Category: Balkans

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Concluding Second Resumed Session, Fifth Committee Approves Budget Covering Peacekeeping Missions, Service Centres, Headquarters Support Staff

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI

    The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) today approved a budget of nearly $5.4 billion to cover the financing needs of about a dozen peacekeeping missions, two service centres and support staff at Headquarters from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026.  As it wrapped up its second resumed session, the Committee sent to the General Assembly 19 resolutions and 1 decision.  All but one of these texts were adopted without a vote.  The exception dealt with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and its financing document (document A/C.5/79/L.36/Rev.1), which the Committee approved by a recorded vote of 134 in favour, to 3 against (Argentina, Israel, United States), with 1 abstention (Paraguay).

    That was after the Committee rejected, also by a recorded vote, an oral amendment proposed by Israel to delete four paragraphs referring to the shelling of a UNIFIL compound in Qana, Lebanon, by the Israeli forces on 18 April 1996.  The oral amendment was rejected by a vote of 5 in favour (Argentina, Canada, Paraguay, Israel, United States) to 70 against, with 53 abstentions.

    Chandramouli Ramanathan, Assistant Secretary-General, Controller, Management Strategy, Policy, thanked the delegates for finishing the session before the end of June and recognized their power of consensus as they find common ground three times a year to approve crucial resolutions that keep the Organization running.  Yet, as much as the world needs peacekeeping, the Committee needs to solve a financing problem that has been plaguing the United Nations for 80 years.  “The UN staff is progressively losing confidence in the entire budget process,” he said, referring to cash shortages that have led to severe spending and hiring restrictions.  The United Nations needs to find a compromise that allows the Organization to function effectively, he added.

    Fifth Committee Chair Egriselda Aracely González López (El Salvador) recognized the time, effort and dedication that delegates displayed in recent weeks as they worked through days, nights and weekends to achieve today’s results.  She noted the Committee’s unique working methods and thanked delegates for exercising the political will to achieve results.  The Committee’s work, on the eve of the Organization’s eightieth anniversary, helps establish policy and lets the Organization operate and carry out its mandates.

    In closing remarks, many delegates welcomed the adoption of the peacekeeping budgets for the 2025/26 financial year and the agreement to move forward with the Strategic Heritage Plan for the UN offices in Geneva.  Yet, many regretted that agreements were not reached on cross-cutting policy issues or on a mechanism to improve the Organization’s financial situation.

    The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the African Group, expressed concern about the Committee’s inability to agree on a cross-cutting policy resolution, as well as the lack of agreement on mission-specific policy directives.  “Unfortunately, this year, the Committee has chosen to abandon its duty to provide overall guidance to missions as well as specific provisions based on their unique context and operational requirements,” he said.  This is an alarming regression that risks eroding the trust between host countries and the UN, he cautioned.

    The United Kingdom’s delegate echoed this sentiment and said her delegation was disappointed that the Committee iron out a solution to provide predictable financing for the Organization.  The representative of the United States said his delegation was pleased that the $5.38 billion peacekeeping budget for 2025/26, $110 million less than the Secretary-General’s proposal, ensured the core functions of international peacekeeping would be met.

    The representative of the European Union, speaking in its capacity as observer, stressed that the outcome of the budget approval can only be meaningful if all States pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.  She also noted the agreement reached to fund and maintain the full scope of the Strategic Heritage Plan in Geneva and the adoption of the report of the Board of Auditors.  However, “a non-constructive approach to negotiations by some delegations hampered our ability to reach meaningful compromises, resulting in skeletal resolutions on several agenda items”, she said.  For the fifth consecutive year, the Committee was unable to provide any guidance on the support account, the Global Service Centre and the Regional Service Centre.

    “Most disappointing was our handling of the financial situation agenda item, together with the liquidity aspects of closed peacekeeping operations,” she said, adding that the proposals on the table would have contributed meaningfully to the long-term financial health of the Organization.  The Fifth Committee’s strength lies in its ability to engage in dialogue collectively and constructively and reach decisions by consensus.  It is essential to begin substantive engagement earlier in the session because consensus requires sufficient time and space for meaningful dialogue, she said.

    Japan’s delegate agreed, stating:  “Unfortunately, we were unable to give the necessary guidance to the Secretariat in tackling the liquidity crisis.”  The Fifth Committee must work together with the Secretariat to resolve these outstanding fiscal challenges.

    The representative of Iraq, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said the bloc was pleased to reach consensus on the Strategic Heritage Plan in Geneva, the Board of Auditors and peacekeeping mission budgets.  Yet, it was concerning that consensus could not be achieved on a plan to address the Organization’s recurring financial problems.

    As the second-largest contributor to the Organization’s budget, the representative of China said his delegation stands for the allocation of necessary resources to achieve its peacekeeping goals.  He hoped the Secretariat would cherish these resources as it works to maintain peace and security.  He noted that the Organization’s largest contributor remains in arrears and was the main cause of the liquidity crisis.

    Action on Draft Resolutions

    The Committee first approved the draft resolutions “Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors” (document A/C.5/79/L.51) and “Strategic heritage plan of the United Nations Office at Geneva” (document A/C.5/79/L.52).

    The Committee then approved draft resolution I, “Support account for peacekeeping operations” (document A/C.5/79/L.50); draft resolution II, “Financing of the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda” (document A/C.5/79/L.40); and draft resolution III, “Financing of the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda”(document A/C.5/79/L.39).

    The Committee then approved the draft “Financing of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei” (document A/C.5/79/L.41).

    The Committee the approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic” (document A/C.5/79/L.42).

    It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus” (document A/C.5/79/L.43).

    The Committee then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (document A/C.5/79/L.44).  It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo” (document A/C.5/79/L.45).

    The Committee then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali” (document A/C.5/79/L.38).

    Turning to “Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Middle East”, the Committee approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force” (document A/C.5/79/L.46).

    It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan” (document A/C.5/79/L.47).

    The Committee then approved draft resolution “Financing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara” (document A/C.5/79/L.48).

    Next it approved the draft resolution “Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur” (document A/C.5/79/L.37).

    It then approved the draft resolution “Financing of the activities arising from Security Council resolution 1863 (2009)” (document A/C.5/79/L.49).

    The Committee then took notes of the Secretary-General contained in documents A/C.5/79/L.33 and A/C.5/79/L.34.

    Finally, it approved the draft decision “Questions deferred for future consideration” (document A/C.5/79/L.53).

    __________

    * The 37th Meeting was covered in Press Release GA/12685.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: WTO General Council February 2025: UK Statements

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    WTO General Council February 2025: UK Statements

    Statements delivered by Simon Manley, the UK’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN, 18 – 19 February 2025 at the World Trade Organization in Geneva.

    Item 2: Practical Steps to Enhance the Process for the Appointment of Officers to Certain WTO Bodies. Communication from Canada, Chile, Jamaica, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland

    Thank you, Chair. The UK adds our congratulations to the new Chairs, and also extends our thanks to you, Chair, in particular, for your work in the General Council. Your leadership and tireless drive, which we can already see this morning, to take forward our work with both good humour and astute steering of the meetings has been hugely appreciated. On this item, the UK does support pragmatic initiatives that can help improve processes for all of us here at the WTO, so we are grateful to the countries who have put this forward. We do support reform by doing, and as this document says, this is reform by doing. It solves issues around the appointment of Chairs, which when they are delayed leads to gaps that effect all of us and the efficiency of the organization. It is practical steps that we should all be able to agree to and the UK supports it.

    Item 4: Incorporation of the Agreement on Electronic Commerce into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement

    Thank you, Chair. The UK is disappointed with the objections this morning to the incorporation of the E-commerce agreement as an annex 4 plurilateral. It is even more disappointing to see the failure to reach agreement on an investment facilitation and development on the previous item and I would just like to acknowledge the large number of very eloquent and well-reasoned interventions, especially from developing countries, on how they, like all WTO numbers, stand to benefit from the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). Both the IFDA and E-commerce agreements are in the category of things the WTO can and should do now, and in good time, before MC14. Speakers this morning, especially from developing countries, have clearly set out the benefits which the E-commerce agreement offers. I’m just going to briefly recap a few. First, that this is the first set of global digital trade rules, in a sector which already by 2020 represented 25% of global trade worth almost 5 trillion USD; it has a key role in global economic growth. It is an agreement which not just increases digital trade and lowers trade barriers, it also enhances trust in an open digital environment. In all these ways it can unlock opportunities for businesses, jobs and their consumers all around the world. It is also an agreement that has been inclusive in its preparation. The vast majority of the 91 countries originally involved in the negotiation are developing countries. It is inclusive in its benefits as so many developing countries have set out. It is not just the delegations in this room who say all of these things, just in the last few weeks. For example, we heard directly from businesses at the World Economic Forum about the benefits of unleashing digital trade for MSMEs, in particular. Then, very importantly, my last point to support the implementation of the agreement includes a multi-avenue support package comprising implementation periods, technical assistance and capacity building.

    The UK is committed to continuing our support for various technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives, such as a Digital Access Programme. We are ready to work with all members on the E-commerce agreement to make progress and reach agreement swiftly, hopefully well in advance of MC14.

    Item 5: Report by the Chairperson of the Trade Negotiations Committee and Report by the Director General

    Thank you for your Report, in particular for reminding us of the measurable benefits traders have brought to economic growth and development and for your commitments driving forward all our work. The UK is ready to cooperate with all members to ensure meaningful progress across all the areas you mentioned in the run up to MC14, including things we can and should agree before MC14. We recognise that, as you said Director General, it is a challenging time for global trade. We are grateful for your efforts. As our Minister for Trade Policy and Economic Security said in the UK parliament last week, the UK stands behind your exemplary leadership. We agreed that the WTO is a forum to listen and to discuss differences on trade with a review to resolving them; for calm responses and constructive dialogue as we look ahead to MC14.

    As we look ahead to MC14, we support the particular priority to deliver for development. For the UK this includes the things we can and should do before MC14. On the development benefits of IFDA and E-commerce, I refer to the points I and others, including so many developing countries, made this morning. On the fisheries subsidies agreements and, through them, realising SDG target 14.6, we hope both enter into force, and Fish One and adoption of Fish Two could be secured before the UN Ocean Summit in France in June. That these agreements are so close is actually a tribute to the hard work and readiness to listen with compromises by so many in this room. Completing that work will also help us form a clear pathway to MC14, including space to work on agriculture and other important areas already under discussion. On agriculture, our thanks also to outgoing Chair, Ambassador Alparslan Acarsoy of Türkiye, for his work. Achieving a breakthrough on agriculture is more essential than ever. We cannot lose time, including to agree a new Chair, and then to work for successive MC14. Director General, thank you again for your leadership. We of course recognise the challenges. Trade is not always straightforward. The UK continues to support the WTO in the multilateral trading system; the benefits for trade for all of us, for growth, for development, are real. We are committed to working with you, with Members, to realise them. Thank you.

    Item 9: Follow-up to the WTO Off-Site Retreat on Trade as a Tool for Development and Way Forward. Request from Barbados and South Africa

    Thank you, Chair and the Secretariat for giving us a quick readout of the discussions. Already today we have heard several times about the importance of high ambition on development for MC14, and more widely, and the UK fully agrees. We would particularly like to thank South Africa and Barbados for bring in this discussion and helping to set out a path forward and welcome your particular collaboration when we think about what can be achieved. Development is cross cutting in so much of our work, and that is why, for the UK, the best way to maintain short-term momentum is with the early agreement on outcomes that are already in reach. That is why in earlier interventions today we have stressed the development benefits from early conclusion on investment facilitation for development, fisheries and E-commerce. We add to this, the development opportunities around LDC graduation and indeed the opportunities through new accessions to the WTO, that we will hear about tomorrow. Equally, to make a success of this we want to hear ideas, and we urge developing country members in particular to deliver their priority proposals as soon as possible, so that we really can work together to achieve progress in the timeframe of MC14.

    Finally, the UK is committed to wider initiatives supporting developing countries, working in partnerships, listening to needs, and with this in mind we note that as the only fund dedicated to LDC trade, the UK wants to ensure that the enhanced integrated framework continues to deliver impact for LDCs. We have just made available this year an additional £100,000 into the interim facility, which brings our total contribution to £1,000,000 and we hope this will help ensure continuity while the future of the fund is discussed. As Members are aware, we hope the EIF taskforce will make its recommendations very soon as a basis for further improvement, meeting the expectations of LDCs and donors. Thank you.

    Item 11: WTO Accessions: 2024 Annual Report by the Director General

    The UK is closely engaged in this work and supports prospective Members to secure the benefits of the global trading system by progressing their accessions. We particularly note the positive development impact of WTO accession and underline that we are keen to welcome more developing countries, particularly LDCs, to the WTO. We support the strategic focus for 2025 on the accession of Uzbekistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina who have made significant progress. The UK for example recently held constructive bilateral discussions with Uzbekistan to help advance the accession and we encourage all Members to work with Uzbekistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina to support their ambitions for early WTO accession. We also very much welcome Somalia’s first Working Party and Ethiopia’s renewed energy behind their accession as specific examples of LDC interest and with this in mind we would like to reconfirm the UK’s commitment to chairing the Working Party on the accession of Ethiopia, but are also grateful to the Deputy Director General for temporarily standing in the coming meeting. Finally, the UK is a provider of technical support in this area, and we note that the Enhanced Integrated Fund is open to LDCs post accession, so we encourage Timor Leste and Comoros to use the facility where it is helpful.

    Item 13: Stocktaking of Work on the Operationalization of paragraph 21 of the MC13 Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration. Communication from Pakistan

    Thank you, Chair. We will be brief, but we just wanted to add thanks to Pakistan for bringing this important issue back to the General Council’s attention. Unfortunately, if anything, it is becoming increasingly relevant and urgent, and the UK does see the role of trade in this area. We will publish a full statement but just to acknowledge, in particular, Pakistan’s proactivity and thinking of areas like services, financial services and trade debt and finance work to identify where, as a Membership, we can take things forward and we look forward to continuing to contribute.

    Item 14: WTO at 30. Statement by the Director General

    Thank you. I want to be short. We set out yesterday commitment to the WTO in the multilateral trading system and the opportunities we have at work to benefit all Members. Of course, that includes WTO reform by doing, and we set out our confidence in your leadership, Director General. Like Australia, we encourage further work on this proposal. Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB (in addition to decisions setting interest rates)

    Source: European Central Bank

    June 2025

    27 June 2025

    External communication

    ECB Convergence Report 2025

    On 4 June 2025 the ECB published its Convergence Report, prepared following a request by Bulgaria on 25 February 2025. The report examines Bulgaria’s state of economic convergence and the compatibility of its national legislation with the Treaties. It was approved by the General Council and published simultaneously with the report prepared by the European Commission as foreseen by the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The report is available on the ECB’s website, together with a related press release.

    Monetary policy

    Climate-related disclosures of the Eurosystem’s corporate bond holdings

    On 30 May 2025 the Governing Council authorised the publication of the third ECB report on the climate-related financial disclosures of Eurosystem assets held for monetary policy purposes and the ECB’s foreign reserves. The report provides information on the Eurosystem portfolios’ carbon footprint and exposure to climate risks, as well as on climate-related governance, strategy and risk management. A second report also provides information on the ECB’s euro-denominated non-monetary policy portfolios, including its own funds portfolio and its staff pension fund. Both reports, together with a related press release, were published on the ECB’s website on 12 June 2025.

    Market operations

    Postponement of reporting requirements of monetary policy counterparties for the first quarter of 2025

    On 6 June 2025 the Governing Council decided to postpone, on a one-off basis, the reporting requirements of counterparties for the first quarter of 2025 as spelled out in Article 158(3) of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the European Central Bank (General Documentation Guideline) with the transitional periods of the new supervisory reporting regime introduced by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3117. More specifically, the Governing Council decided to set the date for an automatic suspension on the grounds of prudence mentioned in Article 158(3) to 7 October 2025. The reporting requirements concerned relate to the transmission of own funds and leverage ratio data by eligible counterparties. A related announcement is available on the ECB’s website.

    Amendments to the third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) Decisions

    On 11 June 2025 the Governing Council adopted Decision ECB/2025/20 amending Decision ECB/2020/8 on the implementation of the CBPP3, and adopted Decision ECB/2025/21 amending Decision ECB/2020/17 on a temporary PEPP. The amendments reflect the decisions taken by the Governing Council in April 2025 to amend, first, the provisions on counterparties eligible for the CBPP3 to allow Eurosystem central banks to participate in standard market transactions such as repurchase transactions by issuers of covered bonds (“buybacks”), and, second, the rules applicable to securities lending transactions of covered bonds held by the Eurosystem under the CBPP3 and the temporary PEPP to reflect risk management considerations.

    Market infrastructure and payments

    Decision confirming the go-live of the Eurosystem Collateral Management System (ECMS)

    On 16 May 2025 the Governing Council confirmed, following a positive assessment conducted by the Market Infrastructure Board, that the ECMS would go live on 16 June 2025. A related announcement was published on the same day on the ECB’s website. The ECB also issued a press release on 17 June 2025 confirming the successful launch over the weekend of 13-15 June 2025.

    Launch of a public consultation on a possible extension of T2 operating hours

    On 30 May 2025 the Governing Council decided to launch a public consultation on a possible extension of T2 operating hours and approved the related consultation paper and its publication on the ECB’s website. The primary objective of this consultation, which runs until 30 September 2025, is for the Eurosystem to understand current and upcoming market needs and identify any constraints that may arise if T2 operating hours were extended. Based on this feedback and a thorough analysis of the responses received, in the course of 2026 the Governing Council will discuss possible follow-up actions.

    Decision amending Decision (EU) 2025/222 on access by non-bank payment service providers to Eurosystem central bank operated payment systems and central bank accounts (ECB/2025/2)

    On 2 June 2025 the Governing Council adopted Decision (EU) 2025/1148 amending Decision (EU) 2025/222 on access by non-bank payment service providers to Eurosystem central bank operated payment systems and central bank accounts (ECB/2025/2) (ECB/2025/18). The amendment follows from the decision taken by the Governing Council to postpone amendments to the TARGET Guideline in order to avoid the legal uncertainty that would have ensued in relation to access by non-bank payment service providers to Eurosystem central bank operated payment systems, including TARGET components, as a result of delays in some euro-area Member States in transposing relevant amendments to Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems and Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market into national legislation.

    Progress report on the digital euro project

    On 3 June 2025 the Governing Council discussed the progress made on key digital euro design aspects (e.g. the sourcing of potential providers, preparation of the rulebook, experimentation and further analysis) and took note of the envisaged next steps, concluding that the project remained on track in terms of both budget and timing. More detailed information on the digital euro project is available on the ECB’s website.

    Eurosystem roadmap regarding distributed ledger technology (DLT) for wholesale central bank money settlement

    On 23 June 2025 the Governing Council approved a high-level roadmap for its two-track approach on DLT for wholesale central bank money settlement which the Eurosystem embarked on with its exploratory work in 2024. Under the first track, referred to as Pontes, the Market Infrastructure Board is mandated to deliver an operational short-term offering to settle DLT-based transactions in central bank money, for which a pilot is expected to be launched by the end of the third quarter of 2026. The second track, referred to as Appia, will focus on identifying a potential long-term approach for an innovative and integrated ecosystem in Europe that also includes international operations. A related press release with more detailed information will be published in due course on the ECB’s website.

    Report on Eurosystem’s exploratory work on new technologies for wholesale central bank money settlement

    On 25 June 2025 the Governing Council took note of a report, prepared by the Market Infrastructure and Payments Committee, on the Eurosystem’s exploratory work on new technologies for wholesale central bank money settlement. The report consolidates the key findings of this initiative, which attracted high interest with a total of 64 eligible participants, across nine jurisdictions, and almost €1.6 billion settled in 27 trials, and it showcases the various use cases identified. The report will be published in due course on the ECB’s website.

    Advice on legislation

    ECB Opinion on the composition of the decision-making bodies of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the treasury accounts managed by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the permitted activities of foundations established by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank

    On 27 May 2025 the Governing Council adopted Opinion CON/2025/12 prepared on the ECB’s own initiative.

    ECB Opinion on the pensions of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique

    On 10 June 2025 the Governing Council adopted Opinion CON/2025/13 at the request of the Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finances and Pensions.

    ECB Opinion on access to cash and a constitutional right to payment in cash

    On 25 June 2025 the Governing Council adopted Opinion CON/2025/14 at the request of Magyar Nemzeti Bank. The Opinion will be available in due course on EUR-Lex.

    Corporate governance

    ECB Recommendation on the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank

    On 2 June 2025 the Governing Council adopted Recommendation ECB/2025/19 to the Council of the European Union on the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

    Membership of the ECB Audit Committee and the ECB Ethics Committee

    On 4 June 2025 the Governing Council appointed Gaston Reinesch as Governing Council member to the ECB Audit Committee to succeed Klaas Knot, whose mandate comes to an end on 1 July 2025. The Governing Council also appointed Federica Mogherini, the current Rector of the College of Europe, Director of the European Union Diplomatic Academy and former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, as a new member of the ECB Ethics Committee, to succeed Virginia R. Canter, whose mandate comes to an end at the beginning of August 2025. These appointments, which start on 1 July and 1 August 2025, respectively, are for an initial term of three years, renewable once.

