Category: Balkans

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Surging Translation Costs in Schools Expose Hidden Cost of Immigration

    Source: Traditional Unionist Voice – Northern Ireland

    Commenting on an answer he received from the Education Minister recently TUV North Antrim MLA Timothy Gaston said:

    “While there are those who claim that there is no evidence of mass immigration in Northern Ireland, this is another set of data which exposes the truth. Every penny spent by the Education Authority on translation costs for pupils who do not speak English is money which has to be diverted from other pressing needs within our schools.

    “The rapid growth of the spend is shocking. I requested data over a five-year period and discovered that the total has more than tripled from £44,000 in 2020/2021 to £139,000 in 2024/25. Additionally, there has been a rapid expansion in the diversity of languages over the period.

    “Arabic is the most expensive language, costing the Education Authority £13,887 in 2020/2021 and £33,214 in 2022/2023.

    “Romanian is placing a heavy burden on the EA, with the cost of translators for the language increasing some 260% over the last five years, while Bulgarian is up 192%. Spend on Farsi translators has ballooned by 1,169%.

    “This surge in demand reflects rapid demographic change across Northern Ireland.

    “The figures are a snapshot of long-term costs of immigration policies which are failing and simply aren’t putting the people whose parents and grandparents have paid into the system for years first. Hard-pressed taxpayers are having to fund an education system which must operate in dozens of foreign languages.

    “Over the five-year period covered by my question, interpreters were required for over 30 different languages including Somali, Pashto, Vietnamese and Kurdish. The presence of so many distinct language groups not only places financial strain on the education system but raises serious questions about integration in the long term.

    “We need to urgently move to a migration system which works and is common sense. A basic starting point should be an expectation that people who are permitted to remain in the UK speak English and it doesn’t end up being a costly afterthought and burden on our education system.”

    Note to editors

    You can read Mr Gaston’s question and the answer received here.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI China: Romania’s new government sworn in

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Romanian President Nicusor Dan (C, Front) poses with members of the new government headed by Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan (3rd L, Front) after a swearing-in ceremony at the Cotroceni presidential palace in Bucharest, Romania, on June 23, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Romania’s new pro-European government, led by Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, was sworn in Monday evening before President Nicusor Dan, marking the end of a period of political instability and interim leadership.

    The new cabinet is backed by a broad ruling coalition comprising the Social Democratic Party (PSD), National Liberal Party (PNL), Save Romania Union (USR), and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR). Earlier in the day, the coalition secured a strong parliamentary mandate with 301 votes in favor and only 9 against.

    Following the swearing-in ceremony, Bolojan outlined the government’s core priorities: restoring public financial order, ensuring effective governance, and safeguarding citizens’ rights.

    President Dan welcomed the formation of the new cabinet, emphasizing the urgent need for fiscal reform and expressing optimism about Romania’s economic outlook. He cited the country’s dynamic private sector and reiterated the national goal of joining the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by the end of 2026 – a move he said could enhance foreign investment and reduce borrowing costs.

    Dan also underscored the importance of state reform and rebuilding public trust, urging both the coalition and minority representatives to act in the national interest.

    The newly formed government includes 16 ministers and five deputy prime ministers, one of whom is an independent tasked with overseeing state reform. Cabinet portfolios have been distributed proportionally among the coalition parties.

    With 311 seats in Romania’s 464-member Parliament, the ruling coalition holds an outright majority. Earlier on Monday, party leaders signed a political agreement outlining a pro-Western agenda, a rotating premiership, and key policy objectives, including structural reforms and increased administrative transparency. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: European countries call for restraint amid escalating conflict in Mideast

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Protesters holding placards are pictured in The Hague, the Netherlands, June 22, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    European leaders have voiced deep concern over the escalating conflict in the Middle East, following a series of military strikes that have intensified fears of a wider regional war.

    Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic, in a statement released Monday, said the Croatian government is “monitoring the situation with great concern,” particularly the direct confrontations between Israel and Iran.

    He warned that further escalation could lead to a range of consequences, including rising energy prices, increased migration, and the threat of terrorist attacks.

    “Our position is clear: escalation should be avoided,” the statement read. “The Croatian government calls for restraint, calming of tensions, and de-escalation of the conflict.”

    Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic also criticized the recent U.S. military action in the region, calling the strike on Iran a violation of international law.

    “There is no doubt that the United States violated international public law,” Vucic said at a press conference following a meeting of the General Staff.

    Drawing parallels with the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, he emphasized the need for respect for the UN Charter and international norms. Vucic also lamented the missed opportunity for diplomacy between Iran and Israel.

    In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni addressed the lower house of parliament ahead of the upcoming European Union Council meeting, urging renewed diplomatic engagement.

    “Only coordinated diplomatic action can ensure peace in the region,” she said, after the U.S. strike on three Iranian nuclear sites.

    Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa issued a statement on Sunday calling for “restraint and the urgent resumption of diplomatic efforts,” stressing that diplomacy remains the only viable solution to the conflict.

    He reaffirmed Portugal’s alignment with the United Nations and the European Union in advocating for de-escalation and avoidance of further military confrontation.

    Portuguese Prime Minister Luis Montenegro echoed this sentiment on social media, calling for “maximum restraint from all parties and a return to negotiations.”

    Meanwhile, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) issued a strongly worded condemnation of the U.S. airstrikes, labeling them a “clear violation” of the UN Charter and international law. The party argued the attack reflects a broader strategy of global domination by the U.S. and its allies.

    Israel launched a series of large-scale airstrikes on June 13 targeting Iranian nuclear and military facilities, killing a number of senior commanders and nuclear scientists. In response, Iran carried out missile and drone attacks on Israeli territory.

    U.S. President Donald Trump said on Saturday that the United States had carried out attacks on three nuclear-related sites in Iran: Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.

    In retaliation, Iran launched a missile attack on the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar Monday evening. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: Improving the quality of teaching natural sciences in schools is bearing fruit

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Russian team of the first Open International Geographical Olympiad (openGeo 2025)

    The results of the first Open International Geographical Olympiad (openGeo 2025) were summed up at the University Gymnasium of the Lomonosov Moscow State University. The competition brought together 107 participants from 23 countries. The Russian team was represented by six winners of the final stage of the All-Russian School Olympiad in Geography for the 2024/25 academic year. In the team competition at openGeo 2025, they won first place: the Russian team has four gold and two silver medals.

    The children were congratulated by Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Chernyshenko and Minister of Education of Russia Sergei Kravtsov.

    “Our President Vladimir Putin noted that geography serves as the basis for the formation of patriotic values, cultural, national identity and self-awareness. The brilliant victory of our schoolchildren shows that adult outstanding scientific minds have someone to rely on. Thanks to such victories, we see that our common work to fulfill the President’s task – to improve the quality of teaching natural sciences in schools – is bearing fruit. Thank you to everyone who contributed to these high results, and we wish you success in the future!” said the Deputy Prime Minister.

    He also added that the national project “Youth and Children” helps to create conditions for realizing the potential and developing the talents of each person.

    The head of the Russian Ministry of Education, Sergei Kravtsov, congratulated the children and drew attention to the fact that the Olympiad contributes to strengthening international educational ties.

    “Today we pay special attention to developing interest in schoolchildren in studying natural sciences. Participation in the Open International Geographical Olympiad is an opportunity for children not only to test their knowledge, but also to meet young talents from different countries, exchange experiences and ideas. I would like to note that such a competition was held on the Russian platform for the first time. I congratulate our team, their parents and teachers on their brilliant result. I am sure that the success of our schoolchildren will inspire their peers to new discoveries and achievements,” emphasized Sergey Kravtsov.

    Gold medals were awarded to:

    ● Christian Rymarchuk, State Budgetary Educational Institution “School No. 179”;

    ● Dina Islyamutdinova, State Budgetary Educational Institution of the City of Moscow “School No. 2054”;

    ● Nikita Rusakov, University Gymnasium of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov;

    ● Elizaveta Kiseleva, State Budgetary Educational Institution “Lyceum “Second School” named after V.F. Ovchinnikov”.

    Silver medals were won by:

    ● Tikhon Pulyayev, State Budgetary Educational Institution “Moscow Gymnasium in the South-West No. 1543 named after People’s Teacher of the Russian Federation Yu.V. Zavelsky”;

    ● Alexey Gorlov, OAO “School of the Center of Pedagogical Excellence”.

    The coaches of the Russian team were leading specialists from the Faculty of Geography of the Lomonosov Moscow State University Pavel Kirillov and Dmitry Bogachev, as well as a teacher from the National Research University Higher School of Economics Artur Petrosyan and a teacher from the OANO New School Anna Romashina.

    Young geographers from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Ghana, Zambia, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, China, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka took part in the Olympiad. Thaddeus Trazo (Philippines) was recognized as the absolute winner of openGeo 2025. Russian schoolboy Christian Rymarchuk shared 2nd place with a participant from Belarus.

    All Olympiad tasks were completed in English. The Olympiad competition program consisted of three rounds. During the theoretical round, participants solved five problems in physical and socio-economic geography. The practical round included tasks aimed at analyzing space images, graphic and cartographic tasks. As part of the multimedia test, schoolchildren answered 40 illustrated questions from various areas of geographical knowledge.

    The scientific committee and jury of openGeo 2025 included leading scientists and geographers from Russia (representatives of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences), India, Kazakhstan, Serbia and other countries.

    Open International Geographical Olympiad (HTTPS: //opengeo. Msu.ru) is an international competition for high school students. Its organizers are the Russian Ministry of Education and Lomonosov Moscow State University.

    The competition is held as an open alternative international Olympiad for schoolchildren and students selected based on the results of national geographic Olympiads and other intellectual competitions in the field of geography of the CIS, SCO, BRICS and other countries. The event is aimed at popularizing geographical knowledge and skills among talented schoolchildren and strengthening international educational and academic ties.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Presidents of both parties have launched military action without Congress declaring war − Trump’s bombing of Iran is just the latest

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sarah Burns, Associate Professor of Political Science, Rochester Institute of Technology

    President Donald Trump is seen on a monitor in the White House press briefing room on June 21, 2025, after the U.S. military strike on three sites in Iran. AP Photo/Alex Brandon

    In the wake of the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025, many congressional Democrats and a few Republicans have objected to President Donald Trump’s failure to seek congressional approval before conducting military operations.

    They note that Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and say that section required Trump to seek prior authorization for military action.

    The Trump administration disagrees. “This is not a war against Iran,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Fox News host Maria Bartiromo, implying that the action did not require approval by Congress. That’s the same view held by most modern presidents and their lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel: Article 2 of the Constitution allows the president to use the military in certain situations without prior approval from Congress.

    By this reading of the text, presidents, as commander in chief, claim the power to unilaterally order the military to initiate small-scale operations for a short duration. Members of Congress may object to that claim, but they have done little to limit presidents’ unilateralism. What little they have done has not been effective.

    As I’ve demonstrated in my research, even though the 1973 War Powers Resolution attempted to constrain presidential power after the disasters of the Vietnam War, it contains many loopholes that presidents have exploited to act unilaterally. For example, it allows presidents to engage in military operations without congressional approval for up to 90 days. And more recent congressional resolutions have broadened executive control even further.

    President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the U.S. declaration of war against Japan on Dec. 8, 1941.
    U.S. National Archives

    A long tradition of executive authority

    Presidents can even overcome the loopholes in the War Powers Resolution if the operation lasts longer than 90 days. In 2011, a State Department lawyer argued that airstrikes in Libya could continue beyond the War Powers Resolution’s 90-day time limit because there were no ground troops involved. By that logic, any future president could carry out an indefinite bombing campaign with no congressional oversight.

    While every president has bristled at congressional restraints on their actions, presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt have successfully circumvented them by citing vague concerns like “national security,” “regional security” or the need to “prevent a humanitarian disaster” when launching military operations. While members of Congress always take issue with these actions, they never hold presidents accountable by passing legislation restraining him.

    President Trump’s decision to bomb Iranian nuclear sites without consulting Congress falls in line with precedent from both Democratic and Republican leaders for decades.

    Much like his predecessors, Trump did not, and likely will not, provide Congress with more concrete information about the legality of his actions. Nor are congressional lawmakers effectively holding him accountable.

    The push-and-pull between Congress and the president over military operations dates back to the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, which led Congress to declare war on Japan. Before then, Congress had prevented the U.S. from joining World War II by enforcing an arms embargo and refusing to help the Allies prior to the attack on Hawaii. But afterward, Congress began allowing the president to take more control over the military.

    During the Cold War, rather than returning to a balanced debate between the branches, Congress continued to relinquish those powers.

    Congress never authorized the war in Korea; Harry Truman used a U.N. Security Council resolution as legal justification. Congress’ vote explicitly opposing the invasion of Cambodia didn’t stop Richard Nixon from doing it anyway. Even after the Cold War, Bill Clinton regularly acted unilaterally to address humanitarian crises or the continued threat from leaders like Saddam Hussein. He sent the military to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, among other places.

    After 9/11, Congress quickly gave up more of its power. A week after those attacks, Congress passed a sweeping Authorization for Use of Military Force, giving the president permission to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”

    In a follow-up 2002 authorization, Congress went even further, allowing the president to “use the Armed Forces … as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend national security … against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” This approach provides few, if any, congressional checks on the control of military affairs exercised by the president.

