation of the use of the veto in the Council in cases of mass atrocities. “The veto is not a privilege but a responsibility,” he said, noting that this proposal is already supported by over 100 States and inviting all other States to join this commitment, starting with the Council’s elected and permanent members. He also emphasized the crucial role of national human rights institutions, civil society and the Human Rights Council’s mechanisms as essential tools for early warning, prevention and accountability.
“Now, more than ever, we must continue to promote and defend our collective political commitment to [the] responsibility to protect and its implementation,” said Australia’s delegate, speaking also on behalf of Canada and New Zealand. The world is facing the highest level of conflict since the Second World War, with reported violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. “We cannot allow impunity,” he asserted, calling for full accountability for atrocity crimes through appropriate national and international investigative and justice mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
However, other delegates voiced concern that the responsibility to protect principle is increasingly being instrumentalized to justify interventions under a humanitarian pretext, or to undermine States’ sovereignty through the application of unilateral coercive measures.
Among them was the representative of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations, who cited the notion as “non-consensual and controversial”. Accordingly, he voiced concern over the principle “selective and politically motivated” application.
Paradoxically, at the same time, the world is witnessing a “resounding failure” to ensure the protection of civilians caught in the armed conflict in Gaza, where the Palestinian people are suffering an increasingly brutal Israeli occupation, which represents a systematic violation of international law and requires urgent action to protect and save civilian lives, in accordance with international humanitarian law.
Poland’s representative emphasized that invoking the responsibility to protect to justify military aggression — such as the Russian Federation’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine — constitutes a deliberate distortion of the principle. In March 2022, the International Court of Justice issued a preliminary ruling finding that Moscow did not have grounds to attack Ukraine based on claims of genocide, he noted. He also expressed support for the mandates of the Special Advisers on Genocide Prevention and on the Responsibility to Protect.
Other delegates highlighted their countries’ experiences with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
“The crisis in Myanmar is the heartbreaking case in point,” said that country’s representative, adding that the military junta continues to commit widespread atrocities with impunity, violating the core principles of the responsibility to protect. Noting that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court applied in 2024 for an arrest warrant against Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, he said a swift decision is vital. He also called for the issuance of the arrest warrant against Min Aung Hlaing “to save lives and protect the people of Myanmar from the military junta’s further heinous crimes”. The Security Council must act decisively, he asserted, noting that a follow-up to resolution 2669 (2022) should include monitoring and enforcement.
Noting that the application of the responsibility to protect principle “remains uneven”, Burundi’s delegate emphasized that it “cannot be selective on the basis of temporal or material considerations”. Drawing attention to the 1972 genocide committed against the Hutu ethnic group, he said that, during this “massacre of terrible proportions”, which occurred between April and July 1972, hundreds of thousands of Burundians of the Hutu ethnic group were hunted down, arrested, executed without trial and very often buried in mass graves.
“This has a name in international law: genocide,” he said. And while Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission officially described the events of 1972 as such, identifying over 4,000 potential mass graves and collecting thousands of witness testimonies, “no international body has recognized this crime as such”. Citing this silence as “a form of abandoning innocent victims whose souls need to be put to rest”, he underscored that “the responsibility to protect is not a slogan”, but a “legal, moral and political commitment”.
Source: United Nations MIL OSI
The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) today approved a budget of nearly $5.4 billion to cover the financing needs of about a dozen peacekeeping missions, two service centres and support staff at Headquarters from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026. As it wrapped up its second resumed session, the Committee sent to the General Assembly 19 resolutions and 1 decision. All but one of these texts were adopted without a vote. The exception dealt with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and its financing document (document A/C.5/79/L.36/Rev.1), which the Committee approved by a recorded vote of 134 in favour, to 3 against (Argentina, Israel, United States), with 1 abstention (Paraguay).
That was after the Committee rejected, also by a recorded vote, an oral amendment proposed by Israel to delete four paragraphs referring to the shelling of a UNIFIL compound in Qana, Lebanon, by the Israeli forces on 18 April 1996. The oral amendment was rejected by a vote of 5 in favour (Argentina, Canada, Paraguay, Israel, United States) to 70 against, with 53 abstentions.
Chandramouli Ramanathan, Assistant Secretary-General, Controller, Management Strategy, Policy, thanked the delegates for finishing the session before the end of June and recognized their power of consensus as they find common ground three times a year to approve crucial resolutions that keep the Organization running. Yet, as much as the world needs peacekeeping, the Committee needs to solve a financing problem that has been plaguing the United Nations for 80 years. “The UN staff is progressively losing confidence in the entire budget process,” he said, referring to cash shortages that have led to severe spending and hiring restrictions. The United Nations needs to find a compromise that allows the Organization to function effectively, he added.