    Statistics

    Recommendation for amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 concerning the collection of statistical information by the ECB

    On 22 May 2025 the Governing Council adopted Recommendation ECB/2025/17 for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank. The main objective of amending Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 is to address the significant changes in the collection, compilation, dissemination and use of statistical information by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) owing to the digital transformation. These changes have led to demands for timelier, more frequent and more detailed statistical information but have also offered new possibilities for a more efficient collection of statistical information, therefore improving its cost-effectiveness and minimising the reporting burden.

    International and European cooperation

    Report on the international role of the euro

    On 15 May 2025 the Governing Council approved the June 2025 edition of the report on the international role of the euro and authorised its publication on the ECB’s website. The report, which presents an overview of developments in the use of the euro by non-euro area residents in 2024, is available, together with a related press release, on the ECB’s website.

    ESCB response to the European Commission targeted consultation on the integration of EU capital markets

    On 4 June 2025 the Governing Council, with the benefit of the observations received from members of the General Council, approved an ESCB response to the European Commission’s targeted consultation on the integration of EU capital markets. The ESCB response, which provides detailed views of the ESCB on specific aspects regarding simplification and burden reduction, trading, post-trading, horizontal barriers to trade and post-trade infrastructures, asset management and funds, topics for consultation on supervision, as well as horizontal questions on the supervisory framework, is available on the ECB’s website.

    ECB Banking Supervision

    Compliance with the European Supervisory Authorities’ (ESA) Joint Guidelines for the exchange of information relevant for fit and proper assessments

    On 16 May 2025 the Governing Council did not object to a proposal by the Supervisory Board to notify the European Banking Authority (EBA) that, for the significant institutions under its direct supervision, the ECB already complies with the Joint Guidelines on the system established by the ESAs for the exchange of information relevant to the assessment of the fitness and propriety of holders of qualifying holdings, directors and key function holders of financial institutions and financial market participants by competent authorities (JC/GL/2024/88). The Joint Guidelines aim at establishing consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices within the European System of Financial Supervision, and at ensuring the common, uniform and consistent application of Union law with regard to the use of the system established by the ESAs for the aforementioned exchange of information.

    Compliance with the ESA Joint Guidelines on the estimation of aggregated annual costs and losses caused by major ICT-related incidents under Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

    On 19 May 2025 the Governing Council did not object to a proposal by the Supervisory Board to notify the EBA that, for the significant institutions under its direct supervision, the ECB intends to comply by 30 November 2025 with the Joint Guidelines on the estimation of aggregated annual costs and losses caused by major ICT-related incidents under Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (JC/GL/2024/34).

    Compliance with the EBA Guidelines on environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks

    On 28 May 2025 the Governing Council did not object to a proposal by the Supervisory Board to notify the EBA that, for the significant institutions under its direct supervision, the ECB intends to comply by 11 January 2026 with the Guidelines on the management of ESG risks (EBA/GL/2025/01). These guidelines aim at enhancing the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of ESG risks by institutions, and at supporting their safety and soundness as they are confronted with the short, medium and long-term impact of ESG factors. They contain requirements as to the internal processes and ESG risk management arrangements that institutions should have in place, including specific plans to address the risks arising from the transition and process of adjustment to relevant sustainability legal and regulatory objectives.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: INTERPOL-Europol operation results in global seizures of fake and illicit food

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    14 December 2012

    A joint INTERPOL-Europol operation targeting fake and substandard food and drink, as well as the organized crime networks behind this illicit trade, has resulted in the seizure of more than 135 tonnes of potentially harmful goods ranging from everyday products of coffee, soup cubes and olive oil, to luxury goods such as truffles and caviar. A further 100 tonnes of misdeclared and/or potentially hazardous food was confiscated during investigations linked to Operation Opson II.

    Raids and inspections resulted in around 100 arrests and the seizure of more than 135 tonnes of potentially harmful goods, including everyday products such as coffee, soup cubes and olive oil.

    Illicit goods are often produced, transported and stored without any form of hygiene controls, putting the health and safety of consumers at risk.

    This year, Opson expanded beyond Europe to include countries in Africa, the Americas and Asia. Inspections were carried out at this warehouse in Thailand.

    A project under development  –  the INTERPOL Global Register  – will enable people to scan and verify the legitimacy of a product from their mobile device.

    Operation Opson targets fake and substandard food and drink and the organized crime networks behind this illicit trade.

    Cash was also seized during Opson II.

    INTERPOL and Europol representatives helped coordinate action in Madrid, Spain.

    Checks and raids were carried out at airports, seaports, shops, markets and private homes.

    The operation was supported by customs (Hungarian customs officers pictured here), national food regulatory bodies and partners from the private sector.

    The Thai Food and Drug Administration displayed the wide variety of goods seized including snacks, canned food, coffee and soft drinks.

    National police in 29 countries took part. Officers in Budapest, Hungary, were briefed on the operation.

    Opson was a week-long operation, coordinated jointly by INTERPOL and Europol.

    Operation Opson II (3 – 9 December), which involved 29 countries from all regions of the world, resulted in the recovery of more than 385,000 litres of counterfeit liquids including vodka, wine, soy sauce and orange juice in addition to fish, seafood and meat declared unfit for human consumption, as well as fake candy bars and condiments.

    With the fake and substandard food and drink often produced, transported and stored without any form of regulation or hygiene controls, consumers buying these illicit goods are risking their health and safety while the criminal networks make millions in profits which can be used to fund other illegal activities such as human and drug trafficking.

    Operation Opson II saw the number of participating countries rise from 10 in 2011 to nearly 30 this year, an increase which, says Simone Di Meo, a Criminal Intelligence Officer with INTERPOL’s Trafficking in Illicit Goods unit, reflects a growing awareness of the problem and involvement by organized crime.

    “With this year’s operation going beyond Europe and involving countries in Africa, the Americas and Asia, this will enable us to gather even more intelligence about the networks behind this criminal activity and potentially identify global links with other types of crime,” says Mr Di Meo.

    Coordinated by INTERPOL and Europol, the week-long operation was supported by customs, police and national food regulatory bodies in addition to partners from the private sector. Checks and raids were carried out at airports, seaports, shops, markets and private homes.

    “With this operation, we are showing the criminal networks involved in this line of business that they are not safe and, just as importantly, we are helping to protect public health and safety. In many cases, the quality of the packaging of the fake food and drink is so well done that consumers may not even be aware that they are buying illicit products and potentially risking their lives,” says Chris Vansteenkiste, Project Manager of the Intellectual Property Crime Team at Europol.

    Among the key aims of Operation Opson (meaning food in ancient Greek) were the development of practical cooperation between national law enforcement, food and drug agencies and private companies, the identification of the organized criminal groups behind the trafficking, and raising awareness among consumers and governments about this type of crime.

    Countries which took part in Operation Opson II are Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the USA.

    Investigations are continuing in many countries and additional information on national activities can be obtained from the enforcement agencies of the countries concerned.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Poland, divided between Trump and the EU

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Jacques Rupnik, Directeur de recherche émérite, Centre de recherches internationales (CERI), Sciences Po

    Karol Nawrocki in the Oval Office with Donald Trump on May 25th 2025, ten days before the first round of the Polish presidential election. It is very rare for a sitting US president to receive a candidate in a foreign election.
    White House X account

    Nawrocki’s narrow victory (50.89%) over Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw and candidate of the government coalition, illustrates and reinforces the political polarisation of Poland and the rise of the populist “Trumpist” right in Central and Eastern Europe. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there has been much speculation about whether Europe’s geopolitical centre of gravity is shifting eastwards. The Polish election seems to confirm that the political centre of gravity is shifting to the right.

    A narrow victory

    We are witnessing a relative erosion of the duopoly of the two major parties, Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS), whose leaders – the current Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, and Jarosław Kaczyński respectively – have dominated the political landscape for over twenty years.

    Kaczyński’s skill lay in propelling a candidate with no responsibilities in his party, who was little known to the general public a few months ago, and, above all, who is from a different generation, to the presidency (a position held since 2015 by a PiS man, Andrzej Duda). Nawrocki, a historian by training and director of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, has helped shape PiS’s memory policy. He won the second round, despite his troubled past as a hooligan, by appealing to voters on the right.

    In the first round, he won 29.5% of the vote, compared to Trzaskowski’s 31.36%, but the two far-right candidates, Sławomir Mentzen (an ultra-nationalist and economic libertarian) and Grzegorz Braun (a monarchist, avowed reactionary, and anti-Semite), won a total of 21% of the vote. They attracted a young electorate (60% of 18–29-year-olds), who overwhelmingly transferred their votes to Nawrocki in the second round.



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    Despite a high turnout of 71% and favourable votes from the Polish diaspora (63%), Trzaskowski was unable to secure enough votes from the first-round candidates linked to the governing coalition, including those on the left (who won 10% between them) and the centre-right (Szymon Hołownia’s Third Way movement, which won 5% in the first round).

    A Tusk government struggling to implement its programme

    There are two Polands facing each other: the big cities, where incomes and levels of education are higher, and the more rural small towns, which are more conservative on social issues and more closely linked to the Catholic Church.
    The themes of nationhood – Nawrocki’s campaign slogan was “Poland first, Poles first” – family, and traditional values continue to resonate strongly with an electorate that has been loyal to PiS for more than twenty years. The electoral map, which shows a clear north-west/south-east divide, is similar to those of previous presidential elections and even echoes the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. The PiS vote is strongest in the part of the country that was under Russian rule until 1918. A more traditional Catholicism in these less developed regions, coupled with a strong sense of national identity, partly explains these historical factors.

    The economic explanation for the vote is unconvincing. Over the past 25 years, Poland has undergone tremendous transformation, driven by steady economic growth. GDP per capita has risen from 25% to 80% of the EU average, although this growth has been unevenly distributed. Nevertheless, a relatively generous welfare state has been preserved.

    Clearly, however, this growth, driven by investment from Western Europe (primarily Germany) and European structural funds (3% of GDP), does not provide a sufficient electoral base for a liberal, centrist, pro-European government.

    It is precisely the government’s performance that may hold the key to Trzaskowski’s failure. Having come to power at the end of 2023 with a reformist agenda, Donald Tusk’s government has only been able to implement part of its programme, and it is difficult to be the candidate of an unpopular government. Conversely, the governing coalition has been weakened by the failure of its candidate.

    The main reason for the stalling of reforms is the presidential deadlock. Although the president has limited powers, he countersigns laws and overriding his veto requires a three fifth majority in parliament, which the governing coalition lacks.

    The president also plays a role in foreign policy by representing the country, and above all by appointing judges, particularly to the Supreme Court. This has hindered the judicial reforms expected after eight years of PiS rule. It is mainly in this area that Duda has obstructed progress. The election of Nawrocki, who is known for his combative nature, suggests that the period of cohabitation will be turbulent.

    What are the main international implications of Nawrocki’s election?

    Donald Tusk is now more popular in Europe than in Poland; in this respect, we can speak of a “Gorbachev syndrome”. In Central Europe, the Visegrad Group (comprising Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) is deeply divided by the war in Ukraine, but it could find common ground around a populist sovereignty led by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Orbán was the first to congratulate Nawrocki on his victory, followed by his Slovak neighbour Robert Fico. The Czech Republic could also see a leader from this movement come to power if Andrej Babiš wins the parliamentary elections this autumn. Nawrocki would fit right into this picture.

    Since Donald Tusk returned to power, particularly during Poland’s EU presidency, which ends on 30 June, the focus has been on Poland’s “return” to the heart of the European process. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and Poland’s pivotal role in coordinating a European response, the Weimar Group (comprising Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw) has emerged as a key player. Three converging factors have made this possible: the French president’s firm stance toward Russia; the new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, breaking a few taboos on defence and budgetary discipline; and Donald Tusk, the former president of the European Council, regaining a place at the heart of the EU that his predecessors had abandoned. A framework for a strategic Europe was taking shape.

    However, President Nawrocki, and the PiS more generally, are taking a different approach to the EU: they are positioning themselves as Eurosceptic opponents defending sovereignty. They are playing on anti-German sentiment by demanding reparations 80 years after the end of the Second World War and asserting Poland’s sovereignty in the face of a “Germany-dominated Europe”. The Weimar Triangle, recently strengthened by the bilateral treaty between France and Poland signed on 9 May 2025, could be weakened on the Polish–German flank.

    As a historian and former director of the Second World War Museum in Gdansk and the Institute of National Remembrance, Nawrocki is well placed to exploit this historical resentment. He has formulated a nationalist memory policy centred on a discourse of victimhood, portraying Poland as perpetually under attack from its historic enemies, Russia and Germany.

    While there is a broad consensus in Poland regarding the Russian threat, opinions differ regarding the government’s desire to separate the traumas of the past, particularly those of the last war, from the challenges of European integration today.

    Memory issues also play a prominent role in relations with Ukraine. There is total consensus on the need to provide military support to Ukraine, under attack: this is obvious in Poland, given its history and geography – defending Ukraine is inseparable from Polish security. However, both Nawrocki and Trzaskowski have touched upon the idea that Ukraine should apologise for the crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists during the last war, starting with the massacre of more than 100,000 Poles in Volyn (Volhynia), north-western Ukraine) by Stepan Bandera’s troops.

    Alongside memory policy, Nawrocki and the PiS are calling for the abolition of the 800 zloty (190 euros) monthly allowance paid to Ukrainian refugees. Poland had more than one million Ukrainian workers prior to the war, and more than two million additional workers have arrived since it started, although around one million have since relocated to other countries, primarily Germany and the Czech Republic.

    Prior to the second round of the presidential election, Nawrocki readily signed the eight demands of the far-right candidate Sławomir Mentzen, which included ruling out Ukraine’s future NATO membership. Playing on anti-Ukrainian (and anti-German) sentiment, alongside Euroscepticism and sovereignty, is one of the essential elements of the new president’s nationalist discourse.

    A Central and Eastern European Trumpism?

    Certain themes of the Polish election converge with a trend present throughout Central and Eastern Europe. We saw this at work in the Romanian presidential election, where the unsuccessful far-right nationalist candidate, George Simion, came to Warsaw to support Nawrocki, just as the winner, the pro-European centrist Nicușor Dan, lent his support to Trzaskowski. Nawrocki’s success reinforces an emerging “Trumpist” movement in Eastern Europe, with Viktor Orbán in Budapest seeing himself as its self-proclaimed leader. A year ago, Orbán coined the slogan “Over there (in the United States), it’s MAGA; here, it will be MEGA: Make Europe Great Again”. The “Patriots for Europe” group, launched by Orbán last year, is intended to unify this movement within the European Parliament.

    American conservative networks, through the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), a gathering of international hard-right figures, and the Trump administration are directly involved in this process. Shortly before the presidential election, Nawrocki travelled to Washington to arrange a photo opportunity with Trump in the Oval Office.

    Most notably, two days before the election, Kristi Noem, the US Secretary of Homeland Security, was dispatched on a mission to Poland. Speaking at the CPAC conference in Rzeszów, she explicitly linked a vote for Nawrocki to US security guarantees for Poland:

    “If you (elect) a leader that will work with President Donald J. Trump, the Polish people will have a strong ally that will ensure that you will be able to fight off enemies that do not share your values. […] You will have strong borders and protect your communities and keep them safe, and ensure that your citizens are respected every single day. […] You will continue to have a U.S. presence here, a military presence. And you will have equipment that is American-made, that is high quality.”

    “Fort Trump”, that is how the outgoing President Andrzej Duda named the US military base financed by Poland after a bilateral agreement was signed with Donald Trump during his first term in office, in 2018. Similarly, the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the President of the European Commission accusing her of applying “double standards”, pointing out that EU funds had been blocked when the PiS was in power, and claiming that European money had been used to influence the outcome of the Polish presidential election in favour of Trzaskowski. The letter was posted online on the State Department website. Prioritising the transatlantic link at the expense of strengthening Europe was one of the issues at stake in the Warsaw presidential election.

    CPAC is playing a significant role in building a Trumpist national-populist network based on rejecting the “liberal hegemony” established in the post-1989 era, regaining sovereignty from the EU, and defending conservative values against a “decadent” Europe. Beyond the Polish presidential election, the goal seems clear: to divide Europeans and weaken them at a time when the transatlantic relationship is being redefined.

    Jacques Rupnik ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    ref. Poland, divided between Trump and the EU – https://theconversation.com/poland-divided-between-trump-and-the-eu-260007

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia – A10-0118/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia

    (2025/2021(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of North Macedonia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to North Macedonia’s application for membership of the European Union, submitted on 22 March 2004,

     having regard to the European Council decision of 16 December 2005 to grant North Macedonia EU candidate country status,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19-20 June 2003, including the annex thereto entitled ‘The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration’,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘North Macedonia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0693),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in North Macedonia’ (SWD(2024)0830),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘North Macedonia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0693),

     having regard to the Reform Agenda of North Macedonia as approved by the Commission under the Reform and Growth Facility on 23 October 2024,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels as well as the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Sofia, Zagreb and Brdo pri Kranju in 2018, 2020 and 2021 respectively, and the Declaration on the Common Regional Market and the Declaration on the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans agreed on 10 November 2020 at the Sofia Summit within the Berlin Process,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 July 2022 on Enlargement – North Macedonia and Albania  and the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024,

     having regard to the final report of 23 September 2024 of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Election Observation Mission on North Macedonia’s presidential election on 24 April 2024 and parliamentary elections on 8 May 2024,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the Treaty of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, signed on 1 August 2017 and ratified in January 2018;

     having regard to the Final Agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the United Nations Security Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the establishment of a strategic partnership between Greece and North Macedonia, agreed on 17 June 2018, also known as the Prespa Agreement,

     having regard to the joint staff working document entitled ‘Objectives and Indicators to frame the implementation of the Gender Action Plan III (2021-25)’ (SWD(2020)0284) accompanying the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 November 2020 entitled ’EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – An ambitions vision for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action (JOIN(2020)0017), as well as the Country Level Implementation Plan (CLIP) for North Macedonia,

     having regard to the 2023 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Report on North Macedonia, adopted on 29 June 2023 and published on 20 September 2023,

     having regard to the declaration and joint recommendations adopted at the 23rd meeting of the EU-North Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee, held on 27 and 28 February 2025 in Skopje,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on North Macedonia, and in particular its resolution of 24 October 2019 on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania[4],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0118/2025),

    A. whereas North Macedonia has held EU candidate country status since 2005 and successfully completed the screening process in December 2023;

    B. whereas the aspirations of citizens of North Macedonia to become part of the EU have led to progress in terms of democracy and socio-economic reforms, while the EU accession process continues to experience regrettable delays for various reasons;

    C. whereas the EU has mobilised approximately EUR 210 million in macro-financial assistance loans since 2020, aimed at stabilising the Macedonian economy, aiding its recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and accelerating its reform progress;

    D. whereas North Macedonia is a partner that is aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy in the vast majority of cases and has played a constructive role in the region; whereas North Macedonia’s recent abstention from United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 of 24 February 2025 on Ukraine and its co-sponsorship of an alternative resolution led by the United States indicates an unexpected and regrettable shift in its foreign policy alignment;

    E. whereas North Macedonia participates in EU military crisis management operations, including EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    F. whereas the Council reached new conclusions in July 2022 which mean that North Macedonia needs to adopt the outstanding constitutional changes, in line with its commitments, so that the opening phase of accession negotiations can be completed immediately;

    G. whereas the geopolitical changes, the war in Ukraine, disinformation and misinformation have a strong impact on all European countries, both politically and economically;

    H. whereas North Macedonia remains a target of foreign malign influence operations, including efforts to fracture the country’s social fabric and weaponise anti-EU sentiment, notably via Serbian-language tabloids and media outlets, which function as regional amplifiers of Kremlin narratives and enjoy considerable influence; whereas North Macedonia expelled 13 Russian diplomats between 2018 and 2023 for activities incompatible with their diplomatic status, suggesting an ongoing presence of covert influence networks; whereas China has sought to expand its influence through information control, investment diplomacy and coercive clauses in infrastructure loan agreements;

    I. whereas North Macedonia’s authorities have proposed solutions for constitutional change that did not meet the conditions of the July 2022 Council conclusions;

    J. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law;

    K. whereas the Council has not excluded unequivocally the adoption of further new conditions for the starting of accession negotiations;

    L. whereas the EU has consistently demonstrated its recognition of the Macedonian language and identity;

    1. Reiterates its full support for North Macedonia’s continued and persistent commitment to join the EU and for the necessary transformative changes that are required to fulfil the accession criteria; commends the country’s commitment to European integration and encourages continued efforts in advancing EU-aligned reforms, despite the challenges and setbacks that have tested the patience and trust of the Macedonian society;

    2. Underlines that EU accession remains a matter of political will in fulfilling the criteria and implementing the commitments undertaken, in terms of both making the necessary reforms and adopting the necessary constitutional amendments;

    3. Recalls the need to maintain the momentum and credibility of the EU integration process; notes that North Macedonia continues to demonstrate commitment to EU integration and alignment with EU policies; calls for the swift advancement of accession negotiations, while noting the importance of adopting the constitutional amendments; urges the European Council to signal, publicly and unequivocally, that the Council intends to swiftly and unconditionally take the positive decision to enter into the next phase of accession negotiations with North Macedonia once the conditions of its conclusions of 18 July 2022 have been fulfilled, while fully respecting the Macedonian language and identity; encourages all political parties in North Macedonia to engage in constructive dialogue to achieve the necessary consensus on these amendments, which would strengthen the country’s multi-ethnic character and accelerate its progress towards EU membership; believes that strengthening the links between the multiple ethnicities is essential for improving social cohesion and ensuring more effective governance; calls on the Member States, the Council and the Commission to safeguard the predictability and credibility of the accession process, also with a view to maintaining popular support for accession in enlargement countries;

