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Category: Brexit

  • MIL-OSI Russia: UK and French leaders pledge to jointly combat illegal migration

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    LONDON, July 10 (Xinhua) — British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met with French President Emmanuel Macron at his Downing Street residence on Wednesday, vowing to work together to combat illegal migration.

    “The leaders agreed that tackling the threat of illegal migration and small boat crossings is a shared priority that requires joint solutions,” said a statement released by the Prime Minister’s Office.

    “Both leaders agreed on the need to move forward and make progress in developing new and innovative solutions, including new deterrents to disrupt the business model of these gangs,” the statement said.

    Despite joint funding and collaboration, more than 20,000 people have arrived in the UK from France on small boats across the English Channel this year, a 50 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2024.

    Both leaders are under enormous pressure in their countries over a surge in far-right and anti-immigration political sentiment. In a speech to the British parliament on Tuesday, Mr Macron called the issue a “burden” for both countries. It remains unclear whether the two sides will reach a new deal to combat illegal migration during the French president’s three-day visit.

    During their meeting on Wednesday, the leaders also discussed joint efforts to further deepen the partnership, from strengthening defense cooperation to increasing bilateral trade and investment.

    A British-French summit is planned for Thursday, at which both sides aim to make concrete progress in these areas, the statement said.

    Macron began a state visit to the UK on Tuesday, the first such visit by a French president since 2008. Macron is also the first head of state from the European Union to visit the UK on a state visit since Brexit. –0–

    Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    .

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • UK and France must end dependency on US and China, Macron warns

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    French President Emmanuel Macron said on Tuesday Britain and France must work together to counter the world’s many destabilising threats and protect Europe from “excessive dependencies” on the United States and China.

    Macron, in a rare address to both houses of the British parliament, celebrated the return of closer ties between the two countries as he became the first European leader to be invited for a British state visit since Brexit.

    Having been greeted earlier by the British royal family, Macron set out to parliament where he said the two countries needed to come together to strengthen Europe, including on defence, immigration, climate, and trade.

    “The United Kingdom and France must once again show the world that our alliance can make all the difference,” he said.

    “The only way to overcome the challenges we have, the challenges of our times, will be to go together hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder.”

    Listing the geopolitical threats the countries face, Macron argued they should also be wary of the “excessive dependencies of both the U.S. and China,” saying they needed to “de-risk our economies and our societies from this dual dependency.”

    But he also set out the opportunities of a closer union, saying they should make it easier for students, researchers and artists to live in each other’s countries, and seek to work together on artificial intelligence and protect children online.

    The speech symbolised the improvement in relations sought by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s centre-left Labour Party, as part of a broader reset of ties with European allies following the rancour over Britain’s departure from the European Union.

    ‘ENTENTE AMICALE’

    Macron, who enjoys a strong personal relationship with King Charles, was earlier greeted by the royal family, including heir-to-the-throne Prince William and his wife Princess Catherine, before they travelled in horse-drawn carriages to Windsor Castle.

    Charles used his speech at the evening’s opulent state banquet to christen a new era of friendly relations, upgrading the “entente cordiale” – an alliance dating from 1904 that ended centuries of military rivalries – to an “entente amicale.”

    “As we dine here in this ancient place, redolent with our shared history, allow me to propose a toast to France and to our new entente. An entente not only past and present, but for the future – and no longer just cordiale, but now amicale,” he said.

    The 76-year-old monarch, who is undergoing treatment for cancer, had a noticeably red right eye. A Buckingham Palace source said he had suffered a burst blood vessel that was unrelated to any other health condition.

    Britain and France marked the three-day visit with an announcement that French nuclear energy utility EDF would invest £1.1 billion ($1.5 billion) in a nuclear power project in eastern England.

    The two also said France would lend Britain the Bayeux Tapestry, allowing the 11th-century masterpiece to return for the first time in more than 900 years, in exchange for Britain loaning France Anglo-Saxon and Viking treasures.

    The state visit comes 16 years after the late Queen Elizabeth hosted then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy.

    Despite tensions over post-Brexit ties and how to stop asylum seekers from crossing the Channel in small boats, Britain and France have been working closely to create a planned military force to support Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire with Russia.

    Starmer is hoping that will help persuade Macron to take a different approach to stopping people smuggling, with London wanting to try out an asylum seekers’ returns deal. This would involve Britain deporting one asylum seeker to France in exchange for another with a legitimate case to be in Britain.

    A record number of asylum seekers have arrived in Britain on small boats in the first six months of this year.

    Starmer, whose party is trailing Nigel Farage’s right-wing Reform UK party in the polls, is under pressure to find a solution.

    France has previously refused to sign such an agreement, saying Britain should negotiate an arrangement with all EU countries.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Cahal Moran, Visiting Fellow in the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    During my adult life, I have never experienced what it’s like to live in a “good” economy. Starting with the global financial crash in 2008, which hit just as I began studying economics, the world seems to have lurched from crisis to crisis and the UK economy even more so.

    Some of those crises, like the crash and COVID, are sudden shocks. Others have been more gradual, such as increasingly unaffordable housing or the rising dominance of the world’s ultra rich.

    As I explore in my new book, Why We’re Getting Poorer, the result of these crises is an economic system which works for some much more than it does for others. Here are four reasons why you may be feeling let down.

    1. Grasping for growth

    Like many of his fellow leaders across the world, the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, is aiming to make economic growth the primary mission of his government. And understandably so.

    A growing economy puts more money in people’s pockets and brings other benefits such as low unemployment. But economic growth is not easy (in the UK it has been poor for a long time).

    That’s because there’s no GDP dial that a prime minister or president can simply turn up. Research shows that economic growth is an amorphous and difficult goal which depends on many factors – geopolitical, demographic, technological – outside any single country’s control.

    One option is to focus on achievable goals around investment, like the public investments of £113 billion on homes, transport and energy planned in the UK. But big projects can take a long time to build and develop, so even if they do boost growth, it can take a while for households to feel the benefits.

    2. Inherent inequality

    Against the backdrop of low growth in the UK has been high inequality, under Conservative and Labour governments. And again, inequality is an international issue.

    The wealth of the richest people in the world skyrocketed over COVID, buoyed in many cases by the increased importance of the tech sector during lockdowns. Even before the pandemic, wealth inequality was a problem across the globe.

    This imbalance has given the very richest opportunities to buy up commercial competitors, indulge in space travel and control large parts of the media, exerting extreme economic, social and political power. Needless to say, their economic priorities are not the same as everyone else’s.

    Meanwhile, communities and regions may be left behind, with declining physical and social infrastructure. People living in hollowed out areas where incomes and opportunities are limited are unlikely to feel that the economic system is working for them.

    3. Globalisation

    Globalisation has made a lot of people – in places like China, India and Brazil – better off. But it is not a system which ensures economic benefits for everyone.

    With global competition, big businesses are often under pressure to reduce costs. Free trade deals have often failed to enforce labour standards or redistribute gains to poorly paid workers, and in many cases simply made the rich richer.

    Such a distorted form of economic governance, where large sections of society end up feeling left behind was bound to provoke a response. Some would link it to recent political events like Brexit and the presidencies of Donald Trump, whose international tariffs are a clear attempt to reverse the rise of globalisation.

    Sporadic supply chains.
    Corona Borealis Studio/Shutterstock

    Since the pandemic, more fault-lines have been exposed. The global economy has become too dependent on certain regions, epitomised by Taiwanese dominance in the manufacturing of semiconductors, or European reliance on Russia for gas and oil.

    Recent years have also seen supply chain bottlenecks, leading to shortages of goods including cars, phones and even salad ingredients. Inflexible global systems have been ineffective, and internationally agreed fixes are hard to achieve.

    4. Climate change

    World news at the start of 2020 was dominated by the massive wildfires raging across Australia. At the start of 2025, Los Angeles burned.

    As the global climate shifts and lurches, extreme weather events are becoming more common. Floods, hurricanes and extreme temperatures look to be the likely outcome.

    When sea levels rise, countless coastal cities will experience flooding, and many Pacific islands may disappear altogether. The UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that humanity will struggle with food production, disease and massive migration.

    This will all result in huge economic costs, impeding growth and disrupting livelihoods across the world. According to the IPCC, the impacts could range from extreme weather events disrupting infrastructure to changing weather reducing yields in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

    Yet many countries appear to be backtracking on their commitment to reducing emissions. It seems they would prefer to deal with the fallout of climate change rather than invest in potential solutions like carbon taxes, walkable cities or alternative fuels. But such acts of self-harm are not a sound basis for a prosperous economy, society or planet.

    Cahal Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side – https://theconversation.com/four-reasons-why-many-of-us-feel-the-global-economy-is-not-on-our-side-252220

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Cahal Moran, Visiting Fellow in the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    During my adult life, I have never experienced what it’s like to live in a “good” economy. Starting with the global financial crash in 2008, which hit just as I began studying economics, the world seems to have lurched from crisis to crisis and the UK economy even more so.

    Some of those crises, like the crash and COVID, are sudden shocks. Others have been more gradual, such as increasingly unaffordable housing or the rising dominance of the world’s ultra rich.

    As I explore in my new book, Why We’re Getting Poorer, the result of these crises is an economic system which works for some much more than it does for others. Here are four reasons why you may be feeling let down.

    1. Grasping for growth

    Like many of his fellow leaders across the world, the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, is aiming to make economic growth the primary mission of his government. And understandably so.

    A growing economy puts more money in people’s pockets and brings other benefits such as low unemployment. But economic growth is not easy (in the UK it has been poor for a long time).

    That’s because there’s no GDP dial that a prime minister or president can simply turn up. Research shows that economic growth is an amorphous and difficult goal which depends on many factors – geopolitical, demographic, technological – outside any single country’s control.

    One option is to focus on achievable goals around investment, like the public investments of £113 billion on homes, transport and energy planned in the UK. But big projects can take a long time to build and develop, so even if they do boost growth, it can take a while for households to feel the benefits.

    2. Inherent inequality

    Against the backdrop of low growth in the UK has been high inequality, under Conservative and Labour governments. And again, inequality is an international issue.

    The wealth of the richest people in the world skyrocketed over COVID, buoyed in many cases by the increased importance of the tech sector during lockdowns. Even before the pandemic, wealth inequality was a problem across the globe.

    This imbalance has given the very richest opportunities to buy up commercial competitors, indulge in space travel and control large parts of the media, exerting extreme economic, social and political power. Needless to say, their economic priorities are not the same as everyone else’s.

    Meanwhile, communities and regions may be left behind, with declining physical and social infrastructure. People living in hollowed out areas where incomes and opportunities are limited are unlikely to feel that the economic system is working for them.

    3. Globalisation

    Globalisation has made a lot of people – in places like China, India and Brazil – better off. But it is not a system which ensures economic benefits for everyone.

    With global competition, big businesses are often under pressure to reduce costs. Free trade deals have often failed to enforce labour standards or redistribute gains to poorly paid workers, and in many cases simply made the rich richer.

    Such a distorted form of economic governance, where large sections of society end up feeling left behind was bound to provoke a response. Some would link it to recent political events like Brexit and the presidencies of Donald Trump, whose international tariffs are a clear attempt to reverse the rise of globalisation.

    Sporadic supply chains.
    Corona Borealis Studio/Shutterstock

    Since the pandemic, more fault-lines have been exposed. The global economy has become too dependent on certain regions, epitomised by Taiwanese dominance in the manufacturing of semiconductors, or European reliance on Russia for gas and oil.

    Recent years have also seen supply chain bottlenecks, leading to shortages of goods including cars, phones and even salad ingredients. Inflexible global systems have been ineffective, and internationally agreed fixes are hard to achieve.

    4. Climate change

    World news at the start of 2020 was dominated by the massive wildfires raging across Australia. At the start of 2025, Los Angeles burned.

    As the global climate shifts and lurches, extreme weather events are becoming more common. Floods, hurricanes and extreme temperatures look to be the likely outcome.

    When sea levels rise, countless coastal cities will experience flooding, and many Pacific islands may disappear altogether. The UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that humanity will struggle with food production, disease and massive migration.

    This will all result in huge economic costs, impeding growth and disrupting livelihoods across the world. According to the IPCC, the impacts could range from extreme weather events disrupting infrastructure to changing weather reducing yields in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

    Yet many countries appear to be backtracking on their commitment to reducing emissions. It seems they would prefer to deal with the fallout of climate change rather than invest in potential solutions like carbon taxes, walkable cities or alternative fuels. But such acts of self-harm are not a sound basis for a prosperous economy, society or planet.

    Cahal Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side – https://theconversation.com/four-reasons-why-many-of-us-feel-the-global-economy-is-not-on-our-side-252220

    MIL OSI –

  • King Charles hosts Macron in first European state visit since Brexit

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Britain’s King Charles will welcome French President Emmanuel Macron to Windsor Castle on Tuesday for the first state visit by a European leader since Brexit in a trip aimed at celebrating the return of closer political ties between the countries.

    The grand ceremonial event will be the first for Macron, who enjoys a good personal relationship with the king. The last state visit to Britain by a French president was in 2008, when Nicolas Sarkozy was a guest of the late Queen Elizabeth.

    Britain has been trying to reset ties with European allies since Prime Minister Keir Starmer was elected last year. The talks this week will focus on a range of issues, including how to stop people-smuggling and improving economic and defence ties at a time when the United States is retrenching from its traditional role as a defender of European security.

    Although there have been tensions over the shape of post-Brexit ties and how to stop asylum seekers from crossing the Channel in small boats, Britain and France have been working closely together to create a planned military force to support Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire with Russia.

    Sebastien Maillard, an associate fellow at London’s Chatham House think tank, said the two sides were seeking to repair some of the damage done by the Brexit negotiations in the run up to Britain leaving the EU in 2020, “when France was more or less playing the bad cop”.

    While Macron’s three-day visit is filled with meetings about economic issues and foreign affairs, the first day of the visit is largely focused on pageantry, and heavy in symbolism.

    Prince William and his wife Kate will greet Macron and his wife Brigitte at a military airport in London and will accompany them to Windsor where they will be officially welcomed by the king and Queen Camilla, and gun salutes.

    They will then travel in a carriage procession through Windsor’s streets, attend a military parade and then have lunch with the royal family at the castle.

    On Tuesday afternoon, Macron will travel back to London to speak to lawmakers in the parliament. The day will end with a state dinner at Windsor Castle, including speeches by the king and Macron in front of about 150 guests.

    MIGRANTS’ RETURN DEAL

    The following day Starmer will host Macron at Downing Street where they will discuss how to stop the flow of tens of thousands of asylum seekers across the Channel.

    British officials are hoping that Macron will agree to a pilot of an asylum seekers’ returns deal. This would involve Britain deporting one asylum seeker to France in exchange for another with a legitimate case to be in Britain, thereby disrupting the business model of people-smuggling gangs.

    A record number of asylum seekers have arrived in Britain on small boats from France in the first six months of this year. Starmer, trailing behind Nigel Farage’s insurgent, right-wing Reform UK party in the polls, is under pressure to come up with a solution.

    France has previously refused to sign up to such an agreement, saying Britain should negotiate an arrangement with all the EU countries.

    On Thursday, Starmer and Macron will host a UK-France summit to discuss other bilateral issues and how to support Ukraine. The two could also announce further cooperation on nuclear investment, such as at Sizewell C.

    Macron’s visit is a sign of a new era in relations.

    Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said in his memoirs published last year that Macron wanted to punish Britain after it voted to leave the EU in 2016.

    Britain and France in recent years have publicly clashed over fishing rights and a submarine alliance that united Britain, Australia and the United States, but left France on the sidelines.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Welcome to post-growth Europe – can anyone accept this new political reality?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Peter Bloom, Professor of Management, University of Essex

    TSViPhoto/Shutterstock

    Across much of Europe, the engines of economic growth are sputtering. In its latest global outlook, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sharply downgraded its forecasts for the UK and Europe, warning that the continent faces persistent economic bumps in the road.

    Globally, the World Bank recently said this decade is likely to be the weakest for growth since the 1960s. “Outside of Asia, the developing world is becoming a development-free zone,” the bank’s chief economist warned.

    The UK economy went into reverse in April 2025, shrinking by 0.3%. The announcement came a day after the UK chancellor, Rachel Reeves, delivered her spending review to the House of Commons with a speech that mentioned the word “growth” nine times – including promising “a Growth Mission Fund to expedite local projects that are important for growth”:

    I said that we wanted growth in all parts of Britain – and, Mr Speaker, I meant it.

