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Category: Banking

  • MIL-OSI: Provident Financial Holdings Announces CFO Appointment

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RIVERSIDE, Calif., May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Provident Financial Holdings, Inc. (“Company” or “Provident”), NASDAQ GS: PROV, the holding company for Provident Savings Bank, F.S.B. (“Bank” or “Provident”), today announced that Peter C. Fan has been appointed Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, and Corporate Secretary of the Company and the Bank, effective May 12, 2025. Mr. Fan most recently served as Senior Vice President – Director of Finance and Treasury at Royal Business Bank since February 2024 and prior to that, as Senior Vice President – Finance at Pacific Western Bank from April 2014 to February 2024.

    President and Chief Executive Officer Donavon P. Ternes commented, “I am pleased to announce the newest member of Provident’s senior management team and extend a warm welcome to Mr. Fan. Peter brings a wealth of financial leadership experience – acquired throughout his banking career particularly with strategic corporate initiatives, liquidity and capital planning, asset-liability management, budgeting, and forecasting.   Peter, together with his colleagues at Provident, will continue our community banking focus which has served our local customers and communities very well for many years.”

    Mr. Fan’s educational background includes a Master of Business Administration from the University of California at Los Angeles and a Bachelor of Science in Accounting from the University of Southern California.   Mr. Fan is also a Certified Public Accountant in California (Inactive).

    About Provident

    With over $1.3 billion in total assets and 13 retail banking centers, Provident is the largest independent community bank headquartered in Riverside County, California, and has been serving the financial needs of its community since 1956. Provident’s community banking operations primarily consist of accepting deposits from customers and businesses within the communities surrounding its full-service offices and investing those funds in single-family, multi-family, commercial real estate, construction, commercial business, consumer, and other loans.

    Safe-Harbor Statement

    Certain matters in this News Release may constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements may relate to, among others, expectations of the business environment in which the Company operates, projections of future performance, perceived opportunities in the market, potential future credit experience, and statements regarding the Company’s mission and vision. These forward-looking statements are based upon current management expectations, and may, therefore, involve risks and uncertainties. The Company’s actual results, performance, or achievements may differ materially from those suggested, expressed, or implied by forward-looking statements as a result of a wide range of factors including, but not limited to, the general business environment, interest rates, the California real estate market, competitive conditions between banks and non-bank financial services providers, regulatory changes, and other risks detailed in the Company’s reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024.

    Contacts:

    Donavon P. Ternes
    President and 
    Chief Executive Officer 

    Tam B. Nguyen
    Senior Vice President and
    Chief Financial Officer

    (951) 686-6060

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: ABC News: Bipartisan pair of senators applaud DOJ investigation into egg producers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
    May 09, 2025
    A bipartisan pair of senators applauded the Justice Department’s ongoing investigation into major egg producers over rising prices and called on the department to look even further into the issue in a letter to Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater late Thursday evening.
    “We write to express support for the Department of Justice’s reported investigation into anticompetitive practices in the U.S. egg industry,” Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Republican Sen. Jim Banks wrote. “As you are aware, the sustained increase in egg prices has placed a significant financial strain on American families, particularly workingclass households. While egg producers and trade associations point to recent avian flu outbreaks as the cause of high prices, we are concerned that record high egg prices reflect noncompetitive behavior among large producers.”
    ABC News reported in March that the Department of Justice was in the early stages of investigating major egg producers over soaring egg prices. Sources told ABC News at the time that department investigators were looking into whether the major egg companies were sharing information about supply and pricing, possibly contributing to price increases.
    …
    Read the full article here.
    By:  Allison Pecorin and Katherine FauldersSource: ABC News

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: KBRA Affirms Ratings for Heritage Commerce Corp

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN JOSE, Calif., May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Heritage Commerce Corp (NASDAQ: HTBK) (the “Company”), parent company of Heritage Bank of Commerce (the “Bank”), announced today that Kroll Bond Rating Agency, LLC (“KBRA”) affirmed the Company’s senior unsecured debt rating of BBB+, the subordinated debt rating of BBB, and the short-term debt rating of K2. KBRA also affirmed deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings of A-, the subordinated debt rating of BBB+, and the short-term deposit and debt ratings of K2 for the Bank. They graded the outlook of the long-term ratings for both the Company and the Bank as stable on May 9, 2025.

    “I am pleased to see that KBRA’s latest ratings report highlights our disciplined and conservative approach to liquidity and capital management, as it shielded the Company during the more uncertain credit and liquidity environment in recent years,” said Clay Jones, President and Chief Executive Officer. “They also recognized our solid credit quality position due to our prudent underwriting and robust monitoring.”

    The complete KBRA press release on Heritage Commerce Corp is available on KBRA’s website, https://www.krollbondratings.com. The KBRA press release, credit ratings, and analysis constitute part of the information contained therein are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion of KBRA and not statements of fact or recommendations of KBRA or the Company to purchase, sell or hold any of the Company’s securities.

    Heritage Commerce Corp, a bank holding company established in October 1997, is the parent company of Heritage Bank of Commerce, established in 1994 and headquartered in San Jose, CA with full-service branches in Danville, Fremont, Gilroy, Hollister, Livermore, Los Altos, Los Gatos, Morgan Hill, Oakland, Palo Alto, Pleasanton, Redwood City, San Francisco, San Jose, San Mateo, San Rafael, and Walnut Creek. Heritage Bank of Commerce is an SBA Preferred Lender. Bay View Funding, a subsidiary of Heritage Bank of Commerce, is based in San Jose, CA and provides business-essential working capital factoring financing to various industries throughout the United States. For more information, please visit www.heritagecommercecorp.com.

    Member FDIC

    For additional information, email:
    InvestorRelations@herbank.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump heads to the Gulf aiming to bolster trade ties – but side talks on Tehran, Gaza could drive a wedge between US and Israel

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

    President Donald Trump and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman attend the G20 Summit in Japan in 2019. Eliot Blondet/AFP via Getty Images

    President Donald Trump will sit down with the Saudi crown prince and Emirati and Qatari leaders on May 14, 2025, in what is being heavily touted as a high-stakes summit. Not invited, and watching warily, will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

    Like many other members of his right-wing coalition, Netanyahu appeared delighted at the election of Trump as U.S. president in November, believing that the Republican’s Middle East policies would undoubtedly favor Israeli interests and be coordinated closely with Netanyahu himself.

    But it hasn’t quite played out that way. Of course, Washington remains – certainly in official communications – Israel’s strongest global ally and chief supplier of arms. But Trump is promoting a Middle East policy that is, at times, distinctly at odds with the interests of Netanyahu and his government.

    In fact, in pushing for an Iran nuclear deal – a surprise reversal from Trump’s first administration – Trump is undermining long-held Netanyahu positions. Such is the level of alarm in Israeli right-wing circles that rumors have been circulating of Trump announcing unilateral U.S. support for a Palestinian state ahead of the Riyadh visit – something that would represent a clear departure for Washington.

    As a historian of Israel and the broader Middle East, I recognize that in key ways Trump’s agenda in Riyadh represents a continuation of the U.S. policies, notably in pursuing security relationships with Arab Gulf monarchies – something Israel has long accepted if not openly supported. But in the process, the trip could also put significant daylight between Trump and Netanyahu.

    Trump’s official agenda

    The four-day trip to the Gulf, Trump’s first policy-driven foreign visit since being elected president, is on the surface more about developing economic and security ties between the U.S. and traditional allies in the Persian Gulf.

    Trump is expected to cement trade deals worth tens of billions of dollars between the U.S. and Arab Gulf States, including unprecedented arms purchases, Gulf investments in the U.S. and even the floated Qatari gift of a palatial 747 intended for use as Air Force One.

    There is also the possibility of a security alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

    So far, so good for Israel’s government. Prior to the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel was already in the process of forging closer ties to the Gulf states, with deals and diplomatic relations established with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain through the Abraham Accords that the Trump administration itself facilitated in September 2020. A potential normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia was also in the offing.

    Dealing with Tehran

    But central to the agenda this week in Riyadh will be issues where Trump and Netanyahu are increasingly not on the same page. And that starts with Iran.

    While the country won’t be represented, Iran will feature heavily at Trump’s summit, as it coincides with the U.S. administration’s ongoing diplomatic talks with Tehran over its nuclear program. Those negotiations have now concluded four rounds. And despite clear challenges, American and Iranian delegations continue to project optimism about the possibility of reaching a deal.

    The approach marks a change of course for Trump, who in 2018 abandoned a similar deal to the one he is now largely looking to forge. It also suggests the U.S. is currently opposed to the idea of direct armed confrontation with Iran, against Netanayhu’s clear preference.

    Diplomacy with Tehran is also favored by Gulf states as a way of containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia – Tehran’s long-term regional rival that, like Israel, opposed the Obama-era Iran nuclear diplomacy – is increasingly looking for a more cautious engagement with Iran. In April, the Saudi defense minister visited Tehran ahead of the recent U.S.-Iranian negotiations.

    Netanyahu has built his political career on the looming threat from a nuclearized Iran and the necessity to nip this threat in the bud. He unsuccessfully tried to undermine President Barack Obama’s initial efforts to reach an agreement with Iran – resulting in 2015’s Iran nuclear deal. But Netanyahu had more luck with Obama’s successor, helping convince Trump to withdraw from the agreement in 2018.

    So Trump’s about-turn on Iran talks has irked Netanyahu – not only because it happened, but because it happened so publicly. In April, the U.S. president called Netanyahu to the White House and openly embarrassed him by stating that Washington is pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran.

    Split over Yemen

    A clear indication of the potential tension between the Trump administration and the Israeli government can be seen in the ongoing skirmishes involving the U.S., Israel and the Houthis in Yemen.

    After the Houthis fired a missile at the Tel Aviv airport on May 4 – leading to its closure and the cancellation of multiple international flights – Israel struck back, devastating an airport and other facilities in Yemen’s capital.

    But just a few hours after the Israeli attack, Trump announced that the U.S. would not strike the Houthis anymore, as they had “surrendered” to his demands and agreed not to block passage of U.S. ships in the Red Sea.

    It became clear that Israel was not involved in this new understanding between the U.S. and the Houthis. Trump’s statement was also notable in its timing, and could be taken as an effort to calm the region in preparation of his trip to Saudi Arabia. The fact that it might help smooth talks with Iran too – Tehran being the Houthis’ main sponsor – was likely a factor as well.

    Timing is also relevant in Israel’s latest attack on Yemeni ports. They took place on May 11 – the eve of Trump setting off for his visit to Saudi Arabia. In so doing, Netanyahu may be sending a signal not only to the Houthis but also to the U.S. and Iran. Continuing to attack the Houthis might make nuclear talks more difficult.

    Bibi’s political survival-first approach

    Critical observers of Netanyahu have long argued that he prioritizes continued war in Gaza over regional calm for the sake of holding together his far-right coalition, members of which desire full control of the Gaza Strip and de-facto annexation of the West Bank.

    Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warns of the Iran nuclear threat at the United Nations in 2012.
    Mario Tama/Getty Images

    This, many political commentators have argued, is the main reason why Netanyahu backed off from the last stage of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas in March – something which would have required the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip.

    Since the collapse of the ceasefire, Israel’s army has mobilized in preparation for a renewed Gaza assault, scheduled to start after the end of Trump’s trip to the Gulf.

    With members of the Netanayhu government openly supporting the permanent occupation of the strip and declaring that bringing back the remaining Israeli hostages is no longer a top priority, it seems clear to me that deescalation is not on Netanyahu’s agenda.

    Trump himself has noted recently both the alarming state of the hostages and the grave humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Now, in addition to the release of Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander, the U.S. is also engaged in negotiations with Hamas over ceasefire and aid – ignoring Netanyahu in the process.

    The bottom dollar

    Current U.S. policy in the region may all be serving a greater aim for Trump: to secure billions of dollars of Gulf money for the American economy and, some have said, himself. But to achieve that requires a stable Middle East, and continued war in Gaza and Iran inching closer to nuclear capabilities might disrupt that goal.

    Of course, a diplomatic agreement over Tehran’s nuclear plans is still some way off. And Trump’s foreign policy is notably prone to abrupt turns. But whether guided by a dealmaker’s instincts to pursue trade and economic deals with wealthy Gulf states, or by a genuine – and related – desire to stabilize the region, his administration is increasingly pursuing policies that go against the interests of the current Israeli government.

    Asher Kaufman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump heads to the Gulf aiming to bolster trade ties – but side talks on Tehran, Gaza could drive a wedge between US and Israel – https://theconversation.com/trump-heads-to-the-gulf-aiming-to-bolster-trade-ties-but-side-talks-on-tehran-gaza-could-drive-a-wedge-between-us-and-israel-256371

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: VIDEO: Huizenga Reintroduces BRAVE Burma Act to Sanction Junta, Gets Commitment from Treasury Secretary Bessent to Help the People of Burma

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Bill Huizenga (MI-02)

    Today, Congressman Bill Huizenga (R-MI) reintroduced H.R. 3190, the BRAVE Burma Act. This bill addresses the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Burma by cutting off the ruthless military junta from the revenue sources it uses to facilitate acts of genocide against the Burmese civilian population. Joining Congressman Huizenga in introducing H.R. 3190 was fellow Burma Caucus co-chair Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN) as well as Rep. Seth Moulton (D-MA) and Rep. Ann Wagner (R-MO).

    “The United States can and must do more to protect the people of Burma and stop the genocide being committed by the military junta,” said Congressman Bill Huizenga. “This bipartisan bill moves to cut off the primary source of funding for the regime and diminish its ability to conduct horrific airstrikes on civilian populations.”

    “On behalf of the Burmese (Myanmar) community in the constituency, I would like to extend our gratitude to Congressman Huizenga for his leadership on Burma-related legislation. We view this bill as a testament to the Burma Caucus’s continued commitment and constructive engagement in matters concerning Burma. We urge the United States to take a leading role in restoring democracy in Burma through sustained and vigorous engagement. The Burmese diaspora also hopes that the Burma Caucus will work closely with Burmese advocacy groups, who often possess valuable insights into the situation on the ground.” – Dr. Than N. Oo, Co-Chair, Burma Center of Battle Creek

    [embedded content]

    Congressman Huizenga: Can I get your commitment that you are going to continue to work with my staff and us on a bipartisan basis as we try to address these issues in Burma?

    U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent: Congressman, we are happy to work with your staff on this legislation. Thank you for your leadership on this issue. I share your concern about imposing consequences on persons who threaten the peace and security of Burma. Treasury has tools to continue to take action for the people of Burma and working with you, we will continue to do so.

    Background:

    The BRAVE Burma Act requires the President to determine, on an annual basis, whether to impose stronger blocking sanctions on Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, Myanma Economic Bank, and foreign persons operating in the jet fuel sector of the Burmese economy.

    Additionally, BRAVE Burma Act would require the Secretary of the Treasury to limit any increase in Myanmar’s influence at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as long as it is governed by the military junta. Not only will this prevent Myanmar from gaining in voting power, but it will also limit the junta’s ability to borrow from the IMF. Lastly, this bill appoints a Senate-approved Special Envoy for Burma at the Department of State. The goal of this position is to develop a comprehensive strategy for implementing the full range of US diplomatic capabilities to promote human rights and the restoration of a civilian government in Burma.  

    Congressman Huizenga established the first-ever Congressional Burma Caucus on February 1, 2024, to coincide with the three-year anniversary of the military coup in Burma. This caucus was created to bolster congressional support for the Burmese people in their fight for democracy and human rights against the brutal military junta. Congressman Huizenga serves as the Republican Co-Chair alongside Democrat Co-Chair Betty McCollum of Minnesota.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Hallador Energy Company Reports First Quarter 2025 Financial and Operating Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    – Q1 Total Revenue up 6% YoY to $117.8 Million –
    – Q1 Net Income up Materially YoY to $10.0 Million or $0.23 Earnings per Share –
    – Q1 Operating Cash Flow up ~2x YoY to $38.4 Million –
    – Q1 Adjusted EBITDA up ~3x YoY to $19.3 Million –

    TERRE HAUTE, Ind., May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Hallador Energy Company (Nasdaq: HNRG) (“Hallador” or the “Company”) today reported its financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    “We are pleased with our first quarter performance as we returned to top line growth and saw material improvements to our bottom line and cash flow generation, underscoring the strength of our strategic shift to a vertically integrated independent power producer (‘IPP’),” said Brent Bilsland, President and Chief Executive Officer. “January and February offered a strong backdrop as the combination of colder weather and higher pricing enabled us to benefit from increased dispatch volumes.”

    “We are making meaningful progress in our negotiations with a leading global data center developer for the long-term supply of capacity and energy from our facility. Our partner has demonstrated their commitment through significant investments, including securing land, transmission capacity and equipment, in addition to the previously announced exclusivity agreement with us that runs through early June 2025. Given the inherent complexity of these multi-party agreements, it is uncertain that we will finalize terms before the exclusivity expires. However, we remain confident that we will execute a strategic transaction that delivers long-term value for our shareholders.”

    Bilsland continued, “We continue to see rising demand for reliable power, particularly as grid volatility grows with the retirement of dispatchable generation. That demand, paired with supportive regulatory sentiment and Hallador’s ability to deliver dependable energy, positions us well for sustained growth. Our evaluation of dual-fuel capabilities and potential acquisitions of other dispatchable generation assets reflect our confidence in the long-term economics and viability of our platform. With a robust contracted sales book, strengthening fundamentals, and ongoing interest from high-demand end users, we believe we are well-positioned to materially strengthen our opportunities for growth and cash flow generation for many years to come.”

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights

    • Hallador returned to growth on both the top and bottom line.
      • Total revenue increased 6% year-over-year and 24% quarter-over-quarter to $117.8 million, driven by a strong increase in electric sales to $85.9 million. Electric sales are currently 73% of the Company’s revenue mix, underscoring Hallador’s commitment to emphasizing electric sales as an IPP.
      • Net income increased materially to $10.0 million, with adjusted EBITDA up ~3x year-over-year and 78% quarter-over-quarter to $19.3 million.
    • The Company generated $38.4 million in operating cash flow during the first quarter, which partially supported the repayment of debt and funding capex.
      • Total bank debt was reduced to $23.0 million at March 31, 2025, compared to $44.0 million at December 31, 2024, and $77.0 million at March 31, 2024.
      • Total liquidity was $69.0 million at March 31, 2025, compared to $37.8 million at December 31, 2024, and $39.5 million at March 31, 2024.
      • Capital expenditures in the first quarter were $11.7 million compared to $14.9 million in the year-ago period.
    • Hallador continues to focus on forward sales to secure its energy position.
      • At quarter-end, Hallador had total forward energy, capacity and coal sales to 3rd party customers of $1.1 billion through 2029.

    Financial Summary ($ in Millions and Unaudited)

        Q1 2024   Q4 2024   Q1 2025
    Electric Sales   $ 60.7     $ 69.7     $ 85.9  
    Coal Sales – 3rd Party   $ 49.6     $ 23.3     $ 30.2  
    Other Revenue   $ 1.3     $ 1.8     $ 1.7  
    Total Sales and Operating Revenue   $ 111.6     $ 94.8     $ 117.8  
    Net Income (Loss)   $ (1.7 )   $ (215.8 )   $ 10.0  
    Operating Cash Flow   $ 16.4     $ 32.5     $ 38.4  
    Adjusted EBITDA*   $ 6.8     $ 6.2     $ 19.3  
    ___________________________
    * Non-GAAP financial measure, defined as EBITDA plus effects of certain subsidiary and equity method investment activity, less other amortization, plus certain operating activities including stock-based compensation, asset retirement obligations accretion, less gain on disposal or abandonment of assets, plus other reclassifications such as special non-recurring project expenses.

    Adjusted EBITDA should not be considered an alternative to net income, income from operations, cash flows from operating activities or any other measure of financial performance presented in accordance with GAAP. Our method of computing Adjusted EBITDA may not be the same method used to compute similar measures reported by other companies.

    Management believes the non-GAAP financial measure, Adjusted EBITDA, is an important measure in analyzing our liquidity and is a key component of certain material covenants contained within our Credit Agreement, specifically the minimum quarterly EBITDA. Noncompliance with the covenants could result in our lenders requiring the Company to immediately repay all amounts borrowed. If we cannot satisfy these financial covenants, we would be prohibited under our Credit Agreement from engaging in certain activities, such as incurring additional indebtedness, making certain payments, and acquiring and disposing of assets. Consequently, Adjusted EBITDA is critical to the assessment of our liquidity. The required amount of Adjusted EBITDA is a variable based on our debt outstanding and/or required debt payments at the time of the quarterly calculation based on a rolling prior 12-month period.

    Reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measure, Adjusted EBITDA, to Income (Loss) before Income taxes, the most comparable GAAP measure, is as follows (in thousands) for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively.

    Reconciliation of GAAP “Income (Loss) before Income Taxes” to non-GAAP “Adjusted EBITDA”
    (In $ Thousands and Unaudited)
     
        Three Months Ended
        March 31, 
        2025   2024
    NET INCOME (LOSS)   $ 9,979     $ (1,696 )
    Interest expense     3,723       3,937  
    Income tax expense (benefit)     —       (610 )
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization     14,977       15,443  
    EBITDA     28,679       17,074  
    Other operating revenue     —       7  
    Stock-based compensation     1,084       666  
    Asset retirement obligations accretion     427       399  
    Other amortization (1)     (11,334 )     (12,401 )
    (Gain) loss on disposal or abandonment of assets, net     (21 )     (24 )
    Loss on extinguishment of debt     —       853  
    Equity method investment (loss)     236       249  
    Other reclassifications     239       —  
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ 19,310     $ 6,823  
     
    (1) Other amortization relates to the non-cash amortization of the Hoosier PPA entered into in connection with the acquisition of the Merom Power Plant in 2022.


    Solid Forward Sales Position – Segment Basis, Before Intercompany Eliminations (unaudited):

        2025   2026   2027   2028   2029   Total
    Power                                                
    Energy                                                
    Contracted MWh (in millions)     3.04       3.36       1.78       1.09       0.27       9.54  
    Average contracted price per MWh   $ 37.20     $ 44.43     $ 54.66     $ 52.94     $ 51.33          
    Contracted revenue (in millions)   $ 113.09     $ 149.28     $ 97.29     $ 57.70     $ 13.86     $ 431.22  
                                                     
    Capacity                                                
    Average daily contracted capacity MW     784       733       623       454       100          
    Average contracted capacity price per MWd   $ 211     $ 230     $ 226     $ 225     $ 230          
    Contracted capacity revenue (in millions)   $ 45.45     $ 61.54     $ 51.40     $ 37.33     $ 3.47     $ 199.19  
                                                     
    Total Energy & Capacity Revenue                                                
                                                     
    Contracted Power revenue (in millions)   $ 158.54     $ 210.82     $ 148.69     $ 95.03     $ 17.33     $ 630.41  
                                                     
    Coal                                                
    Priced tons – 3rd party (in millions)     2.21       2.50       2.50       0.50       —       7.71  
    Avg price per ton – 3rd party   $ 50.95     $ 55.49     $ 56.74     $ 59.00     $ —          
    Contracted coal revenue – 3rd party (in millions)   $ 112.60     $ 138.73     $ 141.85     $ 29.50     $ —     $ 422.68  
                                                     
    TOTAL CONTRACTED REVENUE (IN MILLIONS) – CONSOLIDATED   $ 271.14     $ 349.55     $ 290.54     $ 124.53     $ 17.33     $ 1,053.09  
                                                     
    Priced tons – Intercompany (in millions)     1.82       2.30       2.30       2.30       —       8.72  
    Avg price per ton – Intercompany   $ 51.00     $ 51.00     $ 51.00     $ 51.00     $ —          
    Contracted coal revenue – Intercompany (in millions)   $ 92.82     $ 117.30     $ 117.30     $ 117.30     $ —     $ 444.72  
                                                     
    TOTAL CONTRACTED REVENUE (IN MILLIONS) – SEGMENT   $ 363.96     $ 466.85     $ 407.84     $ 241.83     $ 17.33     $ 1,497.81  


    Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act“), and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act“). Statements that are not strictly historical statements constitute forward-looking statements and may often, but not always, be identified by the use of such words such as “expects,” “believes,” “intends,” “anticipates,” “plans,” “estimates,” “guidance,” “target,” “potential,” “possible,” or “probable” or statements that certain actions, events or results “may,” “will,” “should,” or “could” be taken, occur or be achieved. Forward-looking statements include, without limitation, those relating to our ability to execute definitive agreements with respect to the non-binding term sheet with a leading global data center developer, to execute a strategic transaction that delivers long-term value for our shareholders or to strengthen opportunities for growth and cash flow generation. Forward-looking statements are based on current expectations and assumptions and analyses made by Hallador and its management in light of experience and perception of historical trends, current conditions and expected future developments, as well as other factors appropriate under the circumstances that involve various risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those reflected in the statements. These risks include, but are not limited to, those set forth in Hallador’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, and other Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Hallador undertakes no obligation to revise or update publicly any forward-looking statements except as required by law.

    Conference Call and Webcast

    Hallador management will host a conference call today, May 12, 2025, at 5:00 p.m. Eastern time to discuss its financial and operational results, followed by a question-and-answer period.

    Date: Monday, May 12, 2025
    Time: 5:00 p.m. Eastern time
    Dial-in registration link: here
    Live webcast registration link: here

    The conference call will also be broadcast live and available for replay in the investor relations section of the Company’s website at www.halladorenergy.com.

    About Hallador Energy Company

    Hallador Energy Company (Nasdaq: HNRG) is a vertically-integrated Independent Power Producer (IPP) based in Terre Haute, Indiana. The Company has two core businesses: Hallador Power Company, LLC, which produces electricity and capacity at its one-Gigawatt (GW) Merom Generating Station, and Sunrise Coal, LLC, which produces and supplies fuel to the Merom Generating Station and other companies. To learn more about Hallador, visit the Company’s website at http://www.halladorenergy.com/.