    4. Welcomes the successful completion of the screening process for North Macedonia at the end of 2023; encourages North Macedonia to adopt the constitutional amendments that the country committed to making and implementing, as required by the Council, in order for the accession negotiation process to proceed;

    5. Commends the commitment of the Macedonian people to EU integration and the support they show to this project two decades on from starting the process; urges the Commission to do the utmost to help the authorities of North Macedonia accomplish the necessary steps before entering into the next negotiation phase as well as further along the negotiation process, to help deliver on the expectations of citizens and the country and to explore all measures for gradual integration into the EU structures, thus increasing trust in the EU and its democratic values;

    6. Recalls that the accession process should not be used to settle bilateral disputes, obstruct merit-based progress on the European path or outweigh the broader strategic interests of the Union, but that such disputes must rather be addressed through open dialogue and genuine cooperation; underlines that accession negotiations should follow a clear path, guided by objective criteria and solely based on merit and the fulfilment of the accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria), which require in-depth reforms across fundamental areas, as well as the presence of stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities;

    7. Affirms the importance of unequivocally recognising and respecting the Macedonian language and identity as an integral part of the nation’s heritage and constitutional order, but also of European values; notes that the European institutions, in country reports and official documents, consistently refer to the Macedonian language in line with international recognition and the implementation of the Prespa Agreement; reaffirms that the respect for linguistic, cultural and national identity is a fundamental component of the EU accession process and a cornerstone of democratic societies which will be further affirmed with the accession to the family of European nations;

    8. Repeats its calls for the EU’s capacity to act to be enhanced through a reform of its decision-making, including through the introduction of qualified majority voting on the intermediate steps in the accession process, in particular at the start of negotiations and the opening and closing of individual negotiating clusters and chapters;

    9. Welcomes the new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans which will provide EUR 750 million in grants and loans to North Macedonia when it meets the conditions set out in its Reform Agenda; welcomes, in this context, the excellent and ambitious Reform Agenda, which sets clear, transparent goals and targets, and calls on the authorities to focus on its rigorous implementation; underlines the need to focus on incentivising reforms and reinforcing economic stability as well as on public administration, governance, the rule of law and the fight against corruption, decarbonisation and the green transition, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while addressing social challenges;

    10. Notes the funds being received by North Macedonia from individual Member States and the good cooperation between them; warns however about strengthening alliances with illiberal regimes;

    11. Commends North Macedonia on its continued commitment to the EU integration process and regrets the delays in the accession process; welcomes the stability of and encourages continued efforts to secure interethnic relations and the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement;

    12. Encourages North Macedonia to achieve tangible results in complying with the EU’s expectations under the negotiating framework and the Council conclusions of July 2022, including relevant constitutional changes, in line with the country’s commitments;

    13. Urges North Macedonia to intensify efforts to strengthen the rule of law and judicial independence, including in judicial appointments and the functioning of the Judicial Council, to counter corruption, reform its public administration and improve the transparency and concentration of media ownership; encourages further implementation of systemic measures to ensure transparency and efficiency in governance;

    14. Expresses its profound sorrow and heartfelt solidarity following the tragic Kočani nightclub fire that led to the death of more than 50 young people and injuries to more than 150 others and offers its condolences to the victims and their families; commends the rapid use of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the help provided by the Member States to save as many lives as possible; commends neighbouring and EU countries, in particular Greece and Bulgaria, for the immediate support and solidarity they showed and the medical treatment they provided to victims;

    Functioning of democratic institutions

    15. Notes that, while democratic institutions in North Macedonia function satisfactorily, political polarisation remains a major stumbling block to necessary reforms; calls on the political parties represented in the country’s parliament to work together to reach an agreement on those reforms;

    16. Welcomes the adoption of new rules of procedure by the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia (Sobranie), facilitated by the European Parliament within the framework of the Jean Monnet Dialogue; stresses, however, that persistent political polarisation continues to delay important reforms and appointments; emphasises that cross-party collaboration and an improved political climate remain vital to accelerate the implementation of EU-related reforms and strengthen democratic institutions;

    17. Notes with concern that about half of all laws enacted by the Sobranie in 2023 were approved through shortened procedures; calls on the Sobranie to improve its legislative planning, coordination and quality through proper consultation procedures and parliamentary oversight, in particular with a view to the conclusions of the Jean Monnet Dialogue and to avoid fast-track procedures;

    18. Stresses that, while the 2024 parliamentary and presidential elections were competitive, and democratic and amendments to the Electoral Code have been made, comprehensive electoral reform is still needed; calls strongly for the implementation of the outstanding recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission through an inclusive revision of the Electoral Code, while underlining the importance of insulating future electoral processes from malign foreign interference and information manipulation, including through the adoption of robust cybersecurity and online campaign transparency rules;

    19. Calls for improved regulation of the financing of political parties and campaigns, including measures to increase transparency regarding the funds and expenses of political parties; urges a revision of the rules on state advertising in commercial media and paid political advertisement; emphasises the need for functioning oversight mechanisms to ensure integrity in party financing and for equal and adequate media access for political parties and independent candidates;

    20. Calls for the continued modernisation of a merit-based public administration, addressing systemic challenges of politicisation, strengthening transparent recruitment processes, and reforming local self-government to provide better social services for citizens and to develop tailor-made local and regional development strategies; urges the authorities to step up their efforts and adopt and implement the necessary legislation with a view to improving public trust in the administration and fostering a resilient and capable public service that can effectively respond to contemporary challenges and serve the needs of the community; commends the 2023-2030 public administration strategy and the related action plan for 2023-2026 adopted in July 2023; acknowledges that they cover all relevant reform areas and set out a clear baseline, objectives and targets, thus identifying crucial policy challenges; regrets, however that the implementation rate remains low;

    21. Calls for further steps to ensure the systemic accountability of public institutions through meaningful and public stakeholder consultations, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda, and to provide feedback from the consultations conducted; commends the law on general administrative procedures that is providing for simplification, but strongly recommends that it be implemented systematically across the administration;

    22. Urges the authorities of North Macedonia to refrain from opaque, politicised dismissals from, and appointments to, positions within independent bodies and agencies, as well as to ensure that the institutions are adequately funded and that decisions and recommendations are implemented consistently; notes with regret the continued lack of progress in strengthening the office of the Ombudsman;

    Media and civil society

    23. Welcomes North Macedonia’s steady progress in assuring media freedom; recalls however, the need for continued reforms to ensure an independent and resilient media landscape, including reforming the legal framework governing online and offline media to align fully with the European Media Freedom Act[5], addressing persistent challenges in media ownership transparency, digital media disclosure and media concentration; underlines the need for media reform that prioritises anti-concentration measures to safeguard journalistic integrity; emphasises the urgent need to counter malign foreign influence in the media landscape, including disinformation disseminated by actors linked to Russia and China;

    24. Calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that effectively protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), and to implement the provisions of the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive[6];

    25. Urges the authorities to ensure full transparency and unimpeded access to information for citizens;

    26. Notes with concern the reinstatement of government advertising in commercial media in North Macedonia; stresses the heightened risk of this measure opening the media market to disruption and undue political influence, thus endangering media independence and media pluralism; reiterates its calls for the comprehensive reform of the rules governing state financing and political party advertising in the media, noting the lack of transparency, the ongoing misuse of state funds for political advertising, and the continued risk of compromising media independence through opaque funding mechanisms; calls strongly for these reforms to be adopted and implemented before the local elections planned for autumn 2025;

    27. Underlines the need to strengthen the independence and capacity of the media regulator, the public service broadcaster and the regulator of electronic communication;

    28. Encourages action to enhance the editorial and financial independence, impartiality and professionalism of public service broadcasters and media regulators, while noting the continued delay in appointing key oversight bodies and the need for comprehensive modernisation efforts; calls for stricter transparency and ownership rules to expose covert influence, including foreign-sponsored media content, and for the establishment of mechanisms to identify and disrupt coordinated foreign disinformation networks;

    29. Notes that certain Chinese diplomatic entities have financed paid content and opinion pieces in Macedonian media outlets without clear labelling; recalls that a 2023 analysis found that Russian state-affiliated actors had used Serbian media proxies to disseminate narratives hostile to NATO and to claim that the EU is pressuring North Macedonia to ‘abandon its identity’;

    30. Expresses concern over the ongoing threats and attacks against independent journalists and media professionals, including misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, often targeting those reporting on the rule of law, corruption and justice; welcomes the assignment of a dedicated prosecutor to monitor these attacks on journalists and oversee the establishment of cyberbullying reporting mechanisms; calls for stronger measures to protect media professionals from physical and non-physical threats, harassment and the inappropriate use of language by public figures;

    31. Encourages North Macedonia to continue the efforts to combat hate speech in all of its forms and targeting all groups, to proactively prevent and thoroughly investigate all instances of hate speech, hate crimes and intimidation, systematically prosecute related attacks, with a view to achieving convictions and ensuring the safety and security of their targets, such as journalists, people belonging to minorities, communities such as Bulgarians, and other vulnerable groups;

    32. Expresses concern about the rise in hate speech and growing threats from disinformation in online media, over which the national Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services has no regulatory authority; calls for strengthened measures to support investigative journalism, fact-checking capabilities and media literacy and to improve the legal framework and interinstitutional capacity in order to combat hate speech, disinformation and foreign interference; is concerned by widespread disinformation campaigns which call into question democratic values and the country’s goal of EU membership; calls, in this regard, for the support of the EU institutions to help the country mitigate these malicious effects; welcomes civil society initiatives promoting media fact-checking, digital literacy in schools and the combating of the spread of hate speech, and notes that nearly 50 % of the citizens of North Macedonia have adopted false narratives about international events, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine, underscoring the urgency of reinforcing societal resilience against malign information manipulation;

    33. Underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; welcomes the country’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process, and recalls that further efforts are needed to ensure inclusive, timely and meaningful consultation and transparency, as well as formal mechanisms for cooperation; welcomes, against this backdrop, the recent initiation of the process for re-establishing the Council for Cooperation with and Development of the Civil Society Sector and calls for enhanced cooperation between the government and civil society, especially in mitigating the implications for civil society of the recent ‘freeze’ of US Agency for International Development (USAID) funds; notes that, while civil society organisations operate in an overall enabling environment, legal and financial frameworks need to be implemented to ensure that their public funding is increased and that public funding mechanisms are transparent; is concerned about reports of an increase in hostile statements towards civil society and encourages the Ministry of Internal Affairs to work with civil society organisations to develop a security protocol for human rights defenders to ensure their protection against threats from non-state actors; calls strongly for further enhancement of the role of civil society by ensuring that it continues to be meaningfully included in the decision-making process and by consulting the Venice Commission before adopting future legislation related to non-governmental organisations (NGOs);

    Fundamental rights

    34. Commends North Macedonia for ratifying most international human rights instruments; expresses concern, however, about the level of implementation, the lack of progress in gender equality, the rise of anti-gender movements and the increase in their influence, which have a negative impact on legislative and policymaking processes; urges the government to fully implement the Istanbul Convention; calls on the authorities to adopt the new Law on Gender Equality and to strengthen formal government structures designed to promote gender equality and improve the status and rights of women at all levels, as well as to ensure the effective implementation of the gender equality strategy and the national action plan, notably by ensuring adequate funding, enhancing interinstitutional coordination and aligning national policies with the EU acquis;

    35. Urges the authorities to ensure the full and effective implementation of the existing legal framework for the protection of victims of gender-based and domestic violence, by allocating sufficient budgetary resources for prevention, and by improving access to support services, protection mechanisms and the enforcement of legally guaranteed social and economic rights of survivors; notes, against this background, the adoption in 2023 of the Law on Payment of Monetary Compensation to Victims of Violent Crimes, which integrates the standards of the Istanbul Convention to provide better protection for victims of gender-based violence; urges the authorities, furthermore, to strengthen their efforts to reduce and mitigate gender-based violence and domestic violence, and to increase shelter capacity and personnel, as well as the number of well-trained and gender-sensitive law enforcement officers, judges, medical personnel and social workers;

    36. Notes, with concern, the dire situation of young women in prison, including juvenile girls aged between 14 and 16, who lack education and job skills training and are often overmedicated, with insufficient healthcare; urges the authorities of North Macedonia to take urgent measures to improve the detention conditions for all inmates, to reduce corruption and stop inhuman treatment, and to enhance the probation and reintegration of ex-prisoners into society;

    37. Urges North Macedonia to fully implement the recommendations outlined in the 2023 ECRI report on North Macedonia in order to effectively address the human rights violations identified;

    38. Welcomes the fact that interethnic relations remain stable and the Ohrid Framework Agreement continues to be implemented; commends North Macedonia’s efforts in strengthening minority rights protections, while encouraging further financial support; calls for adequate funding and staffing for institutions protecting the rights of non-majority communities; calls on political representatives of minority communities to avoid promoting divisive ethnic narratives echoing policies that caused profound suffering and wars in the region’s recent past; urges North Macedonia to fully implement the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as regards the ‘One society for all and interculturalism’ strategy; calls on North Macedonia to provide sufficient funding and staff for the Language Implementation Agency and the Agency for Community Rights Realization; regrets that North Macedonia did not ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; awaits a final decision on the contested Law on the Use of Languages, which may have an impact on interethnic relations;

    39. Welcomes the progress the country has achieved in aligning its legislative and institutional framework for the rights of the child with the EU acquis and international human rights standards; notes the progress in implementing the strategy for deinstitutionalisation and welcomes the successful relocation of children from institutions to foster care or small group homes; notes with concern, however, the continued instances of child violence and discrimination, including against Roma children; calls, therefore, for the country to set up a national body responsible for coordinating all policies relating to the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the optional protocols thereto;

    40. Encourages North Macedonia to take meaningful steps toward recognising and incorporating national minorities and communities into its constitution, fostering inclusivity, protecting diversity, fighting discrimination and strengthening social cohesion in line with European values and democratic principles; calls on North Macedonia to fully guarantee equal rights and opportunities for all ethnic communities in the country;

    41. Notes that persons with disabilities continue to face significant barriers as the country’s legislation is still not aligned with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; welcomes the national strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities for 2023-2030 and calls strongly for its proper implementation, including in regard to ensuring a sufficient number of educational assistants, in order to effectively and smoothly include children with disabilities in the education process;

    42. Welcomes the first court ruling on hate speech against the LGBTIQ+ community, but calls strongly for the systematic prosecution of all instances of hate speech, hate crimes and intimidation, as well as for the inclusion of hate speech in the Criminal Code and for the state institutions responsible to keep adequate statistics on cases of hate speech and hate crimes;

    43. Notes with concern the widespread hate speech on social media, particularly towards Roma, LGBTIQ+ persons and other marginalised groups; urges all political actors to amend the Law on Civil Registry and ensure swift and unimpeded legal gender recognition on the basis of self-determination, to uphold human rights, ensure dignity, and establish a clear and accessible legal process in line with international standards; recommends that the new Law on Primary Education maintain explicit protection against discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation and gender identity, ensuring alignment with national and international commitments; encourages the Assembly of North Macedonia to promptly (re-)establish an active interparliamentary LGBTIQ+ group to support and advance LGBTIQ+ rights;

    44. Calls on North Macedonia to strengthen migration management, improve alignment with the EU acquis and address persistent challenges in handling regular and irregular migration while upholding fundamental human rights; welcomes enhanced cooperation on border management and the strengthening of the country’s capacity to manage migration flows and combat migrant smuggling, human trafficking and other organised crime; encourages the continued development of asylum procedures and integration policies and the improvement of reception conditions, in alignment with EU migration frameworks; stresses the importance of regional cooperation in migration management and urges the EU to provide further support in terms of resources, technical assistance and capacity-building in order to address migration challenges effectively;

    45. Calls on North Macedonia to step up its efforts in the fight against human trafficking, notably by further aligning the Criminal Code with the EU acquis and its legislation on drugs;

    Rule of law

    46. Notes, with serious concern, that the country’s track record in fighting corruption, including high-level corruption, has worsened, as also evidenced by its decline in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, particularly owing to Criminal Code amendments that have weakened the legal framework, resulting in the termination of many ongoing cases; reiterates that this decline underscores the urgent need for comprehensive reforms; calls strongly for the anti-corruption framework to be strengthened and for effective accountability to be ensured, in particular in high-level corruption cases, through proper investigation, prosecution and convictions; urges a review of recent amendments to the Criminal Code in relation to sentencing standards and the statute of limitations, in order to ensure that the prosecution of corruption, especially of complex and high-level cases, is not negatively affected;

    47. Recalls that sufficient financial and human resources are needed to ensure effective and consistent application of dissuasion, prevention, detection, investigation and sanction mechanisms for public office holders through broad measures covering conflicts of interest, lobbying, codes of ethics and whistle-blower protection;

    48. Notes that the perceived level of trust in the judiciary remains very low and that further efforts are needed to prevent undue influence and intimidation; underlines the lack of progress in the implementation of the 2020 strategies for human resources management in the courts and in the public prosecutor’s office; calls strongly for the critical shortage of judges and prosecutors, which impacts the quality and efficiency of justice, to be addressed; calls for the independence and transparency of judicial bodies to be strengthened and for the funds necessary for their effective functioning to be allocated;

    49. Calls for the strengthening of the Judicial Council and the Council of Prosecutors and for the allocation of necessary funds, while ensuring their independence; strongly urges political actors to cease interfering in judicial institutions;

    50. Notes, with concern, the lack of progress in preventing and fighting corruption, and that financial investigations remain problematic; underlines how corruption continues to severely affect crucial policy areas; calls for the operational capacity and cooperation of agencies responsible for fighting organised crime and financial crime to be significantly strengthened, including through ensuring the necessary financial resources; encourages the country to improve its fight against organised and economic crime and cybercrime through a strengthened partnership with Europol, the European Cybercrime Centre and Eurojust; calls on North Macedonia to enhance its efforts to combat money laundering;

    51. Calls for all necessary measures to be put in place to effectively counter organised crime; urges the authorities to improve coordination through the National Coordination Centre for the Fight Against Organised Crime as well as to allocate the necessary funds and staffing to the Office of the Basic Public Prosecutor for Organised Crime and Corruption; underlines the need to direct particular attention and resources towards uncovering money-laundering schemes;

    52. Notes, with concern, North Macedonia’s partial alignment with the EU acquis in the fight against organised crime; reiterates its call for further alignment with the EU acquis and for systematic financial investigations, stepping up the freezing, confiscation, management and disposal of illegally acquired assets;

    53. Calls for a thorough and transparent investigation of the Kočani nightclub fire on 16 March 2025, to bring to justice the persons responsible, and also for the legislation to be updated and thoroughly implemented to prevent similar tragedies and ensure better public safety and regulatory compliance to protect citizens;

    54. Calls for the swift implementation of the ongoing reforms in the security and intelligence sectors, and for the independence of security and intelligence bodies to be strengthened through the establishment of appropriate regulatory frameworks, while also enhancing democratic oversight mechanisms; notes, with concern, that the National Security Agency is still located on the premises of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, calling into question its status as an independent state administration body;

    55. Commends North Macedonia’s strong determination to counter hybrid threats; welcomes the government’s initiative to create a national strategic framework to counter disinformation as well as the adoption of the national cybersecurity strategy 2025-2028; calls for further efforts to build resilience against foreign interference and information manipulation; underlines the need to work on a national strategy to build resilience against disinformation as a security threat to the state, including through enhanced cybersecurity measures and strategic communication as well as education and media literacy; calls for the full operationalisation of EU mechanisms, such as the rapid alert system, to detect malign foreign influence in real time during key democratic processes, including elections;

    56. Is deeply concerned that North Macedonia and other EU accession countries in the Western Balkans are being particularly hard hit by foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, including hybrid threats, strategic corruption, opaque financial flows and coercive investment practices, notably originating in Russia and China; is alarmed by Hungary’s and Serbia’s roles in advancing China’s and Russia’s geopolitical objectives; notes, in this context, the risk of dependence on China caused by asymmetrical loan agreements, as well as the recent loan from Hungary, which  appears to be sourced from China;

    Socio-economic reforms

    57. Recommends that North Macedonia continue to pursue steps to improve the business climate and infrastructure, strengthen education and digital infrastructure, and enhance social protection systems and their connection to employment initiatives; welcomes the inclusion of human capital-related reforms in the Growth Plan Reform Agenda and calls on North Macedonia to dedicate sufficient effort to implementing these reforms to achieve sustainable results in the development of human capital for children and young people, as the foundation of resilient societies and sustainable growth;

    58. Welcomes the adoption of the Reform Agenda and the multiannual work programme under the Reform and Growth Facility for North Macedonia, which will provide support for small and medium-sized enterprises, cut red tape and digitalise the public system, and welcomes the steps provided for in the Reform Agenda regarding the digital infrastructure roll-out and the new Law on Electronic Communications, aligning the national legislation with the relevant EU acquis and keeping up with the digital transition worldwide;

    59. Encourages labour market activation strategies for young people, the long-term unemployed, and low-skilled individuals, as well as for women, persons with disabilities and Roma, and calls for these measures to be properly evaluated; takes note of the long-term improvement in unemployment rates, notes, however, that this must be accompanied by a rise in real wages, the improvement of working conditions and the protection of workers’ rights, including trade union rights; calls for the full implementation of the Law on the Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes;