    In the two decades since those authorizations, four presidents have used them to justify all manner of military action, from targeted killings of terrorists to the years long fight against the Islamic State group.

    Congress regularly discusses terminating those authorizations, but has yet to do so. If Congress did, the loopholes in the original War Powers Resolution would still exist.

    While President Biden claimed he supported the repeal of the authorizations, and supported more congressional oversight of military actions, Trump has made no such claims. Instead, he has claimed even more sweeping authority to act without any permission from Congress.

    As recently as 2024, Biden used the 2002 authorization as a legal rationale for the targeted killing of Iranian-backed militiamen in Iraq, a strike condemned by Iraqi leaders.

    Those actions may have ruffled congressional feathers, but they were in keeping with a long U.S. tradition of targeting members of terrorist groups and protecting members of the military serving in a conflict zone.

    Demonstrators outside the U.S. Capitol in January 2020 call on Congress to limit the president’s powers to use the military.
    AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana

    Threats of war

    During his first presidential term in 2020, Trump ordered a lethal drone strike against a respected member of the Iranian government, Major General Qassim Soleimani, the head of Iran’s equivalent of the CIA, without consulting Congress or publicly providing proof of why the attack was necessary, even to this day.

    Tensions – and fears of war – spiked but then slowly faded when Iran responded with missile attacks on two U.S. bases in Iraq.

    Now, the U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear sites have revived both fears of war and renewed questions about the president’s authority to unilaterally engage in military action. Presidents since the 1970s, however, have effectively managed to dodge definitive answers to those questions – demonstrating both the power inherent in their position and the unwillingness among members of the legislative branch to reclaim their coequal status.

    This article is an updated version of a story published on Jan. 24, 2024.

    Sarah Burns does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Presidents of both parties have launched military action without Congress declaring war − Trump’s bombing of Iran is just the latest – https://theconversation.com/presidents-of-both-parties-have-launched-military-action-without-congress-declaring-war-trumps-bombing-of-iran-is-just-the-latest-259636

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: ILUS Provides Shareholder Podcast Update on Strategic Progress Across Its Portfolio Companies

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, NY, June 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ilustrato Pictures International Inc. (OTC: ILUS) (“ILUS” or the “Company”), a mergers and acquisitions company focused on acquiring and scaling businesses in the public safety and industrial sectors, today released a shareholder podcast updating its progress, strategic shifts, and operational milestones across its portfolio companies.

    ILUS shared key updates regarding operational restructuring, financial improvements, and strategic goals as it enters a new phase of focused, scalable growth.

    To listen to the full shareholder podcast, please visit: https://youtu.be/d5DA9IPffK0

    ILUS Company Overview: Reset, Refocus, and Rebuild

    After navigating two challenging years in 2023 and 2024, ILUS is entering a new chapter of strategic growth and consolidation. Key themes from the shareholder podcast included:

    • Audits: ILUS and SAML have transitioned to a U.S.-based auditing firm, enhancing compliance and aligning with future uplisting goals. The company is currently finalizing a comprehensive two-year re-audit and related consolidations to bring all financial filings fully up to date.
    • Business Model Realignment: ILUS has restructured several legacy operations and consolidated its footprint, including relocating core operations to a central facility in Jacksonville, Florida, to streamline production and reduce costs.
    • Strategic Value Creation: ILUS continues to evaluate uplist, spinoffs, partnerships, and dividend-based structures to unlock and return shareholder value.

    ILUS also highlighted its positions in external entities, including Fusion Fuel Green PLC (Nasdaq: HTOO). Additionally, the podcast introduced ILUV Capital, a business development company (BDC) under consideration that may operate alongside ILUS to deliver alternative pathways for a return for ILUS Shareholders should it materialize.

    Portfolio Highlights

    SAML to ILUS Industries Transition

    SAML, an ILUS portfolio company, is currently undergoing a rebranding process:

    • A name change to ILUS Industries is underway.
    • Nick Link is serving as interim CEO, with the search for a permanent CEO currently in progress.
    • ILUS Industries will provide a focused platform for vertical growth and additional merger activity.

    Emergency Response Technologies (ERT)

    Will sit as a subsidiary under ILUS Industries, controlled by ILUS Industries

    ERT remains a core pillar of ILUS’s strategy, advancing innovation in the fire, public safety, and industrial markets.

    • Firebug Product Line: Production is underway at the Jacksonville facility, focused on wildfire response, battery fire suppression, and public safety, which will also alleviate any tariff risk.
    • E-Raptor EV Range: The desk top R&D and new design of the new electric vehicle are complete. Production will begin in Serbia, with partial U.S. assembly at ILUS’s Jacksonville site.
    • Expansion into Vertical Markets: ERT is actively developing distribution networks and product offerings in the industrial, safety, and agricultural sectors for this product and will seek an acquisition of a distribution network for this product.

    Fusion Fuel Green (HTOO)

    ILUS recently completed the sale of QIND to Fusion Fuel Green PLC (Nasdaq: HTOO):

    • As part of the realignment, JP Backwell transitioned from SAML to assume the role of CEO at HTOO.
    • ILUS now holds approximately 35 million shares of Nasdaq-listed HTOO equity as an asset on its Balance Sheet while:
      • The transaction eliminated QIND’s debt from ILUS’s balance sheet and relieved ILUS of related consolidation and reporting burdens.
      • ILUS retains indirect exposure to QIND’s future performance.

    Replay Solutions (Resource Recovery & E-Waste)

    A wholly owned subsidiary of ILUS Industries

    Replay is now launching its environmentally sustainable operations:

    • E-waste processing is set to begin in Serbia, with future expansion planned into additional regions, including Egypt, the UAE, and later the USA in 2026.
    • Equipment and machinery have been manufactured and are awaiting shipment to operational locations.
    • Has signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a Dubai-based refinery for the potential acquisition of a substantial volume of marine sludge oil, intended for processing into recycled oil products and lubricants. Additionally, Replay is conducting due diligence on a second acquisition target. There is no guarantee that either of these acquisitions will materialize.
    • Research and development are underway for a tyre pyrolysis facility to diversify Replay’s recycling capabilities, for the conversion of tyres into oil and lubricants.

    Strategic and Financial Outlook

    • ILUS has materially strengthened its financial position through the QIND/ HTOO transaction and strategic restructuring.
    • The organization now manages a portfolio of increasingly bankable businesses supporting improved capital access.
    • With enhanced balance sheet strength and operational scale, ILUS is increasingly improving and readying itself for a potential IPO or uplist in the future.
    • ILUS intends to establish a BDC company called As ILUV Capital either within ILUS or standalone, with ILUS Shareholders receiving benefits in some way to be defined. As this matures, ILUS may be in a position to explore dividends or share buybacks, consistent with its vision of long-term shareholder return.

    Summary and Closing Remarks

    • ILUS has postponed the upcoming shareholder meeting to ensure stronger participation and alignment.
    • With two difficult years behind it, ILUS is focused on ensuring the next three years reflect sustained growth, transparency, and execution.
    • ILUS management expressed gratitude for shareholders’ support and patience and looks forward to connecting in person during planned meetings later this year.

    For further information on ILUS, please see its communication channels:

    Website: https://ilus-group.com
    X: @ILUS_INTL
    Email: IR@Ilus-Group.com
    Source: ILUS

    Contact:
    IR@Ilus-group.com
    (917) 522-3202)

    Forward-Looking Statement

    Certain information set forth in this press release contains “forward-looking information”, including “future-oriented financial information” and “financial outlook”, under applicable securities laws (collectively referred to herein as forward-looking statements). Except for statements of historical fact, the information contained herein constitutes forward-looking statements and includes, but is not limited to, the (i) projected financial performance of the Company; (ii) completion of, and the use of proceeds from, the sale of the shares being offered hereunder; (iii) the expected development of the Company’s business, projects, and joint ventures; (iv) execution of the Company’s vision and growth strategy, including with respect to future M&A activity and global growth; (v) sources and availability of third-party financing for the Company’s projects; (vi) completion of the Company’s projects that are currently underway, in development or otherwise under consideration; (vii) renewal of the Company’s current customer, supplier and other material agreements; and (viii) future liquidity, working capital, and capital requirements. Forward-looking statements are provided to allow potential investors the opportunity to understand management’s beliefs and opinions in respect of the future so that they may use such beliefs and opinions as one factor in evaluating an investment. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and undue reliance should not be placed on them. Such forward-looking statements necessarily involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties, which may cause actual performance and financial results in future periods to differ materially from any projections of future performance or results expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Although forward-looking statements contained in this presentation are based upon what management of the Company believes are reasonable assumptions, there can be no assurance that forward-looking statements will prove to be accurate, as actual results and future events could differ materially from those anticipated in such statements. The Company undertakes no obligation to update forward-looking statements if circumstances or management’s estimates or opinions should change except as required by applicable securities laws. The reader is cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has provided guidance to issuers regarding the use of social media to disclose material nonpublic information. In this regard, investors and others should note that we announce material financial information via official Press Releases, in addition to SEC filings, press releases, Questions & Answers sessions, public conference calls, and webcasts also may take time from time to time. We use these channels as well as social media to communicate with the public about our company, our services, and other issues. It is possible that the information we post on social media could be deemed to be material information. Therefore, considering the SEC’s guidance, we encourage investors, the media, and others interested in our company to review the information we post on the following social & media channels: Website: https://ilus-group.com X: @ILUS_INTL

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murphy Delivers Speech on Dangers of Unregulated AI During CODEL to Europe

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Connecticut – Chris Murphy

    June 20, 2025

    PARIS—U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) delivered a major speech on the threats posed to the U.S. economy and spiritual health of Americans by unregulated artificial intelligence technology at the Paris Institute of Political Studies during a congressional delegation to Paris, France and Bucharest, Romania.

    Murphy acknowledged the potential benefits of this transformational technology: “It will likely turn out to be one of the most socially and economically disruptive technologies ever. It’s probably going to be bigger than the printing press or advanced medicine or the internet. And there’s also no doubt that it has enormous practical upsides. Medical advances will come more quickly. Production will be cheaper. Administration will become more efficient. Complex societal problems will be solved more easily.”

    But Murphy warned the Trump administration is downplaying the potential risks of unregulated AI technology, evidenced by a speech given earlier this year by Vice President J.D. Vance: “The current U.S. administration is right now fully captured by the AI industry, and they are focused only on driving up the industry’s profits at the expense of the American worker and the American family. The vice president said at that summit that the White House refuses to view AI as a purely disruptive technology that will inevitably automate away our labor force. But this is exactly what unregulated, unchecked AI will do. The vice president claimed that the White House wanted the AI driven internet to be a safe place, but refused to endorse a single rule or a single idea that would keep it safe, apparently believing the industry whitewash that they will just self-regulate and prioritize family and citizen safety above profits, something the tech industry has never done.”

    He argued the industry leaders lobbying against AI regulation are prioritizing profit over the common good: “The leaders of these companies, brimming with dangerous hubris, rapacious in their desire to build wealth and power, and far too comfortable in shrugging off the destructive power of their product… They’re in a race to deploy and commercialize and profit, and they are paying mere lip service to the ways in which AI and AGI could destroy the already fraying fabric of our country…If we don’t decide collectively as a transatlantic community to protect ourselves from the most transformational technology of our lifetime. And as I said, perhaps in the history of the world, we won’t have democracies to be able to protect the values that we care so deeply about. We won’t be able to debate domestic and foreign policy.”

    He pushed back on those who argue regulating AI in the U.S. will give China a strategic advantage in developing the technology: “Frankly, China is likely rooting for us to use American and European citizens as guinea pigs for the AI revolution because they aren’t doing that. China’s attempts at regulation have been lighter than the EU, but it’s just not true that China believes that the way to beat the United States towards AI prominence is by not regulating the industry. China would love for the United States economy to collapse, because we are less thoughtful than Beijing in controlling the job loss they would love for unchecked fake video and audio to turn our culture into chaos. They would love for our young people to become even further lost and isolated as robot friends replace real friends and real interaction. Regulating AI isn’t a gift to China – it’s a way to make sure that we manage the growth of AI in a way that makes sure that we beat the Chinese in this race.”

    ##

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 23 June 2025 News release Tobacco control efforts protect 6.1 billion people – WHO’s new report

    Source: World Health Organisation

    The World Health Organization (WHO) today released its report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic 2025 at the World Conference on Tobacco Control in Dublin, warning that action is needed to maintain and accelerate progress in tobacco control as rising industry interference challenges tobacco policies and control efforts.

    The report focuses on the six proven WHO MPOWER tobacco control measures to reduce tobacco use, which claims over 7 million lives a year:

    • Monitoring tobacco use and prevention policies;
    • Protecting people from tobacco smoke with smoke-free air legislation;
    • Offering help to quit tobacco use;
    • Warning about the dangers of tobacco with pack labels and mass media;
    • Enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and
    • Raising taxes on tobacco.

    Since 2007, 155 countries have implemented at least one of the WHO MPOWER tobacco control measures to reduce tobacco use at best-practice level. Today, over 6.1 billion people, three-quarters of the world’s population, are protected by at least one such policy, compared to just 1 billion in 2007. Four countries have implemented the full MPOWER package: Brazil, Mauritius, the Netherlands (Kingdom of the), and Türkiye. Seven countries are just one measure away from achieving the full implementation of the MPOWER package, signifying the highest level of tobacco control, including Ethiopia, Ireland, Jordan, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia and Spain.