    Across Europe, a long-term economic forecast to 2040 predicted annual growth of just 0.9% over the next 15 years – down from 1.3% in the decade before COVID. And this forecast was in December 2024, before Donald Trump’s aggressive tariff policies had reignited trade tensions between the US and Europe (and pretty much everywhere else in the world).

    Even before Trump’s tariffs, the reality was clear to many economic experts. “Europe’s tragedy”, as one columnist put it, is that it is “deeply uncompetitive, with poor productivity, lagging in technology and AI, and suffering from regulatory overload”. In his 2024 report on European (un)competitiveness, Mario Draghi – former president of the European Central Bank (and then, briefly, Italy’s prime minister) – warned that without radical policy overhauls and investment, Europe faces “a slow agony” of relative decline.

    To date, the typical response of electorates has been to blame the policymakers and replace their governments at the first opportunity. Meanwhile, politicians of all shades whisper sweet nothings about how they alone know how to find new sources of growth – most commonly, from the magic AI tree. Because growth, with its widely accepted power to deliver greater productivity and prosperity, remains a key pillar in European politics, upheld by all parties as the benchmark of credibility, progress and control.

    But what if the sobering truth is that growth is no longer reliably attainable – across Europe at least? Not just this year or this decade but, in any meaningful sense, ever?

    The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.

    For a continent like Europe – with limited land and no more empires to exploit, ageing populations, major climate concerns and electorates demanding ever-stricter barriers to immigration – the conditions that once underpinned steady economic expansion may no longer exist. And in the UK more than most European countries, these issues are compounded by high levels of long-term sickness, early retirement and economic inactivity among working-age adults.

    As the European Parliament suggested back in 2023, the time may be coming when we are forced to look “beyond growth” – not because we want to, but because there is no other realistic option for many European nations.

    But will the public ever accept this new reality? As an expert in how public policy can be used to transform economies and societies, my question is not whether a world without growth is morally superior or more sustainable (though it may be both). Rather, I’m exploring if it’s ever possible for political parties to be honest about a “post-growth world” and still get elected – or will voters simply turn to the next leader who promises they know the secret of perpetual growth, however sketchy the evidence?

    Which way is the right way?
    Pixelvario/Shutterstock

    What drives growth?

    To understand why Europe in particular is having such a hard time generating economic growth, first we need to understand what drives it – and why some countries are better placed than others in terms of productivity (the ability to keep their economy growing).

    Economists have a relatively straightforward answer. At its core, growth comes from two factors: labour and capital (machinery, technology and the like). So, for your economy to grow, you either need more people working (to make more stuff), or the same amount of workers need to become more productive – by using better machines, tools and technologies.

    The first issue is labour. Europe’s working-age population is, for the most part, shrinking fast. Thanks to decades of declining birth rates (linked with rising life expectancy and higher incomes), along with increasing resistance to immigration, many European countries face declines in their working population. “”). Rural and urban regions of Europe alike are experiencing structural ageing and depopulation trends that make traditional economic growth ever harder to achieve.

    Historically, population growth has gone hand-in-hand with economic expansion. In the postwar years, countries such as France, Germany and the UK experienced booming birth rates and major waves of immigration. That expanding labour force fuelled industrial production, consumer demand and economic growth.

    Why does economic growth matter? Video: Bank of England.

    Ageing populations not only reduce the size of the active labour force, they place more pressure on health and other public services, as well as pension systems. Some regions have attempted to compensate with more liberal migration policies, but public resistance to immigration is strong – reflected in increased support for rightwing and populist parties that advocate for stricter immigration controls.

    While the UK’s median age is now over 40, it has a birthrate advantage over countries such as Germany and Italy, thanks largely to the influx of immigrants from its former colonies in the second half of the 20th century. But whether this translates into meaningful and sustainable growth depends heavily on labour market participation and the quality of investment – particularly in productivity-enhancing sectors like green technology, infrastructure and education – all of which remain uncertain.

    If Europe can’t rely on more workers, then to achieve growth, its existing workers must become more productive. And here, we arrive at the second half of the equation: capital. The usual hope is that investments in new technologies – particularly AI as it drives a new wave of automation – will make up the difference.

    In January, the UK’s prime minister, Keir Starmer, called AI “the defining opportunity of our generation” while announcing he had agreed to take forward all 50 recommendations set out in an independent AI action plan. Not to be outdone, the European Commission unveiled its AI continent action plan in April.

    But Europe is also falling behind in the global race to harness the economic potential of AI, trailing both the US and China. The US, in particular, has surged ahead in developing and deploying AI tools across sectors such as healthcare, finance, manufacturing and logistics, while China has leveraged its huge state-supported, open-source industrial policy to scale its digital economy.

    Keir Starmer announces the UK’s AI action plan. Video: BBC.

    Despite the EU’s concerted efforts to enhance its digital competitiveness, a 2024 McKinsey report found that US corporations invested around €700 billion more in capital expenditure and R&D, in 2022 alone than their European counterparts, underscoring the continent’s investment gap. And where AI is adopted, it tends to concentrate gains in a few superstar companies or cities.

    In fact, this disconnect between firm-level innovation and national growth is one of the defining features of the current era. Tech clusters in cities like Paris, Amsterdam and Stockholm may generate unicorn startups and record-breaking valuations, but they’re not enough to move the needle on GDP growth across Europe as a whole. The gains are often too narrow, the spillovers too weak and the social returns too uneven.

    Yet admitting this publicly remains politically taboo. Can any European leader look their citizens in the eye and say: “We’re living in a post-growth world”? Or rather, can they say it and still hope to win another election?

    The human need for growth

    To be human is to grow – physically, psychologically, financially; in the richness of our relationships, imagination and ambitions. Few people would be happy with the prospect of being consigned to do the same job for the same money for the rest of their lives – as the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated. Which makes the prospect of selling a post-growth future to people sound almost inhuman.

    Even those who care little about money and success usually strive to create better futures for themselves, their families and communities. When that sense of opportunity and forward motion is absent or frustrated, it can lead to malaise, disillusionment and in extreme cases, despair.

    The health consequences of long-term economic decline are increasingly described as “diseases of despair” – rising rates of suicide, substance abuse and alcohol-related deaths concentrated in struggling communities. Recessions reliably fuel psychological distress and demand for mental healthcare, as seen during the eurozone crisis when Greece experienced surging levels of depression and declining self-rated health, particularly among the unemployed – with job loss, insecurity and austerity all contributing to emotional suffering and social fragmentation.

    These trends don’t just affect the vulnerable; even those who appear relatively secure often experience “anticipatory anxiety” – a persistent fear of losing their foothold and slipping into instability. In communities, both rural and urban, that are wrestling with long-term decline, “left-behind” residents often describe a deep sense of abandonment by governments and society more generally – prompting calls for recovery strategies that address despair not merely as a mental health issue, but as a wider economic and social condition.

    The belief in opportunity and upward mobility – long embodied in US culture by “the American dream” – has historically served as a powerful psychological buffer, fostering resilience and purpose even amid systemic barriers. However, as inequality widens and while career opportunities for many appear to narrow, research shows the gap between aspiration and reality can lead to disillusionment, chronic stress and increased psychological distress – particularly among marginalised groups. These feelings are only intensified in the age of social media, where constant exposure to curated success stories fuels social comparison and deepens the sense of falling behind.

    For younger people in the UK and many parts of Europe, the fact that so much capital is tied up in housing means opportunity depends less on effort or merit and more on whether their parents own property – meaning they could pass some of its value down to their children.

    ‘Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism’, a discussion hosted by LSE Online.

    Stagnation also manifests in more subtle but no less damaging ways. Take infrastructure. In many countries, the true cost of flatlining growth has been absorbed not through dramatic collapse but quiet decay.

    Across the UK, more than 1.5 million children are learning in crumbling school buildings, with some forced into makeshift classrooms for years after being evacuated due to safety concerns. In healthcare, the total NHS repair backlog has reached £13.8 billion, leading to hundreds of critical incidents – from leaking roofs to collapsing ceilings – and the loss of vital clinical time.

    Meanwhile, neglected government buildings across the country are affecting everything from prison safety to courtroom access, with thousands of cases disrupted due to structural failures and fire safety risks. These are not headlines but lived realities – the hidden toll of underinvestment, quietly hollowing out the state behind a veneer of functionality.

    Without economic growth, governments face a stark dilemma: to raise revenues through higher taxes, or make further rounds of spending cuts. Either path has deep social and political implications – especially for inequality. The question becomes not just how to balance the books but how to do so fairly – and whether the public might support a post-growth agenda framed explicitly around reducing inequality, even if it also means paying more taxes.

    In fact, public attitudes suggest there is already widespread support for reducing inequality. According to the Equality Trust, 76% of UK adults agree that large wealth gaps give some people too much political power.

    Research by the Sutton Trust finds younger people especially attuned to these disparities: only 21% of 18 to 24-year-olds believe everyone has the same chance to succeed and 57% say it’s harder for their generation to get ahead. Most believe that coming from a wealthy family (75%) and knowing the right people (84%) are key to getting on in life.

    In a post-growth world, higher taxes would not only mean wealthier individuals and corporations contributing a relatively greater share, but the wider public shifting consumption patterns, spending less on private goods and more collectively through the state. But the recent example of France shows how challenging this tightope is to walk.

    In September 2024, its former prime minister, Michel Barnier, signalled plans for targeted tax increases on the wealthy, arguing these were essential to stabilise the country’s strained public finances. While politically sensitive, his proposals for tax increases on wealthy individuals and large firms initially passed without widespread public unrest or protests.

    However, his broader austerity package – encompassing €40 billion (£34.5 billion) in spending cuts alongside €20 billion in tax hikes – drew vocal opposition from both left‑wing lawmakers and the far right, and contributed to parliament toppling his minority government in December 2024.

    In the UK, the pressure on government finances (heightened both by Brexit and COVID) has seen a combination of “stealth” tax rises – notably, the ongoing freeze on income tax thresholds, which quietly drags more earners into higher tax bands – and more visible increases, such as the rise in employer National Insurance contributions. At the same time, the UK government moved to cut benefits in its spring statement, increasing financial pressure on lower-income households.

    Such measures surely mark the early signs of a deeper financial reckoning that post-growth realities will force into the open: how to sustain public services when traditional assumptions about economic expansion can no longer be relied upon.

    For the traditional parties, the political heat is on. Regions most left behind by structural economic shifts are increasingly drawn to populist and anti-establishment movements. Electoral outcomes have shown a significant shift, with far-right parties such as France’s National Rally and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) making substantial gains in the 2024 European parliament elections, reflecting a broader trend of rising support for populist and anti-establishment parties across the continent.

    Voters are expressing growing dissatisfaction not only with the economy, but democracy itself. This sentiment has manifested through declining trust in political institutions, as evidenced by a Forsa survey in Germany where only 16% of respondents expressed confidence in their government and 54% indicated they didn’t trust any party to solve the country’s problems.

    This brings us to the central dilemma: can any European politician successfully lead a national conversation which admits the economic assumptions of the past no longer hold? Or is attempting such honesty in politics inevitably a path to self-destruction, no matter how urgently the conversation is needed?

    Facing up to a new economic reality

    For much of the postwar era, economic life in advanced democracies has rested on a set of familiar expectations: that hard work would translate into rising incomes, that home ownership would be broadly attainable and that each generation would surpass the prosperity of the one before it.

    However, a growing body of evidence suggests these pillars of economic life are eroding. Younger generations are already struggling to match their parents’ earnings, with lower rates of home ownership and greater financial precarity becoming the norm in many parts of Europe.

    Incomes for millennials and generation Z have largely stagnated relative to previous cohorts, even as their living costs – particularly for housing, education and healthcare – have risen sharply. Rates of intergenerational income mobility have slowed significantly across much of Europe and North America since the 1970s. Many young people now face the prospect not just of static living standards, but of downward mobility.

    Effectively communicating the realities of a post-growth economy – including the need to account for future generations’ growing sense of alienation and declining faith in democracy – requires more than just sound policy. It demands a serious political effort to reframe expectations and rebuild trust.

    History shows this is sometimes possible. When the National Health Service was founded in 1948, the UK government faced fierce resistance from parts of the medical profession and concerns among the public about cost and state control. Yet Clement Attlee’s Labour government persisted, linking the creation of the NHS to the shared sacrifices of the war and a compelling moral vision of universal care.

    While taxes did rise to fund the service, the promise of a fairer, healthier society helped secure enduring public support – but admittedly, in the wake of the massive shock to the system that was the second world war.

    In 1946, Prime Minister Clement Attlee asked the UK public to help ‘renew Britain’. Video: British Pathé.

    Psychological research offers further insight into how such messages can be received. People are more receptive to change when it is framed not as loss but as contribution – to fairness, to community, to shared resilience. This underlines why the immediate postwar period was such a politically fruitful time to launch the NHS. The COVID pandemic briefly offered a sense of unifying purpose and the chance to rethink the status quo – but that window quickly closed, leaving most of the old structures intact and largely unquestioned.

    A society’s ability to flourish without meaningful national growth – and its citizens’ capacity to remain content or even hopeful in the absence of economic expansion – ultimately depends on whether any political party can credibly redefine success without relying on promises of ever-increasing wealth and prosperity. And instead, offer a plausible narrative about ways to satisfy our very human needs for personal development and social enrichment in this new economic reality.

    The challenge will be not only to find new economic models, but to build new sources of collective meaning. This moment demands not just economic adaptation but a political and cultural reckoning.

    If the idea of building this new consensus seems overly optimistic, studies of the “spiral of silence” suggest that people often underestimate how widely their views are shared. A recent report on climate action found that while most people supported stronger green policies, they wrongly assumed they were in the minority. Making shared values visible – and naming them – can be key to unlocking political momentum.

    So far, no mainstream European party has dared articulate a vision of prosperity that doesn’t rely on reviving growth. But with democratic trust eroding, authoritarian populism on the rise and the climate crisis accelerating, now may be the moment to begin that long-overdue conversation – if anyone is willing to listen.

    Welcome to Europe’s first ‘post-growth’ nation

    I’m imagining a European country in a decade’s time. One that no longer positions itself as a global tech powerhouse or financial centre, but the first major country to declare itself a “post-growth nation”.

    This shift didn’t come from idealism or ecological fervour, but from the hard reality that after years of economic stagnation, demographic change and mounting environmental stress, the pursuit of economic growth no longer offered a credible path forward.

    What followed wasn’t a revolution, but a reckoning – a response to political chaos, collapsing public services and widening inequality that sparked a broad coalition of younger voters, climate activists, disillusioned centrists and exhausted frontline workers to rally around a new, pragmatic vision for the future.

    At the heart of this movement was a shift in language and priorities, as the government moved away from promises of endless economic expansion and instead committed to wellbeing, resilience and equality – aligning itself with a growing international conversation about moving beyond GDP, already gaining traction in European policy circles and initiatives such as the EU-funded “post-growth deal”.

    But this transformation was also the result of years of political drift and public disillusionment, ultimately catalysed by electoral reform that broke the two-party hold and enabled a new alliance, shaped by grassroots organisers, policy innovators and a generation ready to reimagine what national success could mean.

    Taxes were higher, particularly on land, wealth and carbon. But in return, public services were transformed. Healthcare, education, transport, broadband and energy were guaranteed as universal rights, not privatised commodities. Work changed: the standard week was shortened to 30 hours and the state incentivised jobs in care, education, maintenance and ecological restoration. People had less disposable income – but fewer costs, too.

    Consumption patterns shifted. Hyper-consumption declined. Repair shops and sharing platforms flourished. The housing market was restructured around long-term security rather than speculative returns. A large-scale public housing programme replaced buy-to-let investment as the dominant model. Wealth inequality narrowed and cities began to densify as car use fell and public space was reclaimed.

    For the younger generation, post-growth life was less about climbing the income ladder and more about stability, time and relationships. For older generations, there were guarantees: pensions remained, care systems were rebuilt and housing protections were strengthened. A new sense of intergenerational reciprocity emerged – not perfectly, but more visibly than before.

    Politically, the transition had its risks. There was backlash – some of the wealthy left. But many stayed. And over time, the narrative shifted. This European country began to be seen not as a laggard but as a laboratory for 21st-century governance – a place where ecological realism and social solidarity shaped policy, not just quarterly targets.

    The transition was uneven and not without pain. Jobs were lost in sectors no longer considered sustainable. Supply chains were restructured. International competitiveness suffered in some areas. But the political narrative – carefully crafted and widely debated – made the case that resilience and equity were more important than temporary growth.

    While some countries mocked it, others quietly began to study it. Some cities – especially in the Nordics, Iberia and Benelux – followed suit, drawing from the growing body of research on post-growth urban planning and non-GDP-based prosperity metrics.