    60. Encourages North Macedonia to advance its digital transformation, particularly by improving the digital skills of all citizens and by providing online access to public services; recognises the demographic challenges faced by North Macedonia, including population decline, the emigration of young professionals, and an ageing workforce, and underlines the need to address the brain drain, especially in the medical, technological and educational fields; calls for the implementation of targeted policies to reverse the brain drain, enhance family-friendly social policies and attract return migration; encourages cooperation with the EU on demographic resilience strategies, including labour market incentives, housing support for young families, and investment in education and skills development to align with future job market needs; calls for increased support for innovation and competitiveness;

    61. Welcomes the positive effects of the Youth Guarantee on the reduction of youth unemployment; calls on North Macedonia to intensify its efforts to reduce the unemployment rate of young people aged between 15 and 24, which remains high at 29.3 %; underlines the need to address social challenges, ensure quality employment policies, foster upward social cohesion and convergence towards EU standards and support progress on the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights;

    62. Welcomes the efforts to amend the labour law; urges full alignment of the Law on Working Relations with EU directives to effectively guarantee the right to equal pay for equal work, ensure pay transparency and enhance protection against discrimination based on pregnancy and maternity; insists on the need to strengthen the competencies and capacities of the State Labour Inspectorate to ensure effective protection of workers’ rights, including safeguards against labour discrimination;

    63. Commends North Macedonia for joining the single euro payments area (SEPA), recognising this as an important step toward deeper financial integration with the European market and the facilitation of faster, more efficient cross-border transactions; urges North Macedonia to introduce structural reforms to strengthen the economy and secure the country’s debt sustainability;

    64. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all of the Western Balkans into the EU’s digital single market at the earliest opportunity, which would crucially benefit the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    65. Urges the authorities to fully implement existing legal provisions to ensure access to primary healthcare services, with a particular focus on sexual and reproductive health for women, mothers and children, and eliminate barriers related to geography, finances or other hardships; calls for targeted measures to support vulnerable groups of women in accessing healthcare, including Roma women, rural women and those living in poverty;

    66. Welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the Strategy for Inclusion of Roma 2022-2030; regrets, however, that the strategy lacks a clear approach to participation, empowerment and capacity building; calls on the authorities to implement the respective action plans, ensuring proper monitoring and meaningful and transparent participation of civil society organisations, notably from the Roma community;

    Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport

    67. Welcomes the adoption of the Energy Law in 2025 and underscores its importance for guaranteeing a safe, secure and high-quality supply of energy as well as for creating an efficient, competitive and financially sustainable energy sector; encourages the authorities to continue on this ambitious path and recalls that additional efforts are needed to fully meet the targets for energy efficiency, renewable energy, security of supply and emissions reductions; urges the country’s authorities to align their environment and climate change legislation with the EU acquis and to ensure its enforcement; notes, with concern, the lack of progress on climate action and the pending adoption of key legislation; stresses the need to integrate gender equality and social inclusion into climate action planning so that women, low-income households and marginalised communities are actively consulted and benefit equitably from the transition;

    68. Welcomes the European Investment Bank’s continued financial and technical support in North Macedonia, including strategic infrastructure projects such as the Rail Corridor VIII, the Skopje wastewater treatment plant, and municipal water infrastructure development; calls for an inclusive and just transition which protects the socially vulnerable, by mobilising public and private financing for the green transition, fully operationalising dedicated funding mechanisms and leveraging EU and international support; stresses the need to address the problems of a lack of specialised staff and weak institutional and administrative capacity, which undermine quality control and the adequate performance of environmental impact assessments;

    69. Notes, with concern, that air and water quality and wastewater management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts in order to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; recalls that the situation is particularly alarming in Skopje, which has consistently been one of the most polluted cities in Europe;

    70. Recognises North Macedonia’s great potential as a regional hub with regard to the use of renewable energy sources; urges North Macedonia to fully align its environmental impact assessment with the EU acquis, with a particular focus on secondary legislation concerning small hydropower projects;

    71. Stresses the urgent need to prioritise environmental protection; strongly urges the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation and to step up measures on biodiversity, water, air and climate action, and regional waste management, including through comprehensive impact assessments, rigorous prosecution of environmental crime and proper public consultation that allows for the meaningful and transparent involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions;

    72. Calls on North Macedonia to establish legal protections for Emerald Sites designated under the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (the Bern Convention) to safeguard them from environmentally harmful projects; encourages the country to expand its protected areas, with a view to fulfilling the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework targets; reiterates the urgent need to adopt the law on the re-proclamation of Mavrovo National Park to ensure the continuation and completion of its essential conservation efforts; encourages North Macedonia to include Jablanica on its list of protected areas, thus ensuring the conservation of habitats that are critical to the survival of species;

    73. Encourages the authorities of North Macedonia to implement stricter protection and management strategies for the habitats of endangered species, as well as for the species themselves, particularly the Balkan lynx, including rigorous enforcement of laws against wildlife crimes, specifically illegal killing and poaching, to safeguard biodiversity;

    74. Welcomes North Macedonia’s continued cooperation with Kosovo and Albania regarding the transboundary Sharr Mountains National Park; encourages North Macedonia to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

    75. Stresses the need to tackle financial challenges faced by national parks to improve various aspects, including human resources and overall management, with the aim of strengthening their role in biodiversity conservation, providing recreational opportunities and supporting local economies;

    76. Welcomes the progress made in the construction of the Corridor VIII of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and commends the completion of the Kriva Palanka–Dlabochica–Stracin expressway; urges, however, the authorities of North Macedonia to step up their efforts to prioritise sustainable transport and upgrade energy infrastructure work towards integration in European networks and regional connectivity as well as to address persistent delays in the development of critical infrastructure, including through bilateral negotiations; calls on the Commission to assist in these efforts where needed;

    77. Calls for additional efforts to accelerate progress on all priority sections of the core network for both rail and road, including by increasing the number of border crossings wherever possible; notes the strategic importance of Corridor VIII for the EU’s and NATO’s geostrategic autonomy, serving as a key logistics route along NATO’s southern flank;

    Regional cooperation and foreign policy

    78. Welcomes North Macedonia’s valuable and significant contributions to regional cooperation and stability via its engagement in regional economic and diplomatic initiatives such as the Berlin Process, the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, and the implementation of common regional market agreements, underlining the importance of their inclusiveness;

    79. Welcomes the country’s commitment to nurturing good neighbourly relations and acknowledges its role as a model for the peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes through dialogue and mutual understanding; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of full implementation of international agreements with tangible results in good faith by all sides, including the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation with Bulgaria; calls for consistent commitment to dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries to strengthen regional stability and foster mutual trust; calls for the further promotion of people-to-people contacts across south-eastern Europe;

    80. Expresses concern about the so-called ‘Serbian world’ project and that some representatives of the Government of North Macedonia have been advocating and promoting this concept; condemns the participation in meetings that attempt to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of other countries and the stability of the region;

    81. Recalls the need to open up Yugoslav secret service archives (UDBA and KOS), kept in both North Macedonia and Serbia; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to deal with the totalitarian past in a transparent way, with a view to strengthening democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    82. Welcomes North Macedonia’s continued commitment to Euro-Atlantic security; commends North Macedonia’s active role in the OSCE, in particular its chairmanship of the OSCE in 2023 in a complex geopolitical environment, and substantial contributions to EU crisis management missions and military operations; commends the country’s alignment with the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy, including its clear-cut response to  Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine by aligning with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus and providing support to Ukraine; welcomes the signing of a security and defence partnership with the EU in 2024;

    83. Regrets, however, that North Macedonia, was the only country in the Western Balkans to abstain on the European resolution on Ukraine in the UN General Assembly in February 2025 and instead co-sponsored the US resolution, alongside countries such as Georgia and Hungary, representing a negative signal regarding North Macedonia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and with the collective European commitment to upholding peace, international law and democratic principles;

    84. Acknowledges North Macedonia’s NATO membership as a significant geostrategic contribution to regional security and Euro-Atlantic stability, including through the country’s active participation in NATO missions and operations and its strategic role in fostering peace and cooperation in the Western Balkans, as well as through the ongoing modernisation of its armed forces and reforms in the fields of crisis management, critical infrastructure and cyber defence; highlights the fact that NATO membership strengthens North Macedonia’s defence capabilities, enhances security coordination with EU and NATO allies, and serves as a deterrent against external destabilisation efforts; encourages North Macedonia to deepen cooperation with the EU and NATO on countering hybrid threats, including through cybersecurity coordination, joint disinformation tracking and resilience-building, and to pursue its efforts to deter external destabilisation attempts; encourages North Macedonia to continue its investment in defence modernisation and alignment with NATO strategic priorities in order to further solidify its role as a reliable security partner;

    85. Welcomes the agreement concluded at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate achieving the agreed targets of a substantial reduction of data roaming charges between the Western Balkans and the EU and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    86. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Government and Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE expands focus on virtual assets taxation in second workshop in Moldova

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE expands focus on virtual assets taxation in second workshop in Moldova

    Building on insights from the first workshop held in May, the OSCE organized a follow-up event on the taxation of virtual assets on 26 and 27 June in Chisinau, Moldova.
    The workshop brought together eighteen representatives from Moldova’s State Tax Service and the Ministry of Finance to enhance their understanding of the complex and evolving landscape of crypto taxation.
    Over the course of the workshop, participants engaged in a mix of theoretical sessions and practical exercises aimed at deepening their technical knowledge and increasing their operational capacity. The workshop covered a range of topics, including blockchain-based taxation mechanisms, common tax avoidance strategies involving cryptocurrencies, and compliance with international standards.
    This training comes at a critical time, as Moldovan authorities are actively working to enhance the anti-money laundering framework and develop clear regulatory guidance for the virtual asset sector.
    The workshop series was organized as part of the OSCE’s extra-budgetary project, “Innovative Policy Solutions to Mitigate Money-Laundering Risks of Virtual Assets”, implemented by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities and funded by Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI China: Neymar crucial to Brazil’s World Cup hopes: Ancelotti

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Brazil manager Carlo Ancelotti has urged Neymar to focus on being ready for next year’s World Cup, saying the country’s all-time leading scorer remains crucial to his plans.

    Neymar has not played for Brazil since October 2023, when he suffered a ruptured anterior cruciate ligament in his left knee during a World Cup qualifier against Uruguay.

    Neymar (3rd R) of Brazil vies with Luka Modric of Croatia during the Quarterfinal match between Croatia and Brazil of the 2022 FIFA World Cup at Education City Stadium in Al Rayyan, Qatar, Dec. 9, 2022. (Xinhua/Han Yan)

    The former Barcelona and Paris Saint-Germain star returned to action last October after more than a year on the sidelines but has since struggled with a series of minor muscle injuries.

    “He is a very important player for our team in the World Cup,” Ancelotti said in an interview with South American football confederation CONMEBOL published on Thursday.

    On Wednesday, Santos announced it had reached an agreement to extend Neymar’s contract until December. The 33-year-old has made just 12 appearances since rejoining his boyhood club from Saudi Pro League side Al-Hilal in January.

    “He needs to prepare well,” said Ancelotti, who took charge of Brazil last month after leaving Real Madrid. “He has time for that. I spoke to him about that: to prepare well, because we believe he should be a very important player.”

    Brazil will conclude its World Cup qualifying campaign against Chile and Bolivia in September. The five-time World Cup winners are currently third in the 10-team South American zone standings and have already secured a place at football’s showpiece in the United States, Canada and Mexico.

    Neymar has scored 79 goals in 128 matches for Brazil since his international debut in 2010.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Liverpool complete signing of Kerkez from Bournemouth

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Liverpool on Thursday completed the signing of Hungarian international left-back Milos Kerkez from Bournemouth.

    Kerkez has cost around 40 million pounds (about 54.9 million U.S. dollars) and has signed a five-year deal until June 2030 after impressing in his first two seasons in the Premier League.

    Milos Kerkez of Hungary controls the ball during the UEFA Euro 2024 Group G qualification match between Hungary and Bulgaria in Budapest, Hungary on March 27, 2023. (Photo by Attila Volgyi/Xinhua)

    The 21-year-old’s arrival takes Liverpool’s summer spending to over 200 million pounds after raiding Bayer Leverkusen to sign Florian Wirtz for around 116 million pounds and Jeremie Frimpong for 29 million pounds.

    Goalkeeper Giorgi Mamardashvili will also join Liverpool at the start of the year, although Liverpool bought him from Valencia a year ago and lent him back to the Spanish side for last season.

    “It’s a real honor for me, a privilege to come to play for one of the biggest clubs in the world, the biggest club in England. I’m just really, really happy and excited,” said Kerkez on the Liverpool website.

    “I can’t really wait to come back and put the training kit on and start to train and prepare for the season.”

    “I just want to thank everyone for really showing me big love, even before it will be announced now,” he continued, promising to “give absolutely everything to win trophies and hopefully score some goals,” he added.

    Elsewhere in the Premier League, Arsenal’s young left-back Myles Lewis-Skelly signed a new five-year contract to assure the 18-year-old England international’s future at the Emirates Stadium.

    “I’m so proud and happy. I know those words are simple, but I think they sum up how I feel signing for this club. I’m a fan and it’s like a dream come true,” said the player who has progressed from the club’s youth teams to the England national side.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Failure to meet General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements: qualifications and skills of nominated members of the Bulgarian data protection authority (DPA) – P-001797/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    EU law requires the members of the national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) to be appointed by means of a transparent procedure and that they have the qualifications, experience and skills, in particular in the area of the protection of personal data, required to perform their duties and exercise their powers[1].

    The Commission has observed that heads of DPAs have a diversity of background and experience prior to their appointment, before effectively exercising their tasks. For instance, it is not unusual that in some Member States the heads of DPAs come from the high public administration.

    The Commission notes that the new members of the Bulgarian DPA have been elected by the National Assembly on 9 May 2025 by means of a transparent procedure[2].

    As demonstrated by past actions, t he Commission is attaching utmost importance to the requirement of independence of the DPAs.

    The Commission will therefore continue to closely monitor the situation in all Member States as regards the full and effective independence of national DPAs.

    • [1] Article 53(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1-88.
    • [2] https://www.parliament.bg/en/theme-site/ID/78.
    Last updated: 26 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission action in connection with Denmark’s transposition of the Enforcement Directive – 2014/67/EU – follow-up to Question P-000460/2024 – E-001880/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Following letters of formal notice sent to 24 Member States in July 2021 and reasoned opinions sent to 17 Member States in January 2023, including Denmark, for the non-conformity of their national measures with the Enforcement Directive on the Posting of Workers[1], the Commission closed infringement proceedings concerning 18 Member States[2] between March 2024 and May 2025.

    At this stage, the ongoing infringement proceedings concern six Member States (A ustria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).

    Main issues identified in those infringements relate to administrative requirements and control measures (Article 9), penalties (Article 20), as well as cross-border enforcement of penalties and fines (Chapter VI) of the directive.

    The Commission is currently assessing the measures at issue in the context of the ongoing infringement procedures, including the one against Denmark.

    In determining the appropriate next steps, the Commission is mindful of the need to ensure equal treatment among all Member States for which it has identified similar concerns, in accordance with the principles of fairness and consistency in enforcement.

    If the Commission deems national measures not to be in line with the directive, it will continue to follow the stages of infringement proceedings, including possible referral to the European Court of Justice.

    • [1] Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the internal market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’), OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, p. 11-31.
    • [2] Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
    Last updated: 26 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Operation Interflex reaches three-year milestone

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Operation Interflex reaches three-year milestone

    UK-led training programme of Ukrainian recruits launched on 26 June 2022.

    Crown copyright

    More than 56,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained by the UK and 13 partner nations on Operation Interflex; the UK-led, multination training programme.  

    Today (Thursday 26 June 2025) marks three years since the first Ukrainian trainees landed on British soil to begin the vital military training that turns civilians into soldiers capable of returning home to repel Russia’s illegal invasion of their country.  

    During this time Operation Interflex has continued to evolve to match the specific threats being faced on the frontlines in Ukraine. A variety of training programmes have been delivered via Operation Interflex focussed on equipping trainees with the battlefield essentials: the basic infantry course, leadership training, and instructor courses, which continuously adapt to Ukraine’s needs. 

    Led by the UK, Operation Interflex has been delivered alongside 13 other partner nations: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Albania, Estonia, Kosovo, Lithuania, and Romania. Service personnel from these nations are united in the objective to deliver high quality training that meets the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.  

    At a recent meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) on the 4 June, the Defence Secretary announced that the UK will spend a further £247m this year on training the Armed Forces of Ukraine, supporting Operation Interflex’s highly successful training programmes. This funding not only supports Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, but it is also vital in ensuring both European and UK security, underpinned by the Government’s Plan for Change.  

    Recent polling data reveals that 90% of all the trainees who have completed Interflex training since January 2025 feel more confident in their lethality and survivability at the end of training. The polling also revealed that one of the most valued elements of the training is the battlefield first aid, with 93% of basic recruits saying they felt more confident about treating casualties after receiving the training.  

    Minister for the Armed Forces, Luke Pollard MP said: 

    From each Ukrainian soldier made combat-ready on UK soil, to the £13bn committed in military support, we are proud of every element of our contribution to Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s illegal invasion.  

    The Government is clear that providing military support to Ukraine is essential to both UK and European security. Keeping the country safe is the Government’s first priority, and a foundation of its Plan for Change. 

    The UK and its allies are united in our support for Ukraine. I am sure they share my constant awe of the resilience shown by the Ukrainian people in the face of Russian aggression.” 

    Colonel Andrew Boardman, Commanding Officer of Operation Interflex: 

    Today marks three years since the launch of Operation INTERFLEX to train Ukrainian personnel in the UK. Over this period, the multinational coalition of 14 nations, led by the UK, has trained over 56,000 Ukrainian soldiers, a testament to the enduring strength and shared resolve of our international partnership.  

    This milestone reflects not only our unity of purpose but our unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s freedom and NATO’s collective security.” 

    The UK is proud to be a leading partner in providing vital support to Ukraine. The government has committed £13 billion of military aid for Ukraine, with £4.5 billion expected to be provided this year. This military aid includes training programmes like Operation Interflex, but also military capabilities and equipment such as drones, air defence systems and munitions.  

    The UK and Ukraine’s allies are committed to supporting Ukraine secure a just and lasting peace. The training effort provided by Operation Interflex aims to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position to achieve this peace and to safeguard their sovereignty and our collective security against Russian aggression.

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU prosecutors crack down on illegal Chinese imports scheme

    Source: European Union 2

    Tons of goods illegally imported through port of Piraeus, €700 million in losses

    (Luxembourg, 26 June 2025) – A coordinated raid by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in Athens (Greece), Madrid (Spain), Paris (France) and Sofia (Bulgaria) has dealt a significant blow to criminal networks flooding the EU market with goods fraudulently imported from China, while evading custom duties and VAT. The criminal scheme, which involved the massive importation of textile, shoes, e-scoters, e-bikes and other goods, is believed to have caused an estimated damage of approximately €700 million. 

    The investigation carried out by the EPPO, code-named ‘Calypso’, spans 14 countries: Bulgaria, China, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. A total of 101 searches were conducted yesterday at the offices of customs brokers, companies controlled by the organised criminal groups under investigation, the premises of the suspects, and at the offices of tax advisers and representatives, lawyers, accountants and transport companies, in Bulgaria, Greece, France and Spain. Ten suspects were arrested, including two customs officers. In addition, firearms and cold weapons were found and seized in the houses of three of the suspects.

    Law enforcement agents seized €5.8 million (of which €4.75 million in Greece and the remaining in France and Spain), in different currencies, including Hong Kong dollars, euros in digital wallets and cryptocurrencies. In addition, 7 133 e-bikes and 3 696 e-scooters were secured, as well as 480 containers for further checks and verification in the Port of Piraeus. Eleven properties located in Spain were also seized, as well as 27 vehicles and luxury items (bags, watches and jewellery). Freezing orders were also issued in Greece to seize real estate, boats and bank accounts.

    At issue are several criminal networks, mainly controlled by Chinese nationals, that handle the full circuit of the goods imported from China into the EU market, including distribution to different Member States and sales to end customers, as well as money laundering and sending the profits back to China, while defrauding the payment of customs duties and committing large-scale VAT fraud. 

    How it works 

    The fraudulent scheme starts with the introduction of the goods from China into the EU, mainly through the port of Piraeus (Greece), with a substantial undervaluation or misclassification of the goods, in order to evade custom duties – using false documents to conceal the true value and nature of the merchandise. A network of professional enablers operating at the customs entry point, such as customs brokers, service providers and accounting firms, facilitate the initial clearance, and the apparent purchase and transport of the merchandise by companies mainly registered in Bulgaria, but operating in Greece with a Greek VAT registration number. 

    The goods are subsequently sold to companies established in other Member States, thus allowing the first apparent purchaser to benefit from a VAT import exemption based on Customs Procedure 42 (CP42). This procedure, created to simplify cross-border trade, exempts importers from paying VAT in the country of importation, if the imported goods are subsequently transported to another EU Member State. 

    Through a chain of buffer and shell companies, the goods are apparently sold to companies in specific Member States, where they are supposed to be sold on the market. These fraudulently declared destinations include Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. However, these fake ultimate acquirers of the goods never receive the merchandise, and operate as a missing trader, thus not paying VAT. In some cases, the criminal organisations used identity documents from legitimate companies, fraudulently hijacking their VAT numbers to conceal the true destination of the goods.