    However, there are major gaps. Forty countries still have no MPOWER measure at best-practice level and more than 30 countries allow cigarette sales without mandatory health warnings.

    “Twenty years since the adoption of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, we have many successes to celebrate, but the tobacco industry continues to evolve and so must we,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. “By uniting science, policy and political will, we can create a world where tobacco no longer claims lives, damages economies or steals futures. Together, we can end the tobacco epidemic.”

    The WHO Global Tobacco Epidemic 2025 report, developed with support from Bloomberg Philanthropies, was launched during the 2025 Bloomberg Philanthropies Awards for Global Tobacco Control. The awards celebrated several governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) making progress to reduce tobacco use.

    “Since Bloomberg Philanthropies started supporting global tobacco control efforts in 2007, there has been a sea change in the way countries prevent tobacco use, but there is still a long way to go,” said Michael R. Bloomberg, founder of Bloomberg LP and Bloomberg Philanthropies and WHO Global Ambassador for Noncommunicable Diseases and Injuries. “Bloomberg Philanthropies remains fully committed to WHO’s urgent work – and to saving millions more lives together.”

    The WHO Global Tobacco Epidemic 2025 report reveals that the most striking gains have been in graphic health warnings, one of the key measures under the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), that make the harms of tobacco impossible to ignore:

    • 110 countries now require them – up from just 9 in 2007 – protecting 62% of the global population; and
    • 25 countries have adopted plain packaging.

    WHO warns, however, that enforcement is inconsistent, and smokeless tobacco packaging remains poorly regulated. The new report is accompanied by a new data portal that tracks country-by-country progress between 2007–2025.

    Despite their effectiveness, 110 countries haven’t run anti-tobacco campaigns since 2022. However, 36% of the global population now lives in countries that have run best-practice campaigns, up from just 19% in 2022. WHO urges countries to invest in message-tested and evaluated campaigns.

    Taxes, quit services and advertising bans have been expanding, but many improvements are needed:

    • Taxation: 134 countries have failed to make cigarettes less affordable. Since 2022, just 3 have increased taxes to the best-practice level.
    • Cessation: Only 33% of people globally have access to cost-covered quit services.
    • Advertising bans: Best-practice bans exist in 68 countries, covering over 25% of the global population.

    Around 1.3 million people die from second-hand smoke every year. Today, 79 countries have implemented comprehensive smoke-free environments, covering one-third of the world’s population. Since 2022, six additional countries (Cook Islands, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and Uzbekistan) have adopted strong smoke-free laws, despite industry resistance, particularly in hospitality venues.

    There has been a growing trend to regulate the use of e-cigarettes or ENDS – Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems. The number of countries regulating or banning ENDS has grown from 122 in 2022 to 133 in 2024, a clear signal of increased attention to these products. However, over 60 countries still lack any regulations on ENDS.

    WHO is calling for urgent action in areas where momentum is lagging. “Governments must act boldly to close remaining gaps, strengthen enforcement, and invest in the proven tools that save lives. WHO calls on all countries to accelerate progress on MPOWER and ensure that no one is left behind in the fight against tobacco,” said Dr Ruediger Krech, Director of Health Promotion.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA and Romania to Launch Global Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    Fire trucks and an emergency response helicopter are positioned to provide support during a national nuclear emergency exercise in Romania in October 2023. (Photo: C. Torres Vidal/IAEA)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Romania will launch tomorrow, 24 June, the world’s largest and most complex international nuclear emergency exercise, simulating a severe accident at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    Over two days, more than 75 countries and 10 international organizations will take part in the ConvEx-3 (2025)—a full-scale exercise designed to test global readiness for a nuclear or radiological emergency with cross-border consequences. Participation will occur both on-site in Romania and remotely from other countries.

    As nuclear use expands globally, its success hinges on strong safety standards and constant vigilance, said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “This exercise is a clear demonstration of the international community’s commitment to protect people and the environment by working together, across borders and systems, when every minute counts.”

    “Hosting ConvEx-3 is both a responsibility and an opportunity for Romania,” said Cantemir Ciurea-Ercău, President, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). “Two decades after we hosted the first ConvEx-3, we are proud to again contribute to strengthening global nuclear emergency preparedness. In today’s interconnected world, effective preparedness must transcend borders—this exercise reflects our shared commitment to safety, cooperation and transparency.”

    Romania, bordering five countries, last hosted such an exercise in 2005. Cernavodă is the country’s only nuclear power plant, situated roughly 160 kilometres east of Bucharest, close to the Black Sea. During the 36-hour exercise, participants will simulate real-time decisions, emergency communications and international coordination under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Early Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). These will include protective actions such as simulated evacuation and iodine distribution, public outreach and communication, medical response coordination, and the management of food and trade restrictions based on radiological assessments.

    The IAEA will activate its Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) and test critical tools like the Unified System for Information Exchange (USIE), a secure platform for designated contact points from IAEA Member States, and the International Radiation Monitoring System (IRMIS) platform. Member States will also activate their national emergency centres, request or offer assistance, share monitoring data, and coordinate cross-border protective actions and messaging to their populations.

    The ConvEx-3 (2025) was developed by SNN Nuclearelectrica and CNCAN, with international coordination by the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE), which includes the World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, INTERPOL and others.

    About Convention Exercises

    Convention Exercises, or ConvEx, are held to test the operational arrangements of the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention.  The goal is to evaluate and further improve the international framework for emergency preparedness and response. ConvEx are prepared at three levels of complexity:

    • ConvEx-1 is designed to test emergency communication links with contact points in Member States that need to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and to test the response times of these contact points.
    • ConvEx-2 is designed to test specific parts of the international framework for emergency preparedness and response, for example to rehearse the appropriate use of communication procedures; to practice procedures for international assistance; and to test the arrangements and tools used for assessment and prognosis in a nuclear or radiological emergency.
    • ConvEx-3 is a full-scale exercise designed to evaluate international emergency response arrangements and capabilities for a severe nuclear or radiological emergency over several days, regardless of its cause.

    Photos from the ConvEx-3 will be made available here.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: IAEA and Romania to Launch Global Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    Fire trucks and an emergency response helicopter are positioned to provide support during a national nuclear emergency exercise in Romania in October 2023. (Photo: C. Torres Vidal/IAEA)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Romania will launch tomorrow, 24 June, the world’s largest and most complex international nuclear emergency exercise, simulating a severe accident at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    Over two days, more than 75 countries and 10 international organizations will take part in the ConvEx-3 (2025)—a full-scale exercise designed to test global readiness for a nuclear or radiological emergency with cross-border consequences. Participation will occur both on-site in Romania and remotely from other countries.

    As nuclear use expands globally, its success hinges on strong safety standards and constant vigilance, said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “This exercise is a clear demonstration of the international community’s commitment to protect people and the environment by working together, across borders and systems, when every minute counts.”

    “Hosting ConvEx-3 is both a responsibility and an opportunity for Romania,” said Cantemir Ciurea-Ercău, President, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). “Two decades after we hosted the first ConvEx-3, we are proud to again contribute to strengthening global nuclear emergency preparedness. In today’s interconnected world, effective preparedness must transcend borders—this exercise reflects our shared commitment to safety, cooperation and transparency.”

    Romania, bordering five countries, last hosted such an exercise in 2005. Cernavodă is the country’s only nuclear power plant, situated roughly 160 kilometres east of Bucharest, close to the Black Sea. During the 36-hour exercise, participants will simulate real-time decisions, emergency communications and international coordination under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Early Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). These will include protective actions such as simulated evacuation and iodine distribution, public outreach and communication, medical response coordination, and the management of food and trade restrictions based on radiological assessments.

    The IAEA will activate its Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) and test critical tools like the Unified System for Information Exchange (USIE), a secure platform for designated contact points from IAEA Member States, and the International Radiation Monitoring System (IRMIS) platform. Member States will also activate their national emergency centres, request or offer assistance, share monitoring data, and coordinate cross-border protective actions and messaging to their populations.

    The ConvEx-3 (2025) was developed by SNN Nuclearelectrica and CNCAN, with international coordination by the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE), which includes the World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, INTERPOL and others.

    About Convention Exercises

    Convention Exercises, or ConvEx, are held to test the operational arrangements of the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention.  The goal is to evaluate and further improve the international framework for emergency preparedness and response. ConvEx are prepared at three levels of complexity:

    • ConvEx-1 is designed to test emergency communication links with contact points in Member States that need to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and to test the response times of these contact points.
    • ConvEx-2 is designed to test specific parts of the international framework for emergency preparedness and response, for example to rehearse the appropriate use of communication procedures; to practice procedures for international assistance; and to test the arrangements and tools used for assessment and prognosis in a nuclear or radiological emergency.
    • ConvEx-3 is a full-scale exercise designed to evaluate international emergency response arrangements and capabilities for a severe nuclear or radiological emergency over several days, regardless of its cause.

    Photos from the ConvEx-3 will be made available here.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA and Romania to Launch Global Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Fire trucks and an emergency response helicopter are positioned to provide support during a national nuclear emergency exercise in Romania in October 2023. (Photo: C. Torres Vidal/IAEA)

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Romania will launch tomorrow, 24 June, the world’s largest and most complex international nuclear emergency exercise, simulating a severe accident at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant.

    Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

    Over two days, more than 75 countries and 10 international organizations will take part in the ConvEx-3 (2025)—a full-scale exercise designed to test global readiness for a nuclear or radiological emergency with cross-border consequences. Participation will occur both on-site in Romania and remotely from other countries.

    As nuclear use expands globally, its success hinges on strong safety standards and constant vigilance, said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “This exercise is a clear demonstration of the international community’s commitment to protect people and the environment by working together, across borders and systems, when every minute counts.”

    “Hosting ConvEx-3 is both a responsibility and an opportunity for Romania,” said Cantemir Ciurea-Ercău, President, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). “Two decades after we hosted the first ConvEx-3, we are proud to again contribute to strengthening global nuclear emergency preparedness. In today’s interconnected world, effective preparedness must transcend borders—this exercise reflects our shared commitment to safety, cooperation and transparency.”

    Romania, bordering five countries, last hosted such an exercise in 2005. Cernavodă is the country’s only nuclear power plant, situated roughly 160 kilometres east of Bucharest, close to the Black Sea. During the 36-hour exercise, participants will simulate real-time decisions, emergency communications and international coordination under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Early Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). These will include protective actions such as simulated evacuation and iodine distribution, public outreach and communication, medical response coordination, and the management of food and trade restrictions based on radiological assessments.

    The IAEA will activate its Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) and test critical tools like the Unified System for Information Exchange (USIE), a secure platform for designated contact points from IAEA Member States, and the International Radiation Monitoring System (IRMIS) platform. Member States will also activate their national emergency centres, request or offer assistance, share monitoring data, and coordinate cross-border protective actions and messaging to their populations.

    The ConvEx-3 (2025) was developed by SNN Nuclearelectrica and CNCAN, with international coordination by the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE), which includes the World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, INTERPOL and others.

    About Convention Exercises

    Convention Exercises, or ConvEx, are held to test the operational arrangements of the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention.  The goal is to evaluate and further improve the international framework for emergency preparedness and response. ConvEx are prepared at three levels of complexity:

    • ConvEx-1 is designed to test emergency communication links with contact points in Member States that need to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and to test the response times of these contact points.
    • ConvEx-2 is designed to test specific parts of the international framework for emergency preparedness and response, for example to rehearse the appropriate use of communication procedures; to practice procedures for international assistance; and to test the arrangements and tools used for assessment and prognosis in a nuclear or radiological emergency.
    • ConvEx-3 is a full-scale exercise designed to evaluate international emergency response arrangements and capabilities for a severe nuclear or radiological emergency over several days, regardless of its cause.