Fifth Committee Chair Egriselda Aracely González López (El Salvador) recognized the time, effort and dedication that delegates displayed in recent weeks as they worked through days, nights and weekends to achieve today’s results. She noted the Committee’s unique working methods and thanked delegates for exercising the political will to achieve results. The Committee’s work, on the eve of the Organization’s eightieth anniversary, helps establish policy and lets the Organization operate and carry out its mandates.
In closing remarks, many delegates welcomed the adoption of the peacekeeping budgets for the 2025/26 financial year and the agreement to move forward with the Strategic Heritage Plan for the UN offices in Geneva. Yet, many regretted that agreements were not reached on cross-cutting policy issues or on a mechanism to improve the Organization’s financial situation.
The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the African Group, expressed concern about the Committee’s inability to agree on a cross-cutting policy resolution, as well as the lack of agreement on mission-specific policy directives. “Unfortunately, this year, the Committee has chosen to abandon its duty to provide overall guidance to missions as well as specific provisions based on their unique context and operational requirements,” he said. This is an alarming regression that risks eroding the trust between host countries and the UN, he cautioned.
The United Kingdom’s delegate echoed this sentiment and said her delegation was disappointed that the Committee iron out a solution to provide predictable financing for the Organization. The representative of the United States said his delegation was pleased that the $5.38 billion peacekeeping budget for 2025/26, $110 million less than the Secretary-General’s proposal, ensured the core functions of international peacekeeping would be met.
The representative of the European Union, speaking in its capacity as observer, stressed that the outcome of the budget approval can only be meaningful if all States pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. She also noted the agreement reached to fund and maintain the full scope of the Strategic Heritage Plan in Geneva and the adoption of the report of the Board of Auditors. However, “a non-constructive approach to negotiations by some delegations hampered our ability to reach meaningful compromises, resulting in skeletal resolutions on several agenda items”, she said. For the fifth consecutive year, the Committee was unable to provide any guidance on the support account, the Global Service Centre and the Regional Service Centre.
“Most disappointing was our handling of the financial situation agenda item, together with the liquidity aspects of closed peacekeeping operations,” she said, adding that the proposals on the table would have contributed meaningfully to the long-term financial health of the Organization. The Fifth Committee’s strength lies in its ability to engage in dialogue collectively and constructively and reach decisions by consensus. It is essential to begin substantive engagement earlier in the session because consensus requires sufficient time and space for meaningful dialogue, she said.
Japan’s delegate agreed, stating: “Unfortunately, we were unable to give the necessary guidance to the Secretariat in tackling the liquidity crisis.” The Fifth Committee must work together with the Secretariat to resolve these outstanding fiscal challenges.
The representative of Iraq, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said the bloc was pleased to reach consensus on the Strategic Heritage Plan in Geneva, the Board of Auditors and peacekeeping mission budgets. Yet, it was concerning that consensus could not be achieved on a plan to address the Organization’s recurring financial problems.
As the second-largest contributor to the Organization’s budget, the representative of China said his delegation stands for the allocation of necessary resources to achieve its peacekeeping goals. He hoped the Secretariat would cherish these resources as it works to maintain peace and security. He noted that the Organization’s largest contributor remains in arrears and was the main cause of the liquidity crisis.
Action on Draft Resolutions
The Committee first approved the draft resolutions “Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors” (document A/C.5/79/L.51) and “Strategic heritage plan of the United Nations Office at Geneva” (document A/C.5/79/L.52).
The Committee then approved draft resolution I, “Support account for peacekeeping operations” (document A/C.5/79/L.50); draft resolution II, “Financing of the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda” (document A/C.5/79/L.40); and draft resolution III, “Financing of the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda”(document A/C.5/79/L.39).
The Committee then approved the draft “Financing of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei” (document A/C.5/79/L.41).
The Committee the approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic” (document A/C.5/79/L.42).
It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus” (document A/C.5/79/L.43).
The Committee then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (document A/C.5/79/L.44). It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo” (document A/C.5/79/L.45).
The Committee then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali” (document A/C.5/79/L.38).
Turning to “Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Middle East”, the Committee approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force” (document A/C.5/79/L.46).
It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan” (document A/C.5/79/L.47).
The Committee then approved draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara” (document A/C.5/79/L.48).
Next it approved the draft resolution “Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur” (document A/C.5/79/L.37).
It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the activities arising from Security Council resolution 1863 (2009)” (document A/C.5/79/L.49).
The Committee then took notes of the Secretary-General contained in documents A/C.5/79/L.33 and A/C.5/79/L.34.
Finally, it approved the draft decision “Questions deferred for future consideration” (document A/C.5/79/L.53).
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* The 37th Meeting was covered in Press Release GA/12685.