    Company Contact

    Marjorie Hargrave
    Chief Financial Officer
    MHargrave@halladorenergy.com

    Investor Relations Contact

    Sean Mansouri, CFA
    Elevate IR
    (720) 330-2829
    HNRG@elevate-ir.com

    Hallador Energy Company
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (in thousands, except per share data)
    (unaudited)
     
        March 31,   December 31,
        2025   2024
    ASSETS            
    Current assets:            
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 6,891     $ 7,232  
    Restricted cash     9,316       4,921  
    Accounts receivable     12,582       15,438  
    Inventory     36,318       36,685  
    Parts and supplies     40,137       39,104  
    Prepaid expenses     1,808       1,478  
    Total current assets     107,052       104,858  
    Property, plant and equipment:            
    Land and mineral rights     70,307       70,307  
    Buildings and equipment     435,329       429,857  
    Mine development     94,725       92,458  
    Finance lease right-of-use assets     13,034       13,034  
    Total property, plant and equipment     613,395       605,656  
    Less – accumulated depreciation, depletion and amortization     (360,624 )     (347,952 )
    Total property, plant and equipment, net     252,771       257,704  
    Equity method investments     2,370       2,607  
    Other assets     3,904       3,951  
    Total assets   $ 366,097     $ 369,120  
                 
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY            
    Current liabilities:            
    Current portion of bank debt, net   $ 16,965     $ 4,095  
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities     45,652       44,298  
    Current portion of lease financing     7,067       6,912  
    Contract liabilities – current     107,368       97,598  
    Total current liabilities     177,052       152,903  
    Long-term liabilities:            
    Bank debt, net     4,000       37,394  
    Long-term lease financing     6,921       8,749  
    Asset retirement obligations     15,386       14,957  
    Contract liabilities – long-term     42,539       49,121  
    Other     4,851       1,711  
    Total long-term liabilities     73,697       111,932  
    Total liabilities     250,749       264,835  
    Commitments and contingencies (Note 16)            
    Stockholders’ equity:            
    Preferred stock, $.10 par value, 10,000 shares authorized; none issued     —       —  
    Common stock, $.01 par value, 100,000 shares authorized; 42,978 and 42,621 issued and outstanding, as of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, respectively     430       426  
    Additional paid-in capital     190,378       189,298  
    Retained earnings (deficit)     (75,460 )     (85,439 )
    Total stockholders’ equity     115,348       104,285  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity   $ 366,097     $ 369,120  
    Hallador Energy Company
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (in thousands, except per share data)
    (unaudited)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    SALES AND OPERATING REVENUES:            
    Electric sales   $ 85,943     $ 60,681  
    Coal sales     30,185       49,630  
    Other revenues     1,659       1,263  
    Total sales and operating revenues     117,787       111,574  
    EXPENSES:            
    Fuel     15,210       8,059  
    Other operating and maintenance costs     28,389       37,262  
    Cost of purchased power     6,840       1,926  
    Utilities     4,152       4,594  
    Labor     27,029       35,168  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization     14,977       15,443  
    Asset retirement obligations accretion     427       399  
    Exploration costs     21       70  
    General and administrative     6,825       5,944  
    Gain on disposal or abandonment of assets, net     (21 )     (24 )
    Total operating expenses     103,849       108,841  
                 
    INCOME FROM OPERATIONS     13,938       2,733  
                 
    Interest expense (1)     (3,723 )     (3,937 )
    Loss on extinguishment of debt     —       (853 )
    Equity method investment (loss)     (236 )     (249 )
    NET INCOME (LOSS) BEFORE INCOME TAXES     9,979       (2,306 )
                 
    INCOME TAX EXPENSE (BENEFIT):            
    Current     —       —  
    Deferred     —       (610 )
    Total income tax expense (benefit)     —       (610 )
                 
    NET INCOME (LOSS)   $ 9,979     $ (1,696 )
                 
    NET INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE:            
    Basic   $ 0.23     $ (0.05 )
    Diluted   $ 0.23     $ (0.05 )
                 
    WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING            
    Basic     42,619       34,816  
    Diluted     43,462       34,816  
    Hallador Energy Company
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (in thousands)
    (unaudited)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:            
    Net income (loss)   $ 9,979     $ (1,696 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:            
    Deferred income tax (benefit)     —       (610 )
    Equity method investment loss     236       249  
    Depreciation, depletion and amortization     14,977       15,443  
    Loss on extinguishment of debt     —       853  
    Gain on disposal or abandonment of assets, net     (21 )     (24 )
    Amortization of debt issuance costs     497       404  
    Asset retirement obligations accretion     427       399  
    Cash paid on asset retirement obligation reclamation     (156 )     (639 )
    Stock-based compensation     1,084       666  
    Amortization of contract liabilities     (35,669 )     (24,529 )
    Accretion on contract liabilities     1,560       —  
    Change in current assets and liabilities:            
    Accounts receivable     2,856       5,709  
    Inventory     367       (6,613 )
    Parts and supplies     (1,033 )     (1,483 )
    Prepaid expenses     (330 )     (37 )
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities     3,124       (8,015 )
    Contract liabilities     37,297       35,355  
    Other     3,224       937  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   $ 38,419     $ 16,369  
    Hallador Energy Company
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (in thousands)
    (continued)
    (unaudited)
     
        Three Months Ended March 31,
        2025   2024
    CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:            
    Capital expenditures   $ (11,693 )   $ (14,874 )
    Proceeds from sale of equipment     21       24  
    Net cash used in investing activities     (11,672 )     (14,850 )
                 
    CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:            
    Payments on bank debt     (33,000 )     (26,500 )
    Borrowings of bank debt     12,000       12,000  
    Payments on lease financing     (1,693 )     (1,238 )
    Proceeds from sale and leaseback arrangement     —       1,927  
    Issuance of related party notes payable     —       5,000  
    Debt issuance costs     —       (38 )
    ATM offering     —       6,580  
    Taxes paid on vesting of RSUs     —       (1 )
    Net cash used in financing activities     (22,693 )     (2,270 )
    Increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash     4,054       (751 )
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash, beginning of period     12,153       7,123  
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash, end of period   $ 16,207     $ 6,372  
                 
    CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS, AND RESTRICTED CASH:            
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 6,891     $ 1,635  
    Restricted cash     9,316       4,737  
        $ 16,207     $ 6,372  
                 
    SUPPLEMENTAL CASH FLOW INFORMATION:            
    Cash paid for interest   $ 1,830     $ 3,083  
                 
    SUPPLEMENTAL NON-CASH FLOW INFORMATION:            
    Change in capital expenditures included in accounts payable and prepaid expense   $ (1,649 )   $ (5,290 )
    Stock issued on redemption of convertible notes and interest   $ —     $ 9,721  

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. Announces Financial Results for the Second Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIAMI, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. (NYSE: PFLT) announced today its financial results for the second quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    HIGHLIGHTS
    Quarter ended March 31, 2025 (Unaudited)
    ($ in millions, except per share amounts)
             
               
    Assets and Liabilities:          
    Investment portfolio (1)       $ 2,344.1  
    Net assets       $ 1,067.1  
    GAAP net asset value per share       $ 11.07  
    Quarterly change in GAAP net asset value per share         (2.4 )%
    Adjusted net asset value per share (2)       $ 11.07  
    Quarterly change in adjusted net asset value per share (2)         (2.4 )%
               
    Credit Facility       $ 273.8  
    2036 Asset-Backed Debt       $ 284.4  
    2036-R Asset-Backed Debt       $ 265.3  
    2026 Notes       $ 184.2  
    2037 Asset-Backed Debt       $ 358.1  
    Regulatory debt to equity       1.29x  
    Weighted average yield on debt investments at quarter-end         10.5 %
               
    Operating Results:          
    Net investment income       $ 25.0  
    Net investment income per share (GAAP)       $ 0.28  
    Core net investment income per share (3)       $ 0.28  
    Distributions declared per share       $ 0.31  
               
    Portfolio Activity:          
    Purchases of investments       $ 293.3  
    Sales and repayments of investments       $ 122.4  
               
    PSSL Portfolio data:          
    PSSL investment portfolio       $ 1,060.2  
    Purchases of investments       $ 60.0  
    Sales and repayments of investments       $ 36.8  

    (1)    Includes investments in PennantPark Senior Secured Loan Fund I LLC, or PSSL, an unconsolidated joint venture, totaling $297.3 million, at fair value.

    (2)    This is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company believes that this number provides useful information to investors and management because it reflects the Company’s financial performance excluding the impact of the unrealized amounts on the Credit Facility. The presentation of this additional information is not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for financial results prepared in accordance with GAAP.

    (3)    Core net investment income (“Core NII”) is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company believes that Core NII provides useful information to investors and management because it reflects the Company’s financial performance excluding one-time or non-recurring investment income and expenses. The presentation of this additional information is not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for financial results prepared in accordance with GAAP. For the quarter ended March 31, 2025, Core NII excluded: i) $0.4m of credit facility amendment costs and ii) $0.1m of incentive fee expense offset.

    CONFERENCE CALL AT 9:00 A.M. ET ON May 13, 2025

    PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. (“we”, “our”, “us”, or the “Company”) will also host a conference call at 9:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) on Tuesday May 13, 2025 to discuss its financial results. All interested parties are welcome to participate. You can access the conference call by dialing toll-free (888) 394-8218 approximately 5-10 minutes prior to the call. International callers should dial (929) 477-0402. All callers should reference conference ID #6661250 or PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. An archived replay will also be available on a webcast link located on the Quarterly Earnings page in the Investor section of PennantPark’s website.

    PORTFOLIO AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITY

    “We are pleased that we significantly increased our financial strength during the quarter. A lower cost credit facility, a new low cost long term securitization, new low cost securitization at our PSSL JV and additional equity capital at PFLT have positioned us well to take advantage of the upcoming attractive vintage of new loans,” said Art Penn, Chairman and CEO. “Additionally, we are pleased that our senior secured loan portfolio, with among the lowest portfolio company leverage and most meaningful covenants in the industry, is positioned defensively and continues to perform well.”

    As of March 31, 2025, our portfolio totaled $2,344.1 million, and consisted of $2,100.2 million of first lien secured debt (including $237.7 million in PSSL), $4.4 million of subordinated debt and $239.5 million of preferred and common equity (including $59.6 million in PSSL). Our debt portfolio consisted of approximately 100% variable-rate investments. As of March 31, 2025, we had four portfolio companies on non-accrual, representing 2.2% and 1.2% of our overall portfolio on a cost and fair value basis, respectively. As of March 31, 2025, the portfolio had net unrealized depreciation of $61.2 million. Our overall portfolio consisted of 159 companies with an average investment size of $14.7 million and had a weighted average yield on debt investments of 10.5%.

    As of September 30, 2024, our portfolio totaled $1,983.5 million and consisted of $1,746.7 million of first lien secured debt (including $237.7 million in PSSL), $2.7 million of second lien secured debt and subordinated debt and $234.1 million of preferred and common equity (including $56.5 million in PSSL). Our debt portfolio consisted of approximately 100% variable-rate investments. As of September 30, 2024, we had two portfolio companies on non-accrual, representing 0.4% and 0.2% of our overall portfolio on a cost and fair value basis, respectively. As of September 30, 2024, the portfolio had net unrealized depreciation of $11.4 million. Our overall portfolio consisted of 158 companies with an average investment size of $12.6 million, and a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.5%.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2025, we invested $293.3 million in three new and 54 existing portfolio companies at a weighted average yield on debt investments of 9.9%. Sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $122.4 million including $52.9 million of sales to PSSL. For the six months ended March 31, 2025, we invested $900.2 million in 14 new and 96 existing portfolio companies with a weighted average yield on debt investments of 10.2%. Sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $523.7 million, including $240.6 million of sales to PSSL.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2024, we invested $338.3 million in 11 new and 48 existing portfolio companies at a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.6%. For the three months ended March 31, 2024, sales and repayments of investments totaled $144.8 million, including $77.2 million of sales to PSSL. For the six months ended March 31, 2024, we invested $640.9 million in 24 new and 64 existing portfolio companies at a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.8%. For the six months ended March 31, 2024, sales and repayments of investments totaled $248.7 million, including $139.9 million of sales to PSSL.

    PennantPark Senior Secured Loan Fund I LLC

    As of March 31, 2025, PSSL’s portfolio totaled $1,060.2 million, consisted of 118 companies with an average investment size of $9.0 million and had a weighted average yield on debt investments of 10.5%. As of September 30, 2024, PSSL’s portfolio totaled $913.3 million, consisted of 109 companies with an average investment size of $8.4 million and had a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.4%.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2025, PSSL invested $60.0 million (including $52.9 million purchase from the Company) in four new and five existing portfolio companies with a weighted average yield on debt investments of 9.8%. PSSL’s sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $36.8 million. For the six months ended March 31, 2025, PSSL invested $284.9 million (including $240.6 million purchased from the Company) in 21 new and 12 existing portfolio companies with a weighted average yield on debt investments of 10.2%. PSSL’s sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $123.4 million.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2024, PSSL invested $80.1 million (including $77.2 million purchased from the Company) in six new and four existing portfolio companies at a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.6%. Sales and repayments of investments for the three months ended March 31, 2024 totaled $49.5 million. For the six months ended March 31, 2024, PSSL invested $155.9 million (including $139.9 million purchased from the Company) in 10 new and 11 existing portfolio companies at a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.9%. Sales and repayments of investments for the six months ended March 31, 2024 totaled $77.2 million.

    RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

    Set forth below are the results of operations for the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024.

    Investment Income

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 investment income was $61.9 million and $128.9 million, respectively, which was attributable to $56.2 million and $117.2 million from first lien secured debt and $5.7 million and $11.7 million from other investments, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, investment income was $44.4 million and $82.3 million, respectively, which was attributable to $39.0 million and $72.2 million from first lien secured debt and $5.4 million and $10.1 million from other investments, respectively. The increase in investment income for the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, was primarily due to the increase in the size of the debt portfolio.

    Expenses

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, expenses totaled $36.9 million and $74.0 million, respectively and were comprised of: $22.5 million and $44.9 million of debt related interest and expenses, $5.6 million and $10.9 million of base management fees, $6.3 million and $13.8 million of performance-based incentive fees, $1.9 million and $3.6 million of general and administrative expenses, $0.2 million and $0.5 million of taxes and $0.4 million and $0.4 million in Credit Facility amendment costs. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, expenses totaled $25.3 million and $43.8 million, respectively and were comprised of: $14.7 million and $23.6 million of debt related interest and expenses, $3.4 million and $6.4 million of base management fees, $4.8 million and $9.6 million of performance-based incentive fees, $1.8 million and $3.5 million of general and administrative expenses and $0.5 million and $0.7 million of taxes. The increase in expenses for the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, was primarily due to the increase in interest expense from increased borrowings and an increase in base management fees and incentive fee as a result of the increase in our investment portfolio.

    Net Investment Income

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 net investment income totaled $25.0 million or $0.28 per share, and $55.0 million or $0.64 per share, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, net investment income totaled $19.1 million or $0.31 per share, and $38.5 million or $0.64 per share, respectively. The increase in net investment income for the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, was primarily due to an increase in investment income partially offset by an increase in expenses.

    Net Realized Gains or Losses

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 net realized gains (losses) totaled $(3.5) million and $23.1 million, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, net realized gains (losses) totaled $4.0 million and $0.9 million, respectively. The change in net realized gains (losses) was primarily due to changes in the market conditions of our investments and the values at which they were realized.

    Unrealized Appreciation or Depreciation on Investments and Debt

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 we reported net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments of $(20.8) million and $(49.7) million, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, we reported net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments of $7.7 million and $13.9 million, respectively. As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, our net unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments totaled $(61.2) million and $(11.4) million, respectively. The net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on our investments was primarily due to the operating performance of the portfolio companies within our portfolio, changes in the capital market conditions of our investments and realization of investments.

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, our Credit Facility had a net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) of less than $0.1 million and $0.1 million, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, our Credit Facility had a net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) of less than $0.1 million and ($0.1) million, respectively. As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, the net unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on the Credit Facility totaled approximately $0.1 million and zero, respectively. The net change in net unrealized (appreciation) or depreciation was primarily due to changes in the capital markets.

    Net Change in Net Assets Resulting from Operations

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations totaled $1.2 million or $0.01 per share and $29.6 million or $0.34 per share, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations totaled $31.1 million or $0.51 per share and $53.6 million, or $0.89 per share, respectively. The net increase or (decrease) from operations for the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, was primarily due to operating performance of our portfolio and changes in capital market conditions of our investments along with change in size and cost yield of our debt portfolio and costs of financing.

    LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES

    Our liquidity and capital resources are derived primarily from cash flows from operations, including income earned, proceeds from investment sales and repayments, and proceeds of securities offerings and debt financings. Our primary use of funds from operations includes investments in portfolio companies and payments of fees and other operating expenses we incur. We have used, and expect to continue to use, our debt capital, proceeds from our portfolio and proceeds from public and private offerings of securities to finance our investment objectives and operations.

    In February 2025 the Company, through the 2037 Securitization Issuer, completed a $474.6 million term debt securitization of which we retained $85.1 million of subordinated notes and $28.5 million of BBB-(sf) Class D Notes of the debt securitization. The weighted average credit spread is 1.59%. This 2037 Asset-Backed Debt is scheduled to mature on April 20, 2037.

    For the six months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024, the annualized weighted average cost of debt, inclusive of the fee on the undrawn commitment on the Credit Facility, amendment costs and debt issuance costs, was 6.8% and 7.1%, respectively. As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, we had $462.1 million and $192.1 million of unused borrowing capacity under the Credit Facility, respectively, subject to leverage and borrowing base restrictions.

    As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, we had cash equivalents of $111.4 million and $112.1 million, respectively, available for investing and general corporate purposes. We believe our liquidity and capital resources are sufficient to take advantage of market opportunities.

    During the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 we issued 11,562,000 shares and 18,838,000 shares of our common stock through the 2024 ATM Program, respectively at an average price of $11.34 per share and $11.35 per share raising $131.0 million and $213.2 million of net proceeds after commissions to the Sales Agents and inclusive of proceeds from the Investment Adviser to ensure that all shares were sold at or above NAV, respectively. During the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, we issued 4,493,436 shares of common stock through the 2022 ATM Program at an average price of $11.35 per share, raising $51.0 million of net proceeds after commissions to the Sales Agents and inclusive of proceeds from the Investment Adviser to ensure that all shares were sold at or above NAV, respectively.

    For the six months ended March 31, 2025, our operating activities used cash of $350.8 million and our financing activities provided cash of $350.1 million. Our operating activities used cash primarily due to our investment activities and our financing activities provided cash primarily due to borrowings under our Credit Facility, proceeds from the 2037 Asset-Backed debt and proceeds from the public offerings under our 2024 ATM Program.

    For the six months ended March 31, 2024, our operating activities used cash of $354.5 million and our financing activities provided cash of $379.2 million. Our operating activities used cash primarily due to our investment activities and our financing activities provided cash primarily due to borrowings under the Credit Facility and proceeds from the 2036 Asset-Backed debt partially offset by the repayment of the 2023 Notes.

    DISTRIBUTIONS

    During the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 we declared distributions of $0.3075 and $0.615 per share for total distributions of $27.7 million and $52.9 million, respectively. During the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, we declared distributions of $0.3075 and $0.615 per share for total distributions of $18.8 million and $36.9 million, respectively. We monitor available net investment income to determine if a return of capital for tax purposes may occur for the fiscal year. To the extent our taxable earnings fall below the total amount of our distributions for any given fiscal year, stockholders will be notified of the portion of those distributions deemed to be a tax return of capital. Tax characteristics of all distributions will be reported to stockholders subject to information reporting on Form 1099-DIV after the end of each calendar year and in our periodic reports filed with the SEC.

    RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

    In April 2025, PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. amended its credit facility agreement led by Truist Bank. As part of the amendment, the Company pricing decreased to SOFR plus 200 basis points from SOFR plus 225 basis points, the reinvestment period was extended one year to August 2028, the maturity date was extended one year to August 2030, and the maximum first lien advance rate was increased to 72.5% from 70.0%. As part of this amendment, commitments decreased from $736 million to $718 million.

    In April 2025, PSSL through its wholly-owned and consolidated subsidiary, PennantPark CLO 12, LLC closed a four year reinvestment period, twelve-year final maturity $301 million debt securitization in the form of a collateralized loan obligation. The debt in this securitization is structured in the following manner: (i) $30.0 million of Class A-1 Loans, which bear interest at three-month SOFR plus 1.45%, (ii) $141.0 million of Class A-1 Notes,which bear interest at three-month SOFR plus 1.45%, (iii) $12.0 million of Class A-2 Notes, which bear interest at a three-month SOFR plus 1.60%, (iv) $21.0 million of Class B notes, which bears interest at three-month SOFR plus 1.85%, (v) $24.0 million of Class C notes, which bears interest at three-month SOFR plus 2.30%, (vi) $18.0 million Class D notes, which bears interest at three-month SOFR plus 3.30%, (vii) $55.0 million of Sub notes. The weighted average credit spread is 1.71%. PSSL will continue to retain all of the subordinated notes through a consolidated subsidiary. The reinvestment period for the term debt securitization ends in April 2029 and the debt is scheduled to mature in April 2037. The term debt securitization is expected to be approximately 100% funded at close. The proceeds from the debt will be used to repay a portion of PSSL’s $325 million secured credit facility.

    AVAILABLE INFORMATION

    The Company makes available on its website its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q filed with the SEC, and stockholders may find such report on its website at www.pennantpark.com.

    PENNANTPARK FLOATING RATE CAPITAL LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
    (in thousands, except per share data)
     
       
        March 31, 2025     September 30, 2024  
        (unaudited)        
    Assets            
    Investments at fair value            
    Non-controlled, non-affiliated investments (amortized cost— $2,043,844 and $1,622,669, respectively)   $ 2,046,762     $ 1,632,269  
    Controlled, affiliated investments (amortized cost— $361,375 and $372,271, respectively)     297,290       351,235  
    Total investments (amortized cost— $2,405,219 and $1,994,940, respectively)     2,344,052       1,983,504  
    Cash and cash equivalents (cost— $111,368 and $112,046, respectively)     111,358       112,050  
    Interest receivable     11,094       12,167  
    Receivables from investments sold     2,048       —  
    Distributions receivable     946       635  
    Due from affiliate     82       291  
    Prepaid expenses and other assets     2,268       198  
    Total assets     2,471,848       2,108,845  
    Liabilities            
    Credit Facility payable, at fair value (cost— $273,855 and $443,855, respectively)     273,790       443,880  
    2026 Notes payable, net (par—$185,000)     184,220       183,832  
    2036 Asset-Backed Debt, net (par—$287,000)     284,357       284,086  
    2036-R Asset-Backed Debt, net (par-$266,000)     265,300       265,235  
    2037 Asset-Backed Debt, net (par— $361,000)     358,083       —  
    Payable for investments purchased     —       20,363  
    Interest payable on debt     15,202       14,645  
    Distributions payable     9,627       7,834  
    Base management fee payable     5,604       4,588  
    Incentive fee payable     6,258       3,189  
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses     1,664       2,187  
    Deferred tax liability     612       1,712  
    Total liabilities     1,404,717       1,231,551  
    Net assets            
    Common stock, 96,417,896 and 77,579,896 shares issued and outstanding, respectively Par value $0.001 per share and 200,000,000 shares authorized     96       78  
    Paid-in capital in excess of par value     1,189,888       976,744  
    Accumulated deficit     (122,853 )     (99,528 )
    Total net assets   $ 1,067,131     $ 877,294  
    Total liabilities and net assets   $ 2,471,848     $ 2,108,845  
    Net asset value per share   $ 11.07     $ 11.31  
    PENNANTPARK FLOATING RATE CAPITAL LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (in thousands, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)
     
       
        Three Months Ended
    March 31,
        Six months Ended
    March 31,
     
        2025     2024     2025     2024  
    Investment income:                        
    From non-controlled, non-affiliated investments:                        
    Interest   $ 49,215     $ 30,470     $ 96,678     $ 54,238  
    Dividend     369       577       946       1,085  
    Other income     634       1,268       2,114       3,031  
    From controlled, affiliated investments:                        
    Interest     7,345       8,320       20,153       16,754  
    Dividend     4,375       3,719       8,750       7,219  
    Other income     —       —       306       —  
    Total investment income     61,938       44,354       128,947       82,327  
    Expenses:                        
    Interest and expenses on debt     22,529       14,688       44,890       23,630  
    Performance-based incentive fee     6,258       4,767       13,750       9,630  
    Base management fee     5,604       3,424       10,868       6,375  
    General and administrative expenses     1,200       1,255       2,400       2,243  
    Administrative services expenses     650       585       1,150       1,211  
    Expenses before amendment costs and provision for taxes     36,241       24,719       73,058       43,089  
    Provision for taxes on net investment income     225       547       450       701  
    Credit Facility amendment costs     442       —       442       —  
    Total expenses     36,908       25,266       73,950       43,790  
    Net investment income     25,030       19,088       54,997       38,537  
    Realized and unrealized gain (loss) on investments and debt:                        
    Net realized gain (loss) on:                        
    Non-controlled, non-affiliated investments     (795 )     4,010       386       921  
    Non-controlled and controlled, affiliated investments     (2,682 )     —       22,811       —  
    Provision for taxes on realized gain (loss) on investments     (21 )     —       (94 )     —  
    Net realized gain (loss) on investments     (3,498 )     4,010       23,103       921  
    Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on:                        
    Non-controlled, non-affiliated investments     (9,630 )     3,278       (6,688 )     8,506  
    Controlled and non-controlled, affiliated investments     (11,146 )     4,466       (43,050 )     5,408  
    Provision for taxes on unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments     468       230       1,100       230  
    Debt appreciation (depreciation)     1       39       91       (23 )
    Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments and debt     (20,307 )     8,013       (48,547 )     14,121  
    Net realized and unrealized gain (loss) from investments and debt     (23,805 )     12,023       (25,444 )     15,042  
    Net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations   $ 1,225     $ 31,111     $ 29,553     $ 53,579  
    Net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations per common share   $ 0.01     $ 0.51     $ 0.34     $ 0.89  
    Net investment income per common share   $ 0.28     $ 0.31     $ 0.64     $ 0.64  

    ABOUT PENNANTPARK FLOATING RATE CAPITAL LTD.

    PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. is a business development company which primarily invests in U.S. middle-market companies in the form of floating rate senior secured loans, including first lien secured debt, second lien secured debt and subordinated debt. From time to time, the Company may also invest in equity investments. PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. is managed by PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC.

    ABOUT PENNANTPARK INVESTMENT ADVISERS, LLC

    PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC is a leading middle-market credit platform, managing approximately $10 billion of investable capital, including potential leverage. Since its inception in 2007, PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC has provided investors access to middle-market credit by offering private equity firms and their portfolio companies as well as other middle-market borrowers a comprehensive range of creative and flexible financing solutions. PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC is headquartered in Miami and has offices in New York, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and Amsterdam.

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS AND OTHER

    This press release may contain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. You should understand that under Section 27A(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or the Exchange Act, the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 do not apply to forward-looking statements made in periodic reports we file under the Exchange Act. All statements other than statements of historical facts included in this press release are forward-looking statements and are not guarantees of future performance or results, and involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements as a result of a number of factors, including those described from time to time in filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd. undertakes no duty to update any forward-looking statement made herein. You should not place undue influence on such forward-looking statements as such statements speak only as of the date on which they are made.

    We may use words such as “anticipates,” “believes,” “expects,” “intends,” “seeks,” “plans,” “estimates” and similar expressions to identify forward-looking statements. Such statements are based on currently available operating, financial and competitive information and are subject to various risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from our historical experience and our present expectations.

    The information contained herein is based on current tax laws, which may change in the future. The Company cannot be held responsible for any direct or incidental loss resulting from applying any of the information provided in this publication or from any other source mentioned. The information provided in this material does not constitute any specific legal, tax or accounting advice. Please consult with qualified professionals for this type of advice.

    CONTACT: Richard T. Allorto, Jr.
      PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd.
      (212) 905-1000
      www.pennantpark.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Middlefield Banc Corp. Announces 2025 Second-Quarter Cash Dividend Payment

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDDLEFIELD, Ohio, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Middlefield Banc Corp. (NASDAQ: MBCN) today announced that its Board of Directors declared a quarterly cash dividend of $0.21 per common share. The 2025 second-quarter dividend is payable on June 13, 2025, to shareholders of record on May 30, 2025.

    About Middlefield Banc Corp.
    Middlefield Banc Corp., headquartered in Middlefield, Ohio, is the Bank holding Company of The Middlefield Banking Company, with total assets of $1.89 billion at March 31, 2025. The Bank operates 21 full-service banking centers and an LPL Financial® brokerage office serving Ada, Beachwood, Bellefontaine, Chardon, Cortland, Dublin, Garrettsville, Kenton, Mantua, Marysville, Middlefield, Newbury, Orwell, Plain City, Powell, Solon, Sunbury, Twinsburg, and Westerville. The Bank also operates a Loan Production Office in Mentor, Ohio.

