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Category: Balkans

  • MIL-OSI Global: The world is in crisis – what role should our universities play?

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Vinita Srivastava, Host + Exec. Producer, Don’t Call Me Resilient | Senior Editor, Culture + Society

    It’s hard not to categorize our present global moment as a crisis. And just when we think things can’t get worse — they do.

    Across the globe, we’re witnessing a rise in far-right movements and governments.

    Just a few weeks ago, the AfD party in Germany secured second place. This marks the first time a far-right party has gained this level of power in the country since the Second World War. Germany is not alone in this trend: Italy, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Croatia are now led by far-right governments.

    And it may come as no surprise that many of these new leaders are increasingly hostile towards universities.

    In India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, universities have the lowest academic freedom since the 1940s. In Brazil, former president Jair Bolsonaro claimed that public universities transform students into leftists, gays, drug addicts and perverts.

    Meanwhile in the United States, Vice President JD Vance has called universities the enemy for allegedly teaching that America is “an evil, racist nation.” (Vance was echoing President Richard Nixon who called professors and the press the enemy. President Donald Trump even signed an executive order demanding higher education institutions dismantle their DEI (diversity, equity, inclusion) programs. He’s also pulled federal funding from universities that allow “illegal protests”, and he’s demanded that Columbia University’s Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies Departments be independently reviewed.

    But, despite this hostility, universities — and students — have historically been springboards for progressive change. It was student protests 25 years ago that helped lead to the downfall of apartheid in South Africa. More recently, in Bangladesh, student protests helped topple the country’s authoritarian leader. This past year, students across the world have worked to raise public awareness of acts of genocide in Gaza.

    Meanwhile, here in Canada, universities are facing financial pressure because of reductions in international student permits. This drop in revenue has caused alarming budget constraints at universities, revealing a deep reliance on international students as a revenue source.

    This has led to existential questions about our universities. With today’s world in crisis, what should the role of the university be? And why are our public universities so underfunded? And how can they continue to serve their communities?

    Theses are big questions, ones that seemed fitting to tackle on our final episode of Don’t Call Me Resilient recorded live in front of an audience at the University of British Columbia. Joining us to tackle them was Annette Henry, a professor in the Department of Language and Literacy Education at UBC who is cross-appointed to the Institute for Race, Gender, Sexuality and Social Justice. Her work examines race, class, language, gender and culture in education for Black students and educators in Canada.

    We also spoke with Michelle Stack, an associate professor in UBC’s Department of Educational Studies whose work looks at educational policy, university rankings and equity and education.

    At a time when critical conversations in higher education are under attack worldwide, can Canadian universities rise to the challenge and be a force for good?

    Read more:

    Universities should stand up for integrity and public trust in university teaching

    How Commonwealth universities profited from Indigenous dispossession through land grants

    Universities should respond to cuts and corporate influence with co-operative governance

    Cops on campus: Why police crackdowns on student protesters are so dangerous

    Student protests: How the university perpetuates colonial violence on campus

    This episode was coproduced by Ateqah Khaki (associate producer), Marisa Sittheeamorn (student journalist) and Jennifer Moroz (consulting producer). Our sound engineer was Alain Derbez, with onsite assistance from Josh Mattson. Thank you to UBC’s Global Journalism Innovation Lab and its crew, The UBC School of Journalism and the Social Science Research Council of Canada for their generous support.

    – ref. The world is in crisis – what role should our universities play? – https://theconversation.com/the-world-is-in-crisis-what-role-should-our-universities-play-250235

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Report by the Head of OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina: UK response, March 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Report by the Head of OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina: UK response, March 2025

    Ambassador Holland welcomes the work of the OSCE Mission over the last 12 months, and condemns recent attempts by Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik to undermine regional stability.

    Firstly, I would like to welcome back Ambassador Aggeler to the Permanent Council. Thanks once again to you and your team for your work over the past 12 months, and for this comprehensive report. The United Kingdom highly appreciates the work and added value of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    Mr Chair, the United Kingdom strongly supports a stable, prosperous and inclusive Bosnia and Herzegovina, making progress on its Euro-Atlantic path. We therefore condemn Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik’s illegal and dangerous recent attacks on the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dodik and the Republika Srpska National Assembly’s attempts to break up the state – including through a proposal for a new secessionist constitution – will only harm the citizens he claims to protect. As a signatory to the Dayton Peace Agreement, the UK rejects any such attempts to undermine regional stability and prosperity.

    In this difficult context, we welcome the OSCE Mission’s continuous efforts and engagement on reconciliation, peace- and trust-building. We particularly support the Mission’s work on strengthening inter-ethnic relations, and in connecting neighbouring communities across political and administrative divides. A more inclusive and cohesive society is essential to achieving a positive future for the whole of BiH. We highly value the insight and information provided by the nine Field Offices across the country towards this.

    The UK welcomes that local elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October proceeded smoothly and were found by ODIHR and other partners to be competitive and managed efficiently. However, we note concerns over the perceived lack of genuine public engagement. We encourage authorities in BiH to fully align BiH’s Election Law with international standards, following ODIHR recommendations, and to ensure that funding for the Central Election Committee’s work is agreed in good time for the 2026 general elections. Changes to the Election Law will rebuild voters’ trust in the democratic process and ensure that the results reflect their will. The UK is pleased to have supported work through the OSCE Mission to improve the integrity of electoral processes.

    The UK also fully supports the work of the Mission towards safeguarding fundamental freedoms and shares the Mission’s concerns at the shrinking space for civil society and media observed over the last 12 months. We encourage BiH to focus on its reform agenda and positive legislative steps required as part of the EU accession pathway.

    Mr Chair, this remains a critical and dangerous time for European security. It is vital that the international community takes a collective approach to supporting the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further economic, social and political progress must build on the many years of reforms.

    The UK joins international partners in urging all actors to fully adhere to the Dayton Peace Agreement and respect the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We reaffirm our unequivocal commitment to the territorial integrity of BiH and support for a single, sovereign state comprising two entities, in which all its peoples and citizens are equal. As we approach the 30th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide and of the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the UK is committed to supporting BiH in its efforts to build a secure, stable, inclusive society, and heal the fractures caused by conflict.

    Ambassador Aggeler – dear Brian – on a personal level, I also wanted to thank you for your leadership of the Mission over the last three years, and wish you all the best with your future endeavours.

    Thank you, Mr Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    March 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE Presence in Albania strengthens environmental governance at municipal level

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE Presence in Albania strengthens environmental governance at municipal level

    Training session on enhancing environmental inspection and control at the municipal level, Elbasan, 11 March 2025. (OSCE) Photo details

    The OSCE Presence in Albania has completed a series of thematic training sessions aimed at enhancing environmental inspection and control at the municipal level. The initiative is part of ongoing efforts to strengthen environmental governance and security across the country.
    Held in Tirana (4 March), Elbasan (11 March), Lezha (18 March), and Gjirokastra (25 March), the training sessions gathered around 120 municipal representatives, fostering dialogue with key national institutions, including the National Environmental Agency, National Forestry Agency, the Agency for the Support of Local Self-Governance, the Central Inspectorate and the National Inspectorate for Territorial Protection.
    The discussions focused on legal frameworks, inspection procedures, inter-institutional coordination and best practices in environmental monitoring, forestry inspections and pollution control. “The training series reaffirms the OSCE Presence’s commitment to enhancing municipal capacities and strengthening collaboration between central and local institutions to safeguard Albania’s natural resources,” said Elton Qendro, the project manager.
    The training series was organized under the OSCE Presence’s project “Enhancing environmental governance and security in Albania” funded by Norway, France and Italy. The project provides national and local authorities with the necessary knowledge and tools to improve environmental protection and enforcement efforts.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: The United States remained the world’s largest liquefied natural gas exporter in 2024

    Source: US Energy Information Administration

    In-brief analysis

    March 27, 2025


    The United States exported 11.9 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2024, remaining the world’s largest LNG exporter. LNG exports from Australia and Qatar—the world’s two next-largest LNG exporters—have remained relatively stable over the last five years (2020–24); their exports have ranged from 10.2 Bcf/d to 10.7 Bcf/d annually, according to data from Cedigaz. Russia and Malaysia have been the fourth- and fifth-largest LNG exporters globally since 2019. In 2024, LNG exports from Russia averaged 4.4 Bcf/d, and exports from Malaysia averaged 3.7 Bcf/d.

    U.S. LNG exports remained essentially flat compared with 2023 mainly because of several unplanned outages at existing LNG export facilities, lower natural gas consumption in Europe, and very limited new LNG export capacity additions since 2022. In December 2024, Plaquemines LNG Phase 1 shipped its first export cargo, becoming the eighth U.S. LNG export facility in service. We estimate that utilization of LNG export capacity across the other seven U.S. LNG terminals operating in 2024 averaged 104% of nominal capacity and 86% of peak capacity, unchanged from the previous year. While Europe (including Türkiye) remained the primary destination for U.S. LNG exports in 2024, accounting for 53% (6.3 Bcf/d) of the total exports, the share of U.S. LNG exports to Asia increased from 26% (3.1 Bcf/d) in 2023 to 33% (4.0 Bcf/d) in 2024. U.S. LNG exports to other regions, including the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America, also increased last year and accounted for 14% (1.6 Bcf/d) of total exports, compared with 8% (0.9 Bcf/d) in 2023.

    In 2024, U.S. natural gas exports to Europe decreased by 19% (1.5 Bcf/d), mostly to countries in the EU and the UK. U.S. LNG exports increased only to Türkiye and Greece in 2024—by 0.2 Bcf/d and 0.1 Bcf/d, respectively, compared with 2023. Türkiye imported more U.S. LNG compared with the prior year mainly to offset a decline in imports from other countries, such as Egypt and Russia. U.S. LNG exports to other EU countries and the UK decreased by 24% (1.7 Bcf/d) compared with 2023, primarily because of lower natural gas consumption and high storage inventories following the mild 2023–24 winter. At the same time, LNG import capacity in the EU and the UK expanded by more than 40% between 2021 and 2024 and will continue to grow in 2025 once new and expanded regasification facilities in Croatia, Cyprus, and Italy come online.

    As in 2023, the Netherlands, France, and the UK imported the most U.S. LNG among countries in Europe, accounting for a combined 46% (2.9 Bcf/d) of the regional total. Since Germany started LNG imports in December 2022, U.S. LNG exports to Germany have grown and averaged 0.6 Bcf/d in both 2023 and 2024. However, in early 2025, Germany reduced its regasification capacity by terminating a charter for one of its floating storage and regasification units, citing high operational costs.

    In 2024, countries in Asia imported 33% (4.0 Bcf/d) of total U.S. LNG exports. Among countries in Asia, Japan, South Korea, India, and China imported the most U.S. LNG—a combined 76% (3.0 Bcf/d). U.S. LNG imports increased the most in India—by 0.2 Bcf/d. Other countries in Asia imported 24% (1.0 Bcf/d) of U.S LNG.

    In other regions, Egypt—a natural gas producer and LNG exporter—imported 0.3 Bcf/d of LNG from the United States, its first U.S. LNG imports since 2018. In recent years, Egypt’s domestic natural gas consumption, particularly in summer months, exceeded available supply and turned Egypt from an exporter to an importer of natural gas during several months of the year. In Brazil and Colombia, imports of U.S. LNG increased last year because drought reduced hydropower electricity generation and increased demand for generation from natural gas-fired power plants.


    Principal contributor: Victoria Zaretskaya

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: High-level dialogues held during Boao Forum for Asia

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    High-level dialogues held during Boao Forum for Asia

    Updated: March 27, 2025 13:45 Xinhua
    A high-level dialogue themed on “Building Trust in the Shifting Global Landscape” is held during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Jeffrey D. Sachs, professor of Columbia University, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Building Trust in the Shifting Global Landscape” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Portugal’s Minister of State and Foreign Affairs Paulo Rangel speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Building Trust in the Shifting Global Landscape” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Ban Ki-moon, chairman of Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) and former secretary-general of the United Nations, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Maurizio Massari, permanent representative of Italy to the United Nations, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” is held during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” is held during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Volkan Bozkir, president of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Danilo Turk, former Slovenian president and president of the World Leadership Alliance Club de Madrid, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Wang Huiyao, founder and president of Center for China and Globalization (CCG), speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Munir Akram, permanent representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Global Governance after the UN Summit of the Future” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Liu Zhenmin, China’s special envoy for climate change, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Achieving Sustainable Development in a Transforming World” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Andrew Forrest, executive chairman and founder of Fortescue Metals Group, speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Achieving Sustainable Development in a Transforming World” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    CEO of Astra Zeneca Pascal Soriot speaks at a high-level dialogue themed on “Achieving Sustainable Development in a Transforming World” during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A high-level dialogue themed on “Achieving Sustainable Development in a Transforming World” is held during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) Annual Conference 2025 in Boao, south China’s Hainan Province, March 26, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Keith Rankin Analysis – Learning the correct lessons from World War Two in Europe

    Analysis by Keith Rankin.

    Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    While World War Two (WW2) always was a set of intersecting conflicts – with Japan fighting a war of imperialism in East Asia and the Western Pacific – the war in Europe has been cast as the ultimate battle of ‘Good’ versus ‘Evil’. Hence the narrative of the Good War. Further, it has been personalised, with Adolf Hitler becoming the personalisation of Evil and Winston Churchill the personalisation of Good.

    It always was nonsense. Wars are fought over territories and hegemony, between various peoples (nationalities), empires, religions, ideologies etc.; in the vast majority of cases between Bad and Bad, albeit various shades of bad (although the Hitler’s Nazis and Joseph Stalin’s Communists were close to having been equally Bad). The Bad versus Good narrative remains compelling to the human mind, however. Once you can find a compelling Evil – without or within, over there or over here – then our brains want to tell us that whoever opposes that ‘bad’ must be ‘good’. (In the old days, the ‘good’ said: ‘God was on our side’. Typically, their opponents thought something similar.)

    Winston Churchill was neither a Good leader nor a competent leader. He didn’t start WW2, though there is an argument that the United Kingdom did. Nevertheless, Churchill, as a charismatic rhetorician and narcissist, had some sway over political discourse in Britain for half a century. (His important career began in 1904, when he became a party-hopping backbencher. He resigned from his second stint as Prime Minister in 1955; he was an MP for 61 years, and PM for 9 years.) That’s why there are so many more cited quotations from him than from any other British back-bench MP in the late 1930s.

    Churchill, as a war-leader, was an ultra-imperialist who fought imperialist wars under the cover of World Wars One and Two. He was responsible for numerous atrocities, including appeasements of Stalin that were more problematic than Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler in 1938. In his speeches in 1938 and 1939, Churchill may have been alluding to Eastern Europe, but he was thinking about Italy and its threat to British ‘assets’ in and around the Mediterranean Sea.

    WW2: Germany versus Soviet Russia, with the United Kingdom as stoker and as kingmaker

    World War Two was round two of the Germany versus Russia conflict; this time as ‘Nazi’ Germany against ‘Communist’ Russia, the Third Reich versus the Soviet Union. The centrality of the Germany versus Russia conflict – indeed a conflict between them for the territories of Ukraine and the oilfields to the southeast of Ukraine – becomes more apparent when WW1 and WW2 are seen as one. World War One clearly started as a conflict between Germany and Russia; albeit triggered as a conflict between proxies, Austria and Serbia. And World War Two ended with the defeat of Germany by Soviet Russia; and after the entry of Russia into the Pacific War (which henceforth became the Cold War between Soviet Russia and the United States of America).

    Technically, WW2 became a world war (rather than a regional war) when the United Kingdom and France (and their empires) ‘declared war’ on Germany on 1 Sep 1939. The trigger issue was the possibility of Germany invading Poland. But what mischief was the United Kingdom upto with distant Poland? Why did a British ghost-war go horribly wrong? And why did open warfare between the two principal belligerents in Europe – Berlin and Moscow – not commence until June 1941?

    My reading of British and French ‘diplomacy’ between March and August 1939 is that these notional allies, United Kingdom in particular, wanted there to be a major regional showdown between Berlin and Moscow; both powers would be substantially weakened as a result, thereby enhancing British and French control of the Mediterranean and the ‘Middle East’.

    The British and the French ‘tried’ to do a deal with Stalin, in March 1939, with respect to protecting Poland from German aggression. (On 15 March 1939, Germany annexed the Czech part of Czechoslovakia.) They revealed their military weakness (especially Britain’s), or at least the paucity of the military contribution they were willing to make towards the security of Poland.

    Britain and France subsequently went on to sign a treaty guarantee with Poland; a guarantee that both would declare war against Germany if Poland was attacked by Germany. Stalin already knew that the United Kingdom would not back-up such a declaration with any action to defend Poland.

    The reason for the guarantee appears to have been to deter Poland from negotiating a peace deal with Germany. Further, Britain was maintaining diplomatic communication with Germany until August 1939. The inference would appear to be that Britain was trying to start a ‘nothing-war’ between itself and Germany, while stoking a ‘something war’ between Germany and Soviet Russia. Britain had no intention of doing anything in Poland, and was expecting that France would provide a substantial defensive barrier between Germany and Great Britain; this was all in the context that Britain and France would be helping their own security by nudging Germany into ‘pushing’ East (as was always Germany’s apparent plan) rather than ‘West’.

    However, Britain and France were nonplussed by the non-aggression pact – the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – signed between Moscow and Berlin in the last week of August 1939. Further, there was a secret sub-pact. Moscow and Berlin would carve up Poland, and which effectively – and subsequently – meant the Soviet annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, activating that secret deal. Despite having nineteenth-century precedents for a pragmatic backing out from a signed-up deal, the United Kingdom and France – at least notionally – honoured their guarantee and declared war on Germany.

    For France, this meant further shoring-up of its border with Germany, and – virtue signalling –making a small and brief incursion into Germany (the Saar Offensive). For Britain it meant further rearmament, but really to build up its navy to shore up its imperial interests, and building up its Air Force to defend itself from possible German attack. And it sent an army into France, as a show of support for France, more to be seen to be doing something than to actually be doing anything.

    But the clear sense is that Britain still expected Germany to negotiate peace with Britain while consolidating its annexations of the Czech lands and Poland. The ‘phoney war’ proceeded, though it was far from phoney to the people of Poland and other Eastern European countries. The United Kingdom was launched into war proper in May 1940, with the lightning conquest of France by Germany, a conquest made possible by Germany’s temporary truce with the Soviet Union. (Though that was preceded, by a month, by Germany’s invasion of Norway; a matter for Britain’s navy rather than army.)

    Adolf Hitler abandoned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in June 1941, embarking Nazi Germany on a full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union, his main plan all along. He had secured his western border in 1940; though his plans were somewhat scuppered by a need to attend to the military failings of Mussolini’s Italian forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, hence the war in Greece which involved New Zealand.

    The Bloodlands and their toll of political murder: 1932-1945

    The atrocities of the Nazis took place during a world war; those of Stalin were mostly during peace-time. Timothy Snyder, in his 2010 book Bloodlands, “conservatively” estimates that fourteen million civilians and prisoners-of-war were politically murdered in a set of contiguous territories – between Germany and Russia-proper – by either the Moscow-based Soviet Communist regime or the Berlin-based National Socialist regime. This includes ‘The Holocaust’, or at least most of it.

    As real estate, Snyder defines the Bloodlands as the pre-WW2 territories of Ukraine and Belarus (within the Soviet Union), Poland, the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), and the part of Russia close to Leningrad (now St Petersburg). The murders included in his tally were inflicted by deliberate starvation, guns, and gas. The cases of starvation were not due to famine in the conventional sense of that term. In the Ukrainian ‘famine’ of 1932/33, the food grown on Ukrainian farms – among the most productive lands in Europe – was confiscated and exported to Russian cities and to other countries in return for foreign currency. In the Siege of Leningrad – 1941 to 1944 – the German military prevented food from entering the city.

    The worst-affected areas of the Bloodlands are today in western Ukraine and western Belarus. This land was in Eastern Poland before World War Two, and therefore in the Soviet-annexed territories of pre-war Poland. These lands were annexed or occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939, Germany in 1941, and the Soviet Union again in 1944. Each annexation saw its own round of political mass murder.

    The murders of citizens of Poland and the Soviet Union took place on a vastly larger scale than any comparable atrocities committed on West Europeans; including the Holocaust, for which the vast majority of victims were Jews resident in Eastern Europe (not Germany; not the West). Snyder summarises the Bloodlands murder toll as:

    • 3.3 million deliberately starved mostly in Ukraine in the 1932/33 Holodomor
    • 0.7 million murdered in the Great Terror of 1937/38
    • 0.2 million murdered in occupied Poland in 1939-1941 (disproportionately highly educated people; many killed by the notorious Einsatzgruppen, Nazi loyalists with PhD degrees)
    • 4.2 million Soviet citizens starved by German occupiers in 1941-1944
    • 5.4 million Jews (mostly Polish or Soviet citizens) shot or gassed by Germans in 1941-1944
    • 0.7 million citizens (mostly Belarussians or Poles) shot by Germans in reprisals in 1941-1944

    To what extent would have these (or equivalent numbers of) deaths have happened anyway, regardless of how the war actually started in Poland? Stalin’s victims, mostly already dead, represented about 40 percent of these fourteen million. The majority of Stalin’s victims were killed in the Ukrainian Holodomor which peaked in 1932 and 1933; or in the Great Terror of 1937 and 1938, which targeted the ‘kulak’ class of peasants and former peasants, ethnic Poles, and Russia’s political class (including many Bolshevik allies of the paranoid Stalin; communists who had come to be seen as potential threats to him).

    Before September 1939, Hitler’s attempts at political murder were puny at best, when compared to Stalin’s ‘peace-time’ terror campaigns. Stalin murdered Soviet citizens. So, to a large extent did Hitler; Hitler killed comparatively few Germans, before or during the war.

    Those who died in the Bloodlands after August 1939 might have experienced different fates had the war not been started then and there. Certainly, in 1940, a group of Hitler’s scientists – led by a leading agronomist – devised the ‘Hunger Plan’, which, if implemented in full, would have led to the murder of thirty of forty million Soviet citizens, to be replaced by German Aryan settlers. (While Hitler used ‘capitalist’ and ‘communist’ Jews as convenient scapegoats, Nazi racism should be understood as pro-Aryan rather than specifically anti-Jewish.) This was probably a racist and supremacist Nazi fantasy, unlikely to be able to be realised in full, and which was not prevented by the declaration of war by the United Kingdom against Germany in 1939.

    It’s hard to see that the eventual victory of the Soviet Union over Germany in 1945 made the world a better, freer or more democratic place than it otherwise would have been; with fewer deaths and sufferings after 1939 than there actually were. Would a German victory over the Soviet Union have led to a less inhumane outcome for many millions of people, in the Bloodlands and elsewhere? We’ll never know, but it’s possible. It seems unlikely that the extremes of German National Socialism could have lasted for as long as the extremes of Soviet and Maoist Communism. And we know that most oppressive regimes do come to an end eventually; just as Hitler thought the Third Reich was forever (or for 1,000 years), so did Stalin and his successors believe of the Soviet Union.

    World War Two morphed into the Cold War

    Mostly, the Cold War – between the United States and the Soviet Union, and their proxies and alleged proxies – was ‘fought’ between the First World and the Second World; but its many victims were mostly in the ‘Third World’, now called the ‘Global South’. The way the Pacific War morphed into the Cold War is glaringly obvious, with the nuclear attack on Japan by the United States representing the end of the one war and the beginning of the next. (And note The bombing of Hamburg foreshadowed the horrors of Hiroshima.)

    The Cold War began in Europe too, when the ‘victorious’ western ‘powers’, most particularly the United States, ‘suggested’ that the Russian ‘liberators’ of Eastern Europe were planning to overrun Western Europe as well (and turn the conquered into ‘communists’). The result was a tensely divided Europe until 1990, unnecessarily so; many European lives were blighted by politico-military suppression for 45 years. Further, that east-west divide has reappeared; just look at the results of the recent general election in Germany.

    Finally, the costs ain’t over yet

    Just as the World War came in two episodes, so too is the Cold War now in its second episode. (In the case of the World War, the second episode was explicitly ideological; communism versus fascism. In the Cold War, it was the first episode that was explicitly ideological; communism versus liberal capitalism.) Further, with signs that the United States might be withdrawing early, the second Cold War (CW2?) is looking like becoming, at its core, the Fourth Reich (aka the European Union) versus Russia (the new Russian Empire?), and with the territories of contention once again being Ukraine and the Black Sea.

    The World War could have ended in 1918 or 1919 after the Great War (later known as World War One) – understood then to be the ‘War to End All Wars’ – if the ‘great powers’ had learned the appropriate lessons. Sadly, the ‘powers-that-were’ and the ‘powers-that-would-be’ learned, if anything, the wrong lessons. World War Two was not a Good War; it was grubbier and crueller than probably all its predecessors, and all sides – including the Anglo-side – contributed to that grubbiness and cruelty.

    Imperialism was very much the problem, not the solution. The ‘rules-based-world-order’, devised in 1919 by the then-victorious powers – shonky new-nation national-borders and all – proved to be just another variation of great-power imperialism. We live in a world today of powers (some more ‘super’ than others), their proxies, and nations in the Global South saddled with borders which ensure forever conflicts.

    We live in a world in which the Global West sees itself as morally and culturally superior, even though manifestly it isn’t. And we live in a world in which the Global East – in its various ethnic and cultural shades – rejects the supremacist assumptions and liberal presumptions of the West. And we live in a world in which those powers gamble with global war, just as the British gambled in 1939. And we live in a world in which the militaries contribute vastly to very real climate change, partly from military emissions of greenhouse gasses, partly because the immediate (eg 2020s) security concerns of the world outweigh concerns about the climate future (eg 2040s) concerns, and partly because we behave as if the goals to prevent or adapt to global warming are unwinnable.

    There is a lot happening in the world at the moment, including tensions within Europe that would lead few people to be confident that – in 2050 – the present political architecture of Europe would still exist. Germany coveted Ukraine in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, Germany occupied Ukraine in 1918 and in the middle years of World War Two. Will the second quarter of the twenty-first century once again see German control of Ukraine? I wouldn’t bet against it. I see a stronger belligerence today in Germany towards having influence in Ukraine than I see in any other western country.

    The biggest threat to peace is war; not Russia, not China, not Germany, not the United States of America, not Iran, not the hapless United Kingdom. Wars are a problem, not a solution.