    In reality, after the goods enter the EU, they are stored in warehouses and places controlled by the criminal organisations, and from there they are transported, using false documents, to France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain (the real countries of destination). These Chinese logistics centres, where all goods are stored, operate as highly controlled warehouse districts, functioning almost like exclusive communities, accessible only to members of the criminal groups managing them.

    The transport documents are destroyed as soon as the goods are delivered, and the merchandise is sold to end customers mostly on the black market, in cash, as part of a highly concealed parallel economy. 

    One-stop criminal enterprise

    The criminal organisations under investigation are in charge of producing the false invoices and transport documents to conceal the real destination of the goods, and to recruit a large network of sham companies used for the fake sales and deliveries, in order to hide the whole fraudulent chain. This allows the companies controlled by the criminal organisations to sell the products at a very competitive price, since VAT remains unpaid and customs duties and anti-dumping fees are largely evaded.

    Finally, the proceeds of the crime are transferred to China using different money laundering techniques, including providing money laundering services to other criminal organisations via trade-based underground banking systems. In this way, the organised criminal groups control and conceal the whole criminal chain, from the initial fraudulent import to the VAT fraud, and from the sale of the goods to the laundering of the profits.

    The total damage of the criminal activities under investigation is currently estimated at approximately €700 million: over €250 million come from evaded customs duties (which revert entirely to the EU budget), and close to €450 million from unpaid VAT (which damages both the EU budget and the national budgets of Member States). The damage caused by the fraudulent scheme under investigation is likely much higher. Greece’s Independent Authority for Public Revenue (AADE) is also actively supporting the EPPO to further evaluate the extent of the damage in evaded customs duties. 

    This EPPO-led investigation was supported by Europol through analytical assistance, coordination via a Virtual Command Post, and the deployment of an expert to the command centre in Luxembourg, with additional backing from national law enforcement agencies – highlighting the value of cross-border cooperation against organised crime. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) contributed to the detection. 

    All persons concerned are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty in the competent courts of law.

    The EPPO is the independent public prosecution office of the European Union. It is responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment crimes against the financial interests of the EU.

    List of most important partners and national authorities involved:

    • Europol
    • European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
    • Hellenic Internal Affairs Agency of Law Enforcement Bodies (Υπηρεσία Εσωτερικών Υποθέσεων Σωμάτων Ασφαλείας)
    • Hellenic Police’s Digital Forensics Investigations and Analysis Subdivision (Υποδιεύθυνση Ψηφιακής Εγκληματολογικής Έρευνας και Ανάλυσης της ΔΕΕ)
    • France’s National Anti-Fraud Office (Office National Antifraude – ONAF)
    • Bulgaria’s State Agency for National Security (ДАНС); National Investigation Service (Национална следствена служба); General Directorate National Police) Главна дирекция “Национална полиция”) and General Directoratе Gendarmerie and Specialised Counter-Terrorism Department (Главна дирекция “Жандармерия и специализан отряд за борба с тероризма”)
    • Spain’s National Police and Tax Agency (Policía Nacional and Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European rural areas face higher levels of energy poverty

    Source: European Union 2

    Around 48 million Europeans are unable to keep their homes warm, according to a new report. Rural areas in the EU experience higher levels of energy poverty, especially in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. However, rural areas are ahead of cities in carrying out energy efficiency improvements.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European rural areas face higher levels of energy poverty

    Source: European Union 2

    Around 48 million Europeans are unable to keep their homes warm, according to a new report. Rural areas in the EU experience higher levels of energy poverty, especially in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. However, rural areas are ahead of cities in carrying out energy efficiency improvements.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Building trust in justice: Reflections from the UK Supreme Court

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    World news story

    Building trust in justice: Reflections from the UK Supreme Court

    Lord Reed’s address at the Supreme Court’s of Montenegro 80th anniversary and AIRE Centre’s conference

    Copyright: Mirko Kuzman for AIRE Centre

    Justice, transparency, and public trust – why it matters

    Strengthening the independence, efficiency, and transparency of the judiciary is central to Montenegro’s reform process as it advances on its European path. It’s also at the heart of the UK’s partnership with Montenegro and our commitment to the wider Western Balkans.

    Judicial independence is not only a legal principle, but it is the foundation of public trust in democratic institutions. The UK continues to support Montenegro’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law as part of a shared vision for a more stable, resilient, and prosperous region.

    A shared commitment to the rule of law

    On 21 June 2025, the British Embassy was proud to support a major conference hosted by the Supreme Court of Montenegro and the AIRE Centre, with the support of the European Union Delegation, marking the 80th anniversary of the Supreme Court of Montenegro.

    The event brought together the judiciary, ministers, officials, Montenegrin and international experts, and partners to reflect on how courts can strengthen public confidence through greater transparency, openness, and effective communication.

    The UK was honoured to be represented by Lord Reed of Allermuir, President of the UK Supreme Court, who shared the UK’s experience and reflections on judicial communication, media engagement, and public accessibility.

    The UK’s ongoing support for judicial reform in Montenegro

    The UK’s partnership with Montenegro’s judiciary builds on a long history of collaboration, supporting training, initiatives for judicial integrity and transparency, and practical cooperation between courts. These efforts complement Montenegro’s reform priorities.

    We remain committed to supporting the development of strong, independent, and trusted institutions that are accountable to citizens and essential for democracy and stability.

    Lord Reed’s Speech

     I am honoured to have been invited to address you. I know that this year – indeed, this month – is the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the Supreme Court of Montenegro. This is a time to celebrate its success and its achievements, and also a time to reflect on how our society has changed over that period and is continuing to develop, and on how the Montenegrin Supreme Court, and other courts, should respond to those changes. I have very much in mind the efforts being made to strengthen judicial independence, efficiency and public trust which I understand are being undertaken. 

     I have been asked to speak about transparency and communication. I want to begin with two fundamental questions. First, what do we mean when we talk about transparency in relation to courts? I would suggest that it means that the court and its work are open and visible to the public. In today’s society, that requires more than just allowing public access into court buildings, although that is a part of it. It also means making the work of the court accessible to the public, and having effective means of communication between the court and the public. 

     My second question is even more fundamental: why does transparency matter? There are a number of reasons, but I would emphasise one in particular. If you ask why the public accept decisions made by the judiciary, the answer, I would suggest, depends on confidence or trust. And trust depends on openness and effective communication with all parts of the community we serve. In the UK, a recent study found that public trust in the Supreme Court is closely connected to knowledge about its work; and public knowledge depends on transparency and communication.

     So, considering transparency first, in the UK we normally have oral hearings in all cases, and they normally take place in public. Members of the public are encouraged to step inside the Supreme Court to watch our hearings and tour our court rooms. We are to some extent a visitor attraction. We have around 100,000 visitors a year, and our court rooms are usually busy with visitors. We have an exhibition area, where visitors can learn more about the court and its case law, and a public café. We also hold open days when more of the building is open to the public. We bear in mind that accessibility includes accessibility to children, and to people with special needs. For example, we hold tours for people with hearing problems, using sign language. 

     In addition, in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, hearings are live streamed online, subject to a short delay in case anything confidential is accidentally mentioned. They are also made available afterwards on the court’s website and on YouTube. The Supreme Court also live streams the delivery of judgments, when the judge who has written the lead judgment gives a short explanation to camera of the court’s decision in accessible language. During the last financial year, around 750,000 viewers watched our cases and judgments on our website, and footage was also used on television and on media websites, under contractual terms set by the court in order to prevent misuse.

     This has been a great help in our most controversial cases. For example, in a case concerned with a challenge to the way the government was proceeding with the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, highlights of the hearing were shown on the television news, and were analysed by experts in much the same way as football matches, with replays of the most important moments. When we gave our judgment recently in a controversial case concerned with issues of gender, footage of the delivery of the judgment was shown on the television news. This helped to improve public understanding of what the court was deciding, and to raise the level of confidence that the judges were focused on issues of law and not on controversial political questions. 

     Televising hearings requires some thought where jurisdictions have a primarily written procedure. For example, in 2023 the French Cour de Cassation decided there was a need to be more transparent, and started to broadcast its hearings. However, the judges of that court were not accustomed to participating in the hearing and sat in silence during the advocates’ oral arguments. I have been told that the court then came under some criticism as members of the public gained the impression that the judges were not engaged in the issues that were the subject of the hearings. Careful consideration should therefore be given to how oral proceedings might be conducted if they are to be broadcast. One possibility is to follow the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, where Grand Chamber hearings are live streamed. In those proceedings, the advocates present their arguments without interruption from the judges. However, at the end of their oral argument the judges then pose questions, after which the advocates are given time to consult with their legal team before providing responses.

     We have also adopted the practice, in some controversial cases, of making the most important case papers available through our website, unless publication should be withheld for reasons such as commercial confidentiality or national security, so that they can be viewed alongside the live stream of the hearing. 

     Considering communication next, most people draw their knowledge of the judiciary and their opinions about the courts from the media, but media coverage of the judiciary is not always accurate or well-informed. To address that problem, the UK Supreme Court employs an expert communications team and uses a number of means to inform the public about our work. We recognise that the court operates in a media environment in which journalists and bloggers are expected to provide an instant response to our decisions. So members of the communications team work with the journalists who cover our work to help them to report it accurately. Where a judgment is likely to attract media interest, they allow journalists to see the judgment and the press summary an hour before they are made public, on a confidential basis. We do not do this in the most sensitive cases, or where prior knowledge of the judgment could be abused. But the confidentiality of the briefing is enforced by our law of contempt of court, and has never been breached. 

     The communications team also work with the judges to help them to communicate with the public, especially in the summaries that are delivered in court and live streamed on the internet when decisions are announced, excerpts from which may appear on the television news. They help us to ensure, for example, that the language we use in our summaries is understandable by members of the public and, in cases which will be reported in the media, that there is a short sentence or two in our summary which can be played or quoted in the reports and which explains the essence of our decision. They also maintain our social media accounts, with X, Instagram and LinkedIn, which have about 400,000 followers.

     We also try to connect with the general public through our education and outreach work. For example, we have established a scheme which gives pupils at schools across the UK, aged about 16 or 17, the opportunity to take part in a live question and answer session with a judge of the Supreme Court from their classroom, via the internet. This has proved to be very popular with schools, and it enables the court to make direct contact with ordinary young people in a positive way. I also give occasional media interviews, including interviews for social media podcasts, when I try to explain our work in ways that the public can understand. We also organise an online course on the Supreme Court in partnership with one of our universities.  About 5000 members of the public have enrolled.

     In the context of the UK, it has also been important for the Supreme Court to try to improve understanding in Parliament and in the government of the constitutional role of the courts. With the support of the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Supreme Court has engaged directly with all new Members of Parliament since our general election last year, providing each of them with materials explaining the rule of law and the constitutional role of the courts, taking part in question and answer sessions with Members of Parliament in private meetings, and encouraging them to visit the court and to meet justices and staff. We regard it as important to help politicians to understand the role of the courts, so that they support judicial independence and understand when we decide cases against the government, as sometimes happens. 

     In the context of the UK, it is also possible for the court to engage with the government in ways that encourage respect for judicial independence. There is generally a good understanding on both sides of the separation of powers. It has proved to be possible, in a context of mutual respect, to find ways of cooperating on projects of law reform and to encourage a sense that protecting the rule of law is a shared responsibility.

     We also have an active programme to demonstrate that we are inclusive to all parts of our population, including ethnic and religious minorities. So we host visits from organisations supporting talented members of minority groups, and we offer internships at the court to young lawyers from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

     In conclusion, we all need to work to maintain public trust in the administration of justice. I am grateful that we can share ideas and learn from each other as we work to safeguard the rule of law, for the benefit of both our societies.

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Nuclear emergency exercise concludes to test international response to simulated reactor accident

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency –

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with more than 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully completed a 36-hour exercise that tested global preparedness and response arrangements for a severe nuclear accident scenario at the Cernavoda NPP in Romania. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise started on 24 June and concluded at 17:45 CET on 25 June.

    Such exercises are conducted every three to five years and are based on simulated events at a nuclear facility in the host IAEA member state.

    The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, requiring participating countries and organizations to make decisions in real time, exchange information, inform the public and coordinate protective measures, including aspects of medical response and cross-border logistics.

    “ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the power of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together under realistic scenarios, we are strengthening our collective capacity to protect people and the environment.”

    Among the main innovations in this year’s exercise program were the following.

    Enhanced regional cooperation: Recognizing the cross-border consequences of severe nuclear accidents, neighbouring countries Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova coordinated protective measures to ensure a coherent cross-border response. Integrating nuclear security scenarios: Simulations also included tests related to physical security and cybersecurity threats, reflecting new and evolving risks. Enhanced crisis communication testing: An enhanced social media simulator was used to evaluate and improve public communication strategies. Deploying international assistance missions: As part of the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Expert groups from Bulgaria, Canada, Lithuania, Moldova, the United States, Sweden and France carried out a number of joint operations, including the use of air and ground-based radiation monitoring equipment.

    The exercise highlighted the importance of timely information sharing, accurate assessments and forecasts, and effective public communication in the event of nuclear emergencies.

    ConvEx-3 exercises are conducted every three to five years to evaluate and strengthen emergency response mechanisms established in accordance with Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident And Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    In the coming weeks, the IAEA will gather feedback from all participants to identify good practices and areas for improvement, contributing to the continued strengthening of global nuclear emergency preparedness. The final report of the exercise will be taken into account in preparation for the upcoming International Conference “Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies”, which is scheduled for December this year in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    A selection of photos from the ConvEx3 exercise is available at this link.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: Beam Global and Platinum Group UAE Sign Joint Venture Agreement Creating Beam Middle East LLC

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN DIEGO, June 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Beam Global, (Nasdaq: BEEM), a leading provider of innovative and sustainable infrastructure solutions for the electrification of transportation and energy security, today announced that it has entered into a joint venture agreement with the Platinum Group LLC, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Chaired by His Royal Highness, Sheikh Mohammed Sultan Bin Khalifa Al-Nahyan, the Platinum Group UAE is recognized for its well-established and trusted relationships across government and industry.

    Beam Global and the Platinum Group will form a new entity, Beam Middle East LLC, which will sell and manufacture Beam Global’s patented sustainable infrastructure solutions for transportation electrification, energy storage, energy security, and smart city development across the Middle East and African regions. This joint venture supports Beam Global’s strategy of geographic diversification by opening new markets and creating opportunities for revenue growth outside the United States. Beam Global, Beam Europe, and now Beam Middle East will each sell and manufacture the company’s full portfolio of patented sustainable technology solutions.

    “The Platinum Group is an organization of the highest reputation, influence and relationships in Abu Dhabi and the surrounding region. They are a perfect partner to accelerate Beam Global’s growth in the Middle East and Africa,” said Desmond Wheatley, CEO of Beam Global. “With planned spending on sustainable infrastructure in the region projected to reach $75.6 billion by 2030, we believe that Beam Global’s patented technology combined with Platinum’s unrivalled position should create a platform for growth which we are uniquely able to leverage. Platinum’s relationships with the best companies in the region and their government contacts, including at the highest level in the UAE and with entities like Masdar City, will allow Beam Middle East to secure direct audiences with top decision makers. Our technology is ideal for the region’s current and future plans, but this is a region where relationships matter just as much as products and solutions. That is why our joint venture with Platinum is so ideal – Beam’s tried and tested clean-technology solutions and Platinum’s influence and relationships form a combination that ticks all the boxes and is without rivals.”

    “The Platinum Group seeks out the highest quality, most timely and relevant companies in each of the industries we target. Beam Global’s unique and patented products are ideally suited to provide value to governments and businesses, as the Gulf region and beyond transitions to clean and sustainable technologies,” said Dr Ali Nasser Sultan Al Yahbouni Al Daheri, CEO of Platinum Group. “We are looking forward to ensuring that our new joint venture with Beam Global, forming Beam Middle East, is a highly successful enterprise with wins in the Middle East and increasingly in Africa. With abundant sunshine and fast-growing adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), renewables, and energy storage, the region is perfect for Beam Global’s solutions. Energy security and Smart Cities solutions like those offered by Beam Middle East are at the forefront of government planning. Our timing is right, and our partnership is formed on mutual benefit from growth and success. We are delighted to have Beam Global as part of our growing family of businesses.”

    Middle East Market Overview Across Five Key Markets: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Jordan

    • The number of EVs in the region is projected to grow from approximately 69.0 thousand in 2024 to approximately 1.5 million by 2030 (Table 1), representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 66.6%.
    • Assuming a 5.0% share of regional chargers using EV ARC™ units, the addressable revenue could reach $516.5 million by 2030.
    • If eBikes account for just 5.0% of total EV volume and follow the same growth trajectory (Table 2), BeamBike™ units could represent a $245.0 million revenue opportunity in the region by 2030.

    Middle East Market Overview: Abu Dhabi Case Study

    • The UAE eBike market is projected to reach $443.8 million by 2030. Assuming 15.0% of that spend goes toward charging infrastructure, and that Abu Dhabi accounts for 35.0% of the national market based on population, the addressable eBike charger market for BeamBike™ in Abu Dhabi is approximately $23.3 million.
    • A streetlight-to-population ratio based on New York City, applied to Abu Dhabi’s estimated 3.8 million residents (Table 3), suggests BeamSpot™ units could represent a potential revenue opportunity of approximately $322.1 million assuming a market penetration of 5.0%.
    • Using Abu Dhabi’s population and a comparable U.S. Police motorcycle fleet ratio (Table 4), the opportunity to electrify local law enforcement fleets with BeamPatrol™ units is estimated at approximately $2.4 million.
    • With over 5.8 million annual hotel guests, Abu Dhabi also offers a strong use case for BeamSkoot™ at resorts, both for logistics and recreational purposes. Assuming adoption rates of 10.0% (Table 5), the potential revenue opportunity for BeamSkoot™ units could reach approximately $10.0 million.

    The above scenarios are estimates only, based upon market data taken from internet resources. Beam Global believes these case studies can be replicated in other markets across the Middle East and Africa.

    Key Terms of the Agreement
    Beam Middle East LLC will be a 50/50 joint venture between Beam Global and Platinum Group UAE, incorporated in Abu Dhabi. Beam Global will license its proprietary technologies to the joint venture and support it with incoming opportunities, training, marketing materials, and procurement assistance. Platinum Group will leverage its existing relationships at the highest levels, coordinate local sales, provide experienced and influential business development professionals, and establish manufacturing capabilities efficiently and inexpensively. Both parties will collaborate on the development of a regional manufacturing facility for the products. Beam Middle East will be headquartered in Masdar City, a pioneering sustainable urban community and world-class business and technology hub, where Platinum Group has recently signed an agreement. Masdar City is located in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, strategically positioned at the center of the country’s drive toward a net-zero future by 2050.

    About Platinum Group UAE
    Platinum Group UAE is a diversified, multi-billion-dollar conglomerate operating in energy, real estate, finance and investing, healthcare, information technology, sports and entertainment, food services and legal services in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Chaired by His Royal Highness Sheikh Mohammed Sultan Bin Khalifa Al-Nahyan, son of the former ruler of Abu Dhabi, the Group is recognized for its well-established and trusted relationships across government and industry. Platinum Group UAE is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, with offices in Dubai and Sharjah. For more information visit, PlatinumGroupUAE.com.

    About Beam Global
    Beam Global is a clean technology innovator which develops and manufactures sustainable infrastructure products and technologies. We operate at the nexus of clean energy and transportation with a focus on sustainable energy infrastructure, rapidly deployed and scalable EV charging solutions, safe energy storage and vital energy security. With operations in the U.S. and Europe, Beam Global develops, patents, designs, engineers and manufactures unique and advanced clean technology solutions that power transportation, provide secure sources of electricity, save time and money and protect the environment. Beam Global is headquartered in San Diego, CA with facilities in Broadview, IL and Belgrade and Kraljevo, Serbia. Beam Global is listed on Nasdaq under the symbol BEEM. For more information visit, BeamForAll.comLinkedInYouTube, Instagram and X (formerly Twitter).

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release includes forward-looking statements within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “potential,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should,” “may,” or similar expressions. These statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding the expected benefits, market potential, and future operations of Beam Middle East LLC; anticipated revenue opportunities in the Middle East and African regions; projections regarding electric vehicle and infrastructure market growth; and strategic goals and international expansion plans of Beam Global.

    These forward-looking statements are based on current assumptions and expectations that are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied in the statements. Factors that may cause such differences include, among others, risks associated with entering new markets and joint ventures, including regulatory and operational challenges; risks relating to the adoption of EV technologies and infrastructure in foreign jurisdictions; the ability to develop and scale manufacturing capabilities in the region; the effectiveness of partnerships; and general economic, political, and business conditions in the Middle East and Africa. Additional risks and uncertainties are detailed in Beam Global’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including its most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q.