    Additional information is available at www.middlefieldbank.bank

    This press release of Middlefield Banc Corp. and the reports Middlefield Banc Corp. files with the Securities and Exchange Commission often contain “forward-looking statements” relating to present or future trends or factors affecting the banking industry and, specifically, the financial operations, markets and products of Middlefield Banc Corp. These forward-looking statements involve certain risks and uncertainties. There are a number of important factors that could cause Middlefield Banc Corp.’s future results to differ materially from historical performance or projected performance. These factors include, but are not limited to: (1) a significant increase in competitive pressures among financial institutions; (2) changes in the interest rate environment that may reduce interest margins; (3) changes in prepayment speeds, charge-offs and loan loss provisions; (4) less favorable than expected general economic conditions; (5) legislative or regulatory changes that may adversely affect businesses in which Middlefield Banc Corp. is engaged; (6) technological issues which may adversely affect Middlefield Banc Corp.’s financial operations or customers; (7) changes in the securities markets; or (8) risk factors mentioned in the reports and registration statements Middlefield Banc Corp. files with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Middlefield Banc Corp. undertakes no obligation to release revisions to these forward-looking statements or to reflect events or circumstances after the date of this press release.

    Company Contact: Investor and Media Contact:
    Ron Zimmerly
    President and Chief Executive Officer Middlefield Banc Corp.
    (419) 673-1217
    RZimmerly@middlefieldbank.com
    Andrew M. Berger
    Managing Director
    SM Berger & Company, Inc.
    (216) 464-6400
    andrew@smberger.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: PennantPark Investment Corporation Announces Financial Results for the Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIAMI, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PennantPark Investment Corporation (NYSE: PNNT) announced today its financial results for the second quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    HIGHLIGHTS       
    Quarter ended March 31, 2025 (unaudited)
    ($ in millions, except per share amounts)                           

    Assets and Liabilities:    
    Investment portfolio (1) $ 1,213.6  
    Net assets $ 488.1  
    GAAP net asset value per share $ 7.48  
    Quarterly change in GAAP net asset value per share   (1.2 )%
    Adjusted net asset value per share (2) $ 7.48  
    Quarterly change in adjusted net asset value per share (2)   (1.2 )%
         
    Credit Facility $ 311.4  
    2026 Notes $ 149.0  
    2026-2 Notes $ 163.5  
    Regulatory debt to equity 1.29x  
    Weighted average yield on debt investments   12.0 %
         
    Operating Results:    
    Net investment income $ 11.4  
    Net investment income per share $ 0.18  
    Core net investment income per share (3) $ 0.18  
    Distributions declared per share $ 0.24  
         
    Portfolio Activity:    
    Purchases of investments * $ 176.8  
    Sales and repayments of investments * $ 263.1  
         
    PSLF Portfolio data:    
    PSLF investment portfolio $ 1,392.9  
    Purchases of investments $ 169.9  
    Sales and repayments of investments $ 48.3  
           

    * excludes U.S. Government Securities

    1. Includes investments in PennantPark Senior Loan Fund, LLC (“PSLF”), an unconsolidated joint venture, totaling $217.7 million, at fair value.
    2. This is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company believes that this number provides useful information to investors and management because it reflects the Company’s financial performance excluding the impact of unrealized gain on the Company’s multi-currency, senior secured revolving credit facility with Truist Bank, as amended, the “Credit Facility.” The presentation of this additional information is not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for financial results prepared in accordance with GAAP.
    3. Core net investment income (“Core NII”) is a non-GAAP financial measure. The Company believes that Core NII provides useful information to investors and management because it reflects the Company’s financial performance excluding one-time or non-recurring investment income and expenses. The presentation of this additional information is not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for financial results prepared in accordance with GAAP. For the quarter ended March 31, 2025, Core NII excluded: i) $0.3 million of credit facility amendment cost, and ii) $0.1 million of incentive fee expense offset.

    CONFERENCE CALL AT 12:00 P.M. EST ON MAY 13, 2025

    PennantPark Investment Corporation (“we,” “our,” “us” or the “Company”) will also host a conference call at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 to discuss its financial results. All interested parties are welcome to participate. You can access the conference call by dialing toll-free (888) 394-8218 approximately 5-10 minutes prior to the call. International callers should dial (646) 828-8193. All callers should reference conference ID #1509093 or PennantPark Investment Corporation. An archived replay will also be available on a webcast link located on the Quarterly Earnings page in the Investor section of PennantPark’s website.

    PORTFOLIO AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITY 

    “We are pleased that our secured loan portfolio, with among the lowest portfolio company leverage and most meaningful covenants in the industry, is positioned defensively and continues to perform well,” said Art Penn, Chairman and CEO. “Additionally, our dividend stream is supported by substantial spillover income as we look to rotate equity investments over time.”

    As of March 31, 2025, our portfolio totaled $1,213.6 million and consisted of $503.0 million or 41% of first lien secured debt, $124.6 million or 10% of U.S. Government Securities, $17.9 million or 2% of second lien secured debt, $216.8 million or 18% of subordinated debt (including $140.3 million or 12% in PSLF) and $351.3 million or 29% of preferred and common equity (including $77.4 million or 6% in PSLF). Our interest bearing debt portfolio consisted of 91% variable-rate investments and 9% fixed-rate investments. As of March 31, 2025, we had three portfolio companies on non-accrual, representing 1.6% and 0.4% percent of our overall portfolio on a cost and fair value basis, respectively. Overall, the portfolio had net unrealized appreciation of $40.7 million as of March 31, 2025. Our overall portfolio consisted of 158 companies with an average investment size of $6.9 million (excluding U.S. Government Securities), had a weighted average yield on interest bearing debt investments of 12.0%.

    As of September 30, 2024, our portfolio totaled $1,328.1 million and consisted of $667.9 million or 50% of first lien secured debt, $99.6 million or 8% of U.S. Government Securities, $67.2 million or 5% of second lien secured debt, $181.7 million or 14% of subordinated debt (including $115.9 million or 9% in PSLF) and $311.7 million or 23% of preferred and common equity (including $67.9 million or 5% in PSLF). Our interest bearing debt portfolio consisted of 94% variable-rate investments and 6% fixed-rate investments. As of September 30, 2024, we had two portfolio companies on non-accrual, representing 4.1% and 2.3% of our overall portfolio on a cost and fair value basis, respectively. Overall, the portfolio had net unrealized appreciation of $11.2 million as of September 30, 2024. Our overall portfolio consisted of 152 companies with an average investment size of $8.1 million (excluding U.S. Government Securities), had a weighted average yield on interest bearing debt investments of 12.3%.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2025, we invested $176.8 million in three new and 52 existing portfolio companies with a weighted average yield on debt investments of 10.7% (excluding U.S. Government Securities). For the three months ended March 31, 2025, sales and repayments of investments totaled $263.1 million (including $154.4 million was sold to PSLF) which excludes U.S. Government Securities. For the six months ended March 31, 2025, we invested $472.5 million in 15 new and 96 existing portfolio companies with a weighted average yield on debt investments of 10.6% (excluding U.S. Government Securities). For the six months ended March 31, 2025, sales and repayments of investments totaled $616.8 million (including $441.0 million was sold to PSLF) which excludes U.S. Government Securities.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2024, we invested $188.5 million in six new and 43 existing portfolio companies with a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.7% (excluding U.S. Government Securities). For the three months ended March 31, 2024, sales and repayments of investments totaled $176.2 million (including $103.1 million was sold to PSLF) which excludes U.S. Government Securities. For the six months ended March 31, 2024, we invested $419.6 million in 18 new and 60 existing portfolio companies with a weighted average yield on debt investments of 11.8% (excluding U.S. Government Securities). For the six months ended March 31, 2024, sales and repayments of investments totaled $247.2 million (including $154.0 million was sold to PSLF) which excludes U.S. Government Securities.
      
    PennantPark Senior Loan Fund, LLC

    As of March 31, 2025, PSLF’s portfolio totaled $1,392.9 million, consisted of 119 companies with an average investment size of $11.7 million and had a weighted average yield interest bearing debt investments of 10.4%.

    As of September 30, 2024, PSLF’s portfolio totaled $1,031.2 million, consisted of 102 companies with an average investment size of $10.1 million and had a weighted average yield interest bearing debt investments of 11.3%.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2025, PSLF invested $169.9 million (including $154.4 million were purchased from the Company) in eight new and 14 existing portfolio companies at weighted average yield interest bearing debt investments of 10.1%. PSLF’s sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $48.3 million. For the six months ended March 31, 2025, PSLF invested $523.7 million (including $441.0 million were purchased from the Company) in 23 new and 57 existing portfolio companies at weighted average yield interest bearing debt investments of 10.4%. PSLF’s sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $157.4 million.

    For the three months ended March 31, 2024, PSLF invested $113.2 million (including $103.1 million were purchased from the Company) in 11 new and five existing portfolio companies at weighted average yield on interest bearing debt investments of 11.8%. PSLF’s sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $49.7 million. For the six months ended March 31, 2024, PSLF invested $194.2 million (including $154.0 million were purchased from the Company) in 16 new and 11 existing portfolio companies at weighted average yield on interest bearing debt investments of 12.2%. PSLF’s sales and repayments of investments for the same period totaled $78.9 million.

    RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

    Set forth below are the results of operations for the three and six months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024.

    Investment Income

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, investment income was $30.7 million and $64.9 million, respectively, which was attributable to $22.1 million and $47.3 million from first lien secured debt, $1.0 million and $3.0 million from second lien secured debt, $1.1 million and $2.2 million from subordinated debt and $6.5 million and $12.4 million from other investments, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, investment income was $36.0 million and $70.3 million, respectively, which was attributable to $27.8 million and $52.9 million from first lien secured debt, $2.8 million and $5.4 million from second lien secured debt, $0.1 million and $1.4 million from subordinated debt and $5.3 million and $10.6 million from preferred and common equity, respectively. The decrease in investment income for three and six months ended March 31, 2025, was primarily due to a decrease in our total portfolio size and a decrease in our weighted average yield on debt investments.

    Expenses

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, expenses totaled $19.2 million and $40.4 million, respectively, and were comprised of $10.6 million and $22.4 million of debt related interest and expenses, $4.0 million and $8.3 million of base management fees, $2.4 million and $5.2 million of incentive fees, $1.6 million and $3.3 million of general and administrative expenses and $0.6 million and $1.3 million of provision for excise taxes, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, expenses totaled $21.7 million and $40.4 million, respectively, and were comprised of; $11.9 million and $21.4 million of debt-related interest and expenses, $4.1 million and $8.1 million of base management fees, $3.0 million and $6.3 million of incentive fees, $1.9 million and $3.3 million of general and administrative expenses and $0.8 million and $1.2 million of provision for excise taxes, respectively. The decrease in expenses for the three months ended March 31, 2025, was primarily due to decreases in interest and expenses on debt and incentive fees. Total expenses were flat for the six months ended March 31, 2025.

    Net Investment Income

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, net investment income totaled $11.4 million and $24.4 million, or $0.18 per share and $0.37 per share, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, net investment income totaled $14.3 million and $29.9 million, or $0.22 per share and $0.46 per share, respectively. The decrease in net investment income was primarily due to a decrease in investment income and partially offset by a decrease in expenses.

    Net Realized Gains or Losses

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, net realized gains (losses) totaled $(27.7) million and $(30.3) million, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, net realized gains (losses) totaled $(31.0) million and $(29.2) million, respectively. The change in realized gains (losses) was primarily due to changes in the market conditions of our investments and the values at which they were realized.

    Unrealized Appreciation or Depreciation on Investments and Debt

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, we reported net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments of $27.1 million and $29.5 million, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, we reported net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments of $33.2 million and $28.3 million, respectively. As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, our net unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments totaled $40.7 million and $11.2 million, respectively. The net change in unrealized depreciation on our investments was primarily due to changes in the capital market conditions of our investments and the values at which they were realized.

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, the Truist Credit Facility had a net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) of $(1.4) million and $1.9 million, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, the Truist Credit Facility had a net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) of $0.5 million and $(1.6) million, respectively. As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, the net unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on the Truist Credit Facility totaled $3.0 million and $1.1 million, respectively. The net change in unrealized depreciation compared to the same periods in the prior period was primarily due to changes in the capital markets.

    Net Change in Net Assets Resulting from Operations

    For the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations totaled $9.5 million and $25.5 million or $0.14 per share and $0.39 per share, respectively. For the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations totaled $16.1 million and $26.7 million or $0.25 per share and $0.41 per share, respectively. The change in net assets from operations for the six months ended March 31, 2025 was primarily due to a change in the net realized and unrealized depreciation in the portfolio primarily driven by changes in market conditions and decrease in net investment income.

    LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES

    Our liquidity and capital resources are derived primarily from cash flows from operations, including income earned, proceeds from investment sales and repayments and proceeds of securities offerings and debt financings. Our primary use of funds from operations includes investments in portfolio companies and payments of interest expense, fees and other operating expenses we incur. We have used, and expect to continue to use, our debt capital, proceeds from the rotation of our portfolio and proceeds from public and private offerings of securities to finance our investment objectives and operations.

    As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, we had $314.5 million and $461.5 million, respectively, in outstanding borrowings under the Truist Credit Facility. The Truist Credit Facility had a weighted average interest rate of 6.7% and 7.2%, respectively, exclusive of the fee on undrawn commitment.  As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, we had $185.5 million and $13.5 million of unused borrowing capacity under the Truist Credit Facility, respectively, subject to leverage and borrowing base restrictions.

    As of March 31, 2025 and September 30, 2024, we had cash and cash equivalents of $32.6 million and $49.9 million, respectively, available for investing and general corporate purposes. We believe our liquidity and capital resources are sufficient to allows us to effectively operate our business.

    For the six months ended March 31, 2025, our operating activities provided cash of $161.1 million and our financing activities used cash of $178.3 million. Our operating activities provided cash primarily due to our investment activities and our financing activities used cash primarily for repayments of our credit facility and distributions paid to stockholders.

    For the six months ended March 31, 2024, our operating activities used cash of $150.9 million and our financing activities provided cash of $147.5 million. Our operating activities used cash primarily due to our investment activities and our financing activities provided cash primarily from borrowings under the Truist Credit Facility.

    DISTRIBUTIONS

    During the three and six months ended March 31, 2025, we declared distributions of $0.24 and $0.48 per share, for total distributions of $15.7 million and $31.3 million, respectively. During the three and six months ended March 31, 2024, we declared distributions of $0.21 and $0.42 per share, for total distributions of $13.7 million and $27.4 million, respectively. We monitor available net investment income to determine if a return of capital for tax purposes may occur for the fiscal year. To the extent our taxable earnings fall below the total amount of our distributions for any given fiscal year, stockholders will be notified of the portion of those distributions deemed to be a tax return of capital. Tax characteristics of all distributions will be reported to stockholders subject to information reporting on Form 1099-DIV after the end of each calendar year and in our periodic reports filed with the SEC.

    AVAILABLE INFORMATION

    The Company makes available on its website its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q filed with the SEC and stockholders may find the report on our website at www.pennantpark.com.

    PENNANTPARK INVESTMENT CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
    (In thousands, except share data)
     
      March 31, 2025     September 30, 2024  
      (unaudited)        
    Assets          
    Investments at fair value          
    Non-controlled, non-affiliated investments (amortized cost—$716,505 and $916,168, respectively) $ 723,808     $ 910,323  
    Non-controlled, affiliated investments (amortized cost—$58,068 and $56,734, respectively)   11,050       33,423  
    Controlled, affiliated investments (amortized cost—$398,359 and $343,970, respectively)   478,752       384,304  
    Total investments (amortized cost—$1,172,932 and $1,316,872, respectively)   1,213,610       1,328,050  
    Cash and cash equivalents (cost—$32,568 and $49,833, respectively)   32,587       49,861  
    Interest receivable   5,322       5,261  
    Distribution receivable   6,040       5,417  
    Due from affiliates   35       228  
    Prepaid expenses and other assets   185       269  
    Total assets   1,257,779       1,389,086  
    Liabilities          
    Truist Credit Facility payable, at fair value (cost—$314,456 and $461,456, respectively)   311,412       460,361  
    2026 Notes payable, net (par— $150,000)   149,022       148,571  
    2026 Notes-2 payable, net (par— $165,000)   163,506       163,080  
    Payable for investment purchased   124,609       100,096  
    Interest payable on debt   6,349       6,406  
    Distributions payable   5,224       5,224  
    Base management fee payable   4,017       4,297  
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   3,108       4,053  
    Incentive fee payable   2,425       3,057  
    Due to affiliate   1       33  
    Total liabilities   769,673       895,178  
    Commitments and contingencies          
    Net assets          
    Common stock, 65,296,094 and 65,296,094 shares issued and outstanding, respectively              
    Par value $0.001 per share and 200,000,000 shares authorized   65       65  
    Paid-in capital in excess of par value   743,968       743,968  
    Accumulated deficit   (255,927 )     (250,125 )
    Total net assets $ 488,106     $ 493,908  
    Total liabilities and net assets $ 1,257,779     $ 1,389,086  
    Net asset value per share $ 7.48     $ 7.56  
                   
    PENNANTPARK INVESTMENT CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In thousands, except share data)
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended March 31,     Six Months Ended March 31,  
      2025     2024     2025     2024  
    Investment income:                      
    From non-controlled, non-affiliated investments:                      
    Interest $ 14,987     $ 22,904     $ 33,753     $ 43,972  
    Payment-in-kind   1,564       187       2,985       189  
    Dividend income   499       623       1,006       1,315  
    Other income   120       778       702       2,203  
    From non-controlled, affiliated investments:                      
    Payment-in-kind   —       —       —       347  
    From controlled, affiliated investments:                      
    Interest   7,887       5,941       15,142       11,422  
    Payment-in-kind   —       857       823       1,489  
    Dividend income   5,579       4,689       10,430       9,378  
    Other income   27       —       27       —  
    Total investment income   30,663       35,979       64,868       70,315  
    Expenses:                      
    Interest and expenses on debt   10,318       11,868       22,058       21,424  
    Base management fee   4,017       4,137       8,285       8,141  
    Incentive fee   2,425       3,018       5,180       6,339  
    General and administrative expenses   1,150       1,379       2,400       2,593  
    Administrative services expenses   450       550       950       739  
    Expenses before amendment costs, debt issuance costs and provision for taxes   18,360       20,952       38,873       39,236  
    Provision for taxes on net investment income   550       775       1,250       1,168  
    Credit facility amendment and debt issuance costs   324       —       324       —  
    Net expenses   19,234       21,727       40,447       40,404  
    Net investment income   11,429       14,252       24,421       29,911  
    Realized and unrealized gain (loss) on investments and debt:                      
    Net realized gain (loss) on investments and debt:                      
    Non-controlled, non-affiliated investments   (27,714 )     (1,434 )     (30,274 )     1,146  
    Non-controlled and controlled, affiliated investments   —       (29,419 )     —       (30,169 )
    Provision for taxes on realized gain on investments   (49 )     (177 )     (49 )     (177 )
    Net realized gain (loss) on investments and debt   (27,763 )     (31,030 )     (30,323 )     (29,200 )
    Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on:                      
    Non-controlled, non-affiliated investments   17,918       (1,528 )     13,141       (13,798 )
    Non-controlled and controlled, affiliated investments   9,214       34,751       16,352       42,075  
    Provision for taxes on unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments   37       (830 )     —       (680 )
    Debt appreciation (depreciation)   (1,379 )     470       1,949       (1,570 )
    Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments and debt   25,790       32,863       31,442       26,027  
    Net realized and unrealized gain (loss) from investments and debt   (1,973 )     1,833       1,119       (3,173 )
    Net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations $ 9,456     $ 16,085     $ 25,540     $ 26,738  
    Net increase (decrease) in net assets resulting from operations per common share $ 0.14     $ 0.25     $ 0.39     $ 0.41  
    Net investment income per common share $ 0.18     $ 0.22     $ 0.37     $ 0.46  
                                   

    ABOUT PENNANTPARK INVESTMENT CORPORATION

    PennantPark Investment Corporation, or the Company, is a business development company that invests primarily in U.S. middle-market companies in the form of first lien secured debt, second lien secured debt, subordinated debt and equity investments. PennantPark Investment Corporation is managed by PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC.

    ABOUT PENNANTPARK INVESTMENT ADVISERS, LLC

    PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC is a leading middle market credit platform, managing approximately $10 billion of investable capital, including available leverage. Since its inception in 2007, PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC has provided investors access to middle market credit by offering private equity firms and their portfolio companies as well as other middle-market borrowers a comprehensive range of creative and flexible financing solutions. PennantPark Investment Advisers, LLC is headquartered in Miami and has offices in New York, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and Amsterdam.

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

    This press release may contain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. You should understand that under Section 27A(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 do not apply to forward-looking statements made in periodic reports PennantPark Investment Corporation files under the Exchange Act. All statements other than statements of historical facts included in this press release are forward-looking statements and are not guarantees of future performance or results and involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements as a result of a number of factors, including those described from time to time in filings with the SEC. PennantPark Investment Corporation undertakes no duty to update any forward-looking statement made herein. You should not place undue influence on such forward-looking statements as such statements speak only as of the date on which they are made.

    We may use words such as “anticipates,” “believes,” “expects,” “intends,” “seeks,” “plans,” “estimates” and similar expressions to identify forward-looking statements. Such statements are based on currently available operating, financial and competitive information and are subject to various risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from our historical experience and our present expectations.

    The information contained herein is based on current tax laws, which may change in the future. The Company cannot be held responsible for any direct or incidental loss resulting from applying any of the information provided in this publication or from any other source mentioned. The information provided in this material does not constitute any specific legal, tax or accounting advice. Please consult with qualified professionals for this type of advice.

    Contact: Richard T. Allorto, Jr.
      PennantPark Investment Corporation
      (212) 905-1000
      www.pennantpark.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Global and Kenya-based Family Bank team up in €100 million financing deal for country’s women and young entrepreneurs

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • The financing targets expanding credit access to women owned/led businesses and youth entrepreneurs in Kenya
    • EIB Global will advance €50 million, which Family Bank will match
    • Part of EU’s Global Gateway strategy to promote trade, manufacturing, agriculture, climate action and services, which are key priorities in Kenya

    The European Investment Bank’s development arm (EIB Global) and Kenya-based Family Bank are mobilising €100 million (14.7 billion Kenyan shillings) in financing for businesses, with a focus on women-owned/led enterprises and youth entrepreneurs in the country. EIB Global is providing a €50 million credit line to Family Bank, which will match the sum in an agreement to expand loans for Kenyan small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and Mid-Caps.

    The financing accord, announced during the second edition of the European Union-Kenya business forum in Nairobi, seeks to bolster the working capital and investments of Kenyan SMEs and Mid-Caps active mainly in the trade and agriculture sectors. At least 50% of the financing will target businesses owned or run by women while a further minimum of 30% will be extended to youth entrepreneurs. 

    “SMEs represent over 80% of our customer base. As a result of our growth efforts, our market revenue from this segment continues to increase, further underscoring the sector’s strong growth potential,” said Family Bank Chief Executive Officer Nancy Njau. “This partnership not only supports our 2025–2029 strategy to scale SME lending and deepen market segmentation but also enables us to better address the specific needs of SMEs across various value chains for sustainable growth and long-term value.”

    In addition to the credit line, EIB Global will provide Family Bank with technical assistance to enhance its gender strategy and product offering. This includes a potential certification under a 2018 initiative called 2X Challenge launched by development and multilateral finance institutions to invest in women worldwide.

    “We recognise that beyond access to financing and investment opportunities, small businesses, especially those led by women, also need education, information and networking opportunities with like-minded enterprises,” said Njau. “This partnership enables us to offer that holistic support.”

    The agreement is part of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy to promote trade, manufacturing, agriculture, climate action and services, which are key priorities in Kenya. It also feeds into a European initiative called Investing in Young Businesses in Africa (IYBA) that operates across Africa with the goal of creating sustainable jobs and expanding business opportunities. The EIB currently chairs the IYBA.

     “The financing partnership we now have with Family Bank will inject much-needed capital into Kenya’s private sector to support businesses and create employment,” said EIB Vice-President Thomas Ostros. “Investing in women and youth entrepreneurs is not only the right thing to do but also the smart thing to do. It holds much promise to bring growth and prosperity to the Kenyan economy. This is a cause that is very important to us.”

    The agreement signed between EIB Global and Family Bank represents the fourth time that the banks are partnering

    “European Fund for Sustainable Development Fund Plus (#EFSD+) is a testament to our commitment to fostering sustainable economic growth by empowering small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in partner countries,” said European Commission Director for International Partnerships – Africa, Hans Stausboll. “Through this strategic partnership with the European Investment Bank, we’re unlocking vital financial resources for SMEs in Kenya, via Family Bank. This collaboration not only fuels female-led entrepreneurship and innovation but also spurs climate smart and sustainable value chains across the Kenyan landscape. More in general, it contributes to Global Gateway strategy in Kenya across various economic sub-sectors including manufacturing, services, trade and competitiveness.”

    Background Information

    About EIB Global

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives.  

    EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of Global Gateway. EIB Global aims to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 — around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to people, companies and institutions through offices across the world. High-quality, up-to-date photos of the organisation’s headquarters for media use are available here. 

    About Global Gateway

    The Global Gateway strategy is the EU’s positive offer to reduce the worldwide investment disparity and boost smart, clean and secure connections in digital, energy and transport sectors, and to strengthen health, education and research systems. In a Team Europe approach that brings together the European Union, EU Member States, and European development finance institutions, together we aim to mobilise up to €300 billion in public and private investments from 2021 to 2027, creating essential links rather than dependencies, and closing the global investment gap.

    The EU-Africa Global Gateway investment package consists of €150 billion in investments to help accelerate Africa’s digital and green transition as well as support sustainable jobs growth and stronger health systems. More information on the investment package as well as country specific flagships can be found here.

    About Family Bank:

    Family Bank is a financial institution that prides itself in growing a strong retail customer base, with a strong focus on SME banking, anchored on the positive transformation of people’s lives in Africa. Family Bank is the eighth-largest bank in Kenya, in terms of branch network with 95 branches across 32 counties. The Bank has over 1.2 million customers, 6,000 bank agents and 75,000 merchants across the country with total assets of KES.168.5 billion and a deposit base of KES 126.4 billion as of 31st December 2024.

    A pioneer in digital banking innovation, Family Bank was the first in Kenya to introduce paperless banking through smart card technology, mobile banking, and PesaPap. It also made history as the first bank in Africa to launch the mVisa service, reinforcing its commitment to seamless and accessible financial solutions.

    In 2024, Family Bank was recognized for its commitment to excellence, winning the Excellence in Customer Responsiveness award at the Innovation & Excellence Awards East Africa. The Bank was also voted the third-best overall bank and the best tier-two bank for the fifth consecutive year in the Kenya Bankers Association Customer Satisfaction and Digital Banking Experience Survey. Additionally, Family Bank emerged as the winner of the 2024 Banking on Women Awards and received the prestigious Service Excellence Award in the CX Social Impact & Sustainability category from the Institute of Customer Experience.

    Previously, in 2021, Family Bank’s highly successful Corporate Bond Campaign, which achieved a 147.3% subscription rate, raising KES 4.42 billion through public placement, earned the Financial Communication Campaign of the Year and Overall Public Relations Campaign of the Year at the Public Relations Society of Kenya Annual Awards for Excellence.

    Other notable accolades include Best-Performing Young Bankers in Africa at the 2023 Battle of the Banks Africa Competition and Best in Internal Customer Experience at the 2023 Service Excellence Awards. In 2022, Family Bank was named Bank of the Year for high-impact agricultural lending to SMEs by Aceli Africa. The Bank also received the Best SME Bank in Kenya award at the 2017 Banker Africa East Africa Awards, a prestigious initiative recognizing excellence in African financial institutions. Additionally, Family Bank was honored with the Think Business Fastest Growing Bank Award for three consecutive years (2013-2015) and was the 1st Runner-Up for Best Bank in Microfinance at the Think Business Awards in 2013 and 2014.