    The worst things happen during wars, or as a result of wars. There is one important exception. As we have seen, the Soviet Union – a Marxian ‘scientific utopia’ – destroyed many of its own people in the 1930s, in ‘peacetime’, and while the liberal world was looking the other way. Something similar, maybe worse, happened in China in the 1960s.

    The lessons to learn are: avoid war, and the drum-beating that precedes it. And avoid technocratic utopian groupthink; avoid ideologies masquerading as science. The Nazi Hunger Plan was devised by an agronomist, Herbert Backe. War leads to such ideologies; and such ideologies lead to war.

    *******

    Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Australia: Bosnia and Herzegovina

    Source:

    We continue to advise exercise a high degree of caution due to crime, protests and the risk of landmines in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unexploded landmines remain a danger. Stay on main roads and avoid isolated mountain areas. Travel in daylight.

    MIL OSI News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: United States Files Civil Forfeiture Complaint for $47 Million in Proceeds from the Sale of 1 Million Barrels of Iranian Oil

    Source: US State Government of Utah

    A civil forfeiture complaint was filed today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that $47 million in proceeds from the sale of nearly one million barrels of Iranian petroleum is forfeitable as property of, or affording a person a source of influence over, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

    The forfeiture complaint alleges a scheme between 2022 and 2024 to facilitate the shipment, storage, and sale of Iranian petroleum product for the benefit of the IRGC and IRGC-QF. The facilitators used deceptive practices to masquerade the Iranian oil as Malaysian, including by manipulating the tanker’s automatic identification system (AIS) to conceal that it onboarded the oil from a port in Iran. The facilitators presented falsified documents to the Croatian storage and port facility, claiming that the oil was Malaysian. The facilitators paid for storage fees associated with the oil’s storage in Croatia in U.S. dollars, transactions that were conducted through U.S. financial institutions that would have refused the transactions had they known they were associated with Iranian oil. The petroleum product was sold in 2024, and the United States seized $47 million in proceeds from that sale.

    The civil forfeiture complaint further alleges that the petroleum product constitutes the property of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which has perpetuated a federal crime of terrorism by providing material support to the IRGC and IRGC-QF. As alleged, profits from petroleum product sales support the IRGC’s full range of malign activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism, and both domestic and international human rights abuses.

    Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.

    FBI Minneapolis Field Office and Homeland Security Investigations New York are investigating the case.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Karen P. Seifert, Maeghan O. Mikorski, and Brian Hudak for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Adam Small of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are litigating the case. They received assistance from former Paralegal Specialist Brian Rickers and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.

    A civil forfeiture complaint is merely an allegation. The burden to prove forfeitability in a civil forfeiture proceeding is upon the government.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: United States Files Civil Forfeiture Complaint for $47 Million in Proceeds from the Sale of 1 Million Barrels of Iranian Oil

    Source: United States Attorneys General 1

    A civil forfeiture complaint was filed today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that $47 million in proceeds from the sale of nearly one million barrels of Iranian petroleum is forfeitable as property of, or affording a person a source of influence over, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or its Qods Force (IRGC-QF), designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

    The forfeiture complaint alleges a scheme between 2022 and 2024 to facilitate the shipment, storage, and sale of Iranian petroleum product for the benefit of the IRGC and IRGC-QF. The facilitators used deceptive practices to masquerade the Iranian oil as Malaysian, including by manipulating the tanker’s automatic identification system (AIS) to conceal that it onboarded the oil from a port in Iran. The facilitators presented falsified documents to the Croatian storage and port facility, claiming that the oil was Malaysian. The facilitators paid for storage fees associated with the oil’s storage in Croatia in U.S. dollars, transactions that were conducted through U.S. financial institutions that would have refused the transactions had they known they were associated with Iranian oil. The petroleum product was sold in 2024, and the United States seized $47 million in proceeds from that sale.

    The civil forfeiture complaint further alleges that the petroleum product constitutes the property of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which has perpetuated a federal crime of terrorism by providing material support to the IRGC and IRGC-QF. As alleged, profits from petroleum product sales support the IRGC’s full range of malign activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism, and both domestic and international human rights abuses.

    Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.

    FBI Minneapolis Field Office and Homeland Security Investigations New York are investigating the case.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Karen P. Seifert, Maeghan O. Mikorski, and Brian Hudak for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Adam Small of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are litigating the case. They received assistance from former Paralegal Specialist Brian Rickers and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs.

    A civil forfeiture complaint is merely an allegation. The burden to prove forfeitability in a civil forfeiture proceeding is upon the government.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Despite Diplomatic Progress, Security Council Told Continuing Attacks, Funding Cuts Worsening Humanitarian Situation in Ukraine

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The humanitarian crisis in Ukraine is worsening, a senior United Nations official told the Security Council today, as she both welcomed diplomatic progress and expressed deep alarm over rising attacks on civilians and severe cuts to global humanitarian funding.

    “Since 1 March, not a day has passed without an attack harming civilians,” Joyce Msuya, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, told the 15-member Council. The regions of Sumy, Odesa, Dnipro, Donetsk and Kharkiv have been hit especially hard in recent weeks, with extensive damage to homes, shops, warehouses and vehicles.

    Meanwhile, global funding cuts for humanitarian operations — including for Ukraine — are further reducing the UN’s capacity to provide life-saving aid.  While the announcement of a ceasefire on energy infrastructure and discussions regarding safe navigation in the Black Sea are positive steps, she noted that the impact of past attacks continue to undermine civilians’ access to electricity, gas, heating and water as the harsh winter persists.

    “We are deeply concerned by the human cost of continued fighting,” she said, noting that, as of 24 February 2022, at least 12,881 civilians — including 681 children — have been killed in Ukraine.  The true toll is likely much higher.  She reiterated that the protection of infrastructure critical to civilian survival is imperative, and that indiscriminate attacks are unequivocally prohibited under international law.

    And with almost 13 million people in Ukraine in need of humanitarian aid, she warned against funding cuts that could threaten vital services — including gender-based-violence support and safe spaces for 640,000 affected women and girls.  Thus far, only 17 per cent of the $2.6 billion needed for Ukraine’s 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan has been received.  Against that backdrop, she urged the international community to enforce compliance with international law, secure funding to save lives and push for an end to the war — all while ensuring that humanitarian needs remain central to peace talks.

    Speakers Express Concern over Increasing Attacks on Civilians, Urge Moscow to Demonstrate Commitment to Peace

    During the discussion that ensued, many speakers expressed concern over growing attacks on civilians in Ukraine.  “The death and destruction caused by this war are tremendous,” said Slovenia’s delegate, noting the over 42,000 verified casualties and reconstruction costs exceeding $500 billion.  Three years on, and the fighting does not seem to be diminishing — in February 2025, civilian casualties increased by 35 per cent compared to February 2024.  “Every human life matters and is not merely a number,” added Pakistan’s delegate, welcoming deals reached between Ukraine and the Russian Federation banning the targeting of energy sites and ensuring safe navigation in the Black Sea.

    While also noting progress on those fronts, other speakers continued to call on the Russian Federation to demonstrate its commitment to peace, with France’s delegate highlighting “the gaping disconnect between [the Russian Federation’s] actions and words”.  Romania’s delegate pointed out that “the dialogue efforts and the proposals in the last weeks are yet to be met by deeds”, spotlighting new attacks by the Russian Federation since the night of 21 March.

    “It is now for Russia to show its willingness to achieve peace,” said the representative of the European Union, in its capacity as observer, adding:  “There can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine, and no negotiations that affect European security without Europe.”  Finland’s delegate, speaking also for Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, echoed that, also expressing concern that limited humanitarian access makes it hard for humanitarian workers to deliver life-saving aid — especially in front-line areas.

    “A ceasefire seems not to be enough,” observed Greece’s delegate, adding that peace should only be possible “with credible and robust security guarantees, which will deter and prevent the recurrence of war in the future”.  Any peace must be more than a mere pause that allows the aggressor to rearm and strike again — as it has done before — Poland’s delegate underscored.  “We must have enduring peace in Ukraine,” stressed the representative of the United Kingdom, adding that, until Moscow’s forces withdraw from Ukraine, “the United Kingdom will continue to work with Kyiv to achieve a just and lasting peace”.

    Meanwhile, the representative of the Republic of Korea said that interviews with soldiers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea captured in Kursk show men deceived and told they were being sent to Moscow for training.  “Pyongyang must stop sacrificing its own people to sustain the regime in exchange for military, political and economic support from Moscow,” he stressed.

    The representative of Denmark, Council President for March, spoke in her national capacity to describe the latest report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine as a “grim catalogue of crimes against humanity” perpetrated by the Russian Federation’s forces against civilians.  Lithuania’s delegate, also speaking for Estonia and Latvia, drew attention to the 4,000 cases against the Russian Federation in the European Court of Human Rights, all related to events in Crimea, Donbas and the wider war against Ukraine.

    Russian Federation, Ukraine Acknowledge Limited Ceasefire Agreements while Expressing Reservations

    For his part, the representative of the Russian Federation said that the European Union and the United Kingdom are trying to thwart efforts by his country and the United States to settle the Ukrainian crisis.  He went on to say that Moscow’s air forces target only military sites, and that civilian casualties in Ukraine occur because Kyiv stores ammunition in residential areas.  He also stated that Ukraine’s European supporters ignore the crimes committed by Kyiv, reiterating that Moscow’s military operation started three years ago to end the war being waged on fellow Russians.

    Regarding the agreement concerning the Black Sea, he said that this will go into effect only after a series of measures are adopted — including the lifting of sanctions against some Russian Federation banks.  And while agreement has been reached to ban strikes on energy sites both in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation, Kyiv continues to violate that agreement.  “The Russian Federation reserves the right to respond should the Kyiv regime continue on this destructive course,” he emphasized.

    Further, he asked those present if they would prefer to either continue providing weapons to “private-military-company Ukraine”, or to join the Russian Federation and the United States to “find a long-term solution that would address the root causes of the Ukraine crisis and strengthen security in Europe and the world over”.

    “Moscow speaks of peace while launching brutal strikes almost daily on densely populated residential areas” in her country, Ukraine’s delegate said, adding that the Russian Federation launched — in the first half of March alone — hundreds of strikes against her people, using approximately 2,800 guided aerial bombs, nearly 2,000 attack drones and over 100 missiles of various types.  Moscow has also sought to block Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, forcibly transferred Ukrainian children to its territory and that of Belarus, and made use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals.

    While welcoming the United States’ mediation and Saudi Arabia’s hospitality, and reaffirming her country’s commitment to peace, she underscored:  “We won’t accept peace at any price.”  Ukraine will not recognize any of its temporarily occupied territories as belonging to the Russian Federation, and Kyiv will not agree to any foreign diktat regarding the structure or other characteristics of its defence forces.

    While Ukraine has agreed to a ceasefire regarding energy facilities and in the Black Sea, she warned that this does not extend to Russian Federation warships that enter Ukraine’s territorial waters.  “Everyone should focus on Russian actions, not their statements,” she urged, noting that the coming days will be critical in determining “whether Russia is serious about peace or intends to deceive the United States and the world”.

    Nevertheless, Speakers Point to Path towards Peace

    “The war must end now,” the representative of the United States stressed, as she commended both the Russian Federation and Ukraine for taking the first steps towards a ceasefire.  If fully implemented, the agreements concerning energy infrastructure and the Black Sea will open a path towards peace.  “We call on both sides to abide by these agreements and expand on them,” she said.

    Some speakers expressed optimism about the talks under way in Riyadh.  “A window of peace is opening,” said China’s delegate, welcoming recent negotiations that the Russian Federation and Ukraine have had bilaterally with the United States.  Positive progress was made on numerous issues, he said.  Algeria’s delegate, welcoming progress, as well, added that a lasting peace must consider the legitimate concerns of both parties.  The representative of Panama, noting that maritime security is fundamental to his country, expressed optimism about the steps towards a cessation of hostilities in the Black Sea.

    Similarly, the representative of Somalia said that the agreement to ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea represents a practical step towards reducing tensions and protecting vital economic infrastructure.  The recent breakthrough is “creating tangible momentum towards de-escalation”, he said.  “Even as we celebrate the modest breakthroughs,” Guyana’s delegate warned that the slightest misstep could doom millions of civilians to even more bombardment and displacement.  Sierra Leone’s representative observed that “cautious hope has begun to emerge”, but highlighted the severe impact already had on children — trauma from constant shelling, loss of loved ones, displacement and abduction.

    “Even when bombings subside, the scars of war remain,” said the Permanent Observer for the Sovereign Order of Malta, pointing to the need for psychological support for those affected by war-related trauma.  Ukraine’s health system will need restoring, he said, adding that it is also crucial to facilitate the safe and dignified return of displaced families.  “The land must be restored and made habitable,” he added, as the detritus of war is cleared away.

    Quoting Pope Francis, he asked those present:  “Can we get out of this spiral of sorrow and death?  Can we once more walk and live in the ways of peace?  I would like for each one of us — from the least to the greatest, including those who are called to govern nations — to respond in one voice: ‘Yes, we want peace.’”

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Rights Committee Adopts Annual Report 2024-2025

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee this morning adopted its annual report on the work of its one hundred and forty-first (1-23 July 2024), one hundred and forty-second (14 October-7 November 2024), and one hundred and forty-third sessions (3-28 March 2025). 

    Introducing the report, Ivan Šimonović, Committee Rapporteur, said that as of 26 March 2025, 174 States were parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 116 States were parties to the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on individual communications, and 92 States were parties to the Second Optional Protocol, on the abolition of the death penalty.  Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia had acceded to the Second Optional Protocol in May and December 2024 respectively. 

    Country report task forces met during the three sessions to consider and adopt lists of issues on the reports of Chad and Latvia and lists of issues prior to reporting for Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Barbados, Benin, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Poland, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and South Africa.

    At its one hundred and forty-first session, the Committee adopted concluding observations on Croatia, Honduras, India, Maldives, Malta, Suriname and the Syrian Arab Republic.  At its one hundred and forty-second session, the Committee adopted concluding observations on Ecuador, France, Greece, Iceland, Pakistan and Türkiye.  At its one hundred and forty-third session, the Committee would adopt concluding observations on Albania, Burkina Faso, Mongolia, Montenegro and Zimbabwe.  The review of Haiti had been postponed to the Committee’s next session, due to the human rights situation in the country. 

    During the one hundred and forty-first session, the Special Rapporteur for follow-up on concluding observations submitted interim reports to the Committee.  During that session, the Committee reviewed the following States parties under the follow-up process: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Liberia, and Lao People’s Democratic Republic.

    Regarding communications, at its one hundred and forty-first session, the Committee examined 21 drafts concerning 63 communications: 53 communications were decided on the merits, 10 were declared inadmissible and 32 were closed. Regarding communications decided on the merits, the Committee found violations in 51 of them.  At its one hundred and forty-second session, the Committee examined 19 drafts concerning 308 communications: 287 were decided on the merits, 10 were declared inadmissible and 11 were closed.  With regard to the communications for which a decision was taken on the merits, the Committee found violations in 287 of them. At its one hundred and forty-third session, the Committee examined 19 drafts concerning 66 communications: 38 were decided on the merits, five were declared inadmissible and 23 were closed. The Committee found violations in 37 of the communications for which decisions were taken on the merits.  The Committee had successfully started applying its multifaceted strategy aimed at ending the high number of communications pending consideration and adoption.  Mr. Šimonović reiterated the Committee’s concern regarding the lack of resources and emphasised the importance of allocating adequate staff resources to service its sessions. 

    Following the presentation, various Committee experts took the floor, thanking the Rapporteur for his work on the report.  A speaker said that the Committee’s follow-up procedure allowed the Committee to remain in a dialogue with States parties on the implementation of the Covenant. States parties that had been under the Committee’s review were invited to submit their follow-up information and continue the dialogue.  The liquidity crisis was challenging, a speaker noted, and the Committee was approaching a point where it would be difficult to continue the high quality of their work without the required resources.  The Committee was sometimes the last beacon of hope for persons from countries to obtain legal redress outside their own legal system.  The report was worth being shared more broadly and could be further developed and enhanced, another speaker said. 

    The Committee then adopted the annual report, before closing the meeting.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-third session is being held from 3 to 28 March 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 11 a.m. on Friday 28 March to close its one hundred and forty-third session.

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CCPR25.007E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: The day the Red Army reached the USSR border in 1944

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On March 26, 1944, on the 1009th day of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR with Romania.

    This significant event occurred as a result of the actions of the 2nd Ukrainian Front during the Uman-Botoşani offensive operation under the command of the newly-minted Marshal Ivan Konev. Let us recall that Konev received a promotion for the successful Korsun-Shevchenkovsk operation, which ended on February 17, that is, just a month before the Red Army reached the border.

    Border posts were once again installed on the 85-kilometer section of the Soviet border, and this section of the border was taken under the protection of the 24th Border Regiment, the same one that guarded this line in 1941. Regiment veteran Boris Sichan recalls:

    “You can’t imagine the excitement in the regiment when it became clear that we were going to the same section of the border that we had guarded before the war. After we crossed the Dniester at Mogilev-Podolsky, many border guards took off their hats and caps and pulled out of their kit bags the green caps that they had carefully preserved since 1941.”

    Now the Red Army faced the task of liberating a not very friendly Europe from fascism: Romania under the dictatorship of Hitler’s ally John Antonescu, Hungary with the puppet regime of Ferenc Szalasi, Bulgaria, ruled by a pro-German regency council…

    There were still many large-scale operations and fierce battles ahead. In the meantime, Soviet troops were gradually reaching the borders of the Motherland and in other sections of the front: – On July 20, units of the 1st Belorussian Front crossed the border with Poland; – On July 21, troops of the Karelian Front reached the border with Finland; – On August 17, units of the 3rd Belorussian Front entered German territory; – On November 7, the western state border of the USSR was completely restored.

    #Scientific regiment

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 03/26/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Empowering women in cybersecurity focus of OSCE workshop in Sarajevo

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Empowering women in cybersecurity focus of OSCE workshop in Sarajevo

    Participants in an OSCE workshop on gender considerations in cyber/ICT security in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25 March 2025. (OSCE/Edib Jahic) Photo details

    The OSCE Transnational Threats Department held a workshop focusing on gender considerations in cyber/ICT security in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 25 and 26 March. The event gathered 23 cybersecurity experts and policymakers from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and showcased practical ways to empower women to actively take part in shaping inclusive policies and strategies related to cybersecurity and cyber diplomacy.
    “This workshop is a fantastic example of taking an action-orientated approach to ensuring we benefit from all the talent society has to offer as we tackle increasingly complex cyber threats,” said Julian Reilly, British Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    Experts presented good practices from political, economic, social and technical sectors and discussed regional and international initiatives aimed at boosting women’s participation in cybersecurity. During a practical exercise, participants explored ways to interpret and implement the OSCE’s 16 cyber/ICT security confidence-building measures with a gender-responsive approach.
    The event was organized with the support of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. “I am glad to say that the OSCE has been playing a pivotal role in fostering co-operative efforts to address cybersecurity threats. We are proud that the Mission effectively advocates for greater female participation in cybersecurity, emphasizing the importance of gender diversity to enhance stability through diverse perspectives and resources,” said Thomas Busch, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    The workshop was delivered as part of the extrabudgetary project “Activities and customized support for the implementation of OSCE cyber/ICT security confidence-building measures” with financial support from the United Kingdom.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – US restrictions on AI chip exports to EU Member States – P-000495/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The United States (US) Interim Final Rule on a Framework on Artificial Intelligence (AI) Diffusion[1] (‘AI Diffusion measures’) restricts the export of advanced AI models and semiconductors. Exemptions to the restrictions depend on the ‘Tier’ or ‘category’ of country.[2]

    The AI Diffusion measures go against the principles of the Single Market: the free movement of goods (advanced AI semiconductors) and services (AI-enabled services).

    The Commission believes that it is also in the US’ economic and security interest that the EU buys advanced AI chips from the US without limitations. The EU cooperates closely, in particular in the field of security, and represents an economic opportunity for the US, not a security risk.

    The Commission shared its concerns about these measures in a statement issued on 13 January 2025[3] immediately after the adoption of the US AI Diffusion measures.

    The Commission is committed to the integrity of the Single Market and ensuring that trade restrictions do not undermine its functioning or the EU’s legitimate technological ambitions in the field of AI.

    The Commission works closely with the Member States to prepare a reply to the US Bureau of Industry and Security within the consultation period until 15 May 2025, and will further engage in discussions with the US administration to find an appropriate solution.

    In its engagement with the US, the Commission advocates for a non-discriminatory approach for EU Member States, which is key to safeguarding the integrity of the EU Single Market and the future of the AI ecosystem.

    At the same time, recognising the strategic importance of building AI chip capabilities in Europe, the Commission already supports initiatives in AI chip design and is committed to driving their manufacturing, as set out in the Competitiveness Compass.

    • [1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion
    • [2]  Tier 1: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.
      Tier 2: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_255
    Last updated: 26 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU citizens most concerned with security and unity, survey shows

    Source: European Union 2

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey, released today, highlights historic levels of approval for EU membership linked to peace and security.

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “Two thirds of Europeans want the EU to play a greater role in their protection. This is a clear call for action which we will answer. Europe needs to be stronger so that our citizens feel safer. The European Parliament will ensure that every proposal put forward is bold and ambitious enough to match the serious level of threat Europe faces. Europe must step up today, or it risks being stepped over tomorrow.”

    66% of EU citizens want the EU to take a more important role in protecting them against global crises and security risks. This view is particularly strong amongst younger respondents to the survey. At the national level, results for a stronger role of the EU range from 87% in Sweden to 47% in Romania and 44% in Poland.

    Almost three quarters of EU citizens (74%) believe their country has benefited from being a member of the EU. This is the highest result ever recorded in a Eurobarometer survey for this question since it was first asked in 1983. Fitting the current context, respondents mention the EU’s contribution to maintaining peace and strengthening security (35%) as the main reason why membership is considered beneficial.

    In addition, there is wide agreement among EU citizens that EU Member States should be more united to face current global challenges (89%) and that the European Union needs more means to deal with the challenges ahead (76%).

    Citizens expect the EU to strengthen security and defence and to enhance competitiveness

    In a rapidlychanging geopolitical environment, defence and security (36%) as well as competitiveness, economy and industry (32%) are identified as the areas on which the EU should focus most to reinforce its position in the world. These are also the topics that featured high on last week’s European Council with Parliament’s President calling for faster action and bolder ambition. While the results for defence and security have remained stable compared to February/March 2024, those for competitiveness, economy and industry have increased by five points. These two areas are followed by energy independence (27%), food security and agriculture (25%) and education and research (23%).

    Economic and security issues are also at the forefront when it comes to the topics citizens want the European Parliament to address as a priority. Four in ten Europeans mention inflation, rising prices and the cost of living (43%), followed by the EU’s defence and security (31%), the fight against poverty and social exclusion (31%) and support to the economy and the creation of new jobs (29%). Inflation, rising prices and the cost of living is a main priority across all age groups and with peak results recorded in Portugal (57%), France (56%), Slovakia (56%), Croatia (54%) and Estonia (54%).

    As shown by the EP’s previous survey, inflation and the cost of living had already played a major role as a driving force in the last European elections and the economic situation continues to be a main concern for many Europeans. A third (33%) expect their standard of living to decrease in the next five years, seven points more than in June-July 2024. This is the case for 53% of French respondents (+8 pp) and 47% of Germans (+15 pp).

    Peace and democracy remain EU core values

    Looking at the values Europeans would like the European Parliament to defend, peace (45%), democracy (32%) and the protection of human rights in the EU and worldwide (22%) come first. The results for this question have remained stable, underlining citizens steadfast support for the EU’s founding values and principles.

    Two-thirds of citizens support a stronger role for the EP

    As historic trend lines show, in moments of crisis citizens look to the EU for decisive actions and solutions. When the EU is perceived as coming together and delivering results, support indicators are high – which is currently the case.  50% of respondents have a positive image of the EU. In the last decade, this positive perception was only higher once (at 52%), in spring 2022 in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The positive image of the EP is stable at a high level (41%). A few months into the legislative term, over six in ten (62%) citizens would like to see the European Parliament play a more important role, a six- percentage point increase compared to February-March 2024, a few months before the June 2024 European elections.

    Full results can be found here.

    Background   

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey was carried out between 09 January and 04 February 2025 in all 27 EU Member States. The survey was conducted face-to-face, with video interviews used additionally in Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Netherlands, and Sweden. 26.354 interviews were conducted in total and EU results are weighted according to the size of the population in each country.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Romanian Men Indicted For Card Skimming

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA – Acting U.S. Attorney Michael M. Simpson announced that DANIEL IULIAN TEUTOC (“TEUTOC”), a/k/a “Simon Mikula,” and CONSTANTIN CALIN (“CALIN”), citizens of Romania, were charged on March 21, 2025, in a nine-count indictment for conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343, 1344, and 1349; conspiracy to commit access device fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 1029(a)(3) and 1029(a)(4); and seven counts of possession of 15 or more unauthorized access devices, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(a)(3). 

    According to the indictment, TEUTOC and CALIN went to Walmart stores across the Eastern District of Louisiana, including Laplace, Slidell, Harvey, Boutte, Chalmette, and New Orleans. TEUTOC and CALIN captured card information at different the points of sale, from card skimming devices that had been previously installed by other members of the conspiracy.  TEUTOC and CALIN used magnets to activate the card skimmers and send the card information electronically to TEUTOC and CALIN’s cell phones.  After gaining possession of the Walmart customer’s credit, debit, and EBT card information, TEUTOC and CALIN sent the information to another co-conspirator with the intent to allow members of the conspiracy to make fraudulent charges with the stolen card information.

    If convicted of the conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, TEUTOC and CALIN face up to 30 years imprisonment, up to a $1,000,000 fine, and up to 5 years of supervised release.  If convicted of the conspiracy to commit access device fraud, TEUTOC and CALIN face up to 5 years imprisonment, up to a $250,000 fine, and up to 3 years of supervised release.  If convicted of possession of unauthorized access devices, TEUTOC and CALIN face up to 10 years imprisonment, up to a $250,000 fine, and up to 3 years of supervised release.  As to each count, TEUTOC and CALIN, individually, face payment of a mandatory $100 special assessment fee.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Simpson reiterated that the indictment is merely a charging document and that the guilt of the defendant must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Simpson praised the work of Homeland Security Investigations, United States Secret Service, New Orleans Police Department, St. Bernard Sheriff’s Office, and St. John the Baptist Parish’s Sheriff’s Office, in investigating this matter. Assistant United States Attorneys Paul J. Hubbell of the General Crimes Unit, Nicholas Moses, Healthcare Fraud Coordinator, and André Jones, lead OCDETF Narcotics Task Force Attorney, are in charge of the prosecution.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    *   *   *

     

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Maritime truce would end a sorry war on the waves for Russia that set back its naval power ambitions

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Colin Flint, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Utah State University

    A warship is seen docked in the port of the Black Sea city of Sochi. Mikhail Mordasov/AFP via Getty Images

    Away from the grueling land battles and devastating airstrikes, the Ukraine war has from its outset had a naval element. Soon after the February 2022 invasion, Russia imposed a de facto naval blockade on Ukraine, only to see its fleet stunningly defeated during a contest for control of the Black Sea.