    Read more:
    Beyond GDP: changing how we measure progress is key to tackling a world in crisis – three leading experts

    This was not a retreat from ambition but a redefinition of it. The shift was rooted in a growing body of academic and policy work arguing that a planned, democratic transition away from growth-centric models is not only compatible with social progress but essential to preventing environmental and societal collapse.

    The country’s post-growth transition helped it sidestep deeper political fragmentation by replacing austerity with heavy investment in community resilience, care infrastructure and participatory democracy – from local budgeting to citizen-led planning. A new civic culture took root: slower and more deliberative but less polarised, as politics shifted from abstract promises of growth to open debates about real-world trade-offs.

    Internationally, the country traded some geopolitical power for moral authority, focusing less on economic competition and more on global cooperation around climate, tax justice and digital governance – earning new relevance among smaller nations pursuing their own post-growth paths.

    So is this all just a social and economic fantasy? Arguably, the real fantasy is believing that countries in Europe – and the parties that compete to run them – can continue with their current insistence on “growth at all costs” (whether or not they actually believe it).

    The alternative – embracing a post-growth reality – would offer the world something we haven’t seen in a long time: honesty in politics, a commitment to reducing inequality and a belief that a fairer, more sustainable future is still possible. Not because it was easy, but because it was the only option left.

    For you: more from our Insights series:

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Peter Bloom does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. His latest book is Capitalism Reloaded: The Rise of the Authoritarian-Financial Complex (Bristol University Press).

    – ref. Welcome to post-growth Europe – can anyone accept this new political reality? – https://theconversation.com/welcome-to-post-growth-europe-can-anyone-accept-this-new-political-reality-257420

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Nature-friendly farming budget swells in UK – but cuts elsewhere make recovery fraught

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nathalie Seddon, Professor of Biodiversity, Smith School of Enterprise and Environment and Department of Biology, University of Oxford

    Skylarks are a red-listed species, which means they are of high conservation concern in the UK. WildlifeWorld/Shutterstock

    Nature in the UK appeared to receive a rare funding boost in the June spending review, with the government setting a spending target of up to £2 billion a year for England’s environmental land management (ELM) scheme by 2028-29.

    By steering public funds toward farmers who restore hedgerows, soils and wetlands, England’s ELM programme is meant to renew landscapes that absorb carbon, support pollinators and keep water clean while helping rural businesses stay viable in a changing climate.

    If delivered in full, the package would elevate the UK’s post-Brexit model of investing public money in shared ecological care (rather than payments based on acreage) to one of the most generously funded in the world.

    Yet, scrutinise the details and a more complicated story emerges.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    The review has trimmed the day-to-day budget of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in real terms. Defra now faces the unenviable task of signing and monitoring thousands of new ELM agreements with fewer staff and shrinking data resources. Without the capacity to check whether fields really have become richer in skylarks or streams clearer of fertiliser, large sums could be delayed or misdirected.

    Scale is another challenge. An independent analysis published in 2024 estimated that roughly £6 billion every year across the UK is needed to bring agriculture in line with the Environment Act targets for habitat restoration and net zero commitments.

    Even the full £2 billion promised for England would meet only about half of that evidence-based need. And the “up to” £400 million for trees and peatlands is not new money: it is funding that was first promised in 2024 and the payment schedule has still not been confirmed.

    Money could be paid to farmers for allowing woodlands to regenerate.
    Richard Hepworth, CC BY

    While the review earmarked £4.2 billion for flood and coastal defence, it does not specify how much of that will support nature-based measures such as floodplain restoration, or the creation of saltmarshes or riparian woodlands. The Environment Agency is consulting on a funding model that could embed such solutions, but the Treasury papers are silent on who will pay for that shift.

    Tech spending dwarfs habitat investment

    Contrast this with the sums heading to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.

    Roughly £30 billion is earmarked for nuclear fission, fusion research and carbon-capture hubs. These projects are heavy on concrete and steel (materials with a hefty carbon cost) but have no immediate ecological benefit.

    While new low-carbon technologies are crucial, thriving and resilient soils, wetlands and woodlands nourish food systems, safeguard water and hold vast stores of carbon – benefits that deepen and become more cost-effective over time.

    Nature-based solutions can also revitalise local economies. The Office for National Statistics estimates that replacing the benefits flowing from the UK’s forests, rivers and soils – flood buffering, crop pollination, cleaner air, recreation and more – would cost about £1.8 trillion, a figure that only hints at their deeper, immeasurable value.

    Yet the review sets out no plan to safeguard these life-support systems, or to factor their decline into the Treasury’s green book (the rule book used to appraise public investments) or the Bank of England’s stress tests, which check how shocks could ripple through the financial system.

    This is also a matter of fairness and public health. Growing evidence shows that regular contact with nature lowers the risks of heart disease and anxiety, while improving children’s cognitive development. These are benefits with a value that defies any price tag.

    Yet the places with the fewest trees and parks tend to be the same post-industrial towns ministers want to “level up”. The review is silent on biodiversity net gain (the flagship policy meant to channel private finance into local habitats) and on a proposed national nature wealth fund that could blend public and private capital for large-scale restoration.

    Housing money could repeat past mistakes

    One line in the spending review could still shift the balance.

    The chancellor has earmarked £39 billion for building social and affordable housing over the next decade. If every development delivers at least a 10% net gain for biodiversity onsite, and if schemes build in climate-smart design (living roofs, shade-giving street trees, permeable surfaces) with local residents, Britain could pioneer the world’s first large-scale, nature-positive, net-zero housing programme.

    Without those safeguards, “levelling up” risks repeating old mistakes: sealing green space under concrete today and paying tomorrow to retrofit drainage, shade and parks.

    Green space is scarce on this new housing estate near Cardiff, Wales.
    Shutterstock

    That risk is heightened by the government’s planning and infrastructure bill, now before parliament. In an open letter to MPs, economists and ecologists warn that the bill would let developers “pay cash to trash” irreplaceable habitats by swapping onsite protection for a levy, a move they describe as a “licence to kill nature”.

    At the next UN climate summit, Cop30 in Brazil in November 2025, the UK will have to show the world that its domestic spending matches its international rhetoric.

    More than 150 UK researchers made that point in an open letter to the prime minister, urging him to put nature at the centre of the UK’s Cop30 stance. Converting the Treasury’s headline figures into habitat gains and locking robust rules into both the planning bill and the housing drive would give ministers credible proof of progress when they update the UK’s climate and nature pledges on the Cop30 stage.

    The spending review may have nudged farm policy in the right direction and set a new higher water mark for nature-positive agriculture. Yet amid the squeeze on Defra, the recycling rather than expansion of tree and peat budgets and the continued dominance of technology over habitat, nature still comes a distant second to hard infrastructure in the UK growth model.

    There is still time to change course. Guaranteeing Defra’s capacity, publishing a timetable for the tree-and-peat fund, reserving part of the flood budget for community-led nature-based solutions and hardwiring strong biodiversity net gain rules into housing and planning reforms would turn headline promises into projects that enrich daily life while stewarding public money wisely.

    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

    Nathalie Seddon receives funding from UKRI and the Leverhulme Trust and sits on the UK Climate Change Committee. She is also a trustee of the Circular Bioeconomy Alliance and is a non-executive director of the social venture, Nature-based Insights.

    – ref. Nature-friendly farming budget swells in UK – but cuts elsewhere make recovery fraught – https://theconversation.com/nature-friendly-farming-budget-swells-in-uk-but-cuts-elsewhere-make-recovery-fraught-259091

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Have you noticed that Nigel Farage doesn’t talk about Donald Trump anymore?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle University

    Each is the main political subject in their country, and one is the main political subject in the world. Each rode the populist wave in 2016, campaigning for the other. In 2024 the tandem surfers remounted on to an even greater breaker. Yet, though nothing has happened to suggest that bromance is dead, neither Donald Trump nor Nigel Farage publicly now speak of the other.

    Trump’s presidential campaign shared personnel with Leave.eu, the unofficial Brexit campaign. Farage was on the stump with Trump, and his “bad boys of Brexit” made their pilgrimage to Trump Tower after its owner’s own triumph in the US election. Each exulted in the other’s success, and what it portended.

    Trump duly proposed giving the UK ambassadorship to the United States to Farage. Instead, Farage became not merely MP for Clacton, but leader of the first insurgent party to potentially reset Britain’s electoral calculus since Labour broke through in 1922.

    Then, Labour’s challenge was to replace the Liberals as the alternative party of government. It took two years. Reform UK could replace the Conservatives in four.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Trump, meanwhile, has achieved what in Britain has either been thwarted (Militant and the Labour party in the 1980s) or has at most had temporary, aberrant, success (Momentum and the Labour party in the 2010s): the takeover of a party from within. Farage has been doing so – hitherto – from without.

    At one of those historic forks in a road where change is a matter of chance, after Brexit finally took place, Farage considered his own personal leave – to go and break America.

    The path had been trodden by Trump-friendly high-profile provocateurs before him: Steve Hilton, from David Cameron’s Downing Street, via cable news, now standing to be governor of California; Piers Morgan, off to CNN to replace the doyen of cable news Larry King, only to crash, but then to burn on, online. Liz Truss, never knowingly understated, has found her safe space – the rightwing speaking circuit.

    But Farage remained stateside. He knew his domestic platform was primed more fully to exploit the voter distrust that his nationalist crusade had done so much to provoke.

    The Trump effect

    Genuine peacetime transatlantic affiliations are rare, usually confined to the leaders of established parties: Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. One consequence of the 2016 political shift is that the US Republicans and the British Conservatives, the latter still at least partially tethered to traditional politics, have become distanced.

    During the first Trump administration, and even in the build up to the second, it was Farage who was seen as the UK’s bridge to the president. But today, at the peak of their influence, for Farage association can only be by inference, friendship with the US president is not – put mildly – of political advantage. For UK voters, Trump is the 19th most popular foreign politician, in between the King of Denmark and Benjamin Netanyahu.

    There is, moreover, the “Trump effect”. Measuring this is crude – circumstances differ – but the trend is that elections may be won by openly criticising, rather than associating with, Trump. This was the case for Mark Carney in Canada, Anthony Albanese in Australia, and Nicușor Dan in Romania.

    Trump’s second state visit to the UK will certainly be less awkward for Farage than it will be Starmer, the man who willed it. Farage will likely not – and has no reason to – be seen welcoming so divisive a figure.

    Starmer has no choice but to, and to do so ostentatiously. It is typical of Starmer’s perfect storm of an administration that he will, in the process, do nothing to appeal to the sliver of British voters partial to Trump while further shredding his reputation with Labour voters. Farage would be well served in taking one of his tactical European sojourns for the duration. Starmer may be tempted too.

    Outmanoeuvring the establishment

    Reflecting the historic cultural differences of their countries, Trump’s prescription is less state, Farage’s is more. The Farage of 2025 that is. He had been robustly Thatcherite, but has lately embraced socialist interventionism, albeit through a most Thatcherite analysis: “the gap in the market was enormous”.

    Reform UK now appears to stand for what Labour – in the mind of many of its voters – ought to. Eyeing the opportunity of smokestack grievances, Farage called for state control of steel production even as Trump was considering quite how high a tariff to put on it. Nationalisation and economic nationalism: associated restoratives for national malaise.

    Aggressively heteronormative, Trump and Farage dabble in the natalism burgeoning in both countries – as much a cultural as an economic imperative. Each has mastered – and much more than their adversaries – social media. Each has come to recognise the demerits in publicly appeasing Putin.

    And Reform’s rise in a hitherto Farage-resistant Scotland can only endear him further to a president whose Hebridean mother was thought of (in desperation) as potentially his Rosebud by British officials preparing for his first administration.

    Given their rhetorical selectivity, Trump and Farage’s rolling pitches are almost unanswerable for convention-confined political opponents and reporters. These two anti-elite elitists continue to confound.

    Unprecedentedly, for a former president, Trump ran against the incumbent; Farage will continue to exploit anti-incumbency, despite his party now being in office. Most elementally, the pair are bound for life by their very public near-death experiences. Theirs is, by any conceivable measure, an uncommon association.

    Farage’s fleetness of foot would be apparent even without comparison with the leaden steps of the leaders of the legacy parties. His is a genius of opportunism. That’s why he knows not to remind us of his confrere across the water.

    Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Have you noticed that Nigel Farage doesn’t talk about Donald Trump anymore? – https://theconversation.com/have-you-noticed-that-nigel-farage-doesnt-talk-about-donald-trump-anymore-258333

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Have you noticed that Nigel Farage doesn’t talk about Donald Trump anymore?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle University

    Each is the main political subject in their country, and one is the main political subject in the world. Each rode the populist wave in 2016, campaigning for the other. In 2024 the tandem surfers remounted on to an even greater breaker. Yet, though nothing has happened to suggest that bromance is dead, neither Donald Trump nor Nigel Farage publicly now speak of the other.

    Trump’s presidential campaign shared personnel with Leave.eu, the unofficial Brexit campaign. Farage was on the stump with Trump, and his “bad boys of Brexit” made their pilgrimage to Trump Tower after its owner’s own triumph in the US election. Each exulted in the other’s success, and what it portended.

    Trump duly proposed giving the UK ambassadorship to the United States to Farage. Instead, Farage became not merely MP for Clacton, but leader of the first insurgent party to potentially reset Britain’s electoral calculus since Labour broke through in 1922.

    Then, Labour’s challenge was to replace the Liberals as the alternative party of government. It took two years. Reform UK could replace the Conservatives in four.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Trump, meanwhile, has achieved what in Britain has either been thwarted (Militant and the Labour party in the 1980s) or has at most had temporary, aberrant, success (Momentum and the Labour party in the 2010s): the takeover of a party from within. Farage has been doing so – hitherto – from without.

    At one of those historic forks in a road where change is a matter of chance, after Brexit finally took place, Farage considered his own personal leave – to go and break America.

    The path had been trodden by Trump-friendly high-profile provocateurs before him: Steve Hilton, from David Cameron’s Downing Street, via cable news, now standing to be governor of California; Piers Morgan, off to CNN to replace the doyen of cable news Larry King, only to crash, but then to burn on, online. Liz Truss, never knowingly understated, has found her safe space – the rightwing speaking circuit.

    But Farage remained stateside. He knew his domestic platform was primed more fully to exploit the voter distrust that his nationalist crusade had done so much to provoke.

    The Trump effect

    Genuine peacetime transatlantic affiliations are rare, usually confined to the leaders of established parties: Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. One consequence of the 2016 political shift is that the US Republicans and the British Conservatives, the latter still at least partially tethered to traditional politics, have become distanced.

    During the first Trump administration, and even in the build up to the second, it was Farage who was seen as the UK’s bridge to the president. But today, at the peak of their influence, for Farage association can only be by inference, friendship with the US president is not – put mildly – of political advantage. For UK voters, Trump is the 19th most popular foreign politician, in between the King of Denmark and Benjamin Netanyahu.

    There is, moreover, the “Trump effect”. Measuring this is crude – circumstances differ – but the trend is that elections may be won by openly criticising, rather than associating with, Trump. This was the case for Mark Carney in Canada, Anthony Albanese in Australia, and Nicușor Dan in Romania.

    Trump’s second state visit to the UK will certainly be less awkward for Farage than it will be Starmer, the man who willed it. Farage will likely not – and has no reason to – be seen welcoming so divisive a figure.

    Starmer has no choice but to, and to do so ostentatiously. It is typical of Starmer’s perfect storm of an administration that he will, in the process, do nothing to appeal to the sliver of British voters partial to Trump while further shredding his reputation with Labour voters. Farage would be well served in taking one of his tactical European sojourns for the duration. Starmer may be tempted too.

    Outmanoeuvring the establishment

    Reflecting the historic cultural differences of their countries, Trump’s prescription is less state, Farage’s is more. The Farage of 2025 that is. He had been robustly Thatcherite, but has lately embraced socialist interventionism, albeit through a most Thatcherite analysis: “the gap in the market was enormous”.

    Reform UK now appears to stand for what Labour – in the mind of many of its voters – ought to. Eyeing the opportunity of smokestack grievances, Farage called for state control of steel production even as Trump was considering quite how high a tariff to put on it. Nationalisation and economic nationalism: associated restoratives for national malaise.

    Aggressively heteronormative, Trump and Farage dabble in the natalism burgeoning in both countries – as much a cultural as an economic imperative. Each has mastered – and much more than their adversaries – social media. Each has come to recognise the demerits in publicly appeasing Putin.