    EIB Global and Kenya-based Family Bank team up in €100 million financing deal for country’s women and young entrepreneurs
    EIB Global and Kenya-based Family Bank team up in €100 million financing deal for country’s women and young entrepreneurs
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    EIB Global and Kenya-based Family Bank team up in €100 million financing deal for country’s women and young entrepreneurs
    EIB Global and Kenya-based Family Bank team up in €100 million financing deal for country’s women and young entrepreneurs
    ©EIB
    Download original
    EIB Global and Kenya-based Family Bank team up in €100 million financing deal for country’s women and young entrepreneurs
    EIB Global and Kenya-based Family Bank team up in €100 million financing deal for country’s women and young entrepreneurs
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Banking Union – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0105 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023(1),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

    –  having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

    –  having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

    –  having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

    –  having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)(2) and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)(3), and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)(4),

    –  having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive(5) and to the Capital Requirements Regulation(6),

    –  having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk(7),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action(8),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action(9),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency(10),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

    –  having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

    –  having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    –  having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

    –  having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

    –  having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

    –  having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

    –  having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

    –  having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

    –  having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’(11),

    –  having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

    –  having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

    –  having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

    –  having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

    A.  whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

    B.  whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

    C.  whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

    D.  whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

    E.  whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

    F.  whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

    G.  whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

    H.  whereas the EUR 356,1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988,9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

    I.  whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

    J.  whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

    K.  whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

    L.  whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

    M.  whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

    General considerations

    1.  Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

    2.  Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

    3.  Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

    4.   Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

    5.  Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

    6.  Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

    8.  Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

    9.  Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

    10.  Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations(14) could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

    11.  Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

    12.  Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

    13.  Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

    14.  Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

    15.  Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

    16.   Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

    17.  Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

    Supervision

    18.  Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

    19.  Acknowledges the growing phenomenon of bank branch closures, which contributes to the risk of ‘bank desertification’ in certain regions, with a particularly negative impact on vulnerable citizens without digital access; emphasises the critical role smaller banks play in ensuring access to essential banking services, especially in rural and remote areas, thereby supporting households, SMEs and local economies; notes that the high supervisory costs and regulatory burdens can pose significant challenges for smaller banks; underscores the need to apply the principle of proportionality in banking supervision, ensuring that the intensity of regulation is tailored to the size, risk profile and business model of institutions, while taking into account the essential territorial role of smaller banks and their specific characteristics;

    20.  Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

    21.  Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15,81 %;

    22.  Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2,30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159,39 %;

    23.  Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

    24.  Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

    25.  Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

    26.   Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

    27.  Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

    28.  Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies(15); notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

    29.  Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

    30.  Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

    31.  Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

    Resolution

    32.  Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

    33.  Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

    34.  Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

    35.  Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

    36.  Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

    37.  Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

    38.  Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

    39.  Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

    40.  Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

    41.  Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

    42.  Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

    43.  Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

    Deposit insurance

    44.  Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

    45.  Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

    46.  Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

    o
    o   o

    47.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/5706, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5706/oj.
    (2) Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive(EU) 2019/1937, and amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L, 2024/1640, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj).
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).
    (5) Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1623/oj).
    (7) OJ L 2024/2795, 31.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/2795/oj.
    (8) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0326.
    (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0327.
    (10) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0328.
    (11) Véron, N., ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15, June 2024.
    (12) OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 105.
    (13) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 118.
    (14) Draghi report, p. 61.
    (15) Von der Leyen, Ursula, Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, p. 11.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The European Water Resilience Strategy – P10_TA(2025)0091 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

    –  having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2001,

    –  having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)(1),

    –  having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy(2) (Water Framework Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration(3) (Groundwater Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks(5),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption(6) (Drinking Water Directive),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse(7) (Water Reuse Regulation),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(8),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment(9) (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste(10),

    –  having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869(12),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(13) (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)(14),

    –  having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides(15),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(16),

    –  having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

    –  having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

    –  having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

    –  having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)(22),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 4 February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

    –  having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation(23),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

    –  having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water(24),

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

    –  having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

    –  having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

    –  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

    A.  whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

    B.  whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0,5 % of water on earth(26); whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water(27);

    C.  whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems(28); whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling(29);

    D.  whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change(30), despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

    E.  whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country(31);

    F.  whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

    G.  whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

    H.  whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

    I.  whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023(32) in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

    J.  whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place(33);

    K.  whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(34);

    L.  whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

    M.  whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

    N.  whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)(35); whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor(36);

    O.  whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater(37);

    P.  whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

    Q.  whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

    R.  whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

    S.  whereas global population growth requires increased food production, and the EU must guarantee food sovereignty, as laid down in Article 39 TFEU;

    T.  whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified(38), is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

    U.  whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited(39) and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU(40); whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

    V.  whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

    W.  whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

    X.  whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs(41); whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

    Y.  whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’(42);

    Z.  whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’(43);

    AA.  whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment(44);

    AB.  whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction(45);

    AC.  whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU(46); whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation(47);

    AD.  whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

    AE.  whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

    AF.  whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems(48);

    AG.  whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

    AH.  whereas Directive 2010/75/EU(49) mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

    AI.  whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

    AJ.  whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems(50); whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

    AK.  whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels(51);

    AL.  whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

    AM.  whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

    AN.  whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance(52);

    AO.  whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

    AP.  whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

    AQ.  whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C(53); whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains(54);

    AR.  whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water(55); whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU(56) and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100(57);

    AS.  whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

    AT.  whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

    AU.  whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024(58) its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

    AV.  whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991(59);

    AW.  whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

    AX.  whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

    AY.  whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

    AZ.  whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law(60), abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

    BA.  whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

    BB.  whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7,5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

    BC.  whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

    BD.  whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

    BE.  whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021(61), a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

    BF.  whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

    BG.  whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

    BH.  whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

    BI.  whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

    BJ.  whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

    BK.  whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

    BL.  whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

    BM.  whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

    BN.  whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

    BO.  whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers(62); whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

    BP.  whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

    BQ.  whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

    BR.  whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

    BS.  whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

    BT.  whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

    BU.  whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

    General remarks

    1.  Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

    2.  Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

    3.  Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

    4.  Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

    5.  Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

    6.  Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

    7.  Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

    8.  Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

    9.  Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

    10.  Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

    11.  Stresses that no one, whether in public places or private establishments, should be denied access to water supplied from a distribution network intended for human consumption, where available;

    12.  Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

    13.  Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

    Water efficiency

    14.  Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

    15.  Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use; stresses that the strategic importance of food production must not be compromised; emphasises that science, research and technology are important for water efficiency and water use as well as for the circular economy in this regard; calls for the creation and promotion of new smart and high-performance irrigation systems, rainwater retention and water from reuse, as well as water-efficient irrigation systems;

    16.  Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

    17.  Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

    19.  Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

    20.  Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

    21.  Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

    22.  Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

    23.  Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

    24.  Recalls that the use of nutrients such as nitrate and phosphate is essential for food production, as this activity would not be possible without their use; recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle; calls for the proper and safe recovery of phosphorus from organic sources and for incentivising investments in its recovery and circular nutrient management in accordance with the Commission’s JRC publication(63);

    25.  Stresses that the current Nitrates Directive is due for revision, as outdated provisions promote the use of artificial fertilisers rather than organic manure; calls for an urgent review of the Nitrates Directive before the end of this year, and its revision to promote circular nutrient management;

    26.  Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

    27.  Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

    28.  Acknowledges the significant efforts made by farmers to enhance water quality and emphasises the need for an appropriate timeframe to allow the effects of these measures to be accurately assessed;

    29.  Points to the success of the agricultural European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

    30.  Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

    31.  Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

    32.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

    33.  Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

    34.  Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

    35.  Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

    36.  Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

    37.  Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

    38.  Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

    39.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

    40.  Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

    Water pollution

    41.  Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

    42.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

    43.  Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

    44.  Calls for the establishment of comprehensive EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

    45.  Insists that essential uses of PFAS in critical sectors, such as medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the twin transition to a climate neutral and digital economy, are not endangered in the context of upcoming legislative and non-legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) – starting with consumer goods – linked to harmful effects on human health and the environment, based on scientific evidence, allowing their use where there are no safe alternatives; underlines the need to scale up investments and accelerate the research and development of equivalent and safe alternatives;

    46.  Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

    47.  Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

    49.  Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

    50.  Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

    51.  Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food(64) and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

    52.  Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment; notes the existence of differing figures and assessments regarding the impact this would have on the pharmaceutical sector and, consequently, on the availability and affordability of medicines, and therefore calls on the Commission to conduct a new and comprehensive assessment of the impact on this sector;

    53.  Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

    54.  Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

    55.  Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution(65);

    56.  Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

    57.  Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

    Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

    58.  Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

    59.  Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

    60.  Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

    61.  Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

    62.  Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    63.  Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’(66)on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

    64.  Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

    65.  Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States(67); calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

    66.  Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

    67.  Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

    68.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

    69.  Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

    70.  Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

    71.  Insists that the agricultural sector be further supported in implementing new technologies to reduce the demand for water, while at the same time increasing access to water, including by supporting water retention and groundwater recharge; calls for research results, for example on seawater desalination, to be made accessible and to facilitate the deployment of innovative desalination solutions; calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

    72.  Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

    73.  Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

    74.  Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

    Funding and pricing

    75.  Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

    76.  Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

    77.  Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

    78.  Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

    79.  Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

    80.  Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

    81.  Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

    82.  Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

    83.  Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

    84.  Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

    85.  Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

    86.  Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

    87.  Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

    88.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

    89.  Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

    90.  Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

    91.  Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

    92.  Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

    93.  Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

    Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

    94.  Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

    95.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

    96.  Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    97.  Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

    98.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

    99.  Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

    100.  Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

    101.  Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

    102.  Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

    103.  Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

    104.  Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

    105.  Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

    106.  Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

    107.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

    108.  Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

    109.  Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    Cross-border and international cooperation

    110.  Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

    111.  Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

    112.  Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

    113.  Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

    114.  Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

    115.  Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

    116.  Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

    117.  Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

    o
    o   o

    118.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
    (2) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj.
    (3) OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/118/oj.
    (4) OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/105/oj.
    (5) OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2007/60/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2020/2184/oj.
    (7) OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/741/oj.
    (8) OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj.
    (9) OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
    (10) OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1785/oj.
    (11) OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/676/oj.
    (12) OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj.
    (13) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj.
    (14) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
    (15) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 71, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/128/oj.
    (16) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (17) OJ L, 2024/3190, 31.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3190/oj.
    (18) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 54.
    (19) OJ C, C/2024/7216, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7216/oj.
    (20) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.
    (21) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.
    (22) OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj.
    (23) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 126.
    (24) OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 99.
    (25) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0358.
    (26) World Meteorological Organization, 2021 State of Climate Services – Water, WMO-No 1278, WMO, Geneva, 2021.
    (27) European Environment Agency, Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and drought, EEA Report 2/2009.
    (28) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (29) WWF, High Cost of Cheap Water, WWF, Gland, 2021.
    (30) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (31) European Commission, Attitudes of Europeans towards the environment, Special Eurobarometer 550, May 2024.
    (32) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, et al., Implementation of water balances in the EU – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (33) Disclosure Insight Action (CDP) and Planet Tracker, High and Dry. How Water Issues Are Stranding Assets, 2022.
    (34) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (35) European Environment Agency, ‘Water abstraction by economic sector in the 27 EU Member States, 2000-2022’, European Environment Agency website, 5 December 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/water-abstraction-by-source-and/water-abstraction-by-economic?activeTab=8a280073-bf94-4717-b3e2-1374b57ca99d.
    (36) Eurostat, ‘Archive: Water use in industry’, Eurostat website, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Water_use_in_industry&oldid=196132#Further_Eurostat_information.
    (37) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (38) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Water accounting and auditing, A sourcebook, FAO Water Reports 43, FAO, Rome, 2016.
    (39) European Investment Bank, Wastewater as a resource, EIB, 2022.
    (40) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Water reuse: New EU rules to improve access to safe irrigation’, European Commission website, 26 June 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/water-reuse-new-eu-rules-improve-access-safe-irrigation-2023-06-26_en.
    (41) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Zero pollution: Improved quality and access to drinking water’, European Commission website, 12 January 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/improved-quality-and-access-drinking-water-all-europeans-2023-01-12_en.
    (42) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (43) Ibid.
    (44) Ibid.
    (45) Ibid.
    (46) Ibid.
    (47) Ibid.
    (48) European Environment Agency, ‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe’, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (49) Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/75/oj).
    (50) European Commission ‘Nitrates’, European Commission website, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/nitrates_en#implementation.
    (51) European Environment Agency, ‘Public exposure to widely used Bisphenol A exceeds acceptable health safety levels’, European Environment Agency website, 14 September 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/public-exposure-to-bisphenol-a.
    (52) European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (53) Cammalleri, C. et al., Global warming and drought impacts in the EU, JRC Technical Report , Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (54) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (55) Feyen, L. et al., Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe, JRC PESETA IV final report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (56) European Environment AgencyEuropean Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (57) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, GAR Special Report on Drought 2021, Geneva, UNDRR, 2021.
    (58) Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.
    (59) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (60) Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj).
    (61) European Patent Office, Innovation in water-related technologies, EPO, Munich 2024.
    (62) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (63) European Commission JRC Science for Policy Report, ‘Technical proposals for the safe use of processed manure above the threshold established for Nitrate Vulnerable Zones by the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)’, 2020.
    (64) Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/1935/oj).
    (65) European Environment Agency,‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (66) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNISDR, Geneva, 2019.
    (67) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment et al. Stock-taking analysis and outlook of drought policies, planning and management in EU Member States – Final Report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world – P10_TA(2025)0090 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 311, 312, 323 and 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(1) and to the joint declarations agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context and the related unilateral declarations,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(2),

    –  having regard to the amended Commission proposal of 23 June 2023 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2023)0331),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(3) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4) (the Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to its position of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on own resources: a new start for EU finances, a new start for Europe(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(8),

    –  having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights of 13 December 2017(10) and to the Commission Action Plan of 4 March 2021 on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (COM(2021)0102),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 15) in Montreal on 19 December 2022 (Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

    –  having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer together – strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’ (the Niinistö report),

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the report of 4 September 2024 of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture entitled ‘A shared prospect for farming and food in Europe’,

    –  having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market – speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (the Letta report),

    –  having regard to the report of 20 February 2024 of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’,

    –  having regard to the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal,

    –  having regard to the joint communication of 26 March 2025 entitled ‘European Preparedness Union Strategy’ (JOIN(2025)0130),

    –  having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 March 2025 entitled ‘A Roadmap for Women’s Rights’ (COM(2025)0097),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ (COM(2021)0778),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025, 6 March 2025 and 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the next European Commission 2024-2029,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027’(11),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0076/2025),

    A.  whereas, under Article 311 TFEU, the Union is required to provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies;

    B.  whereas the Union budget is primarily an investment tool that can achieve economies of scale unattainable at Member State level and support European public goods, in particular through cross-border projects; whereas all spending through the Union budget must provide European added value and deliver discernible net benefits compared to spending at national or sub-national level, leading to real and lasting results;

    C.  whereas spending through the Union budget, if effectively targeted, aligned with the Union’s political priorities and better coordinated with spending at national level, helps to avoid fragmentation in the single market, promote upwards convergence, decrease inequalities and boost the overall impact of public investment; whereas public investment is essential as a catalyst for private investment in sectors where the market alone cannot drive the required investment;

    D.  whereas the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument (NGEU) established in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic enabled significant additional investment capacity of EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices – beyond the Union budget, which amounts to 1,1 % of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) – prompting a swift recovery and return to growth and supporting the green and digital transitions; whereas NGEU will not be in place post-2027;

    E.  whereas in 2022 Member States spent an average of 1,4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) on State aid – significantly more than their contribution to the Union budget – with over half of the State aid unrelated to crises;

    F.  whereas the Union budget, bolstered by NGEU and loans through the SURE scheme, has been instrumental in alleviating the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in responding to the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Union budget remains ill-equipped, in terms of size, structure and rules, to fully play its role in adjusting to evolving spending needs, addressing shocks and responding to crises and giving practical effect to the principle of solidarity, and to enable the Union to fulfil its objectives as established under the Treaties;

    G.  whereas people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget, including the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to evolving needs and to provide them with the necessary support, especially in times of crisis;

    H.  whereas, since the adoption of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), the political, economic and social context has changed beyond recognition, compounding underlying structural challenges for the Union and leading to a substantial revision of the MFF in 2024;

    I.  whereas the context in which the Commission will prepare its proposals for the post-2027 MFF is every bit as challenging, with the established global and geopolitical order changing quickly and radically, the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis; whereas, as the Commission has made clear, the status quo is not an option and the Union budget will need to change accordingly;

    J.  whereas the US administration has decided to retreat from the country’s post-war global role in guaranteeing peace and security, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world; whereas the Union will therefore have to step up to fill part of the void the US appears set to leave, placing additional demands on the budget;

    K.  whereas the Union has committed to take all the steps needed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to protect nature and reverse biodiversity loss; whereas delivering on the policy framework put in place to achieve this objective will require substantial investment; whereas the Union budget will have to play a key role in providing and incentivising that investment;

    L.  whereas, in order to compensate for the budget’s shortcomings, there have been numerous workaround solutions that make the budget more opaque, leaving the public in the dark about the real volume of Union spending, undermining the longer-term predictability of investment the budget is designed to provide and undercutting not only the principle of budget unity, but also Parliament’s role as a legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account;

    M.  whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; whereas breaches of those values undermine the cohesion of the Union, erode the rights of Union citizens and weaken mutual trust among Member States;

    1.  Insists that, in a fast changing world where people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget and where the Union is confronted with a growing number of crises, the next MFF must be endowed with increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI;

    2.  Underscores that the next MFF must focus on financing European public goods with discernible added value compared to national spending; highlights the need for enhanced synergies and better coordination between Union and national spending; emphasises that spending will have to address major challenges, such as the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop, a competitiveness gap and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis;

    3.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach as envisaged by the Commission, with the Recovery and Resilience Facility model as a blueprint, cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must fully safeguard Parliament’s roles as legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and be designed and implemented through close collaboration with regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders;

    4.  Calls for the next MFF to continue support for economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to help bind the Union together, deepen the single market, promote convergence and reduce inequality, poverty and social exclusion;

    5.  Considers that the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund and complementing existing, highly successful programmes;

    6.  Stresses that, in particular in the light of the US’s retreat from its role as a global guarantor of peace and security, there is a clear need to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, with the next MFF supporting a comprehensive security approach through an increase in investment; stresses that defence spending cannot come at the expense of nor lead to a reduction in long-term investment in the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union;

    7.  Calls for genuine simplification for final beneficiaries by avoiding programmes with overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions; underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    8.  Insists on enhanced in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF and sufficient margins under each heading; stresses that, alongside predictability for investment, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; underlines that flexibility for humanitarian aid should be ring-fenced; considers that the post-2027 MFF should include two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters and one for general-purpose crisis response;

    9.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; insists that the Union budget be protected against misuse, fraud and breaches of the principle of the rule of law and calls for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027;

    10.  Underlines that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must not endanger the financing of EU policies and priorities; stresses, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the future MFF architecture;

    11.  Calls on the Council to adopt new own resources as a matter of urgency in order to enable sustainable repayment of NGEU borrowing; stresses that new genuine own resources, beyond the IIA, are essential for the Union’s higher spending needs; considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with the necessary resources, and considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises, such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    12.  Stands ready to work constructively with the Council and Commission to deliver a long-term budget that addresses the Union’s needs; highlights that the post-2027 MFF is being constructed in a far from ‘business as usual’ context and takes seriously its institutional role as enshrined in the Treaties; insists that it will only approve a long-term budget that is fit for purpose for the Union in a changing world and calls for swift adoption of the MFF to enable timely implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028;

    A long-term budget with a renewed spending focus

    13.  Considers that, in view of the structural challenges facing the Union, the post-2027 MFF should adjust its spending focus to ensure that the Union can meet its strategic policy aims as detailed below;

    Competitiveness, strategic autonomy, social, economic and territorial cohesion and resilience

    14.  Is convinced that boosting competitiveness, decarbonising the economy and enhancing the Union’s innovation capacity are central priorities for the post-2027 MFF and are vital to ensure long-term, sustainable and inclusive growth and a thriving, more resilient economy and society;

    15.  Considers that the Union must develop a competitiveness framework in line with its own values and political aims and that competitiveness must foster not only economic growth, but also social, economic and territorial cohesion and environmental sustainability as underlined in both the Draghi and Letta reports;

    16.  Underlines that, as spelt out in the Letta and Draghi reports, the European economy and social model are under intense strain, with the productivity, competitiveness and skills gap having knock-on effects on the quality of jobs and on living standards for Europeans already grappling with high housing, energy and food prices; is concerned that a lack of job opportunities and high costs of living increase the risk of a brain drain away from Europe;

    17.  Points out that Draghi puts the annual investment gap with respect to innovation and infrastructure at EUR 750-800 billion per year between 2025 and 2030; underlines that the Union budget must play a vital role but it cannot cover that shortfall alone, and that the bulk of the effort will have to come from the private sector – points to the need to exploit synergies between public and private investment, in particular by simplifying and harmonising the EU investment architecture;

    18.  Stresses that the Union budget must be carefully coordinated with national spending, so as to ensure complementarity, and must be designed such that it can de-risk, mobilise and leverage private investment effectively, enabling start-ups and SMEs to access funds more readily; calls, therefore, for programmes such as InvestEU, which ensures additionality and follows a market-based, demand-driven approach, to be significantly reinforced in the next MFF; considers that financial instruments and budgetary guarantees are an effective use of resources to achieve critical Union policy goals and calls for them to be further simplified;

    19.  Insists that more must be done to maximise the potential of the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group – together with other international and national financial institutions – in lending and de-risking in strategic policy areas, such as climate and, latterly, security and defence projects; calls for an increased risk appetite and ambition from the EIB Group to crowd in investment, based on a strong capital position, and for a reinforced investment partnership to ensure that every euro spent at Union level is used in the most effective manner;

    20.  Emphasises that funding for research and innovation, including support for basic research, should be significantly increased, should be focused on the Union’s strategic priorities, should continue to be determined by the principle of excellence and should remain merit-based; considers that there should be sufficient resources across the MFF and at national level to fund all high-quality projects throughout the innovation cycle and to achieve the 3 % GDP target for research and development spending by 2030;

    21.  Stresses that the next MFF, building on the current Connecting Europe Facility, should include much greater, directly managed funding for energy, transport and digital infrastructure, with priority given to cross-border connections and national links with European added value; considers that such infrastructure is an absolute precondition for a successful deepening of the single market and for increasing the Union’s resilience in a changing geopolitical order;

    22.  Points out that a secure and robust space sector is critical for the Union’s autonomy and sovereignty and therefore needs sustained investment;

    23.  Underlines that a more competitive, productive and socially inclusive economy helps to generate high-quality, well-paid jobs, thus enhancing people’s standard of living; emphasises that, through programmes such as the European Social Fund+ and Erasmus+, the Union budget can play an important role in supporting education and training systems, enhancing social inclusion, boosting workforce adaptability through reskilling and upskilling, and thus preparing people for employment in a modern economy;

    24.  Insists that the Union budget should continue to support important economic and job-creating sectors where the Union is already a world leader, such as tourism and the cultural and creative sectors; underscores the need for dedicated funding for tourism, including to implement the EU Strategy for Sustainable Tourism, in the Union budget post-2027; points to the importance of Creative Europe in contributing to Europe’s diversity and competitiveness and in supporting vibrant societies;

    25.  Stresses that, in order to compete with other major global players, the European economy must also become more competitive and resilient on the supply side by investing more in the Union’s open strategic autonomy through enhanced industrial policy and a focus on strategic sectors, resource-efficiency and critical technologies to reduce dependence on third countries;

    26.  Considers that, in light of the above, the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund; recalls that, under Article 182 TFEU, the Union is required to adopt a framework programme for research;

    27.  Notes that, in the Commission communication on the competitiveness compass, the Commission argues that a new competitiveness coordination tool should be established in order to better align industrial and research policies and investment between EU and national level; notes that the proposed new tool is envisaged as part of a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament must play a full decision-making role in both mechanisms;

    28.  Emphasises that food security is a vital component of strategic autonomy and that the next MFF must continue to support the competitiveness and resilience of the Union’s farming and fisheries sectors, including small-scale and young farmers and fishers, and help the sectors to better protect the climate and biodiversity, as well as the seas and oceans; highlights that a modern and simplified common agricultural policy is crucial for increasing productivity through technical progress, ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers, guaranteeing food security and the production of safe, high-quality and affordable food for Europeans, fostering generational renewal and ensuring the viability of rural areas;

    29.  Points out that the farming sector is particularly vulnerable to inflationary shocks which affect farmers’ purchasing power; calls for an increased and dedicated budget for the CAP in the next MFF, safeguarding it from possible cuts, in order to maintain its integrity and commonality, as well as the coherence and interconnection between its first and second pillar, and therefore opposes the idea of integrating the CAP into a single fund for each Member State; calls for additional dedicated funding sources to be explored where appropriate, including outside of the CAP, in order to cope with natural disasters and provide incentives to farmers and foresters to contribute to climate change mitigation, biodiversity recovery and nature protection, without measures causing a regression in EU agricultural production;

    30.  Stresses that the new global challenges facing EU farmers, including the present geopolitical situation, climate change and rising input prices, require sound financial allocation in the next CAP; emphasises that, in order to address these challenges, taking into account the lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis, and to avoid reductions to farmers’ support, the CAP urgently needs an increased budget in the next MFF that is indexed to inflation through annual re-evaluation; underlines, in that respect, that direct payments in the current form generate clear EU added value and should continue to strengthen income security, production and protection against price volatility, better targeting persons actively engaged in agricultural production and the provision of public goods, while respecting realistic and balanced EU environmental and social standards; calls for a fair and efficient distribution of CAP support within and among the Member States; calls for the continuation and reinforcement of measures that maintain production in vulnerable areas and guarantee the viability of rural communities and the adequacy of public infrastructure, specifically regarding digitalisation and particularly through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the renewed involvement of local and regional authorities in the management of such measures; stresses the need to increase and reform the agricultural reserve in order to respond effectively and rapidly to future crises that the European agricultural sector will have to deal with, and to establish new tools for managing natural, market and sanitary risks, such as an EU reinsurance scheme to better mitigate the effects of future crises and provide greater stability for farmers; emphasises that specific solutions must be found for the farmers in eastern Europe who are most affected by the cascade effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine, such as high input prices, inflation and market disturbances; urges the Commission to continue to set up the necessary financial and legal framework for the food supply chain in order to strengthen the position of farmers and better combat unfair trading practices; calls on the Commission to support EU farmers by promoting agri-food products inside and outside the Union through a dynamic and stronger EU promotion policy; regrets the funding cuts made to the programme on the promotion of agricultural products during the review of the current MFF; emphasises that the next MFF must include dedicated funds for agri-tourism, female entrepreneurship, vocational training and technological innovation in agriculture;

    31.  Recalls that social, economic and territorial cohesion is a cornerstone of European integration and is vital in binding the Union together and deepening the single market; reaffirms, in that respect, the importance of the convergence process; underlines that a modernised cohesion policy must follow a decentralised, place-based, multilevel governance approach and be built around the shared management and partnership principle, fully involving local and regional authorities and relevant stakeholders, ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed to reduce regional disparities;

    32.  Stresses that cohesion policy funding must tackle the key challenges the Union faces, such as demographic change and depopulation, and target the regions and people most in need; calls, furthermore, for enhanced access to EU funding for cities, regions and urban authorities; recalls that, under Article 349 TFEU, the Union is required to put in place specific measures for the outermost regions and stresses, therefore, the need for continued, targeted support for these regions in the next MFF, including via a reinforced programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI);