    But that war on the waves looks like it could be ending.

    Under the terms of a deal announced on March 25, 2025, by the U.S. and agreed upon in Saudi Arabia, both sides of the conflict committed to ensuring “safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,” according to a White House statement.

    The naval aspect of the Ukraine war has gotten less attention than events on land and in the skies. But it is, I believe, a vital aspect with potentially far-reaching consequences.

    Not only have Russia’s Black Sea losses constrained Moscow’s ability to project power across the globe through naval means, it has also resulted in Russia’s growing cooperation with China, where Moscow is emerging as a junior party to Beijing on the high seas.

    Battle over the Black Sea

    The tradition of geopolitical theory has tended to paint an oversimplification of global politics. Theories harkening back to the late 19th century categorized countries as either land powers or maritime powers.

    Thinkers such as the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder or the U.S. theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime powers as countries that possessed traits of democratic liberalism and free trade. In contrast, land powers were often portrayed as despotic and militaristic.

    While such generalizations have historically been used to demonize enemies, there is still a contrived tendency to divide the world into land and sea powers. An accompanying view that naval and army warfare is somewhat separate has continued.

    And this division gives us a false impression of Russia’s progress in the war with Ukraine. While Moscow has certainly seen some successes on land and in the air, that should not draw attention away from Russia’s stunning defeat in the Black Sea that has seen Russia have to retreat from the Ukrainian shoreline and keep its ships far away from the battlefront.

    As I describe in my recent book, “Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower,” maritime countries have two concerns: They must attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their “near waters”; meanwhile, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into “far waters” across oceans, which are the near waters of other countries.

    The Black Sea is a tightly enclosed and relatively small sea comprising the near waters of the countries that surround it: Turkey to the south, Bulgaria and Romania to the west, Georgia to the east, and Ukraine and Russia to the north.

    Control of the Black Sea’s near waters has been contested throughout the centuries and has played a role in the current Russian-Ukraine war.

    Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to control the naval port of Sevastopol. What were near waters of Ukraine became de facto near waters for Russia.

    Controlling these near waters allowed Russia to disrupt Ukraine’s trade, especially the export of grain to African far waters.

    But Russia’s actions were thwarted through the collaboration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to allow passage of cargo ships through their near waters, then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea.

    Ukraine’s use of these other countries’ near waters allowed it to export between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024. To be sure, this was a decline from Ukraine’s exports of about 6.5 million tons per month prior to the war, which then dropped to just 2 million tons in the summer of 2023 because of Russian attacks and threats. Prior to the announcement of the ceasefire, the Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture had forecasted a decline in Ukrainian grain exports for 2025.

    But efforts to constrain Russia’s control of Ukraine’s near waters in the Black Sea, and Russia’s unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO countries’ near waters, meant Ukraine was still able to access far waters for economic gain and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat.

    For Putin, that sinking feeling

    Alongside being thwarted in its ability to disrupt Ukrainian exports, Russia has also come under direct naval attack from Ukraine. Since February 2022, using unmanned attack drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged Russian ships and whittled away at Russia’s Black sea fleet, sinking about 15 of its prewar fleet of about 36 warships and damaging many others.

    Russia has been forced to limit its use of Sevastopol and station its ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea. It cannot effectively function in the near waters it gained through the seizure of Crimea.

    Russia’s naval setbacks against Ukraine are only the latest in its historical difficulties in projecting sea power and its resulting tendency to mainly focus on the defense of near waters.

    In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval loss to Japan. Yet even in cases where it was not outright defeated, Russian sea power has been continually constrained historically. In World War I, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to limit German merchant activity in the Baltic Sea and Turkish trade and military reach in the Black Sea.

    In World War II, Russia relied on material support from the Allies and was largely blockaded within its Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports. Many ships were brought close to home or stripped of their guns as artillery or offshore support for the territorial struggle with Germany.

    During the Cold War, meanwhile, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving missile boats and some aircraft carriers, its reach into far waters relied on submarines. The main purpose of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO penetration into the Black Sea.

    And now, Russia has lost control of the Black Sea. It cannot operate in these once secure near waters. These losses reduce its ability to project naval power from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean Sea.

    Ceding captaincy to China

    Faced with a glaring loss in its backyard and put in a weak position in its near waters, Russia as a result can project power to far waters only through cooperation with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water naval capacity.

    Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 are evidence of this cooperation. Wang Guangzheng of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Southern Theater said of the drill that “the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.” And looking forward, he claimed the exercise “effectively enhanced the ability to the two sides to jointly respond to maritime security threats.”

    Warships of the Chinese and Russian navies take part in a joint naval exercise in the East China Sea.
    Li Yun/Xinhua via Getty Images

    This cooperation makes sense in purely military terms for Russia, a mutually beneficial project of sea power projection. But it is largely to China’s benefit.

    Russia can help China’s defense of its northern near waters and secure access to far waters through the Arctic Ocean – an increasingly important arena as global climate change reduces the hindrance posed by sea ice. But Russia remains very much the junior partner.

    Moscow’s strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More to the point, sea power is about power projection for economic gain. China will likely use Russia to help protect its ongoing economic reach into African, Pacific, European and South American far waters. But it is unlikely to jeopardize these interests for Russian goals.

    To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. And securing Russian interests in Africa complements China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure its own, and greater, global economic interests. But cooperation will still be at China’s behest.

    For much of the Ukraine war, Russia has been bottled up in its Black Sea near waters, with the only avenue for projecting its naval power coming through access to Africa and Indian Ocean far waters – and only then as a junior partner with China, which dictates the terms and conditions.

    A maritime deal with Ukraine now, even if it holds, will not compensate for Russia’s ongoing inability to project power across the oceans on its own.

    Editor’s note: This is an updated version of an article originally published by The Conversation U.S. on Oct. 3, 2024.

    Colin Flint does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Maritime truce would end a sorry war on the waves for Russia that set back its naval power ambitions – https://theconversation.com/maritime-truce-would-end-a-sorry-war-on-the-waves-for-russia-that-set-back-its-naval-power-ambitions-253089

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Amid Appalling Civilian Death Toll in Syria, Caretaker Authorities Must Signal ‘Era of Impunity’ Is Over, Special Envoy Tells Security Council

    Source: United Nations 4

    Several Speakers Urge Lifting Economic Sanctions on Damascus, Condemn Israel’s Ongoing Violations of Syria’s Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity

    Meeting today — 14 years after the start of the civil war in Syria, four months since the fall of the former regime and weeks removed from harrowing violence along the country’s coast — the Security Council heard of the need for accountability and economic recovery so that the country can move towards credible, inclusive transition.

    “The legacies of 14 years of war and conflict — and five decades of one-man rule — are huge,” said Geir O. Pedersen, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria.  “So are the immediate challenges facing the Syrians today,” he added. While many have rejoiced at their newfound ability to gather in public spaces without fear, many others have faced devastating violence on Syria’s coast.  On that, he said that “armed groups associated with the former regime” attacked and ambushed caretaker authority forces across that region on 6 March. “Serious armed confrontations ensued, resulting in significant numbers of casualties among the warring factions,” he reported.

    “But far more disturbing was the appalling civilian death toll,” he stressed, spotlighting “widespread footage of grave violations of a plainly sectarian and retaliatory nature”.  Detailing the broader context of fomenting insecurity, hate speech, sense of exclusion and pent-up grievance, he said that further investigation is needed to fully determine the perpetrators of the “shocking” violence against civilians.  For their part, the caretaker authorities have announced an independent investigative committee tasked with examining violations by all sides.  He underscored that findings must be made public and those responsible held accountable to clearly signal that “the era of impunity in Syria is in the past”.

    He went on to express concern over recent Israeli statements on the intention to stay in Syria “for the foreseeable future”, as well as demands for the “full demilitarization of southern Syria”, calling on the Council to “hold Israel to its commitment that this is a temporary presence”.  Additionally, he detailed the caretaker authorities’ actions to establish a transitional Government, a permanent Constitution and transitional justice. “Syrians need an economic future,” he added, welcoming humanitarian pledges made at the ninth Brussels Conference on 17 March to support Syria’s recovery.  However, observing that “more resources will be needed”, he also urged “fast and broad sanctions easing”.

    Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, cited progress on that front, with expanded cross-border deliveries from Türkiye, engagement with Member States to ease sanctions, the repair of infrastructure to restore access to water and the clearance of over 1,700 pieces of unexploded ordnance. Nevertheless, he underscored:  “We need more funding.”  The 2024 Humanitarian Appeal for Syria was only 35 per cent funded, and in 2025, almost half of organizations funded by the United States have received full or partial stop orders.

    Stating that $2 billion is needed to reach 8 million of the most vulnerable people through June, he noted that his office has only received $155 million to date — 13 per cent of what is needed.  Yet, 16 million people — nearly three quarters of the Syrian population — lack sufficient food, water, shelter and medicine.  While stating that there are real reasons for hope after 14 years of conflict and devastation, he stressed that “there is no time to spare”.  He therefore urged those present to be “problem-solvers, rather than problem-observers”.

    Next to brief was Joumana Seif, Co-founder of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement and Legal Adviser at the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, who pointed out that Syrians endured “immense” suffering under the rule of Bashar al-Assad.  This led to sanctions, which affected not only the regime, but also ordinary citizens.  “Now that Assad is no longer in power, there is no justification for maintaining these sanctions,” she stressed, adding that “what Syrians need most” is the immediate lifting of these measures alongside investment, reconstruction and economic revitalization.

    Turning to the recent coastal violence, she underscored that this has “caused real concern for us Syrians”.  She stressed:  “We don’t want to build our new country on the back of a new massacre.”  Instead, Syrians must create a transparent and inclusive plan for transitional justice, which requires consultation with victims’ associations and civil society to ensure fair trials, truth commissions, moral and financial compensation for victims and safeguards to prevent future atrocities.  “All of this requires significant financial resources,” she observed.  Additionally, she underscored the need to form an inclusive Government that “truly represents everyone without exclusion”.

    As the floor opened, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Council President for March, spoke in his national capacity to underscore that the interim Government “must protect Syrians from all religious and ethnic backgrounds”.  He also underlined the need for an inclusive political transition. “Syrian society, in all its complexity and diversity, must be represented,” he urged.  And on the issue of sanctions, he noted that the European Union suspended several such measures in February “to send a very clear signal to the Syrian people of our support towards a better future”.

    Also underlining the European Union’s commitment to the Syrian people, the representative of France noted the suspension of certain restrictive measures to facilitate financial and bank transactions for the country’s reconstruction.  Slovenia’s representative added that the bloc will consider a further lifting of sanctions depending on developments on the ground.  The representative of Greece, meanwhile, emphasized that sanctions should be eased in a gradual, conditional and reversible manner to “ensure that our expectations are met” in terms of an inclusive transition and accountability for recent atrocities.

    Many Council members also spotlighted the recent Brussels Conference, during which donors pledged nearly $6.5 billion in aid to support Syria’s recovery.  The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that her country, at that event, promised up to $207 million in critical humanitarian assistance.  In parallel, the United Kingdom has relaxed some of its sanctions on Syria and revoked the asset freezes of 24 entities and institutions in the energy, transport and finance sectors.

    On the topic of assistance, Kang Insun, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, urged stronger international commitment to humanitarian aid and economic recovery in Syria to “overcome the pain and destruction of 14 years of conflict”.  For its part, Seoul has provided nearly $150 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria and its neighbours over the past decade, and will continue to offer its support.  “As [the Republic of] Korea has pledged, 2,400 tons of Korean rice will be delivered to assist food-insecure populations in Syria,” she reported.  She also took “positive note” of recent developments regarding the suspension of certain sanctions.

    Many Council members, echoing warnings of Syria’s dire economic and humanitarian situation, called for the lifting of unilateral sanctions on the country.  Among them were the representatives of Panama and Pakistan — the latter of whom stressed that lifting sanctions is “imperative to facilitating reconstruction and aid efforts”.  Algeria’s representative — also speaking for Guyana, Sierra Leone and Somalia — stressed: “Without rapid economic recovery, it will be difficult to envision a safe and prosperous future for Syrians.” Therefore, the swift lifting of unilateral sanctions is essential.

    Additionally, he — like many other Council members today — expressed concern over “alarming” statements by Israeli officials regarding the “indefinite” presence of their forces in Syrian territory and their intention to establish a “demilitarized area” in the country’s south.  Condemning these “irresponsible” statements — “which will only exacerbate regional instability” — he also joined others in calling for full respect for the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, including its provisions regarding the area of separation.

    Similarly, the representative of the Russian Federation pointed to the “destructive role” played by Israeli air strikes against — and continued occupation of — Syrian territory.  Condemning recent attacks by the Israel Defense Forces, he called on Israel to withdraw its units from areas taken since December 2023.  Additionally, he expressed concern over the issue of foreign terrorist fighters still present in Syria — a point echoed by China’s representative, who urged the interim authorities to fulfil their counter-terrorism obligations and take decisive measures to combat all Council-listed terrorist organizations.

    The representative of the United States also underscored that all foreign fighters “need to be removed from their posts immediately”. She also stressed that the interim authorities must embark on a political process that includes Kurdish, Druze, Alawite and Christian communities — “something they have not meaningfully done to date”.  There must also be expansive representation of Syrian voices in the drafting of a permanent Constitution.  Otherwise, she stressed, Syria will “remain in the sectarian shadow of the Assad regime, increasing the likelihood of a new civil war”.

    For his part, the representative of Syria reported that, in the wake of recent violence, the Syrian leadership “affirmed that the new Syria will be a State of law and that the law will apply to all”.  Further, such authorities have emphasized that shedding “the blood of the innocent will not go unpunished — regardless of the identity of the perpetrators”.  Additionally, he urged the “full lifting of sanctions imposed on the Syrian people”. And pointing to an Israeli attack on the province of Daraa today, he called on the Council to “compel Israel to cease its ongoing aggression”.

    Several of Syria’s neighbours also took the floor, with Iran’s representative condemning Israel’s ongoing violations of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  So, too, did the representative of Qatar, who additionally called for the lifting of economic sanctions against Syria as “that raison d’être is no longer there”. Jordan’s representative echoed that call, adding that countries hosting Syrian refugees cannot bear that burden alone. Therefore, the international community must provide financial and technical support in this regard.

    The representative of Türkiye, meanwhile, welcomed a “new era” in Syria as the interim authorities work towards political transition.  However, he voiced concern over provocations in Latakia and surrounding areas, which are aimed at undermining a smooth transition process.  “These attacks should not be mischaracterized as a sectarian conflict between Damascus and the Alawite community,” he stressed, as “the international community must recognize that these were coordinated efforts, supported by certain regional actors, to destabilize Syria”.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Human Rights and Sport – Global: FIFA must recognize, support Afghan Women’s team in exile

    Source: Amnesty International

    New Report Details Afghan Women Footballers’ Fight for Right to Play

    (Amsterdam, March 25, 2025) – The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) should act to stop the ongoing discrimination against Afghan women footballers living in exile and facilitate their return to international competition, the Sport & Rights Alliance said in a report released today.

    In two days, the Afghanistan Women’s National Football Team (AWNT) will be absent from the 2026 AFC Women’s Asian Cup Qualifiers draw, which feeds into qualification for the 2027 Women’s World Cup – marking the second World Cup-qualifying cycle from which the team has been excluded since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

    “Though the Afghanistan Women’s National Team escaped the Taliban in 2021, the shadow of systematic gender discrimination continues to follow them across borders, denying them their rightful place on the international stage,” said Samira Hamidi, South Asia campaigner at Amnesty International. “Amnesty, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and other civil society organizations, has called for the Taliban’s gender persecution to be investigated as crimes against humanity.”

    The new Sport & Rights Alliance report, titled “’It’s not just a game. It’s part of who I am’: Afghan Women Footballers’ Fight for the Right to Play,” details how the Afghan women’s team, a symbol of women’s empowerment in post-Taliban Afghanistan, was specifically targeted for reprisals when the Taliban returned to power in 2021. The report documents that dozens of Afghan women footballers who were evacuated to countries including Australia, Portugal, Albania, the United Kingdom and the United States remain eager and ready to represent Afghanistan in international competition.

    “Right now, the game is at halftime, and the Taliban think they are winning,” said Khalida Popal, founder of the Afghanistan Women’s National Team and Girl Power Organization. “If FIFA would change its rules and let us play, we could show the world that Afghan women and girls belong in sport, in school and everywhere in society – and we will not be defeated.”

    FIFA regulations currently require the team to receive recognition from the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan Football Federation, which will not recognize a women’s football team due to the Taliban’s ban on women’s sports. For more than three years, the Afghan women’s team players and their supporters have campaigned for FIFA to intervene and provide them with the official recognition and financial support denied to them by Afghanistan.

    In response to a letter from the Sport & Rights Alliance requesting comment on the report, FIFA shared on 21 March that a plan has been developed to provide football opportunities for Afghan women both within and outside the country, but did not say whether they intend to officially recognize the AWNT or how specific funding would be allocated.

    “The Afghanistan Women’s National Team has shown remarkable resilience since its establishment – even in the face of harassment, abuse and death threats, and being forced to leave their homes and build new lives in cities all over the world,” said Joanna Maranhão, network coordinator for the Sport & Rights Alliance’s Athletes Network for Safer Sports. “Restoring the AWNT’s ability to access training facilities and resources to play and represent their country would be an important form of remedy, as required under international human rights law.”

    The FIFA Statutes and Human Rights Policy prohibit discrimination of any kind, including gender discrimination, and commits the global sport governing body to promoting women’s football. The FIFA Statutes mandate that all member associations comply with the organization’s regulations, including the obligation to prevent and oppose discrimination and to promote women’s football. Member associations may face sanctions for any violations of these obligations.

    “Afghan women footballers’ ability to play internationally depends entirely on intervention from FIFA,” said Andrea Florence, executive director of the Sport & Rights Alliance. “FIFA’s letter in response to our report laid out their strategy to support Afghan women. It is great to hear that FIFA is working to promote playing opportunities for the players, but we remain hopeful that they will decide to officially recognize the team and allocate financial support as it does to other member associations.”

    The Sport & Rights Alliance also said that FIFA should provide financial support for the women’s team to train and participate in international competitions, as it does with other member associations. Through the FIFA Forward Development Programme for instance,  each of FIFA’s 211 member associations are currently entitled to up to $9.2 million over a four-year period.

    The Afghan team’s campaign has garnered global attention and support over the last three years, including from Nobel Peace Prize laureate Malala Yousafzai and nearly 200,000 people who have signed a Change.org petition urging FIFA to recognize the team in exile.

    “For these athletes, football is not only their passion but a fundamental act of resistance against the Taliban – an act of solidarity with their sisters still living in Afghanistan,” said Fereshta Abbasi, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “FIFA’s recognition of and support for the team would be a powerful statement that Afghan women’s rights cannot be erased.”

    The International Olympic Committee (IOC) did recognize an Afghan Olympic Committee in exile for the 2024 Paris Olympics, enabling Afghan women athletes to compete despite Taliban restrictions. Several UN experts called this move from the IOC a “welcome start,” but called on international and national sports bodies to do more to push back against the Taliban’s oppressive policies and “support female Afghan athletes wherever they are.”

    MIL OSI – Submitted News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Global: FIFA must recognize, support Afghan women’s team in exile

    Source: Amnesty International –

    New Report Details Afghan Women Footballers’ Fight for Right to Play

    The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) should act to stop the ongoing discrimination against Afghan women footballers living in exile and facilitate their return to international competition, the Sport & Rights Alliance said in a report released today.

    In two days, the Afghanistan Women’s National Football Team (AWNT) will be absent from the 2026 AFC Women’s Asian Cup Qualifiers draw, which feeds into qualification for the 2027 Women’s World Cup – marking the second World Cup-qualifying cycle from which the team has been excluded since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

    “Though the Afghanistan Women’s National Team escaped the Taliban in 2021, the shadow of systematic gender discrimination continues to follow them across borders, denying them their rightful place on the international stage,” said Samira Hamidi, South Asia campaigner at Amnesty International. “Amnesty, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and other civil society organizations, has called for the Taliban’s gender persecution to be investigated as crimes against humanity.”

    The new Sport & Rights Alliance report, titled “‘It’s not just a game. It’s part of who I am’: Afghan Women Footballers’ Fight for the Right to Play,” details how the Afghan women’s team, a symbol of women’s empowerment in post-Taliban Afghanistan, was specifically targeted for reprisals when the Taliban returned to power in 2021. The report documents that dozens of Afghan women footballers who were evacuated to countries including Australia, Portugal, Albania, the United Kingdom and the United States remain eager and ready to represent Afghanistan in international competition.

    “Right now, the game is at halftime, and the Taliban think they are winning,” said Khalida Popal, founder of the Afghanistan Women’s National Team and Girl Power Organization. “If FIFA would change its rules and let us play, we could show the world that Afghan women and girls belong in sport, in school and everywhere in society – and we will not be defeated.”

    FIFA regulations currently require the team to receive recognition from the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan Football Federation, which will not recognize a women’s football team due to the Taliban’s ban on women’s sports. For more than three years, the Afghan women’s team players and their supporters have campaigned for FIFA to intervene and provide them with the official recognition and financial support denied to them by Afghanistan.

    In response to a letter from the Sport & Rights Alliance requesting comment on the report, FIFA shared on 21 March that a plan has been developed to provide football opportunities for Afghan women both within and outside the country, but did not say whether they intend to officially recognize the AWNT or how specific funding would be allocated.

    “The Afghanistan Women’s National Team has shown remarkable resilience since its establishment – even in the face of harassment, abuse and death threats, and being forced to leave their homes and build new lives in cities all over the world,” said Joanna Maranhão, network coordinator for the Sport & Rights Alliance’s Athletes Network for Safer Sports. “Restoring the AWNT’s ability to access training facilities and resources to play and represent their country would be an important form of remedy, as required under international human rights law.”

    The FIFA Statutes and Human Rights Policy prohibit discrimination of any kind, including gender discrimination, and commits the global sport governing body to promoting women’s football. The FIFA Statutes mandate that all member associations comply with the organization’s regulations, including the obligation to prevent and oppose discrimination and to promote women’s football. Member associations may face sanctions for any violations of these obligations.

    “Afghan women footballers’ ability to play internationally depends entirely on intervention from FIFA,” said Andrea Florence, executive director of the Sport & Rights Alliance. “FIFA’s letter in response to our report laid out their strategy to support Afghan women. It is great to hear that FIFA is working to promote playing opportunities for the players, but we remain hopeful that they will decide to officially recognize the team and allocate financial support as it does to other member associations.”

    The Sport & Rights Alliance also said that FIFA should provide financial support for the women’s team to train and participate in international competitions, as it does with other member associations. Through the FIFA Forward Development Programme for instance,  each of FIFA’s 211 member associations are currently entitled to up to $9.2 million over a four-year period.

    The Afghan team’s campaign has garnered global attention and support over the last three years, including from Nobel Peace Prize laureate Malala Yousafzai and nearly 200,000 people who have signed a Change.org petition urging FIFA to recognize the team in exile.

    “For these athletes, football is not only their passion but a fundamental act of resistance against the Taliban – an act of solidarity with their sisters still living in Afghanistan,” said Fereshta Abbasi, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “FIFA’s recognition of and support for the team would be a powerful statement that Afghan women’s rights cannot be erased.”

    The International Olympic Committee (IOC) did recognize an Afghan Olympic Committee in exile for the 2024 Paris Olympics, enabling Afghan women athletes to compete despite Taliban restrictions. Several UN experts called this move from the IOC a “welcome start,” but called on international and national sports bodies to do more to push back against the Taliban’s oppressive policies and “support female Afghan athletes wherever they are.”

    MIL OSI NGO –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Malta, Experts of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances Ask about Efforts to Establish a Stand-Alone Law on Enforced Disappearance and Prevent Disappearances of Migrants

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    Committee Experts Commemorate the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice in Argentina and the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims

    The Committee on Enforced Disappearances today concluded its consideration of the initial report of Malta on its implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.  Committee Experts asked questions on the State’s efforts to establish a stand-alone law on enforced disappearance and a national human rights institution, and to prevent disappearances of migrants.

    Several experts raised concerns that the State party did not have a stand-alone crime of enforced disappearance.  Fidelis Kanyongolo, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, asked about steps taken to establish an autonomous offence of enforced disappearance with appropriate penalties.

    Barbara Lochbihler, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the human rights and equality commission bill, which would establish a national human rights institution, had not yet been enacted.  What parts of the bill were under review and what was the timeline for its adoption?

    Ms. Lochbihler also cited reports of tactics of non-assistance to migrants and refugees in distress at sea, as well as pushbacks to Libya, leading to deaths and disappearances.  Refugees in Libya were reportedly kept in appalling conditions, and exposed to abuse, extortion, abduction and human trafficking.  What measures had the State party taken to prevent disappearances of migrants and dangerous pushbacks at sea?

    Introducing the report, Fiorella Fenech Vella, Office of the State Advocate of Malta and head of the delegation, said Malta had consistently recognised that enforced disappearance was a crime under customary international law, and the State had classified enforced disappearances as inhumane acts under its umbrella provision of crimes against humanity since its independence in 1964.

    The delegation added that Malta had no reported cases of enforced disappearance and the State party criminalised all elements of the crime of enforced disappearance, though it did not have a stand-alone crime of enforced disappearance or plans to create one.

    The establishment of an independent national human rights institution remained a high priority for Malta, Ms. Fenech Vella said.  The equality and human rights commission bill had been previously presented to Parliament; however, the legislative process was halted due to the dissolution of Parliament for the 2022 general elections.  Since then, efforts had been made to develop the bill to ensure full compliance with the Paris Principles and relevant European Union directives.  The delegation could not provide a timeline for its adoption, however.