    Photos from the ConvEx-3 will be made available here.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Albanian Parliament launches e-Legislation Portal with OSCE and Swiss support

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Albanian Parliament launches e-Legislation Portal with OSCE and Swiss support

    Head of OSCE Presence in Albania, Ambassador Michel Tarran, speaking at today’s event aimed at launching Albanian Assembly’s e-Legislation portal. (OSCE/Elton Tahirllari) Photo details

    On 23 June 2025, in an important milestone for Albania’s legislative process, the Assembly of Albania launched the e-Legislation Portal, created through a project of the OSCE Presence in Albania with funding from the Swiss government.
    The Portal, developed in line with the international Akoma Ntoso standard, is designed to allow real-time search and access to consolidated legislative documents. It enhances internal workflow, supports more effective and transparent law-making and contributes to informed decision-making in the Assembly. The e-Legislation Portal is also a stepping stone towards the country’s full transition to the e-Legislation system by 2028.
    Addressing the launching event attended by dignitaries and officials from institutions involved in the law-making process, Speaker of Parliament Elisa Spiropali praised the initiative as an important step towards a unified and standardized legislative process across institutions in Albania, where Parliament leads. “With this platform, we are opening a new chapter in the way we draft, discuss, and adopt laws,” she announced. “We have built a crucial tool for modernizing and digitizing the parliamentary process of law-making, thereby significantly contributing to the democratic transformation of society. The portal represents a direct and concrete response to the challenge of swiftly transforming the Albanian Parliament into one that meets the rigorous standards of EU member state parliaments.” The Speaker expressed gratitude to the OSCE Presence for its continued partnership with the Assembly and to the Swiss Embassy for its contribution and financial support.
    “By embracing e-Legislation, Albania joins a growing number of countries that have adopted these systems and positions itself as a regional leader in digital legislative reform,” said Ambassador Michel Tarran, Head of the OSCE Presence. “Looking ahead, the long-term success of the e-Legislation process depends on full ownership by the Parliament, as a clear testament to the sustainability of this reform and its integration into the institutional fabric of Albania’s legislative system,” he added.
    The event included a demonstration of the Portal’s functionalities. It currently hosts over 300 laws processed in the Akoma Ntoso format. Although currently in a testing phase, the Portal is accessible at: e-legjislacioni.parlament.al, where users can explore its features and contribute to its ongoing improvement. Content development will continue under the direction of the Assembly, with support from the OSCE Presence, as needed.
    The initiative is part of the OSCE Presence’s project “e-Legislation support for Albania” (2023–2025), funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation. The OSCE Presence continues to support the Albanian Parliament in areas including law-making, legislative reform, capacity building, electoral processes, civic engagement, gender equality and good governance.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Right Committee Opens One Hundred and Forty-Fourth Session

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Right Committee this morning opened its one hundred and forty-fourth session, during which it will examine the reports of Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Latvia, North Macedonia, Spain and Viet Nam on their implementation of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

    In her opening remarks, Sara Hamood, Chief of the Anti-Racial Discrimination Section within the Rule of Law, Equality and Non-Discrimination Branch of the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Representative of the Secretary-General, said this session was taking place in extremely challenging times for human rights globally. 

    Quoting the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ opening remarks at the current Human Rights Council session, she expressed concern about “spiralling conflicts”, “social tensions”, “widespread discrimination” and “attacks on the international institutions that underpin our rights, including the International Criminal Court”, as well as about funding cuts affecting the Office of the High Commissioner, the human rights mechanisms, and civil society partners.  The High Commissioner appealed for the strongest possible defence of international law and human rights, emphasising that human rights provided stability and security in troubled times and that they were guardrails on power, especially when it was unleashed in its most brutal forms.

    On 17 June, the High Commissioner presented to the Council his annual report (A/HRC/59/20), in which he stressed that the “global consensus around international norms and institutions continues to face serious threats”.  He stated that “in this troubled and turbulent context, a global coalition is needed to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment, anchored in human rights, to international order and the rule of law.”

    Last week, the Council also held interactive dialogues with Special Procedures.  The Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and association presented her report on the “impact of the 2023-2025 ‘super election’ cycle on the rights of peaceful assembly and association” (A/HRC59/44).  The Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression presented her report on “freedom of expression and elections in the digital age” (A/HRC/59/50). 

    Ms. Hamood said this year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the adoption of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the first international human rights treaty adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1965. This year’s commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was dedicated to this important anniversary.  There needed to be a renewed commitment to the Convention, stronger implementation, and inclusive dialogue to advance racial justice.  A series of global events were being held to mark the occasion, including commemorations in New York and Geneva.  As part of this initiative, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination would host a commemorative event on 4 December.

    While recent years had seen growing momentum for racial justice, a rollback on racial justice commitments was now being seen in some contexts, Ms. Hamood said.  Despite significant progress, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’s promise remained unfulfilled for many.  Racism and white supremacy continued to poison communities, politics, media and online platforms.  Racism was manifested in many ways, including through violations of civil and political rights.  The Human Rights Committee needed to continue its important contribution to the fight against racism; the work of the anti-racism mechanisms would prove helpful in this regard.

    Addressing the financial crisis in the human rights system, Ms. Hamood said that for treaty bodies with three annual sessions, including the Human Rights Committee, the Office of the High Commissioner would not be able to secure the funding to hold their third sessions this year.  The Office received only 73 per cent of its approved regular budget in 2025, a further decrease from the 87 per cent of its approved regular budget received in 2024.  As most of these funds were needed to cover contractual liabilities, particularly staff costs, the amount available for meetings and activities was simply inadequate. Next year also risked seeing a continuation of this trend.

    The liquidity situation was a system-wide crisis.  The United Nations Office at Geneva’s Conference Services had also faced dramatic cuts, leading it to adopt cash conservative measures that would impact the conference support provided to the human rights treaty bodies, particularly in terms of documentation, meeting time and interpretation.  It was called on to reduce official meetings and documentation by 10 per cent.

    Ms. Hamood said reductions of the allotments would impact the treaty bodies’ ability to hold dialogues with States parties and to take decisions on individual communications, resulting in further delays and backlogs.  Another area where cuts were being made was in treaty body capacity building activities, which provided valuable support for States to report to and interact with the treaty bodies.  All this caused real damage to the predictability of the reporting cycle, which was critically important to enable States, civil society organizations and right holders to engage effectively with the treaty bodies.  Ms. Hamood expressed regret that, given the overall reduction in funds and availability of support services, business as usual was no longer possible.

    She reported that the thirty-seventh annual meeting of the Chairs of the human rights treaty bodies took place in Geneva from 2 to 6 June 2025.  An overarching theme addressed in considerable depth was the United Nations liquidity crisis and how it was impacting the effective discharge of the mandates of the treaty bodies.  The Chairs also discussed how to create synergies between human rights mechanisms as well as regional mechanisms, the progress made on the alignment of their working methods and practices, and the implementation of the guidelines on the independence and impartiality of members of the human rights treaty bodies.

    Ms. Hamood said the Committee had a busy agenda ahead of it, including seven State party reviews, the consideration and adoption of 10 lists of issues prior to reporting, as well as several individual communications under the Optional Protocol.  It would also hold briefings with various stakeholders, each of which was a vital opportunity to stem the local but also global assault on human rights and their defenders.  She closed by wishing the Committee a successful and productive session.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chair, said the Committee was particularly interested in the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention against Racial Discrimination.  Racial discrimination was an issue often dealt with by the Committee, as it often manifested itself in violations of civil and political rights.  The Committee would continue to scrutinise the state of racial discrimination under its mandated activities.  The Committee took inspiration from Ms. Hamood’s statement, as next year would mark the sixtieth anniversary of the adoption of the Covenant, Mr. Soh noted.

    The Committee then adopted its agenda and programme of work for the session.

    Hélène Tigroudja, Committee Vice Chair and Chair of the working group on communications, presented the report on the group’s activities for the one hundred and fortieth session. She said that the format of the group’s work had been adjusted, with three days dedicated to discussions on communications prior to the session.  These were not enough to assess all the communications before the Committee. However, the working group had done tremendous work in a spirit of solidarity.

    Ms. Tigroudja said that, of the 21 documents submitted for consideration, it discussed 18 and adopted 16. The Committee had continued to append in a single document communications submitted against the same State party and concerning the same claims.  This enabled the group to review a total of 26 communications, covering, inter alia, participation in public affairs, the right to self-determination, freedom of expression in political and electoral processes, political representation of indigenous peoples, racial discrimination, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment in detention, and non-refoulement.  The communications examined were submitted between 2015 and 2023 and concerned 13 States parties covering different continents and regions.

    Following its discussions, and pending the finalisation of its work this week, the working group submitted to the plenary 10 communications with a finding of inadmissibility and six communications with a finding of violation of the rights of the Covenant, Ms. Tigroudja reported.  Five communications were still to be examined this week.  She thanked all those who had worked hard to facilitate the holding of the condensed working group, including the petitions unit, which prepared draft decisions.

    Preparation of draft decisions in advance of plenary meetings was an absolute necessity, and one of the fundamental tasks entrusted to the Committee by States through the Optional Protocol, Ms. Tigroudja said.  Individual communications were an important part of the Committee’s raison d’être. A session without draft decisions previously discussed, reviewed and finalised in working groups and in person would lead to a decrease in the quality and effectiveness of the Committee’s work, and moreover a denial of justice for victims seeking to denounce violations of their rights, she concluded.

    A Committee Expert thanked the working group for its work, and expressed concern about the financial situation, which impeded the holding of pre-sessional working groups, and had caused the cancellation of the third session of the Committee.  She thanked all Committee members for their efforts to maintain the Committee’s work in these difficult circumstances.

    The working group’s report was adopted.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 24 June, to begin its consideration of the third periodic report of Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/KAZ/3).

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.009E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI China: City cruise into Club World Cup knockouts with 6-0 win

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Manchester City and Juventus reached the last 16 of the FIFA Club World Cup on Sunday while Real Madrid moved closer with a gritty win over Pachuca despite playing nearly the entire match with 10 men.

    Pachuca, Al Ain and Wydad Casablanca joined previously eliminated Auckland City, Ulsan, Urawa Red Diamonds and Los Angeles FC in exiting the tournament in the United States.

    In Philadelphia, 20-year-old Turkiye international forward Kenan Yildiz scored twice as Juventus routed Morocco’s Wydad Casablanca 4-1 to clinch a knockout phase spot with a game to spare.

    Abdelmounaim Boutouil gifted the Italian club the lead with a sixth-minute own goal and Yildiz doubled the advantage by thumping a 20-yard effort into the top-right corner.

    Thembinkosi Lorch narrowed the deficit, lifting a shot over goalkeeper Michele Di Gregorio after Nordin Amrabat’s defense-splitting pass.

    The impressive Yildiz made it 3-1 as he wrong-footed Boutouil before calmly side-footing into the far corner.

    Serbian striker Dusan Vlahovic put the result beyond doubt by converting a 94th-minute penalty after being fouled by Guilherme Ferreira.

    Juventus now has six points from its two games while Wydad is eliminated irrespective of its last group-stage fixture against Al Ain.

    “It was a different kind of match, also because of the [early] kick-off time and the tempo was lower,” Juventus manager Igor Tudor said afterwards. “They had prepared for us as well. We scored early and that helped us. But in football, you never know, you always have to stay alert.

    “I’m never calm, not even at 3-1 or 4-1. I always see danger. Credit to the boys, two good wins. Tonight they’ll have an evening off and a dinner out. They’ve earned it. Now we prepare for City, which will be a great challenge,” he added.

    In Charlotte, Real Madrid registered its first win of the tournament with a 3-1 defeat of Mexican side Pachuca.

    The Spanish giants were reduced to 10 men in the seventh minute after Raul Asencio was shown a straight red card for pulling down Salomon Rondon when the Venezuela international was through on goal.

    Despite the numerical disadvantage, Real Madrid took the lead through Jude Bellingham, who charged into the box after Fran Garcia’s pass before lashing low into the far corner.

    Arda Guler doubled the lead with a clinical finish after combining with Gonzalo Garcia and Federico Valverde made it 3-0 by volleying home at the far post following Brahim Diaz’s lofted pass.

    Pachuca pulled one back through Elias Montiel’s deflected strike 10 minutes from time.

    The victory lifted Real Madrid to the top of Group H with four points while Pachuca is last and cannot advance to the next stage.

    “We had to defend with one less player in a low block and in that situation you have to know how to suffer and have the humility to find the right moment,” Real Madrid manager Xabi Alonso said.

    “We weren’t able to show what we’ve been working on but the defensive line held strong and we had good periods of possession. We took a lot of positives from the game, especially the three points.”

    In Atlanta, Ilkay Gundogan struck twice as Manchester City trounced Al Ain of the United Arab Emirates 6-0.

    Claudio Echeverri, Oscar Bobb, Rayan Cherki and Erling Haaland were also on target – the latter from the penalty spot – as City secured its place in the next round.

    Al Ain had only 26% of the possession and managed only one shot on target, sealing its early exit from the competition.

    “We spoke a lot before the game about how to maintain our pressure so that we could score the goals that we did,” Manchester City manager Pep Guardiola said.

    “The guys that played today took their opportunity. We are fortunate to have a lot of talented players that are waiting for their chance.”

    In Sunday’s other fixture, Austria’s RB Salzburg drew 0-0 with Saudi Arabian club Al Hilal at Audi Field in Washington D.C.

    Al Hilal had 58 percent of the total possession but managed only four shots on target while Salzburg had six attempts saved by Morocco international goalkeeper Yassine Bounou.

    The result leaves Salzburg second in Group H with four points, two ahead of third-placed Al Hila

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: SPbU and RT agree on cooperation | Saint Petersburg State University

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Saint Petersburg State University – Saint Petersburg State University –

    The cooperation includes a wide range of joint activities: from organizing internships and professional training for students within the framework of an educational project RT Schoolbefore university students participate in international programs.

    Employment in the information and communications sector has grown by 20% in five years

    “St. Petersburg University always strives to find advanced solutions in a variety of areas. We are ready to build an effective modern system of interaction between education and media, and contribute to the development of the Russian media industry. Particular attention in this work will be paid to the training of highly qualified specialists who will become the future of the Russian media sphere. I am confident that together we will create a powerful platform for the exchange of experience, knowledge and innovative solutions,” said St. Petersburg University Rector Nikolay Kropachev.

    At St. Petersburg University, journalism students gain unique practical skills at the St. Petersburg University Media Center, where they can take part in preparing news stories about the life of the University, realize their creative potential at the art and radio editorial offices, and create their own original projects.