    33.  Recalls the importance of the social dimension of the European Union and of promoting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, its Action Plan and headline targets; emphasises that the Union budget should, therefore, play a pivotal role in reducing inequality, poverty and social exclusion, including by supporting children, families and vulnerable groups; recalls that around 20 million children in the Union are at risk of poverty and social exclusion; stresses that addressing child poverty across the Union requires appropriately funded, comprehensive and integrated measures, together with the efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee at national level; emphasises that Parliament has consistently requested a dedicated budget within the ESF+ to support the Child Guarantee as a central pillar of the EU anti-poverty strategy;

    34.  Highlights, in this regard, the EU-wide housing crisis affecting millions of families and young people; stresses the need for enhanced support for housing through the Union budget, in particular via cohesion policy, and through other funding sources, such as the EIB Group and national promotional banks; acknowledges that, while Union financing cannot solve the housing crisis alone, it can play a crucial role in financing urgent measures and complementing broader Union and national efforts to improve housing affordability and enhance energy efficiency of the housing stock;

    35.  Points out that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had substantial economic and social consequences, in particular in Member States bordering Russia and Belarus; insists that the next MFF provide support to these regions;

    The green and digital transitions

    36.  Highlights that the green and digital transitions are inextricably linked to competitiveness, the modernisation of the economy and the resilience of society and act as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy; insists therefore, that the post-2027 MFF must continue to support and to further accelerate the twin transitions;

    37.  Recalls that the Union budget is an essential contributor to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including through support for the 2030 and 2040 targets; underlines that the transition will require a decarbonisation of the economy, in particular through the deployment of clean technologies, improved energy and transport infrastructure and more energy-efficient housing; notes that the Commission estimates additional investment needs to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at 1,5 % of GDP per year compared to the decade 2011-2020 and that, while the Union budget alone cannot cover the gap, it must remain a vital contributor; calls, therefore, for increased directly managed support for environment and biodiversity protection and climate action building on the current LIFE programme;

    38.  Underlines that industry will be central in the transition to net zero and the establishment of the Energy Union, and that support will be needed in helping some industrial sectors and their workers to adapt; stresses the importance of a just transition that must leave no one behind, requiring, inter alia, investment in regions that are heavily fossil-fuel dependent and increased support for vulnerable households, in particular through the Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund;

    39.  Points to the profound technological shift under way, with technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum both creating opportunities, in terms of the Union’s economic potential and global leadership and improvements to citizens’ lives, and posing reliability, ethical and sovereignty challenges; stresses that the next MFF must support research into, and the development and safe application of digital technologies and help people to hone the knowledge and skills they need to work with and use them;

    Security, defence and preparedness

    40.  Recalls that peace and security are the foundation for the Union’s prosperity, social model and competitiveness, and a vital pillar of the Union’s geopolitical standing; stresses that the next MFF must support a comprehensive security approach by investing significantly more in safeguarding the Union against the myriad threats it faces;

    41.  Underlines that, as the Niinistö report makes clear, multiple threats are combining to heighten instability and increase the Union’s vulnerability, chief among them the fragmenting global order, the security threat posed by Russia and Belarus, growing tensions globally, hostile international actors, the globalisation of criminal networks, hybrid campaigns – which include cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation, disinformation and interference and the instrumentalisation of migration – increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events as a result of climate change, and health threats;

    42.  Points out that the Union has played a vital role in achieving lasting peace on its territory and must continue to do so by adjusting to the reality of war on its doorstep and the need to vastly boost defence infrastructure, capabilities and readiness, including through the Union budget, going far beyond the current allocation of less than 2 % of the MFF;

    43.  Notes that European defence capabilities suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade; underlines that the Union budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play, in conjunction with national budgets and with a focus on clear EU added value; considers that the Union budget and lending through the EIB Group can help incentivise investment in defence; stresses that defence spending must not come at the expense of social and environmental spending, nor must it lead to a reduction in funding for long-standing Union policies that have proved their worth over time;

    44.  Underlines the merits of the defence programmes and instruments put in place during the current MFF, which have enhanced joint research, production and procurement in the field of defence, providing a valuable foundation on which to build further Union policy and investment;

    45.  Emphasises that, given the geopolitical situation, there is a clear need to act and to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, in coordination with NATO and in full alignment with the neutrality commitments of individual Member States; concurs, in that regard, with the Commission’s analysis that the next MFF must provide a comprehensive and robust framework in support of EU defence;

    46.  Underscores the importance of a competitive and resilient European defence technological and industrial base; considers that enhanced joint EU-level investment in defence in the next MFF backed up by a clear and transparent governance structure can help to avoid duplication, generate economies of scale, and thus significant savings for Member States, reduce fragmentation and ensure the interoperability of equipment and systems; underscores the importance of technology in modern defence systems and therefore of investing in research, cyber-defence and cybersecurity and in dual-use products; points to the need to direct support towards the defence industry within the Union, thus strengthening strategic autonomy, creating quality high-skilled jobs, driving innovation and creating cross-border opportunities for EU businesses, including SMEs;

    47.  Points to the importance of increasing support in the budget for military mobility, which upgrades infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, enabling the large-scale movement of military equipment and personnel at short notice and thus contributing to the Union’s defence capabilities and collective security; highlights, in that regard, the importance of financing for the trans-European transport networks to enable their adaptation for dual-use purposes;

    48.  Emphasises that the Union needs to ramp up funding for preparedness across the board; is alarmed by the growing impact of natural disasters, which are often the result of climate change and are therefore likely to occur with greater frequency and intensity in the future; points out that, according to the 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment Report, cumulated economic losses from natural disasters could reach about 1,4 % of Union GDP;

    49.  Underlines, therefore, that, in addition to efforts to mitigate climate change through the green transition, significant investment is required to adapt to climate change, in particular to prevent and reduce the impact of natural disasters and severe weather events; considers that support for this purpose, such as through the current Union Civil Protection Mechanism, must be significantly increased in the next MFF and made available quickly to local and regional authorities, which are often on the frontline;

    50.  Emphasises that reconstruction and recovery measures after natural disasters must be based on the ‘build back better’ approach and prioritise nature-based solutions; stresses the importance of sustainable water management and security and hydric resilience as part of the Union’s overall preparedness strategy;

    51.  Recalls that the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked economic and social havoc globally and that a key lesson from the experience is that there is a need to prioritise investment in prevention of, preparedness for and response to health threats, in medical research and disease prevention, in access to critical medicines, in healthcare infrastructure, in physical and mental health and in the resilience and accessibility of public health systems in the Union; recalls that strategic autonomy in health is key to ensuring the Union’s preparedness in this area;

    52.  Considers that the next MFF must build on the work done in the current programming period by ensuring that the necessary investment is in place to build a genuine European Health Union that delivers for all citizens;

    53.  Underlines that, with technological developments, it has become easier for malicious and opportunistic foreign actors to spread disinformation, encourage online hate speech, interfere in elections and mount cyberattacks against the Union’s interests; insists that the next MFF must invest in enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and equip the Union to counter hybrid warfare in its various guises;

    54.  Stresses that a free, independent and pluralistic media is a fundamental component of Europe’s resilience, safeguarding not only the free flow of information but also a democratic mindset, critical thinking and informed decision-making; points to the importance of investment in independent and investigative journalism, fact-checking initiatives, digital and media literacy and critical thinking to safeguard against disinformation, foreign information manipulation and electoral interference as part of the European Democracy Shield initiative and therefore to guarantee democratic resilience; underscores the need for continued Union budget support for initiatives in these areas;

    55.  Underscores the importance of continued funding, in the next MFF, for effective protection of the EU’s external borders; underlines the need to counter transnational criminal networks and better protect victims of trafficking networks, and to strengthen resilience and response capabilities to address hybrid attacks and the instrumentalisation of migration, by third countries or hostile non-state actors; highlights, in particular, the need for support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

    56.  Underlines that the EU’s resilience and preparedness are inextricably linked to those of its regional and global partners; emphasises that strengthening partners’ capacity to prevent, withstand and effectively respond to extreme weather events, health crises, hybrid campaigns, cyberattacks or armed conflict also lowers the risk of spill-over effects for Europe;

    External action and enlargement

    57.  Insists that, in a context of heightened global instability, the Union must continue to engage constructively with third countries and support peace, and conflict prevention, stability, prosperity, security, human rights, the rule of law, equality, democracy and sustainable development globally, in line with its global responsibility values and international commitments;

    58.  Regrets the fact that external action in the current MFF has been underfunded, leading to significant recourse to special instruments and substantial reinforcements in the mid-term revision; notes, in particular, that humanitarian aid funding has been woefully inadequate, prompting routine use of the Emergency Aid Reserve;

    59.  Underlines that the US’s retreat from its post-war global role in guaranteeing peace, security and democracy, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world will leave an enormous gap and that the Union has a responsibility and overwhelming strategic interest in helping to fill that gap; calls on the Commission to address the consequences of the US’s retreat at the latest in its proposal for the post-2027 MFF;

    60.  Stresses that the next MFF must continue to tackle the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change, to providing relief in the event of natural disasters, preventing and addressing violent conflict and guaranteeing global security, ensuring global food security, improving healthcare and education systems, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social justice and boosting competitiveness and the security of global supply chains, in full compliance with the principle of policy coherence for development; emphasises, in particular, the need for support for the Union’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods;

    61.  Underlines that, in particular in light of the drastic cuts to the USAID budget, the budget must uphold the Union’s role as the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance in line with the Union’s global obligations and commitments; recalls, in that regard, that the Union and its Member States have collectively committed to allocating 0,7 % of their GNI to official development assistance and that poverty alleviation must remain its primary objective; insists that the budget must continue to support the Union in its efforts to defend the rules-based international order, democracy, multilateralism, human rights and fundamental values;

    62.  Insists that, given the unprecedented scale of humanitarian crises, mounting global challenges and uncertainty of US assistance under the current administration, humanitarian aid funding must be significantly enhanced and that its use must remain solely needs-based and respect the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding delivered through a stand-alone spending programme, distinct from other external action financing; underscores, furthermore, that effective humanitarian aid provision is contingent on predictability through a sufficient annual baseline allocation;

    63.  Emphasises that humanitarian aid, by its very nature, requires substantial flexibility and response capacity; considers, therefore, that, in addition to an adequate baseline figure, humanitarian aid will require significant ring-fenced flexibility in its design to enable an effective response to the growing crises;

    64.  Emphasises that, in a context in which global actors are increasingly using trade interdependence as a means of economic coercion, the Union must bolster its capacity to protect and advance its own strategic interests, develop more robust tools to counter coercion and ensure genuine reciprocity in its partnerships; stresses that such an approach requires the strategic allocation of external financing so as to support, for example, economic, security and energy partnerships that align with the Union’s values and strategic interests;

    65.  Considers that enlargement represents an opportunity to strengthen the Union as a geopolitical power and that the next MFF is pivotal for preparing the Union for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession; recalls that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the candidate countries are inextricably connected to those of the EU and require sustained strategic investment, linked to reforms, to support their convergence with Union standards; underlines the important role that citizens and civil society organisations play in the process of enlargement;

    66.  Points to the need for strategically targeted support for pre-accession and for growth and investment; is of the view that post-2027 pre-accession assistance should be provided in the form of both grants and loans; believes, in that context, that the future framework should allow for innovative financing mechanisms, as well as lending to candidate countries backed by the budgetary headroom (the difference between the own resources and the MFF ceilings);

    67.  Stresses that financial support must be conditional on the implementation of reforms aligned with the Union acquis and policies and adherence to Union values; emphasises, in this regard, the need for a strong governance model that ensures parliamentary accountability, oversight and control and a strong, effective anti-fraud architecture;

    68.  Reiterates its full support for Ukrainians in their fight for freedom and democracy and deplores the terrible suffering and impact resulting from Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression; welcomes the decision to grant Ukraine and the neighbouring Republic of Moldova candidate country status and insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support their accession processes;

    69.  Underlines that pre-accession support to Ukraine has to be distinct from and additional to financial assistance for macroeconomic stability, reconstruction and post-war recovery, where needs are far more substantial and require a concerted international effort, of which support through the Union budget should be an important part;

    70.  Is convinced that the existing mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next framework and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on different sectors;

    Fundamental rights, Union values and the rule of law

    71.  Emphasises the importance of the Union budget and programmes like Erasmus+ and Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values in promoting and protecting democracy and the Union’s values, fostering the Union’s common cultural heritage and European integration, enhancing citizen engagement, civic education and youth participation, safeguarding and promoting fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rule of law; calls, in this regard, for increased funding for Erasmus+ in the next MFF; points to the importance of the independence of the justice system, the sound functioning of national institutions, de-oligarchisation, robust support for and, in line with article 11(2) TEU, an active dialogue with civil society, which is vital for fostering an active civic space, ensuring accountability and transparency and informing policymakers about best practices from the ground;

    72.  Highlights, in that connection, that the recast of the Financial Regulation requires the Commission and the Member States, in the implementation of the budget, to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and to respect the values on which the Union is founded, which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU; expects the Commission to ensure that the proposals for the next MFF, including for the spending programmes, are aligned with the Financial Regulation recast;

    73.  Stresses that instability in neighbouring regions and beyond, poverty, underlying trends in economic development, demographic changes and climate change, continue to generate migration flows towards the Union, placing significant pressure on asylum and migration systems; underlines that the post-2027 MFF must support the full and swift implementation of the Union’s Asylum and Migration Pact and effective return and readmission policies, in line with fundamental rights and EU values, including the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility; underlines, moreover, that, in line with the Pact, the EU must pursue enhanced cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries on migration, with adequate parliamentary scrutiny, and that such cooperation must abide by EU and international law;

    74.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; highlights the importance of strong links between respect for the rule of law and access to EU funds under the current MFF; believes that the protection of the Union’s financial interests depends on respect for the rule of law at national level; welcomes, in particular, the positive impact of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in protecting the Union’s financial interests in cases of systemic and persistent breaches of the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply the regulation strictly, consistently and without undue delay wherever necessary; emphasises that decisions to suspend or reduce Union funding over breaches of the rule of law must be based on objective criteria and not be guided by other considerations, nor be the outcome of negotiations;

    75.  Points to the need for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027 and welcomes the Commission’s commitment to bolster links between the recommendations in the annual rule of law report and access to funds through the budget; calls on the Commission to outline, in the annual rule of law report from 2025 onwards, the extent to which identified weaknesses in rule of law regimes potentially pose a risk to the Union budget; welcomes, furthermore, the link between respect for Union values and the implementation of the budget and calls on the Commission to actively monitor Member States’ compliance with this principle in a unified manner and to take swift action in the event of non-compliance;

    76.  Calls for the consolidation of a robust rule of law toolbox, building on the current conditionality provisions under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the horizontal enabling conditions in the Common Provisions Regulation and the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation and insists that the toolbox should cover the entire Union budget; underlines the need for far greater transparency and consistency with regard to the application of tools to protect the rule of law and for Parliament’s role to be strengthened in the application and scrutiny of such measures; insists, furthermore, on the need for consistency across instruments when assessing breaches of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides that final recipients should not be deprived of the benefits of EU funds in the event of sanctions being applied to their government; believes that, to date, this provision has not been effective and stresses the importance of applying a smart conditionality approach so that beneficiaries are not penalised because of their government’s actions; calls on the Commission, in line with its stated intention in the political guidelines, to propose specific measures to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without weakening the application of the regulation and maintaining the Member State’s obligation to pay under Union law;

    A long-term budget that mainstreams the Union’s policy objectives

    78.  Stresses that a long-term budget that is fully aligned with the Union’s strategic aims requires that key objectives be mainstreamed across the budget through a set of horizontal principles, building on the lessons from the current MFF and RRF;

    79.  Recalls that the implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries and be in line with the principle of proportionality; calls for innovative solutions and the use of automated reporting tools, including artificial intelligence, to achieve more efficient data collection;

    80.  Underlines, therefore, that the next MFF must ensure that, across the board, spending programmes pursue climate and biodiversity objectives, promote and protect rights and equal opportunities for all, including gender equality, support competitiveness and bolster the Union’s preparedness against threats;

    81.  Points out that effective mainstreaming is best achieved through a toolbox of measures, primarily through policy, project and regulatory design, thorough impact assessments and solid tracking of spending and, in specific cases, spending targets based on relevant and available data; welcomes the significant improvements in performance reporting in the current MFF, which allow for much better scrutiny of the impact of EU spending and calls for this to be further developed in the next programing period;

    82.  Welcomes the development of a methodology to track gender-based spending and considers that the lessons learnt, in particular as regards the collection of gender-disaggregated data, the monitoring of implementation and impact and administrative burden, should be applied in the next MFF in order to improve the methodology; calls on the Commission to explore the feasibility of gender budgeting in the next MFF; stresses, in the same vein, the need for a significant improvement in climate and biodiversity mainstreaming methodologies to move towards the measurement of impact;

    83.  Regrets that the Commission has not systematically conducted thorough impact assessments, including gender impact assessments, for all legislation involving spending through the budget and insists that this change;

    84.  Is pleased that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be exceeded in the current MFF; regrets, however, that the Union is not on track to meet the 10 % target for 2026 for biodiversity-related expenditure; insists that the targets in the IIA have nevertheless been a major factor in driving climate and biodiversity spending; calls on the Commission to adapt the spending targets contributing positively to climate and biodiversity in line with the Union policy ambitions in this regard, taking into account the investment needs for these policy ambitions;

    85.  Stresses, furthermore, that the Union budget should be implemented in line with Article 33(2) of the Financial Regulation, therefore without doing significant harm(12) to the specified objectives, respecting applicable working and employment conditions and taking into account the principle of gender equality;

    86.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies and environmentally harmful subsidies in the next MFF; expects the Commission to come forward with its planned roadmap in this regard as part of its proposal for the next MFF;

    A long-term budget with an effective administration at the service of Europeans

    87.  Underlines the need for Union policies to be underpinned by a well-functioning administration; insists that, post-2027, sufficient financial and staff resources be allocated from the outset so that Union institutions, bodies, decentralised agencies and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office can ensure effective and efficient policy design, high-quality delivery and enforcement, provide technical assistance, continue to attract the best people from all Member States, thus ensuring geographical balance, and have leeway to adjust to changing circumstances;

    88.  Regrets that the Union’s ability to implement policy effectively and protect its financial interests within the current MFF has been undermined by stretched administrative resources and a dogmatic application of a policy of stable staffing, despite increasing demands and responsibilities; points, for example, to the failure to provide sufficient staff to properly implement and enforce the Digital Services(13) and Digital Markets Acts(14), thus undercutting the legislation’s effectiveness and to the repeated redeployments from programmes to decentralised agencies to cover staffing needs; insists that staffing levels be determined by an objective needs assessment when legislation is proposed and definitively adopted, and factored into planning for administrative expenditure from the outset;

    89.  Emphasises that the Commission has sought, to some degree, to circumvent its own stable staffing policy by increasing staff attached to programmes and facilities and thus not covered by the administrative spending ceiling; underscores, however, that such an approach merely masks the problem and may ultimately undermine the operational capacity of programmes; insists, therefore, that additional responsibilities require administrative expenditure and must not erode programme envelopes;

    90.  Stresses that up-front investment in secure and interoperable IT infrastructure and data mining capabilities can also generate longer-term cost savings and hugely enhance policy delivery and tracking of spending;

    91.  Acknowledges that, in the absence of any correction mechanism in the current MFF, high inflation has significantly driven up statutory costs, requiring extensive use of special instruments to cover the shortfall; regrets that the Council elected not to take up the Commission’s proposal to raise the ceiling for administrative expenditure in the MFF revision, thus further eroding special instruments;

    A long-term budget that is simpler and more transparent

    92.  Stresses that the next MFF must be designed so as to simplify the lives of all beneficiaries by cutting unnecessary red tape; underlines that simplification will require harmonising rules and reporting requirements wherever possible, including, as relevant, ensuring consistency between the applicable rules at European, national and regional levels; underlines, in that respect, the need for a genuine, user-friendly single entry point for EU funding and a simplified application procedure designed in consultation with relevant stakeholders; points out, furthermore, that the next MFF must be implemented as close to people as possible;

    93.  Calls for genuine simplification where there are overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions that should be uniform across programmes; considers that an assessment of which spending programmes should be included in the next MFF must be based on the above aspects, on the need to focus spending on clearly identified policy objectives with clear European added value and on the policy intervention logic of each programme; stresses that reducing the number of programmes is not an end in itself;

    94.  Underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    95.  Insists that simplification cannot come at the expense of the quality of programme design and implementation and that, therefore, a simpler budget must also be a more transparent budget, enabling better accountability, scrutiny, control of spending and reducing the risks of double funding, misuse and fraud; underlines that any reduction in programmes must be offset by a far more detailed breakdown of the budget by budget line, in contrast to some programme mergers in the current MFF, such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe), which is an example not to follow; calls, therefore, for a sufficiently detailed breakdown by budget line to enable the budgetary authority to exercise proper accountability and ensure that decision-making in the annual budgetary procedure and in the course of budget implementation is meaningful;

    96.  Recalls that transparency is essential to retain citizens’ trust, and that fraud and misuse of funds are extremely detrimental to that trust; underlines, therefore, the need for Parliament to be able to control spending and assess whether discharge can be granted; insists that proper accountability requires robust auditing for all budgetary expenditure based on the application of a single audit trail; calls on the Commission to put in place harmonised and effective anti-fraud mechanisms across funding instruments for the post-2027 MFF that ensure the protection of the Union’s budget;

    97.  Reiterates its long-standing position that all EU-level spending should be brought within the purview of the budgetary authority, thereby ensuring transparency, democratic control and protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls, therefore, for the full budgetisation of (partially) off-budget instruments such as the Social Climate Fund, the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund, or their successors;

    A long-term budget that is more flexible and more responsive to crises and shocks

    98.  Points out that, traditionally, the MFF has not been conceived with a crisis response or flexibility logic, but rather has been designed primarily to ensure medium-term investment predictability; underlines that, in a rapidly changing political, security, economic and social context, such an approach is no longer tenable; insists on sufficient in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF;

    99.  Underscores that the current MFF has been beset by a lack of flexibility and an inability to adjust to evolving spending priorities; considers that the next MFF needs to strike a better balance between investment predictability and flexibility to adjust spending focus; highlights that spending in certain areas requires greater stability than in others where flexibility is more valuable; stresses that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance the Union’s priorities as they damage investments and jeopardise the delivery of agreed policy objectives;

    100.  Believes that, while allocating a significant portion of funding to objectives up-front, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; notes that the NDICI – Global Europe’s emerging challenges and priorities cushion provides a model for such a flexibility reserve, but that the decision-making process for its mobilisation must not be replicated in the future MFF; points to the need for stronger, more effective scrutiny powers of the co-legislators over the setting of policy priorities and objectives and a detailed budgetary breakdown to ensure that the budgetary authority is equipped to make meaningful and informed decisions;

    101.  Underlines that the MFF must have sufficient margins under each heading to ensure that new instruments or spending objectives agreed over the programming period can be accommodated without eroding funding for other policy and long-term strategic objectives or eating into crisis response capacity;

    102.  Underlines that the possibility for budgetary transfers under the Financial Regulation already provides for flexibility to adjust to evolving spending needs in the course of budget implementation; stresses that, under the current rules, the Commission has significant freedom to transfer considerable amounts between policy areas without budgetary authority approval, which limits scrutiny and control; calls, therefore, for the rules to be changed so as to introduce a maximum amount, in addition to a maximum percentage per budget line, for transfers without approval; considers that for transfers from Union institutions other than the Commission that are subject to a possible duly justified objection by Parliament or the Council, a threshold below which they would be exempt from that procedure could be a useful measure of simplification;

    103.  Recalls that the current MFF has been placed under further strain due to high levels of inflation in a context where an annual 2 % deflator is applied to 2018 prices, reducing the budget’s real-terms value and squeezing its operational and administrative capacity; considers, therefore, that the future budget should be endowed with sufficient response capacity to enable the budget to adapt to inflationary shocks;

    104.  Calls for a root-and-branch reform of the existing special instruments to bolster crisis response capacity and ensure an effective and swift reaction through more rapid mobilisation; underlines that the current instruments are both inadequate in size and constrained by excessive rigidity, with several effectively ring-fenced according to crisis type; points out that enhanced crisis response capacity will ensure that cohesion policy funds are not called upon for that purpose and can therefore be used for their intended investment objectives;

    105.  Considers that the post-2027 MFF should include only two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters (the successor to the existing European Solidarity Reserve) and one for general-purpose crisis response and for responding to any unforeseen needs and emerging priorities, including where amounts in the special instrument for natural disasters are insufficient (the successor to the Flexibility Instrument); insists that both special instruments should be adequately funded from the outset and able to carry over unspent amounts indefinitely over the MFF period; believes that all other special instruments can either be wound up or subsumed into the two special instruments or into existing programmes;

    106.  Calls for the future Flexibility Instrument to be heavily front-loaded and subsequently to be fed through a number of additional sources of financing: unspent margins from previous years (as with the current Single Margin Instrument), the annual surplus from the previous year, a fines-based mechanism modelled on the existing Article 5 of the MFF Regulation, reflows from financial instruments and decommitted appropriations; underlines that the next MFF should be designed such that the future special instruments are not required to cover debt repayment;

    107.  Underlines that re-use of the surplus, of reflows from financial instruments and surplus provisioning and of decommitments would require amendments to the Financial Regulation;

    108.  Points out that, with sufficient up-front resources and such arrangements for re-using unused funds, the budget would have far greater response capacity without impinging on the predictability of national GNI-based contributions; insists that an MFF endowed with greater flexibility and response capacity is less likely to require a substantial mid-term revision;

    A long-term budget that is more results-focused

    109.  Emphasises that, in order to maximise impact, it is imperative that spending under the next MFF be much more rigorously aligned with the Union’s strategic policy aims and better coordinated with spending at national level; underlines that, in turn, consultation with regional and local authorities is vital to facilitate access to funding and ensure that Union support meets the real needs of final recipients and delivers tangible benefits for people; underscores the importance of technical assistance to implementing authorities to help ensure timely implementation, additionality of investments and therefore maximum impact;

    110.  Underlines that, in order to support effective coordination between Union and national spending, the Commission envisages a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament play a full decision-making role in any coordination or steering mechanism;

    111.  Considers that the RRF, with its focus on performance and links between reforms and investments and budgetary support, has helped to drive national investments and reforms that would not otherwise have taken place;

    112.  Underlines that the RRF can help to inform the delivery of Union spending under shared management; recalls, however, that the RRF was agreed in the very specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic and cannot, therefore, be replicated wholesale for future investment programmes;

    113.  Points out that spending under shared management in the next MFF must involve regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders from design to delivery through a place-based and multilevel governance approach and in line with an improved partnership principle, ensure the cross-border European dimension of investment projects, and focus on results and impact rather than outputs by setting measurable performance indicators, ensuring availability of relevant data and feeding into programme design and adjustment;

    114.  Underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must safeguard Parliament’s role as legislator, budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account, putting in place strict accountability mechanisms and guaranteeing full transparency in relation to final recipients or groups of recipients of Union spending funds through an interoperable system enabling effective tracking of cash flows and project progress;

    115.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach envisaged by the Commission is not in line with the principles set out above and cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; recalls that, in this regard, the Union is required, under Article 175 TFEU, to provide support through instruments for agricultural, regional and social spending;