    The delegation said Malta had saved several migrants at sea.  Maltese authorities acted on distress calls at sea in accordance with relevant international laws and had not engaged in any pushbacks to Libya. The Government signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya in 2020 on setting up coordination centres in Tripoli and Malta to improve the reception of migrants and combat trafficking in the region.

    In concluding remarks, Ms. Fenech Vella said the dialogue was an essential component for further strengthening Malta’s implementation of the Convention and for strengthening protections for rights holders in the State.  The State party would carefully analyse and take into account the Committee’s recommendations in its development of laws and policies.

    Olivier de Frouville, Committee Chair, in concluding remarks, said the State party and the Committee’s common goal was to ensure the implementation of the Convention.  Mr. de Frouville called on Malta and other States that had ratified the Convention to petition States that had not ratified to do so.  The Committee looked forward to continuing to work with Malta in future.

    The delegation of Malta consisted of representatives of the Ministry for Home Affairs, Security and Employment; Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Tourism; Office of the State Advocate; Office of the Attorney General; Ministry for Justice and Reform of the Construction Industry; and the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    At the end of the first day of the dialogue, the Committee heard statements marking the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice in Argentina and the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims.

    Horacio Ravenna, Committee Vice-Chair, recounted that 49 years ago, the armed forces in Argentina initiated a coup against the State’s leadership and imposed a military dictatorship.  In this era, when many political dissidents were subjected to enforced disappearance, the exiled mothers of victims led the fight and bravely spoke out.  On this day, the Committee honoured persons who had passed away and continued to raise public awareness for the next generations, so that the horrendous crime could be eradicated forever.

    Mr. de Frouville, Committee Chair, said all needed to remember the courageous struggle of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, whose actions had led to the development of the Convention.

    The Committee will issue its concluding observations on the report of Malta at the end of its twenty-eighth session, which concludes on 4 April.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.  The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Friday, 4 April at 5 p.m. to close its twenty-eighth session.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the initial report of Malta (CED/C/MLT/1).

    Presentation of Report

    FIORELLA FENECH VELLA, Office of the State Advocate of Malta and head of the delegation, said the dialogue was an opportunity to reaffirm Malta’s unwavering commitment to the Convention and its unwavering support to the United Nations human rights treaty bodies.  Malta had consistently recognised that enforced disappearance was a crime under customary international law amounting to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.  The State had classified enforced disappearances as inhumane acts under its umbrella provision of crimes against humanity since its independence in 1964. It also signed in February of last year the Ljubljana-Hague Convention on prosecuting war crimes and genocide, which would help deliver justice to victims of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, facilitating effective international cooperation in domestic investigations and prosecutions.

    Malta’s 1964 Constitution and Bill of Rights, adopted upon Malta’s establishment as a State, enshrined key rights, including the right to life; protection against arbitrary arrest or detention, and inhuman treatment; the right to a fair hearing; and the prohibition of deportation, among others.  The Constitution stipulated that detention could only occur under lawful conditions.  The International Criminal Court Act incorporated international crimes, including enforced disappearances categorised as crimes against humanity, into the State’s law.  Malta had ratified several international treaties aimed at preventing enforced disappearances and protecting human rights, including the European Convention on Human Rights; had ratified several United Nations human rights treaties and their protocols; and had accepted communications procedures under a number of these.  It was constantly reviewing the Committee’s communications procedure and would keep it updated on any developments.

    Combatting trafficking in persons remained a priority for the State.  Malta had launched a national strategy and action plan on combatting trafficking in human beings in Malta (2024-2030), which aimed to strengthen the necessary national framework required to prevent human trafficking, protect victims, and prosecute offenders of this crime.  Anti-trafficking actions were being developed to address root causes, risks, threats, new methods used by traffickers, and demand.  The strategy took a human rights-focused, gender-sensitive, interdisciplinary, and cross-sectoral approach.  The Police, via the Vulnerable Victims Unit, conducted investigations into human trafficking and collaborated closely with the Financial Crime Investigation Department to effectively target traffickers and prevent them from reaping financial gains from their criminal activities.  In 2024, Malta initiated two prosecutions which combined human trafficking charges with money laundering charges, with legal proceedings currently underway.

    Victims of human rights violations – including heirs of individuals subjected to enforced disappearances – were entitled to initiate court proceedings against the State Advocate in the First Hall of Malta’s Civil Court.  An individual could only be presumed dead when their absence had lasted for a continuous period exceeding 10 years.  The Constitutional Court could issue orders to safeguard affected individuals’ rights and ensure that any law, entity or individual, including all State officials, in breach of fundamental human rights were held accountable.  Even the President could face legal action for acts committed outside the scope of functions of the Office. 

    Malta had incorporated effective remedies for victims of human rights violations in its legislation. The State was in full compliance with article 17(3) of the Convention, which mandated that official registers of individuals deprived of liberty were maintained by the appropriate authorities and updated as necessary.

    The establishment of an independent national human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles remained a high priority for Malta.  The equality and human rights commission bill had been previously presented to Parliament; however, the legislative process was halted due to the dissolution of Parliament for the 2022 general elections. Since then, efforts were ongoing to further develop the bill to ensure full compliance with the Paris Principles and European Union directives that established minimum standards for equality bodies’ independence, resources and powers.  The proposed institution was conceived to function as an independent, well-resourced, and effective entity to be endowed with the necessary legal mandate to promote and protect human rights fervently.

    Malta was resolutely committed to the promotion and protection of human rights, including related to enforced disappearances, and ensuring justice and accountability.  The State party’s efforts reflected its moral commitment to uphold the dignity and rights of all individuals.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BARBARA LOCHBIHLER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the human rights and equality commission bill, which would establish a national human rights institution, had not yet been enacted.  What parts of the bill were under review and what was the timeline for its adoption? Why had the State party not yet accepted the Committee’s competence to receive individual and inter-State communications?  Had any national courts directly invoked the Convention?  Why had the State party not consulted with civil society organizations in preparing the report?

    FIDELIS KANYONGOLO, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the emergency powers act empowered the President to make necessary regulations for public safety, health and the defence of Malta in states of emergency.  Had the President ever exercised this power?  Which legal provisions specifically guaranteed non-derogation from legislation stipulating the right of every person to be protected from enforced disappearances during states of emergency?

    Was State legislation in line with article two of the Convention?  What steps had been taken to establish an autonomous offence of enforced disappearance with penalties commensurate to the seriousness of the offence in State legislation?  Did the State party have a law which established its jurisdiction over the offence of enforced disappearance committed outside of Malta when the alleged offender was present in the country, including in cases where the alleged offender was not subject to military law and when the crime was not a crime against humanity?

    There was no up-to-date statistical information available on the number of disappeared persons or persons involved in enforced disappearances in Malta.  What challenges was the State party facing in this regard?  What plans did it have to systematically collect data on enforced disappearances in future?  How many cases of enforced disappearance had been investigated by the State?  What measures had been taken to ensure the impartiality of such investigations and that public officers allegedly involved in the crime did not take part in the proceedings?

    Malta’s whistleblower act offered some degree of protection to whistleblowers and witnesses.  However, it did not extend its protection to members of a “disciplined force”, the Security Service or persons employed in the foreign, consular or diplomatic service of the Government.  What measures were in place to protect such internal whistleblowers and witnesses, as well as relatives of victims and defence counsel? Did the Code of Ethics of Police Officers provide protection to police officers who witnessed acts of violence, inhumane or offensive treatment?

    Had the State party concluded any extradition agreement with other State parties?  Had it participated in mutual legal assistance and cooperation with other States in respect to offences of enforced disappearances and abduction? Were there any inter-country procedures in place to govern the search for and release of disappeared persons, and the identification and return of their remains in case of death?

    A Committee Expert asked whether the Convention could be directly enforced in Malta.  The State party did not have a stand-alone crime of enforced disappearance.  What mechanisms were in place to harmonise domestic law with the Convention?

    Another Committee Expert asked about plans to involve civil society in the development of State party reports.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Malta had no reported cases of enforced disappearance and the State maintained a robust legal framework to prevent occurrences of enforced disappearance. The Criminal Code classified enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity.  It was in line with article two of the Convention.  All cases of suspected enforced disappearance and missing persons were treated with the highest priority by the police and promptly investigated.  Authorities immediately checked detention records after reports of missing persons. Investigations utilised a range of forensic techniques and legal electronic surveillance tools.  In cases of cross-border activities, the State party engaged with Interpol in investigations.  The police compiled a centralised system containing all reports of missing persons and disappearances, which was used to track searches and investigations.

    Several oversight mechanisms were in place to investigate alleged human rights violations by State officials, including the police’s internal investigation unit.  The police conducted regular human rights training, which addressed the prohibition of enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention. Early warning mechanisms were in place to identify arbitrary detentions at an early stage.  All persons in police custody needed to be registered in the police detention registry.  The maximum period of police detention, which was 48 hours, could be extended for an equivalent period for serious offences when permitted by a magistrate.

    The Criminal Code stated that detained persons had the right to a lawyer and to communicate with consular authorities if they were foreigners.  When detained persons required an interpreter, one needed to be provided without delay.  Police officers were required to follow the Police Code of Ethics, considering the potential effects of their actions.  They were required to take immediate action to protect people and private property from violence.

    Persons subjected to extradition proceedings had the right to engage with lawyers and to appeal extradition decisions.  Malta had the competence to try cases of enforced disappearance that were crimes against humanity committed inside and outside of Malta.  When unable to extradite a person accused of enforced disappearance, the State had the competence to prosecute the person domestically.  Malta had colonial-era extradition agreements with the United States, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.  It was bound by the European Convention on Extradition, which superseded any provisions implemented by bilateral agreements.  There had been no cases of extradition of persons accused of enforced disappearance, but there were cases related to abduction and trafficking in persons.

    Detention services had a central registry of detentions.  All immigration detentions and involuntary admissions to psychiatric institutions were registered.  Persons under arrest could challenge the lawfulness of their detention at any time. The detention of persons in places that were not classified as prisons was an offence.  Police investigations into trafficking cases checked for enforced disappearance.  Persons who had conspired to commit enforced disappearance were prosecuted.  All public officers accused of enforced disappearance or abductions were immediately suspended and were not involved in searches or investigations.

    Maltese law was derogable; Parliament had the power to change national laws, except for the Constitution.  All directives given by the President needed to be in line with the Constitution, which prevailed in cases where domestic legislation conflicted with it.  Parliament could not make amendments to laws without reaching a two-thirds majority, meaning that the ruling party could not impose laws on its own.

    The bill establishing the national human rights institution had been suspended in 2022 due to the general election and assessment of it had started afresh.  Malta was not able to provide a date for the enactment of the bill. There were no civil society organizations active in the field of enforced disappearance in Malta.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    FIDELIS KANYONGOLO, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, asked about the State party’s jurisdiction over enforced disappearances that did not amount to crimes against humanity.  Suspensions could be imposed by the heads of government departments in cases of allegations against inferiors.  Were there provisions that ensured that heads of departments exercised this discretion from the beginning of investigations and for their entire duration?  To what extent did domestic legislation address concealment of the fate or whereabouts of disappeared persons?  To what extent was the State obliged to investigate when enforced disappearance was perpetrated by non-State actors?  Was the right to be protected from enforced disappearance derogable in Malta?  Could persons be extradited to places where they could be subjected to enforced disappearance?  Were police officers who reported enforced disappearances to persons other than their superior officers protected under whistle-blower legislation?

    BARBARA LOCHBIHLER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said enforced disappearances related to issues such as trafficking in persons and migration. Why were civil society organizations that dealt with these issues not involved in preparing the State party’s report?

    Another Committee Expert asked if State legislation addressed the act of aiding and abetting the crime of trafficking in persons.  There were barriers to enforced disappearance being invoked as grounds for an extradition in Malta due to the principle of double jeopardy, which required both the extraditing and receiving States to have the same laws on the crime.  How would the State party address this issue?

    A Committee Expert asked if the Executive, the Attorney General, non-governmental organizations or private individuals had the power to develop legal norms that could be assessed and approved by the legislature.

    One Committee Expert said the Committee was delighted that Malta had never recorded cases of enforced disappearances, but the Convention required that the State party set up legal mechanisms, including a stand-alone offence of enforced disappearance, that would allow it to deal with enforced disappearances that could occur on national territory in future.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party criminalised all elements of the crime of enforced disappearance, though it did not have a stand-alone crime of enforced disappearance or plans to create one. The State party could prosecute all cases of enforced disappearance occurring on its territory.  The emergency powers of the President had never been applied.  The delegation was unable to provide a timeline for the adoption of the bill establishing the national human rights institution.

    There were no bilateral agreements that Malta had concluded that addressed enforced disappearances.  Acts that constituted offences to the laws of Malta were extraditable offences.  Double criminality was adopted in most extradition cases.  When offences listed as grounds for extradition in a foreign State’s extradition request were not included in Malta’s laws, the State party was obliged to indicate an applicable domestic law.  How certain countries interpreted trafficking in persons crimes could differ, which could lead to complications.  The State party needed to do its best to find common ground between jurisdictions in cases of this kind.

    Comprehensive witness protection measures were in place.  Witnesses whose safety was at risk were entitled to identity changes and relocation measures.  Punishments could be mitigated based on witnesses’ cooperation.

    When there were allegations against a police officer, the officer involved was immediately suspended.  When a civil servant under suspicion of having committed a crime was suspended, they could appeal their suspension with the civil service complaints authority.

    Malta was a Westminster democracy, so the Executive could not submit draft laws for consideration, but citizens could.

    State laws addressed aiding and abetting crimes of human trafficking and abduction, including financing and supporting the crime and making use of products obtained through the crime of trafficking in persons.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BARBARA LOCHBIHLER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, asked about mechanisms applied prior to an extradition to assess whether persons could be at risk of enforced disappearance.  Did registers of detained persons include all the details required by the Convention? Were registers regularly updated? Had the State party revised its legal definition of “places of deprivation of liberty” in line with the recommendation of the Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Torture

    Malta’s policies and practices reportedly increased the risk of enforced disappearances of migrants and victims of trafficking.  Tactics of non-assistance or delay in assistance to migrants and refugees in distress at sea, as well as pushbacks to Libya, violating the non-refoulement principle, had led to deaths and disappearances of migrants at sea.  The widespread use of immigration detention and alleged episodes of violence in pre-removal detention centres also continued to be a human rights concern in Malta.  The State party had been called on to stop pushbacks at sea to Libya, which could not be considered a safe space.  Refugees in Libya were reportedly kept in appalling conditions, and exposed to abuse, extortion, abduction and human trafficking.  What measures had the State party taken to prevent disappearances of migrants and dangerous pushbacks at sea?  Malta had had a Memorandum of Understanding with Libya since 2020 that included the funding of two coordination centres in Libya.  What were the contents of this memorandum and how did it prevent migrant pushbacks? 

    Open centres for migrants in Malta reportedly lacked space, forcing the State party to place migrants in detention centres.  Could the delegation update the Committee on this practice?  Were there migration detention facilities that were not operated by the detention service?  What progress had been made in establishing a central register for detained migrants? How long was the maximum and minimum period of migrant detention?  Could data on the nationality of detained migrants be provided?  What was the timeline for extending the mandate of the national preventive mechanism?

    Did the content of training activities referred to in the reply to the list of issues address the Convention? Was the State party planning on providing human rights training to medical personnel in prisons, members of the judiciary, immigration personnel and social workers?  Would training address illegal intercountry adoptions?

    Did national laws place a time limit on access by victims of enforced disappearance and their relatives to reparation?  Did laws address victims’ relatives’ rights to information and property?

    What policies and measures had been taken to protect children, particularly unaccompanied minors, from enforced disappearances in the context of migration and trafficking?  Could the delegation provide figures on trafficking of children?  How had the State party’s policies on illegal intercountry adoption developed, taking into account international norms on the practice?

    FIDELIS KANYONGOLO, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the State party’s obligations under the Convention still existed, although there were no recorded cases of enforced disappearance in the State.  Were there plans to expand the definition of “victims” in Malta’s victims of crime act to align it with article 24 of the Convention, particularly to include family members of individuals who had suffered harm as a result of enforced disappearances that had not directly caused deaths?  What measures were in place to provide victims’ relatives the right to know the progress of investigations and the fate of disappeared persons, and the right to be returned remains in cases of death?  Did relatives have the right to various forms of reparation, including restitution, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition?  Were there laws that obliged the State to continue the investigation of cases until the fate of the disappeared person had been clarified?  Had measures been taken in law and practice to guarantee the right of people in Malta to establish and participate freely in associations attempting to establish the fate of disappeared persons and to assist victims and relatives?

    Another Committee Expert asked how detained persons were informed of their rights, including their right to counsel? How were women and children protected in cases of enforced disappearance?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said no person was to be subjected to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment during extradition proceedings.  Persons were not to be returned if they could be subjected to inhumane treatment or other human rights violations.  Under European arrest warrant laws, the State was bound by a 10-day surrender period, during which time persons subjected to extradition proceedings could appeal the extradition.  Last year, a judgement was made by the Court of Criminal Appeal deciding to prevent the extradition of a person to Romania due to deficiencies in prison conditions in that State.

    Malta was in the process of amending the whistleblowers act so that whistleblowers who were members of the disciplinary forces and other persons would be protected under the act.

    Malta’s laws on trafficking in persons were in line with international norms and ensured protection for vulnerable groups, including women and children.  The victims of crime act ensured that victims had access to legal aid, psychological support and shelter, and granted them the right to be informed about the progress of legal proceedings. The Malta police had a unit for investigating trafficking and non-governmental organizations provided shelters and support for victims.  Training was provided to police on identifying victims of trafficking.  The State party had ratified several international norms on trafficking, including the Palermo Protocol.

    Records of immigration detention were kept in an online database that relevant State authorities could access.  Data was recorded upon admission to migrant facilities.  Many police officers had participated in training courses addressing human rights, investigating missing persons, and victim and witness protection.

    The judiciary had received training on the rights of victims, including to access compensation and justice.  The definition in the victims of crime act was not the only definition of a “victim” in State legislation.  Victims had the right to be understood, and were informed about the protection and legal aid measures they were entitled to and methods of accessing compensation. There were many avenues to compensation under Malta’s legislation, including provisions in the Criminal Code addressing compensation and a process for obtaining compensation for civil cases. Agencies had been established to ensure victims received timely individual assessments regarding the support measures they were entitled to.  The State party prioritised the protection of vulnerable victims and victims of serious crimes, guarding against intimidation and reprisals against victims.  Child victims testified to magistrates in separate rooms to trial rooms to prevent traumatisation.

    Migration remained a challenge for Malta, as the State was located on a major migration route. It had saved several migrants at sea over the past 20 years.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had assisted the State party to improve its asylum system and to establish services such as migrant health services and return counselling.  The State party was dedicated to meeting its human rights obligations regarding migrants, to providing protection to those who needed it, and to returning other migrants in a safe and humane manner.  Maltese authorities acted on distress calls at sea in accordance with relevant international laws. 

    Malta had not engaged in any pushbacks to Libya and there had been no occurrences of collective expulsions.  The Government signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya in 2020 on setting up coordination centres in Tripoli and Malta to improve reception of migrants and combat trafficking in the region.  Libyan authorities needed to be given the necessary resources to combat migrant smuggling.  The memorandum of understanding had led to reduced loss of life in the Mediterranean region.

    The detention of migrants was enforced on clear legal grounds.  Detention orders were issued following individual assessments and only as a last resort.  Such orders were subject to an automatic review and subsequent reviews every 14 days. Migrants were notified of removal decisions verbally and in writing.  Removal orders provided explanations of the reasons for the order and options for voluntary removals.  All return activities were monitored by an independent monitoring board. Free legal aid and interpretation services were provided in legal proceedings on removals.

    All unaccompanied minors were protected by care orders issued by the courts.  They were cared for by the agency for the welfare of asylum seekers, which collaborated with the police force and reported signs of trafficking and risks of minors leaving the country without consent.

    Overcrowding in detention and open centres had not been a problem since 2021.  Malta’s open centre was closed in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The centre was reopened in 2021 and an additional centre was constructed, resolving the problem.  The current occupancy rate in detention centres was less than 30 per cent. Violence in detention centres was not an issue.  Independent correctional centre monitoring boards had been appointed as the State’s national preventive mechanism.  These boards submitted regular reports to the State regarding conditions in detention centres.

    The legal status of victims of enforced disappearance was defined in the Civil Code, which specified that the assets of such persons were managed by curators who were appointed by the courts.  There were safeguards on victims’ assets.  Courts ensured the protection and supervision of unattended children. The directorate for child protection services operated a children’s house and had powers to carry out and request investigations into cases of violations of children’s rights.

    The Constitution provided for freedom of association.  Any person was entitled to associate regarding issues of enforced disappearance.  No legislation could restrict the freedom of association of any person.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BARBARA LOCHBIHLER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the State party had formed a further memorandum of understanding with Libya in 2024.  Did it address the prevention of enforced disappearance?  Some persons employed by the Libyan Coastguard were reportedly themselves involved in trafficking in persons.  How did the State party respond to these reports?  How did it respond to reports that Maltese authorities had failed to rescue over 200 migrants whose vessel sank in the Mediterranean in 2013?  Did migrants deprived of liberty have the right to a lawyer?  Did the State party address the situation of potentially disappeared persons in its work on locating missing migrants?  Had the State party referenced the Committee’s general comment on illegal intercountry adoptions in its regulations on the practice?

    FIDELIS KANYONGOLO, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, asked about amendments being contemplated for the whistleblowers act and the potential timeline for their adoption.  Did registers of persons deprived of liberty include all details stipulated in article 17 (3) of the Convention?  Were the State’s registers interconnected and interoperable?  Did the State’s various definitions of “victims” reflect the breadth of the definition of victims in article 24 of the Convention?  Were victims entitled to compensation and remedies as broadly defined in article 24 (5)?  Mr. Kanyongolo appreciated the details provided by the delegation regarding Malta’s legislation.

    Another Committee Expert said the State party had proceedings to declare absences and deaths. What procedure was used to declare disappearances?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that when a person was charged with a criminal offence, victims could participate in criminal proceedings and could file a petition to claim compensation. The Criminal Code included a compensation scheme.  Under Maltese law, victims could also file actions against the Government before the Civil Court requesting damages.  Damages were timebound and could be renewed after certain periods.  In cases where breaches of human rights were found, courts could grant pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.  Victims also had the right to file applications for reparation with the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights.

    Adoptions were regulated by State laws and there was an authority that oversaw adoptions, including intercountry adoptions, to ensure that they were legal.

    Migrants were granted the same rights as other individuals in criminal proceedings, including the right to a lawyer, the right to contact family members, and the right to medical assistance as required.  They were given information on their rights upon detainment in a language that they understood.

    The memorandum of understanding with Libya had been renewed in 2024 with the same terms and conditions of the previous one.  It aimed to dismantle trafficking activities and prevent the loss of life of migrants at sea.  When the State party received requests for information on missing migrants at sea, responsible authorities conducted necessary investigations.  Malta abided by its international obligations and had never relinquished a search case for migrants in distress at sea.

    Amendments to the whistleblower act were still in the drafting stage and the delegation could not provide a timeline for its adoption.

    Malta was in full compliance with article 17 (3) of the Convention.  Registers of detained persons were maintained by authorities and updated as necessary.  They included the detainees’ personal details, and the time of and reason for arrest, among other details.  Registers were regularly reviewed to ensure compliance with domestic and international norms.

    The Civil Code defined the process for declaring absences.  Disappeared persons could be declared as absentees.  Presumptive heirs of absentees could file petitions to courts to obtain their assets.  The will of the absentee was opened after 10 years of absence, and courts determined who received assets in cases where the absentee had not made a will.

    Closing Remarks

    OLIVIER DE FROUVILLE, Committee Chair, thanked the delegation for the dialogue.  The Committee would prepare concluding observations based on the topics discussed and call on the State party to report on implementation of these concluding observations after a certain period.  The Committee would decide whether or not to hold a follow-up dialogue with Malta based on its assessment of this report.  The State party and the Committee’s common goal was to ensure the implementation of the Convention.  Mr. de Frouville called on Malta and other States that had ratified the Convention to petition States that had not ratified to do so.  The Committee looked forward to continuing to work with Malta in future.

    FIORELLA FENECH VELLA, Office of the State Advocate of Malta and head of the delegation, said the delegation had engaged fully with the Committee in the dialogue.  The Committee had posed pertinent questions related to the implementation of the Convention.  The dialogue was an essential component for further strengthening Malta’s implementation and for strengthening protections for rights holders in the State.  Malta had never implemented policies that had amounted to enforced disappearance, a reflection of its dedication to promoting human rights principles.  The State party would carefully analyse and take into account the Committee’s recommendations in its development of laws and policies.

    Statements Marking the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice in Argentina and the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims

    At the end of the first day of the dialogue, HORACIO RAVENNA, Committee Vice-Chairperson, said that 24 March was a special day in Argentina, the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice. Forty-nine years ago today, the armed forces in Argentina initiated a coup against the State’s leadership and imposed a dictatorship.  Several similar coups were also carried out in other countries in South and Latin America. Many political dissidents were killed, arbitrarily detained and subjected to enforced disappearance in this era as part of Operation Condor, and legislation in many countries did not sufficiently address the phenomenon of enforced disappearance.  In this context, the exiled mothers of victims of enforced disappearance led the fight and bravely spoke out, meeting in Paris to discuss the issue, and these discussions led to the development of the Convention, which had been in force for 14 years.  Today, the Committee honoured persons who had passed away and continued to raise public awareness for the next generations, so that the horrendous crime could be eradicated forever.

    OLIVIER DE FROUVILLE, Committee Chair, said today was also, in addition to being the Day of Remembrance for Truth and Justice, the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims. All needed to remember the courageous struggle of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, whose actions had led to the development of the Convention.  They had spoken the truth bravely to combat dictatorships.

     

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

     

    CED25.007E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Systemic discrimination against Romanian students in the Netherlands and violations of EU law – P-001191/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001191/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE)

    As the Guardian of the Treaties, the Commission has the duty to ensure the enforcement of EU law, including the principles of non-discrimination and free movement. However, newly declassified documents from the Dutch ministry of education reveal serious and systemic discrimination and administrative abuse against Romanian students in the Netherlands, perpetrated by DUO (the Dutch student finance agency) and overlooked by the Dutch ombudsman.