    “For RT, developing the young generation of specialists is a priority task. We are convinced that the future depends on the professionalism and fresh ideas of those who are just starting their journey today. Therefore, cooperation with such an authoritative educational institution as St. Petersburg State University is of great importance to us. The signing of this agreement is a significant step in the development of our educational project “RT School”. This partnership will provide students of St. Petersburg State University with a unique opportunity to acquire practical skills and learn from world-famous professionals working for RT, and will also become fertile ground for cultivating new talents in the media,” said Vera Kharina, General Director of ANO TV-Novosti.

    Guided by the desire for comprehensive development of partnerships, the University and the organization have agreed to mutually study the experience and improve the qualifications of the company’s specialists at the University. It is also planned to jointly develop and implement priority areas of activity of the parties, create common information resources, publications, audio and video materials dedicated to various areas of activity of St. Petersburg State University.

    The RT international television network includes news channels in English, Arabic, Spanish, German, Serbian and French, and the RTD documentary channel in Russian and English. The network also includes online portals in eight languages and the global multimedia agency Ruptly, which offers exclusive content to television channels around the world. RT is present in Chinese on popular Chinese social networks, as well as on social networks in Hindi. RT is available 24 hours a day to over 900 million viewers in more than 100 countries.

    The parties also agreed on cooperation in the field of information coverage of the University’s international projects, language teaching, including rare African languages such as Xhosa, the implementation of educational programs in the field of artificial intelligence, work on the creation of an explanatory dictionary of the state language of the Russian Federation, support for SVO participants and their children, including the organization of training in additional educational programs, the activities of the University’s representative offices abroad, the development of the SPbU online school and the promotion of advanced scientific developments in current areas of research.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Building inclusive peace: How LGBTIQ+ communities are bridging divides in Cyprus and Kosovo

    Source: United Nations – Peacekeeping

     

    This story was written by Elssa Gbeily, a former strategic communications consultant for the UN Department of Peace Operations focused on gender, peace and security.

    Every June, Pride Month highlights the rights and identities of LGBTIQ+* people. For the UN and its peacekeepers, Pride is more than a celebration—it is a call to uphold our shared responsibility to protect the rights and dignity of all people, no matter their sexual orientation or gender identity. 

    Many peacekeeping missions operate in environments where LGBTIQ+ people face stigma, discrimination, or legal barriers. Despite these challenges, missions are finding context-sensitive ways to support rights-based inclusion without jeopardizing their impartiality or host country relations.

    For the UN peacekeeping missions in Kosovo** and Cyprus, advancing the rights of LGBTIQ+ people has become not only a human rights imperative, but a concrete strategy for building trust, strengthening social cohesion, and preventing conflict.

    unficyp_2.jpg

     

    Building bridges between communities in Cyprus

    On the island of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots live on either side of a UN-administered buffer zone. Although Cyprus became independent in 1960 with a constitution intended to balance the interests of both communities, a series of constitutional crises led to the outbreak of violence in 1963. A UN peacekeeping mission, UNFICYP, was subsequently established and today helps maintain peace along the buffer zone.

    Fostering trust and reconciliation between the two communities is a key part of UNFICYP’s work to promote peace. The mission works with civil society, diplomats, international organizations and local communities to host events that bring people together and has found an ally in the LGBTIQ+ community as a powerful agent for reconciliation.

    Working with LGBTIQ+ communities from both sides of the island, the mission has supported Pride events across the island, including a Queer film festival and a joint conference on LGBTIQ+ rights in health and education that was organized by local organizations and the British High Commission, and hosted inside the UN buffer zone.

    “For me, it really highlights how despite obstacles we are able to gather, we were able to organize collective events, and we are able to show a way forward,” explains Theo Ieronymides, a local Cypriot and co-founder of the Queer Collective, an initiative that connects LGBTIQ+ persons across the divide. 

    By supporting initiatives that build bridges between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriot communities, UNFICYP and its LGBTIQ+ partners are fostering mutual recognition and breaking down identity-based divisions that fuel tensions.

    “LGBTIQ+ people, and those working with them to secure their rights, have proved time and again the value of communities in providing support and driving change,” emphasized UN Secretary-General António Guterres in May. 

    Supporting human rights in Kosovo for inclusive governance and durable conflict resolution

    Following the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, which left deep divisions between ethnic communities, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) promotes human rights and fosters reconciliation. Advancing LGBTIQ+ rights is integral to this work, as inclusion and equality are key to building trust and achieving lasting peace.

    Together with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNMIK has supported efforts to combat discrimination—such as supporting Kosovo’s first-ever Pride parade in 2017.

    UNMIK also serves on Kosovo’s Advisory and Coordination Group on LGBTI Rights, alongside government, civil society and international actors. It provides technical input, particularly on anti-discrimination policy, and helped draft the upcoming “Action Plan for the Rights of LGBTI Persons in Kosovo 2024–2026”—the first of its kind in Kosovo. The plan covers health, education and culture, anti-discrimination, and awareness-raising, and seeks to enhance cooperation between government institutions and civil society.

    UNMIK supports the Civil Society Human Rights Network—a coalition of seven local organizations defending marginalized groups, including LGBTIQ+ persons. The network documents rights violations, promotes legal reform, and raises awareness. Its 2024 report highlights issues such as hate crimes and lack of healthcare and shelter, urging legislative action to protect gender identity and legalize same-sex unions.

    By working with the LGBTIQ+ community and other partners to combat inequality and discrimination, UNMIK plays a vital role in promoting human rights, reconciliation and security in Kosovo. These actions not only benefit the LGBTIQ+ community, they help build a more inclusive, cohesive society where peace is more likely to be sustained for future generations.

    The experiences of Cyprus and Kosovo offer valuable lessons for other missions seeking to promote inclusion in deeply divided contexts, demonstrating that even in fragile environments, small, locally driven initiatives can lay the groundwork for broader societal transformation.

     

    LGBTIQ+ inclusion as a foundation for lasting peace   

    In June 2024, the UN launched its inaugural strategy to mainstream LGBTIQ+ inclusion across all areas of its work, including peacekeeping. Building on the UN Free & Equal campaign, launched in 2013 by the UN Human Rights Office, the strategy strengthens the UN’s commitment to recognizing the rights, needs and contributions of LGBTIQ+ persons. Together, these initiatives seek to enhance the inclusiveness and effectiveness of peace, humanitarian and development efforts.

    Implementing this vision in peacekeeping contexts can present challenges.  “Many UN missions are deployed to countries where issues related to LGBTIQ+ people are taboo and LGBTIQ+ persons and organizations can face legal restrictions, which can make these issues difficult to raise,” says Albert Trithart, a research fellow at the International Peace Institute and author of one of the first reports on LGBTIQ+ inclusion in UN peacekeeping. 

    However, he sees the adoption of the LBGTIQ+ strategy as an opportunity. “The strategy requires UN missions—and the whole UN Secretariat—to integrate the protection and promotion of the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons in programming and to ‘ensure safe and meaningful engagement of LGBTIQ+ persons in programmes and policies that impact them.’”  He sees many areas where peacekeeping can help advance LGBTIQ+ rights, and peace more broadly, as part of their current work. “One area is reporting. Violence against LGBTIQ+ people is often invisible, especially in contexts of armed conflict. Missions that are already reporting on conflict-related sexual violence could help draw attention to violence specifically targeting people on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.”  By better understanding the dynamics of violence, peacekeeping missions can better address them and more effectively promote security.

    Together, UN Peacekeeping, UN Member States and our other partners can expand on the work being done with LGBTIQ+ communities to protect their rights and advance more inclusive, sustainable peace. “Working as one, we must push to repeal discriminatory laws, combat violence and harmful practices, and end the scapegoating of marginalized communities,” said Secretary-General Guterres in May. “We will not rest until the rights of all are a reality, no matter who they are or whom they love.”

    *LGBTIQ+ stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons

    **References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why Israel and the U.S. are sure to encounter the limits of air power in Iran

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

    The United States has apparently answered Israel’s call to to become involved in the war between Israel and Iran.

    President Donald Trump had signalled a willingness for the U.S. to become involved in the conflict. He went so far, in fact, to suggest in social media posts that he could kill Iran’s supreme leader if he wanted to.

    Segment on Trump’s threats against Iran’s leader. (BBC News)

    The American military can certainly make an impact in any air campaign against Iran. The problem from a military standpoint, however, is that the U.S., based on its forces’ deployment, will almost certainly seek to keep its involvement limited to its air force to avoid another Iraq-like quagmire.

    While doing so could almost certainly disrupt Iran’s nuclear program, it will likely fall short of Israel’s goal of regime change.

    In fact, it could reinforce the Iranian government and draw the U.S. into a costly ground war.




    Read more:
    Why is there so much concern over Iran’s nuclear program? And where could it go from here?


    Israel’s need for American support

    The initial stated reason for Israel’s bombing campaign — Iran’s nuclear capabilities — appears specious at best.

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued several times in the past, without evidence, that Iran is close to achieving a nuclear weapon. U.S. intelligence, however, have assessed that Iran is three years away from deploying a nuclear weapon.

    Regardless of the veracity of the claims, Israel initiated the offensive and requires American support.

    Israel’s need for U.S. assistance rests on two circumstances:

    1. While Israel succeeded in eliminating key figures from the Iranian military in its initial strikes, Iran’s response appears to have exceeded Israel’s expectations with their Arrow missile interceptors nearing depletion.

    2. Israel’s air strikes can only achieve so much in disrupting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Most analysts note that Israel’s bombings are only likely to delay the Iranian nuclear program by a few months. This is due to the fact that Israeli missiles are incapable of penetrating the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which estimates place close to 300 feet underground.

    The United States, however, possesses munitions that have reportedly destroyed the Fordow facility. Most notably, the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (more commonly known as a bunker buster) has a penetration capability of 200 feet and was reportedly used in the attack.

    Romanticizing air power

    Nonetheless, the efficacy of air power has been vastly overrated in the popular media and various air forces of the world. Air power is great at disrupting an opponent, but has significant limitations in influencing the outcome of a war.

    Specifically, air power is likely to prove an inadequate tool for one of the supposed Israeli and American objectives in the war: regime change. For air power to be effective at bringing about regime change, it needs to demoralize the Iranian people to the point that they’re willing to oppose their own government.

    Early air enthusiasts believed that a population’s demoralization would be an inevitable consequence of aerial bombardment. Italian general Giulio Douhet, a prominent air power theorist, argued that air power was so mighty that it could destroy cities and demoralize an opponent into surrendering.

    Douhet was correct on the first point. He was wrong on the second.

    Recent history provides evidence. While considerable ink has been spilled to demonstrate the efficacy of air power during the Second World War, close examination of the facts demonstrate that it had a minimal impact. In fact, Allied bombing of German cities in several instances created the opposite effect.

    More recent bombing campaigns replicated this failure. The U.S. bombing of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War did not significantly damage North Vietnamese morale or war effort. NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999, likewise, rallied support for the unpopular Slobodan Milosevic due to its perceived injustice — and continues to evoke strong emotions to this day.

    Iran’s political regime may be unpopular with many Iranians, but Israeli and American bombing may shore up support for the Iranian government.

    Nationalism is a potent force, particularly when people are under attack. The attacks on Iran will rally segments of the population to the government that would otherwise oppose it.

    Few positive options

    The limitations of air power to fuel significant political change in Iran should have given Trump pause about intervening in the conflict.

    Some American support, such as providing weapons, is a given due to the close relationship between the U.S. and Israel. But any realization of American and Israeli aspirations of a non-nuclear Iran and a new government will likely require ground forces.

    Recent American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq show such a ground forces operation won’t lead to the swift victory that Trump desires, but could potentially stretch on for decades.

    James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Why Israel and the U.S. are sure to encounter the limits of air power in Iran – https://theconversation.com/why-israel-and-the-u-s-are-sure-to-encounter-the-limits-of-air-power-in-iran-259348

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in Malaysia, Recommends Further Improvement

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    An IAEA team of experts visited Malaysia’s nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI, during an Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors mission. (Photo: Nuklear Malaysia)

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Malaysia is committed to the safe operation of its sole nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP). The team also identified the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the reactor’s safety committee, the management of refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components, and operating procedures.

    The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the RTP facility, which concluded on 20 June, was conducted at the request of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia). The mission team comprised three experts from Slovenia, South Africa, and Thailand, and two IAEA staff.

    RTP is located in Bangi, Selangor, about 30 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Two INSARR missions were conducted at RTP in 1997 and 2014. Since then, the reactor has undergone modifications, including replacement of the rotary rack, refurbishment of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and the upgrading of the stack monitoring system.

    RTP was constructed in 1979 and began operation in 1982. RTP was designed for various fields of nuclear research, education and training, and it incorporates facilities for neutron and gamma radiation studies, as well as isotope production and sample activation.

    The INSARR team visited the reactor and its associated facilities and met with the research reactor staff and management. “Nuklear Malaysia has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Ageing management of reactor systems and components that are important to safety can be challenging. Effective application of the IAEA safety standards, including the establishment of effective leadership and management for safety and the utilization of operating experience feedback, helps address this challenge.”