    And Reform’s rise in a hitherto Farage-resistant Scotland can only endear him further to a president whose Hebridean mother was thought of (in desperation) as potentially his Rosebud by British officials preparing for his first administration.

    Given their rhetorical selectivity, Trump and Farage’s rolling pitches are almost unanswerable for convention-confined political opponents and reporters. These two anti-elite elitists continue to confound.

    Unprecedentedly, for a former president, Trump ran against the incumbent; Farage will continue to exploit anti-incumbency, despite his party now being in office. Most elementally, the pair are bound for life by their very public near-death experiences. Theirs is, by any conceivable measure, an uncommon association.

    Farage’s fleetness of foot would be apparent even without comparison with the leaden steps of the leaders of the legacy parties. His is a genius of opportunism. That’s why he knows not to remind us of his confrere across the water.

    Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Have you noticed that Nigel Farage doesn’t talk about Donald Trump anymore? – https://theconversation.com/have-you-noticed-that-nigel-farage-doesnt-talk-about-donald-trump-anymore-258333

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: I survived the 7/7 London bombings, but as a British Muslim I still grew up being called a terrorist

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Neema Begum, Assistant Professor in British Politics, University of Nottingham

    Twenty years ago, I was walking through central London with my history teacher when a bus exploded behind us. We were in London for an awards ceremony at Westminster where I was to pick up the award for best opposition speaker in the Youth Parliament competition.

    We had arrived at Euston station and all local transport had been cancelled. At this point, we heard that there’d been a bomb scare.

    We bought a map at the station and set off to walk to Westminster when the number 30 bus exploded on Tavistock Square. It was the loudest sound I’d ever heard. People were running and screaming. We ran too and took shelter in a nearby park.

    We later learned that four bombs had been detonated on London’s transport system. The attack, carried out by British-born Islamist extremists on July 7 2005, claimed the lives of 52 people and injured hundreds. My teacher and I were far enough away from the bus to be physically unhurt.

    Four years on from the attacks on 9/11, this was a time when, in the minds of many, Muslims were already associated with terrorism. Despite going to a state school where the pupils were predominantly Muslim, we were called terrorists in the playground.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    In the aftermath of 7/7, there was no space for Muslim survivors like me. No headlines about our fear, our trauma or our belonging – only suspicion. While I was lucky to walk away physically unscathed, I carried a different kind of wound: being part of a community that was treated with collective blame.

    My academic research focuses on ethnic minority voting behaviour, political participation and representation in Britain. The events of 7/7 marked a critical moment in how British Muslims are still viewed as inherently suspect today.

    Over the last 25 years, Muslim communities have been viewed as places where terrorism is fostered. Following 7/7, British Muslims were viewed as a security threat by politicians, the media and many non-Muslims.

    One stark example was the implementation of the Prevent counter-terrorism programme after 7/7. Prevent has contributed to increased surveillance and marginalisation of Muslim communities in the UK.

    Fear of Muslims and especially “home-grown terrorists” has meant that Muslims are made to feel that they must condemn terrorist acts. Despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of Muslims in the UK identify as British and are proud to be British citizens, British Muslims often feel they must prove their “Britishness” and distance themselves from stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists or terrorist sympathisers.

    Post-7/7 arguments that British Muslims were at odds with “British values” and fears that Britain was sleepwalking into segregation have persisted in politics and the media. Negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims in media, including stigmatising, offensive and biased news reports have not helped.

    In 2013, a device exploded outside the mosque I attended as a child, carried out by an extreme right-wing white supremacist. In 2025, hate crimes against Muslims have reached record levels.

    Stereotypes of Muslims in politics

    Twenty years after the London bombings, there are more Muslim voices in politics and media, and a greater awareness of Islamophobia. The idea that London could have a Muslim mayor, as it does today with Sadiq Khan, may have been unthinkable in the immediate aftermath of 7/7.

    But the fear that gripped the country in 2005 never disappeared, it just changed shape. Today it shows up in political attacks and increases in anti-Muslim hate crimes in the context of the war in Gaza. It also shows up in attacks on the religious freedoms of British Muslims – like calls for a burka ban – under the guise of “British values”.

    While there are more Muslims in politics at every level, they are not exempt from stereotypes. In my research on ethnic minority local councillors, I’ve found Muslim women councillors were often stereotyped as submissive and oppressed in white council spaces.

    A hijab-wearing Muslim woman councillor received comments that she wasn’t “westernised enough” and that she needed to be “more modernised”. Another Muslim woman councillor had a white male journalist remark that she was “very confident” in a way she felt was derisive.

    Working against ingrained stereotypes of how a Muslim woman would behave, these councillors often faced a double burden: having to constantly prove their “modernity” and competence while simultaneously navigating accusations of being either too passive or too assertive – never quite fitting the narrow expectations imposed upon them.

    The 7/7 memorial in London’s Hyde Park.
    Chris Dorney/Shutterstock

    In research on ethnic minority voting behaviour in the EU referendum, I found that campaign groups for Brexit such as Muslims for Britain drew on “good Muslim” narratives to buttress their claims to Britishness. For example, they have referred to the sacrifices Muslim soldiers made for Britain in the two world wars, to position British Muslims – particularly those with south Asian heritage – as established and loyal members of the nation.

    Even as a survivor of terrorism, I – like many British Muslims – am constantly made to prove my distance from it. I have particularly noticed this as a woman of Bangladeshi heritage, sharing a surname with Shamima Begum, who joined Islamic State as a teenager and had her UK citizenship stripped.

    Begum is also my mother’s name, my classmates’ name, and shared by many British Bengali women. It belongs to Nadiya Hussain (née Begum), winner of The Great British Bake Off and Halima Begum, chief executive of Oxfam. Behind every headline are real, complex communities still hoping to be seen beyond the shadow of suspicion.

    Neema Begum receives funding from the British Academy.

    – ref. I survived the 7/7 London bombings, but as a British Muslim I still grew up being called a terrorist – https://theconversation.com/i-survived-the-7-7-london-bombings-but-as-a-british-muslim-i-still-grew-up-being-called-a-terrorist-259316

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: I survived the 7/7 London bombings, but as a British Muslim I still grew up being called a terrorist

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Neema Begum, Assistant Professor in British Politics, University of Nottingham

    Twenty years ago, I was walking through central London with my history teacher when a bus exploded behind us. We were in London for an awards ceremony at Westminster where I was to pick up the award for best opposition speaker in the Youth Parliament competition.

    We had arrived at Euston station and all local transport had been cancelled. At this point, we heard that there’d been a bomb scare.

    We bought a map at the station and set off to walk to Westminster when the number 30 bus exploded on Tavistock Square. It was the loudest sound I’d ever heard. People were running and screaming. We ran too and took shelter in a nearby park.

    We later learned that four bombs had been detonated on London’s transport system. The attack, carried out by British-born Islamist extremists on July 7 2005, claimed the lives of 52 people and injured hundreds. My teacher and I were far enough away from the bus to be physically unhurt.

    Four years on from the attacks on 9/11, this was a time when, in the minds of many, Muslims were already associated with terrorism. Despite going to a state school where the pupils were predominantly Muslim, we were called terrorists in the playground.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    In the aftermath of 7/7, there was no space for Muslim survivors like me. No headlines about our fear, our trauma or our belonging – only suspicion. While I was lucky to walk away physically unscathed, I carried a different kind of wound: being part of a community that was treated with collective blame.

    My academic research focuses on ethnic minority voting behaviour, political participation and representation in Britain. The events of 7/7 marked a critical moment in how British Muslims are still viewed as inherently suspect today.

    Over the last 25 years, Muslim communities have been viewed as places where terrorism is fostered. Following 7/7, British Muslims were viewed as a security threat by politicians, the media and many non-Muslims.

    One stark example was the implementation of the Prevent counter-terrorism programme after 7/7. Prevent has contributed to increased surveillance and marginalisation of Muslim communities in the UK.

    Fear of Muslims and especially “home-grown terrorists” has meant that Muslims are made to feel that they must condemn terrorist acts. Despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of Muslims in the UK identify as British and are proud to be British citizens, British Muslims often feel they must prove their “Britishness” and distance themselves from stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists or terrorist sympathisers.

    Post-7/7 arguments that British Muslims were at odds with “British values” and fears that Britain was sleepwalking into segregation have persisted in politics and the media. Negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims in media, including stigmatising, offensive and biased news reports have not helped.

    In 2013, a device exploded outside the mosque I attended as a child, carried out by an extreme right-wing white supremacist. In 2025, hate crimes against Muslims have reached record levels.

    Stereotypes of Muslims in politics

    Twenty years after the London bombings, there are more Muslim voices in politics and media, and a greater awareness of Islamophobia. The idea that London could have a Muslim mayor, as it does today with Sadiq Khan, may have been unthinkable in the immediate aftermath of 7/7.

    But the fear that gripped the country in 2005 never disappeared, it just changed shape. Today it shows up in political attacks and increases in anti-Muslim hate crimes in the context of the war in Gaza. It also shows up in attacks on the religious freedoms of British Muslims – like calls for a burka ban – under the guise of “British values”.

    While there are more Muslims in politics at every level, they are not exempt from stereotypes. In my research on ethnic minority local councillors, I’ve found Muslim women councillors were often stereotyped as submissive and oppressed in white council spaces.

    A hijab-wearing Muslim woman councillor received comments that she wasn’t “westernised enough” and that she needed to be “more modernised”. Another Muslim woman councillor had a white male journalist remark that she was “very confident” in a way she felt was derisive.

    Working against ingrained stereotypes of how a Muslim woman would behave, these councillors often faced a double burden: having to constantly prove their “modernity” and competence while simultaneously navigating accusations of being either too passive or too assertive – never quite fitting the narrow expectations imposed upon them.

    The 7/7 memorial in London’s Hyde Park.
    Chris Dorney/Shutterstock

    In research on ethnic minority voting behaviour in the EU referendum, I found that campaign groups for Brexit such as Muslims for Britain drew on “good Muslim” narratives to buttress their claims to Britishness. For example, they have referred to the sacrifices Muslim soldiers made for Britain in the two world wars, to position British Muslims – particularly those with south Asian heritage – as established and loyal members of the nation.

    Even as a survivor of terrorism, I – like many British Muslims – am constantly made to prove my distance from it. I have particularly noticed this as a woman of Bangladeshi heritage, sharing a surname with Shamima Begum, who joined Islamic State as a teenager and had her UK citizenship stripped.

    Begum is also my mother’s name, my classmates’ name, and shared by many British Bengali women. It belongs to Nadiya Hussain (née Begum), winner of The Great British Bake Off and Halima Begum, chief executive of Oxfam. Behind every headline are real, complex communities still hoping to be seen beyond the shadow of suspicion.

    Neema Begum receives funding from the British Academy.

    – ref. I survived the 7/7 London bombings, but as a British Muslim I still grew up being called a terrorist – https://theconversation.com/i-survived-the-7-7-london-bombings-but-as-a-british-muslim-i-still-grew-up-being-called-a-terrorist-259316

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – EU-UK 2025 Leaders’ Summit: Setting the path for further rapprochement – 03-07-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Amid Brexit’s negative consequences for the British economy and with the 2024 leadership change in the United Kingdom, the shift towards closer European Union-UK relations has gained momentum. After months of negotiation, the first EU-UK leaders’ summit took place in London on 19 May 2025. Both sides agreed on global priorities of common strategic interest, such as support for multilateralism and Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The parties also established a Security and Defence Partnership, based on biannual structured foreign policy dialogue and consultation mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation. To this end, regular thematic dialogues on a range of security issues will commence. The partnership paves the way for UK participation in the EU’s common joint defence procurement (SAFE initiative). The summit cemented an accord on full reciprocal access to fishing waters until 30 June 2038. The UK and EU also agreed to extend energy cooperation on a permanent basis. Further negotiations will continue, on the youth mobility scheme (including UK participation in Erasmus+), UK participation in the EU’s internal electricity market, linking emission trading systems and establishing a common sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) area. Many experts see the summit as an important step towards further rapprochement, as the UK indicated willingness to dynamically align some of its laws with the EU legal framework, recognise the authority of the Court of Justice of the EU and cooperate closely on security and defence issues. However, some point to a lack of milestones and solid progress monitoring tools. In numerous resolutions, the European Parliament has called for closer cooperation on trade, security and for UK participation in several EU programmes. Parliament will be involved in scrutinising any implementing legislation and giving or refusing consent if further binding international agreements, such as the SPS area, materialise as a result of the London summit.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – ENVI vote on opinion to the EU-UK TCA implementation report – Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

    Source: European Parliament

    On 3 July 2025, ENVI Members will vote on their opinion for the AFET/INTA-led report on the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, focusing on the Committee’s areas of competence

    The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), in force since 2021, governs post-Brexit relations in many policy areas, including on trade, energy, transport, fisheries, and climate and environmental cooperation. In March 2025, the European Commission published its 2023 implementation report, outlining progress and challenges. In areas under ENVI’s remit, the report notes continued cooperation on emissions trading and offshore renewable energy, and highlights UK legislative changes to its Emissions Trading Scheme, which the Commission continues to monitor. It also flags divergence in the UK’s chemicals policy (UK REACH) from EU REACH. Following this, the AFET and INTA committees launched its periodical own-initiative implementation report. ENVI is one of 11 committees authorised to contribute an opinion, providing input within its area of competence. ENVI Members tabled 245 amendments to the draft opinion, with nine compromise amendments negotiated ahead of the vote.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: The Status of the Chagos Archipelago –  Part II: United Kingdom’s Agreement with Mauritius

    Source: US Global Legal Monitor

    The following is a guest post by Clare Feikert-Ahalt, a senior foreign law specialist at the Law Library of Congress covering the United Kingdom and several other jurisdictions. Clare has written numerous posts for In Custodia Legis, including Revealing the Presence of Ghosts; Weird Laws, or Urban Legends?; FALQs: Brexit Referendum; 100 Years of “Poppy Day” in the United Kingdom; and Mr. Bates vs. The Post Office Spurs Possible Law Change.

    Yesterday’s post described the historic status of the Chagos Archipelago and the United Kingdom’s (UK) power over the territory. Today’s post describes the new agreement, which returns sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and allows for the continued use of the UK-US military base.

    On May 22, 2025, the United Kingdom and Mauritius signed an agreement that “recognis[es] the wrongs of the past” with regards to the Chagos Archipelago. The agreement transfers sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) from the UK to Mauritius, while providing the UK with “rights and authorities [over Diego Garcia] that the United Kingdom requires for the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base.”

    The agreement, which took over two years and 13 rounds of negotiations to achieve, secures British interests in Diego Garcia, including an area of 12 nautical miles surrounding the island, for 99 years. The agreement provides the UK with the right to access, maintain, and invest in the base, along with the ability to use it for defense purposes. It places a binding obligation on both parties to ensure the secure and effective operation of the base. The UK’s secretary of state for defence notes the agreement achieves the “secured unrestricted access to, and use of, the base, as well as control over movement of all persons and all goods on the base and control of all communication and electronic systems.”

    Any activities on the wider islands of the Chagos Archipelago, such as the construction of any structure, artificial island, sensor, or barrier within 24 nautical miles, must be approved through a joint decision process between the UK and Mauritius, which serves as an “effective veto” of development in the islands surrounding Diego Garcia as the UK does not want other countries, particularly those hostile to the UK, to have a presence near this facility.

    The 99 years can be extended for a further 40 years if both parties agree, and it may be extended again thereafter. The estimated cost to UK for 99 years “is £101 million [annually] and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion” (approximately US$136 million and US$4.6 billion respectively) accounting for approximately 0.2% of the defense budget. The government has stated this is less than the cost of running an aircraft carrier, without aircraft, for a year.

    The agreement provides for the resettlement of the residents of Diego Garcia, known as the Chagossians, on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago, with the exception of Diego Garcia. It also provides for the establishment of a trust fund of £40 million (approximately US$54 million) to benefit Chagossians and an annual grant of £45 million (approximately US$61 million) for 25 years to fund projects that promote economic development and welfare in Mauritius. Article 11 of the agreement states that it “constitutes the full and final settlement of all claims by Mauritius in relation to the Chagos Archipelago.”

    The treaty was laid before both Houses of Parliament on May 22, 2025, and either of the Houses of Parliament may object to its ratification until July 3, 3035.

    The Defense Facility on Diego Garcia

    The secretary of state for defence for the UK stated “[t]he importance of Diego Garcia cannot be overstated” and a government press release announcing the agreement notes that the base is central to both the UK and US’s emergency planning and operations, with the base serving as:

    “a critical logistics hub at a strategic location, with a full range of facilities that acts as a key refueling and resupply station for naval and air operations. This enables power projection and global reach, allowing for rapid and flexible deployment of our forces across the Middle East, East Africa, and South Asia.”