    A long-term budget that manages liabilities sustainably

    116.  Recalls Parliament’s very firm opposition to subjecting the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs to a cap within an MFF heading given that these costs are subject to market conditions, influenced by external factors and thus inherently volatile, and that the repayment of borrowing costs is a non-discretionary legal obligation; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden of past debts;

    117.  Deplores the fact that, under the existing architecture and despite the joint declaration by the three institutions as part of the 2020 MFF agreement whereby expenditure to cover NGEU financing costs ‘shall aim at not reducing programmes and funds’, financing for key Union programmes and resources available for special instruments, even after the MFF revision, have de facto been competing with the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs in a context of steep inflation and rising interest rates; recalls that pressure on the budget driven by NGEU borrowing costs was a key factor in cuts to flagship programmes in the MFF revision;

    118.  Underlines that, to date, the Union budget has been required only to repay interest related to NGEU and that, from 2028 onwards, the budget will also have to repay the capital; underscores that, according to the Commission, the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25-30 billion a year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of payment appropriations in the 2025 budget;

    119.  Acknowledges that, while NGEU borrowing costs will be more stable in the next MFF period as bonds will already have been issued, the precise repayment profile will have an impact on the level of interest and thus on the degree of volatility; insists, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the MFF architecture;

    120.  Points, in that regard, to the increasing demand for the Union budget to serve as a guarantee for the Union’s vital support through macro-financial assistance and the associated risks; underlines that, in the event of default or the withdrawal of national guarantees, the Union budget ultimately underwrites all macro-financial assistance loans and therefore bears significant and inherently unpredictable contingent liabilities, notably in relation to Ukraine;

    121.  Calls, therefore, on the Commission to design a sound and durable architecture that enables sustainable management of all non-discretionary costs and liabilities, fully preserving Union programmes and the budget’s flexibility and response capacity;

    A long-term budget that is properly resourced and sustainably financed

    122.  Underlines that, as described above, the budgetary needs post-2027 will be significantly higher than the amounts allocated to the 2021-2027 MFF and, in addition, will need to cover borrowing costs and debt repayment; insists, therefore, that the next MFF be endowed with significantly increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI, which has prevented the Union from delivering on its ambitions and deprived it of the ability to respond to crises and adapt to emerging needs;

    123.  Considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with those resources, in line with its priorities and identified needs; considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing through the issuance of EU bonds presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    124.  Reiterates the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the Union budget; points to the legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources in the IIA, in which Parliament, the Council and the Commission undertook to introduce sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of NGEU debt; underlines that, overall, the basket of new own resources should be fair, linked to broader Union policy aims and agreed on time and with sufficient volume to meet the heightened budgetary needs;

    125.  Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposal on the system of own resources; is deeply concerned by the complete absence of progress on the system of own resources in the Council; calls on the Council to adopt this proposal as a matter of urgency; and urges the Commission to spare no effort in supporting the adoption process;

    126.  Calls furthermore, on the Commission to continue efforts to identify additional innovative and genuine new own resources and other revenue sources beyond those specified in the IIA; stresses that new own resources are essential not only to enable repayment of NGEU borrowing, but to ensure that the Union is equipped to cover its the higher spending needs;

    127.  Calls on the Commission to design a modernised budget with a renewed spending focus, driven by the need for fairness, greater simplification, a reduced administrative burden and more transparency, including on the revenue side; underlines that existing rebates and corrections automatically expire at the end of the current MFF;

    128.  Welcomes the decision, in the recast of the Financial Regulation, to treat as negative revenue any interest or other charge due to a third party relating to amounts of fines, other penalties or sanctions that are cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice; recalls that this solution comes to an end on 31 December 2027; invites the Commission to propose a definitive solution for the next MFF that achieves the same objective of avoiding any impact on the expenditure side of the budget;

    A long-term budget grounded in close interinstitutional cooperation

    129.  Underlines that Parliament intends to fully exercise its prerogatives as legislator, budgetary authority and discharge authority under the Treaties;

    130.  Recalls that the requirement for close interinstitutional cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Parliament from the early design stages to the final adoption of the MFF is enshrined in the Treaties and further detailed in the IIA;

    131.  Emphasises Parliament’s commitment to play its role fully throughout the process; believes that the design of the MFF should be bottom-up and based on the extensive involvement of stakeholders; underlines, furthermore, the need for a strategic dialogue among the three institutions in the run-up to the MFF proposals;

    132.  Calls on the Commission to put forward practical arrangements for cooperation and genuine negotiations from the outset; points, in particular, to the importance of convening meetings of the three Presidents, as per Article 324 TFEU, wherever they can aid progress, and insists that the Commission follow up when Parliament requests such meetings; reminds the Commission of its obligation to provide information to Parliament on an equal footing with the Council as the two arms of the budgetary authority and as co-legislators on MFF-related basic acts;

    133.  Recalls that the IIA specifically provides for Parliament, the Council and the Commission to ‘seek to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue’; stresses that the cooperation provisions set out in the IIA, including regular meetings between Parliament and the Council, are a bare minimum and that much more is needed to give effect to the principle in Article 312(5) TFEU of taking ‘any measure necessary to facilitate the adoption of a new MFF’; calls, therefore, on the successive Council presidencies to respect not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Treaties;

    134.  Recalls that the late adoption of the MFF regulation and related legislation for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods led to significant delays, which hindered the proper implementation of EU programmes; insists, therefore, that every effort be made to ensure timely adoption of the upcoming MFF package;

    135.  Expects the Commission, as part of the package of MFF proposals, to put forward a new IIA in line with the realities of the new budget, including with respect to the management of contingent liabilities; stresses that the changes to the Financial Regulation necessary for alignment with the new MFF should enter into force at the same time as the MFF Regulation;

    o
    o   o

    136.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
    (2) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
    (4) OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
    (7) OJ C, C/2023/1067, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1067/oj.
    (8) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
    (9) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
    (10) OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (11) OJ C, C/2025/279, 24.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/279/oj.
    (12) Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj).
    (13) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Spain: EIB finances with €20 million Heura Foods to develop innovative and sustainable plant-based food products

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Heura Foods is a Spain based startup that produces 100% plant-based, sustainable and healthy food products with a focus on plant-based meat.
    • The agreement will finance investments to boost Heura’s R&D&I capabilities to produce new products in several categories.
    • The agreement contributes to the EIB strategic priorities of supporting European innovation and the bioeconomy sector while fostering healthy and environmentally friendly food systems in Europe.
    • The operation is backed by InvestEU, an EU programme that aims to unlock over €372 billion in investment by 2027.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has signed a €20 million loan with Spanish start-up Heura Foods to support development and commercialization of innovative, sustainable and healthy food products 100% plant-based. Heura is a bioeconomy pioneer and innovator in the plant-based foods sector with headquarters in Barcelona. Heura focuses on improving food composition by replacing saturated fats and cholesterol with ingredients rich in fiber and antioxidants, while ensuring a high protein content.

    The loan will support Heura’s R&D&I programme for the development of plant-based alternatives to meat, cheese, and other animal products, as well as products that incorporate a higher share of protein than conventionally found on the supermarket shelves.  Heura’s objective is to provide nutritious alternatives to traditional meat products and popular ultra-processed food categories, using legume-based proteins and healthy fats. The loan will also permit Heura to scale up its production capacity by financing investments in equipment needed to this end, both in Heura’s laboratories and in the co-manufacturers premises in Spain.  Ultimately, the agreement will contribute to fostering healthy and environmentally friendly food systems in Europe.

    “The EIB’s support for innovation and biotechnology is key to Europe’s technological leadership. With this agreement we are boosting the dynamism of the startup ecosystem in Spain and Europe and responding to new consumer needs by developing new sustainable food products,’” said Nadia Calviño, President of the EIB Group.

    “This financing agreement with Heura is a clear example of how the EIB is stepping up its support for companies that are at the forefront of the bioeconomy sector, driving innovation and sustainability across the entire value chain. By investing in the development of new plant-based foods products, the EIB is also contributing to a more sustainable and healthy food system in Europe and the overall food security of the European Union”, said EIB Director of Equity, Growth Capital and Project Finance Alessandro Izzo.

    “Innovation is our tool to live longer and better. We are committed to simple processes, legumes, healthy fats, and science in the service of collective well-being. Our goal is to democratize food that is tasty, nutritious, and aligned with today’s challenges”, said co-founder and CEO of Heura Foods, Marc Coloma.

    “For the European Commission, fostering innovation is crucial for enhancing the competitiveness of its agri-food industry. We welcome the European Investment Bank support to research and development in innovative agri-food companies. This can help the EU to unlock new economic opportunities, create high-value jobs, and solidify its position as a leader in the evolving global food landscape. This operation is a good example of what InvestEU can do to empower businesses to grow, innovate, and build a sustainable future” stated Lucas González Ojeda, Acting Director of the European Commission Representation in Spain.

    The EIB loan is guaranteed by InvestEU, the flagship EU programme to mobilize over €372 billion of additional public and private sector investment to support EU policy goals from 2021 to 2027.

    Background information

    EIB
    The ElB is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. Built around eight core priorities, it finances investments that pursue EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund, signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Agreement, as pledged in the group’s Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects that contribute directly to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and a healthier environment.

    In Spain, the EIB Group signed €12.3 billion of new financing for more than 100 high-impact projects in 2024, helping power the country’s green and digital transition and promote economic growth, competitiveness and better services for inhabitants.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    InvestEU

    The InvestEU programme provides the European Union with crucial long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable recovery. It also helps mobilise private investment for EU policy priorities, such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition. InvestEU brings together under one roof the multitude of EU financial instruments available to support investment in the European Union, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient and more flexible. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is implemented through financial partners that invest in projects, leveraging on the EU budget guarantee of €26.2 billion. The entire budget guarantee will back the investment projects of the implementing partners, increasing their risk-bearing capacity and mobilising at least €372 billion in additional investment.

    Heura Foods

    Heura Foods is a 100% plant-based food technology startup founded by activists and born in Barcelona. It creates solutions that make the problems of the current food system obsolete and accelerate change towards a world where our daily eating habits have a positive impact on humans, the planet and other animals. While based on scientific discoveries and cutting-edge technologies, Heura’s innovations maintain the culinary traditions of the Mediterranean, including high nutritional density, positive climate impact and exceptional taste. Already a market leader in Spain, Heura is expanding the plant-based category across Europe.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Nominees of the 2025 One World Media Women’s Solutions Reporting Award are out

    Source: European Investment Bank

    One World Media unveiled the nominees for this year’s Awards in each category, including the Women’s Solutions Reporting Award, supported by the European Investment Bank.

    After weeks of careful consideration, One World Media’s expert panel has selected three outstanding nominees in each of the 13 categories. Fifty judges from 29 countries reviewed 559 powerful entries to identify the very best journalism from across the global south.

    The judges have looked for overall merit of a story alongside criteria like relevance, substance and impact, among others. The decisions weren’t easy. But the results are now in!

    We are thrilled to present the nominees of the Women’s Solutions Reporting Award. Huge congratulations to them!

    Discover the 2025 nominees for all categories: Shortlist 2025 – One World Media

    Winners will be announced at the Awards Ceremony on 25th of June.

    Check out our latest news: One World Media Awards

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Governors and Heads of Supervision reaffirm expectation to implement Basel III and discuss work on financial impact of extreme weather events

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    • Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) unanimously reaffirm their expectation to implement Basel III in full and consistently and as soon as possible.
    • The Basel Committee will publish a voluntary disclosure framework on climate-related financial risks for jurisdictions to consider.
    • GHOS agreed to prioritise further analysis on the financial risk implications of extreme weather events.

    The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, met on 12 May 2025.

    Basel III implementation

    The GHOS took stock of the implementation status of the outstanding Basel III reforms, which were finalised in 2017. Members have continued to make good progress with implementation. About 70% of member jurisdictions have now implemented, or will shortly implement, the standards.

    GHOS members unanimously reaffirmed their expectation of implementing all aspects of the Basel III framework in full, consistently and as soon as possible. The series of shocks to financial markets over the past few years have highlighted the importance of having a prudent global regulatory framework in place. The GHOS tasked the Committee with continuing to monitor and assess the full and consistent implementation of Basel III.

    The GHOS also took note of the Committee’s ongoing analytical and supervisory work to assess whether specific features of the Basel Framework performed as intended during the 2023 banking turmoil, such as liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book.

    Climate-related financial risks

    GHOS members discussed the Committee’s proposed Pillar 3 disclosure framework for climate-related financial risks. The Basel Committee will publish a voluntary disclosure framework for jurisdictions to consider.

    The GHOS also discussed the Committee’s broader work on climate-related financial risks. The GHOS tasked the Committee with prioritising its work to analyse the impact of extreme weather events on financial risks.


    Note to editors: 

    The Basel Committee is the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. The Committee reports to the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision and seeks its endorsement for major decisions. The Committee has no formal supranational authority, and its decisions have no legal force. Rather, the Committee relies on its members’ commitments to achieve its mandate. The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision is chaired by Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada. The Basel Committee is chaired by Erik Thedéen, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank. 

    More information about the Basel Committee is available here.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: SCHUMER – WITH CAPITAL REGION RELIGIOUS LEADERS, FOOD BANKS & FARMERS – SOUNDS ALARM THAT UNDER GOP PLAN TO CUT SNAP – AMERICA’S LARGEST ANTI-HUNGER PROGRAM – THOUSANDS OF KIDS, SENIORS, & FAMILIES…

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Charles E Schumer

    Already 27 Tractor Trailers, Nearly 1 Million Pounds Of Food, For The Regional Food Bank Of Northeastern NY Has Been Canceled Due To Trump’s Cruel USDA Cuts – Now GOP Wants To Steal Up To $230 Billion From SNAP To Fund Trump’s Tax Breaks For Corporations & Billionaires

    Schumer, With Church Leaders & Advocates, Say This Double Whammy Could Hurtle Families To A Hunger Crisis, Impacting 112,000+ In Capital Region, Millions Nationwide; Demands GOP Block Cruel Cut To SNAP And Protect Anti-Hunger Programs

    Schumer: No Child Should Go To Bed Hungry. This Is Not A Partisan Issue; This Is A Moral Issue

    As Congressional Republicans look to advance the largest potential cut to the anti-hunger program SNAP in American history this week, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer stood with Capital Region religious leaders, food banks, & farmers to issue a stark warning and demand action against the devastating proposed $230 billion SNAP cut to fund Trump’s tax cuts for corporations & billionaires, that would leave thousands of seniors, families and children hungry. The senator joined with church leaders and hunger advocates to say how this is a moral issue that we should all unite to stop, and Schumer called on the administration to reverse its hunger program cuts and for the NY House Republicans to stand against stealing from SNAP, which over 112,000 in the Capital Region rely on for food.

    “No child should ever go to bed hungry. But Trump’s slashing of anti-hunger programs at the USDA has already cancelled 27 tractor trailers, nearly 1 million pounds of food, for the Regional Food Bank of Northeastern NY. Now, House Republicans are trying to rush through the budget process and make the largest cut to SNAP in history. With food insecurity on the rise, this is a double whammy that could hurtle families to a hunger crisis,” said Senator Schumer. “Stealing from SNAP to pay for Trump’s tax breaks for corporations & billionaires is as backwards as it gets, and will result in thousands of kids, seniors, and families going hungry. It is not a partisan issue, it is a moral issue. That is why I am here to show what these cuts mean for the nuns, priests, and food banks on the frontlines of fighting against hunger. Together we are demanding a stop to this all-out assault on our federal anti-hunger programs and to protect SNAP for our children, veterans, seniors, and families.”

    Sister Betsy Van Deusen, CEO of Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany said, “SNAP is a lifeline for so many people in our communities and across the country. Working people who are trying to feed their families depend on this critical resource. The vast and draconian cuts that have been discussed will send children to bed hungry, our elders without basic nutrition and our veterans without dignity. the lives of wealthiest people in our country will not be substantially changed by another tax cut, but the millions on whose backs those cuts come, will be devastated.”

    Schumer added, “It only takes a few NY House Republicans to join us to stop this cruel cut to SNAP. We need NY Republicans to show us which side they are on with their actions. For feeding corporate & billionaires’ greed or for feeding hungry families here in the Capital Region. We need them to join us in demanding the USDA reverse all of Trump’s cuts to our farmers, food banks, and anti-hunger programs and keep their hands off SNAP to fund Trump’s tax breaks.”

    Schumer explained how Trump’s USDA has already cruelly canceled $1 billion in food assistance, hurting the Capital Region’s Food Bank of Northeastern NY, and if these SNAP cuts move forward it would be a double whammy, hurtling us to a hunger crisis. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a lifeline for nearly 3 million NY seniors, veterans and families who rely on the critical funding to purchase groceries. Schumer said that we should be investing more not less in anti-hunger programs, but under the Republican proposal, the average family would be reduced to just $5.00 per day per person. A breakdown of SNAP recipients in the Capital Region from the Center for American Progress can be found below:

    County

    SNAP Recipients

    % of County on SNAP

    SNAP Retailers

    Albany

    34,556

    10.9%

    281

    Columbia

    5,546

    9.1%

    82

    Greene

    4,504

    9.5%

    54

    Rensselaer

    15,022

    9.4%

    148

    Saratoga

    13,847

    5.8%

    163

    Schenectady

    22,196

    13.9%

    166

    Schoharie

    3,671

    12.2%

    34

    Warren

    6,726

    10.3%

    75

    Washington

    6,556

    10.8%

    61

    TOTAL

    112,624

     

    1,064

    Schumer explained the Republican proposal to cut up to $230 billion from SNAP would inevitably mean costs of feeding families shift to states, who simply do not have the capacity to absorb this massive increase in expenses, risking families going hungry. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, mandating New York State to cover even a modest share of SNAP benefits would shift astronomical costs to the state with even just 5% increasing New York State’s costs by nearly $3.5 billion from FY2026 to FY2034. The senator said it is impossible to cut this much from federal SNAP funding without ripping food away from hungry children, seniors, veterans, people with disabilities, and more.

    These agonizing decisions would be amplified even further at the local level, with non-profits, many of whom have already had their funding cut, unable to fill in the gap. Counties could even be forced to shoulder the burden of increased costs in SNAP, using more local dollars to provide coverage because less federal funding will be coming in.

    According to New York’s Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, in New York’s 20th Congressional District – which represents all of Albany, Saratoga, and Schenectady counties, and portions of Montgomery and Rensselaer counties – nearly 45,000 households receive an estimated $185 million in annual benefits. 34% of SNAP recipients are children, 15% are elderly, and 12% are people with disabilities. In New York’s 21st Congressional District – which represents all of Clinton, Franklin, St. Lawrence, Lewis, Hamilton, Essex, Warren, Washington, Fulton, Herkimer, Montgomery, and Schoharie counties, and portions of Jefferson, Oneida, and Saratoga counties – more than 52,000 households receive as estimated$194 million in annual benefits. 30% of SNAP recipients are children, 18% are elderly, and 14% are people with disabilities.

    Schumer said, “SNAP is a lifeline that helps uplift everyone, from the NY farms who get direct assistance from the program to the Capital Region families’ kitchen tables. NY Republicans are tying themselves in knots to try to justify these SNAP cuts, but the math shows you cannot make the massive cuts the House’s tax bill proposes without risking the food security for thousands of families. I’m all for reducing any waste or fraud to make the program more efficient, but rushing to pass these massive damaging cuts with no plan while they slash our food banks is a recipe for disaster.”

    The proposed SNAP cuts would be a blow to Capital Region food banks which have already been hit hard by Trump’s funding freezes and canceled payments. Earlier this year, the USDA canceled $1 billion in food assistance for organizations to purchase locally grown food. USDA programs provide food banks, schools, and other organizations with federal support to purchase local food products from NY farms.

    The Regional Food Bank of Northeastern New York has already had 27 tractor-trailers of food canceled, which is nearly 1 million pounds meant to feed Capital Region families. That’s nearly 800,000 meals, and the food bank expects to lose over 200 tractor-trailers over the next year. 80% of this food goes to pantries and soup kitchens like CONSERNS-U in Rensselaer. The food bank also works with religious leaders like Catholic Charities to distribute food to those who need it most.

    Schumer said these proposed cuts will limit food banks’ ability to keep shelves stocked as more people have been forced to rely on food banks to feed their families. Food bank workers and religious leaders across Upstate New York are concerned about the impact of potential cuts to SNAP on the people they serve, and farmers are worried there will be nowhere to sell their food if SNAP funding levels drop.

    “No matter which way you slice it, this Congressional Republican plan will screw Capital Region families, food banks and farmers from farm to table. We need everyone to stand up to these cuts that would take away food from our neighbors in need,” added Schumer.

    “When federal nutrition programs are cut, it’s not just a single plate that goes empty — it’s millions,” said Tom Nardacci, CEO of the Regional Food Bank. “Without federal support, community organizations simply can’t fill the growing gap. Slashing SNAP or canceling USDA food deliveries doesn’t just reduce access — it clears the table entirely for seniors, children, veterans, and families in every community in this country. We appreciate Senator Schumer fighting to save these important programs.”

    “Cutting or reducing budgets for food safety net programs is the exact opposite of what is needed to ensure New Yorkers don’t go hungry,” said Natasha Pernicka, Executive Director for The Food Pantries for the Capital District. “Any reductions to current SNAP will continue to exacerbate the growing strain on our food pantry system. We should be doing much more to help our food-insecure communities, not less.”

    Proposed rollbacks to the country’s most widely utilized nutrition assistance program would strain budgets for Capital Region families. Schumer said decimating funding for SNAP right as costs at grocery stores across the country are skyrocketing will hit the Capital Region hard. According to the New York State Community Action Association, more than 12% of people in Rensselaer County live in poverty, including nearly 20% of children. According to No Kid Hungry, over half of New Yorkers reported going into debt in the past year due to rising food costs, with over 60% of families with children.

    SNAP not only supplements families’ food budgets, it has also generated great economic benefits for New York State and NY-20 specifically. According to the National Grocers Association, grocery stores across New York State sold over $2.1 billion in groceries to people using SNAP benefits, including $99.3 million in NY-20. This created more than 18,500 New York jobs in the grocery industry, including 876 in NY-20, and generated more than $820.8 million in grocery industry wages, including $38.7 million in NY-20.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Warren, Booker, Nadler Press Pepsi on Potentially Illegal Price Discrimination Against Small, Independently-Owned Grocery Stores

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
    May 12, 2025
    “Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases.”
    “American families across the country continue to struggle to afford groceries, and enforcement of the [Robinson-Patman Act] is part of the solution to help promote competition throughout the food supply chain and ease their financial burden.”
    Text of Letter (PDF)
    Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.), along with Representative Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) wrote to Ramon Laguarta, CEO of PepsiCo, Inc. (Pepsi) demanding an explanation for the company’s potentially illegal price discrimination against small and independent grocery stores. The lawmakers are the top Democrats on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, and House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Administrate State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust, respectively. 
    Representatives Becca Balint (D-Vt.), Andre Carson (D-Ind.), Maggie Goodlander (D-N.H.), Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), Summer Lee (D-Pa.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), and Nikema Williams (D-Ga.) joined in signing the letter. 
    In recent months, Pepsi has faced legal action from convenience stores and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a regulator charged with enforcing federal consumer protection laws and antitrust laws. In January 2025, the FTC sued Pepsi, accusing it of violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits sellers from engaging in anticompetitive price discrimination. The FTC claimed that for years, Pepsi has disadvantaged retailers – including local convenience stores – by consistently giving benefits and advantages, such as promotional payments, to a big-box store, while denying those same benefits to the store’s competitors.
    In February 2025, two small, family-owned convenience stores accused Pepsi and its subsidiary Frito-Lay of violating the RPA, claiming the corporation charged independent retailers more “for identical bags of snack chips” compared to what it charged chain stores. The plaintiffs claimed they were charged as much as 50 percent more for those goods, and that the “discriminatory pricing” forced them to pass on the higher costs to consumers. 
    “The Robinson-Patman Act is an important tool for the FTC to combat illegal price discrimination and concentration, and to provide a level playing field to all businesses…Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases,” wrote the lawmakers. 
    The RPA forbids sellers from charging competing buyers different prices for the same goods when the price discrimination may lessen or harm competition. The law also prohibits special promotional payments, discounts, rebates, allowances, or services to one buyer unless they are made available to all competing buyers.
    “As food prices remain sky-high, the FTC should continue to enforce the RPA to promote fair competition in the food industry,” urged the lawmakers. 
    The bicameral coalition asked Pepsi to explain, by May 25, 2025, its pricing strategies, any discrepancies between what it charges chain retailers and small, independent retailers, how these price discrepancies affect shopping options for consumers, and the company’s lobbying efforts to refute price discrimination allegations.  
    As a champion for American consumers and a secure and healthy economy, Senator Warren has engaged in oversight of corporations for unfairly increasing prices for consumers. She has also been calling for more competition and stronger enforcement of antitrust laws to bring down prices for families: 
    In May 2025, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Jim Banks (R-Ind.) applauded the Department of Justice’s ongoing investigation into potential anticompetitive practices by major egg producers and urged the agency to continue its thorough investigation as egg prices continue to rise.
    In January 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) led 19 of their colleagues, writing to President Donald Trump, pushing him to take meaningful steps to lower the prices of eggs and other groceries—a problem he largely ignored during his entire first week in office.
    In November 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congressman Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) led their colleagues in writing to Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Thomas Vilsack, urging them to investigate Albertsons and other major grocery chains for predatory practices that could have violated federal laws.
    In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren led a letter to President and Chief Executive Officer of McDonald’s, Chris Kempczinski, pushing for more information on McDonald’s pricing decisions as fast food prices continue to increase, outpacing inflation and squeezing customers.
    In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey, along with Representatives Jim McGovern and Ayanna Pressley, sent a letter to Frans Muller, CEO of Ahold Delhaize—parent company of Stop & Shop—demanding an explanation for its potential use of pricing algorithms is leading to price gouging, resulting in higher prices in minority and working class communities in Massachusetts.
    On May 3, 2024, during a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Senator Warren called out food industry price gouging and urged action to combat unfair pricing practices.
    On March 28, 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Representative Mary Gay Scanlon (D-Penn.) led a group of 14 lawmakers in a letter to FTC Chair Lina Khan urging the agency to revive enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), a critical tool to promote fair competition in the food industry. 
    On February 28, 2024, Senator Warren joined Senator Bob Casey (D-Pa.) in introducing the Shrinkflation Prevention Act to crack down on corporations that deceive consumers by selling smaller sizes of their products without lowering prices.
    On February 15, 2024, Senators Warren, Baldwin, Casey, and U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) reintroduced the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024, which would protect consumers and prohibit corporate price gouging by authorizing the FTC and state attorneys general to enforce a federal ban against grossly excessive price increases.
    In December 2023, Senator Warren urged the FTC to block the Kroger-Albertsons merger, which would give the five largest food retail companies control of 55 percent of all grocery sales, allowing them to further control and ultimately raise consumer prices, while also reducing job competition, decreasing wages, and decreasing the bargaining power of organized labor.
    In November 2023, Senator Warren called out TransDigm for its refusal to provide cost and pricing information needed to prevent price gouging of taxpayers and the Department of Defense.
    Senator Warren repeatedly urged the Biden administration to closely scrutinize other potentially anticompetitive mergers that could lead to higher prices for consumers and accelerate industry consolidation. She has led letters about the proposed mergers of Frontier and Spirit airlines, JetBlue and Spirit Airlines, Sanderson-Wayne, WarnerMedia-Discovery, and Amazon-MGM.
    In March 2022, Senator Warren introduced the Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act to help stomp out rampant industry consolidation that allows companies to raise consumer prices and mistreat workers. The bill would ban the biggest, most anticompetitive mergers and give the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission the teeth to reject deals in the first instance without court orders and to break up harmful mergers.
    In February 2022, at a hearing, Senator Warren called out corporations for abusing their market power to raise consumer prices and boost profits.
    That same month, Senator Warren requested the Department of Justice to take aggressive action against corporations violating antitrust laws to hike prices for consumers.
    In January 2022, Senator Warren questioned Federal Reserve nominee Lael Brainard about market concentration and price gouging driving inflation.
    At a January 2022 hearing, Senator Warren pressed Fed Chair Jerome Powell on the role of corporate concentration in driving up prices for consumers during his renomination hearing to be Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    In a New York Times op-ed published in April 2020, Senator Warren urged Congress to focus on cracking down on price gouging in its ongoing effort to address the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
    In March 2020, Senator Warren joined her colleagues in urging the FTC to use its full authority to prevent abusive price gouging on consumer health products during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: 51Talk Online Education Group to Present at the dbVIC – Deutsche Bank ADR Virtual Investor Conference May 15th

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SINGAPORE, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — 51Talk Online Education Group (NYSE American: COE) based in Singapore, and focused on global online education, today announced that its Investor Relations Vice President David Chung will present at the dbVIC – Deutsche Bank American Depositary Receipt (ADR) Virtual Investor Conference on May 15, 2025. This virtual investor conference is aimed exclusively at introducing global companies with ADR programs to investors.