    The mission team made recommendations and suggestions to Nuklear Malaysia for further improvements, including the need for:

    • Improving the reactor safety committee’s oversight of all activities important to safety, including reactor modifications and operational safety programmes such as refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components;   
    • Strengthening procedures to respond to abnormal situations and events, such as loss of electrical power, fire and earthquakes;      
    • Establishing procedures for learning from operating experience; and     
    • Strengthening radiological protection practices by improving the classification of different areas of the workplace.  

    “The INSARR mission is a valuable opportunity for us to engage in a peer-review process,” said Julia Abdul Karim, Director of Technical Support Division at Nuklear Malaysia. “It enables us to benchmark our programmes and activities against the IAEA safety standards and the international best practices and to strengthen our operational safety of our research reactor.”

    Background

    INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. General information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

    The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    (As prepared for delivery)

    As the armed conflict in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the nuclear safety and security situation throughout the country continues to be highly precarious. The presence of the IAEA at all Ukrainian nuclear facilities has been and continues to be an invaluable asset to the international community and must be preserved.

    The IAEA remains present at Ukraine’s nuclear power plant facilities. Difficult conditions have in the past month complicated and delayed one rotation of experts, which was safely completed in recent days. Back in December, a drone hit and severely damaged an IAEA official vehicle during a rotation. As I reported to you in the special Board meeting shortly afterward, staff survived this unacceptable attack unharmed, but the rear of the vehicle was destroyed. Other episodes followed, confirming the dangerous situation.

    Around Ukraine, the Khmelnitsky NPP, the Rivne NPP and the South Ukraine NPP, continue to operate amid serious challenges, including on the electricity infrastructure, a major risk to the reliable and stable supply of power crucial for the safe operation of NPPs. The electrical grid’s ability to provide a reliable off-site power supply to Ukrainian NPPs was further reduced by damage sustained following military attacks in November and December 2024, a mission of IAEA experts that visited and assessed seven critical electrical substations concluded late last year. Considering the seriousness of the situation, I visited the Kyivska electrical substation last month to observe the damage sustained first hand. On what was my 11th visit to Ukraine since the start of the war, I also met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reiterating the IAEA’s commitment to supporting nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and our readiness to support the country’s plans to expand nuclear power at Khmelnytskyy NPP. Consultations with Moscow have also taken place and will continue, in the interest of nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

    At Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), where the 6 reactor units are in cold shutdown, the status of the off-site power supply remains extremely vulnerable. For about one week ZNPP had to rely on a single off-site power line following the loss of its only remaining back-up line, confirming the extremely fragile situation. 

    Last month at the Chornobyl site a drone caused significant damage to the structure built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor damaged in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards. Although this attack did not result in any radioactive release, it nevertheless underlines the persistent risk to nuclear safety during this military conflict.

    Since the Board gathered for its last regular meeting in November 2024, the Agency has arranged 31 deliveries of nuclear safety, security and medical equipment and supplies to Ukraine, bringing the total so far to 108 deliveries valued at more than EUR 15.6 million. The Agency also has initiated the first phase of its support on safety and security of radioactive sources in Ukraine.

    We are grateful to all 30 donor states and the European Union for their extrabudgetary contributions, and I encourage those who can, to support the delivery of the comprehensive assistance programme, for which EUR 22 million are necessary.

    As reflected in my latest report to the Board on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine, I would like to reiterate that all the IAEA’s activities in Ukraine are being conducted in line with relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and of the IAEA policy-making organs.

    Madame Chairperson,

    In February, I travelled to Fukushima to participate in collecting water samples off the coast of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. I did this together with scientists from China, Korea and Switzerland as part of additional measures to promote transparency and build trust in the region during the ongoing release of ALPS-treated water from the plant. Additional measures focus on expanding international participation and transparency, allowing hands-on independent measurements of the concentration level of the water. This work is conducted within agreed parameters set by the IAEA in its role as an independent, impartial and technical organization.  IAEA officials and experts from laboratories from China, France, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland also sampled ALPS -treated water – prior to dilution – from measurement/confirmation tanks on the premises at the site. The IAEA has maintained its independent monitoring and analysis efforts, confirming that tritium concentrations in the discharged batches remain far below operational limits.

    In December 2024, an IAEA Task Force concluded that the approach TEPCO, and the Government of Japan are taking continues to align with international safety standards.

    While in Japan, I also visited facilities where soil removed after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident is safely stored, managed, and recycled, an effort the IAEA has been supporting by working to ensure it meets international safety standards.

    You have before you the Nuclear Safety Review 2025 and the Nuclear Security Review 2025. Both documents present, in their respective areas, an analytical overview, the global trends, and the Agency’s main activities in 2024. They also identify the top priorities for the years ahead.

    This month the inaugural meeting of the Nuclear Security Working Group established under the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative’s Regulatory Track will identify nuclear security topics of common interest amongst participating States and share regulatory approaches, good practices and lessons learned in ensuring the security of SMRs.

    Our preparatory work in advance of the launch of Atomic Technology Licensed for Applications at Sea (ATLAS) later this year is progressing. ATLAS will provide a framework to enable the peaceful maritime uses of nuclear technology, a prospect that is generating significant interest.

    Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) later this month will participate in the 8th Review Meeting to study National Reports with the aim of improving safety in radioactive waste and spent fuel management.

    December saw the start of a new project supporting the establishment of sustainable regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and the security of radioactive material in Central East Asia and the Pacific Islands.

    In June, Romania will host ConvEx-3, the IAEA’s highest level and most complex emergency exercise. In the event of an incident with transboundary implications, Member States will be called upon to implement a harmonized response and therefore this exercise will have a particular focus on regional collaboration.

    The International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response will be held in December in Riyadh in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    Madame Chairperson,

    Today, 417 nuclear power reactors operating in 31 countries make up almost 377 gigawatts of installed capacity, providing just under 10 per cent of the world’s total electricity and a quarter of its low-carbon supply.

    It is clear that countries are turning more and more to nuclear energy. In the IAEA’s high case scenario, global nuclear electricity generating capacity is seen increasing two and a half times by 2050.  Delivering on that promise will require public support. That is why the first IAEA International Conference on Stakeholder Engagement for Nuclear Power Programmes will gather governments, industry and practitioners from around the world in the final week of May. Mayors of municipalities with nuclear power facilities from around the world will share their experiences. No one is better placed to assess the impact and contribution to the community of nuclear facilities than those living there.

    Following our first Nuclear Stakeholder Engagement School, hosted by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy last November, we are now planning two more later this year. In addition, we have also established a new Stakeholder Engagement Advisory Service, which will help countries assess and strengthen their stakeholder engagement programmes.

    The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly evolving and growing in all spheres of life, including in nuclear science and technology. AI data centres require a lot of energy and nuclear reactors provide clean, reliable, and adaptable options, including in the form of SMRs and micro reactors.  Meanwhile, the integration of AI into the nuclear sector offers the chance to streamline operations across the nuclear power project life cycle. In this context the IAEA will host the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Energy this December. We look forward to welcoming as many of you as possible to this important and first-of-a-kind event here at the Agency’s headquarters.

    Within the Secretariat we are also intent on making the most of AI while mitigating its risks, therefore we have established official guidelines, a portal and a community of practice.

    Our work on fusion continues apace with the publication of Experiences for Consideration in Fusion Plant Design Safety and Safety Assessment.

    Madame Chairperson,

    The Nuclear Technology Review before you highlights key advancements in nuclear applications that support Member States in addressing critical priorities. This year’s review places particular emphasis on innovations in food safety and authenticity, energy security, early disease detection and cancer treatment, environmental sustainability, and advanced manufacturing.

    In November, the IAEA hosted the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme. The Ministerial Declaration recognized both the critical role of nuclear science, technology, and applications in tackling global challenges, and the important role of the Technical Cooperation programme as a key mechanism in transferring, expanding and further accelerating Member State access to nuclear technology, materials, equipment and expertise for peaceful purposes.

    I am pleased to report the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme achieved an implementation rate of 86% in 2024. We provided our emergency assistance to Türkiye and Syria, assessing damage to civil structures following the earthquakes and building the capacities of Turkish and Syrian experts in non-destructive testing. We initiated procurement to reinstate X-ray and laboratory services in Grenada and Honduras in the aftermath of Hurricane Beryl and Tropical Storm Sara, and we aided oil-spill clean-up efforts in Trinidad and Tobago.

    In 2024, the Rate of Attainment for contributions to the TC Fund was 95%, underscoring Member States’ commitment to our work. To ensure resources for the TC programme are sufficient, assured and predicable, I urge Member States to contribute on time, and in full, to the TC Fund.

    Our flagship initiatives are making progress across the globe. Under Atoms4Food, about 27 countries from all regions have officially requested support. Member States have pledged almost EUR 9 million, two thirds of which was contributed by Japan to support livestock production in Côte d’Ivoire, food safety in Mauritania, and molecular laboratories in Vietnam, among other projects.

    Our network of international partnerships has grown with Memoranda of Understanding having been signed with Anglo American, CGIAR, and the Inter-American Institute of Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA). The partnership with Anglo American focuses on combating soil salinization through climate-smart agricultural practices.

    While I was in Japan last month, I signed a partnership with Sumitomo Corporation, one of the world’s largest integrated trading companies, to cooperate particularly in the area of sustainable uses of nuclear related technologies for multiple areas, including healthcare, shipping, fusion and capacity building efforts.  

    Under Rays of Hope, the Anchor Centre in Argentina held its first capacity-building event to strengthen paediatric radiotherapy services in Latin America and the Caribbean, creating a regional network for knowledge exchange and support.

    In January 2025, the IAEA conducted its first national-level quality assurance audit in diagnostic radiology, reviewing 16 hospitals in Qatar.

    The International Conference on Advances in Radiation Oncology (ICARO-4) will take place in the first week of June, focusing on emerging radiotherapy techniques to address global health challenges.

    Under the Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC), a novel surveillance technology for high-risk pathogens was transferred to the IAEA’s Animal Production and Health Laboratory in November and will soon be passed on to Member States. New funding pledges from the Republic of Korea, Portugal, and Japan are supporting ZODIAC’s coordinated research projects in Asia and Africa, as well as the development of AI-driven platforms for zoonotic disease monitoring.

    Under NUTEC Plastics 104 Member States are engaged in microplastic monitoring, with 42 developing recycling technologies. Four countries in Asia-Pacific and Latin America have validated radiation-based upcycling technology at lab scale, with private sector collaboration helping to build up operations. China is developing a pilot-scale facility, bringing the total number of countries promoting the technology to nine.

    In November this year, the International High-Level Forum on NUclear TEChnology for Controlling Plastic Pollution (NUTEC-Plastics): Scaling Solutions and Partnerships for Global Impact will take place in the Philippines. I thank the Philippines Government for hosting this important milestone.

    The Global Water Analysis Laboratory Network (GloWAL) baseline survey has received 85 responses from 65 countries, informing future activities. Its first coordination meeting for the Spanish-speaking Latin America and the Caribbean is underway.

    Under ReNuAL 2, the construction of new greenhouses in Seibersdorf is nearing completion and the modernized laboratories will be ready to welcome staff soon.  

    Madame Chairperson,

    Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

    Following my last report, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U‑235 has increased to 275 kg, up from 182 kg in the past quarter. Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State enriching to this level, causing me serious concern.

    It has been four years since Iran stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including provisionally applying its Additional Protocol and therefore it is also four years since the Agency was able to conduct complementary access in Iran.

    You also have before you my report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran says it has declared all nuclear material, activities and locations required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. However, this statement is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations in Iran. The Agency needs to know the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment involved.

    There is also a discrepancy in the material balance of uranium involved in uranium metal production experiments conducted at Jaber Ibn Hayan Mutlipurpose Laboratory, for which Iran has not accounted.

    Having stated it had suspended such implementation, Iran still is not implementing modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation for Iran.

    I am seriously concerned that the outstanding safeguards issues remain unresolved. They stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

    I deeply regret that Iran, despite having indicated a willingness to consider accepting the designation of four additional experienced Agency inspectors, did not accept their designation.

    There has been no significant progress towards implementing the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023. I call upon Iran urgently to implement the Joint Statement through serious engagement.

    In response to the Board’s request in its resolution of November 2024, I will produce a comprehensive and updated assessment on the presence and use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

    High-level engagement is indispensable to making real progress. My visit to Tehran last November, and meetings with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indicate that there may be room for constructive compromises. I hope to see them again soon and pursue effective dialogue and tangible results.

    The Board has before it for approval a draft Additional Protocol for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

    I have made it a priority to strengthen the legal framework for safeguards. Since the last Board meeting in November, Oman, Mongolia, Cyprus, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zambia have amended their original Small Quantities Protocols and Saudi Arabia has rescinded its original SQP. The number of States with safeguards agreements in force remains 191, and 143 of these States have additional protocols in force. I call upon the remaining three States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without comprehensive safeguards agreements to bring such agreements into force without delay. I also encourage States that have not yet concluded additional protocols to do so as soon as possible, and I reiterate my repeated calls for the remaining 14 States with SQPs based on the original standard text to amend or rescind them as soon as possible. Let me assure you that I will continue to use my good offices to strengthen the indispensable legal framework on which the continued peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology rest.

    The IAEA continues to monitor the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme.