    Beam Global disclaims any obligation to update or revise these forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

    Media Contact
    Andy Lovsted
    +1 858-327-9123
    Press@BeamForAll.com

    Investor Relations
    Luke Higgins
    +1 858-261-7646
    IR@BeamForAll.com

    Appendix 1 – Sources for Middle East Market Overview Sections

    Table 1 – Projected Growth of EV Adoption in the Middle East

      Number of EVs in 2024 Number of EVs in 2030
    Countries:    
    UAE 28,000 42,000
    Saudi Arabia 23,170 1,300,000
    Qatar 5,624 75,167
    Oman 2,200 13,500
    Jordan 10,000 45,000
         
    Total Number of EVs: 68,994 1,475,667

    Table 2 – Projected Growth of eBike Adoption in the Middle East Assuming 5% EV Market Share

      Number of eBikes in 2024 Number of eBikes in 2030
    Countries:    
    UAE 1,400 2,100
    Saudi Arabia 1,159 50,000
    Qatar 281 3,758
    Oman 110 675
    Jordan 500 2,250
         
    Total Number of eBikes: 3,450 58,783


    Table 3 – Estimated Number of Streetlights in Abu Dhabi Based on New York City’s Streetlight-to-Population Ratio

    Population of NYC 8,258,000
    Number of Street Lights 400,000
    Number of Street Lights per Person 21
    Population of Abu Dhabi 3,800,000
    Number of Street Lights approx. 180,952

    Table 4 – Estimated Size of Abu Dhabi Police Motorcycle Fleet Based on a Comparable U.S. Ratio

    Population of NYC 8,258,000
    Number of Police Motorcycles 115
    Number of People per Motorcycle 71,809
    Population of Abu Dhabi 3,800,000
    No. of Police Motorcycles approx. 53

    Table 5 – Estimated eScooter Demand in Abu Dhabi Based on Annual Number of Hotel Guests

    No. Hotel Guests in Abu Dhabi Annually: 5,811,000
       
    Scenario:  
    Number of Tourists Renting Annually (10%) 581,100
    Rentals per day 1,592
    Average Rentals per Scooter per Day 4
    eScooters Required 398

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Beam Global and Platinum Group UAE Sign Joint Venture Agreement Creating Beam Middle East LLC

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN DIEGO, June 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Beam Global, (Nasdaq: BEEM), a leading provider of innovative and sustainable infrastructure solutions for the electrification of transportation and energy security, today announced that it has entered into a joint venture agreement with the Platinum Group LLC, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Chaired by His Royal Highness, Sheikh Mohammed Sultan Bin Khalifa Al-Nahyan, the Platinum Group UAE is recognized for its well-established and trusted relationships across government and industry.

    Beam Global and the Platinum Group will form a new entity, Beam Middle East LLC, which will sell and manufacture Beam Global’s patented sustainable infrastructure solutions for transportation electrification, energy storage, energy security, and smart city development across the Middle East and African regions. This joint venture supports Beam Global’s strategy of geographic diversification by opening new markets and creating opportunities for revenue growth outside the United States. Beam Global, Beam Europe, and now Beam Middle East will each sell and manufacture the company’s full portfolio of patented sustainable technology solutions.

    “The Platinum Group is an organization of the highest reputation, influence and relationships in Abu Dhabi and the surrounding region. They are a perfect partner to accelerate Beam Global’s growth in the Middle East and Africa,” said Desmond Wheatley, CEO of Beam Global. “With planned spending on sustainable infrastructure in the region projected to reach $75.6 billion by 2030, we believe that Beam Global’s patented technology combined with Platinum’s unrivalled position should create a platform for growth which we are uniquely able to leverage. Platinum’s relationships with the best companies in the region and their government contacts, including at the highest level in the UAE and with entities like Masdar City, will allow Beam Middle East to secure direct audiences with top decision makers. Our technology is ideal for the region’s current and future plans, but this is a region where relationships matter just as much as products and solutions. That is why our joint venture with Platinum is so ideal – Beam’s tried and tested clean-technology solutions and Platinum’s influence and relationships form a combination that ticks all the boxes and is without rivals.”

    “The Platinum Group seeks out the highest quality, most timely and relevant companies in each of the industries we target. Beam Global’s unique and patented products are ideally suited to provide value to governments and businesses, as the Gulf region and beyond transitions to clean and sustainable technologies,” said Dr Ali Nasser Sultan Al Yahbouni Al Daheri, CEO of Platinum Group. “We are looking forward to ensuring that our new joint venture with Beam Global, forming Beam Middle East, is a highly successful enterprise with wins in the Middle East and increasingly in Africa. With abundant sunshine and fast-growing adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), renewables, and energy storage, the region is perfect for Beam Global’s solutions. Energy security and Smart Cities solutions like those offered by Beam Middle East are at the forefront of government planning. Our timing is right, and our partnership is formed on mutual benefit from growth and success. We are delighted to have Beam Global as part of our growing family of businesses.”

    Middle East Market Overview Across Five Key Markets: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Jordan

    • The number of EVs in the region is projected to grow from approximately 69.0 thousand in 2024 to approximately 1.5 million by 2030 (Table 1), representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 66.6%.
    • Assuming a 5.0% share of regional chargers using EV ARC™ units, the addressable revenue could reach $516.5 million by 2030.
    • If eBikes account for just 5.0% of total EV volume and follow the same growth trajectory (Table 2), BeamBike™ units could represent a $245.0 million revenue opportunity in the region by 2030.

    Middle East Market Overview: Abu Dhabi Case Study

    • The UAE eBike market is projected to reach $443.8 million by 2030. Assuming 15.0% of that spend goes toward charging infrastructure, and that Abu Dhabi accounts for 35.0% of the national market based on population, the addressable eBike charger market for BeamBike™ in Abu Dhabi is approximately $23.3 million.
    • A streetlight-to-population ratio based on New York City, applied to Abu Dhabi’s estimated 3.8 million residents (Table 3), suggests BeamSpot™ units could represent a potential revenue opportunity of approximately $322.1 million assuming a market penetration of 5.0%.
    • Using Abu Dhabi’s population and a comparable U.S. Police motorcycle fleet ratio (Table 4), the opportunity to electrify local law enforcement fleets with BeamPatrol™ units is estimated at approximately $2.4 million.
    • With over 5.8 million annual hotel guests, Abu Dhabi also offers a strong use case for BeamSkoot™ at resorts, both for logistics and recreational purposes. Assuming adoption rates of 10.0% (Table 5), the potential revenue opportunity for BeamSkoot™ units could reach approximately $10.0 million.

    The above scenarios are estimates only, based upon market data taken from internet resources. Beam Global believes these case studies can be replicated in other markets across the Middle East and Africa.

    Key Terms of the Agreement
    Beam Middle East LLC will be a 50/50 joint venture between Beam Global and Platinum Group UAE, incorporated in Abu Dhabi. Beam Global will license its proprietary technologies to the joint venture and support it with incoming opportunities, training, marketing materials, and procurement assistance. Platinum Group will leverage its existing relationships at the highest levels, coordinate local sales, provide experienced and influential business development professionals, and establish manufacturing capabilities efficiently and inexpensively. Both parties will collaborate on the development of a regional manufacturing facility for the products. Beam Middle East will be headquartered in Masdar City, a pioneering sustainable urban community and world-class business and technology hub, where Platinum Group has recently signed an agreement. Masdar City is located in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, strategically positioned at the center of the country’s drive toward a net-zero future by 2050.

    About Platinum Group UAE
    Platinum Group UAE is a diversified, multi-billion-dollar conglomerate operating in energy, real estate, finance and investing, healthcare, information technology, sports and entertainment, food services and legal services in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Chaired by His Royal Highness Sheikh Mohammed Sultan Bin Khalifa Al-Nahyan, son of the former ruler of Abu Dhabi, the Group is recognized for its well-established and trusted relationships across government and industry. Platinum Group UAE is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, with offices in Dubai and Sharjah. For more information visit, PlatinumGroupUAE.com.

    About Beam Global
    Beam Global is a clean technology innovator which develops and manufactures sustainable infrastructure products and technologies. We operate at the nexus of clean energy and transportation with a focus on sustainable energy infrastructure, rapidly deployed and scalable EV charging solutions, safe energy storage and vital energy security. With operations in the U.S. and Europe, Beam Global develops, patents, designs, engineers and manufactures unique and advanced clean technology solutions that power transportation, provide secure sources of electricity, save time and money and protect the environment. Beam Global is headquartered in San Diego, CA with facilities in Broadview, IL and Belgrade and Kraljevo, Serbia. Beam Global is listed on Nasdaq under the symbol BEEM. For more information visit, BeamForAll.comLinkedInYouTube, Instagram and X (formerly Twitter).

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release includes forward-looking statements within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “potential,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should,” “may,” or similar expressions. These statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding the expected benefits, market potential, and future operations of Beam Middle East LLC; anticipated revenue opportunities in the Middle East and African regions; projections regarding electric vehicle and infrastructure market growth; and strategic goals and international expansion plans of Beam Global.

    These forward-looking statements are based on current assumptions and expectations that are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied in the statements. Factors that may cause such differences include, among others, risks associated with entering new markets and joint ventures, including regulatory and operational challenges; risks relating to the adoption of EV technologies and infrastructure in foreign jurisdictions; the ability to develop and scale manufacturing capabilities in the region; the effectiveness of partnerships; and general economic, political, and business conditions in the Middle East and Africa. Additional risks and uncertainties are detailed in Beam Global’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including its most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q.

    Beam Global disclaims any obligation to update or revise these forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

    Media Contact
    Andy Lovsted
    +1 858-327-9123
    Press@BeamForAll.com

    Investor Relations
    Luke Higgins
    +1 858-261-7646
    IR@BeamForAll.com

    Appendix 1 – Sources for Middle East Market Overview Sections

    Table 1 – Projected Growth of EV Adoption in the Middle East

      Number of EVs in 2024 Number of EVs in 2030
    Countries:    
    UAE 28,000 42,000
    Saudi Arabia 23,170 1,300,000
    Qatar 5,624 75,167
    Oman 2,200 13,500
    Jordan 10,000 45,000
         
    Total Number of EVs: 68,994 1,475,667

    Table 2 – Projected Growth of eBike Adoption in the Middle East Assuming 5% EV Market Share

      Number of eBikes in 2024 Number of eBikes in 2030
    Countries:    
    UAE 1,400 2,100
    Saudi Arabia 1,159 50,000
    Qatar 281 3,758
    Oman 110 675
    Jordan 500 2,250
         
    Total Number of eBikes: 3,450 58,783


    Table 3 – Estimated Number of Streetlights in Abu Dhabi Based on New York City’s Streetlight-to-Population Ratio

    Population of NYC 8,258,000
    Number of Street Lights 400,000
    Number of Street Lights per Person 21
    Population of Abu Dhabi 3,800,000
    Number of Street Lights approx. 180,952

    Table 4 – Estimated Size of Abu Dhabi Police Motorcycle Fleet Based on a Comparable U.S. Ratio

    Population of NYC 8,258,000
    Number of Police Motorcycles 115
    Number of People per Motorcycle 71,809
    Population of Abu Dhabi 3,800,000
    No. of Police Motorcycles approx. 53

    Table 5 – Estimated eScooter Demand in Abu Dhabi Based on Annual Number of Hotel Guests

    No. Hotel Guests in Abu Dhabi Annually: 5,811,000
       
    Scenario:  
    Number of Tourists Renting Annually (10%) 581,100
    Rentals per day 1,592
    Average Rentals per Scooter per Day 4
    eScooters Required 398

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Gender-responsive policing in focus at cadet training organized by OSCE and Albanian Security Academy

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Gender-responsive policing in focus at cadet training organized by OSCE and Albanian Security Academy

    Police cadets in Albania strengthening their skills in gender-responsive policing during an introductory training course organized by the OSCE and the Albanian Security Academy in Tirana, 24 June. (OSCE) Photo details

    More than 400 police cadets in Albania strengthened their skills in gender-responsive policing during a series of one-day introductory training courses organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Presence in Albania, and the Albanian Security Academy from 23 to 26 June 2025 in Tirana.
    The aim of the course was to help future police officers effectively respond to cases of gender-based violence and know how to maintain a victim-centred approach. It also underscored the key role police officers play in detecting and preventing gender-based violence, as well as how to ensure effective implementation of protective measures and risk assessments.
    Each cadet attended a one-day training session led by a group of national police officers, prosecutors, and local experts. They learned about key terms and concepts related to gender stereotypes and gender-based violence as well as the importance of a victim-centred approach.
    “Victim-centred criminal justice responses to gender-based violence are crucial for the safety of all women and girls, their families and wider society. Meaningful actions of law enforcement authorities to address gender-based violence, in full respect of the victim, is a core element of increasing trust in the criminal justice system and increasing reporting of this particularly damaging type of crime,” said Umberto Severini, Head of the OSCE’s Strategic Police Matters Unit.
    A professional psychologist also worked with the cadets to understand the neurobiology of trauma and the psychology of victims and perpetrators. Through a specially-developed role play theatre session, they deepened their insights into the consequences of gender-based violence on victims.
    Finally, the cadets heard from a victim of domestic violence who had received support from a local civil society organization working with victims of gender-based violence and had offered to share her experience at the training courses. She spoke about some of the challenges and stigma she faced when seeking help and dealing with the law enforcement system.
    “During the training, I particularly liked the methodology and the moderating approach. The trainers created an open and safe environment to express opinions, encouraging active participation and respect for different opinions. What I believe will have a direct impact on my future profession is the ability to communicate effectively, to listen with empathy and to intervene without judgment in delicate situations, especially when it comes to sensitive issues such as gender-based violence,” said one of the cadets in the training.
    The training courses were delivered as part of the OSCE’s extrabudgetary project, “Enhancing Criminal Justice Capacities for Combating Gender-based Violence in South-Eastern Europe”, funded by Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Norway. The project contributes to the implementation of the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Croatia renew education cooperation program

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    ZAGREB, June 26 — China’s Ministry of Education and the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Youth signed the 2025-2029 education cooperation program here Wednesday to further promote bilateral education cooperation.

    According to the program, the two sides will increase cooperation in such fields as higher education research, basic and vocational education, and expand multilateral cooperation within international organizations and other institutions.

    The new education cooperation program has been a continuation and expansion of the 2018-2022 education cooperation program signed by the two sides years ago.

    At the signing ceremony, Chinese Ambassador to Croatia Qi Qianjin said that the renewal of the two countries’ education cooperation program will further promote the two countries’ all-round cooperation in the field of education.

    Since the establishment of a comprehensive cooperative partnership between China and Croatia 20 years ago, bilateral cooperation in various fields has continued to increase, Qi said, adding that as the world’s scientific and technological innovation is developing rapidly, it is particularly important to strengthen educational cooperation between the two sides.

    Radovan Fuchs, minister of Science, Education and Youth of Croatia, praised the signing of the new education cooperation program, highlighting its expansion into basic and vocational education cooperation, and expressed confidence that the new program will lead to results in bilateral education cooperation.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – European Parliament Press Kit for the European Council of 26 – 27 June 2025

    Source: European Parliament

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola will represent the European Parliament at the summit, where she will address the heads of state or government at 11.00 and hold a press conference after her speech.

    When: Press conference at around 11.45 on 26 June

    Where: European Council press room and via Parliament’s webstreaming or EbS.

    At their meeting in Brussels, the heads of state or government will focus on ways to bolster EU competitiveness. They will also discuss how the EU can continue supporting Kyiv against Russia’s aggression – with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, how to strengthen the EU’s defence capabilities, and the EU’s response to the escalation in the Middle East. Leaders will also discuss migration and the situation in the Western Balkans.

    Competitiveness

    In a resolution, adopted on Thursday 19 June in response to the European Commission’s Clean Industrial Deal plan, Parliament stresses the need to combine climate action with industrial competitiveness. It underscores the importance of the EU’s newly established industrial decarbonisation bank, which MEPs consider vital for scaling up investment in clean technologies. The resolution addresses the importance of regulatory simplification and the need to streamline permitting procedures to support the transition and innovation efforts of small businesses. MEPs also support the action plan for affordable energy and want measures to boost cross-border energy infrastructure and to complete the energy union.

    On 18 June, MEPs adopted a resolution highlighting the stabilising effect of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) at a time of significant economic uncertainty in Europe. They note that the RRF prevented the fragmentation of the EU internal market and promoted economic recovery in member states. MEPs are concerned that the short timeframe for the implementation of outstanding RRF funding poses challenges to the completion of key reforms, large-scale investments and innovative projects, as well as the 70% of milestones and targets that have still to be reached. They urge the Commission to set up new programmes, which should be flexible and reactive to changing circumstances and guarantee predictability. MEPs also demand an 18-month extension for ongoing mature projects.

    In a keynote speech at the event “Europe at the crossroads” on 13 May, Parliament President Roberta Metsola outlined her vision for a smarter, stronger and safer Europe. The President argued “the time of hypothetical crossroads is over. There is only one path left: forward and together”. She called for a different Europe, which is more realistic, more self-critical and supportive of its industries, with less regulation and more innovation. On the need to cut back regulation, she said: “Europe’s simplification agenda needs to signal the start of a new Europe and with the upcoming MFF, trigger an economic boom.”

    Further reading

    Clean Industrial Deal must marry industrial competitiveness with climate action

    National recovery plans should add to EU resilience and strategic autonomy

    Metsola calls to “re-launch Europe as a global power”

    MEPs call for a more competitive EU that respects social and labour standards

    Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

    On 16 June, Parliament debated the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression, the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians. You can watch the debate here. Parliament ill vote on a resolution on 9 July.

    On 17 June, MEPs agreed to update the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement and extend it until the end of 2025, to continue facilitating the movement of goods in and out of the country. Concluded in June 2022, the agreement has facilitated the transport of vital goods such as fuel and humanitarian aid into Ukraine, and enabled Ukrainian exports such as grain, ore, and steel to reach the EU and beyond. Set to expire in June 2024, its application continued provisionally pending formal backing by MEPs and the EU Council of its extension until the end of 2025.

    On 22 May, MEPs backed increased tariffs on fertilisers and certain Russian and Belarusian agricultural goods, seeking to reduce EU dependency on those imports. Plenary has endorsed the Commission proposal to increase by 50% EU tariffs on agricultural products from Russia and Belarus that were not yet subject to extra customs duties. The aim is to reduce EU dependence on the two countries still further. Products targeted by the new tariffs include sugar, vinegar, flour and animal feed.

    In a resolution adopted on 8 May, MEPs strongly condemn Russia’s “genocidal strategy”, with the support of Belarus, designed to erase Ukrainian identity. The forced transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children, their illegal adoption, their assassination, and the forced Russification and militarisation must stop. Russia must report the identities and whereabouts of all deported Ukrainian children and ensure their well-being and safe and unconditional return. The Russian authorities must also, MEPs say, allow international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNICEF, access to all deported Ukrainian children.

    On 8 May, MEPs voted to renew the suspension of import duties and quotas for certain imports from Ukraine, such as iron and steel, due to expire on 5 June 2025.With the adoption of the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATM) Regulation, the EU liberalised trade with Ukraine by suspending trade defence measures on 4 June 2022. MEPs have now approved the proposed prolongation of these trade liberalisation measures, which focus steel, to provide Ukraine with vital export revenues

    On 7 May, Parliament discussed with Commission President von der Leyen and Polish Minister for EU Affairs Szłapka how the EU can contribute to achieving a just, sustainable, and comprehensive peace deal for Ukraine. The debate focussed on the EU’s political, financial and military support for Ukraine, and its role in efforts to secure a peace settlement that preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and is based on international law.

    Further reading

    European Parliament backs extension of EU-Ukraine road transport agreement

    Parliament approves new tariffs on Russian and Belarussian agricultural goods

    Parliament backs extension of trade liberalisation measure for Ukrainian imports

    The EU must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine

    Joint statement on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

    EP Conference of Presidents’ statement on EU support for Ukraine

    How the EU is supporting Ukraine

    EU stands with Ukraine


    European defence and security

    On 18 June, MEPs outlined their expectations for the 24 – 26 June NATO summit in The Hague, Netherlands, in a debate with EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas.

    On 24 April, the Committees on Industry, Research and Energy and Security and Defence have adopted their position on the proposed creation of a European defence industry programme (EDIP), designed to strengthen Europe’s defence industry, ramp up defence product manufacturing and provide more support for Ukraine. More specifically, MEPs backed measures to boost Europe’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), to strengthen EU defence and integrate the EU defence industry. They want the new programme to focus on improving the supply of weapons, ammunition and other crisis-relevant products, boosting manufacturing capacities and ensuring their ramp-up, reducing lead times for production and delivery, and increasing stockpiles. MEPs and Council are now negotiating the final shape of the law.

    In a resolution adopted on 12 March, Parliament calls on the EU to act urgently and ensure its own security. This will mean, MEPs say, strengthening relationships with like-minded partners, and strongly diminishing reliance on non-EU countries. The EU needs “truly ground-breaking efforts” and actions “close to those of wartime”, say MEPs, who welcomed the recently tabled ReArm plan. To achieve peace and stability in Europe, the EU must support Ukraine and become more resilient itself, MEPs argue. The resolution says “Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the end of the Cold War”. It calls on member states, international partners, and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets on Russian territory.

    Further reading

    MEPs push for a more ambitious European defence industry programme

    MEPs urge the EU to ensure its own security

    “We cannot afford to depend on others to keep us safe”, Metsola tells EU leaders

    “Europe must be responsible for its own security”, Metsola tells EU leaders

    MEPs call on Europe to strengthen its defence capacity

    Rutte to MEPs: “We are safe now, we might not be safe in five years”


    Middle East

    On 17 June, MEPs and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas debated the situation in the Middle East. The debate focussed on the risk of further instability in the Middle East following the Israel-Iran military escalation, the review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

    On 17 June, the King of Jordan, His Majesty Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein, addressed MEPs at a formal sitting in Strasbourg. Welcoming King Abdullah II of Jordan to the hemicycle, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “The European Parliament appreciates Jordan’s critical efforts in reducing regional tensions, in pushing for a ceasefire in Gaza and for the return of hostages whilst also facilitating so much urgently needed humanitarian aid, as well as for the unwavering support for Palestinian and Syrian refugees and a two-State solution as a path to lasting peace.”