    While most of the work on, and capabilities of, Diego Garcia are not disclosed, the secretary of state for defence and the UK prime minister have publicly acknowledged that the base supports operations, including those related to counter-terrorism, in the Middle East, East Africa, and South Asia. Public statements detail that the base houses:

    • an airfield enabling strike operations and the rapid deployment of the military in this area, “… creat[ing] real military advantage across the Indo-Pacific;”
    • a deep-water port that, among other uses, “supports missions from nuclear-powered submarines to [the UK’s] carrier strike group;”
    • advanced communications, which includes management of the electromagnetic spectrum satellite;
    • surveillance capabilities;
    • facilities that support the global operation of GPS, notably one monitoring station and one of four ground antennas;
    • Ground-Base Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) System, which “provides situational awareness of objects in Earth’s orbit, helping to track space debris that pose a risk to space systems”; and
    • “three pieces of critical Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty monitoring equipment”, including seismic monitoring equipment that checks for indicators of nuclear testing, helping to secure compliance with the nuclear test ban treaty.

    The presence of the base in the center of the Indian Ocean also helps to safeguard an important trade route, through which “a third of the world’s bulk cargo and two-thirds of global oil shipments are transported.”

    The US Navy describes the facility on Diego Garcia as “the tip of the spear” and states that it “provides logistic support to operational forces forward deployed to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas of responsibility in support of national policy objectives.”

    The prime minister stated that the agreement is vital to the UK’s defence and intelligence, and for securing the safety and security of the British people at this time. He stated “… the base was under threat” from legal challenges by Mauritius, and the government believes there is no viable alternative to protect the base and secure the islands surrounding it.

    The prime minister further noted that if the UK disregarded any future legal judgements, “international organisations and other countries would act on them. And that would undermine the operation of the base.” The UK was particularly concerned at the prospect of other countries establishing a presence in the islands surrounding Diego Garcia, or conducting training exercises nearby, which could impact the operation of the base, and that it would be unable to prevent this without an agreement.

    The prime minister has described the base as “one of the most significant contributions we make to our security relationship with the United States.” The UK foreign secretary stated the US was unhappy with the uncertainty created by the situation and “strongly encouraged [the UK] to strike a deal.” It was against this background that negotiations were commenced and the treaty was made.

    Reaction to the Agreement

    The opposition conservative party has been critical of the agreement, stating that the government “prioritised heeding the most pessimistic legal advice” concerning the potential of legal judgments. The opposition further stated that the agreement puts the defense facility at risk due to Mauritius’ ties to Russia and China. The UK shadow secretary of state said in parliament that “[t]he Government should not be surrendering strategically vital sovereign territory, especially when we face such threats, and they certainly should not be paying billions for the privilege”, noting further that the agreement does not offer any protection to the Chagossians.

    Internationally, the agreement has been backed by the UK’s “Five Eyes” partners, which include the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Japan, India, and the African Union have also welcomed the agreement. US President Donald Trump expressed his support for the agreement and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, stated that while the administration is not a party to the agreement, it “remain[s] responsible for operating the U.S. Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia, which continues to play a vital role in supporting forward-deployed operational forces and advancing security across the region.”

    The US secretary of state stated:

    “The Trump Administration determined that this agreement secures the long-term, stable, and effective operation of the joint U.S.-UK military facility at Diego Garcia. This is a critical asset for regional and global security.”

    While the agreement has been welcomed by the UK and several of its allies, the United Nations has condemned the agreement, issuing a press release stating:

    “By maintaining a foreign military presence of the United Kingdom and the United States on Diego Garcia and preventing the Chagossian people from returning to Diego Garcia, the agreement appears to be at variance with the Chagossians’ right to return, which also hinders their ability to exercise their cultural rights in accessing their ancestral lands from which they were expelled.”

    The UN has urged the UK to “apply a human rights-based approach in addressing historical injustices against the Chagossian people.”

    Additional Law Library of Congress Resources on the Laws of Mauritius and the UK

    Subscribe to In Custodia Legis – it’s free! – to receive interesting posts drawn from the Law Library of Congress’s vast collections and our staff’s expertise in U.S., foreign, and international law.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges – A10-0122/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064-2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0164),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 164, 175, 177 and 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0064-2025),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to Rules 60 and 58 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Security and Defence,

    – having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0122/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities.

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for more structural possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and the investment needs of industries and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities in an inclusive manner and only where those challenges have not been addressed in the current programmes, while safeguarding cohesion, creating quality jobs and preserving a level playing field in the internal market.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) The ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy. The main objectives of the ESF+ are to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and structures in the policy area of employment and social policies, which are far from met yet. ESF+ funding should support those objectives. The reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1b) The European Court of Auditors’ adopted on 6 May 2025 the opinion on the legislative proposal forming the basis for this Regulation.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 c (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1c) Cohesion policy is often used as an emergency response tool, which risks undermining the primary longer-term policy and objectives of cohesion policy, as underlined in the European Court of Auditors’ opinion of 6 May 2025. It is essential to ensure that any measures taken in the context of emergencies do not interfere with the objectives of cohesion policy. Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of the cohesion policy.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 d (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1d) The Union and its Member States continue to show that they can rapidly react to geopolitical events and are willing to use sufficient financial resources towards strengthening our defence industry through different Union and national programmes, which is positive and needed for the security of the Union. It is important to strengthen our defence sector through competitiveness programmes. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to continue to invest in the social objectives of the Union through the ESF+, as social cohesion is a cornerstone of the Union’s  democratic and societal resilience which is essential in facing threats of aggression.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) It is already possible to support the development of skills in the defence industry under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council2a, to facilitate the development of skills and training in the defence industry, while safeguarding social standards. Together with the Niinisto Report, ‘Safer Together’, the EU Preparedness Strategy, and the European Defence Industrial Strategy, the White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence, civil defence, the defence industry, dual use technologies and civil preparedness capabilities, which should be carried out together with social spending, creating employment and up- and reskilling opportunities . In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem.

    __________________

    __________________

     

    2a Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    3Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025)0090

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

     

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation.

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and quality job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation. Particular consideration should be given to the specific needs and circumstances of less developed regions and rural areas, which should benefit from the green transition and to ensure their integration into the Union’s broader economic, social and environmental development. In accordance with Article 5(1),  second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the ESF+ contributes to the specific objective of enabling regions and people to address the social, employment, economic and environmental impacts of the transition towards the Union’s 2030 targets for energy and climate and a climate-neutral economy of the Union by 2050, based on the Paris Agreement.

    __________________

    __________________

    6 COM (2025) 85 final

    6 COM (2025)0085

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership and the development of skills. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    __________________

    __________________

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (8a) Skills development and the training of young talent and entrepreneurs through incentives and targeted training are essential for job creation, and institutions working on skills creation and uptake should cooperate closely to align with labour market needs. Especially, vocational education and training institutes, given their direct links to the labour market and this should be supported through the ESF+.

    Amendment  10

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful reprogramming and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful and just reprogramming without losing focus on the main objectives of the fund and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic social challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments. While aligning with new Union priorities, diverting attention to global strategic challenges should not change the primary mission of the ESF+. The cohesion policy must remain firmly rooted in its core objective: reducing regional disparities.

    Amendment  11

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine. In order to incentivise the re-programming towards key priorities in the context of the mid-term review, the additional pre-financing should only be available where a certain threshold for the reallocation of financial resources to specific crucial priorities is reached.

    (6) NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are disproportionate heavily impacted by Russian war of aggression, experiencing job losses, less economic activity and social exclusion. In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, with no specific conditions to reallocate financial resources of the programme to dedicated priorities.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) It should also be possible to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 100% to priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    (8) It should also be possible, while taking into account the current differentiation between categories of regions, to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 95% to programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic social challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (9a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 11

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (11) [Given the urgent need to enable crucial investments in skills in the defence industry as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    (11) [Given the increased need to enable crucial investments in specific skills in the critical industries, including the defence industry, as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level. The one-off pre-financing for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face, and the related subparagraph is moved in a new paragraph.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing shall only apply where reallocations of at least 10% of financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d have been approved and provided that the measures supporting the dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d target smaller beneficiaries and provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

     

    For the purpose of calculating the total reallocations of the financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d, as referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall assess the measures and take into account only the measures responding to the strategic priorities identified.

    Amendment  18

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1a. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided that the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to supporting their resilience in countering hybrid attacks.

     

    The pre-financing due to the Member State which results from programme amendments pursuant to reallocation to the priorities referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph shall be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be de-committed in accordance with Article 105 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, provided that the request for programme amendment was submitted in 2025.

    Amendment  19

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU)2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1b. Before disbursing payment for the pre-financing pursuant to this Article, the Commission shall assess the Union’s overall budgetary situation, in particular with respect to the principle of the sustainability of the Union budget. Where, on the basis of that assessment, the Commission identifies a risk to the Union budget arising from paying the full pre-financing amount in 2026, the Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 37 to provide for only part of the pre-financing amount to be disbursed to the Member States in 2026, with the remaining part disbursed in 2027.

    Amendment  20

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 10% of the ESF+ financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level.

    Amendment  21

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) When amending programmes, the Member States shall include, with the close and meaningful participation of social partners, for the dedicated priorities, obligations to the beneficiaries to respect working and employment conditions under applicable Union and national law, conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and collective agreements.

    Justification

    In line with Articles 33 and 169 of the Financial Regulation.

    Amendment  22

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 95 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State.

    Justification

    The 95% co-financing rate for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face.

    Amendment  23

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d within 2 months of the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX [this Regulation]. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d by 31 December 2025. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    Justification

    Taking into account that a significant level of reprogramming is expected, Member States could need more time to provide a complementary assessment.

    Amendment  24

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment.;

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that smaller beneficiaries have priority access to the funding and that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment;

    Amendment  25

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support to skills in civil preparedness and the defence industry

    Amendment  26

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12 c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support for the development of skills in the defence industry and cyber security under dedicated priorities, prioritising dual use capabilities related to civil defence and preparedness, provided that micro, small and medium- sized enterprises have priority access to the support. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    In this context, Member States may allocate resources to attract young talent and entrepreneurs, particularly to rural or less developed regions, through incentives and targeted training.

    Amendment  27

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%.

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  28

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepeneurs to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may, after consulting the social partners at national level, decide to programme targeted support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling and training with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and the social economy to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities, with in the objective of maintaining competitiveness, sustainability and innovation during the green transition. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    Member States may support promoting collaboration between different organisations, such as educational institutions who support skills development, provided that such measures support any of the specific objectives set out in Article(4), points (a) to (g).

     

    Resources allocated to the dedicated priority referred to in the first two subparagraphs of this paragraph shall be taken into account when ensuring compliance with the thematic concentration requirements as set out in Article 7.

    Amendment  29

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%..

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  30

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (3a) the following article is inserted:

     

    Article 12da

     

    Guidance and administrative simplification

     

    The Commission shall publish, by … [60 days after the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX (this amending Regulation)], detailed guidelines, accompanied by a Q&A system, aiming to clarify the technical, legal and procedural implications of the measures adopted in Articles 5a, 12c and 12d. Those guidelines shall support the managing authorities in the uniform application of this Regulation, reducing the administrative burden and facilitating solutions to early doubts.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    ETUC

    Social Platform

    Save the Children

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (18.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Jean‑Marc Germain 

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    The Committee on Budgets,

    A. whereas the proposal does not modify existing budgetary commitments and remains within the limits of the overall allocations for the period 2021-2027 and is therefore budgetary neutral;

    B. whereas the combined effect of exceptional one-off 30 % pre-financing and 100 % co-financing on new EU priorities, as well as additional one-off pre-financing of 4.5 % (9.5 % for NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine) for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their resources to the new priorities, leads to a partial frontloading of estimated payment appropriations of EUR 500 million in 2026, followed by lower payments in 2027;

    C. whereas the extension of the eligibility period by one year – from the end of 2029 to the end of 2030 – for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their total allocation to new specific objectives creates payments in 2030 and changes the applicable decommitment rule for 2027 from year n+2 to year n+3;

    Conclusions of the budgetary assessment 

    1. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the MFF Regulation[1]; notes that the proposed measures are voluntary and do not involve any top-up of the initial allocation available to Member States;

    2. Notes that the proposal requires additional human resources of EUR 376 000 per year in 2025, 2026 and 2027, for two establishment plan posts; notes that the additional needs will be covered by redeployment within the Directorate-General or other Commission services; notes, however, that the overall impact of redeployments within the Commission services has reached its limit;

    3. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the Interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline (IIA)[2]; notes, however, that re-programming in the context of the mid-term review is considered not to alter the contribution to climate targets as set out in point 16 of the IIA; underlines that allocating resources to new objectives, including for the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, could lead to shifting resources from interventions with a higher coefficient for calculation of support to climate change objectives to interventions with a lower coefficient, thus potentially reducing the expenditure supporting climate objectives; invites the Commission to take preventive action to counter this risk; calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the revised plans on the shares of expenditure supporting climate objectives; notes also that the ‘do no significant harm’ principle should apply to all European investments in line with the applicable legislation;

    4. Considers that the proposal is compatible with the budgetary principles laid down in the Financial Regulation[3]; notes, however, that the pre-financing paid in 2026 will be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be decommitted, in particular as regards respect for the principle of annuality;

    5. Recalls the importance of the general regime of conditionality as set out in Article 6 of the Financial Regulation; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and to respect the Union values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union in the implementation of the budget;

    6. Notes that the Commission does not expect any implications for the budget for 2025 beyond the redeployment of existing human resources; expects the Commission to take into account the current proposal and the updated payment needs for the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) in the budgetary procedure for 2026 following the actual re-programming by Member States and to keep Parliament informed in a timely manner of the progress of the mid-term review in the Member States; calls for a prudent approach to payment frontloading;

    Recommendations as regards budget implementation

    7. Notes that the proposal provides further flexibility and introduces incentives for Member States in the context of the mid-term review of cohesion policy to address strategic challenges that the EU is facing by redirecting resources to new EU priorities; underlines that cohesion policy should not be used again as a crisis response tool and maintains that this approach risks undermining its longer-term policy and investment objectives, including investments in regional development, skills, innovation and productivity; regrets that the Commission did not perform an impact assessment of the changes; acknowledges that the proposal offers a pragmatic, albeit unsatisfactory, way forward for dealing with insufficient budgetary flexibility and response capacity in the EU budget;

    8. Recalls that the ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy and its main objective is to support Member States and regions in achieving social inclusion and social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and systems in the policy area of employment and social policies; highlights that the Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of cohesion policy; underlines the need to ensure that the implementation of the amended ESF+ Regulation[4] is accompanied by measures for simplification and strengthening of administrative capacities in order to drive investments in key sectors and increase the absorption rate;

    9. Underlines that the combined effect of reallocating a minimum of 15 % of resources and of lifting of the 20 % ceiling for transfer towards Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) objectives may have a negative impact on the achievements of targets initially set in the ESF+ Regulation and could result in some initially planned actions for later years not materialising owing to a discontinuity in matching objectives with resources, while noting the need to adapt to new priorities, taking into account the recent geopolitical dynamics;

    10. Notes that payments to 2021-2027 cohesion policy programmes were of a very low level in the first years of implementation, leading to an increase in payment needs towards the later years; recalls that this actual payment cycle does not coincide with the more linear payment profile set out in the MFF Regulation[5] and that this situation results in a serious risk of exceeding payment ceilings; recalls that the gradual increase in payments towards the later part of the programming period is a feature of multiannual programmes; considers that the frontloading of payments towards 2026 could have an impact on the pressure on payments;

    11. Recalls that the STEP Regulation[6] and the RESTORE Amending Regulation of 2024 were accompanied by a frontloading of payment appropriations in the budgets for 2024 and for 2025; notes that the total amount of payment appropriations in the 2026 draft budget is very close to the payment ceiling and is concerned, in this respect, about the high level of uncertainty with regard to the volume of payment claims in 2026; highlights the difficulties in predicting the take-up of the newly introduced flexibilities and incentives and in estimating payment needs, as also underpinned by the ongoing trend of increasing inaccuracy of payment forecasts by Member States; calls on the Commission to closely monitor payment developments and provide timely information to Parliament in this regard, and to propose any remedial action to the budgetary authority if needed;

    12. Recalls that 100 % co-financing without additional resources leads to a lower total amount of financial support through the programme; insists that broadening the scope of investment must not lead to a reduction in financial support for the initial priorities of investing in employment, social services, inclusive education and skills, and of providing assistance to the most vulnerable, including children; recalls that mandatory co-financing is an important principle of cohesion policy funding;

    13. Requests that the Commission provide traceable information in the form of timely reports on transfers to ensure that the impact of the mid-term review is clearly identifiable for the budgetary authority;

    14. Calls on the Commission to maintain consistency in applying conditionality across all EU funding streams and insists that amendments in Parliament’s reading are essential to close any loophole; demands rigorous enforcement of conditionality mechanisms and explicitly rejects any reallocation of blocked cohesion policy funds if this would circumvent the rule-of-law-related requirements established in the Common Provisions Regulation[7]; underlines that rule of law conditionality is a fundamental principle that must apply to all EU funds without exception;

    15. Considers that the actual take-up of the proposal may depend on various factors, such as the effectiveness of the 15 % re-allocation threshold and the availability of more favourable funding options under other Union programmes; considers that the proposed condition of the reallocation of at least 15 % of the funds to new priorities may be too high and unsuitable for single national programmes, as it could create implementation complications; highlights the importance of preventing double financing and calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that support for new types of investment is in addition to support under other Union programmes, including the EDF, EDIP and SAFE;

    16. Notes that the mid-term review may reduce the amount of funds at risk of decommitment; recalls that an amount equivalent to the cumulative decommitments made on outstanding commitments since 2021 can be made available for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI); asks the Commission to provide further analysis of the impact of the mid-term review on the EURI instrument.