    Since 2019, Romanian students legally studying and working in the Netherlands have been arbitrarily denied financial aid, in violation of EU regulations. Official Dutch institutions confirmed that these students met all legal requirements, yet DUO continued to exclude them on the basis of nationality. The declassified documents, officially acknowledged by the Dutch Parliament, expose an institutional effort to justify these illegal practices rather than protect the affected students.

    Given the gravity of these findings:

    • 1.What measures will the Commission take to ensure that the Dutch authorities are held accountable for these violations?
    • 2.Will the Commission initiate an official investigation into this case and demand corrective actions from the Netherlands?
    • 3.How will the Commission prevent such systemic discrimination against EU citizens in the future?

    Submitted: 20.3.2025

    Last updated: 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Undermining EU interests: the Lipa reception centre on the Balkan migration route – E-003043/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Bosnia and Herzegovina has significantly strengthened its migration management, border management and asylum, with EU support of more than EUR 140 million since 2018.

    Bosnia and Herzegovina also benefits from regional EU programmes supporting border management and anti-smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings.

    Thanks to EU support, four temporary reception centres provide shelter for approximately 4 500 persons across Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    They play a key role for the identification and assessment of the status of migrants, including access to asylum for persons in need, and possible return of persons not in need of international protection, as well as for statistical data collection.

    EU support has helped the country avoid a repetition of the tragic events witnessed in the winter of 2020-21, following the fire at the former centre in Lipa.

    At the current multi-purpose reception and identification centre in Lipa, which is operational since 2021, migrants are registered, their status is assessed to establish if they intend to seek asylum in the country and their identity is checked when entering and leaving the centre.

    The centre is built in accordance with EU standards[1] and is managed by the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities with EU support. The EU-funded operation of the Lipa centre is subject to regular monitoring visits, detailed reporting and independent audits as per usual practice.

    • [1] Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the individual measure to strengthen the response capacity to manage migration flows in favour of the Western Balkans for 2022, C(2022) 2561 final.

    Last updated: 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Dimitar Radev: Bulgaria currently fulfils unconditionally all nominal convergence criteria

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Dear colleagues and guests,

    Thank you for inviting me to open today’s conference. It is taking place at a particularly dynamic and challenging moment for both the global and the Bulgarian economy. Such forums are extremely useful for the exchange of analyses, opinions and ideas at a time when the need to adapt economic processes to new realities is becoming increasingly clear.

    Let’s start with the geopolitical context. In my opinion, at least for the last 35 years, it has not been as important for the economic and financial, but also for the political development of Bulgaria, as it is now.

    The key words for today’s geopolitical context are uncertainty and unpredictability about what lies ahead or, as the President of the ECB very well put it these days, quoting Paul Valéry: “The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be.”

    The obvious question is, what to do in such an environment? Politicians are facing it, but not only them. It is not my job to give advice on what should be done on the political front, at least not in my capacity. I shall therefore confine myself to one sentence: Active participation in strengthening and developing the European project in today’s geopolitical context is the surest guarantee for Bulgaria’s good prospects.

    I will focus more on the economic and financial aspects.

    Developments in Ukraine and the Middle East, the increasing trade conflicts between leading economies and the process of geopolitical fragmentation, as well as the boom in digital technology development are triggering significant structural transformations in global supply chains with uncertain duration, depth and consequences.

    These developments are already having a tangible impact on international trade, leading to increased volatility in commodity prices and forcing a number of countries to adapt their economic and, in particular, industrial policies to rising protectionism worldwide. In pursuit of economic security, many economies are reviewing their dependence on external suppliers and taking measures to localise critical industries, restructuring their production chains.

    These developments are likely to have an increasing impact on Europe, which remains one of the most vulnerable economies in the context of global geopolitical uncertainties, especially with regard to energy resources. For us, this vulnerability is an even more serious risk factor, given that our country remains one of the most energy-intensive economies in Europe. Breaking long-standing energy dependencies, soaring gas and electricity prices and the need for accelerated energy transformation pose serious challenges to European economies. Energy costs continue to be significantly higher than in the US and some Asian economies, creating serious structural challenges for the competitiveness of European industry.

    In this complex global environment, Bulgaria’s starting macroeconomic position is actually not at all bad. In 2024, the country’s real GDP grew by 2.8%, i.e. above expectations, and according to the latest BNB forecast, economic growth will remain stable on positive territory, standing at 2.5% this year and 3.0% in 2026. Growth will be supported primarily by domestic demand in a context of historically very low unemployment and the absence of macroeconomic imbalances.

    The performance of our banking sector remains robust, with capital buffers, liquidity coverage and profitability above the EU average.

    Despite the deterioration of fiscal indicators in recent years, our country still has manoeuvrability, both in terms of the fiscal space available and in terms of the opportunities to restore the fiscal buffers exhausted by the recent budgets.

    Last but not least, our country currently fulfils unconditionally all nominal convergence criteria, including the price stability criterion, with which we have had problems in recent years.

    For a small and open economy like ours, which is highly integrated into global supply chains, geopolitical developments also pose a number of risks, mostly related to:

    • a continued decline in foreign demand for Bulgarian goods and services, especially in view of the deepening structural challenges faced by some of our main euro area trading partners; and
    • increased fluctuations in the prices of key energy and non-energy raw materials, which affect business production costs and household disposable income.

    In an environment of such risks, it is essential that the economy is well prepared for unexpected shocks affecting the aggregate supply of goods and services. Macroeconomic preparations mainly consist of maintaining sufficient buffers in the banking and fiscal sectors. On the one hand, the existence of such buffers would contribute to cushioning the effect of materialisation of risks and, on the other hand, to adapting to and potentially benefiting from changes in the global economy, such as the restructuring of global production chains. A good example in this regard in recent years is the relatively smooth transition of the Bulgarian economy through the COVID crisis. The high levels of fiscal reserve and bank capitalisation maintained at that time allowed our country to recover relatively quickly from the crisis and without the need for external financial support.

    In such an environment, it is extremely important to break the momentum of quantitative and structural deterioration of our fiscal position and restore fiscal buffers. I will give the following example. By the end of 2024, the fiscal reserve reached its historical low, both as a percentage of GDP (4.7%) and as a percentage of total budgetary expenditure under the Consolidated Fiscal Programme (12.3%). For comparison, the average values of these indicators for the last two decades amounted to 8.8% and 24.4%, respectively. The consolidation of the fiscal stance will remain a serious medium-term challenge against the objective need for higher public investment and military expenditure.

    Let me also say a few words about the role of the BNB. In this uncertain environment, the BNB will continue to apply conservative supervisory and regulatory policies, introducing preventive measures to ensure the resilience of the banking system. The consistency and predictability of the policies we pursue are key to the confidence of the banking sector, businesses and investors.

    Our approach will continue to include:

    • maintaining high capital and liquidity buffers that ensure the resilience of the banking system;
    • strict supervision of lending to avoid the accumulation of excessive risks on banks’ balance sheets; and
    • policy flexibility so that we can respond adequately to new challenges, including in terms of anticipatory economic growth objectives.

    In other words, we not only want to ensure stability, but also to create a predictable environment in which economic actors can plan and invest with greater confidence.

    Finally, of course, I will also touch on the subject of the country’s accession to the euro area.

    This topic unites more strongly than before the current issues we are discussing from geopolitics to economics and finance.

    We have, indeed, one final step left. I am convinced that we are able to do it with dignity and self-confidence. It is not by chance that I emphasised that at the moment our country meets all the convergence criteria.

    As a central bank, we are focused both on the successful implementation of this final step and on our full readiness to work in the context of the shared monetary sovereignty of the euro area. This includes two main groups of tasks.

    The first relates to the operationalisation of the existing capacity to operate in the euro area, including the performance of functions that we cannot perform in a currency board environment. These functions relate both to the participation in defining the Eurosystem’s monetary policy, which required the building of strong analytical capacity, and to the implementation of the common monetary policy at national level through its main instruments, including the conduct of open market operations, the preparation of conditions for participation and the technical provision of access for Bulgarian banks to the ECB’s standing facilities. In addition to our participation in the process of creating and distributing the money supply, the BNB will also act as a lender of last resort, providing extraordinary liquidity support to Bulgarian banks in case of need.

    The second task is related to logistics and technical preparation of the process of exchange and functioning of the banking system in the context of the euro area. What has been done so far is truly unprecedented for the bank and the country in terms of scale and technical complexity. It includes construction and renting of areas; supply of machinery, equipment and materials; providing in practice a new fleet of armoured and security vehicles; creation of a qualitatively new payment and IT infrastructure; development and approval of transport schemes and security systems; full readiness to mint Bulgarian euro coins and deliver the necessary euro banknotes; obtaining the necessary licences and certificates; carrying out a large number of public procurements. I am making this incomplete enumeration to underline two things: first that we have been working hard on this topic and not since yesterday or today; and second, that the BNB and the banking sector are very ready to join and operate within a euro area context.

    Allow me to finish with a few conclusions:

    • First, geopolitical uncertainty is one of the main risks to the country’s economy and finances and requires the maintenance of buffers in the banking and fiscal spheres and readiness to implement adaptive policies;
    • Second, the banking sector is well prepared to face the risks stemming from the external macroeconomic environment and can play an important role in the materialisation of potential development opportunities for key sectors of the economy by channelling credit resources to them;
    • Third, unlike the banking sector, public finances need to restore fiscal buffers in the medium term while preserving the long-term sustainability of government debt; and
    • Fourth, joining the euro area has enormous potential to become a catalyst for the country to navigate successfully in the face of global uncertainty. And this potential needs to be exploited.

    Thank you for your attention and I wish you interesting and fruitful discussions!

    MIL OSI Economics –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission – A10-0042/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    – having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027[1] and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context[2] and the related unilateral declarations[3],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4],

    – having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5] (MFF Revision),

    – having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[6],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges[7],

    – having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027[8],

    – having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[9],

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom[10],

    – having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570) and its position of 23 November 2022 on the proposal[11],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[12] (the Financial Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[13],

    – having regard to the EU’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and its commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

    – having regard to the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025,

    – having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing European Union Recovery Instrument borrowing costs[14],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[15],

    – having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16],

    – having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights[17] of 13 December 2017,

    – having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025[18] and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

    – having regard to Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’, presented in the European Parliament on 21 October 2024,

    – having regard to Mario Draghi’s report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, presented in the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,

    – having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report entitled ‘Safer together – Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’, presented in the European Parliament on 14 November 2024,

    – having regard to the presentation of the EU Competitiveness Compass by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 29 January 2025,

    – having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 for European Defence Readiness providing a framework for the ReArm Europe plan (JOIN(2025)0120),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    – having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 February 2025 on the budget guidelines for 2026,

    – having regard to Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    – having regard to the letters from the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0042/2025),

    Budget 2026: building a resilient, sustainable and prosperous future for Europe

    1. Highlights the anticipated economic growth projected for 2025 and 2026 within the EU[19], accompanied by an easing of inflation; notes nonetheless the uncertainties stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly threatens the security of the EU, and the worsening effects of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, also manifested in the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which are compounded by new significant geopolitical changes and a deteriorating international rules-based order, heightened security threats and a rise in global protectionism; emphasises that, in such an increasingly volatile landscape, it is imperative for the EU to enhance its defence and security capabilities, social, economic and territorial cohesion and political and strategic autonomy, decrease its dependence, increase its competitiveness and ensure a prosperous future for the continent and its people, who are currently facing an increasingly high cost of living;

    2. Is determined to ensure that the 2026 budget, by focusing on strategic preparedness and security, economic competitiveness and resilience, sustainability, climate, as well as strengthening the single market, provides the people in the EU with a robust ecosystem and delivers on their priorities, thus reinforcing a socially just and prosperous Europe; underlines the need for additional investment in security and defence, research, innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, energy, migration, as well as land and maritime border protection, inclusive digital and green transitions, job creation, and the provision of opportunities for young people; insists that this be accompanied by administrative simplification, as indicated in the Competitiveness Compass; insists that the EU budget is the largest investment instrument with leverage effect, complementing national budgets and therefore enabling the EU to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing world while ensuring prosperity, social cohesion and stability for its people; is strongly of the opinion that the EU should use this leverage effect to the maximum degree to boost the Union’s objectives and policymaking, as well as private investment;

    Investing in a solid, sustainable and resilient economy

    3. Is adamant that sound economic resilience and sustainability can be achieved in the EU by boosting public and private investment, increasing innovation and supporting competitiveness, including by addressing the skills gap and fostering more industrial production in Europe as a source for robust economic growth and quality jobs, and thereby guaranteeing the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring that the EU remains agile and self-reliant in the face of global challenges, disruptions and volatility; highlights the need to promote innovation, prioritise education, reduce costs and the administrative burden, and strengthen the single market, particularly as regards services;

    4. Reaffirms, in this regard, that research and innovation remain crucial for the EU’s success in cutting-edge industries and new clean and sustainable technologies; recalls the long-standing goal of increasing research and innovation investment to 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP); calls, therefore, for increased funding to be provided under Horizon Europe to fund at least 50 % of all excellent proposals in all scientific disciplines, enable researchers as well as companies, especially SMEs, to bring new developments to the market, and to scale up, ensure solid economic growth and boost the Union’s competitiveness in the global economy, thereby preventing actors from leaving for competing regions while also ensuring that Europe has the knowledge base it needs to pursue the Green Deal commitments;

    5. Highlights the importance of targeted support in encouraging public-private partnerships and accessible and increased financing to support SMEs as the backbone of the European economy and a vector for pioneering innovation, emphasising the role of the European Innovation Council, InvestEU and the SME component of the single market programme in empowering start-ups and scale-ups of innovative companies, supporting them in their growth and contributing to a greater role for the EU economy on the global stage; expresses its concern that, according to the interim evaluation of InvestEU, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; takes note of the Commission proposal in this regard; underlines, furthermore, the importance of the single market programme to leverage the full potential of the EU’s cross-border dimension;

    6. Stresses that the modernisation of the economy will require blending public and private investment; emphasises, in this regard, the necessity of private investments to maximise the leverage effect of public spending; recalls that these efforts should lead to simplification and reduce the financial burden for the EU’s SMEs while maintaining EU standards;

    7. Underscores the urgency of further accelerating the digital and green transitions as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy that remains attractive for innovative businesses and that is based on market-driven investments providing quality jobs and leaving no one behind; advocates substantial investment in forward-looking digital infrastructure, underpinned by well-regulated, human-centred and trustworthy artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; stresses the need to improve citizens’ basic digital skills to match the needs of companies and to equip citizens to counter disinformation; stresses, further, the need to increase the resilience of the Union’s democracy in fighting malign foreign interference;

    8. Recognises the strategic value of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for contributing to the economic, social and climate goals of the EU’s cross-border transport infrastructure; calls for network extensions, particularly towards candidate countries and the EU’s strategic partners, as regards the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and the complementarities between the TEN-T and the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);

    A better-prepared Union, capable of effectively responding to crises

    9. Underlines the need to enhance EU security and defence capabilities to create a genuine defence union and to better prepare for and respond to unprecedented geopolitical challenges and new hybrid security threats; stresses the essential role of common investment, research, production and procurement mechanisms, including in new disruptive technologies supporting an independent EU defence industry; considers that there is an EU added value in security and defence cooperation that not only makes Europe and its people safer but also leads to greater efficiency, potential savings, quality job creation and enhanced strategic autonomy; calls therefore for immediate upscaling and much better coordination of defence spending by Member States; stresses in particular the need to provide adequate resources to innovate and enhance Member States’ military capabilities, as well as their interoperability; takes note, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, of its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry while safeguarding their operations and financing capacity; recalls the importance of investing in and developing dual-use equipment and, particularly, of strengthening EU military mobility as regards funding dual-use transport infrastructure along priority axes; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of using calls for this purpose under the CEF transport programme, in the light of the military mobility funding gap; underlines the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capabilities to fight hybrid warfare;

    10. Recalls the role of the EU’s space programme in enhancing the strategic security of the Union through a variety of civil and military applications; underlines that a strong European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, the protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions, and therefore requires sufficient resources;

    11. Highlights, in the face of new challenges in internal and external security, the importance of ensuring proper implementation of the Asylum and Migration Pact, in full compliance with international human rights law, and of respecting the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility; stresses that effective management and protection of the EU’s external borders, both land and maritime, are essential for maintaining the freedoms of the Schengen area and crucial for the security of the EU and its citizens; emphasises the need to better protect people from trafficking and enhance support to strengthen cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the Union in combating criminal networks, particularly those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, so as to reinforce law enforcement and the judicial response to these criminal networks, as well as to support Member States facing hybrid threats, in particular the instrumentalisation of migrants as defined in the Crisis Regulation[20];

    12. Recalls the vital role that the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund play in protecting external borders; calls, in addition, for appropriate funding for border protection capabilities, including physical infrastructure, buildings, equipment, systems and services required at border crossing points, as provided for in Annex III to the BMVI Regulation[21], and for the requirements to be met in terms of reception conditions, integration, return and readmission procedure; reaffirms that cooperation agreements with non-EU countries in full respect of international law can help to prevent irregular migration and strengthen border security;

    13. Acknowledges the common agricultural policy (CAP) as a key strategic European policy for food security and greater EU autonomy in affordable and high-quality food production; stresses the crucial role of the CAP in ensuring a decent income for EU farmers as well as a productive, competitive and sustainable European agriculture; regrets that direct payments have significantly decreased in real terms due to inflation, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; urges the Commission to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining high production standards and the requirement to implement EU legislation; calls for adequate resources and for direct payments to be protected to help farmers cope with the impact of inflation, fuel costs, changes in the global food and trade market and adverse climate events, affecting agricultural production and threatening food security, including in the outermost regions; highlights, in this regard, the role of the agricultural reserve; emphasises the need to help small and medium-sized farms and new and young farmers by supporting generational renewal and ensuring continued support for the promotion of EU agricultural products; underlines the need for appropriate support for research and innovation to make the agricultural sector more sustainable, including water management, in particular through the Horizon Europe programme, without reducing European agricultural production and while preventing European farmers from facing unfair competition from imported products that do not meet our standards; welcomes the Commission’s preparation of a second simplification package; underscores that food security is an essential component for geopolitical stability;

    14. Stresses the strategic role of fisheries and aquaculture and the need for them to be adequately supported financially; acknowledges that the common fisheries policy ensures a stable income and long-term future for fishers by contributing to protecting sustainable marine ecosystems, which are key to the sector’s competitiveness; insists that special attention must be devoted to the EU’s fishing fleet in order to improve safety and security, including by combating illegal fishery actions and improving working conditions, energy efficiency and sustainability, as well as by renewing the fleet; reaffirms that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should support a human resources policy capable of addressing future challenges, in order to promote an inclusive, diversified and sustainable blue economy; expresses its concern about the effect of the end of the Brexit transition period in June 2026 on the fishing and aquaculture sectors;

    15. Stresses that enhancing energy security and independence remains fundamental for the EU; highlights the EU’s role in ensuring security of energy supply, assisting households, farmers and businesses in mitigating price volatility and managing price gaps in comparison to the rest of the world; calls, therefore, for additional investment in critical infrastructure and connectivity, including large-scale cross-border electricity grids and hydrogen infrastructure for hard-to-abate sectors, which are an essential prerequisite to the decarbonisation of European industry, in low-carbon and renewable energy sources and connectivity, in particular by properly funding the CEF, as well as in energy efficiency; highlights the need to adapt European infrastructure to meet future energy demands as part of the transition to a clean and modern economy; underlines the importance of investing in new, expanding and modernising interconnector capacity for electricity trading, in particular cross-border capacity, for a fully integrated EU energy market that enhances Europe’s diversified supply security and resilience to energy market disruptions, reducing external dependencies and ultimately ensuring affordable and sustainable energy for EU citizens and businesses; stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen cooperation with Africa;

    16. Recalls, in this context, the current housing crisis in Europe, including the lack of decent and affordable housing; calls, therefore, for swift additional investments through a combination of funding sources, including the EIB and national promotional banks, in areas with a positive impact on reducing the cost of living for households, improving the energy efficiency of buildings and deploying renewable energy sources; calls for a coordinated approach at EU level that respects the principle of subsidiarity, encourages best practices and effectively uses all relevant funding mechanisms in addressing this pressing challenge;

    17. Is highly concerned by the strong impacts of climate change and the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and globally and by the fact that the year 2024 was assessed to be the planet’s warmest year on record; calls for sufficient funding for the LIFE programme to finance climate and environment-related projects, including in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for increased budgetary flexibility to adequately respond to natural disasters in the EU; regrets that increasing numbers of natural disasters have led to a high number of victims, as well as to long-term devastating effects on citizens, farmers and businesses based and working in the regions concerned, as well as in the ecosystems impacted; calls for increased funding for the EU Solidarity Fund, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, including for increasing rescEU capacities, which allow for more cost-efficient capacity building, in order to support Member States quickly and effectively in overwhelming crisis situations; recognises the EU’s role as a hub for coordinating and improving Member States’ preparedness and capacities to respond immediately to large-scale, high-impact emergencies, and its added value both for Member States and citizens; stresses, in this regard, that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a tangible expression of European solidarity, reinforcing the EU’s role as a crisis responder; acknowledges that the European Union Solidarity Fund or any other fund alone cannot fully compensate for the extreme weather events of increased frequency and severity caused by climate change today and in the future; stresses the need to invest in and prioritise preparedness, prevention, and adaptation measures, prioritising nature-based solutions; stresses that it is crucial to ensure that Union spending contributes to climate mitigation, adaptation efforts and water resilience infrastructure; emphasises that these investments are far lower than the cost of climate inaction;

    Enhancing citizens’ opportunities in a vibrant society

    18. Insists that continued investment in EU4Health and Cluster Health in Horizon Europe are key to improving health and preparedness for future health crises, thereby improving the health status of EU citizens; stresses the need for health investments for maximum impact; highlights its support for a holistic regulatory and funding approach to Europe’s life sciences and biotech ecosystem, including the creation of cutting-edge European clusters of excellence, as a central pillar of a stronger European health union, to which a European plan for cardiovascular diseases and lifestyles should be added, focusing on primary and secondary prevention as key objectives to increase life expectancy in the EU; highlights the need to create a more supportive care system to respond to demographic challenges and the ageing population; reiterates its support for Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, as well as the importance of European investment in tackling childhood diseases, rare diseases and antimicrobial resistance; reiterates the importance of the gender aspect of health, including sexual and reproductive health and access to services; is highly concerned by the current mental health crisis in Europe, affecting in particular the young generation, exacerbated by recent global events, which requires immediate action to be taken; underlines the need to prevent shortages of critical medicines, medical countermeasures and healthcare workers faced by some Member States; calls, in this respect, for better coordination at EU level and joint procurement of medicines in order to reduce costs;

    19. Stresses the importance of investing in young generations and their skills, as major agents of change and progress, by ensuring access to quality education; considers it essential that all students, without discrimination and in every EU Member State, should have full access to the Erasmus+ programme and underlines the essential role of Erasmus+ in facilitating cultural exchange, strengthening European identity and promoting peace through mutual understanding and cooperation, making it a cornerstone of European integration and unity; recalls the need to tackle the skills deficit, the brain drain and the correlation between market needs and skills; considers that for the EU workforce to remain competitive in the future, establishing key areas for training and reskilling is needed; stresses that further investment is required in modernising the Union’s education systems, by equipping them for the digital and green transitions, creating talent booster schemes and incentivising young entrepreneurs; points, in this respect, to the relevance of sufficient financial resources for EU programmes such as the European Social Fund Plus, Erasmus+ and the EU Solidarity Corps, which have proven highly effective in helping to achieve high employment levels and fair social protection, in broadening education and training across the Union, as well as in promoting new job opportunities and fostering skills, youth participation and equal opportunities for all; calls on the Commission to do its utmost so that all university students remain eligible to participate in the Erasmus+ programme, including in Hungary;

    20. Recalls the role of the EU budget in contributing to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights; highlights the role of the EU budget in contributing to initiatives that reinforce social dialogue and facilitate labour mobility, including in the form of training, networking and capacity building;

    21. Highlights the ever-increasing threats and dangers of organised and targeted disinformation campaigns against the EU by foreign stakeholders undermining European democracy; calls for the mobilisation of all relevant Union programmes, including Creative Europe, to fund actions in 2026 that promote inclusive digital and media literacy, in particular for young people, combating disinformation, countering online hate speech and extremist content, while encouraging the active participation of citizens in democratic processes and safeguarding media freedom and pluralism for good cultural resilience, all of which are fundamental to a thriving democracy;

    22. Calls on the Commission to increase EU funding for protecting citizens, religious communities and public spaces against terrorist threats, combating radicalisation and terrorist content online, as well as countering hate speech and rising antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred and racism;

    23. Calls on the Commission to ensure the swift, full and proper implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act[22], the Digital Market Act[23] and the Artificial Intelligence Act[24], also by allocating sufficient human resources; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability and the integrity of the digital public space;

    24. Underlines the added value of funding programmes in the areas of democracy, rights and values; recalls the important role that the EU budget plays in the promotion of the European values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in supporting the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, inclusiveness, justice, non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality; reaffirms, furthermore, the essential role of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme in promoting European values and citizens’ rights, in particular its Union Values strand, as well as gender equality, thereby sustaining and further developing an open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive society based on the rule of law; stresses the need for targeted measures to address gender disparities and promote equal opportunities through EU funding allocations; stresses that supporting investigative journalism with sufficient resources is a strategic investment in democracy, transparency and social justice; reiterates the importance of the Daphne and Equality and Rights programmes, and stresses that necessary resources should be devoted to combating discrimination in all its forms, as well as tackling forms of violence;

    25. Emphasises the valuable work carried out under the Union Values strand, which provides, among other things, direct funding to civil society organisations as key actors in vibrant democracies; stresses that citizens and civil society organisations, promoting the will and interest of citizens, represent the core of European democracy; underlines, in this regard, the importance of all EU programmes and increased funding in supporting the genuine engagement of civil society, particularly in the context of the impact of reduced funding for civil society by the EU’s international partners;