    DATE: May 15th
    TIME: 11:00 a.m. EST
    LINK: REGISTER HERE

    This will be a live, interactive online event where investors are invited to ask the company questions in real-time. If attendees are not able to join the event live on the day of the conference, an archived webcast will also be made available after the event.

    It is recommended that online investors pre-register and run the online system check to expedite participation and receive event updates.  

    Participation is free of charge.

    51Talk Online Education Group: Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial and Operational Highlights

    • Gross billings for the fourth quarter of 2024 were US$21.4 million, a 93.4% growth from the fourth quarter of 2023.
    • Net revenues were US$16.2 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, a 117.3% increase from US$7.5 million for the fourth quarter of 2023.
    • The number of active students with attended lesson consumption was approximately 74,200 in the fourth quarter of 2024, representing an 83.2% increase from approximately 40,500 for the fourth quarter of 2023.

    About 51Talk Online Education Group

    51Talk Online Education Group (NYSE American: COE) is a global online education platform with core expertise in English education. The Company’s mission is to make quality education accessible and affordable. The Company’s online and mobile education platforms enable students to take live interactive English lessons, on demand. The Company connects its students with a large pool of highly qualified teachers that it assembled using a shared economy approach, and employs student and teacher feedback and data analytics to deliver a personalized learning experience to its students.

    About Virtual Investor Conferences®
    Virtual Investor Conferences (VIC) is the leading proprietary investor conference series that provides an interactive forum for publicly traded companies to seamlessly present directly to investors.

    Providing a real-time investor engagement solution, VIC is specifically designed to offer companies more efficient investor access.  Replicating the components of an on-site investor conference, VIC offers companies enhanced capabilities to connect with investors, schedule targeted one-on-one meetings and enhance their presentations with dynamic video content. Accelerating the next level of investor engagement, Virtual Investor Conferences delivers leading investor communications to a global network of retail and institutional investors.

    CONTACTS:
    51Talk Online Education Group

    David Chung

    Investor Relations Vice President

    Jinling Wang

    Investor Relations Manager

    wangjinling@51talk.com 

    Virtual Investor Conferences
    John M. Viglotti
    SVP Corporate Services, Investor Access
    OTC Markets Group
    (212) 220-2221
    johnv@otcmarkets.com 

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Viomi Technology Co., Ltd to Present at the dbVIC – Deutsche Bank ADR Virtual Investor Conference May 15th

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    GUANGZHOU, China, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Viomi Technology Co., Ltd (“Viomi” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ: VIOT) based in Guangzhou, and focused on home water solutions, today announced that Mr.Sam Yang, Head of the Company’s Capital and Strategy Department, and Ms. Claire Ji, the Company’s IR contact, will present at the dbVIC – Deutsche Bank American Depositary Receipt (ADR) Virtual Investor Conference on May 15, 2025. This virtual investor conference is aimed exclusively at introducing global companies with ADR programs to investors.

    DATE: May 15, 2025
    TIME: 8:30 AM EDT
    LINK: REGISTER HERE

    This will be a live, interactive online event where investors are invited to ask the company questions in real-time. If attendees are not able to join the event live on the day of the conference, an archived webcast will also be made available after the event.

    It is recommended that online investors pre-register and run the online system check to expedite participation and receive event updates.

    Participation is free of charge.

    Recent Company Highlights

    • The Company achieved strong results with a significant turnaround from previous losses, driven by a strategic shift to focus on home water business. Net revenue for 2024 increased by 29.3% year over year, and net income reached RMB62.3 million, compared to a net loss of RMB89.3 million in 2023. Viomi is now on a fast track to high-quality growth and is well-positioned to seize new market opportunities.

    About Viomi Technology

    Viomi’s mission is “AI for Better Water,” utilizing AI technology to provide better drinking water solutions for households worldwide.

    As an industry-leading technology company in home water solutions, Viomi has developed a distinctive “Equipment + Consumables” business model. By leveraging its expertise in AI technology, intelligent hardware and software development, the Company simplifies filter replacement and enhances water quality monitoring, thereby increasing the filter replacement rate. Its continuous technological innovations extend filter lifespan and lower user costs, promoting the adoption of water purifiers and supporting a healthy lifestyle while effectively addressing the rising global demand for cleaner, fresher and healthier drinking water. The Company operates a world-leading “Water Purifier Gigafactory” with an integrated industrial chain that boasts optimal efficiency and facilitates continuous breakthroughs in water purification. This state-of-the-art facility enables Viomi to achieve economies of scale and accelerate the global popularization of residential water filtration.

    For more information, please visit: https://ir.viomi.com.

    About Virtual Investor Conferences®

    Virtual Investor Conferences (VIC) is the leading proprietary investor conference series that provides an interactive forum for publicly traded companies to seamlessly present directly to investors.

    Providing a real-time investor engagement solution, VIC is specifically designed to offer companies more efficient investor access.  Replicating the components of an on-site investor conference, VIC offers companies enhanced capabilities to connect with investors, schedule targeted one-on-one meetings and enhance their presentations with dynamic video content. Accelerating the next level of investor engagement, Virtual Investor Conferences delivers leading investor communications to a global network of retail and institutional investors.

    CONTACTS:
    Viomi Technology Co., Ltd
    Claire Ji
    E-mail: ir@viomi.com.cn

    Virtual Investor Conferences
    John M. Viglotti
    SVP Corporate Services, Investor Access
    OTC Markets Group
    (212) 220-2221
    johnv@otcmarkets.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Kehoe Announces Appointments to Missouri School Funding Modernization Task Force

    Source: US State of Missouri

    MAY 12, 2025

    Jefferson City — Building on the education priorities outlined in his inaugural State of the State Address in January, Governor Mike Kehoe announced today the full slate of members appointed to the Missouri School Funding Modernization Task Force. The Task Force, established by Executive Order 25-14, is charged with reviewing and recommending changes to Missouri’s K-12 school funding model and providing a final report to the Governor by December 1, 2026.

    “To secure a better future for Missouri students and schools, we must rethink how we fund Missouri’s foundation formula,” said Governor Kehoe. “We need a modernized funding model that rewards outcomes, encourages innovation, and ensures fairness for all Missouri students. These Task Force members bring the experience, perspective, and commitment needed to make responsible changes at business-speed. We look forward to reviewing their recommendations.”

    The 16-member body represents a broad range of voices—urban and rural, traditional and nontraditional, academia and industry—who will help build a model that delivers results for every Missouri student. The Task Force will operate under core guiding principles that promote equal access for students, local flexibility, performance accountability, and long-term funding sustainability.

    Governor Kehoe’s appointments include the following individuals:

    • Matt Davis, of Eldon, is a dedicated educational leader with more than 25 years of experience in the Missouri school system, including 17 years as superintendent of Eldon School District. Prior to serving as superintendent, he led career and technical education programs and prioritized securing grants and funding to enhance program offerings and facilities at Eldon Career Center. Davis will serve as the representative for superintendents from small rural school districts in Missouri.
    • Noah Devine, of Kansas City, is the executive director of the Missouri Charter Public School Association. He previously served as the deputy director of the Kansas City Action Fund and led the implementation of the sixth iteration of the Missouri School Improvement Plan (MSIP) standards for the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education as the MSIP 6 support facilitator. Devine will serve as the representative for charter schools in Missouri.
    • Emily LeRoy, of Hermann, is a senior advisor at Missouri Farm Bureau, serving on a leadership team that advocates for the diverse interests of farmers. She began her career at the Missouri Department of Agriculture as a legislative assistant and youth program coordinator before rising to the position of legislative and budget director. LeRoy will serve as an additional member as appointed by the Governor.
    • James “Jim” Meats, of Springfield, is the vice president of sales and marketing at Loren Cook Company and a licensed professional engineer. He previously worked as a technical consultant to manufacturers and municipalities in southwest Missouri, where he supported the development of formal plan reviews, permitting procedures, and construction inspection processes. Meats will serve as the representative for the business community.
    • Mike Podgursky, of Columbia, is a school finance expert with more than 40 years of experience, currently serving as the Chancelor’s Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri–Columbia and an affiliated scholar at Sinquefield Center for Applied Economic Research. He is also the author of several peer-reviewed articles and the book, Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality. Podgursky will serve as an additional member as appointed by the Governor.
    • Donald “Don” Thalhuber, of Columbia, is the policy director for the Senate Minority Caucus. Prior to serving in his current position, Thalhuber worked as a senior research analyst crafting education, pension, financial, tax, and veterans’ affairs legislation. He also drafted Missouri’s most recent public school funding formula in 2005. Thalhuber will serve as an additional member as appointed by the Governor.
    • Michael “Jeremy” Tucker, of Liberty, is the superintendent for Liberty Public Schools, managing the district’s $279 million budget and providing oversight and strategic guidance to executive leadership and their respective departments. Prior to serving as superintendent, he worked as an adjunct professor for Evangel University and Southwest Baptist University as well as a social studies teacher at Logan-Rogersville High School. Tucker will serve as the representative for superintendents from large urban school districts in Missouri.
    • Chris Vas, of Kansas City, is a senior director for the Herzog Foundation, working to implement school choice initiatives and trainings across the nation while overseeing an $8 million annual budget. He previously served as the executive director of Liberty Alliance USA, a regional, conservative grassroots network and watchdog organization. Vas will serve as the representative for non-profit organizations that work on expanding school choice in Missouri.
    • Casey Wasser, of California, is the deputy executive director and chief operating officer for the Missouri Soybean Association, a grassroots organization dedicated to advocating on behalf of soybean producers and crafting state and federal policy initiatives that support farmers’ freedom to operate and improved profitability. He has an extensive background in public policy, previously serving as the legislative director for the Missouri Department of Revenue. Wasser will serve as the representative for the agriculture industry.
    • David Wood, of Versailles, most recently served as a policy analyst and liaison for the Missouri State Tax Commission before retiring in June 2023. He previously served in the Missouri House of Representatives from 2013 to 2020 and worked as an upper-level math and computer science teacher for Morgan County R-II Schools. Wood will serve as the representative for teachers from schools in Missouri.

    These ten appointments will be joined on the Task Force by two members of the State Board of Education.

    • Kerry Casey, of Chesterfield, recently retired from her position as vice president of Exegy, a global leader in financial market data, trading platforms, and predictive signals, where she was responsible for Global Sales Operations and Enablement. Casey was a founding board member of the KIPP Charter School in St. Louis and served on the board of directors until her appointment to the State Board in 2023.
    • Pamela Westbrooks-Hodge, of Pasadena Hills, is a former vice president of the Normandy Schools Collaborative Joint Executive Governing Board and recently retired general partner from Edward Jones, where she co-led the Internal Audit Division. She previously worked for Express Scripts, Anheuser-Busch and Bank of America in senior governance, risk and compliance roles and held certifications in financial, operational, and information systems auditing.

    Missouri Senate President Pro Tem Cindy O’Laughlin and Missouri House Speaker Jonathan Patterson have also appointed Senators Rusty Black and Travis Fitzwater as well as Representatives Ed Lewis and Marlene Terry to serve on the Task Force.

    Senator Black, a former educator, will chair the task force.

    “As a former educator, I know firsthand the challenges our teachers face and the importance of ensuring that every dollar we invest in education has a meaningful impact,” said Senator Black. “I’m honored to help lead this important work as we build a funding model that supports student success in every corner of Missouri.”

    For more information on the Missouri School Funding Modernization Task Force, click here.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Yiren Digital to Present at the dbVIC – Deutsche Bank ADR Virtual Investor Conference May 15th  

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BEIJING, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Yiren Digital (NYSE:YRD) based in Beijing, an AI-powered platform providing a comprehensive suite of financial and lifestyle services in Asia, today announced that its SVP of Capital Market, William Hui, will present at the dbVIC – Deutsche Bank American Depositary Receipt (ADR) Virtual Investor Conference on May 15, 2025. This virtual investor conference is aimed exclusively at introducing global companies with ADR programs to investors.

    DATE: May 15th
    TIME: 11:30 AM ET
    LINK: REGISTER HERE

    This will be a live, interactive online event where investors are invited to ask the company questions in real-time. If attendees are not able to join the event live on the day of the conference, an archived webcast will also be made available after the event.

    It is recommended that online investors pre-register and run the online system check to expedite participation and receive event updates.

    Participation is free of charge.

    About Yiren Digital

    Yiren Digital Ltd. is an advanced, AI-powered platform providing a comprehensive suite of financial and lifestyle services in Asia. Our mission is to elevate customers’ financial well-being and enhance their quality of life by delivering digital financial services, tailor-made insurance solutions, and premium lifestyle services. We support clients at various growth stages, addressing financing needs arising from consumption and production activities, while aiming to augment the overall well-being and security of individuals, families, and businesses.

    About Virtual Investor Conferences®
    Virtual Investor Conferences (VIC) is the leading proprietary investor conference series that provides an interactive forum for publicly traded companies to seamlessly present directly to investors.

    Providing a real-time investor engagement solution, VIC is specifically designed to offer companies more efficient investor access.  Replicating the components of an on-site investor conference, VIC offers companies enhanced capabilities to connect with investors, schedule targeted one-on-one meetings and enhance their presentations with dynamic video content. Accelerating the next level of investor engagement, Virtual Investor Conferences delivers leading investor communications to a global network of retail and institutional investors.

    CONTACTS:

    Yiren Digital
    Name: Keyao He
    Title: IR Director
    Email: ir@yiren.com 

    Virtual Investor Conferences
    John M. Viglotti
    SVP Corporate Services, Investor Access
    OTC Markets Group
    (212) 220-2221
    johnv@otcmarkets.com 

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Ahead of Mother’s Day, Duckworth Discusses Ways to Support Moms and Families

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth

    May 09, 2025

    Duckworth also celebrated the opening of Mothers’ Milk Bank’s new facility for which she personally secured $850,000 in federal funding

    [ELK GROVE VILLAGE, IL] – U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) today met with Illinois moms and local leaders to highlight the ways our country can better support moms and families. Ahead of Mother’s Day this weekend, Duckworth—a mom of two daughters herself—met with donor and recipient moms who benefitted from the work of Mothers’ Milk Bank of the Western Great Lakes, a nonprofit milk bank dedicated to providing safe, pasteurized donor human milk to premature and critically ill babies throughout Illinois and Wisconsin. Photos of today’s event are available on the Senator’s website.

    “Our communities—and our local economies—thrive when we invest in our families, and Mothers’ Milk Bank is a prime example of the positive impacts federal investment can have—especially compared to the damage caused by Trump and Musk’s ruthless efforts to gut federal funding and programs that support nearly every aspect of our lives,” Duckworth said. “Mothers’ Milk Bank plays an important role in the journey of many moms across the Midwest, and it’s one of the many pillars of support in the sometimes scary, often overwhelming moments of becoming a new mother.

    Duckworth continued, “Because that’s what supporting new families looks like—not a one-time $5,000 ‘baby bonus.’ That’s how out of touch the Trump Administration is, they think five grand, just once, is enough to support moms. As moms, we know what we actually need is affordable child care. It’s paid family leave. It’s maternal health research. It’s baby gear that’s not 145 percent more expensive thanks to tariffs. It’s access to reproductive care. It’s lower grocery costs.”

    Duckworth secured $850,000 in Congressionally Directed Spending (CDS) for Mothers’ Milk Bank’s new facility, which celebrated its grand opening today. The new 15,000 square-foot facility houses a large walk-in freezer, two production labs, a research lab and Poppy’s Dream Bereavement Memorial–a special place to honor the babies of families who donate milk after loss. The project was funded by Duckworth’s FY2024 CDS request, an Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO) grant sponsored by Illinois State Senator Laura Murphy (IL-SD-28), as well as grants from Illinois Arts Council and donor support.

    Duckworth was joined at today’s event by Mothers’ Milk Bank WGL Executive Director Summer Kelly, Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity Assistant Director Cameron Joost and Mothers’ Milk Bank donor and recipient moms and children.

    “The grand opening of Mothers’ Milk Bank of Western Great Lakes is a prime example of the importance of collaboration and prioritizing good public policy,” said DCEO Director Kristin Richards. “This new state-of-the-art facility will have a positive and lasting impact on families throughout the state, ensuring Illinois continues to be the best place for families to live, work, and thrive.”

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Kugler, Economic Outlook

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Thank you, Reamonn. It is an honor and a privilege to be asked to speak in the beautiful country of Ireland and here at the Central Bank of Ireland. The histories of the U.S. and Ireland are intertwined. Our friendship is enduring, and our economies are closely tied. The Irish economy and the Bank stand as examples of the benefits of being open to international connections and the sharing of the best ideas and practices. I am delighted to have the opportunity to meet with my counterparts here and continue this great friendship. It is also wonderful to see many members of the National Association for Business Economics (NABE). NABE and its members have made many important contributions to the field of economics; as such, I always enjoy speaking to this esteemed group.1
    I am particularly delighted to contribute to this conference on trade, technology, and policy. As an academic, part of my research has investigated the link between trade and productivity. And in my current role, I have highlighted these themes in several of my recent speeches, including the role of recent advancements in technology, such as artificial intelligence, as well as the role of business formation in terms of boosting U.S. productivity over the past few years.2 Today, I would like to focus my attention on the current outlook for the U.S. economy and how I am thinking about the path of monetary policy. Of course, given current developments, I will focus on the role played by trade policy and how it may affect the economy and productivity going forward.
    While the latest data show a resilient economy, I expect growth this year to be slower than last. Labor market conditions have been mostly stable. Inflation remains above the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) 2 percent target, and further progress on disinflation has been slow. Looking ahead, I am monitoring the effects of changing trade policies, as I see them as likely having a significant effect on the U.S. and global economies in the near future.
    Trade policies are evolving and are likely to continue shifting, even as recently as this morning. Still, they appear likely to generate significant economic effects even if tariffs stay close to the currently announced levels, and the uncertainty associated with these tariffs has already generated effects on the economy through front-loading, sentiment, and expectations. Let me start by describing how I see current economic conditions.
    Economic ActivityRegarding overall economic activity, it is currently hard to judge the underlying pace of growth of the U.S. economy, as the gross domestic product (GDP) release for the first quarter showed strong evidence of front-loading of imports ahead of tariffs. GDP contracted at a 0.3 percent annual rate in the first quarter after expanding 2.5 percent during 2024. However, the latest GDP figure likely overstates the deceleration in activity, as a 41.3 percent surge in imports apparently did not get fully picked up in the inventory data or other components of spending. The size of the swings in imports may make the measurement of activity more difficult.
    It is helpful to look at private domestic final purchases (PDFP), a measure of demand in the private sector: It rose at a rate of 3 percent in the first quarter—similar to the pace recorded last year. Still, the strength in PDFP also likely reflects some pull-forward of purchases by businesses and consumers to get ahead of tariffs.
    The Federal Reserve’s April Beige Book and conversations with contacts also point toward front-loading in auto sales or other high-end goods. However, the Beige Book and various indicators of consumer and business confidence also point to a downbeat tone about underlying economic activity down the road. For instance, the Beige Book notes that several Districts see a deterioration in demand for travel and other nonfinancial services and indicates that businesses may put investments on hold moving forward. Several other economic indicators that I track suggest some signs of declining economic activity in the future. For instance, the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing purchasing managers index for April shows that new orders have been declining since February.
    Labor MarketOn the employment side of our mandate, conditions seem to be mostly stable. The most recent employment report showed that employers created 177,000 new jobs in April, in line with the average of the previous six months. The unemployment rate was 4.2 percent—still within the narrow and historically low range of 4 to 4.2 percent—where it has remained since May of 2024. In addition, the pace of layoffs remains modest. New applications for unemployment benefits have remained relatively stable at historically low levels. However, I am carefully watching other sources of data for any signs that the labor market could be shifting, given the broader uncertainty. Some forward-looking measures of layoffs have increased, such as the number of mentions of the word “layoff” in the Beige Book.
    In terms of the demand for workers, the U.S. Labor Department’s Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) showed that the vacancy rate—the number of vacant jobs as a percentage of total employment and vacant jobs—declined to 4.3 percent in March, the lowest in six months. The government data showed that the ratio of vacancies to the number of unemployed Americans was 1.0 in March, below its 2019 average of 1.2—also indicating the continuing easing of U.S. labor markets. Overall, job growth remains positive, and unemployment is still low, but I am watching a broad range of incoming readings carefully.
    InflationOn the other side of our dual mandate is inflation. After two years of notable progress following U.S. inflation reaching its pandemic-era peak, progress on disinflation has slowed since last summer. Inflation remains somewhat above the FOMC’s 2 percent goal. At the Fed, the inflation reading we track most closely is the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The March report, released on April 30, showed that the 12-month change in the PCE price index was 2.3 percent; the core PCE price index—which excludes food and energy prices—rose 2.6 percent over the same period.
    To help me judge the path of future inflation, I pay careful attention to two subcategories of the index. One is core goods prices, which exclude volatile food and energy prices. The second is nonhousing market-based services, which are based on transactions such as car maintenance and haircuts, not imputed prices. Goods inflation was negative for most of 2024—as was the norm for several years before the pandemic—but it was positive early this year. In contrast, nonhousing market services inflation stayed elevated through March, coming in at 3.4 percent. That category often provides a good signal of inflationary pressures across all nonhousing services. Looking ahead, I find it critical to monitor not only the most up-to-date data but also the changing economic policies around the world.
    Economic Effects of Global Policy ChangesTo pause briefly, I would like to take a moment to discuss the Fed’s structure. The Fed operates independently from the elected government in Washington. We make our policies to best achieve the goals given to us by Congress of maximum employment and price stability. As such, it is not my role to comment on the policies offered by the U.S. government or any government around the world. Rather, I make assessments of the likely effects of these policies, observe the behavior of the U.S. and world economies, and develop views about the best U.S. monetary policy to achieve our dual-mandate goals.
    The U.S. is implementing policy changes in trade, immigration, fiscal policy, and regulation, and other economies are also changing their policies in the areas of trade and fiscal spending, particularly in defense, which could stimulate aggregate demand. But given that the most important changes have occurred so far in the area of trade policy, today I would like to discuss some important economic channels through which changes in tariffs may affect the U.S. economy.
    Although higher tariffs on U.S. imported goods may affect our macroeconomy through many channels, some of which I will describe next, I think they will primarily act as a negative supply shock, raising prices and decreasing economic activity. While uncertainty remains about the ultimate level of the average tariff rate, currently announced average tariffs in the U.S. are still much higher than they were in the past many decades. If tariffs remain significantly larger relative to earlier in the year, the same is likely to be true for the economic effects, which will include higher inflation and slower growth.
    How do I expect this to play out? In the near term, higher import costs will raise prices for both consumer goods and inputs to production. On their own, imported goods represent about 11 percent of U.S. GDP. However, given that several intermediate goods, such as aluminum and steel have been tariffed, and they affect costs in many sectors of the economy, prices of many goods and services are also likely to be affected. In addition, in conversations with business contacts, I have heard that firms are paying attention to the price sensitivity of consumers across the entire catalog of items sold and may spread price increases to less price-sensitive items to avoid reducing their profit margins. A Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas survey of Texas business executives found that 55 percent of respondents expect to pass through most or all of the costs from higher tariffs to customers.3 Of those expecting to pass on costs, 26 percent expect to pass through the higher tariff cost upon the announcement of tariffs, and 64 percent expect this pass-through to occur within the first three months after the tariffs take effect. That would suggest that price increases may be observed soon.
    Given these expected price increases, real incomes will fall, and operating costs will rise, which will lead consumers to demand fewer final goods and services and firms to demand fewer inputs. Ultimately, I see the U.S. as likely to experience lower growth and higher inflation. Over time, there could also be significant effects on productivity. As firms adjust to the higher input costs and lower demand, they may cut back on capital investment and shift to a less-efficient combination of inputs. Additionally, less-efficient domestic firms may increase their market share.4 All of this may result in a decrease in potential output growth, lowering the underlying pace of economic activity in the U.S.
    In addition to any direct effect from actual global policy changes, consumers, businesses, and market participants have reported high levels of uncertainty about which policies may be ultimately chosen and how long they will remain in place. In fact, in recent months, several measures of economic uncertainty have risen sharply.
    There are several types of measures that quantify economic uncertainty, with two types having gained prominence among economists closely monitoring the U.S. economic outlook.5 Some are based on financial market transactions, such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index, popularly called the VIX. Others are based on the occurrence of certain keywords associated with the concept of uncertainty in newspapers of wide circulation, such as the economic policy uncertainty and trade policy uncertainty readings.6 These measures of uncertainty have reached historical highs in recent months. Similarly, I also saw the word “uncertainty” being highly cited in the Beige Book I reviewed before the FOMC’s policy meeting last week.7
    In times of heightened uncertainty, businesses may delay investment decisions, and consumers may increase precautionary savings and postpone discretionary purchases. Moreover, the economic research literature has documented that these decisions from businesses and consumers reverberate through the economy, pushing down aggregate demand. Firms, anticipating lower demand for their services and products, may post fewer job openings and cut back on investments to expand capacity. While the labor market has remained broadly resilient, the JOLTS data for March showed that job openings fell. Workers, therefore, may have a more difficult time finding employment, decreasing economy-wide income and aggregate demand.8 This lower aggregate demand may then exert downward pressure on inflation, though probably not by enough to offset the effect from the adverse supply shock that I previously mentioned. For example, recent data show that prices for accommodations and airfares have fallen, consistent with an increasing number of anecdotal reports of weaker consumer demand for discretionary travel services.
    I am also monitoring the effect of policy changes on another important channel: inflation expectations. For instance, consumers and businesses have reported tariffs as an important reason for having increased their near-term inflation expectations. Several surveys, including those from the Conference Board and the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and New York, have found that consumers and businesses expect higher inflation one year from now. Another closely watched survey from the University of Michigan showed that one-year-ahead inflation expectations in April were higher than in the pandemic period. This increase in short-run expectations may give businesses more leeway to raise prices.
    Most longer-run measures, including those from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters and the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations, show either stability or much smaller increases in inflation expectations, which does provide some comfort to me. Additionally, inflation compensation, which is based on yields from Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, has increased only for short-term maturities, such as one year ahead, and has shown stability in maturities over the five years starting five years from now. Still, I have taken note of the increase in longer-term inflation expectations from the Michigan survey, which reached the highest level since June 1991. Given these developments, I am keeping a close watch on inflation, because as I have indicated in the past, I believe it is critical to keep long-term inflation expectations very well anchored at 2 percent.
    Looking globally, international developments do not seem to be adding inflationary pressures to the U.S. Economic growth in most developed economies remains moderate, and domestic inflation in those countries has declined from elevated levels. In Europe, activity data point to modest growth as the region deals with headwinds stemming from past energy shocks and competitive pressures from elsewhere in the world. The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has been relatively stable since the beginning of the year. Oil prices have declined significantly since January.
    Monetary PolicyI have discussed a lot of data and developments with you today. To summarize, the U.S. economy has remained resilient up until now, with a still-stable labor market. Meanwhile, the disinflationary process has slowed. This comes against a backdrop of heightened uncertainty as households, businesses, and, indeed, monetary policymakers process the changes to economic policies that are happening around the world. Going forward, I will continue to closely monitor the direct effects of global economic policies on prices and employment, as well as the indirect economic effects from uncertainty, inflation expectations, and productivity.
    U.S. monetary policymakers on the FOMC met last week in Washington. At that meeting, the Committee voted to maintain its policy rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent. Given the upside risks to inflation and given that I still view our policy stance as somewhat restrictive, I supported the decision to keep rates at that level. With inflation and employment potentially moving in opposite directions down the road, I will closely monitor developments as I consider the future path of policy.
    I view our current stance of monetary policy as well positioned for any changes in the macroeconomic environment. I remain committed to achieving both of our dual-mandate goals of maximum employment and stable prices.
    Thank you for your attention today—and thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you here in Dublin. It has been an honor and a privilege. I look forward to your questions.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. See Adriana D. Kugler (2025), “Entrepreneurship and Aggregate Productivity,” speech delivered at the 2025 Miami Economic Forum, Economic Club of Miami, Miami, Florida, February 7. Also, see Adriana D. Kugler (2024), “A Year in Review: A Tale of Two Supply Shocks,” speech delivered at the Detroit Economic Club, Detroit, Michigan, December 3. Return to text
    3. The special questions included in the survey of Texas business executives is available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ website at https://www.dallasfed.org/research/surveys/tbos/2025/2504q#tab-all. Return to text
    4. For the effects of tariffs on productivity, see Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger, Adriana Kugler, and Maurice Kugler (2013), “Trade and Market Selection: Evidence from Manufacturing Plants in Colombia,” Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 16 (January), pp. 135–58; Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger, Adriana Kugler, and Maurice Kugler (2004), “The Effects of Structural Reforms on Productivity and Profitability Enhancing Reallocation: Evidence from Colombia,” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 75 (December), pp. 333–71; and Davide Furceri, Swarnali A. Hannan, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Andrew K. Rose (2022), “The Macroeconomy after Tariffs,” World Bank Economic Review, vol. 36 (May), pp. 361–81. Return to text
    5. For a literature review on quantifying uncertainty, see Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia, Cisil Sarisoy, Juan M. Londono, Bo Sun, Deepa D. Datta, Thiago Ferreira, Olesya Grishchenko, Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar, Francesca Loria, Sai Ma, Marius Rodriguez, Ilknur Zer, and John Rogers (2023), “What Is Certain about Uncertainty?” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 61 (June), pp. 624–54. Return to text
    6. For more details on the economic policy uncertainty index, see Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016), “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131 (November), pp. 1593–1636. For more details on the trade policy uncertainty index, see Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo (2020), “The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 109 (January), pp. 38–59. Return to text
    7. The April 2025 Beige Book is available on the Federal Reserve Board’s website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/beigebook202504-summary.htm. Return to text
    8. For studies documenting how uncertainty shocks may act as adverse aggregate demand shocks, see Sylvain Leduc and Zheng Liu (2016), “Uncertainty Shocks Are Aggregate Demand Shocks,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 82 (September), pp. 20–35, as well as Susanto Basu and Brent Bundick (2017), “Uncertainty Shocks in a Model of Effective Demand,” Econometrica, vol. 85 (May), pp. 937–58. Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Company behind London art galleries which claimed to sell works by Banksy and Andy Warhol is shut down