     

     

    AMENDMENT

     

    As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendment to the proposal:

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital [9] a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    ([9]a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Budgetary assessment by

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Jean-Marc Germain

    12.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    5.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    24

    6

    3

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Tomasz Buczek, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Siegfried Mureşan, Jana Nagyová, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Pablo Arias Echeverría, Roman Haider, Céline Imart, Rasmus Nordqvist, Jacek Protas, Annamária Vicsek

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Benoit Cassart, Andi Cristea

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    24

    +

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Pablo Arias Echeverría, Andrzej Halicki, Céline Imart, Siegfried Mureşan, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Andi Cristea, Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    6

    –

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tomasz Buczek, Roman Haider, Annamária Vicsek, Auke Zijlstra

     

    3

    0

    ECR

    Ruggero Razza, Bogdan Rzońca

    PfE

    Jana Nagyová

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE (17.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    ((COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – (2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Urmas Paet

     

     

     

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Security and Defence submits the following to the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 of 19 March 2025 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. Investment in defence and security-related skills covering dual use and transferable skills contributes not only to European defence resilience but also to territorial cohesion. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Furthermore, lifelong learning programmes and initiatives should promote continuous development and adaptation to emerging technologies and defence needs. Moreover, in the European Defence Industrial Strategy of 5 March 2024, the Commission set the priority of the full integration of defence and security as a strategic objective of relevant Union funding and programmes, including ESF+. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the European defence industry, in particular to address skills gaps and shortages directly related to the ability to address the critical capability gaps set out in the White paper. Defence industry should be understood as the industries producing defence products, their respective supply chains, and industries which develop and produce dual-use goods.

    __________________

    __________________

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

     

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 , Member States should promote synergies and avoid duplications between actions arising for dedicated priorities referred to in Article 12c and actions resulting from other Union programmes that benefit the defence industry.

    Amendment  3

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to support their resilience in countering hybrid attacks, breaches of the Union’s external borders, terrorist activities and war.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  5

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Amendment  6

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) The Member States shall work closely with social partners, when reprogramming, and respect working and employment conditions  under applicable ILO conventions, Union and national law and collective agreements.

    Amendment  7

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  8

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support European defence industry and cybersecurity

    Amendment  9

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry and related cybersecurity, as well as in skills related to civil defence and preparedness under dedicated priorities to meet urgent needs. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l). This support may include actions that promote the recognition of skills acquired during military service and facilitate their conversion into qualifications recognised on the civilian labour market.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 30% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 35% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (5a) When allocating funds to dedicated priorities pursuant to paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that those funds contribute to the Member States’ ability to address critical capability gaps set out in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Urmas Paet

    14.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    3.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    31

    8

    4

    Members present for the final vote

    Petras Auštrevičius, Wouter Beke, Marc Botenga, Tobias Cremer, Salvatore De Meo, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Niclas Herbst, Costas Mavrides, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Hans Neuhoff, Andrey Novakov, Kostas Papadakis, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Reinis Pozņaks, Marjan Šarec, Mārtiņš Staķis, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Mihai Tudose, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Michael von der Schulenburg, Alexandr Vondra, Lucia Yar

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    José Cepeda, Bart Groothuis, Marina Mesure, Thijs Reuten, Hélder Sousa Silva, Villy Søvndal, Petra Steger, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    31

    +

    ECR

    Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Reinis Pozņaks, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Alexandr Vondra

    PPE

    Wouter Beke, Salvatore De Meo, Niclas Herbst, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Novakov, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Hélder Sousa Silva, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis, Marjan Šarec, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    José Cepeda, Tobias Cremer, Elio Di Rupo, Costas Mavrides, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Thijs Reuten, Mihai Tudose

    Verts/ALE

    Mārtiņš Staķis

     

    8

    –

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff

    NI

    Kostas Papadakis, Michael von der Schulenburg

    PfE

    Petra Steger, Roberto Vannacci

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Özlem Demirel, Marina Mesure

     

    4

    0

    PfE

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

    Verts/ALE

    Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (25.6.2025)

    Ms Li Andersson

    Chair

    Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges (2025/0085(COD) – COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025)

     

     

    Dear Ms Andersson,

     

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Regional Development was asked to submit an opinion to your Committee.

     

    At its meeting of 9 April 2025, REGI committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It discussed the matter at its meeting of 13 May 2025 and adopted the opinion at its meeting of 25 June 2025[8].

     

    The Committee on Regional Development:

     

    1. Underlines the crucial role that cohesion policy and sectoral programmes, in spite of the fact that they are not crisis management instruments, have repeatedly and efficiently played in helping regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters;

     

    2. Is aware of the rapidly evolving economic, societal, environmental and geopolitical context, as well as the housing crisis, and shares the need for more flexibility in assessing the extent to which cohesion policy programmes can help respond to these changes; nevertheless is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy, in accordance with Article 174 TFEU;

     

    3. Reiterates that ESF+ stands as positive example of EU solidarity and that its main objective is to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights that are far from met yet; stresses that the reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality;

     

    4. Underlines the fact that cohesion policy shall first and foremost ensure social cohesion, not defence spending; nonetheless acknowledges that flexibility of the policy from the point of view of the beneficiaries is a key point, and stresses the need to provide regions with greater flexibility already when programming the funding, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, particularly border regions; furthermore acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities through the development of skills and training, while safeguarding social standards, is already possible under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057;

     

    5. Acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities and in adaptation linked to decarbonisation makes a key contribution to the promotion of the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, and requires having people with the right skills; in general, recognises the importance of the development of skills through lifelong learning and training models, targeted in particular at young people not in education, employment and training (NEET) and unemployed people, and targeted also at teachers, trainers, mentors, coaches, as well as entrepreneurs and researchers; encourages in this regard private sector involvement to enhance skills development and labour market integration, ensuring that ESF+ investments translate into tangible economic benefits; calls for stronger partnerships between businesses, educational institutions, and regional authorities to align training programs with labour market demands, fostering innovation and job creation;

     

    6. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; welcomes the focus given by the legislative proposal to the challenges the Eastern border regions are facing since the Russian aggression against Ukraine began; supports the proposal that programmes under the Investment for jobs and growth goal, with NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, should benefit from the possibility of a one-off 9.5% pre-financing of the programme allocation in 2026 and a 100% Union financing;

     

    7. Reaffirms that cohesion policy and ESF+ should reach all EU regions, especially those affected by transformation processes, while keeping a focus on least developed regions and people; stresses that cohesion policy should be deepened where possible, with a view to remain the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies;

     

    8. Reiterates the importance of compliance with horizontal enabling conditions, and stresses that funds suspended under Regulation 2020/2092 should not be subject to amended programmes or transfers;

     

    9. Encourages the European Commission to allow for targeted simplification measures in Member States where administrative capacity constraints may hinder full or efficient absorption of ESF+ and cohesion funds, and to provide technical assistance to local and regional authorities to ensure efficient implementation and spending; furthermore stresses the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures to limit bureaucratic burden;

     

    10. Believes that the ESF+ strengthens a pro-European identity in the entire EU and should be communicated as such and that local and regional authorities, in light of their role as both beneficiary and managing authority, as well as social partners shall be meaningfully involved in the formulation of new legislative proposals and in the revision of programmes pursuant to the mid-term review, in order to guarantee more effectiveness and coordination between the ESF+ and the broader cohesion and regional policy and its financing tools;

     

    11. Suggests laying down measures to facilitate access for Outermost Regions to flexibilities introduced by the mid-term review, such as lowering to 10% the amounts of reallocations to one or more dedicated priorities established in the second subparagraph of Art. 5a(1), and in the first subparagraph of Art. 5a(2), which are required to benefit from the additional one-off pre-financing.

     

     

    Yours sincerely,

    Dragoş BENEA

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    2.4.2025

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

     Date announced in plenary

    EMPL

    5.5.2025

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    ITRE

    5.5.2025

    REGI

    5.5.2025

    Not delivering opinions

     Date of decision

    ITRE

    9.4.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Marit Maij

    8.5.2025

     

     

     

    Simplified procedure – date of decision

    5.5.2025

    Budgetary assessment

     Date of budgetary assessment

    BUDG

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    13.5.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    25.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    32

    15

    11

    Members present for the final vote

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Grégory Allione, Marc Angel, Pascal Arimont, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Nikola Bartůšek, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Rachel Blom, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Estelle Ceulemans, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Henrik Dahl, Johan Danielsson, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Elena Donazzan, Gheorghe Falcă, Chiara Gemma, Niels Geuking, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Sérgio Humberto, Katrin Langensiepen, Miriam Lexmann, Marit Maij, Marlena Maląg, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Idoia Mendia, Maria Ohisalo, Branislav Ondruš, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Nicola Procaccini, Dennis Radtke, Nela Riehl, Liesbet Sommen, Villy Søvndal, Pál Szekeres, Georgiana Teodorescu, Jana Toom, Raffaele Topo, Francesco Torselli, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Marianne Vind, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Petar Volgin, Jan-Peter Warnke, Séverine Werbrouck

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Regina Doherty, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes, Hristo Petrov

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral

    Date tabled

    30.6.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    32

    +

    ECR

    Georgiana Teodorescu

    PPE

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Pascal Arimont, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Henrik Dahl, Regina Doherty, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Gheorghe Falcă, Niels Geuking, Sérgio Humberto, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Dennis Radtke, Liesbet Sommen

    Renew

    Grégory Allione, Hristo Petrov, Jana Toom, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne

    S&D

    Marc Angel, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Estelle Ceulemans, Johan Danielsson, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Marit Maij, Idoia Mendia, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Raffaele Topo, Marianne Vind

     

    15

    –

    ESN

    Petar Volgin

    NI

    Branislav Ondruš, Jan-Peter Warnke

    PfE

    Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Pál Szekeres, Séverine Werbrouck

    The Left

    Konstantinos Arvanitis, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes

     

    11

    0

    ECR

    Elena Donazzan, Chiara Gemma, Marlena Maląg, Nicola Procaccini, Francesco Torselli, Mariateresa Vivaldini

    PPE

    Miriam Lexmann

    Verts/ALE

    Katrin Langensiepen, Maria Ohisalo, Nela Riehl, Villy Søvndal

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

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    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

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    CBHH is a boutique M&A and corporate finance advisory firm, operating at the intersection of infrastructure and technology—a space the firm refers to as “core+ or value-add infrastructure.” This includes data centres and fiber broadband roll-outs, EV and HGV charging infrastructure, energy generation and storage and smart city technologies—all sectors with proven unit economics, but where companies still face growth-stage operational risk and have considerable demands for capital.

    Core+ Infrastructure

    Cameron explains how CBHH’s business focuses on “next-generation infrastructure” assets—businesses that fall between venture and traditional infrastructure mandates. They’re too small for most large-cap investors, but too capital-intensive for early-stage funds. Yet, these firms are driving “mission critical” infrastructure for the future and therefore, it is important that their funding needs are solved.

    “These companies are capital hungry and operationally intense. But if you understand the unit economics—like take-up rates for fiber or utilization of EV charging—you can underwrite the growth just like with traditional infrastructure,” Cameron notes.

    European Market Dynamics & German Expansion

    Cameron Barney’s post-Brexit merger with German boutique Herbst Hilgenfeldt Partners has given the enlarged firm (“CBHH”) real-time coverage across two of Europe’s most active infrastructure markets.

    “In Europe, decarbonization and digital infra are public priorities. Governments and investors alike are aligned—and we’re specifically positioned as the ‘go to’ firm to advise technology-centric infrastructure scale-ups which are leading that transition,” he says.

    From Advisory to Execution to Capital

    Strong relationships are central to CBBH’s approach. It is notable that CBHH regularly works with companies from their earliest institutional round all the way to large-scale strategic exits. A particular feature is that the firm has also co-invested in past clients—blending traditional merchant banking principles and support for clients with modern M&A execution.

    “We’re not just dropping-in for a transaction. Some clients we’ve advised through 9 or 10 deals—and we have also invested alongside them from the outset. That level of commitment and continuity is rare (in our view), but it’s how we operate and how we have developed deep sector knowledge and relationships.”

    Competing with Bulge Bracket banks

    Despite its boutique size, CBHH punches well above its weight—often winning mandates over global investment banks. Cameron attributes this in part to the global banking heritage and transaction experience of the senior team. He also believes that the firm’s continued success if founded on deep sector knowledge, ongoing senior partner engagement, and agility in the midst of complex transactions.

    “We are the size of a bulge bracket’s sector team—but almost certainly more focused, more aligned, and closer to the client. Our clients always get the A-team, not the associate bench.”

    Scaling Institutional Knowledge with Navatar

    With a growing cross-border team, CBHH chose Navatar’s CRM platform to turn individual relationships into firmwide institutional knowledge.

    “With a growing team and across separate offices, Navatar gives us CRM tool of a bulge-bracket platform, but purpose-built for firms like ours,” observed Cameron.

    “CBHH represents exactly the kind of investment bank redefining sector leadership in today’s private markets,” said Alok Misra, CEO at Navatar. “Their deep expertise in infrastructure, enviable record in transaction execution and long-term client model set them apart. Navatar simply helps surface and scale their institutional knowledge—so every individual in the firm, on every deal can benefit from every insight from their colleagues – and bring the full value of the firm to its mandates.”

    Final Takeaways

    Cameron also shares perspectives on:

    • Why large infra investors may want to engage earlier in an infra lifecycle
    • How operational experience of its partners has made CBHH a stronger advisor
    • Why the firm is leaning into ‘smart city’ infra and exploring ‘natural capital’ opportunities alongside its more traditional sector focus of telecoms and renewable energy infrastructure.
    • How to balance the demands of ‘hands-on’ partner involvement whilst scaling an advisory firm.

    “This is a firm built by ex-Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and UBS bankers—all of whom chose to bring their A game to the next generation of entrepreneurs, facing the challenges of rapid growth and large-scale capital requirements. We bring a distinct discipline and empathy to every client relationship.”

    Listen to the full episode: https://youtu.be/wDJeyzySbTs?si=kG_2nkbM1dQaDmOw

    Learn more about CBHH: www.cbhh.com

    Learn more about on Navatar’s CRM for M&A Advisory & Investment Banking: https://www.navatargroup.com/mergers-and-acquisitions-crm-software/

    About Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt

    Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt (CBHH) is an independent European investment bank providing financing and M&A advice to fast-growing companies in the ‘infra-tech’ sector including energy transition infrastructure, digital infrastructure, social infrastructure, natural capital and technology.

    About Navatar

    Navatar (@navatargroup), the CRM platform for alternative assets and investment banking firms, is a low-touch, high-impact intelligence engine purpose-built for investment workflows across private markets. Our platform delivers seamless intelligence capture, unifies firmwide relationships, and orchestrates complex deal processes—without requiring high-touch input or behavioral change from investment professionals. Backed by over two decades of CRM expertise, Navatar is used by hundreds of global private markets firms to drive institutional knowledge, create early access to opportunities and streamline execution. For more information, visit www.navatargroup.com.