    The King outlined two essential areas for action: first, supporting development, because a thriving Middle East creates opportunities that benefit us all; and second, strong, coordinated action to ensure global security. “Our mutual security won’t be assured until our global community acts, not only to end the three-year war in Ukraine, but also the world’s longest and most destructive flashpoint, the eight-decade-long Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” King Abdullah II added: “Palestinians, like all people, deserve the rights to freedom, sovereignty, and, yes, statehood (…) The path to peace has been walked before. It can be again, if we have the courage to choose it, and the will to walk it together.”

    On 21 May, Parliament discussed the EU’s response to the Israeli government’s plan to seize the Gaza Strip, ensuring effective humanitarian support and the liberation of hostages.

    Further reading

    King Abdullah II of Jordan: “A shameful version of humanity is unfolding in Gaza”

    The EU must support the political transition and reconstruction of Syria


    Western Balkans

    In a vote on 24 June, the Foreign Affairs Committee backed North Macedonia’s EU path and called for bold reforms. Skopje must introduce constitutional changes, strengthen rule of law and fight corruption, MEPs say. The report underlines that EU accession is ultimately a matter of political will—both in enacting reforms and adopting constitutional amendments. MEPs call on all political parties in North Macedonia to engage in constructive dialogue to reach the required consensus, which would strengthen the country’s multi-ethnic character and accelerate EU progress.

    In two reports adopted on 18 June, MEPs welcomed Montenegro´s objective to join the EU in 2028 and praised Moldova’s EU membership efforts. Parliament is calling for political stability in Montenegro and substantial progress regarding electoral and judicial reforms as well as the fight against organised crime and corruption. MEPs stress that Montenegro remains the leading candidate in the EU enlargement process and point to the overwhelming support of its citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028. Parliament welcomes the country’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including EU sanctions against Russia, and commends Montenegro for its support for the international rules-based order at the United Nations.

    Praising Moldova’s exemplary commitment to advancing its progress towards EU membership, Parliament recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered a new phase. Cooperation has intensified alongside sustained efforts by the government in Chișinău to align Moldova’s laws with those of the EU (the so-called “EU acquis”). Despite significant internal and external challenges, such as the effects of Russia’s continuing war against neighbouring Ukraine and Moscow’s interference in Moldova’s democratic processes, MEPs are encouraged by the Moldovan government’s progress on meeting the EU’s enlargement requirements and the country’s ambition to open negotiations on more enlargement-related issues.

    In a report adopted on 4 June, the Foreign Affairs Committee has praised Albania’s steadfast commitment to EU accession. MEPs highlight Albania’s broad political consensus and strong public support for joining the EU, alongside full alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy. While welcoming Albania’s aim to complete accession talks by 2027 and the progress already made, MEPs stress the urgent need to intensify reforms. Key priorities include strengthening judicial independence, combating corruption and organised crime, and protecting fundamental rights. Enhancing media pluralism and transparency remains crucial to building public trust. Plenary will vote on the report on 9 July.

    The Foreign Affairs Committee called urgently for reform and unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina to advance EU accession and tackle corruption and division, in a report adopted on 4 June. MEPs reaffirm their strong support for BiH’s EU accession bid, emphasising a merit-based process aligned with the Copenhagen criteria and grounded in the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and in equality among all citizens. Welcoming the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH amid the changing geopolitical landscape following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the committee acknowledged key reforms but expressed concern over stalled progress and weak implementation. The vote in plenary is scheduled for 9 July.

    On 7 May, Parliament adopted two resolutions, saying Kosovo needs to accelerate its EU-related reforms and that Serbia must do more to protect the rule of law and media freedom and to fight corruption.

    Kosovo has made notable strides in its electoral reforms, economic resilience, and the protection of fundamental rights, say MEPs. However, challenges remain regarding judicial reforms, media freedom, public administration efficiency, and the digitalisation of public services. Continued commitment to comprehensive reforms and inclusive governance is essential for Kosovo to make progress on its European integration pathway, they stress.

    Despite some progress in negotiations, Serbia still has major hurdles to overcome, according to MEPs. Belgrade needs to improve its internal political dialogue, protect the rule of law, and make anti-corruption reforms. It also has to work on reaching a comprehensive normalisation agreement with Kosovo, and fully align with EU foreign policy. Parliament calls on Serbia’s authorities to ensure the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the country’s Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media.

    Further reading

    European Parliament backs North Macedonia’s EU path, calls for bold reforms

    Montenegro and Moldova: MEPs applaud EU membership progress

    MEPs call on Albania to accelerate reforms and strengthen democratic institutions

    Support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession amid urgent calls for reform

    Parliament encourages Kosovo and Serbia to advance their EU accession reforms


    Migration

    On 18 June, Civil Liberties Committee MEPs backed proposals to give Europol and EU authorities more tools to fight migrant-smuggling and human trafficking. The proposed law would give the EU’s police agency Europol new tools to combat and investigate migrant-smuggling and human trafficking by coordinating the actions of EU national authorities. A European Centre Against Migrant Smuggling (ECAMS) would be formally established within Europol to support cross-border investigations. . Parliament and Council are now negotiating on the final shape of the law.

    On 19 May, Parliament and Council reached an agreement on gradually rolling out the Entry-Exit System (EES) at the EU’s external borders. Once operational, the system will register the data, including biometric data such as facial images and fingerprints, of third‑country nationals entering and leaving the Schengen area on short‑stay visas. The aim is to improve security, speed up the border check process, and reduce queues. The idea behind the gradual implementation over 180 days is to prevent a simultaneous launch in all countries from compromising the system. During the roll-out period, the launch could be temporarily suspended if waiting times become too long or there are technical issues. The vote in plenary will take place on 8 July.

    On 15 January, the Working Group on Asylum-Implementation of the Pact/CEAS (Common European Asylum System), formed by MEPs of all EP political groups, started to monitor the implementation of the EU Pact on Asylum and Migration. Chaired by Birgit Sippel (S&D, Germany), the Working Group will focus on scrutinising and monitoring the Common European Asylum System and the implementation of the Pact on Asylum and Migration.

    Further reading

    Migrant-smuggling: new resources and a stronger role for Europol

    Border security: agreement on gradual roll-out of Entry-Exit System

    MEPs kick off scrutiny work of the Asylum and Migration Pact

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024 – A10-0114/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025 – 2025/0138(BUD))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3], and in particular point 10 thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2024 on RESTORE – Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1057[8], and in particular the budgetary assessment attached to it,

     having regard to the EEA Report No 1/2024 – European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA)[9],

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0114/2025),

    A. whereas in September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Austrian authorities at EUR 1 711,6 million;

    B. whereas in September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Polish authorities at EUR 3,04 billion;

    C. whereas in September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck entire Czechia which led to flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Czech authorities at EUR 2,82 billion;

    D. whereas as of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions which led to the levels of the Danube and Morava rivers significantly rising resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Slovakian authorities at EUR 84,3 million;

    E. whereas in September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit several districts of Moldova resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Moldovan authorities at EUR 7,8 million;

    F. whereas in October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in several parts of the country resulting in total direct damages estimated by the authorities at EUR 841,85 million;

    G. whereas above mentioned occurrences caused by severe natural disasters are a result of global climate change; whereas the European State of the Climate 2024 confirms that 2024 was the warmest year ever recorded in Europe and that 30 % of the continent’s river network exceeded the “high” flood threshold while 12 % exceeded the “severe” threshold, resulting in the most widespread flooding since 2013;

    1. Expresses its deepest solidarity with all the victims, their families and all the individuals affected by the destructive floods in Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as with the national, regional and local authorities involved in the relief efforts;

    2. Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas, including with those in partner countries;

    3. Reiterates the importance of communicating to the public the tangible benefits brought about by the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), also to further increase citizens’ awareness of Union tools and programmes in the Member States and countries involved in accession negotiations with the Union;

    4. Highlights the increasing number of severe, destructive and deadly natural disasters in Europe and calls on Member States and the Commission to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation measures to avoid human and economic losses; underlines that in 2024 storms and flooding affected an estimated 413 000 people, resulting in the loss of at least 335 lives and that the damage from storms and flooding across Europe during the year is estimated to have cost at least EUR 18 billion[10]; considers that the budget of the EUSF or its equivalent should be substantially expanded in view of the upcoming Commission proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and subsequent inter-institutional negotiations and that the EUSF or its equivalent must provide assistance commensurate to the magnitude of such disasters to citizens; notes that substantially increasing the EUSF would allow Member States to respond more effectively and quickly to disasters while other instruments, particularly cohesion funds whose primary purpose is not disaster response, could be preserved; urges also the Commission to explore all possible avenues for accelerating the mobilisation of the EUSF, in particular by amending current rules and granting higher advance payments to applicant countries;

    5. Calls on the Commission to develop dedicated crisis-response instruments for the post-2027 period, recognising that the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, health emergencies, geopolitical instability, and economic shocks require more agile and tailored financial mechanisms at the Union level; underlines the need for enhanced coordination with national civil protection systems and early-warning mechanisms, ensuring a more integrated and data-driven Union-wide disaster response; emphasises the importance of dedicated support for cross-border and regional cooperation in preparedness, mitigation, and recovery efforts, particularly in vulnerable or high-risk areas;

    6. Stresses that the EUSF is only a curative instrument and that the Union should also continue to address climate change adaptation and mitigation by supporting European and national policies to prevent natural disasters; underlines that EEA Report No 1/2024 ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’ warned that the Union is unprepared for the effects of climate change even if the world manages to keep global temperature rise to 1,5 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, and stresses the need for action to avoid the climate risks identified reaching critical levels; recalls the need for effective synergies with other Union policies and programmes and underlines that Member States should make best use of funding opportunities in particular, of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the rural development programmes; calls on the Commission to assess with due urgency any reasoned requests by Member States to reallocate funds within the National Recovery and Resilience plans to natural disaster assistance, in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council[11]; stresses also the need for preventive measures, not only to mitigate future damage but also to prevent the exacerbation of risk conditions following catastrophic events, such as floods, wildfires, landslides or the drying up of lakes and rivers; emphasises that all reconstruction financed by the EUSF must be climate-resilient; underlines the importance of adequate flexibility between the different programmes; underscores that assistance provided under the EUSF should not be to the detriment of Union funding received by Member States under other Union policies or programmes; recalls that Member States can grant State aid, in accordance with the applicable Union rules, notably for agricultural businesses that have suffered damages due to natural disasters;

    7. Recalls that RESTORE[12] and the specific measures under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)[13] provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural disasters through further flexibilities in the use of the funds; stresses that Member States should make use of the new opportunities; underlines also that RESTORE provided limited flexibility for some Member States as the implementation of the current Multiannual Financial Framework is very advanced;

    8. Recalls the importance of rapid and solid damage assessment that takes due account of the economic repercussions and calls for increased operational efforts to be made in order to reduce the average time for the release of advanced payments to offer timely assistance to regions affected by natural disasters and extreme weather events, while ensuring the Union budget is protected; stresses that Member States should, in the context of disaster response and recovery measures, give due priority to the needs of the affected population, with particular attention to vulnerable groups;

    9. Stresses the urgent need to release immediate financial assistance through the EUSF to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner;

    10. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;

    11. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

    12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.

     

     

    ANNEX: DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[14], and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[15], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

    Having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16], and in particular point 10 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Whereas:

    (1) The European Union Solidarity Fund (‘the Fund’) aims to enable the Union to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to emergency situations in order to show solidarity with the population of regions struck by major or regional natural disasters or major public health emergency.

    (2) The Fund is not to exceed the ceilings laid down in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2020/2093, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765[17].

    (3) On 29 November 2024, Austria submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (4) On 29 November 2024, Poland submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (5) On 4 December 2024, Czechia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (6) On 7 December 2024, Slovakia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (7) On 5 December 2024, Moldova submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (8) On 27 December 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in October 2024.

    (9) Those applications meet the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the Fund, as laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    (10) The Fund should therefore be mobilised to provide a financial contribution to Austria, Poland,  Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    (11) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the Fund, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    For the general budget of the Union for the financial year 2025, the European Union Solidarity Fund shall be mobilised as follows in commitment and payment appropriations in relation to natural disasters:

    (a) the amount of EUR  42 789 075 shall be provided to Austria in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (b) the amount of EUR 75 998 939 shall be provided to Poland in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (c) the amount of EUR 113 979 781 shall be provided to Czechia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (d) the amount of EUR 2 108 187 shall be provided to  Slovakia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (e) the amount of EUR 195 196 shall be provided to Moldova in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (f) the amount of EUR 45 669 725 shall be provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to floods in October 2024.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    It shall apply from [the date of its adoption][*].

     

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President  The President

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Commission proposes to mobilise the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 (EUSF regulation) for an amount of EUR 280 740 903 to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the natural disaster (floods) that took place in 2024.

     

    Austria – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 16 September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding. Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Vienna were particularly affected. In some parts of Lower Austria, 300-420 mm of rain fell in five days. The entire province of Lower Austria was declared a disaster area. Protective measures had to be put in place along the Danube River. In Lower Austria, nearly 2 000 houses had to be evacuated, thousands of households were without electricity, drinking water and sewerage for days. The floods led to five fatalities and 24 people were injured in Lower Austria.

     

    Austria estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 1 711.6 million. This amount represents 0.38% of Austria’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Austria is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Poland – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 11 and 16 September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers. The most impacted provinces were the Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces. Subsequently, nearly 10 600 residential and more than 2 000 farm buildings were flooded. Over 200 000 people were directly affected by the disaster. Numerous businesses were forced to temporarily suspend or significantly reduce their operations which led to significant financial losses.

     

    The Polish authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 3.04 billion. According the EUSF regulation, where the natural disaster concerns several regions at NUTS level 2, the threshold shall be applied to the average GDP of those regions weighted according to the share of total damage in each region. The direct damage expressed as a percentage of total weighted regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces is 8.46%. This amount exceeds 1.5% of the weighted average regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces.

     

    Czechia – major natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 17 September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck the entire country which led to flooding. The most affected regions were the Moravian-Silesian and the Olomouc Region. Dozens of houses and approximately 1 000 road and railway bridges and 2 000 km of roads and railway lines were destroyed, or damaged. More than 350 schools were flooded. Over 250 000 households were left without electricity, heat and drinking water. As a result, over 13 000 people, as well as several hospitals had to be evacuated. The floods also led to eight fatalities.

     

    The Czech authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 2.82 billion. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Czechia of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 1.58 billion in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Slovakia – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    As of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions. Both the Danube and Morava rivers saw significant water level rises, with return periods exceeding 100 years in some locations. Cumulative rainfall reached up to 400 mm in the Záhorie region, exacerbating the impact. The most significant damage was attributed to smaller rivers, where levee breaches were reported, amplifying the flooding and leading to destruction in both rural and urban areas. Roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure were severely affected, straining emergency response efforts.

     

    Slovakia estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 84.3 million. This amount represents 0.07% of Slovakia’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Slovakia is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Moldova – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 14 and 16 September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit the Cantemir, Hincesti, Leova, Straseni, Floresti and Telenesti districts of Moldova. Over 200 000 people were affected by the disaster. The floods destroyed or damaged 20 bridges, 8 educational institutions and several public buildings. Dozens of houses and cellars were flooded and over 60 people needed to be rescued.

     

    The Moldovan authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 7.8 million. The Moldovan authorities submitted the application under the “regional natural disaster” criterion as laid down in Article 2(3) of the EUSF Regulation, which is any natural disaster in a region at NUTS level 2 of an eligible State resulting in direct damage exceeding 1.5% of that region’s gross domestic product (GDP).

     

    Bosnia and Herzegovina – major natural disaster: floods in October 2024

     

    Between 3 and 17 October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall, which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in the central, southern and western parts of the country. Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Zenica-Doboj and Canton 10 were the most affected cantons. In addition to power outages lasting several days and disruptions to landline and mobile phone services, there was also a complete disruption to road and rail transport. This caused severe physical and financial damage to residential and commercial buildings, as well as to the transport, water and sewage system. The floods led to 27 fatalities and 22 people were injured. Many families were forced to leave their homes and were accommodated in temporary shelters.

     

    The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 841.85 million. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Bosnia and Herzegovina of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 138.33 million in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Conclusion

     

    The methodology for calculating the aid was set out in the 2002-2003 Annual Report on the EUSF and accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commision therefore proposes to the budget authority to mobilise the following amounts for the applications submitted by Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina:

     

    Disaster

    Total direct damage (EUR)

    Applied disaster threshold

    (EUR)

    2,5% of total direct damage (up to the threshold for major diasters) (EUR)

    6% of direct damage above the major disaster threshold (EUR)

    2.5% of total direct damage

    Total amount of aid proposed (EUR)

    Advance paid

    (EUR)

    Balance to be paid

    (EUR)

    Austria-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    1 711 563 002

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    42 789 075

    42 789 075

    10 663 587

     

    32 125 488

    Poland-floods

    (regional disaster)

    3 039 957 574

    538 909 893

    N/A

    N/A

    75 998 939

    75 998 939

    N/A

     

    75 998 939

    Czechia

    (major disaster)

    2 821 143 019

    1 579 680 000

    39 492 000

    74 487 781

    N/A

    113 979 781

    N/A

     

    113 979 781

    Slovakia-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    84 327 482

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    2 108 187

    2 108 187

    N/A

     

    2 108 187

    Moldova-floods

    (regional disaster)

    7 807 840

    226 331

    N/A

    N/A

    195 196

    195 196

    N/A

     

    195 196

    Bosnia and Herzegovia-floods

    (major disaster)

    841 851 670

    138 325 000

    3 458 125

    42 211 600

    N/A

    45 669 725

    N/A

     

    45 669 725

    TOTAL

    280 740 903

    10 663 587

    270 077 316

     

     

    Council Regulation 2024/765[18] of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 split the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) in two separate instruments: the European Solidarity Reserve and the Emergency Aid Reserve. The European Solidarity Reserve with an annual amount of EUR 1 016 million (in 2018 prices, corresponding to EUR 1 167.1 million in 2025 prices) will be used for assistance to respond to emergency situations covered by the EUSF.

    In order to avoid an early depletion of the annual allocation, Article 3(7) of the EUSF Regulation and Article 9(2), second subparagraph, of the amended MFF Regulation stipulate  that 25% of the annual EUSF allocation (i.e. EUR 291.8 million for 2025) shall remain available on 1 October of each year.

    Finally, according to the Article 4a(4) of the EUSF Regulation, the amount of EUR 50 000 000 has been already inscribed in the EU general budget 2025 (in commitments and payments appropriations) for the payment of possible advances.

    Therefore, the maximum amount that can be used by the EUSF at this stage is EUR 908,95 million (excluding the reserve for advances and the amound that will become available on 1 October). After this mobilisation EUR 980,64 million will remain available for upcoing mobilisastions.

     

    Amount available under the EUSF in 2025 (EUR):

     

    Total annual 2025 EUSF allocation (incl. 1 October tranche)

    1 167 064 638

    Amount carried over from 2024 (incl. unused advances) (+)

    194 316 161

    Credits reserved for advance payments (-)

    50 000 000

    Amount already used for advances to Spain and Austria (-)

    110 663 587

    Amount available only after 1 October (-)

    291 766 160

    Total amount currenty available (excl. reserve for advances and 1 October tranche)

    908 951 052

    Amount proposed for mobilisation under current  Mobilisation Decision (only balance to be paid)

    270 077 316

    Remaining amount for future applications (inc. for advances and 1 October tranche)

    980 639 896

     

     

    The Rapporteur recommends the swift approval of the Commission proposal for a decision annexed to this report, leading to the rapid mobilisation of the aforementioned amounts, as a sign of European solidarity with Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rapporteur calls on the Commission that this financial contribution should be delivered with particular urgency.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026 – A10-0113/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    (COM(2025)0304 – C10‑0110/2025 – 2025/0158(NLE))

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2025)0304),

     having regard to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0110/2025),

      having regard to the Commission Convergence Report 2025 and the European Central Bank Convergence Report of June 2025,

     having regard to Rule 108 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0113/2025),

    1. Approves the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4. Instructs its President to forward Parliament’s position to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup and the governments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Bulgaria joining the euro area sends a strong political and economic signal of confidence in the enduring viability and appeal of the European Union’s single currency. More than two decades after the euro’s introduction, Bulgaria’s readiness to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026 reaffirms the Union’s cohesion and the euro’s role as a global symbol of stability and unity. Bulgaria has achieved substantial progress towards full economic convergence, making it well-positioned to become the twenty-first member of the euro area.

    Bulgaria introduced its currency board framework on 1 July 1997, pegging the Bulgarian lev to the German mark and subsequently to the euro. Since its EU accession in 2007, Bulgaria has held the status of a “Member State with a derogation,” subject to regular convergence assessments by the European Commission and the European Central Bank.

    At the European Parliament level, the Euro Accession Countries Working Group was established by a decision of the ECON Coordinators on 18 November 2019. It remained active throughout the entire 9th legislative term, scrutinising Bulgaria’s readiness to join the euro area and holding four dedicated sessions with experts, as well as Bulgarian Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Finance. 