    The Agency has observed that the 5MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon resumed operation in mid-October 2024, following a shutdown period of approximately 60 days. This shutdown is assessed to be of sufficient length to refuel the reactor and start its seventh operational cycle. Strong indicators of preparations for a new reprocessing campaign, including the operation of the steam plant serving the Radiochemical Laboratory, have been observed.

    In late-January 2025, the DPRK released photographs of General Secretary Kim Jong Un visiting “the nuclear material production base and the Nuclear Weapons Institute”. The depicted centrifuge cascades and infrastructure are consistent with the layout of a centrifuge enrichment facility and with the structure of the Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Plant. This development follows the DPRK’s publication in September 2024 of photographs of an undeclared enrichment facility at the Kangson Complex. The undeclared enrichment facilities at both Kangson and Yongbyon, combined with General Secretary Kim’s call for “overfulfilling the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials,” are of serious concern. There are indications that the uranium enrichment plants at Kangson and Yongbyon continue to operate, and there are indications that the light water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon continues to operate. Additions to the support infrastructure have been observed adjacent to the LWR.

    There were no indications of significant changes at the Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri, which remains prepared to support a nuclear test.

    The continuation and further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme are clear violations of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and are deeply regrettable. I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme.

    Concerning the safety of the LWR, we lack the necessary information to make an assessment. Safety should always be a paramount consideration when operating a reactor. Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.

    Following the change of Government in the Syrian Arab Republic towards the end of 2024, I have written to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. I requested cooperation with the Agency to enable us to fulfill our obligation to verify nuclear material and facilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement. I conveyed the importance of continuing and reinforcing cooperation between Syria and the Agency to address unresolved issues. Clarifying these issues remains essential to Syria demonstrating its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and international peace and security.

    I hope to be able to engage with the new government soon. Bringing total clarity to the situation regarding past activities in this field in Syria is indispensable to the realization of current efforts to modernize the country and put it on a firm path to peace and development.

    In April and May, the IAEA will participate in the Third Preparatory Meeting for the 2026 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York.

    Madame Chairperson,

    The IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska‑Curie Fellowship Programme has been expanding the talent base for the nuclear field since 2020 with 760 female students and graduates from 121 Member States so far having been supported in studying in 72 countries. In the current, fifth cycle, we selected 200 candidates from 109 countries. I would like to thank Member States that have contributed so far. For this programme to continue accepting new fellowship candidates it urgently needs further support. I ask those who can, to support this endeavor. 

    This year, we have planned three Lise Meitner Programme cohorts, in Argentina, Canada and Japan. They are focused on nuclear power, advanced nuclear technologies and research reactors.

    I am happy to report that we have reached parity, women now make up half the staff in the professional and higher categories. This is up from about 30% when I took office in 2019.

    I thank Member States who have paid their regular budget contributions, including some who paid in advance. It is important that all Member States pay their contributions in a timely manner. This will ensure liquidity of the regular budget throughout the year, allowing the Agency to carry out its activities effectively.

    You recently received for your consideration my proposed programme and budget for the 2026-2027 biennium.

    It has been prepared with due consideration of the constraints of the prevailing financial environment. Despite increasing demands and higher operational costs, I have decided for the third time in a row to propose a zero real growth budget. The proposal maintains balance among the different programmes and emphasises my commitment to ensuring our resources are managed with discipline, efficiency and restraint so that we maximize the impact of the Agency’s work.

    This being our first Board meeting of 2025, I want to conclude by saying that I look forward to making 2025 a successful year in which the IAEA benefits all Member States as we advance our common goals of peace and development.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI China: Belt and Road Film Week opens in Shanghai, fueling cross-cultural ties

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The Belt and Road Film Week opened in Shanghai on June 18 as part of the 27th Shanghai International Film Festival (SIFF), serving as a platform for international industry dialogue and offering an immersive cultural experience for residents and visitors.

    Actors Huang Xiaoming, Tang Yan and Yu Shi receive certificates appointing them as Belt and Road Film Week ambassadors during the opening ceremony in Shanghai, June 18, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    The event, themed “Travel through Cinema” and held primarily in Shanghai’s Pudong New Area, features a diverse program, including film screenings, cultural industry roundtables, the Charm Pudong Tour cultural experience, and a Belt and Road lifestyle market. Organizers said they aim to combine industry expertise with public participation and promote global cultural exchange.

    This year’s lineup features 15 films from Belt and Road countries, spanning a range of genres. Several entries have been screened at major film festivals, including Rotterdam, Locarno, and Tokyo. The program centers on cross-cultural narratives and regional identities, aiming to spotlight the cultures along the ancient Silk Road.

    Event coordinators have arranged eight post-screening filmmaker meet-and-greets, some of which have sold out. Five standout films are screening concurrently in Nanjing, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo and Hefei, extending the SIFF experience across the Yangtze River Delta. Honors such as the Audience Choice Award and Audience Recommendation Award are being decided by public voting during the film week.

    The event is bringing together more than 40 international filmmakers from over 20 Belt and Road countries in Pudong. Throughout the week, participants will explore key industry topics such as cross-border film collaboration, international distribution strategies, and the nurturing of emerging talent under the Belt and Road Initiative through alliance meetings and roundtable forums.

    The Belt and Road Film Festival Alliance, the foundation of the film week, has expanded rapidly since its launch. With the recent addition of the Serbia International Film and Music Festival, the alliance now includes 56 institutions in 49 countries, up from 31 institutions in 29 countries. Twenty alliance members and international guests received honorary certificates during the opening ceremony.

    Members of the Belt and Road Film Festival Alliance and international guests receive honorary certificates during the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Film Week in Shanghai, June 18, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    To strengthen cinematic exchanges among Belt and Road countries, this year’s film week appointed actors Huang Xiaoming, Yu Shi and Tang Yan as event ambassadors. Organizers said the trio will help broaden international outreach and engage audiences in China and overseas.

    The year 2025 marks the 130th anniversary of world cinema and the 120th anniversary of Chinese cinema. Shanghai, the birthplace of Chinese film, has played a key role in both the nation’s cinematic evolution and the global industry. Since its launch seven years ago, the Belt and Road Film Week has combined international films with Chinese storytelling abroad, strengthening cultural ties and expanding its global reach each year.

    Building on last year’s Latin American Fiesta, this year’s Belt and Road Film Week includes a Southeast Asian market at Bicester Village Shanghai. The summer event combines culture, tourism, commerce, sports and exhibitions. Inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, the market blends Southeast Asian and local elements, offering an immersive experience of food, art and film.

    The Belt and Road Film Week has also brought significant film industry resources to the Shanghai International Resort Area, a major tourism and entertainment zone in Pudong that includes the Shanghai Disney Resort and other commercial and cultural facilities. More than 180 film and cultural companies now operate in the area, covering entertainment, tourism, business and exhibitions.

    Representatives of 20 key film and cultural projects sign agreements to establish operations at the resort during the Belt and Road Film Week opening ceremony in Shanghai, June 18, 2025. [Photo courtesy of SIFF Organizing Committee]

    This year, 20 additional film and cultural companies set up operations in the resort area. Representatives signed agreements at an on-site ceremony during the opening event, marking a new stage in the development of Shanghai International Resort Area as a film and creative hub. Organizers said these efforts support the resort’s goal of becoming a globally influential screen culture center.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: Implementation of AI will give BRICS economies about 2-3 trillion dollars by 2030

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Chernyshenko held a plenary session entitled “AI Science: A New Path to Leadership.” Leading Russian and foreign scientists discussed how AI science and innovation are shaping Russia’s new technological path to global leadership.

    At the session, the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that the expected effect of introducing AI into the economies of the BRICS countries by 2030 will be around 2–3 trillion dollars:

    “According to various estimates, the expected effect of using AI technologies in the BRICS countries is between 2 and 3 trillion dollars. There is something to fight for – the share of advanced generative AI systems in this market is currently about 20%. Those who are the first to see the “golden” directions in the development of AI will discover a new Klondike, and if we conduct exploratory research in all areas, we will increase our chances of getting there.”

    The Deputy Prime Minister recalled that in December 2024, at the AI Journey conference, President Vladimir Putin proposed holding an international foresight in Russia – a strategic session on the future of artificial intelligence – in order to determine the directions of technology development together with scientists from around the world.

    The foresight is being implemented by the International AI Alliance Network, an organization that unites industry associations from 14 countries. The Russian part of the foresight is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and the Strategic Agency for Support and Formation of AI Developments (SAPFIR), a project office created on the basis of the Skolkovo Foundation, on behalf of the President of Russia.

    “In Russia, the President has set a national goal – ‘Technological Leadership’. One of the tasks is to form a new AI market for Russia. We are building a complete system – a foundation for Russia’s long-term leadership in AI science. At the same time, we understand that scientific leadership in AI is impossible without international cooperation and coordination of efforts. The future of AI should be built in cooperation, taking into account various scientific schools, cultures and approaches. For this reason, the results of the foresight are published openly, and every scientist in the world can make a contribution. The alliance plans to present the results to the UN and to Russian President Vladimir Putin at the annual AI Journey conference before November this year. This is our manifesto of openness, accessibility and trust for every member of the global AI community,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    Last year, Russian experts identified 10 key areas of fundamental scientific research in the field of AI. They formed the basis for discussion at this year’s international foresight. Several sessions of the scientific dialogue on the global prospects of AI have already been held in Morocco, the UAE, Serbia and China. One of the foresight iterations took place at the Sber tech hub in St. Petersburg.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko emphasized that the state’s task is to ensure the completeness of research and competencies in the field of AI. To this end, within the framework of the federal project “Artificial Intelligence”, the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia is holding a grant competition among research centers, according to the results of which 13 teams were selected.

    “Investments in research centers have already demonstrated their success and effectiveness: 13 centers provide half of Russia’s entire scientific reserve in AI,” the Deputy Prime Minister noted.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko noted that the issue of personnel with knowledge of AI is also being addressed systematically.

    “Studying the effects of AI on humans, including dependence on AI decisions, is a meaningful scientific task, where major research is ahead. We are faced with a challenge: to provide not just education, but to cultivate a new type of thinking. To this end, a strategy for the development of education is being developed in Russia, which provides for the creation of a digital environment, individual educational, upbringing, career trajectories and assistants,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    An important topic of the session was international foresight – a joint initiative aimed at identifying priority areas of research and development of AI at the global level. Participants also discussed current issues of artificial intelligence development, consolidation of efforts at the international level, tools for accelerating scientific progress and new forms of financing.

    The discussion was attended by Professor Ajit Abraham from India, who created a unique network of machine intelligence laboratories, uniting more than 1,000 researchers from 100 countries.

    Another participant was the CEO of the AIRI Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Ivan Oseledets, one of the leading experts in the field of machine learning, the second most cited Russian mathematician, professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and laureate of the Russian Presidential Prize.

    The speakers also included First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank PJSC Alexander Vedyakhin, Vice-Rector for Research at Serbia’s Singidunum University Nebojsa Bakanin, Professor at China’s Anhui University Ye Tian, Rector of Innopolis University Alexander Gasnikov, and Skoltech Professor Anhui Fan from Vietnam.

    Speakers focused on the role of fundamental science and support for research initiatives, including issues of task-oriented machine learning algorithms (narrow AI), as well as computation and data for AI, fundamental and generative models, human-machine interactions, optimization and mathematics.

    The results of the discussions at the session will form the basis of a foresight study to identify fundamental scientific problems in the field of AI.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    The Chair of the Working Party, Ambassador Anita Pipan of Slovenia, said the meeting was an opportunity to “inject fresh momentum into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession process, which is now in its 26th year and is technically advanced.”
    Ambassador Pipan asked delegations to clearly pinpoint the last outstanding issues of this accession process. She underlined that Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified by the WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as one of three accessions with a strategic focus for this year and the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) next year in Cameroon, alongside Ethiopia and Uzbekistan.
    “Today’s meeting offers an opportunity to take stock of where we are, identify remaining concerns, and consider possible next steps toward the conclusion of the accession process,” she added.
    Mr. Hamdo Tinjak, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and Head of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO Accession Team, led the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Geneva.
    He said that through the WTO accession process, alongside other integration efforts, the country has succeeded in establishing an open and liberal foreign trade regime grounded in the principles of free movement of people, goods, services and capital, and the removal of trade barriers.
    “We view this as one of the most significant achievements of the accession process. Full WTO membership would serve as formal recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country with harmonized and transparent trade legislation — a reliable partner for international trade and a favourable destination for foreign investment. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to the expansion of our foreign trade and, ultimately, to the broader economic development of the country,” said Mr Tinjak. See his full statement here.
    On the bilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported significant progress in the last remaining bilateral market access negotiations, following the resolution of a key outstanding issue relating to the regulation of petroleum fuels. On the multilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina stressed that the draft Working Party Report (the formal document that outlines the specific commitments an acceding government will undertake upon joining the WTO) is nearly complete, reflecting Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with WTO rules and principles.
    Deputy Director-General Zhang Xiangchen said that the reactivation of this accession process after seven years “stands as a testament to the recent constructive developments in this technically advanced accession file, which have provided a clear basis for the Working Party to take its work towards finalization.”
    DDG Zhang, who accompanied the Working Party Chair on a visit to Sarajevo in November 2024, stressed that the WTO Secretariat remains fully committed to supporting efforts “to cross the finishing line in the very near future”.
    Delegations commended Bosnia and Herzegovina’s technical engagement, and the substantive progress made in the accession process.
    Next steps
    Recognizing the value of securing a potential deliverable for the WTO before or at MC14, Ambassador Pipan urged the conclusion of the remaining bilateral market access negotiations, which would enable the WTO Secretariat to consolidate the draft schedules of commitments on goods and services. On the multilateral front, she requested members to submit additional questions and comments by 17 July that will be circulated to the Working Party.
    Subsequently, the Secretariat will update the draft Working Party Report. “I very much hope that this next version will be final,” Ambassador Pipan said.
    Keeping in mind Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspiration to finalize its accession process as soon as possible, the Chair added that the next Working Party meeting will depend on consultations with delegations and the Secretariat, particularly on the conclusion of the last outstanding bilateral market negotiations and the finalization of the draft Working Party Report.