    Sales Team
    Navatar
    sales@navatargroup.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: CBHH’s Charles Cameron on Financing The Next Generation of Critical Infrastructure – On Navatar’s A-Game Podcast: Sector Focus, Growth Infra, Cross-Border M&A Execution and CRM Value

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LONDON and NEW YORK, July 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In the latest episode of Navatar’s A-Game podcast, Charles Cameron, Partner at CBHH (Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt), shares the firm’s focused approach to sourcing and executing infrastructure financing and M&A opportunities across the UK and continental Europe. The conversation explores how CBHH is helping next-generation infrastructure businesses raise institutional capital and scale across borders

    CBHH is a boutique M&A and corporate finance advisory firm, operating at the intersection of infrastructure and technology—a space the firm refers to as “core+ or value-add infrastructure.” This includes data centres and fiber broadband roll-outs, EV and HGV charging infrastructure, energy generation and storage and smart city technologies—all sectors with proven unit economics, but where companies still face growth-stage operational risk and have considerable demands for capital.

    Core+ Infrastructure

    Cameron explains how CBHH’s business focuses on “next-generation infrastructure” assets—businesses that fall between venture and traditional infrastructure mandates. They’re too small for most large-cap investors, but too capital-intensive for early-stage funds. Yet, these firms are driving “mission critical” infrastructure for the future and therefore, it is important that their funding needs are solved.

    “These companies are capital hungry and operationally intense. But if you understand the unit economics—like take-up rates for fiber or utilization of EV charging—you can underwrite the growth just like with traditional infrastructure,” Cameron notes.

    European Market Dynamics & German Expansion

    Cameron Barney’s post-Brexit merger with German boutique Herbst Hilgenfeldt Partners has given the enlarged firm (“CBHH”) real-time coverage across two of Europe’s most active infrastructure markets.

    “In Europe, decarbonization and digital infra are public priorities. Governments and investors alike are aligned—and we’re specifically positioned as the ‘go to’ firm to advise technology-centric infrastructure scale-ups which are leading that transition,” he says.

    From Advisory to Execution to Capital

    Strong relationships are central to CBBH’s approach. It is notable that CBHH regularly works with companies from their earliest institutional round all the way to large-scale strategic exits. A particular feature is that the firm has also co-invested in past clients—blending traditional merchant banking principles and support for clients with modern M&A execution.

    “We’re not just dropping-in for a transaction. Some clients we’ve advised through 9 or 10 deals—and we have also invested alongside them from the outset. That level of commitment and continuity is rare (in our view), but it’s how we operate and how we have developed deep sector knowledge and relationships.”

    Competing with Bulge Bracket banks

    Despite its boutique size, CBHH punches well above its weight—often winning mandates over global investment banks. Cameron attributes this in part to the global banking heritage and transaction experience of the senior team. He also believes that the firm’s continued success if founded on deep sector knowledge, ongoing senior partner engagement, and agility in the midst of complex transactions.

    “We are the size of a bulge bracket’s sector team—but almost certainly more focused, more aligned, and closer to the client. Our clients always get the A-team, not the associate bench.”

    Scaling Institutional Knowledge with Navatar

    With a growing cross-border team, CBHH chose Navatar’s CRM platform to turn individual relationships into firmwide institutional knowledge.

    “With a growing team and across separate offices, Navatar gives us CRM tool of a bulge-bracket platform, but purpose-built for firms like ours,” observed Cameron.

    “CBHH represents exactly the kind of investment bank redefining sector leadership in today’s private markets,” said Alok Misra, CEO at Navatar. “Their deep expertise in infrastructure, enviable record in transaction execution and long-term client model set them apart. Navatar simply helps surface and scale their institutional knowledge—so every individual in the firm, on every deal can benefit from every insight from their colleagues – and bring the full value of the firm to its mandates.”

    Final Takeaways

    Cameron also shares perspectives on:

    • Why large infra investors may want to engage earlier in an infra lifecycle
    • How operational experience of its partners has made CBHH a stronger advisor
    • Why the firm is leaning into ‘smart city’ infra and exploring ‘natural capital’ opportunities alongside its more traditional sector focus of telecoms and renewable energy infrastructure.
    • How to balance the demands of ‘hands-on’ partner involvement whilst scaling an advisory firm.

    “This is a firm built by ex-Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and UBS bankers—all of whom chose to bring their A game to the next generation of entrepreneurs, facing the challenges of rapid growth and large-scale capital requirements. We bring a distinct discipline and empathy to every client relationship.”

    Listen to the full episode: https://youtu.be/wDJeyzySbTs?si=kG_2nkbM1dQaDmOw

    Learn more about CBHH: www.cbhh.com

    Learn more about on Navatar’s CRM for M&A Advisory & Investment Banking: https://www.navatargroup.com/mergers-and-acquisitions-crm-software/

    About Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt

    Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt (CBHH) is an independent European investment bank providing financing and M&A advice to fast-growing companies in the ‘infra-tech’ sector including energy transition infrastructure, digital infrastructure, social infrastructure, natural capital and technology.

    About Navatar

    Navatar (@navatargroup), the CRM platform for alternative assets and investment banking firms, is a low-touch, high-impact intelligence engine purpose-built for investment workflows across private markets. Our platform delivers seamless intelligence capture, unifies firmwide relationships, and orchestrates complex deal processes—without requiring high-touch input or behavioral change from investment professionals. Backed by over two decades of CRM expertise, Navatar is used by hundreds of global private markets firms to drive institutional knowledge, create early access to opportunities and streamline execution. For more information, visit www.navatargroup.com.

    Sales Team
    Navatar
    sales@navatargroup.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: CBHH’s Charles Cameron on Financing The Next Generation of Critical Infrastructure – On Navatar’s A-Game Podcast: Sector Focus, Growth Infra, Cross-Border M&A Execution and CRM Value

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LONDON and NEW YORK, July 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In the latest episode of Navatar’s A-Game podcast, Charles Cameron, Partner at CBHH (Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt), shares the firm’s focused approach to sourcing and executing infrastructure financing and M&A opportunities across the UK and continental Europe. The conversation explores how CBHH is helping next-generation infrastructure businesses raise institutional capital and scale across borders

    CBHH is a boutique M&A and corporate finance advisory firm, operating at the intersection of infrastructure and technology—a space the firm refers to as “core+ or value-add infrastructure.” This includes data centres and fiber broadband roll-outs, EV and HGV charging infrastructure, energy generation and storage and smart city technologies—all sectors with proven unit economics, but where companies still face growth-stage operational risk and have considerable demands for capital.

    Core+ Infrastructure

    Cameron explains how CBHH’s business focuses on “next-generation infrastructure” assets—businesses that fall between venture and traditional infrastructure mandates. They’re too small for most large-cap investors, but too capital-intensive for early-stage funds. Yet, these firms are driving “mission critical” infrastructure for the future and therefore, it is important that their funding needs are solved.

    “These companies are capital hungry and operationally intense. But if you understand the unit economics—like take-up rates for fiber or utilization of EV charging—you can underwrite the growth just like with traditional infrastructure,” Cameron notes.

    European Market Dynamics & German Expansion

    Cameron Barney’s post-Brexit merger with German boutique Herbst Hilgenfeldt Partners has given the enlarged firm (“CBHH”) real-time coverage across two of Europe’s most active infrastructure markets.

    “In Europe, decarbonization and digital infra are public priorities. Governments and investors alike are aligned—and we’re specifically positioned as the ‘go to’ firm to advise technology-centric infrastructure scale-ups which are leading that transition,” he says.

    From Advisory to Execution to Capital

    Strong relationships are central to CBBH’s approach. It is notable that CBHH regularly works with companies from their earliest institutional round all the way to large-scale strategic exits. A particular feature is that the firm has also co-invested in past clients—blending traditional merchant banking principles and support for clients with modern M&A execution.

    “We’re not just dropping-in for a transaction. Some clients we’ve advised through 9 or 10 deals—and we have also invested alongside them from the outset. That level of commitment and continuity is rare (in our view), but it’s how we operate and how we have developed deep sector knowledge and relationships.”

    Competing with Bulge Bracket banks

    Despite its boutique size, CBHH punches well above its weight—often winning mandates over global investment banks. Cameron attributes this in part to the global banking heritage and transaction experience of the senior team. He also believes that the firm’s continued success if founded on deep sector knowledge, ongoing senior partner engagement, and agility in the midst of complex transactions.

    “We are the size of a bulge bracket’s sector team—but almost certainly more focused, more aligned, and closer to the client. Our clients always get the A-team, not the associate bench.”

    Scaling Institutional Knowledge with Navatar

    With a growing cross-border team, CBHH chose Navatar’s CRM platform to turn individual relationships into firmwide institutional knowledge.

    “With a growing team and across separate offices, Navatar gives us CRM tool of a bulge-bracket platform, but purpose-built for firms like ours,” observed Cameron.

    “CBHH represents exactly the kind of investment bank redefining sector leadership in today’s private markets,” said Alok Misra, CEO at Navatar. “Their deep expertise in infrastructure, enviable record in transaction execution and long-term client model set them apart. Navatar simply helps surface and scale their institutional knowledge—so every individual in the firm, on every deal can benefit from every insight from their colleagues – and bring the full value of the firm to its mandates.”

    Final Takeaways

    Cameron also shares perspectives on:

    • Why large infra investors may want to engage earlier in an infra lifecycle
    • How operational experience of its partners has made CBHH a stronger advisor
    • Why the firm is leaning into ‘smart city’ infra and exploring ‘natural capital’ opportunities alongside its more traditional sector focus of telecoms and renewable energy infrastructure.
    • How to balance the demands of ‘hands-on’ partner involvement whilst scaling an advisory firm.

    “This is a firm built by ex-Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and UBS bankers—all of whom chose to bring their A game to the next generation of entrepreneurs, facing the challenges of rapid growth and large-scale capital requirements. We bring a distinct discipline and empathy to every client relationship.”

    Listen to the full episode: https://youtu.be/wDJeyzySbTs?si=kG_2nkbM1dQaDmOw

    Learn more about CBHH: www.cbhh.com

    Learn more about on Navatar’s CRM for M&A Advisory & Investment Banking: https://www.navatargroup.com/mergers-and-acquisitions-crm-software/

    About Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt

    Cameron Barney Herbst Hilgenfeldt (CBHH) is an independent European investment bank providing financing and M&A advice to fast-growing companies in the ‘infra-tech’ sector including energy transition infrastructure, digital infrastructure, social infrastructure, natural capital and technology.

    About Navatar

    Navatar (@navatargroup), the CRM platform for alternative assets and investment banking firms, is a low-touch, high-impact intelligence engine purpose-built for investment workflows across private markets. Our platform delivers seamless intelligence capture, unifies firmwide relationships, and orchestrates complex deal processes—without requiring high-touch input or behavioral change from investment professionals. Backed by over two decades of CRM expertise, Navatar is used by hundreds of global private markets firms to drive institutional knowledge, create early access to opportunities and streamline execution. For more information, visit www.navatargroup.com.

    Sales Team
    Navatar
    sales@navatargroup.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: The Status of the Chagos Archipelago – Part I: History of the Disputes Surrounding its Status and the Creation of a UK-US Military Base

    Source: US Global Legal Monitor

    The following is a guest post by Clare Feikert-Ahalt, a senior foreign law specialist at the Law Library of Congress covering the United Kingdom and several other jurisdictions. Clare has written numerous posts for In Custodia Legis, including Revealing the Presence of Ghosts; Weird Laws, or Urban Legends?; FALQs: Brexit Referendum; 100 Years of “Poppy Day” in the United Kingdom; and most recently Mr. Bates vs. The Post Office Spurs Possible Law Change.

    A small, but important, island known as Diego Garcia has given rise to a number of legal challenges and international agreements that date back to Britain’s colonial era. The challenges surround whether the detachment from Mauritius, and subsequent colonization of the Chagos Archipelago, which consists of several islands and atolls remotely located in the center of the Indian Ocean, including the island of Diego Garcia, was lawful, and whether the removal and prohibition on the return of its inhabitants occurred within the bounds of the law. A recent agreement between the United Kingdom (UK) and Mauritius settles the disputes, by returning Chagos Archipelago to Mauritus and providing the UK with continued use of a military base, which I will describe in a post tomorrow. Today I will look at the history that preceded the agreement.

    UK Colonization of Chagos Archipelago

    One of the driving forces for the UK colonization of Chagos Archipelago was the establishment of a defense facility, to be operated jointly with the United States (US). Almost immediately upon detaching the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and establishing the colony of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) the UK, after undertaking a survey to determine the most appropriate location for a defense facility, entered into an agreement with the US to allow Diego Garcia to be used for defense purposes. The US subsequently constructed, and jointly operated with the UK, a defense facility that according to the UK government provides “crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the UK.”

    History of the Chagos Archipelago and Diego Garcia

    The BIOT, which includes Diego Garcia, was the last colony established by the British as its colonial era entered into its waning days and Mauritius was on the verge of obtaining independence. In 1965, the government of the UK and a representative of Mauritius signed an agreement detaching the Chagos Archipelago from the territory of Mauritius.

    The agreement between the UK and Mauritius provided the legal foundation for the UK to establish the BIOT as new colony in the Chagos Archipelago, which initially included three other islands detached from Seychelles that were later ceded back to the Seychelles upon their independence in 1976. In return for the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago, the UK government provided Mauritius with a grant of £3 million (approximately US$4 million), along with a commitment to return the islands to Mauritius at a later date when it no longer needed the territory for defense purposes. Once under UK control, in 1966, the UK signed an agreement with the US to establish a military base on the largest island, Diego Garcia.

    Independence of Mauritius Leads to Legal Dispute over Territorial Definition

    Mauritius was granted independence from the UK in 1968, but the definition of Mauritius, contained in the Mauritius Independence Act 1968, which became its constitution and was promulgated by the government of the UK prior to Mauritius’ independence, does not include the Chagos Archipelago. Instead “Mauritius” is defined in section 5 of the 1968 Act as “the territories which immediately before the appointed day constitute the Colony of Mauritius.” The Mauritian government later claimed that its independence was made conditional upon the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from its territory and disputed the sovereignty of the UK over the Chagos Archipelago.

    This bilateral dispute progressed through numerous meetings, international exchanges, courts and tribunals for a period of 60 years until the UK and Mauritius signed the recent agreement providing sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius..

    United Nations Resolution of 1966

    In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution condemning the British for exercising sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and calling for it to be returned to Mauritius.  In the same year, the UK and US reached an agreement providing for the use of an island in the Chagos Archipelago for defense purposes. The agreement provided that the UK government would take any administrative measures necessary to ensure the defense needs were met, which included the resettlement of the inhabitants of the islands.

    Challenges Regarding Status Continue

    The challenges faced by the Chagossians, along with their efforts to reclaim Diego Garcia are well detailed and documented in the decisions of the courts in which they lodged their claims.

    The UK entered into an agreement with Mauritius in 1972 whereby it agreed to pay Mauritius £650,000 (approximately US$875,000) for the cost of resettlement of people displaced from the Chagos Archipelago. The UK reached an additional agreement with Mauritius in 1982, under which it paid a further £4 million (approximately US$5.4 million) to be placed into a trust fund for the Chagossians removed from the islands as a final settlement of all claims, without admitting liability.

    Despite these agreements and settlement, Mauritius continued to challenge the legitimacy of British sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and the Chagossians challenged the legality of their resettlement and exile from Diego Garcia. During these challenges, and in response to a judgment from England’s High Court, the UK government conducted a feasibility study in 2002 into the return of the Chagossians to Diego Garcia. The study concluded that if the Chagossians were permitted to return to live on Diego Garcia, the costs of long-term inhabitation would be prohibitive and that natural events, such as flooding and seismic activity “would make life difficult for a resettled population.”

    Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

    In 2019, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion that the decolonization of Mauritius was not completed lawfully and that an international agreement was not possible when one territory was under the authority of the other. The ICJ stated that the UK “has an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible.” The UK government acknowledged the opinion, but noted it was not legally binding. It stated that it did “not share the court’s approach” and asserted that it has exercised sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago since 1814. The UK affirmed that it stood by its commitment “to cede sovereignty of the territory to Mauritius when it is no longer required for defence purposes.”

    While advisory opinions from the ICJ are not binding, the UK government in 2025 acknowledged that they do “carr[y] significant weight; in particular it is likely to be highly influential on any subsequent court/tribunal”. This advisory opinion had a “meaningful real-world impact on the sustainability of UK sovereignty and the operation of the Base.” In particular, the UK government determined that if Mauritius made another legal challenge, its “… longstanding legal view is that [the UK] would not have a realistic prospect of success.”