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Company behind London art galleries which claimed to sell works by Banksy and Andy Warhol is shut down

    The company has been wound-up following a hearing at the High Court

    • Artwork Holdings Ltd, formerly Yield Gallery Limited, described itself as “contemporary art specialists offering the purchase and investment of artwork to the public” 

    • Insolvency Service investigations into the company found conflicting accounts as to whether it was trading, inaccurate accounts, and a suspected under-payment of VAT and corporation tax 

    • The company has been shut down by the High Court, with the Official Receiver appointed as liquidator

    A company with two London art galleries which marketed itself as selling works by famous artists such as Banksy, Andy Warhol and Tracey Emin has been shut down. 

    Artwork Holdings Ltd traded under the banner of Yield Gallery, which described itself as an internationally established “reputable and respected” contemporary and modern art gallery with two locations in London. 

    The business said it specialised in sourcing the rarest works by Banksy and Canadian street artist Richard Hambleton, offering collectors and investors the chance to own “original works from the artists”. 

    However, Insolvency Service investigations into Artwork Holdings were met with a lack of clarity over the company’s trading status, unreliable accounts, and a failure from the directors to adequately co-operate. 

    Artwork Holdings opposed the proceedings and asked the court to dismiss the winding-up petition presented by the Insolvency Service.  

    However, the company was wound-up at a hearing of the High Court in London on Monday 12 May. 

    Edna Okhiria, Chief Investigator at the Insolvency Service, said: 

    Our investigations into Artwork Holdings Ltd found several matters of concern. The company claimed to have ceased trading three years ago, but our investigators uncovered substantial evidence directly contradicting that account. Indeed, the company only changed its name to Artwork Holdings in November 2024.  

    Unreliable and inconsistent accounts were uncovered which did not provide a fair representation of the company’s business. The company and its director also failed to sufficiently co-operate with our investigations. 

    The public rightly expects companies to operate with transparency, file their tax returns, and comply with investigations by law enforcement. Artwork Holdings failed to do this and these matters of concern will now be investigated during the course of the company’s liquidation.

    Yield Gallery was founded in 2019 with a gallery based on Royal Parade, Blackheath, in south-east London. A second space, which the company said was the largest Richard Hambleton gallery in the world, opened on Eastcastle Street in Fitzrovia in June 2024. 

    Insolvency Service investigations into Artwork Holdings began in October 2023, with the company named Yield Gallery Limited at that point. The company had earlier traded under a different name, Yield for You Ltd. 

    Solicitors acting on behalf of the company told investigators that it had ceased trading over a period time, rather than at a particular point as is usually the case. No dates were provided, other than vague statements that it was either in late 2021 or early 2022. 

    A new company, YG Group Ltd, was alleged to have taken over the company’s business and trading activities. 

    But information obtained by the Insolvency Service directly contradicted this, with Yield Gallery’s website referencing the company’s full name on its contact page up until April 2024. 

    A rental agreement for one of Yield Gallery’s former locations was also signed by one of the directors in August 2022, more than six months after it claimed to have stopped trading. 

    Similarly, it advertised an exhibition in Soho in the autumn of 2023, with the licence agreement for the location giving the company name as Yield Gallery and the company number of Artwork Holdings. 

    Several Yield Gallery clients contacted by the Insolvency Service also said they had not been informed the company had ceased trading and that the business had been transferred to YG Group. 

    These issues were not disputed by the company’s active director, who blamed “lax administration”, a “lack of diligence” and “carelessness on my part” for the errors. 

    Inaccurate and unreliable accounts were also discovered during the investigations. 

    Investigators found payments from 64 customers totalling just over £2 million paid into two of the company’s bank accounts between December 2020 and April 2022. 

    But sales for that period were more than £4.2 million, suggesting more than half the company’s revenue did not pass through its bank account. 

    Investigators also found that a £50,000 Covid Bounce Back Loan had been secured by the company in June 2020. From the accounts seen by the Insolvency Service, it was not entitled to this government-backed loan as its turnover in 2019 was zero, not the £200,000 it needed to be to secure the funds. 

    The director claimed that the company was entitled to the Bounce Back Loan and that its accounts were wrong. 

    However, in response to questions from investigators who found that the company appeared to owe more than £100,000 in corporation tax, he said he was “unable to comment on the accuracy of the accounts”. 

    No evidence was provided by Artwork Holdings that it had declared and paid the corporation tax due on its trading. 

    Artwork Holdings was also not registered with HM Revenue and Customs as an art market participant which it was required to do to avoid falling foul of money laundering regulations. 

    Concerns were also identified that the company had not paid the appropriate amount of VAT. 

    The Official Receiver has been appointed as liquidator of Artwork Holdings Ltd. 

    All enquiries concerning the affairs of the company should be made to the Official Receiver of the Public Interest Unit: 16th Floor, 1 Westfield Avenue, Stratford, London, E20 1HZ. Email: piu.or@insolvency.gov.uk. 

    Based on the available evidence provided to the Insolvency Service, there is no indication that any of the artists named above had any direct relationship with the company.

    Further information

    • Artwork Holdings Ltd (company number 12067319) 

    • The Insolvency Service can investigate complaints about corporate abuse by live companies. This may include serious misconduct, fraud, scams or dishonest practice in the way the company operates. Further information on our live investigations can be found here 

    • Further information about the work of the Insolvency Service, and how to complain about financial misconduct, is available here.

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    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Byline Bank Expands Payments and Fintech Banking Group to Support Embedded Payment Solutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CHICAGO, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Byline Bank today announced the expansion of its Payments and Fintech Banking division, including several key new hires and leadership appointments, which underscore the bank’s significant investment in embedded finance and modern digital payment solutions.

    Since bringing on industry veterans David Prochnow and Joe Wolsfeld to lead the fintech banking group in March 2024, Byline has taken significant steps in the fintech payments arena. Prior to joining Byline, Prochnow and Wolsfeld led Fifth Third Bank’s Newline embedded payments division, where they managed a portfolio of more than 100 fintech clients representing $2 billion in deposits. Together at Byline, they have built a sponsorship banking and embedded payments model centered on direct oversight, regulatory compliance and faster access to payment networks, enabling fintech clients to develop technology and custom payment solutions with confidence.

    “This team represents an important evolution for Byline as we continue to invest in innovation and meet our clients where they are,” said Alberto Paracchini, President and Chief Executive Officer of Byline Bank. “We’re proud to bring together some of the most experienced fintech banking professionals in the industry, who not only understand the needs of fintech founders but also know how to build these programs the right way—with stability, oversight and collaboration at their core.”

    The team’s strategy of direct, high-touch client engagement is well-timed and backed by the strength of a well-capitalized commercial bank with a history of managing complex business lines.

    “Despite new competitors entering the fintech space in recent years, there has been a gap in banks that want to serve and directly engage with fintech customers,” said Prochnow. “Our team at Byline knows from experience that successful fintech-bank partnerships are rooted in relationships.”

    To power this division, Byline has assembled a seasoned team with deep experience in building and managing complex embedded payment platforms. Led by Prochnow and Wolsfeld, the new team includes the following professionals, who bring a wide range of expertise and sophistication to the division:

    • Paul Garcia, Senior Vice President, Payments and Fintech Banking Risk Manager, joined in January after more than two decades with First National Bank of Omaha, TSYS, MB Financial and Fifth Third Bank, where he led both large-scale risk management teams and national business lines.
    • Ashley Kveton, Vice President and Fintech Banking Operations Director, joined in April following 17 years at MB Financial and Fifth Third Bank, where she held senior roles leading operations and client success groups within their national embedded payments and sponsorship banking division.
    • Joe Tarkington, Vice President of Sales and Relationship Management, joined Byline in April. He previously served as Vice President of Sales and Relationship Management for Newline at MB Financial and Fifth Third Bank.

    The group will provide third-party payment processing for treasury payment flows, issuing and deposit sponsorship banking for virtual card and account programs, and network sponsorship banking for independent sales organizations and payment processors. These offerings are built on a model of direct oversight, designed to streamline execution without relying on outside intermediaries.

    “The message from fintech clients is loud and clear,” said Wolsfeld. “They want to work directly with banks that have experienced teams that understand their business, and that’s what we’ve built here at Byline.”

    About Byline Bank
    Headquartered in Chicago, Byline Bank, a subsidiary of Byline Bancorp, Inc. (NYSE:BY), is a full-service commercial bank serving small- and medium-sized businesses, financial sponsors and consumers. Byline Bank operates over 40 branch locations throughout the Chicago and Milwaukee metropolitan areas. Byline Bank offers a broad range of commercial and community banking products and services, including small-ticket equipment leasing solutions, and is one of the top U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) lenders according to the national SBA rankings by volume FY2024. Byline Bank is a member of FDIC and an Equal Housing Lender.

    Visit bylinebank.com for more information, and follow Byline Bank on Facebook, LinkedIn, X or Instagram for the latest news and updates.

    Media Contact:
    Allison Roche
    Marketing Communications & Partnerships Manager
    Byline Bank
    aroche@bylinebank.com

    Investor Contact:
    Brooks Rennie
    Investor Relations Director
    Byline Bank
    (312) 660-5805
    brennie@bylinebank.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/e6afab2d-4383-4bbb-98d8-672498acf290

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump heads to the Gulf aiming to bolster trade ties – but side talks on Tehran, Gaza could drive a wedge between US and Israel

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

    President Donald Trump and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman attend the G20 Summit in Japan in 2019. Eliot Blondet/AFP via Getty Images

    President Donald Trump will sit down with the Saudi crown prince and Emirati and Qatari leaders on May 14, 2025, in what is being heavily touted as a high-stakes summit. Not invited, and watching warily, will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

    Like many other members of his right-wing coalition, Netanyahu appeared delighted at the election of Trump as U.S. president in November, believing that the Republican’s Middle East policies would undoubtedly favor Israeli interests and be coordinated closely with Netanyahu himself.

    But it hasn’t quite played out that way. Of course, Washington remains – certainly in official communications – Israel’s strongest global ally and chief supplier of arms. But Trump is promoting a Middle East policy that is, at times, distinctly at odds with the interests of Netanyahu and his government.

    In fact, in pushing for an Iran nuclear deal – a surprise reversal from Trump’s first administration – Trump is undermining long-held Netanyahu positions. Such is the level of alarm in Israeli right-wing circles that rumors have been circulating of Trump announcing unilateral U.S. support for a Palestinian state ahead of the Riyadh visit – something that would represent a clear departure for Washington.

    As a historian of Israel and the broader Middle East, I recognize that in key ways Trump’s agenda in Riyadh represents a continuation of the U.S. policies, notably in pursuing security relationships with Arab Gulf monarchies – something Israel has long accepted if not openly supported. But in the process, the trip could also put significant daylight between Trump and Netanyahu.

    Trump’s official agenda

    The four-day trip to the Gulf, Trump’s first policy-driven foreign visit since being elected president, is on the surface more about developing economic and security ties between the U.S. and traditional allies in the Persian Gulf.

    Trump is expected to cement trade deals worth tens of billions of dollars between the U.S. and Arab Gulf States, including unprecedented arms purchases, Gulf investments in the U.S. and even the floated Qatari gift of a palatial 747 intended for use as Air Force One.

    There is also the possibility of a security alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

    So far, so good for Israel’s government. Prior to the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel was already in the process of forging closer ties to the Gulf states, with deals and diplomatic relations established with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain through the Abraham Accords that the Trump administration itself facilitated in September 2020. A potential normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia was also in the offing.

    Dealing with Tehran

    But central to the agenda this week in Riyadh will be issues where Trump and Netanyahu are increasingly not on the same page. And that starts with Iran.

    While the country won’t be represented, Iran will feature heavily at Trump’s summit, as it coincides with the U.S. administration’s ongoing diplomatic talks with Tehran over its nuclear program. Those negotiations have now concluded four rounds. And despite clear challenges, American and Iranian delegations continue to project optimism about the possibility of reaching a deal.

    The approach marks a change of course for Trump, who in 2018 abandoned a similar deal to the one he is now largely looking to forge. It also suggests the U.S. is currently opposed to the idea of direct armed confrontation with Iran, against Netanayhu’s clear preference.

    Diplomacy with Tehran is also favored by Gulf states as a way of containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia – Tehran’s long-term regional rival that, like Israel, opposed the Obama-era Iran nuclear diplomacy – is increasingly looking for a more cautious engagement with Iran. In April, the Saudi defense minister visited Tehran ahead of the recent U.S.-Iranian negotiations.

    Netanyahu has built his political career on the looming threat from a nuclearized Iran and the necessity to nip this threat in the bud. He unsuccessfully tried to undermine President Barack Obama’s initial efforts to reach an agreement with Iran – resulting in 2015’s Iran nuclear deal. But Netanyahu had more luck with Obama’s successor, helping convince Trump to withdraw from the agreement in 2018.

    So Trump’s about-turn on Iran talks has irked Netanyahu – not only because it happened, but because it happened so publicly. In April, the U.S. president called Netanyahu to the White House and openly embarrassed him by stating that Washington is pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran.

    Split over Yemen

    A clear indication of the potential tension between the Trump administration and the Israeli government can be seen in the ongoing skirmishes involving the U.S., Israel and the Houthis in Yemen.

    After the Houthis fired a missile at the Tel Aviv airport on May 4 – leading to its closure and the cancellation of multiple international flights – Israel struck back, devastating an airport and other facilities in Yemen’s capital.

    But just a few hours after the Israeli attack, Trump announced that the U.S. would not strike the Houthis anymore, as they had “surrendered” to his demands and agreed not to block passage of U.S. ships in the Red Sea.

    It became clear that Israel was not involved in this new understanding between the U.S. and the Houthis. Trump’s statement was also notable in its timing, and could be taken as an effort to calm the region in preparation of his trip to Saudi Arabia. The fact that it might help smooth talks with Iran too – Tehran being the Houthis’ main sponsor – was likely a factor as well.

    Timing is also relevant in Israel’s latest attack on Yemeni ports. They took place on May 11 – the eve of Trump setting off for his visit to Saudi Arabia. In so doing, Netanyahu may be sending a signal not only to the Houthis but also to the U.S. and Iran. Continuing to attack the Houthis might make nuclear talks more difficult.

    Bibi’s political survival-first approach

    Critical observers of Netanyahu have long argued that he prioritizes continued war in Gaza over regional calm for the sake of holding together his far-right coalition, members of which desire full control of the Gaza Strip and de-facto annexation of the West Bank.

    Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warns of the Iran nuclear threat at the United Nations in 2012.
    Mario Tama/Getty Images

    This, many political commentators have argued, is the main reason why Netanyahu backed off from the last stage of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas in March – something which would have required the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip.

    Since the collapse of the ceasefire, Israel’s army has mobilized in preparation for a renewed Gaza assault, scheduled to start after the end of Trump’s trip to the Gulf.

    With members of the Netanayhu government openly supporting the permanent occupation of the strip and declaring that bringing back the remaining Israeli hostages is no longer a top priority, it seems clear to me that deescalation is not on Netanyahu’s agenda.

    Trump himself has noted recently both the alarming state of the hostages and the grave humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Now, in addition to the release of Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander, the U.S. is also engaged in negotiations with Hamas over ceasefire and aid – ignoring Netanyahu in the process.

    The bottom dollar

    Current U.S. policy in the region may all be serving a greater aim for Trump: to secure billions of dollars of Gulf money for the American economy and, some have said, himself. But to achieve that requires a stable Middle East, and continued war in Gaza and Iran inching closer to nuclear capabilities might disrupt that goal.

    Of course, a diplomatic agreement over Tehran’s nuclear plans is still some way off. And Trump’s foreign policy is notably prone to abrupt turns. But whether guided by a dealmaker’s instincts to pursue trade and economic deals with wealthy Gulf states, or by a genuine – and related – desire to stabilize the region, his administration is increasingly pursuing policies that go against the interests of the current Israeli government.

    Asher Kaufman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump heads to the Gulf aiming to bolster trade ties – but side talks on Tehran, Gaza could drive a wedge between US and Israel – https://theconversation.com/trump-heads-to-the-gulf-aiming-to-bolster-trade-ties-but-side-talks-on-tehran-gaza-could-drive-a-wedge-between-us-and-israel-256371

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Sydbank share buyback programme: transactions in week 19

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Company Announcement No 22/2025

    Peberlyk 4
    6200 Aabenraa
    Denmark

    Tel +45 74 37 37 37
    Fax +45 74 37 35 36

    Sydbank A/S
    CVR No DK 12626509, Aabenraa
    sydbank.dk

    12 May 2025  

    Dear Sirs

    Sydbank share buyback programme: transactions in week 19
    On 26 February 2025 Sydbank announced a share buyback programme of DKK 1,350m. The share buyback programme commenced on 3 March 2025 and will be completed by 31 January 2026.

    The purpose of the share buyback programme is to reduce the share capital of Sydbank and the programme is executed in compliance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 of 8 March 2016, collectively referred to as the Safe Harbour rules.

    The following transactions have been made under the share buyback programme:

      Number of shares VWAP Gross value (DKK)
    Accumulated, most recent
    Announcement

    696,000

     

    289,031,550.00

    05 May 2025
    06 May 2025
    07 May 2025
    08 May 2025
    09 May 2025
    12,000
    13,000
    13,000
    14,000
    14,000
    433.74
    428.47
    422.12
    421.07
    417.79
    5,204,880.00
    5,570,110.00
    5,487,560.00
    5,894,980.00
    5,849,060.00
    Total over week 19 66,000   28,006,590.00
    Total accumulated during the
    share buyback programme

    762,000

     

    317,038,140.00

    All transactions were made under ISIN DK 0010311471 and effected by Danske Bank A/S on behalf of Sydbank A/S.

    Further information about the transactions, cf Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on market abuse and Commission delegated regulation, is available in the attachment.

    Following the above transactions, Sydbank A/S holds a total of 760,964 own shares, equal to 1,48% of the Bank’s share capital. Sydbank A/S had at its disposal, through direct and indirect holdings, 768,839 shares in Sydbank A/S, representing 1.51% of the total share capital of Sydbank A/S.

    Yours sincerely
            
    Mark Luscombe        Jørn Adam Møller
    CEO        Deputy Group Chief Executive

    Attachment

    • SM 22 UK incl. enc

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Integration processes in international trade and logistics discussed at conference in HSE

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    © Higher School of Economics

    In the context of decoupling, Russia has become a center of attraction for Eurasian integration processes and can play a unifying role in the new multipolar world. This was discussed by participants and guests of the International Scientific and Practical Conference “Dimensions of Eurasian Integration: Transport and Logistics, Energy and Food Security”, which was held Institute of State and Municipal Administration (IGMU) HSE University.

    The conference was attended by leaders of the domestic corporate sector, Russian and foreign industry experts and representatives of the diplomatic corps of friendly countries of the Arab East. Among the participating organizations were Russian Railways and Russian Railways Logistics, Russian Agricultural Bank, Renaissance Insurance, RusHydro and the Resource Group of Agricultural Enterprises, Sber and the Ministry of Tourism and Cultural Heritage of the Sultanate of Oman, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russia and the Eurasian Economic Commission, and the International Research Institute for Management Problems.

    Director of the Irkutsk State Medical University of the National Research University Higher School of Economics Andrey Zhulin noted that it is now important to listen to and hear professionals in the field of public administration and public-private partnership. “This will allow us to analyze successful practices in the field of integration processes during a period of fundamental changes in international trade and logistics,” he emphasized.

    It is important that the conference is taking place at the Higher School of Economics. Over the past 30 years, it is the HSE, according to the director of the Irkutsk State Medical University, that has proven its importance for the national economy and has become a kind of assembly point for integration and management meanings.

    Russia is attracting the attention of politicians and market players with increasing intensity, noted in turn the director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Irkutsk State Medical University of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, member of the Russian-Omani Business Council under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (CCI) Marat Zembatov. “Our country is called upon to play a unique unifying role – both as the center of gravity of Eurasia, and as a state-civilization with its own special economic and cultural structure, and as the center of the transport and logistics framework of the Eurasian economic space in the broad sense,” the expert said.

    He recalled that earlier in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. In the coming days, the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran will come into force, and the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and this country has already been ratified. It is Moscow that is becoming the center of attraction for integration processes and the center for the formation of new integration meanings.

    During the expert discussion, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Yemen Ahmed Salem Al-Waheishi congratulated those gathered on the upcoming anniversary – the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and noted the invariably creative role of Russia in strengthening stability and ensuring food security in the Global South and Global East.

    The use of modern transport, logistics and digital technologies to ensure the growth of foreign trade, including in the direction of the Arab East, North and East Africa, according to the ambassador, have become key factors in the successful implementation of Russia’s unifying role in organizing the use of international transport corridors.

    Counselor of the Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain in the Russian Federation Salum Hossam Eddin, who delivered a welcoming speech on behalf of Ambassador Ahmed Abdulrahman Al-Saati, stated that friendly relations between Russia and the countries of the Arab East will receive an additional boost this year: already in June, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the Kingdom of Bahrain will be presented to participants as an honorary guest country.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta Issues Impact and Affordable Housing Advisory Council Report

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ATLANTA, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta (FHLBank Atlanta) released its Impact and Affordable Housing Advisory Council (AHAC) Report, describing the organization’s highest year of funding to date for affordable housing and community development. The report also outlines the widespread reach of FHLBank Atlanta’s lending products for member institutions and the community investment programs positively impacting its district in 2024.  

    “We are proud of our work to provide nearly 800 financial institutions with access to funding to support local lending for small businesses, mortgages, and community development projects,” said Kirk Malmberg, president and CEO of FHLBank Atlanta. “Additionally, each year we work with members to ensure we offer affordable housing grant programs that address current needs. For 2024, this resulted in the introduction of Workforce Housing Plus+, a new initiative to provide downpayment assistance to a broader population of borrowers challenged by the rising cost of homes and high interest rates.”

    In total, FHLBank Atlanta contributed a record $120 million in grants for affordable housing and community development in 2024. Additional highlights of the report include:

    • $55 million distributed through the Affordable Housing Program (AHP) General Fund, supporting 66 projects that will create or rehabilitate more than 4,200 affordable housing units
    • $40 million distributed through the AHP Homeownership Set-aside Program, providing homeownership grants to more than 3,000 households for downpayment, closing cost, and home rehabilitation assistance
    • $20 million distributed through the Workforce Housing Plus+ program, providing downpayment and closing cost assistance to more than 1,300 households
    • $5.9 million in total allocated to 21 organizations addressing heirs’ property issues to help more than 5,000 families protect their assets and build generational wealth
    • $1 billion in Community Investment Program advances to support housing and economic development
    • $250,000 donated to the American Red Cross for recovery efforts following Hurricane Helene
    • 48 forums attended to promote financial literacy and homeownership knowledge sharing across the FHLBank Atlanta district

    The report also highlights FHLBank Atlanta’s culture of giving back, including its ongoing Community Involvement program and volunteerism efforts.

    “FHLBank Atlanta continues to remain a reliable source of lending for members, allowing us to deliver on our purpose of earning trust, building relationships, and bettering lives,” said Tomeka Strickland, senior vice president and director of community investment services of FHLBank Atlanta. “The record amount of grant funding we distributed last year is a direct reflection of our collaboration with members and commitment to our communities, and we look forward to strengthening these partnerships in 2025 to continue investing in the neighborhoods our members serve.”

    About Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta
    FHLBank Atlanta offers competitively-priced financing, community development grants, and other banking services to help member financial institutions make affordable home mortgages and provide economic development credit to neighborhoods and communities. The Bank is a cooperative whose members are commercial banks, credit unions, savings institutions, community development financial institutions, and insurance companies located in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. FHLBank Atlanta is one of 11 district banks in the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBank System). Since 1990, the FHLBanks have awarded approximately $9.1 billion in Affordable Housing Program funds, assisting more than 1.2 million households. 
    For more information, visit our website at www.fhlbatl.com.

    Contact: Sheryl Touchton
    Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta
    stouchton@fhlbatl.com

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
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