    26. Considers it essential for the Union’s stability and progress and its citizens’ trust to ensure the proper use of Union funds and to take all steps towards protecting the Union’s financial interests, in particular by applying the rule of law conditionality; underscores the undeniable connection between respect for the rule of law and efficient implementation of the Union’s budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management under the Financial Regulation; reiterates that under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation[25], the imposition of appropriate measures must not affect the obligations of governments to implement the programme or fund affected by the measure, and in particular the obligations they have towards final recipients; insists, therefore, that in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments, the Commission should explore alternative ways to implement the budget, including by assessing the possibility of diverting sources to directly and indirectly managed programmes, in order to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding, without weakening the application of the regulation; highlights the role of the European Court of Auditors and its constant activity in defence of transparency, accountability and strict compliance with the regulations on all of the funds and programmes;

    A strong Union in a changing world

    27. Observes that the need for the EU to maintain and augment its presence on the global stage is increasingly crucial amid escalating global conflicts, geopolitical shifts and foreign influence efforts worldwide, particularly considering developments with other major global providers of aid; stresses that in order to achieve this, the Union requires sufficient funding and resources to act, including to respond to major crises in its neighbourhood and throughout the world, in particular in the light of the sudden decrease in international funding; stresses the importance of the humanitarian aid programme and regrets that resources are not increasing in line with record-high needs; underscores the need to strengthen the EU’s role as a leading humanitarian actor while effectively addressing emerging crises, particularly in regions facing protracted conflict, displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters; emphasises that the Union also requires sufficient resources for long-term investments in building global partnerships, and points out the importance of the participation of non-EU countries in Union programmes, where appropriate;

    28. Underlines that the EU’s security environment has changed dramatically following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and unpredictable changes in the policies of its main allies; recalls the importance of enhancing citizens’ safety and of achieving efficiency in the area of defence and strategic autonomy, through a comprehensive approach to security that covers military and civilian capabilities, external relations and internal security; stresses the importance of the Internal Security Fund to ensure funding to tackle increased levels of serious organised crime with a cross-border dimension and cybercrime; recognises the pressure which increased defence spending represents for Member Sates’ national budgets; stresses the importance of Member States stepping up their efforts and increasing funding for their defence capabilities, in a consistent and complementary manner in line with the NATO guideline;

    29. Stresses that, beyond the enormous sacrifices of the people of Ukraine in withstanding Russia’s war of aggression for our common European security, this war has also had substantial economic and social consequences for people throughout Europe; recalls that certain Member States, in particular those with a land border with Russia and/or Belarus in the Baltic region, and frontline Member States, as well as vulnerable sectors of the economy, remain particularly exposed to the consequences of the war and deserve support in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and military mobility, in the spirit of EU solidarity;

    30. Firmly reiterates its unconditional and full support for Ukraine in its fight for its freedom and democracy against Russian aggression, as the war on its soil has passed the three-year mark; underlines the ongoing need for high levels of funding, including in humanitarian aid and for repairs to critical infrastructure, and for improved capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes; welcomes the renewed and reinforced intention of the Commission and Member States to work in a united way to address Ukraine’s pressing defence needs and to further support the Ukrainian economy by providing regular and predictable financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets through the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, in order to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, as well as to foster Ukraine’s progress on its path to EU accession; stresses the importance of ensuring accountability regarding core international crimes;

    31. Insists on the benefits of pre-accession funds, both for the enlargement countries and for the EU itself, as the funding creates more stability in the region; welcomes the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans to further support the economic convergence of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s single market through investment and growth in the region; insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support Moldova’s accession process, in line with the EU’s commitment to enlargement and regional stability; underlines the role of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova and highlights the necessity of securing sufficient financial resources for its full implementation; underlines the importance of sustained support for candidate countries in implementing the necessary accession-related reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, anti-corruption and democracy and in enhancing their resilience and preventing and countering hybrid threats; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society, independent media organisations and journalists;

    32. Underlines, furthermore, that EU neighbourhood policy, namely its Eastern and Southern Partnerships, contributes to the overall goal of increasing the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU’s neighbours and thereby of increasing the security of our continent; stresses, therefore, the importance of reinforcing the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood budget lines in order to support political, economic and social reforms in the regions, facilitate peace processes and reconstruction and provide assistance to refugees, in particular through continuous, reinforced and predictable funding and continuous implementation on the ground; recalls that the EU must continue to alleviate other crises and assist the most vulnerable populations around the world through its humanitarian aid programme, as well as by maintaining its global positioning with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for supporting global challenges and promoting human rights, freedoms and democracy, as well as for the capacity building of civil society organisations and for delivering on the Union’s international climate and biodiversity commitments, within a comprehensive monitoring and control system;

    Cross-cutting issues in the 2026 budget

    33. Underlines that the repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the EU and therefore non-discretionary; notes that borrowing costs depend on the pace of disbursements under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as well as on market fluctuations in bond yields and are therefore inherently partly unpredictable and volatile; insists, therefore, on the need for the Commission to provide reliable, timely and accurate information on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) borrowing costs and on expected RRF disbursements throughout the budgetary procedure as well as on available decommitments; expects the Commission to update the decommitments forecast when it presents the draft budget; recalls that the three institutions agreed that expenditures covering the financing costs of NGEU must aim at not reducing EU programmes and funds;

    34. Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposals for the introduction of new own resources; is highly concerned by the complete lack of progress on the new own resources in the Council, in particular in view of increasing investment and unforeseen needs; considers that the introduction of new own resources, in line with the roadmap in the interinstitutional agreement of 2020, is essential to cover NGEU borrowing costs while shielding the margins and flexibility mechanisms necessary to cater for these needs;

    35. Highlights again Parliament’s full support for the cohesion policy and its key role in delivering on the EU’s policy priorities and its general growth; reiterates that the cohesion policy’s optimal added value for citizens depends on its effective and timely implementation; in the same vein, urges the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the implementation of operational programmes under shared management funds as well as of the recovery and resilience plans so as to ensure swift budgetary execution and to avoid accumulated payment backlogs in the two last years of the MFF period, in particular through additional capacity building and technical assistance for Member States; reaffirms the imperative of a robust and transparent mechanism for accurately monitoring disbursements to beneficiaries;

    36. Notes that particular attention must be paid to rural and remote areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as islands and outermost, cross-border and mountain regions and all those affected by natural disasters; stresses that these regions should benefit from adequate funding to offset the special characteristics and constraints of their structural social and economic situation, as referred to in Article 349 TFEU; stresses the vital importance of the POSEI programme for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions and bringing food to local markets; calls for the programme budget to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in these regions; notes that there has been no such increase since 2013, despite the fact that farmers in these regions face higher production costs due to inflation and climate change; stresses also that the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU, as referred to in Articles 198-204 TFEU, should benefit from adequate funding for their sustainable economic and social development, in the light of their geopolitical importance for global maritime trade routes and key partnerships such as those on sustainable raw materials value chains;

    37. Reiterates that EU programmes, policies and activities, where relevant, should be implemented in such a way that promotes gender equality in the delivery of their objectives; welcomes the Commission’s work on developing gender mainstreaming in order to meaningfully measure the gender impact of Union spending, as set out in the interinstitutional agreement;

    38. Takes note that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be met by 33.5 % in 2025, while the biodiversity target will be below 8.5 % in 2025, and unless dedicated action is undertaken the 10 % target will not be met in 2026; stresses the need for continuous efforts towards the achievement of the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets laid down in the interinstitutional agreement in the Union budget and the EURI expenditures;

    39. Stresses that the 2026 Union budget should be aligned with the Union’s ambitions of making the Union climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, as well as the Union’s international commitments, in particular under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, and should significantly contribute to the implementation of the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy;

    40. Recalls that effective programme implementation is achievable only with the backing of a committed administration; emphasises the essential work carried out by bodies and decentralised agencies and asserts that they must be properly staffed and sufficiently resourced, while taking into account inflation, so that they can fulfil their responsibilities effectively and contribute to the achievement of the Union political priorities, also when given new tasks and mandates;

    41. Recalls that, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, when implementing the budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and respect the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines in particular Articles 137, 138 and 158 of the Financial Regulation and recalls the Commission and the Member States’ obligation to exclude from Union funds any persons or entities found guilty by a final judgment of terrorist offences, as well as by final judgments of terrorist activities, inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences, and corruption or other serious offences; highlights the need to leverage efforts in tackling fraud both at Union and Member State level and to this end ensure appropriate financial and human resources covering the Union’s full anti-fraud architecture; recalls the importance of providing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme with sufficient financial resources;

    42. Underlines the importance of effective communication and the visibility of EU policies and programmes in raising awareness of the added value that the EU brings to citizens, businesses and partners;

    °

    ° °

    43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (20.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Welcomes the fact that the multiannual financial framework (MFF) revision in 2024 provided for additional funding under Heading 6 and for the EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility; deplores, however, the fact that the MFF revision fell short of the needs identified by Parliament; reiterates the urgent need to increase funding, particularly in crisis-affected regions where the needs are greatest, and to address the various challenges in the neighbourhood, invest in partnerships and strengthen the geopolitical position of the EU; underlines in particular the need for continued efforts to finance Ukraine’s immediate funding needs; emphasises that the EU should without any delay intensify its efforts to enable frozen and immobilised Russian assets to be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction, reparations and budgetary needs, in full compliance with EU and international law; underlines that the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the Global Gateway are crucial instruments within the Union’s external action toolbox; stresses the importance of the EU’s humanitarian aid policies and instruments; calls in general for a more strategic and impactful approach to EU funding abroad while advancing open strategic autonomy;

    2. Reiterates that an increased level of funding should be allocated for the Southern Neighbourhood in 2025 to support political, economic and social reforms in the region; highlights in particular the pressing need to contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Gaza and to provide additional humanitarian aid in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria; recalls that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) has up to now been the principal humanitarian assistance structure in Gaza and the West Bank as well as an essential service provider in the region; recalls the need to continue supporting key regional partners such as Jordan in order to foster peace in the region;

    3. Welcomes the new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans and the proposed Facility for Moldova, as well as the role of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III in financing actions in the region; underlines that the Reform Agendas, which beneficiaries need to develop, are a promising instrument to speed up transformation and compliance with EU norms; calls on the Commission, in the interests of a successful accession process, to strictly apply the conditionalities enshrined in the two facilities; calls furthermore on the Commission to accompany all 10 enlargement countries on their path to European integration and to provide tailored assistance to address their respective challenges; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society and independent media organisations and journalists; calls on the Commission to ensure that it retains the possibility to withhold funds, either temporarily or indefinitely, if those funds would contribute to the budgets of governments – whether at the national or sub-national level – whose actions are significantly undermining the stability of the country or its neighbours, or the country’s progress towards European integration, particularly regarding democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to present a proposal for an instrument for pre-accession assistance for the next MFF that incorporates the facilities to avoid overlaps and covers all 10 enlargement countries and which should ensure strong institutional and economic preparedness for EU membership; calls also on the Commission to speed up the integration of all candidate countries in the EU roaming area;

    4. Highlights the importance of the EU’s ensuring that EU funds do not go towards financing educational literature that romanticises martyrdom, violence or terrorism;

    5. Underlines the need for the Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to be provided with sufficient financial and human resources to promote peace, prosperity, security and EU values and interests in both the European neighbourhood and across the globe; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to both the EEAS and the Commission for strategic communication and to counter disinformation; highlights the need to maintain the current structure of the network of EU delegations around the world and to provide financing that is commensurate with the role that the Union expects all delegations to play on the ground; notes, furthermore, that the EEAS, with 145 delegations around the globe, cannot be measured according to the same logic as that applied to European institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Council not to apply the 2 % logic to the EEAS; insists on a budgetary increase for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) actions and common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, as well as other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments; stresses the need to improve IT and security protocols within EEAS headquarters, EU Delegations and in Commission directorates-general with responsibilities in EU External Action; stresses the importance of investing in European security and defence by bolstering the Union’s strategic autonomy and collective defence capabilities;

    6. Welcomes the establishment of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls on the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025, while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women globally, as enshrined in the EU Gender Action Plan III (2021–2025); calls for increased resources to support women’s rights, including efforts to eliminate gender-based violence, strengthen women’s participation in decision-making processes and promote economic empowerment; emphasises the importance of gender mainstreaming across all budgetary and policy initiatives to ensure equal opportunities and inclusivity; stresses that gender equality is not only a fundamental right but also a crucial driver of social and economic development;

    8. Calls on the Commission to collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the transatlantic relationship, including exchange programmes for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the United States;

    9. Underlines that any disbursements from the European budget must depend on the beneficiary country’s respect for the rule of law, human rights and compliance with international obligations, and with respect for international agreements;

    10. Considers that more EU funds need to be allocated to joint cyber defence in order to counter the digital threats from Russia, the People’s Republic of China and others; considers that the Commission needs to secure the necessary funding for a future cyber army that can help EU institutions and Member States to defend themselves against cyberattacks from hostile states;

    11. Stresses the need for the visibility and communication of EU aid, particularly in candidate countries, but also in other partner countries;

    12. Stresses the urgent need for the EU to invest in research and development concerning low-cost drones, not only in order to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself against Russia, but also to strengthen European defence; considers that the EU should cooperate with Ukraine on the development of a drone system following their successful use of drones.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    40

    13

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ľuboš Blaha, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Helmut Brandstätter, Sebastião Bugalho, Tobias Cremer, Danilo Della Valle, Loucas Fourlas, Alberico Gambino, Giorgos Georgiou, Christophe Gomart, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Marion Maréchal, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Hannah Neumann, Urmas Paet, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Mounir Satouri, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Reinier Van Lanschot, Nicola Zingaretti, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Krzysztof Brejza, Jaroslav Bžoch, Engin Eroglu, Tomasz Froelich, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Catarina Mendes, Alessandra Moretti, Ana Miguel Pedro, Chloé Ridel, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Marco Tarquinio

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Mélissa Camara, Alexander Jungbluth, Erik Marquardt, Leire Pajín, Kristian Vigenin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    40

    +

    ECR

    Cristian Terheş

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Krzysztof Brejza, Sebastião Bugalho, Loucas Fourlas, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon, Davor Ivo Stier, Riho Terras, Željana Zovko

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Engin Eroglu, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

    S&D

    Robert Biedroń, Tobias Cremer, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Alessandra Moretti, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Chloé Ridel, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marco Tarquinio, Kristian Vigenin, Nicola Zingaretti

     

    13

    –

    ECR

    Rihards Kols, Marion Maréchal

    ESN

    Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Jungbluth, Alexander Sell

    NI

    Ľuboš Blaha, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jaroslav Bžoch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan

     

    8

    0

    ECR

    Alberico Gambino, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

    Verts/ALE

    Mélissa Camara, Erik Marquardt, Hannah Neumann, Mounir Satouri, Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) has been a highly successful EU instrument for strategic investment in the development of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), aimed at transforming the EU’s roads, railways, ports, inland waterways and airways into a connected, safe, efficient, sustainable and competitive transport system; whereas the completion deadlines of 2030 for the core network, 2040 for the extended core network and 2050 for the comprehensive network are binding on the Member States and often require massive and sustained infrastructure investments; whereas the CEF-T should remain an important transport funding instrument in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    B. whereas modern, interconnected and multimodal transport infrastructure within a single European transport area is central to creating growth and jobs in the EU, completing the European single market and ensuring territorial cohesion, including for the benefit of peripheral, rural, mountainous, island and outermost regions and other geographically disadvantaged areas; whereas the Draghi and Letta reports call on the EU to step up its efforts to develop a competitive industrial strategy in the face of global competition; whereas successful decarbonisation that safeguards the global competitiveness of European industries requires significant investment in renewable-energy-based transport networks and alternative fuel infrastructure for sustainable transport; whereas digitalisation across all transport sectors can yield significant efficiency gains, which often have the potential to exceed the initial investments; whereas sufficient investment is required to achieve this and other technological solutions to enhance interoperability between digital, energy and transport networks and to maximise network benefits; whereas increased investment in road safety is necessary to achieve the goals of the EU’s Vision Zero strategy and ensure the safety of roads and road users; whereas the transport sector faces labour and skills shortages, combined with sometimes poor working conditions;

    C. whereas the efficient use of EU funds is paramount to achieving strategic objectives within limited financial envelopes, particularly in the light of inflationary pressures that have led to significant increases in construction, energy and raw material costs, threatening the financial feasibility of key infrastructure projects of common European interest; whereas resilient and coordinated EU funding mechanisms are vital for maintaining project momentum despite economic volatility; whereas the imperative of maximising the impact of EU spending requires inflation-adjusted budgetary provisions, the reallocation of underutilised funds, as well as clear monitoring and improved reporting frameworks;

    D. whereas delays in planning, permitting and procurement processes also hinder the timely implementation of transport and infrastructure projects, jeopardising EU transport and infrastructure development; whereas establishing optimised approval procedures is crucial to accelerating project timelines and ensuring budget absorption;

    E. whereas, as envisaged under the Omnibus simplification package outlined by the Commission in its Competitiveness Compass, reducing regulatory and administrative burdens and simplifying implementation are key to ensuring equal access to funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional authorities and disadvantaged regions; whereas the simplification of EU regulatory and administrative processes at all levels, coupled with streamlined access to funding, are essential for achieving the timely and efficient implementation of projects under CEF-T and tourism programmes, particularly for SMEs and regional authorities;

    F. whereas the action plan on military mobility 2.0 outlines ambitious EU-level initiatives; whereas, however, inadequate funding remains a significant obstacle to their effective implementation;

    G. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, like the COVID-19 pandemic, has underscored the vulnerability of the EU’s transport and tourism sectors to external shocks; whereas it is more necessary now than ever before to strengthen transport connections with Ukraine and Moldova; whereas the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, which facilitates road freight transport and transit by setting up solidarity corridors, has been extended until 30 June 2025, with the possibility of tacit renewal for a further six months; whereas the European transport network is critical infrastructure facing increasing digital and/or physical security risks and needs to be protected from external threats to maintain the societal functions for which it is vital;

    H. whereas tourism, a major economic activity accounting for almost 10 % of the EU’s GDP and identified in the Commission’s 2021 industrial strategy as a critical ecosystem for the EU’s economy and for employment, continues to face economic, environmental, employment-related and digital challenges;

    1. Calls for a significant increase in the CEF-T budget to secure adequate funding for ongoing and planned TEN-T projects, focusing on cross-border infrastructure with the highest added value for the EU and on the elimination of bottlenecks and missing links, including within Member States, in order to enhance passenger and freight flow throughout Europe; underlines, furthermore, the value of smaller-scale projects in improving cross-border connectivity and their eligibility for EU funding;

    2. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop an EU industrial action plan for the automotive sector, as proposed in the Draghi report, and calls for swift progress in the ongoing strategic dialogue;

    3. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop a new maritime industrial strategy to enhance the competitiveness, sustainability and resilience of the European maritime manufacturing sector; appreciates the Commission’s announcement that it would present a European port strategy to limit the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage linked to the economic presence and operational involvement of entities from non-EU countries in EU ports;

    4. Calls, further, for a strategic action plan for the EU aviation sector to identify potential reductions in administrative burdens and to assess financial needs for maintaining the sector’s competitiveness in the face of decarbonisation pressures and the associated risks, including an uneven playing field and carbon leakage, and geopolitical challenges, and with regard to a cross-country analysis of working conditions as a determinant in attracting and retaining skilled workers and boosting productivity;

    5. Welcomes the commitment to put forward a plan to develop an ambitious European high-speed rail network to help connect EU capitals, including through night trains, and to accelerate rail freight, as well as to set up a single digital ticketing and booking system for railways as soon as possible, as already outlined in the revised TEN-T guidelines; underlines the need for ambitious support for the deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS);

    6. Advocates a comprehensive strategy on hyperloop, with clear timelines, detailed investment frameworks and support for research, development and deployment;

    7. Welcomes, in this respect, the Commission’s announcement under the Competitiveness Compass presenting a sustainable transport investment plan and calls on the Commission to define financing measures for the above-mentioned strategies and action plans, including by de-risking the investment needed to swiftly ramp up charging infrastructure as well as for the production and distribution of renewable and low-carbon transport fuels, without jeopardising existing market choices;

    8. Underlines again the role of the Social Climate Fund in supporting investment for an inclusive transition towards more sustainable mobility and calls on the Member States to address transport poverty with specific policies and financing measures in their national Social Climate Plans;

    9. Highlights the need to address the shortage of qualified labour, women’s employment and an ageing workforce in the transport sector; calls, in this regard, for sufficient support for the safety and good working conditions of transport workers as well as for the funding of safe and secure truck parking areas across the EU;

    10. Calls for the digitalisation of transport through intelligent solutions and digital booking platforms to facilitate seamless cross-border travel; calls for the systematic reduction of EU regulatory burdens across all transport modes to free up resources, including EU budgetary means, for increased investment in transport infrastructure; underlines the strong need for prior impact assessments of all new legislative initiatives with respect to their budgetary implications but also the regulatory or administrative burdens that the proposals would create or resolve;

    11. Calls on the Commission to address inflationary pressures and resource scarcity by incorporating inflation adjustments into the budget; notes that the inclusion of realistic price adjustments is essential to safeguarding the viability of transport and infrastructure projects against the impact of inflation-induced cost increases; supports the reallocation of unused funds to strategic clusters, such as transport infrastructure, sustainable transport solutions and innovation; calls strongly for the integration of inflation-resilient frameworks and adaptive budget mechanisms within the MFF to avoid financing challenges in upcoming cycles;

    12. Emphasises the importance of bolstering co-financing mechanisms, particularly for large-scale projects such as the Clean Aviation, Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and Europe’s Rail Joint Undertakings, to ensure their timely implementation despite economic constraints; insists on the leveraging of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to mobilise additional resources;

    13. Advocates innovative financing models, in particular the facilitation of PPPs by providing guarantees or implementing risk-sharing mechanisms, in order to attract private investment in transport and tourism infrastructure, including for a faster transition to alternative fuels; stresses that these PPPs can also contribute to knowledge-sharing, innovation and support for SMEs and start-ups;

    14. Stresses the need to reinforce the budgets of transport agencies, in particular the EU Aviation Safety Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, and the EU Agency for Railways, so that they can fulfil the additional tasks assigned to them by the co-legislators in recently adopted EU legislation, as well as in order to support critical safety, sustainability, interoperability, competitiveness, innovation and modernisation initiatives;

    15. Calls resolutely for the streamlining of application and reporting procedures in relation to EU funds in line with Directive 2021/1187[26]; insists on transparent and fair allocation of EU transport funding using digital platforms in order to simplify access for SMEs and regional stakeholders; calls for the establishment of expedited review processes for critical transport and infrastructure projects in order to reduce delays; proposes the implementation of the ‘once-only’ principle for administrative processes, allowing applicants to provide information once and reuse it across EU programmes, thus reducing redundancy and delays, including for the increased blending of EU funds;

    16. Insists on the restoration of the military mobility budget to the originally proposed EUR 6.5 billion over seven years; reiterates that the drastic cut of 75 % to military mobility funding within the transport pillar considerably weakens this policy; highlights the critical role of that funding in adapting parts of the TEN-T infrastructure for dual use along priority axes, in order to facilitate the short-notice, large-scale movement of military equipment and humanitarian aid across the continent, enabling a joint response to military threats to the EU Member States and their allied nations; calls for military mobility to be included in the white paper on the future of European defence;

    17. Reiterates that, to help Ukraine withstand Russia’s war of aggression and to accelerate its post-war recovery and integration into the EU market, alongside the upcoming decisions on the renewal of the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, it is imperative to pursue projects to improve the capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, encompassing railway upgrades, improved border crossings and the crucial step of integrating relevant lines of Ukraine’s rail system into the EU’s standard gauge to facilitate the uninterrupted movement of goods and services; considers that the 2026 budget should also help alleviate the economic and social hardship faced by the people of the EU’s eastern border regions, especially the Baltic states, Finland, Poland and Romania, who have been particularly affected by economic losses and the suspension of cross-border mobility as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the financing of further EU measures against the Russian shadow fleet;

    18. Reiterates its repeated request to create a specific EU programme and a dedicated budget line for tourism in the current MFF and beyond, increasing the sector’s resistance to economic shocks and contributing to further growth and jobs across the value chain, bringing significant benefits and long-term well-being to local people and their businesses; highlights the need to reduce administrative burdens for SMEs operating in the tourism sector by simplifying rules, minimising data collection requirements, where appropriate, and providing tailored financial support; notes that the tourism sector stands to benefit greatly from digital innovations, such as smart tourism platforms and integrated digital ticketing systems for attractions and services, which enhance visitor experiences while driving significant economic growth for local communities; stresses that the further development of sustainable tourism, including through the promotion of regional products to strengthen local value chains or the management of tourist flows, could foster economic growth in less popular, more remote and peripheral areas, improve urban-rural connectivity and bolster the climate resilience of EU territories.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    36

    6

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Daniel Attard, Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Benoit Cassart, Carlo Ciccioli, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Devaux, Siegbert Frank Droese, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, François Kalfon, Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Milan Mazurek, Alexandra Mehnert, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Matteo Ricci, Arash Saeidi, Marjan Šarec, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Kosma Złotowski

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Arno Bausemer, Ondřej Krutílek, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Beata Szydło, Flavio Tosi, Kathleen Van Brempt

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Marie Dauchy, Elisabeth Grossmann

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    36

    +

    ECR

    Carlo Ciccioli, Ondřej Krutílek, Beata Szydło, Kosma Złotowski

    PPE

    Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Alexandra Mehnert, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Flavio Tosi, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi

    Renew

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Benoit Cassart, Valérie Devaux, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marjan Šarec

    S&D

    Daniel Attard, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Elisabeth Grossmann, François Kalfon, Ştefan Muşoiu, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Kathleen Van Brempt

    The Left

    Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Arash Saeidi

    Verts/ALE

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff

     

    6

    –

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Milan Mazurek

    NI

    Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus

    PfE

    Marie Dauchy, Philippe Olivier

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget – Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gabriella Gerzsenyi

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas pursuant to Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions’;

    B. whereas cohesion policy is a key instrument for reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions within the Union and for addressing the fact that the least-favoured regions lag behind, playing a vital role in promoting sustainable development and also addressing environmental challenges, complementing national budgets and enhancing the EU’s ability to navigate global complexities;

    C. whereas among the regions concerned, particular attention must be paid to rural areas, areas affected by the industrial and automotive transitions, less-developed areas inside the so-called developed regions, eastern EU regions bordering on Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, as well as outermost regions, islands and Mediterranean regions facing environmental and economic vulnerabilities;

    D. whereas the absorption rate of cohesion policy funds remains very low partly owing to delays to the start of programmes and the high level of bureaucracy and complexity required in cohesion-funded projects, which can lead to unforced errors;