    Share

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report – P10_TA(2025)0129 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    –  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(2) (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(3) (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(4),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    –  having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    –  having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States(6);

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(9),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU(10),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(13),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(15),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(16),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(17),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021(25),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(26),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia(27),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(28),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU(29),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP(30),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union(31),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe(32),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’(33),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(34),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds(35),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(36),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland(37),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists(38),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (JOIN(2023)0051),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023(39),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime(40),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications(41),

    –  having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    –  having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    –  having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    –  having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    –  having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    –  having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)(42),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B.  whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected(43),(44); whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C.  whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D.  whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E.  whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1.  Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2.  Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3.  Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4.  Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5.  Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice; highlights its concern about repeated attacks on judges and prosecutors who are conducting high-profile political investigations linked to cases of corruption and abuse of power perpetrated against political opponents;

    6.  Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8.  Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States(45) and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9.  Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10.  Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11.  Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12.  Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13.  Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14.  Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15.  Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16.  Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive(46) to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17.  Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20.  Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21.  Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24.  Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25.  Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation(47) and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law(48) in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26.  Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27.  Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30.  Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking

    31.  Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32.  Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)(49) and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33.  Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive(50), as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(51), and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35.  Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36.  Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37.  Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

    38.  Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act(52) (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39.  Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40.  Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41.  Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343(53) on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43.  Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44.  Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)(54) and civil society networks(55); reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45.  Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups(56);

    46.  Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47.  Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49.  Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States(57) and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51.  Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52.  Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC(58) on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive(59) and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53.  Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54.  Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55.  Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56.  Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC(60) in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings(61) of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57.  Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; welcomes the CJEU’s opinion of 5 June 2025 stating that it considers Hungary to be in violation of EU law in prohibiting or restricting access to LGBTIQ+ content; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58.  Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59.  Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500(62) and Directive 2024/1499(63), which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61.  Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62.  Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63.  Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)(64); urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64.  Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65.  Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66.  Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67.  Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68.  Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69.  Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70.  Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71.  Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73.  Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74.  Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75.  Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76.  Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law(65), not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78.  Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79.  Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80.  Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81.  Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82.  Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83.  Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act(66), the AI Act(67), Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(68) and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84.  Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85.  Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86.  Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87.  Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms(69); recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88.  Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89.  Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91.  Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92.  Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93.  Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94.  Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95.  Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96.  Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97.  Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98.  Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99.  Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100.  Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102.  Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103.  Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104.  Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105.  Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    o
    o   o

    106.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 433, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (4) OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.
    (5) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162.
    (6) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 21.
    (7) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13.
    (8) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 117.
    (9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.
    (10) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 13.
    (11) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 45.
    (12) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.
    (13) OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 36.
    (14) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 70.
    (15) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.
    (16) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27.
    (17) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146.
    (18) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.
    (19) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.
    (20) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 48.
    (21) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.
    (22) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.
    (23) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.
    (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 108.
    (25) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 80.
    (26) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.
    (27) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 15.
    (28) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 22.
    (29) OJ C 161, 5.5.2023, p. 10.
    (30) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 74.
    (31) OJ C 341, 27.9.2023, p. 2.
    (32) OJ C, C/2023/442, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/442/oj.
    (33) OJ C, C/2024/6743, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6743/oj.
    (34) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (35) OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.
    (36) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (37) OJ C, C/2024/3995, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3995/oj.
    (38) OJ C, C/2024/2656, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2656/oj.
    (39) OJ C, C/2024/5739, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5739/oj.
    (40) OJ C, C/2024/5733, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5733/oj.
    (41) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.
    (42) For all DRFMG monitoring activities, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundament/product-details/20190103CDT02662.
    (43) Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.
    (44) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 42.
    (45) COM(2024)0800, Annex with recommendations, pp. 1, 9, 11, 19 and 24.
    (46) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj).
    (47) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (48) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (49) Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj).
    (50) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (51) OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj.
    (52) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (53) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/343/oj).
    (54) EESC opinion of 14 February 2024 entitled ‘Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward’.
    (55) Civil Society Europe, ‘Joint Civil Society Contribution on Civic Space to the 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report’, June 2024.
    (56) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Addressing racism in policing, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (57) Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Drozd v. Poland, 15158/19 of 6 April 2023, and Mándli and Others v Hungary, 63164/16 of 26 May 2020.
    (58) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj).
    (59) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (60) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj).
    (61) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
    (62) Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU (OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj).
    (63) Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC (OJ L, 2024/1499, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1499/oj).
    (64) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (65) Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518).
    (66) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (67) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (68) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (69) Europol, ‘AI and policing – The benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence for law enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Censorship attempts by France in the run-up to the Romanian presidential elections – E-002390/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002390/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petra Steger (PfE), Mary Khan (ESN)

    According to Telegram founder Pawel Durow, France made deliberate attempts to silence conservative voices in Romania on his platform ahead of the second round of the Romanian presidential elections[1]. It is striking that, just two days before the elections, the head of the French foreign intelligence service, Nicolas Lerner – who had allegedly asked Durow to implement this censorship – travelled to Romania especially to meet the leaders of the Romanian secret service[2]. Even more seriously, Macron’s bosom buddy and Renew Group leader Valérie Hayer issued an open statement to France Info saying that every effort would be made on the ground to ensure that the next Romanian President is pro-European[3]. These rampantly proliferating fantasies of control and censorship are nothing more than an attack on democracy. After all, any attempt to influence national elections through digital platforms such as Telegram constitutes a violation of fundamental European values. What is more, in statements made by ex-Commissioner Thierry Breton – who openly contemplated nullifying undesirable election results – the Commission has itself revealed a dangerous readiness to undermine democratic processes.

    • 1.What information does the Commission have on the censorship allegations made by Telegram founder Pawel Durow?
    • 2.Is the Commission planning to open an investigation to look into these serious allegations?
    • 3.What specific measures is the Commission taking to prevent such interference by Member States in national elections?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/pawel-durow-telegram-gruender-kritisiert-franzoesische-einmischung-in-rumaenien-wahl-a-1eddfa73-f872-4ece-bf7c-64459e217159
    • [2] https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/vorwurf-der-einmischung-frankreichs-geheimdienstchef-soll-rumaenien-kurz-vor-der-wahl-besucht-haben-li.2327797
    • [3] https://www.lejdd.fr/International/presidentielle-en-roumanie-valerie-hayer-accusee-dingerence-au-profit-du-candidat-centriste-pro-ue-157948
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Strong Votes to Protect Taxpayer Dollars, Defund Liberal Media

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Dale Strong (Alabama)

    WASHINGTON — Representative Dale W. Strong (AL-05) issued the following statement after voting to rescind $9.4 billion of wasteful government spending — which includes over $1 billion for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), which funds National Public Radio (NPR). 

    “NPR has strayed from its original mission of providing balanced, educational programming. Today, it is nothing more than a taxpayer-funded mouthpiece for the left—pushing narratives that don’t reflect the values or priorities of most Americans,” said Representative Dale Strong. 

    In addition to rescinding previously appropriated funding for NPR, H.R. 4 also rescinds funds for wasteful and politically-biased programs of the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. Examples of such taxpayer-funded projects include:  

    • $1.5 million to “advance diversity, equity, and inclusion in Serbia’s workplaces and business communities” 

    Representative Strong has championed efforts to defund NPR and ensure the responsible use of taxpayer dollars. In February of this year, Strong introduced the No More Funding for NPR Act of 2025

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ilie Bolojan appointed Prime Minister of Romania

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BUCHAREST, June 20 (Xinhua) — Romanian President Nicusor Dan on Friday appointed Senate (upper house of parliament) President Ilie Bolojan as the country’s new prime minister, following weeks of coalition talks among key political parties.

    “I appoint Mr. Ilie Bolojan as Prime Minister,” N. Dan announced at the Cotroceni Palace. “I want to thank the parties that make up the parliamentary majority for these weeks of discussions. It is in Romania’s interest for the government to enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority, and the parties understand this,” the president said.

    Describing I. Bolojan as “the most suitable person to carry out the necessary reforms in the state apparatus,” N. Dan noted his track record in public administration: “He knows how to reduce and optimize costs, and has a vision for development. He will have a partner in me,” said the head of the Romanian state.

    I. Bolojan, for his part, expressed gratitude for the appointment and acknowledged the full burden of responsibility on his shoulders in the context of economic tension.

    The prime minister stressed that his attention will be focused on restoring financial order, ensuring effective public administration and “showing due respect to the Romanian people” as he continues negotiations to finalize the cabinet and his government program.

    According to local media, the new government will be formed by a coalition of the National Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Save Romania Union and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in Malaysia, Recommends Further Improvement

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    An IAEA team of experts visited Malaysia’s nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI, during an Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors mission. (Photo: Nuklear Malaysia)

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Malaysia is committed to the safe operation of its sole nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP). The team also identified the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the reactor’s safety committee, the management of refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components, and operating procedures.

    The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the RTP facility, which concluded on 20 June, was conducted at the request of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia). The mission team comprised three experts from Slovenia, South Africa, and Thailand, and two IAEA staff.

    RTP is located in Bangi, Selangor, about 30 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Two INSARR missions were conducted at RTP in 1997 and 2014. Since then, the reactor has undergone modifications, including replacement of the rotary rack, refurbishment of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and the upgrading of the stack monitoring system.

    RTP was constructed in 1979 and began operation in 1982. RTP was designed for various fields of nuclear research, education and training, and it incorporates facilities for neutron and gamma radiation studies, as well as isotope production and sample activation.

    The INSARR team visited the reactor and its associated facilities and met with the research reactor staff and management. “Nuklear Malaysia has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Ageing management of reactor systems and components that are important to safety can be challenging. Effective application of the IAEA safety standards, including the establishment of effective leadership and management for safety and the utilization of operating experience feedback, helps address this challenge.”

    The mission team made recommendations and suggestions to Nuklear Malaysia for further improvements, including the need for:

    • Improving the reactor safety committee’s oversight of all activities important to safety, including reactor modifications and operational safety programmes such as refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components;   
    • Strengthening procedures to respond to abnormal situations and events, such as loss of electrical power, fire and earthquakes;      
    • Establishing procedures for learning from operating experience; and     
    • Strengthening radiological protection practices by improving the classification of different areas of the workplace.  

    “The INSARR mission is a valuable opportunity for us to engage in a peer-review process,” said Julia Abdul Karim, Director of Technical Support Division at Nuklear Malaysia. “It enables us to benchmark our programmes and activities against the IAEA safety standards and the international best practices and to strengthen our operational safety of our research reactor.”

    Background

    INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. General information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

    The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in Malaysia, Recommends Further Improvement

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    An IAEA team of experts visited Malaysia’s nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI, during an Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors mission. (Photo: Nuklear Malaysia)

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Malaysia is committed to the safe operation of its sole nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP). The team also identified the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the reactor’s safety committee, the management of refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components, and operating procedures.

    The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the RTP facility, which concluded on 20 June, was conducted at the request of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia). The mission team comprised three experts from Slovenia, South Africa, and Thailand, and two IAEA staff.

    RTP is located in Bangi, Selangor, about 30 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Two INSARR missions were conducted at RTP in 1997 and 2014. Since then, the reactor has undergone modifications, including replacement of the rotary rack, refurbishment of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and the upgrading of the stack monitoring system.

    RTP was constructed in 1979 and began operation in 1982. RTP was designed for various fields of nuclear research, education and training, and it incorporates facilities for neutron and gamma radiation studies, as well as isotope production and sample activation.

    The INSARR team visited the reactor and its associated facilities and met with the research reactor staff and management. “Nuklear Malaysia has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Ageing management of reactor systems and components that are important to safety can be challenging. Effective application of the IAEA safety standards, including the establishment of effective leadership and management for safety and the utilization of operating experience feedback, helps address this challenge.”

    The mission team made recommendations and suggestions to Nuklear Malaysia for further improvements, including the need for:

    • Improving the reactor safety committee’s oversight of all activities important to safety, including reactor modifications and operational safety programmes such as refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components;   
    • Strengthening procedures to respond to abnormal situations and events, such as loss of electrical power, fire and earthquakes;      
    • Establishing procedures for learning from operating experience; and     
    • Strengthening radiological protection practices by improving the classification of different areas of the workplace.  

    “The INSARR mission is a valuable opportunity for us to engage in a peer-review process,” said Julia Abdul Karim, Director of Technical Support Division at Nuklear Malaysia. “It enables us to benchmark our programmes and activities against the IAEA safety standards and the international best practices and to strengthen our operational safety of our research reactor.”

    Background

    INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. General information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

    The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

    MIL Security OSI