    On 25 February 2025, Bulgaria submitted a request for a convergence assessment. The ECB and Commission reports of 4 June 2025 include an examination of the compatibility between Bulgaria’s national legislation, notably the statute of its national central bank, with Articles 130 and 131 of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. The reports also examine whether a high degree of sustainable convergence has been achieved, by reference to the fulfilment of the convergence criteria, and take account of several other factors required under the final sub-paragraph of Article 140(1) of the Treaty.

    Based on its own convergence report and that of the ECB, the Commission proposed that Bulgaria adopt the euro as of 1 January 2026. In accordance with Article 140(2) TFEU, the Council shall decide, by qualified majority and on a proposal from the Commission, which Member States with a derogation meet the necessary conditions for adopting the euro, as defined in Article 140(1) TFEU. This decision is to be made following consultation with the European Parliament and on the basis of the Commission and ECB reports. The Parliament is thus consulted on the legislative proposal for a Council decision to allow Bulgaria to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026.

    On the Convergence Criteria under Article 140(1) of the TFEU, the Rapporteur observes:

    1. Compatibility of National Legislation with Articles 130 and 131 TFEU and the Statutes of the ECB

    Bulgaria’s national legislation, including the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, is fully aligned with EU requirements. The law guarantees the independence of the national central bank and of the members of its decision-making bodies, the prohibition of monetary financing and privileged access, and ensures compliance with the objectives of the ESCB as formulated in Article 127 of the Treaty.

    2. Achievement of a High Degree of Price Stability

    Over the 12 months to April 2025, Bulgaria recorded an average inflation rate of 2.7%, below the reference value of 2.8%. An analysis of a broad set of indicators reveals no concerns regarding the sustainability of price stability. The reference value is calculated as the average inflation rate of the three best-performing EU Member States in terms of price stability, plus 1.5 percentage points. For the period from May 2024 to April 2025, the reference value of 2.8% is based on the inflation rates of Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%), and Italy (1.4%). No Member States were considered statistical outliers in this calculation, as none showed inflation deviations significantly above the euro area average due to country-specific factors.

    3. Sustainability of the Government Financial Position

    Bulgaria is currently not subject to a Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Its general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value, and its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value since 2007. 

    4. Compliance with the Normal Fluctuation Margins of the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at least the past 2 years

    The Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate. Bulgaria has fulfilled nearly all of its post-entry commitments under ERM II. Further efforts are needed related to anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures.

    5. Durability of Convergence, as Reflected in Long-Term Interest Rate Levels

    In the twelve months ending April 2025, Bulgaria’s average long-term interest rate was 3.9%, well below the reference value of 5.1%. The reference value for April 2025 is calculated as the simple average of the average long-term interest rates in Ireland (2.8%), Finland (2.9%) and Italy (3.7%) plus 2 percentage points, yielding a reference value of 5.1%.

    6. Economic Integration and Convergence (Article 140(1), Second Subparagraph TFEU) 

    In accordance with Article 140 TFEU, the Commission’s assessment must also consider additional factors relevant to economic integration and convergence, as these provide insight into a Member State’s capacity to join the euro area without significant difficulties. These include developments in the balance of payments and product, labour, and financial market integration.

    In this context, Bulgaria’s external position has improved, with its combined current and capital account close to balance in 2024. The country is well integrated with the euro area through trade and investment, benefiting from increased banking and financial integration and access to the broader euro area market. Bulgaria continues to make progress but further actions are needed to address the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and regulatory quality. 

    While the financial sector is small and bank-dominated, it is well embedded in the euro area, supported by Bulgaria’s participation in the banking union since 2020. Market-based financing remains underdeveloped, but potential financial stability risks are being mitigated by the Bulgarian National Bank’s conservative macroprudential policy and the robustness of the banking system. The Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report found no need for an in-depth imbalance review, but emphasized the importance of closely monitoring developments in competitiveness, the housing market, and credit growth.

    Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), supported by €5.7 billion in EU grants (2021–2026), targets structural reforms, competitiveness, and reducing regional disparities. A revised RRP was submitted in April 2025 to accelerate implementation, especially in decarbonisation, governance, and business environment. Cohesion policy funds (€10.7 billion for 2021–2027) further support competitiveness, the green transition, social inclusion, and education, with implementation progressing overall, despite some remaining challenges.

    7. Note regarding Consultation of the European Parliament

    In accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure, when Parliament is consulted pursuant to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the committee responsible shall submit a report to Parliament advocating approval or rejection of the proposed act on the basis of which Parliament shall deliberate. Parliament shall take a single vote on the proposed act, to which no amendments may be tabled, which shall apply also to the vote in committee. On 19 March 2025, ECON Coordinators agreed the file to be treated swiftly with plenary vote in July and to allocate the rapporteurship on this file as soon as possible.

    Based on the above, the Rapporteur recommends that the derogation be lifted and Bulgaria adopts the euro on 1 January 2026.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

     

    Entity and/or person

    Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification

    Minister of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union

    Chair of the Committee on Budget and Finance in the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Association of Banks in Bulgaria

    Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank

    Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Bulgarian Commission for Consumer Protection

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    MEP Rada Laykova

    Minority position under Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    The supposed job of the EP is to scrutinize the Commission´s assessment on behalf of the people, as they will pay the price of the ignored Maastricht criteria – mathematical rules to ensure no Ponzi scheme happens to the Euro.

    However, what did it do?

     Ignore incoherence between findings within the Commission report and its final assessment, which strongly suggests a political decision that ignores Maastricht criteria and math to the detriment of the people;

     ignore the suspicious Bulgarian budget data sent to the Commission with absurd income projections and concealed expenses;

     ignore the suppressed referendum in Bulgaria;

     replace the scrutiny by a gleeful statement cheerleading Bulgaria´s boarding of the “Eurotanic”, ignoring the obvious state of the Euro, which shows several classic terminal signs of a flat currency. A short statement like “shared sorrow is half sorrow” would have been more honest.

    The lack of diligence might have serious and far-reaching consequences for the people in the Eurozone or Bulgaria as it recreates certain aspects of Greece´s accession into the Euro.

    Here, the EU´s “democracy in action” was “democracy in name only” and the people will pay the price, as evidenced in the past.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

    (2025/2018(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

     having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[4],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[5],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

     having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

     having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

     having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

     having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

     having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

     having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

     having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

     having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

    C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

    D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

    E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

    F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

    G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

    H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

    I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

    J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

    K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

    L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

    M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

    2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

    3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

    4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

    5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

    6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

    7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

    8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

    9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

    10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

    11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

    12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

    13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

    14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

    15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

    16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

    17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

    18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

    19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

    21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

    22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

    23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

    24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

    25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

    26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

    27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

    28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

    29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

    30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

    31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

    32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

    33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

    34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

    36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

    37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

    38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

    39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

    40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

    41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

    42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

    43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act[8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act[9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

    44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

    45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

    46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

    47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

    Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

    49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

    50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

    51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

    52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

    53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

    54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

    55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

    56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

    57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

    Socio-economic reforms

    58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

    59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

    60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

    61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

    62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

    63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

    64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

    65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

    66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

    67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive[10], the Birds Directive[11] and the Water Framework Directive[12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

    68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

    69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

    70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

    71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

    72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

    73.  Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

    74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

    °

    ° °

    75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

    (2025/2017(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

     having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

     having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

     having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

     having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

     having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

     having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

     having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

     having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

     

    A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

    C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

    D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

    E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

    F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

    G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

    H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

    I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

    K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

    1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

    2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

    3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

    4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

    5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

    6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region; 

    7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

    Democratic institutions, media and civil society

    8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

    9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

    10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of  Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

    11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

    12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

    13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

    14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets  that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act[4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

    15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

    16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

    17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

    18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

    19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

    Fundamental rights

    20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

    21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

    22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

    23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens; 

     

    24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

    25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

    26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

    27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

    28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

    Rule of law

    29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

    30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern  shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

    31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

    32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority;  urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

    33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

    34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

    35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

    36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

    37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

    Socio-economic reforms

    38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

    39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

    40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

    41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

    42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

    43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

    44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive[5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

    45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

    46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

    47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

    Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

    49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment[6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment[7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

    50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

    51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

    52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

    53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

    54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

    Regional cooperation and foreign policy

    55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

    56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

    57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

    58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

    59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

    60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

    °

    ° °

    61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: LEADER JEFFRIES: “THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO RUN AWAY FROM CONFRONTING THESE SITUATIONS ON CAPITOL HILL IS VERY PROBLEMATIC”

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (8th District of New York)

    Today, Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries appeared on MSNBC’s Morning Joe where he emphasized that Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States and the Trump administration must follow the Constitution and stop hiding its actions in the Middle East from Congress and the American people.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Leader Jeffries, thanks so much for being with us. I’m wondering, do you consider his win last night in New York City, do you think it provides a roadmap for Democrats running in 2026 on how to energize the base?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: I think what’s clear is that the relentless focus on affordability had great appeal all across the City of New York. He also clearly out-worked, out-organized and out-communicated the opposition. And when someone is successful in being able to do all three things at the same time, it’s usually going to work out for them.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Yeah, The New York Times editorialized that he was not qualified to be mayor. Of course, The Wall Street Journal and others say that he is far too extreme on economic issues and even issues involving Israel. I’m curious what your thoughts are on him ideologically. Is that—does he have an ideology that you would want your candidates in 2026 to have?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, from the standpoint of House Democrats and what our focus has been, clearly, we have an affordability crisis in the United States of America, and our focus will continue to be on driving down the high cost of living in this country. Donald Trump promised to lower costs on day one. Costs haven’t gone down. They’re going up. He’s crashing the economy in real time, his tariffs are going to impose thousands of dollars in additional cost on everyday Americans per year and he may even be driving us toward a recession. That’s the reason why Donald Trump has become so unpopular, it’s because he’s failed the country on the economy. And so, our vision is going to be for an affordable America—work hard, play by the rules, live the good life, provide a comfortable living for yourself and for your family. That means being able to actually afford a home, educate your children, have access to healthcare, go on vacation with your children and your family every now and then and, of course, Joe, one day retire with grace and dignity.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Democrats look at Donald Trump’s approval ratings and you have a lot of other Democrats and people on media asking the question, why is the Democratic Party’s approval ratings, why are they lower than Donald Trump’s? I take it that’s something that you all grapple with every day. Why has the Democratic Party over the past year found itself at sort of its lowest ebb in recent history? And how do Democrats get out of that?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Yeah, no, it’s a very important question and, listen, institutions are unpopular right now in the United States of America and that includes, of course, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The dynamics that we have to work through, of course, one, Donald Trump and Republicans have given the American people every reason to run away from them, and it’s going to be important for us to continue to make clear why this administration failed on the economy, failed foreign policy, trying to take away healthcare from tens of millions of Americans, ripping food out of the mouths of children and seniors and veterans. Of course, all of that is problematic, all of that is unpopular. That’s why the One Big Ugly Bill has such a high disapproval rate in the United States of America. We also recognize, as Democrats, that it’s going to be important for us to articulate our affirmative agenda, what we stand for, this principle of working hard and playing by the rules, being able to live the good life, an affordable life for hardworking American taxpayers. And that is something that we’re going to have to lean into. The other thing I’d note, Joe, as you know, perhaps the most important thing in terms of a midterm election dynamic, is what’s the generic ballot say to us? Every single significant generic ballot poll has House Democrats beating House Republicans consistently, including a recent Fox News poll that had us up by about eight points. And so, at the end of the day, yes, we have to lean into improving the Democratic brand. But at the end of the day, what will be most significant, most important is how our vision contrasts with the management of this President, which has been a failure in the United States of America.

    JONATHAN LEMIRE: Leader Jeffries, let’s turn you now to the situation in Iran. We played some sound from you earlier in the show, expressing unhappiness that the administration briefing was postponed. The White House saying it’s well, it’s so Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense can be part of it later this week. Is that acceptable to you, and do you have concerns that the administration is not being fully forthcoming as to what actually transpired in Iran over the weekend?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Yes, there’s every reason to be concerned. There was this briefing that had been scheduled to take place in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. There was absolutely no reason that we’ve been provided that it should have been canceled in terms of the important questions that need to be asked and answered by the Trump administration. What was the imminent threat to the safety and security of the United States of America that justified this strike without seeking the congressional authorization required by the Constitution? What is the assessment of the damage that was done to Iran’s nuclear program? Was it completely and totally decimated? No evidence to date has been provided to suggest that that representation made by Donald Trump is accurate. What is the plan to avoid another costly failed war in the Middle East? Why was aggressive diplomacy abandoned by the Trump administration, notwithstanding the success that had taken place under President Obama’s administration in actually pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations. These are questions that need to be answered by the administration. And the fact that they continue to run away from confronting these situations on Capitol Hill is very problematic.

    JONATHAN LEMIRE: So, Leader Jeffries, to that point, you and many people who have had your position in the decades before this, have expressed frustration when presidents don’t seek congressional authority for military action like this. Do you feel like that a greater good was achieved here if Iran’s program was, if not destroyed, but at least significantly delayed? What should be the next steps for this administration in this process?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, to be clear, Iran can never be allowed to become a nuclear-capable power. Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States, of Israel, of Jordan, of our allies in the Middle East, a sworn enemy of the free world. But the question, of course, is, was this strike successful in meaningfully pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations, or is it going to complicate things in the Middle East in ways that put our men and women in uniform, American troops and America in harm’s way? That’s simply the reason that having an all-Member briefing on Capitol Hill sooner rather than later is important so these answers can be obtained for the American people, the representatives of the American People, in the United States Congress. That is the reason, fundamentally, why it’s been Congress that was given the power to declare war, to authorize military force and when administrations act differently, they have an obligation and a responsibility to provide the facts, the evidence and the truth, justifying their actions to the American people.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, this has been the debate, and we talked about it yesterday with another Member of Congress. This has been a debate going back 30, 40, 50 years. Obviously Republicans were saying this after Barack Obama attacked Libya. Republicans were saying this with Bill Clinton in the 1990s on Kosovo. But if you’re going to have a surprise attack with B-2 bombers that are going to be going over to Iran, striking their nuclear facilities. Do you think it’s a good idea to inform 535 members of Congress before that operation takes off?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, the key here is what was the imminent nature of the threat that justified immediate military action and surprise military action—

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right—

    LEADER JEFFRIES: If there was no imminent threat—

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, the United Nations, I’m curious if you’re concerned, like the United Nation’s nuclear agency, the IAEA had said that Iran had already enriched uranium up to 60 percent, and as you know, the jump from 60 to 100 percent is negligible, and had enough enriched uranium for several weapons. Would you consider that to be considerable enough? A considerable enough threat to strike Iran under those circumstances?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, certainly it’s a challenging situation, but one of the reasons why we need a briefing, Joe, is to have an understanding, was that enriched uranium even damaged or was it removed by the Iranians prior to the strike? We don’t know the answers to that question. It certainly is something that should be talked about, and the American people should be informed about the reality of whether it was a successful strike or not. In terms of the Iranian nuclear threat, I think we’ve all been clear that Iran can never be permitted to become nuclear capable. But the constitution is not a mere inconvenience, it’s the reality and if members of the executive branch, if hawkish individuals across the country want to change things, there’s Article I, Section 8, Clause 11. They can put forward a constitutional amendment but the framers of this country saw fit to vest this authority within the House and the Senate, not the executive branch.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right. And at what point should that be triggered? Should it be triggered by every strike, like, for instance, Barack Obama in 2011 in Libya, or countless strikes by the Bush administration and the Obama administration after September the 11th? Is it every strike or is it when you are going in sending troops in? When do you think that action is triggered?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Seems to me, and it’s a great question, Joe, that it has to relate to whether the step that was taken, one, is in response to an imminent threat to American interests, and two, whether it’s an act of war. And part of the reason why, after the fact, it’s important for Members of Congress to be able to have a briefing with the administration that is comprehensive and that gives Members the opportunity to ask questions so we can provide these answers to the American people who clearly do not want another failed, costly, deadly war in the Middle East.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: All right. Leader Hakeem Jeffries, thank you so much for being with us.

    Full interview can be watched here.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Global Nuclear Emergency Exercise Concludes, Testing International Response in Simulated Reactor Accident

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    During the ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise, one of the response measures includes aerial monitoring of the environment. (Photo: J. Jin)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with over 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully concluded a 36-hour simulation that tested global readiness and response mechanisms to a severe nuclear emergency scenario at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise began on 24 June and concluded today, 25 June, at about 17:45 CEST.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, prompting participating nations and organizations to engage in real-time decision-making, information exchange, public communication and coordination of protective actions, including medical response and cross-border logistics.

    “The ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the strength of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together in realistic scenarios, we enhance our collective ability to protect people and the environment.”

    Key innovations in this year’s exercise included:

    • Enhanced regional collaboration: Recognizing the transboundary impact of severe nuclear accidents, neighbouring countries Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova coordinated protective measures to ensure harmonized responses across borders.
    • Integration of nuclear security scenarios: The simulation incorporated physical protection challenges and cyber security threats, reflecting evolving risks.
    • Advanced crisis communication testing: An expanded social media simulator was utilized to assess and improve public information strategies.
    • Deployment of international assistance missions: Expert teams from Bulgaria, Canada, France, Lithuania, Moldova, Sweden and the United States of America conducted joint operations, including aerial and land-based radiation monitoring, under the IAEA’s Response and Assistance Network (RANET).

    The exercise emphasized the importance of timely information sharing, accurate assessment and prognosis, and effective public communication during nuclear emergencies.

    ConvEx-3 exercises are conducted every three to five years to evaluate and strengthen the emergency response frameworks established under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    In the coming weeks, the IAEA will compile feedback from all participants to identify best practices and areas for improvement, contributing to the continuous enhancement of global nuclear emergency preparedness. The final report will guide preparations for the upcoming International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies (EPR 2025) to be held this December in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    Photos from ConvEx-3 are available here.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Global Nuclear Emergency Exercise Concludes, Testing International Response in Simulated Reactor Accident

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    During the ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise, one of the response measures includes aerial monitoring of the environment. (Photo: J. Jin)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with over 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully concluded a 36-hour simulation that tested global readiness and response mechanisms to a severe nuclear emergency scenario at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise began on 24 June and concluded today, 25 June, at about 17:45 CEST.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, prompting participating nations and organizations to engage in real-time decision-making, information exchange, public communication and coordination of protective actions, including medical response and cross-border logistics.

    “The ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the strength of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together in realistic scenarios, we enhance our collective ability to protect people and the environment.”

    Key innovations in this year’s exercise included:

    • Enhanced regional collaboration: Recognizing the transboundary impact of severe nuclear accidents, neighbouring countries Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova coordinated protective measures to ensure harmonized responses across borders.
    • Integration of nuclear security scenarios: The simulation incorporated physical protection challenges and cyber security threats, reflecting evolving risks.
    • Advanced crisis communication testing: An expanded social media simulator was utilized to assess and improve public information strategies.
    • Deployment of international assistance missions: Expert teams from Bulgaria, Canada, France, Lithuania, Moldova, Sweden and the United States of America conducted joint operations, including aerial and land-based radiation monitoring, under the IAEA’s Response and Assistance Network (RANET).

    The exercise emphasized the importance of timely information sharing, accurate assessment and prognosis, and effective public communication during nuclear emergencies.

    ConvEx-3 exercises are conducted every three to five years to evaluate and strengthen the emergency response frameworks established under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    In the coming weeks, the IAEA will compile feedback from all participants to identify best practices and areas for improvement, contributing to the continuous enhancement of global nuclear emergency preparedness. The final report will guide preparations for the upcoming International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies (EPR 2025) to be held this December in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    Photos from ConvEx-3 are available here.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Security: Global Nuclear Emergency Exercise Concludes, Testing International Response in Simulated Reactor Accident

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    During the ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise, one of the response measures includes aerial monitoring of the environment. (Photo: J. Jin)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in collaboration with over 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully concluded a 36-hour simulation that tested global readiness and response mechanisms to a severe nuclear emergency scenario at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise began on 24 June and concluded today, 25 June, at about 17:45 CEST.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, prompting participating nations and organizations to engage in real-time decision-making, information exchange, public communication and coordination of protective actions, including medical response and cross-border logistics.

    “The ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the strength of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together in realistic scenarios, we enhance our collective ability to protect people and the environment.”

    Key innovations in this year’s exercise included:

    • Enhanced regional collaboration: Recognizing the transboundary impact of severe nuclear accidents, neighbouring countries Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova coordinated protective measures to ensure harmonized responses across borders.
    • Integration of nuclear security scenarios: The simulation incorporated physical protection challenges and cyber security threats, reflecting evolving risks.
    • Advanced crisis communication testing: An expanded social media simulator was utilized to assess and improve public information strategies.
    • Deployment of international assistance missions: Expert teams from Bulgaria, Canada, France, Lithuania, Moldova, Sweden and the United States of America conducted joint operations, including aerial and land-based radiation monitoring, under the IAEA’s Response and Assistance Network (RANET).

    The exercise emphasized the importance of timely information sharing, accurate assessment and prognosis, and effective public communication during nuclear emergencies.

    ConvEx-3 exercises are conducted every three to five years to evaluate and strengthen the emergency response frameworks established under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

    In the coming weeks, the IAEA will compile feedback from all participants to identify best practices and areas for improvement, contributing to the continuous enhancement of global nuclear emergency preparedness. The final report will guide preparations for the upcoming International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies (EPR 2025) to be held this December in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

    Photos from ConvEx-3 are available here.

    MIL Security OSI