    E. whereas among the beneficiaries concerned, particular attention should be paid to vulnerable people, such as persons with disabilities;

    1. Considers that, as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument, cohesion policy is based on solidarity, creates sustainable growth and jobs across the Union and contributes to key Union objectives and priorities, including its climate, energy and biodiversity targets, competitiveness, as well as sustainable and socially inclusive economic growth, to tackle demographic challenges and ensure equitable access to affordable housing;

    2. Recalls that cohesion policy has proven to be a helpful tool in tackling challenges in various crises, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its effects on the energy supply, the high cost of living, inflation, and the needs of refugees and displaced persons, as well as natural disasters; underlines, however, that the resulting legislative amendments to cohesion policy have repeatedly brought unexpected changes to its objectives and resources, while cohesion policy should, when needed, complement rather than replace other financial instruments designed for emergency response;

    3. Reiterates the need for coordination at budgetary level between all the financial instruments supporting cohesion policy; believes that, to make the most of NextGenerationEU funds, these should support and complement cohesion policy measures;

    4. Emphasises the need to ensure that the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle is observed across the EU budget; stresses, in this regard, that cohesion policy should not undergo any fundamental changes which could jeopardise the structural and investment funds’ ability to deliver on their goals; stresses that the setting of new priorities should entail new resources and underlines that the long-term investment objectives of cohesion policy are to reduce regional disparities and enhance competitiveness;

    5. Is concerned about the state of implementation of cohesion policy programmes for 2021-2027; urges the Commission to step up monitoring efforts, ensuring respect for the rule of law, a transparent, fair and responsible use of EU resources, as well as their sound financial management; urges the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with the Member State authorities at all levels in order to reduce bureaucracy to make cohesion funds more accessible to local and regional authorities, among others, and to avoid decommitments, unfinished projects and any political manipulation of fund allocation; stresses, therefore, the need to introduce a ‘smart conditionality’ mechanism;

    6. Notes that the Just Transition Fund needs adequate financial resources and a long-term perspective to ensure its effectiveness in supporting regions’ transition towards climate neutrality, while ensuring that the most vulnerable regions are properly supported in the transition process; emphasises the need for a realistic and balanced approach to the just transition, ensuring economic, social and environmental sustainability, with the meaningful participation of local and regional authorities, as well as economic and social partners;

    7. Calls for further simplification of cohesion policy to reduce the growing administrative burden, enhance fund accessibility and ensure investments tailored to the specific needs of regions while enabling the effective management of funds in line with the needs of final beneficiaries; highlights, in this context, the importance of the newly-created EU Councillors network, which is jointly run by the European Committee of the Regions and the European Commission, as a key tool for strengthening the ability to gather evidence of how the Union operates at local level;

    8. Underlines that rural areas are a core part of Europe’s identity and economic potential; welcomes cohesion policy measures that recognise the contribution of more prosperous and resilient rural areas to Europe’s overall resilience; calls for adequate funding to enhance their role in environmental protection, food production, tourism and ensuring ‘the right to stay’; calls for increased public investment to tackle demographic challenges and support young people by improving services and infrastructure, expanding access to digital education, technologies and innovations, so as to raise living standards, increase the stock of affordable housing and foster equal access for citizens and families to culture and high quality education, essential social services and other public services, while making more efficient use of resources, reducing the impact on the environment and creating new opportunities for rural SMEs;

    9. Notes that the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund support investments in sustainable urban development, underlining its importance as a key component of integrated territorial development, with at least 8 % of ERDF resources at the national level being allocated to urban areas through the relevant mechanisms; further notes that this should include special attention to the sustainable development of functional urban and metropolitan areas, facilitating the digital, green and industrial transitions;

    10. Calls for increased investment in digitalisation and innovation to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs in less-developed regions, including rural and peripheral areas, in order to bridge the digital divide and foster inclusive economic growth;

    11. Underlines that sustainable development is directly linked to having a highly skilled work force; insists, therefore, on the need for increased efforts to ensure an adequate degree of upskilling and reskilling of all relevant working age individuals, as well as initiatives to increase citizens’ acceptance of the economic, industrial and energy transitions;

    12. Recalls the importance of mechanisms and strategies adapted to the diversity of the EU’s territories, and therefore calls for a full use of Article 349 TFEU to adapt cohesion policy to the specificities of the outermost regions; reiterates that the outermost regions should receive specific additional allocations to offset the extra costs incurred as a result of permanent constraints on their development; calls for an Islands Pact to be considered by the EU institutions with the participation of the principal stakeholders, along the lines of the Urban Pact and the future Rural Pact;

    13. Reaffirms the need for close cooperation between national, regional, local and other authorities as well as their dialogue with civil society organisations and all relevant stakeholders, including economic and social partners, universities and innovation centres; recognises the importance of research and innovation policy in driving economic growth and enhancing competitiveness in order to fulfil cohesion policy objectives; highlights the need to support the commercialisation and scaling up of interregional innovation projects, underlining the importance of developing value chains, particularly in less-developed regions;

    14. Reiterates the need to strengthen the administrative capabilities and capacity of local, regional and national authorities, which are key components in the effective planning and implementation of initiatives and projects at the local level; highlights the importance of stronger ownership, responsibility, partnership and decentralisation; strongly considers that increased financial resources dedicated to technical assistance are key to effective project implementation;

    15. Emphasises that the implementation of cohesion policy must respect horizontal principles, including its place-based nature, multilevel governance, sustainability, the partnership principle, gender equality and non-discrimination, ensuring that all projects contribute to a more equitable and inclusive Union;

    16. Stresses the need to strengthen awareness-raising among European citizens about cohesion policy achievements and calls for further information measures promoting it such as accessible data platforms, as cohesion policy is a particularly effective means of promoting strong and balanced European regions.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    29

    0

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Gordan Bosanac, Irmhild Boßdorf, Daniel Buda, Klára Dobrev, Klara Dostalova, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Valentina Palmisano, Vladimir Prebilič, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere, André Rougé, Antonella Sberna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Rody Tolassy, Francesco Ventola, Marta Wcisło

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Dan Barna, Sofie Eriksson, Denis Nesci, Jacek Protas

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Francisco Assis

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    29

    +

    ECR

    Denis Nesci, Antonella Sberna, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Francesco Ventola

    PPE

    Daniel Buda, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Jacek Protas, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Klara Dostalova, André Rougé, Rody Tolassy

    Renew

    Dan Barna, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen

    S&D

    Francisco Assis, Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Klára Dobrev, Sofie Eriksson, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere

    The Left

    Valentina Palmisano

    Verts/ALE

    Gordan Bosanac, Vladimir Prebilič, Mārtiņš Staķis

     

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Irmhild Boßdorf

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Dario Nardella

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights the crucial role of agricultural and rural development policies, particularly the common agricultural policy (CAP), in achieving the Union’s objectives under Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; highlights the fact that these policies are tools for farmers to provide safe, healthy, affordable and sustainable food of high quality, while ensuring fair and viable incomes for all farmers, in particular active, small-scale and young farmers, including targeting to prevent land abandonment and promoting short food supply chains; underlines that these policies aim to foster sustainable food systems and secure the long-term viability, profitability, sustainability and safety of EU agricultural production, the development of rural areas and the Union’s food sovereignty, while taking into consideration animal welfare standards, climate protection, mitigation and biodiversity measures; recalls, in this regard, that the strong and simplified EU financial support for a competitive and sustainable farming sector should be increased in the 2026 CAP budget allocation to better reflect the growing challenges in rural areas, including depopulation, and keep rural areas alive; underlines that, according to the latest Eurobarometer survey, support for the CAP has reached an all-time high, with over 70 % of respondents agreeing that the CAP fulfils its role in providing safe, healthy and sustainable food of high quality;

    2. Notes that spending under the CAP significantly exceeds the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets and requests that this surplus be used to allocate funds that directly contribute to achieving the primary objectives of the CAP;

    3. Calls on the Commission to secure additional funding for further nature objectives rather than relying on the CAP, which must above all remain a fund that ensures food security and a viable income for our farmers;

    4. Upholds the promotion of EU agricultural products as a cornerstone of agricultural policy, with the aim of strengthening the competitiveness and relevance of all production sectors, especially that of wine and high-quality products, which need to have better access to both internal and external markets so as to promote diversification and internationalisation; recalls the success achieved by such promotion programmes in the opening up and consolidation of new markets; stresses the need to ensure an adequate promotion-policy budget in the coming financial years;

    5. Stresses the need for a stronger, better equipped, flexible and more reactive agricultural reserve, with adequate funding to cope with market imbalances or unpredictable external factors, such as extreme and recurring weather events, animal diseases, water stress or an evolving geopolitical context, which are having an increasing impact on agricultural production and markets, farmers’ incomes, farm continuity and food security; calls on the Commission to make use of the crisis reserve in the most efficient, expeditious and transparent way; stresses the need to simplify administrative procedures in order to guarantee the swift disbursement of that aid; points out that an increase in the agricultural reserve must not affect direct payments; calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive crisis management strategy for each major agricultural sector, ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of the crisis reserve, while considering the establishment of new crisis and risk management instruments; acknowledges though that the agricultural reserve alone cannot fully compensate for the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by climate change; stresses the need to fund preventive mitigation and adaptation measures that enhance the resilience, including climate resilience, of rural areas and food production systems;

    6. Strongly opposes any proposals to reduce the level of pre-allocated funds from the CAP in the future budget; points out that those funds should be increased by at least the equivalent of cumulative inflation since the start of the current budget period in order to avoid hidden reductions in CAP funding; stresses that farmers need the continuity and predictability of the CAP and that emerging new priorities cannot lead to cuts to the CAP budget; advocates for transparency and accountability in the allocation of CAP funds and encourages Member States and the Commission to enhance cooperation and strengthen anti-fraud measures; stresses the need for a fair distribution of CAP support between and within Member States; calls on the Commission to mobilise funds outside the CAP, given the challenges facing EU agriculture and to simplify the administrative procedures for farmers who receive aid; insists that any revenue accruing to the Union budget from assigned revenue or repayments of irregularities relating to agriculture should remain under the agriculture component of Heading 3 of the multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    7. Underlines that CAP simplification measures adopted in 2024 must be the starting point for the next CAP reform;

    8. Recalls that innovation can play a key role in enhancing the productivity, competitiveness, resilience and adaptability of agriculture; underlines, in this regard, the importance of increasing funding for research, thereby avoiding additional bureaucracy, both in the future budget allocations in the framework of the Horizon Europe research programme, as well as in the CAP, while creating funding mechanisms that ensure the continuity of existing and successful agri-food projects, established and funded through the NextGenerationEU instrument; calls therefore for adequate funding for climate change mitigation, precision agriculture, circular economy projects, renewable energy production in rural areas, development and technology-neutral innovation, including for projects promoting animal and plant health and the efficient use of resources, such as water, in agriculture; notes that production efficiency may also be an aim in itself, and that such funding should, in addition to improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, increase its resilience to challenges such as climate change and the spread of animal diseases; stresses the importance of ensuring adequate resources for training and knowledge exchange through European instruments, such as the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems;

    9. Highlights the fact that digitalisation is a crucial tool in the development and enhancement of the value of rural areas, including inner areas, and plays a key role in addressing depopulation and attracting young people to these areas; welcomes the digital transformation in agriculture and rural areas, including its use in irrigation, to improve the efficiency, environmental, social and economic sustainability, traceability and precision of agricultural systems, ensuring more effective use of the EU’s budgetary resources and promoting entrepreneurship in rural areas, thus making them more attractive to people and businesses; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this context, to strengthen the technological and communications infrastructure in rural areas, including broadband internet coverage, and encourages them to leverage technologies to enhance access to critical information and digitalise administrative processes for CAP support so as to reduce the bureaucratic burden and enable more efficient access to support and services; recalls that the uptake of innovative digital technologies requires sufficient funding, as well as targeted training, education and support programmes for farmers, particularly for small-scale and older farmers, to ensure equitable and affordable access to digital tools;

    10. Notes with concern the continuing loss of farms and farmers, which has a significant socio-economic impact on rural areas; urges, therefore, the EU institutions and Member States to address labour and skills shortages by stepping up their efforts to promote generational renewal in the agricultural sector and rural areas, including in outermost regions and inner areas; highlights the importance of improving the profitability of the agricultural sector by enhancing fiscal and support measures that make farming activities more attractive and by improving access to land, financing and insurance, particularly for women, families involved in small-scale farming, marginalised groups and first-time farmers, such as young people; underlines that young farmers have the potential to be a driving force in sustainable and climate-friendly farming and highlights the need to empower them, including through the use of Union funds and adapted advisory and training tools; underlines that building and modernising rural infrastructure improves the quality of life in rural areas, which is essential for generational renewal; proposes, in this context, the inclusion of a specific indicator in future policies to monitor the rate of generational renewal and the level of services and infrastructure in rural areas;

    11. Calls for EU programmes to prioritise projects that safeguard existing jobs in the agricultural sector and promote the creation of quality employment; stresses that all jobs in the agricultural sector must respect workers’ rights, provide stable and regulated pay, and ensure good working conditions; emphasises the importance of effectively combating poverty and social exclusion in rural areas;

    12. Recalls the challenges that the agri-food sector has faced and is facing, such as the COVID-19 crisis, the harmful effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, natural disasters and rising input costs; regrets that direct payments and CAP subsidies have decreased significantly in real terms due to inflation, resulting in difficulties in implementing rural development measures, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to help farmers cope with those inflationary effects, including fuel costs, and underscores that the 2 % deflator of the current MFF does not compensate for the loss of value resulting from inflation; asks the Commission to provide a more flexible deflator in the next MFF and, furthermore, to work closely with the Member States to implement best practices at national and European levels to help farmers cope with inflation and record costs;

    13. Requests that, following the repeated economic crises and extreme weather events caused by climate change that have affected agricultural companies, the unspent resources of the 2014-2022 rural development plans be spent by 31 December 2026 as a derogation from the N+3 rules laid down in Article 38 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[27];

    14. Welcomes the decision of the European Investment Bank to identify agriculture and the bio-economy as key priorities in its 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap;

    15. Expresses its concern about the adverse effects on the European agri-food sector of political instability in certain Member States and at global level, as well as of geopolitical tensions related to trade or international crises; underlines that the signing of the Mercosur Agreement in December 2024 will have implications for Union farmers and producers; invites the Commission to improve trade agreements to protect EU farmers, to ensure fair competition and a level playing field, and to allocate sufficient funds to mitigate the negative effects of trade agreements on the agricultural sector; recalls that European farmers may face unfair competition from third country producers who do not meet the same production standards as those in the EU and calls therefore for a proper level of reciprocity; reiterates the negative cascade effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on global food security and farmers’ livelihoods; highlights the need to make sure that the reform of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine provides stability and protection for EU farmers; highlights the need to start better preparation for an enlargement of the Union, taking account of European farmers’ interests, especially with regard to the adoption of balanced and enhanced measures to safeguard the European agricultural sector, while also ensuring support for Ukraine;

    16. Calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to revise their national strategic plans, including the rapid use of funds from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and to provide funding to strengthen the relative negotiating positions of farmers in value chains, and for the Commission to swiftly approve these modifications;

    17. Stresses the vital importance of the programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions of Europe, for the provision of food and agricultural products there and for the food sovereignty of the EU as a whole; calls for the budget of the scheme, which has not been increased since 2013, to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in the outermost regions, as farmers in those areas are facing higher production costs; calls therefore on the Commission to apply without delay a 2 % deflator to the POSEI financial envelopes in order to mitigate the substantial losses for producers in real terms and ensure fairer support for all farmers;

    18. Urges the Commission to ensure adequate resources for the implementation of an EU water management strategy and to continue developing water collection, storage and distribution activities, while preserving the status of water bodies, in order to render the use of water reserves more efficient in agriculture, both in crop irrigation and livestock farming, given that droughts are becoming increasingly severe across the Union.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    18.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    34

    2

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Sergio Berlato, Stefano Bonaccini, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Daniel Buda, Waldemar Buda, Gheorghe Cârciu, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ivan David, Valérie Deloge, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Carlo Fidanza, Luke Ming Flanagan, Maria Grapini, Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Elsi Katainen, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, Gilles Pennelle, André Rodrigues, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Eric Sargiacomo, Christine Singer, Raffaele Stancanelli, Anna Strolenberg, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Veronika Vrecionová, Thomas Waitz, Maria Walsh

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Peter Agius, Benoit Cassart, Ton Diepeveen, Elisabetta Gualmini, Esther Herranz García

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    34

    +

    ECR

    Sergio Berlato, Waldemar Buda, Carlo Fidanza, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Veronika Vrecionová

    NI

    Katarína Roth Neveďalová

    PPE

    Peter Agius, Daniel Buda, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Esther Herranz García, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Maria Walsh

    PfE

    Raffaele Stancanelli

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Elsi Katainen, Christine Singer

    S&D

    Stefano Bonaccini, Gheorghe Cârciu, Maria Grapini, Elisabetta Gualmini, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, André Rodrigues, Eric Sargiacomo

     

    2

    –

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen

    The Left

    Luke Ming Flanagan

     

    8

    0

    ESN

    Ivan David

    PfE

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Valérie Deloge, Gilles Pennelle

    Verts/ALE

    Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Anna Strolenberg, Thomas Waitz

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Budgetary Control has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 18 February 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    Yours sincerely,

    Niclas Herbst

     

    CONT Chair

    Rapporteur for the Commission Discharge

    OPINION

    1. Recalls its strong commitment to the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

    2. Stresses the fundamental importance of respect for the rule of law to protect the financial interests of the Union in the implementation of EU funds; recalls the improvements needed in the application of the Rule of law Conditionality Regulation and a swifter follow-up by the Commission on breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or risk affecting the EU financial interests, including the Single Market dimension, as for example procurement and state aid;

    3. Stresses that the sound and timely implementation of the budget contributes to addressing more efficiently and effectively the needs and challenges faced by the Union and its citizens in different policy areas; warns that the implementation of the budget under time pressure may lead to an increase in errors and irregularities;

    4. Recalls that for the last years all available flexibility measures in the EU Budget were used; reiterates the need for flexibility in the EU Budget to address potential new circumstances where EU action is necessary; notes that increasingly the headroom in the EU Budget is used to provide funding to respond to crises; notes in addition, that exposure of the EU Budget to guarantees and contingent liabilities is projected to rise in the coming years, putting additional strain on the headroom in the Budget which further limits the flexibility of the EU Budget, as are the increased interest payments for NGEU related borrowing; urges the Commission to work on a more stringent risk assessment framework to define the exposure more accurately to prevent over-burdening of the EU Budget;

    5. Stresses the need to protect the EU Budget from any misuse, particularly fraud and corruption, and calls on the Commission to continue to be vigilant and proactive in the current and future cases when the lack of respect for Union values and the Rule of Law affect or threaten to affect the Union’s financial interests;

    6. Stresses the importance of the EU anti-fraud architecture and the need to provide increased resources and to strengthen the role of the European anti-fraud office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) in the fight against fraud and corruption; stresses the need for a comprehensive cooperation between all these institutions;

    7. Notes that while the digital transformation is indispensable to increase the efficiency, control and transparency of the EU Budget, this shift has also heightened its exposure to cyber fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient funds to strengthen EU digital infrastructure, research and development while ensuring that investments in cybersecurity are impactful and contribute to the overall protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    8. Is concerned that total outstanding commitments are reaching record levels for several years now; notes that the Commission projects outstanding commitments to decrease after 2024, when NGEU draws to a close; considers that until the projected decrease of the RAL, the risk of decommitments, and a related reduction of EU added value for the EU Budget, remains high; calls on the Commission to enact a more strategic, transparent, and proactive approach to managing decommitments, also considering the use of decommitments in the cascade mechanism;

    9. Is concerned that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences on the EU’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas; encourages the Commission to explore options to reduce the overall debt burden, such as optimising the timing and structure of debt issuance, and consider alternative financing mechanisms that could reduce reliance on high-interest debt; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden for past debts;

    10. Expresses regret that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been increasing since the 2020 financial year, reaching 5,6 % for the 2023 financial year; notes significant variations in error rates across different budget headings, with some areas reporting error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 %, while cohesion policy has an error rate as high as 9,3 %; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities without at the same time either decreasing requirements or increasing ex ante checks and controls contributed to the high error rate; calls on the Commission to take careful consideration of the lessons learned from the implementation of EU crisis response tools, such as increased flexibility;

    11. Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; expresses concern that the Court found 7 out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were impacted by quantitative issues, with 6 of these payments being affected by material errors; notes in addition that absorption of RRF funds was delayed in 2023, and that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period; notes further that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period (post 2023) is more challenging with an increase in number of milestones and targets to be implemented, a shift from reforms to investments, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year; calls on the Commission to support the Member States’ authorities in the implementation of funds, in particular where additional administrative capacity is needed, to stimulate absorption and reduce the occurrence of errors; calls on the Commission to transparently inform the Parliament about the progress of implementation and absorption of funds and to timely propose solutions where bottlenecks in the implementation are observed;

    12. Recalls the importance of protecting the Union’s own resources from any fraudulent irregularity and, to that end, stimulate the cooperation between anti-fraud services and customs agencies to detect, prevent and correct fraud affecting Union revenue; recalls its position on the amended Commission proposals endorsing the introduction of new own resources.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND FOOD SAFETY (18.2.2025)

     

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

     

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    The Coordinators of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) decided on 16 December 2024 that ENVI would provide an opinion on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI)) in the form of a letter. Therefore, as both ENVI Chair and Standing Rapporteur for the Budget, let me provide you with ENVI’s contribution in the form of resolution paragraphs, which was adopted by ENVI at its meeting[28] of 18 February 2025 and which I kindly request will be taken into account by your committee:

    1. Highlights that the current serious geopolitical context requires the Union to allocate sufficient resources for accelerating the green transition to transform the EU into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure the full execution of the REPowerEU Plan to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources and of energy efficiency technologies to speed up the green transition and end dependency on fossil fuels

    2. Stresses the importance of the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping the global average temperature increase below 1,5°C compared to pre-industrial times; recalls the Union’s obligations to deliver the financial commitments made for international climate financing; considers that the Union should continue leading the efforts towards decarbonisation at global level;

    3. Stresses that the Union’s budget for 2026 should be aligned with the realisation of the European Union’s objectives to reduce pollution and enhance biodiversity, as well as the long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy, the legally enshrined objective to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and the Union’s intermediate climate targets for 2030 and 2040, as laid down in the European Climate Law;

    4. Points out that the European Green Deal is a growth strategy, whose effective implementation with adequate funding  is fundamentally connected to the Union’s strength and competitiveness; believes that the future Clean Industrial Deal and Circular Economy Act should further increase the Union’s competitiveness capacity and sustainability and resource-efficiency to achieve the European Green Deal objectives and ensure a just and inclusive transition;

    5. Reminds that the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027, together with NextGenerationEU, is aimed at implementing the EU’s long-term priorities in various areas, including climate and the environment; emphasizes, specifically, that 30 % of total EU expenditures under the MFF have to be allocated to climate-related projects, including clean-tech and innovation projects; stresses that the future Multi-Financial Framework post-2027 should maintain the level of ambition on climate and environment protection;

    6. Considers it unacceptable that the Union did not reach its objective of allocating at least 7.5 % of annual expenditure to biodiversity in 2024;  calls on the Member States and Commission to take the necessary measures to ensure that the 10 % objective will be reached in both 2026 and 2027 in order to achieve concrete outcomes, including the objectives set in the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, whilst ensuring cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability; notes the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to reach biodiversity objectives;

    7. Emphasises the need to allocate sufficient funding for each individual budget line that contributes to the achievement of the green transition, with a particular focus on sustainability, climate change, innovation, competitiveness, resource-efficiency and biodiversity conservation, such as attention to bees and pollinators’ protection and their role as indicators for healthy ecosystems; emphasizes the importance of the Social Climate Fund (SCF), established to support vulnerable groups in the Union’s green transition;

    8. Highlights the importance of improving disaster prevention and preparedness by implementing climate adaptation measures, allowing the Union to better prevent and respond to emergencies like recent climate change events; emphasizes the ongoing need to ensure sufficient funding for the Union’s civil protection mechanism;

    9. Notes the relevance of the reports adopted by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in relation to the management of EU funds linked to climate and environment; urges the Commission and the Member States to implement the recommendations of the reports, in particular report 15/2024 on climate adaptation[29] regarding the need to ensure that all relevant EU-funded projects are adapted to the current and future climate conditions; recalls the importance of the ECA recommendations in its special report 14/2024[30], emphasising the need for the Commission to better estimate climate spending under future funding instruments, to ensure their adequate design, and to enhance the performance of green transition measures; 

    10. Emphasises the need for more ambitious funding allocations for programs like LIFE to support climate and environment-related projects, as well as for the Just Transition Fund to assist the most vulnerable carbon-intensive regions in addressing the economic and social impacts of the climate transition to leave no one behind; emphasises that the funding under LIFE is crucial for the protection of nature and biodiversity, the transition towards an energy efficient, circular, climate neutral, competitive and climate resilient economy and for democratic participation in decision-making processes;  notes that efficient and result-driven climate and biodiversity financing should be integrated into programming activities, while remaining flexible enough to address the diverse needs of different regions and sectors;

    11. Reminds that a stronger European Health Union requires adequate funding with health-related expenditure that follows the ‘One Health’ and ‘Health in all policies’ approaches, securing the proper implementation of, inter alia, the European Health Data Space and of the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan;

    12. Strongly reiterates its regrets over the redeployment from the EU4Health programme of 1 billion EUR over the 2025-2027 period; considers that this funding shortfall threatens the programme’s ability to achieve its critical objectives; renews its call for the Commission, Member States, and other stakeholders to identify practical solutions to offset this cut, ensuring that the programme’s objective of building stronger, more resilient, and more accessible health systems is achieved; calls as well for increased amounts allocated to Cluster Health in Horizon Europe; recognises that stronger health systems directly contribute to economic stability and productivity by reducing health-related workforce disruptions and increasing the resilience of the labour market;

    13. Highlights the importance of effectively allocating sufficient human and financial resources to all relevant DGs for the implementation of the adopted legislation related to climate environment, chemicals and health as well as to the relevant European agencies, including the European Environment Agency (EEA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA);

    14. Highlights the need for a strengthened EU own resources system that can address current challenges while supporting the Union’s environmental, climate and health objectives; stresses the importance of implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism effectively, enabling the Commission to take compensatory measures to address any shortfalls in meeting the EU budget’s overall climate spending target.

    I have sent a similar letter to Mr Andrzej Halicki, general rapporteur for the 2026 budget.

    Yours sincerely,

    Antonio Decaro

     

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan VAN OVERTVELDT

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

     

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion in the form of a letter on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. On 19 February 2024, the committee adopted an opinion in the form of letter during its regular meeting.

    The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution.

    Yours sincerely,

    Borys BUDKA  

    ITRE Chair

     

    SUGGESTIONS

    1.  Recalls that the Union Budget for 2026 should concretely reflect the political priorities of the new legislative term, considering also the various pledges made by Commissioners during their confirmation hearings in Parliament in November 2024; insists that the 2026 budget needs to fully implement all programmes agreed under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), as well as set  in motion and finance new strategic EU initiatives, such as the Clean Industrial Deal for competitive industries and quality jobs; underscores that the 2026 budget must be aligned with the Union’s objectives and international commitments;

    2.  Notes that multiple challenges facing Europe require greater investment and coordination at European level, as well as more concrete action by Member States; calls on the Commission to propose a Union Budget for 2026 that reflects the urgent nature of these challenges; among others, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and hybrid attacks on Member States and their energy and digital infrastructure; maintains this requires multiple forms of EU and national level investments and preparedness, including improving the resilience of digital and energy infrastructure, direct support for Ukraine, accelerated investment in Europe’s defence industry, and support for the EU’s Eastern border regions most directly impacted by the war and Russian hybrid operations; the need to strengthen Europe’s economic competitiveness and industrial base in a volatile environment where global competitors benefit from extensive state support, leading to unfair competition for European companies; the urgent necessity to improve Europe’s research and innovation capabilities, including greater support for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; the digital revolution, including the acceleration of artificial intelligence and growing concerns about cybersecurity; and the need to achieve a just climate transition, as we adapt our economy to the Union’s long-term energy goals and climate neutrality by 2050, by accelerating the decarbonisation in Europe’s energy markets, implementing European Green Deal legislation and achieving a circular economy;

    3.  Notes that EU companies face considerably higher electricity and gas prices compared with the USA, China and other global actors, which presents a significant competitiveness disadvantage, especially but not only for Europe’s energy intensive industries; emphasises the need to  tackle energy poverty and limit the damaging effects of high energy prices on European consumers, many of whom are already struggling with a high cost of living; stresses the importance of reducing EU dependence on fossil-fuels and improving energy efficiency; underlines that security of supply concerns remain paramount and should be addressed in the 2026 budget, given  that energy supplies are easily weaponised by state actors; insists on the need to improve energy interconnections, modernise energy grids, integrate a higher share of renewables while ensuring sufficient clean baseload energy and system flexibilities, therefore calls for significantly increased funding for the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy, which is the flagship EU programme in this field but currently has limited resources to credibly advance Europe towards an interconnected, resilient and decarbonised energy system, able to deliver affordable prices; calls for urgently ending any remaining EU import dependencies on Russia:

    4.   Recalls the need to strengthen the resilience of the EU economy and the competitiveness of Union industries, with ambitious EU industrial policies that can create quality jobs and contribute significantly towards achieving the EU’s social, digital and green objectives, whilst preserving a level playing field in the Single Market; therefore believes that the Union Budget for 2026 should mark the start of the investment boost recommended in the Draghi report by investing strongly in industrial competitiveness, open strategic autonomy and creating pathways towards decarbonisation, while securing EU supply chains for strategic sectors and technologies and improving access to critical raw materials; insists that the 2026 budget must continue strengthening the Union’s competitiveness with increased support for SMEs, midcaps and start-ups, including greater support for scale up to compete globally, in particular through the European Innovation Council;

    5.  Recalls that the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe will be the first after the mid-term review of this strategic EU programme, and therefore needs to offer sufficient investment in fundamental and applied research, foster collaborative research and facilitate the scale-up and commercialisation of research results to ensure Europe can retain and further develop the necessary knowledge base to confront the scientific and economic challenges of the coming decades; regrets that the existing level of Horizon Europe funding is ultimately insufficient to develop the ideas and technologies necessary for the twin green and digital transitions, or to fully deliver on the stated EU goals of sustainable growth and open strategic autonomy; calls for an increase in the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe, including through the reuse of all available decommitments allowing each sub-programme to fund at least 50% of all excellent proposals, given that presently a majority of excellent proposals remain unfunded; calls for maintaining stable and sufficient funding of the ITER project;

    6.  Stresses that significant investments are necessary to address Europe’s connectivity gap and other Digital Decade 2030 targets; recalls that the European Commission estimates that achieving the full gigabit target could exceed €200 billion; calls therefore for adequate resources to be allocated to provide high speed connectivity including gigabit and 5G services, in addition to investments in next generation digital infrastructures and emerging technologies; calls for further investments that foster the development of European digital sovereignty and an EU-based digital sector in order to catch up in crucial areas such as quantum computing and Artificial Intelligence; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient resources to ensure the full implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability, and the integrity of the digital public space.

    7.  Underlines that a strong and sustainable European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions; regrets that EU and its Member States funding for space programmes is highly fragmented and only a fraction of the level in the US, while other global actors including China are rapidly increasing investments; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure sufficient funding for the European space industry, which includes fostering investments from the private sector; calls furthermore for a sufficient level of  EU investments supporting R&I in the field of space;

    8.  Calls for adequate funding and staffing for all agencies and Union bodies in the policy areas of industry, research, energy, space and cybersecurity, in order to cope with increased workload and new regulatory obligations; 

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget –Section III 2024/2110(BUI)

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    to above, the Committee on Culture and Education has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 3 December 2024, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It considered the matter at its meeting of 19 February 2025 and adopted the opinion at that meeting[31].

    The Committee on Culture and Education:

    1. Insists that funding for the most successful EU and crucial programmes like Erasmus+, the European Solidarity Corps (ESC), Creative Europe and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme has to be excluded from debt repayment needs for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) over the whole remaining MFF period; stresses that the ‘EURI cascade mechanism’ has to be implemented effectively, protecting important programme initiatives that directly benefit citizens;

    2. Welcomes further simplification in line with EP calls, e.g. through the use of lump sums in Erasmus+ , for the programmes that are close to the citizens and need to be accessible also for organisations with limited administrative capacities, and calls for further efforts to achieve that end; underlines that attention should be given to peripheral, mountainous and rural areas that experience more difficulties in accessing EU funds; calls on the Commission to continue to share regularly with Parliament, including the Committee on Culture and Education, updated indicators and statistics on the absorption of funds in these programmes;

    3. Welcomes that mobility grants under Erasmus+ were increased to offset rising living costs, upon Parliament’s insistence on an increase to the programme’s budget, to ensure that the programme remains accessible and inclusive;

    4. Stresses necessary efforts to widen participation and to meet inclusivity targets in order to widen the participation of the most vulnerable youth groups and people with disabilities;

    5. Strongly warns against any cuts, and calls for an increase of the funding for the programme, taking into account the high implementation rates and absorption capacities of the programme; calls in particular to preserve funding to initiatives that support teacher development, such as the European Universities and the Erasmus+ Teacher Academies; highlights the growing number of applicants – e.g. a 94% increase  in school education mobility applications from 2022 to 2023 ; regrets, however, the consequence of  lower success rates, notably for school accreditations, which underscores the need for a substantial funding increase to meet the growing demand;

    6. Insists that all funding initially allocated to the programme will be used for investing in the future of young people;

    7. Emphasises the need to support sport under Erasmus+ to promote its role in improving physical and mental health and social inclusion, and to fight discrimination;

    8. Deplores the additional, unanticipated costs for the media strand of Creative Europe, including the implementation of not only the AVMSD, but also of EMFA, including the secretariat of the European Board for Media Services, an additional expenditure that was not taken into account when the current MFF was set up; insists that new initiatives should always be financed from fresh money;

    9. Stresses that the budget for the Creative Europe programme is insufficient to meet the high demand for projects across all its strands, with alarmingly low success rates (e.g. 17% in 2023 under the culture strand); calls for an increase of its funding and highlights the need for synergies between Creative Europe and other EU funds.

    10. Calls for an increase in funding for the ESC programme, given the modest year-on-year increases of about 2% of its budget under the MFF, which is not sufficient to offset inflation rates, and the fact that it is heavily over-subscribed, resulting in a high rejection rate and, therefore, in many cases, disappointment for the young applicants; welcomes the fact that the number of participants with fewer opportunities in the programme (38%)  is the highest of any EU programme and should be maintained;

    11. Stresses the importance of the CERV programme for building bridges between European citizens from different Member States and promoting their engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union, while also contributing to preserving social cohesion and helping to prevent democratic backsliding, particularly in the current challenging political situation; insists, therefore, on an increase for its budget;

    12. Points out that pilot projects and preparatory actions (PPs and PAs) serve as testbeds for new policy initiatives and need adequate funding to properly fulfil that function; deplores any attempts to thwart potentially successful proposals for PPs and PAs already at the selection stage and calls for better cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament on the selection and implementation of PPs and PAs.

    Yours sincerely,

    Nela Riehl

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 29 January 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    The Committee on Constitutional Affairs considered the matter at its meeting of 18 February 2025. At that meeting[32], it decided to submit the opinion set out below to the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible.

    Yours sincerely,

    Sven Simon

     

     

    OPINION

    1. Points out that future substantial EU enlargement cannot be met without a larger EU budget and sufficient new own resources; calls for the necessary budgetary and institutional reforms to be agreed and adopted before substantial enlargement takes place;

    2. Reminds of the need to secure proper financing for the structures within the EU institutions that are responsible for communication with citizens and countering disinformation such as the Commission Representations and European Parliament Liaison Offices, in order to enable them to effectively fulfil their tasks;

    3. Recommends that the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations receives adequate resources, in particular for staffing purposes in view of the significant enlargement of its tasks as foreseen by the Commission proposal for the recast of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1141/2014;

    4. Urges the Committee on Budgets to incorporate the above mentioned budget lines augmentations in its position, as they serve the purpose of delivering concrete results and quality communication to citizens.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    27

    8

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thomas Geisel, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Ondřej Kovařík, Janusz Lewandowski, Victor Negrescu, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Stine Bosse, Mohammed Chahim, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Łukasz Kohut, Marit Maij, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Mirosława Nykiel, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    27

    +

    ECR

    Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Łukasz Kohut, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Stine Bosse, Olivier Chastel, Fabienne Keller, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mohammed Chahim, Marit Maij, Victor Negrescu, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Rasmus Nordqvist, Nicolae Ştefănuță

     

    8

    –

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Kovařík, Julien Sanchez, Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Regula Reaches 15,000 ID Templates in Its Industry’s Largest Database, Revealing New Document Trends

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RESTON, Va., March 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Regula, a global developer of forensic devices and identity verification solutions, now has 15,000 templates in its identity document template database, the most comprehensive in the world. This significant update ensures that businesses and government agencies around the globe can verify the latest IDs, including the most advanced biometric documents, with the highest accuracy.

    Regula’s proprietary identity document template database contains detailed descriptions of each document’s security features. Combined with the advanced capabilities of Regula Document Reader SDK, this enables online ID verification with the same level of precision previously achievable only in on-site scenarios. Incorporating ID templates from 251 countries and territories and capable of reading 138 national languages, this database enables the recognition and proper verification of nearly every ID from any corner of the world, even the rarest ones.

    Tracking Global Shifts in Identity Documents

    The latest expansion of Regula’s ID template database reflects the global shift towards more sophisticated identity documents. More and more countries are introducing biometric passports, which are considered the most secure at the moment. For example, among the recent additions to Regula’s database are the first-ever biometric passports issued by India, Sri Lanka, and Guyana.

    Apart from the format, documents’ security features are also becoming more complex and elaborate. First and foremost, ID issuers are switching from paper substrates in favor of polycarbonate pages, which are much harder to counterfeit. For this reason, states like Benin, Burkina Faso, Chile, and Djibouti have recently issued new IDs with polycarbonate data pages.

    Another advanced security feature that has become quite widespread across different identity documents is the Multiple Laser Image (MLI). An MLI embeds two distinct images within a document. Typically, these include the passport holder’s photo and their personal data. Special lenses positioned above the images can visualize either image clearly by tilting the document. Hard to illegally duplicate by design, MLIs significantly enhance document protection. Among the IDs that were added to Regula’s ID template database with the latest update, the US driver’s license from Wisconsin, as well as the ID cards of Jamaica, San Marino, and Yemen contain such security features.

    “The growing complexity of identity documents presents notable challenges for ID verification workflows. Businesses and government agencies must be prepared to properly verify all the document security features so as not to miss any forgery or identity fraud attempts. Furthermore, they have to handle multiple ID versions from the same country simultaneously, as many older documents remain in circulation alongside the new formats. By keeping pace with evolving security features and document standards, we help streamline ID verification workflows, reduce fraud risks, and maintain compliance with global regulations,” says Ihar Kliashchou, Chief Technology Officer at Regula.

    Among the new IDs added to Regula’s database to hit 15,000 templates are the following, issued in 2024-2025:

    Passports:

    • Azerbaijan
    • Benin
    • Burkina Faso
    • Burundi
    • Chile
    • Djibouti
    • Germany
    • Guyana
    • India
    • Kosovo
    • Malawi
    • Myanmar
    • Netherlands
    • Romania
    • Saint Kitts and Nevis
    • Slovakia
    • Sri Lanka
    • Tajikistan

    ID cards:

    • Argentina
    • Bosnia and Herzegovina
    • Chile
    • Guatemala
    • Jamaica
    • Kazakstan
    • Kosovo
    • Netherlands
    • Nigeria
    • Norway
    • Philippines
    • Puerto Rico
    • San Marino
    • Slovakia
    • Somalia
    • Sri Lanka
    • Vietnam
    • Yemen

    Driver’s licenses:

    • Azerbaijan
    • Denmark
    • Honduras
    • Iran
    • Kosovo
    • Mongolia
    • Puerto Rico
    • Slovakia
    • Sweden
    • Venezuela
    • Bolivia
    • US states: Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin

    To get the full list of the documents supported by Regula’s software solutions, visit Regula’s official website.

    About Regula

    Regula is a global developer of forensic devices and identity verification solutions. With our 30+ years of experience in forensic research and the most comprehensive library of document templates in the world, we create breakthrough technologies for document and biometric verification. Our hardware and software solutions allow over 1,000 organizations and 80 border control authorities globally to provide top-notch client service without compromising safety, security, or speed. Regula has been repeatedly named a Representative Vendor in the Gartner® Market Guide for Identity Verification.

    Learn more at www.regulaforensics.com.

    Contact:
    Kristina – ks@regulaforensics.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/8a3cd960-c05b-412f-9df8-ce5052474afa.

    The MIL Network –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: ODIHR opens limited election observation mission in Romania

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: ODIHR opens limited election observation mission in Romania

    BUCHAREST, 25 March 2025 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today opened an election observation mission for the 4 May repeat presidential election in Romania, following an official invitation from the national authorities.
    The mission is headed by Eoghan Murphy and consists of a core team of 13 international experts based in Bucharest and 22 long-term observers, who will be deployed throughout the country from 2 April.
    The mission will assess the conduct of the election for its compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation.
    Observers will closely monitor all key aspects of the election, such as the conduct of the campaign, including on social networks, the work of the election administration at all levels, election-related legislation and its implementation, campaign finance, media coverage and the resolution of election disputes. Observers will also assess the implementation of previous ODIHR election recommendations.
    Meetings with representatives of national authorities and political parties, judiciary, civil society, the media and the international community form an integral part of the observation.
    While mission members will observe in a number of polling stations across the country to follow election day procedures, in line with ODIHR’s methodology for limited election observation missions, the mission will not carry out systematic or comprehensive observation of the voting, counting and tabulation on election day.
    An interim report will be published some two weeks prior to the election, and the day after the election, the observation mission’s preliminary findings and conclusions will be presented at a press conference. A final report with an assessment of the entire election process and containing recommendations will be published some months after the elections.
    For further information on ODIHR’s election observation activities in the country, please visit: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/romania 
    Media contacts:
    Ružica Jovanović, Media Analyst: ruzica.jovanovic@odihr.ro or +40 759 160 575
    Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson:  katya.andrusz@odihr.pl or +48 609 522 266

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Commission meddling in the Romanian presidential election – E-001112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001112/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petra Steger (PfE)

    On 11 March 2025, the Romanian Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the Central Electoral Committee barring Romanian presidential hopeful Călin Georgescu – who had come out on top in the first round – from the electoral re-run. As this antidemocratic coup unfolded, the EU proved itself to be anything other than a guardian of democracy; on the contrary, its antidemocratic meddling precipitated the vote’s annulment. For example, shortly after the first round yielded a result it deemed unsavoury, the Commission responded by launching a series of formal proceedings against the video platform TikTok, citing alleged violations of the Digital Services Act. By employing such tactics, the Commission is groundlessly exerting its influence over national elections and undermining the sovereignty of an EU Member State.

    Although free elections are the bedrock of democracy, basic democratic principles are being jettisoned, with disinformation and claims of foreign influence used as a smokescreen. Against such a background, US Vice-President JD Vance was absolutely right to say that Europe has a democratic deficit.

    • 1.What does the Commission make of the Romanian Constitutional Court’s decision to strip an EU citizen – who had triumphed in the first round – of the right to stand for election?
    • 2.Did the Commission exert pressure on Romanian institutions to advance decisions against anti-EU and anti-NATO presidential candidate Georgescu?
    • 3.What specific evidence does the Commission have to justify annulling the vote and barring the candidate in pole position?

    Submitted: 14.3.2025

    Last updated: 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Survey confirms Europe’s citizens want the EU to protect them and act in unity

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey, released today, highlights historic levels of approval for EU membership linked to peace and security.

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “Two thirds of Europeans want the EU to play a greater role in their protection. This is a clear call for action which we will answer. Europe needs to be stronger so that our citizens feel safer. The European Parliament will ensure that every proposal put forward is bold and ambitious enough to match the serious level of threat Europe faces. Europe must step up today, or it risks being stepped over tomorrow.”

    66% of EU citizens want the EU to take a more important role in protecting them against global crises and security risks. This view is particularly strong amongst younger respondents to the survey. At the national level, results for a stronger role of the EU range from 87% in Sweden to 47% in Romania and 44% in Poland.

    Almost three quarters of EU citizens (74%) believe their country has benefited from being a member of the EU. This is the highest result ever recorded in a Eurobarometer survey for this question since it was first asked in 1983. Fitting the current context, respondents mention the EU’s contribution to maintaining peace and strengthening security (35%) as the main reason why membership is considered beneficial.

    In addition, there is wide agreement among EU citizens that EU Member States should be more united to face current global challenges (89%) and that the European Union needs more means to deal with the challenges ahead (76%).

    Citizens expect the EU to strengthen security and defence and to enhance competitiveness

    In a rapidlychanging geopolitical environment, defence and security (36%) as well as competitiveness, economy and industry (32%) are identified as the areas on which the EU should focus most to reinforce its position in the world. These are also the topics that featured high on last week’s European Council with Parliament’s President calling for faster action and bolder ambition. While the results for defence and security have remained stable compared to February/March 2024, those for competitiveness, economy and industry have increased by five points. These two areas are followed by energy independence (27%), food security and agriculture (25%) and education and research (23%).

    Economic and security issues are also at the forefront when it comes to the topics citizens want the European Parliament to address as a priority. Four in ten Europeans mention inflation, rising prices and the cost of living (43%), followed by the EU’s defence and security (31%), the fight against poverty and social exclusion (31%) and support to the economy and the creation of new jobs (29%). Inflation, rising prices and the cost of living is a main priority across all age groups and with peak results recorded in Portugal (57%), France (56%), Slovakia (56%), Croatia (54%) and Estonia (54%).

    As shown by the EP’s previous survey, inflation and the cost of living had already played a major role as a driving force in the last European elections and the economic situation continues to be a main concern for many Europeans. A third (33%) expect their standard of living to decrease in the next five years, seven points more than in June-July 2024. This is the case for 53% of French respondents (+8 pp) and 47% of Germans (+15 pp).

    Peace and democracy remain EU core values

    Looking at the values Europeans would like the European Parliament to defend, peace (45%), democracy (32%) and the protection of human rights in the EU and worldwide (22%) come first. The results for this question have remained stable, underlining citizens steadfast support for the EU’s founding values and principles.

    Two-thirds of citizens support a stronger role for the EP

    As historic trend lines show, in moments of crisis citizens look to the EU for decisive actions and solutions. When the EU is perceived as coming together and delivering results, support indicators are high – which is currently the case.  50% of respondents have a positive image of the EU. In the last decade, this positive perception was only higher once (at 52%), in spring 2022 in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The positive image of the EP is stable at a high level (41%). A few months into the legislative term, over six in ten (62%) citizens would like to see the European Parliament play a more important role, a six- percentage point increase compared to February-March 2024, a few months before the June 2024 European elections.

    Full results can be found here.

    Background   

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey was carried out between 09 January and 04 February 2025 in all 27 EU Member States. The survey was conducted face-to-face, with video interviews used additionally in Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Netherlands, and Sweden. 26.354 interviews were conducted in total and EU results are weighted according to the size of the population in each country.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Beam Global Enters Middle Eastern Market Through Partnership with Solvana

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN DIEGO, March 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Beam Global, (Nasdaq: BEEM), a leading provider of innovative and sustainable infrastructure solutions for the electrification of transportation and energy security, today announced its strategic partnership with Solvana, a subsidiary of Greentech LLC, to expand Beam Global’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This partnership supports the region’s growing need for specialized renewable energy, storage, and water treatment solutions, with a focus on electrifying transportation and enhancing energy security.

    Solvana and Beam Global are currently working together to deliver the first BeamWell™ products into Jordan where they are intended to provide lifesaving assistance in Gaza. The BeamWell™ product generates solar-powered electricity for cooking and refrigeration; provides clean drinking water through an integrated desalination plant; and comes equipped with four highly ruggedized Benzina Zero Duo electric mopeds which will provide e-mobility for the delivery of food, water and medical supplies to people in need in the region.

    Solvana was established to meet the urgent regional demand for sustainable solutions, especially in response to crisis situations. Solvana’s vision is to become a leader in the MENA region for specialized solar-powered systems, including EV charging, water treatment, and other critical infrastructure. In addition to providing crisis response solutions, Solvana targets growth markets such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria with specialized solar-powered and EV charging products.

    Dr. Wissam Rabadi, former Minister of Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and Dr. Basim Saleh, CEO of Greentech LLC, lead Solvana. Their expertise and deep regional connections position Solvana as a pivotal partner for Beam Global’s entry into MENA markets.

    “We are honored to partner with Solvana and work alongside leaders like Dr. Wissam Rabadi and Dr. Basim Saleh,” said Desmond Wheatley, CEO of Beam Global. “The MENA region is experiencing significant growth in electrification, and we see a profound opportunity to grow Beam Global’s business in this region both through our lifesaving product, BeamWell™, and through the deployment of our portfolio of renewably energized products and smart cities solutions.”

    The MENA region is set to attract one trillion dollars of renewable energy investments by 2030 according to ZAWYA by the London Stock Exchange Group. The electric vehicle market in the Middle East and Africa is set for substantial growth. The region’s EV sector is projected to reach approximately $52.24 billion by 2030, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 39.7% from 2025 to 2030, driven by increasing government initiatives, sustainability goals, and rising consumer demand for clean transportation options.

    “Beam Global has a portfolio of products which are ideally suited to solve infrastructure challenges in our region,” said Dr. Basim Saleh, CEO of Solvana. “After almost 20 years of involvement in government and energy projects, our relationships span leadership across the region. We look forward to bringing Beam Global’s value to our existing and new relationships, and to providing robust and scalable solutions for the electrification of transportation, energy security, and smart cities solutions. Our first combined engagement, bringing BeamWell™ to the civilian population of Gaza, provides an excellent example of the profound change that these new technologies can deliver. We believe our timing is excellent, and we are delighted to sign this agreement with Beam Global.”

    Through this partnership, Beam Global and Solvana aim to take advantage of investment in off-grid infrastructure and the EV market across the MENA region. Beam Global’s solutions, proven successful in the U.S. and internationally, can be rapidly deployed to enhance energy security, reduce reliance on fossil fuels, and meet the unique needs of communities throughout the region.

    This strategic collaboration marks a significant step in Beam Global’s mission to grow its global presence in markets that constitute significant opportunities for growth.

    About Beam Global
    Beam Global is a clean technology innovator which develops and manufactures sustainable infrastructure products and technologies. We operate at the nexus of clean energy and transportation with a focus on sustainable energy infrastructure, rapidly deployed and scalable EV charging solutions, safe energy storage and vital energy security. With operations in the U.S. and Europe, Beam Global develops, patents, designs, engineers and manufactures unique and advanced clean technology solutions that power transportation, provide secure sources of electricity, save time and money and protect the environment. Beam Global is headquartered in San Diego, CA with facilities in Chicago, IL and Belgrade and Kraljevo, Serbia. Beam Global is listed on Nasdaq under the symbol BEEM. For more information visit BeamForAll.com, LinkedIn, YouTube and X (formerly Twitter).

    About Solvana
    Solvana is a subsidiary of Greentech LLC, which was established to focus on providing specialized energy and water solutions for the MENA region, with a focus on humanitarian and innovative solutions for emerging industries. Established in 2008, Greentech LLC is a leading water-energy-food-environment nexus project developer and service provider. Greentech focuses on identifying synergies between renewable energy solutions, efficient water use, smart agriculture, and the importance of mitigation and adaptation to the survival of our species.

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This Beam Global Press Release may contain forward-looking statements. All statements in this Press Release other than statements of historical facts are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are generally accompanied by terms or phrases such as “estimate,” “project,” “predict,” “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “target,” “plan,” “intend,” “seek,” “goal,” “will,” “should,” “may,” or other words and similar expressions that convey the uncertainty of future events or results. These statements relate to future events or future results of operations. These statements are only predictions and involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which may cause Beam Global’s actual results to be materially different from these forward-looking statements. Except to the extent required by law, Beam Global expressly disclaims any obligation to update any forward-looking statements.

    Media Contact
    Andy Lovsted
    +1-858-335-8465
    Press@BeamForAll.com

    Investor Relations
    Luke Higgins
    +1-858-799-4583
    IR@BeamForAll.com

    The MIL Network –

    March 25, 2025
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