    The advisory opinion was followed in 2021, by a case heard by the Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea relating to the delimitation of the boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives and the court ruled that the sovereignty of Mauritius over the Chagos Archipelago could be inferred from the advisory opinion made by the International Court of Justice.

    The Congress of the Universal Postal Union also recognized Mauritius as responsible for making decisions regarding international postal services in the Chagos Archipelago. The UK government determined these decisions “confirmed the risk that a future (binding) case could be brought successfully against the UK” and that this “would create serious real-world operational impacts for the Base.”

    Between the years 2021-2022, the UK used diplomacy and bilateral initiatives to attempt to steer Mauritius away from commencing further legal challenges, but these were unsuccessful and “… it became clear by mid-2022 that the only viable means to halt the process was to enter negotiations” and the start of these were announced in November 2022. They resulted in the May 2025 agreement, which I will describe in tomorrow’s post. Stay tuned!

    ——————————————————————————————————————————–

    Subscribe to In Custodia Legis – it’s free! – to receive interesting posts drawn from the Law Library of Congress’s vast collections and our staff’s expertise in U.S., foreign, and international law.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anna Walker, Senior Arts + Culture Editor

    Part of the appeal of the 2023 horror flick, M3gan, was that its titular antagonist managed to be two of the scariest villains of the genre in one – a killer robot, and a child’s doll come to life.

    After nine-year-old Cady (Violet McGraw) tragically lost her parents, her roboticist aunt Gemma (Allison Williams of Get Out fame) brought M3gan home to help her niece with the traumatic transition. M3gan was to be Cady’s teacher, playmate and above all, protector. In classic horror style, she soon embarked on a murderous rampage in the name of “protecting” her ward.

    The film was an instant cult hit, dubbed a “camp classic” thanks to M3gan’s TikTok dance moves and determination to destroy the nuclear family.

    In M3gan 2, in cinemas from today, the filmmakers have leaned into that campiness even more. But, as horror expert Adam Daniel explains that doesn’t completely neutralise the terror. Instead, it reformulates it, offering a cathartic release that makes the subject matter more digestible.



    Read more:
    From HAL 9000 to M3GAN: what film’s evil robots tell us about contemporary tech fears

    The trailer for M3gan 2.0.

    If you’re looking for more traditional jump scares, 28 Years Later has you covered. Danny Boyle has returned to the franchise with this instant-classic of the zombie genre, which muses on both post-Brexit Britain and our collective experiences of the COVID pandemic. In this film, Europe has contained a “rage virus” to Britain. There are French boats on quarantine patrols, Swedish soldiers mocking remaining mainlanders and St George’s flags burning.

    For COVID storytelling expert Lucyl Harrison: “The film ushers in a new age of ‘Vi-Fi’” (that’s virus fiction) “without succumbing to pulpy pandemic storytelling”. Ralph Fiennes offers a typically strong performance as the “mad” Dr Kelson, the only person determined to commemorate the virus’s ever-mounting dead.



    Read more:
    The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling

    The trailer for 28 Years Later.

    I confess, I’m a bit of a baby when it comes to horror. So, I’ll need to follow up any zombie fare with something a little more comforting. My choice for this week is The Ballad of Wallis Island, which romcom giant Richard Curtis has dubbed “one of the great British films of all time”.

    It takes place on the fictional Wallis Island, home to millionaire Charles (Tim Key), an almost obsessive fan of former folk-rock duo played by Tom Basden and Carey Mulligan. Invited to the island to play a private gig, they must face their musical and romantic past, all under the gaze of an ecstatic Charles.

    The film was made in just 18 days on a tight budget in a typical Welsh summer – a doctor was on hand to stop the actors getting hypothermia when they filmed in the sea. It reminded our reviewer of another British comedy classic, Victoria Wood’s sitcom Dinnerladies, with its breadcrumb trail of slipped in details that provide laughter in the moment but which return to make the audience think twice.



    Read more:
    The Ballad of Wallis Island is a masterpiece of the extraordinary made ordinary

    The trailer for The Ballad of Wallis Island.

    When Poor Things won the Golden Globe for best picture last year, director Yorgos Lanthimos thanked everybody, from the cast and crew to his hero Bruce Springsteen. But one person who didn’t get a mention was Alasdair Gray, the Scottish artist and writer who wrote the novel the film was based on.

    Now Gray is rightly being celebrated at Glasgow’s Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum. The unseen paintings in the new show Alasdair Gray: Works from the Morag McAlpine Bequest come from a donation of works he made after the death of his wife in 2014.

    Highlights of the show include his original artwork for his novel Poor Things and the streetscape Gray called “my best big oil painting”, depicting Cowcaddens in Glasgow.



    Read more:
    Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist

    Pride month is coming to an end, but you can enjoy the movies in our Hidden Gems of Queer Cinema series year round. These articles highlight brilliant films that should be more widely known and firmly part of the canon of queer cinema. I’d particularly recommend Saving Face (2004), complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asian people.



    Read more:
    Hidden gems of LGBTQ+ cinema: Saving Face is a complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asians

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    – ref. Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week – https://theconversation.com/killer-dolls-and-brexit-zombies-what-to-watch-and-do-this-week-259923

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anna Walker, Senior Arts + Culture Editor

    Part of the appeal of the 2023 horror flick, M3gan, was that its titular antagonist managed to be two of the scariest villains of the genre in one – a killer robot, and a child’s doll come to life.

    After nine-year-old Cady (Violet McGraw) tragically lost her parents, her roboticist aunt Gemma (Allison Williams of Get Out fame) brought M3gan home to help her niece with the traumatic transition. M3gan was to be Cady’s teacher, playmate and above all, protector. In classic horror style, she soon embarked on a murderous rampage in the name of “protecting” her ward.

    The film was an instant cult hit, dubbed a “camp classic” thanks to M3gan’s TikTok dance moves and determination to destroy the nuclear family.

    In M3gan 2, in cinemas from today, the filmmakers have leaned into that campiness even more. But, as horror expert Adam Daniel explains that doesn’t completely neutralise the terror. Instead, it reformulates it, offering a cathartic release that makes the subject matter more digestible.



    Read more:
    From HAL 9000 to M3GAN: what film’s evil robots tell us about contemporary tech fears

    The trailer for M3gan 2.0.

    If you’re looking for more traditional jump scares, 28 Years Later has you covered. Danny Boyle has returned to the franchise with this instant-classic of the zombie genre, which muses on both post-Brexit Britain and our collective experiences of the COVID pandemic. In this film, Europe has contained a “rage virus” to Britain. There are French boats on quarantine patrols, Swedish soldiers mocking remaining mainlanders and St George’s flags burning.

    For COVID storytelling expert Lucyl Harrison: “The film ushers in a new age of ‘Vi-Fi’” (that’s virus fiction) “without succumbing to pulpy pandemic storytelling”. Ralph Fiennes offers a typically strong performance as the “mad” Dr Kelson, the only person determined to commemorate the virus’s ever-mounting dead.



    Read more:
    The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling

    The trailer for 28 Years Later.

    I confess, I’m a bit of a baby when it comes to horror. So, I’ll need to follow up any zombie fare with something a little more comforting. My choice for this week is The Ballad of Wallis Island, which romcom giant Richard Curtis has dubbed “one of the great British films of all time”.

    It takes place on the fictional Wallis Island, home to millionaire Charles (Tim Key), an almost obsessive fan of former folk-rock duo played by Tom Basden and Carey Mulligan. Invited to the island to play a private gig, they must face their musical and romantic past, all under the gaze of an ecstatic Charles.

    The film was made in just 18 days on a tight budget in a typical Welsh summer – a doctor was on hand to stop the actors getting hypothermia when they filmed in the sea. It reminded our reviewer of another British comedy classic, Victoria Wood’s sitcom Dinnerladies, with its breadcrumb trail of slipped in details that provide laughter in the moment but which return to make the audience think twice.



    Read more:
    The Ballad of Wallis Island is a masterpiece of the extraordinary made ordinary

    The trailer for The Ballad of Wallis Island.

    When Poor Things won the Golden Globe for best picture last year, director Yorgos Lanthimos thanked everybody, from the cast and crew to his hero Bruce Springsteen. But one person who didn’t get a mention was Alasdair Gray, the Scottish artist and writer who wrote the novel the film was based on.

    Now Gray is rightly being celebrated at Glasgow’s Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum. The unseen paintings in the new show Alasdair Gray: Works from the Morag McAlpine Bequest come from a donation of works he made after the death of his wife in 2014.

    Highlights of the show include his original artwork for his novel Poor Things and the streetscape Gray called “my best big oil painting”, depicting Cowcaddens in Glasgow.



    Read more:
    Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist

    Pride month is coming to an end, but you can enjoy the movies in our Hidden Gems of Queer Cinema series year round. These articles highlight brilliant films that should be more widely known and firmly part of the canon of queer cinema. I’d particularly recommend Saving Face (2004), complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asian people.



    Read more:
    Hidden gems of LGBTQ+ cinema: Saving Face is a complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asians

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    – ref. Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week – https://theconversation.com/killer-dolls-and-brexit-zombies-what-to-watch-and-do-this-week-259923

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anna Walker, Senior Arts + Culture Editor

    Part of the appeal of the 2023 horror flick, M3gan, was that its titular antagonist managed to be two of the scariest villains of the genre in one – a killer robot, and a child’s doll come to life.

    After nine-year-old Cady (Violet McGraw) tragically lost her parents, her roboticist aunt Gemma (Allison Williams of Get Out fame) brought M3gan home to help her niece with the traumatic transition. M3gan was to be Cady’s teacher, playmate and above all, protector. In classic horror style, she soon embarked on a murderous rampage in the name of “protecting” her ward.

    The film was an instant cult hit, dubbed a “camp classic” thanks to M3gan’s TikTok dance moves and determination to destroy the nuclear family.

    In M3gan 2, in cinemas from today, the filmmakers have leaned into that campiness even more. But, as horror expert Adam Daniel explains that doesn’t completely neutralise the terror. Instead, it reformulates it, offering a cathartic release that makes the subject matter more digestible.



    Read more:
    From HAL 9000 to M3GAN: what film’s evil robots tell us about contemporary tech fears

    The trailer for M3gan 2.0.

    If you’re looking for more traditional jump scares, 28 Years Later has you covered. Danny Boyle has returned to the franchise with this instant-classic of the zombie genre, which muses on both post-Brexit Britain and our collective experiences of the COVID pandemic. In this film, Europe has contained a “rage virus” to Britain. There are French boats on quarantine patrols, Swedish soldiers mocking remaining mainlanders and St George’s flags burning.

    For COVID storytelling expert Lucyl Harrison: “The film ushers in a new age of ‘Vi-Fi’” (that’s virus fiction) “without succumbing to pulpy pandemic storytelling”. Ralph Fiennes offers a typically strong performance as the “mad” Dr Kelson, the only person determined to commemorate the virus’s ever-mounting dead.



    Read more:
    The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling

    The trailer for 28 Years Later.

    I confess, I’m a bit of a baby when it comes to horror. So, I’ll need to follow up any zombie fare with something a little more comforting. My choice for this week is The Ballad of Wallis Island, which romcom giant Richard Curtis has dubbed “one of the great British films of all time”.

    It takes place on the fictional Wallis Island, home to millionaire Charles (Tim Key), an almost obsessive fan of former folk-rock duo played by Tom Basden and Carey Mulligan. Invited to the island to play a private gig, they must face their musical and romantic past, all under the gaze of an ecstatic Charles.

    The film was made in just 18 days on a tight budget in a typical Welsh summer – a doctor was on hand to stop the actors getting hypothermia when they filmed in the sea. It reminded our reviewer of another British comedy classic, Victoria Wood’s sitcom Dinnerladies, with its breadcrumb trail of slipped in details that provide laughter in the moment but which return to make the audience think twice.



    Read more:
    The Ballad of Wallis Island is a masterpiece of the extraordinary made ordinary

    The trailer for The Ballad of Wallis Island.

    When Poor Things won the Golden Globe for best picture last year, director Yorgos Lanthimos thanked everybody, from the cast and crew to his hero Bruce Springsteen. But one person who didn’t get a mention was Alasdair Gray, the Scottish artist and writer who wrote the novel the film was based on.

    Now Gray is rightly being celebrated at Glasgow’s Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum. The unseen paintings in the new show Alasdair Gray: Works from the Morag McAlpine Bequest come from a donation of works he made after the death of his wife in 2014.

    Highlights of the show include his original artwork for his novel Poor Things and the streetscape Gray called “my best big oil painting”, depicting Cowcaddens in Glasgow.



    Read more:
    Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist

    Pride month is coming to an end, but you can enjoy the movies in our Hidden Gems of Queer Cinema series year round. These articles highlight brilliant films that should be more widely known and firmly part of the canon of queer cinema. I’d particularly recommend Saving Face (2004), complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asian people.



    Read more:
    Hidden gems of LGBTQ+ cinema: Saving Face is a complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asians

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    – ref. Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week – https://theconversation.com/killer-dolls-and-brexit-zombies-what-to-watch-and-do-this-week-259923

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Belgium’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 27-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the core component of Next Generation EU (NGEU). By promoting the sustainable and inclusive recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic that ensures the green and digital transitions make progress, the RRF is consistent with the European Commission’s priorities. Belgium’s initial maximum contribution to finance its national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) was set to €5 924 million in grants. The amount was updated in June 2022 and reduced to €4 523 million. In addition, the non-repayable allocation for the REPowerEU chapter to reinforce the NRRP’s energy dimension is set at €281 million. Belgium also submitted a reasoned request to transfer part of its allocation from the resources of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the RRF (€228 million). Finally, Belgium requested a loan support of €264 million. The overall EU financial contribution to the amended Belgian NRRP stands thus at €5 298 million; it represents 0.7 % of the entire RRF, and 1.1 % of Belgium’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019. The Council approved Belgium’s amended NRRP in December 2023. Other targeted revisions took place in 2024 and 2025. In total, Belgium has received €2.46 billion so far: €915.1 million in pre-financing – 13 % of the initial NRRP (€770 million, all grants) in 2021, and 20 % of the REPowerEU chapter (€102.1 million in grants, €43 million in loans) in 2024; and two result-based instalments – one of €631.6 million (all grants) in September 2024, and another of €909 million (of which €40 million in loans) in May 2025. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate of creating a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on RRF implementation and scrutinises the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark – A10-0099/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the draft Council decision (14652/2024),

    – having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, of the other part (2025-2030) (14781/24),

    – having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0227/2024),

    – having regard to its non-legislative resolution of …[1] on the draft decision,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4) and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0099/2025),

    1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

    2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the one part, and of Greenland and Denmark, of the other part.

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

     

    At the end of 2024, Greenland and the European Union signed a new Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) (2025-2030). This is a mixed agreement that allows the European Union’s vessels to fish species such as cod, Greenland halibut, redfish and Northern prawn. In return, the European Union pays a financial contribution of EUR 17 296 857 per annum, comprising EUR 14 096 857 for access rights and EUR 3 200 000 for support and implementation of Greenland’s fisheries policy, plus the fees paid by vessel owners. In recent years, the fisheries agreement has allowed around 10 of the European Union’s vessels to operate in the autonomous territory’s waters. The new Protocol provides details of the rules and provisions governing this access.

     

    Fisheries in Greenland

     

    The fisheries sector is of central importance for Greenland in socio-economic and cultural terms. It accounts for 15% of the territory’s jobs and over 90% of its exports. Inshore fishing mainly involves small boats (dinghies), and sustains a local economy and jobs. Many remote Inuit communities rely on subsistence fishing. The territory also has a developed offshore fishing fleet and has fisheries agreements in force that allow foreign vessels to fish in the offshore area. Greenland’s fisheries are suffering the effects of climate change on a vulnerable Arctic marine environment, with particular impacts on the species caught. Greenland has put measures in place to limit the impact of fisheries on the marine environment; these include a ban on discards, a plan for the management of bycatch, etc.

     

    New Protocol implementing the SFPA

     

    The new Protocol that has been signed has a term of six years, providing stability and visibility for stakeholders. It contains provisions aimed at providing a framework for access to waters by European vessels and cooperation with Greenland: fishing opportunities, bycatch, scientific cooperation, monitoring, controls, surveillance, fishing areas, observers etc.

     

    A specific characteristic of the agreement is that catches are regulated on the basis of fishing opportunities that are set annually. Your rapporteur is concerned about the fact that, according to the ex-post evaluation, the TACs for several of the targeted species exceed the limits set on the basis of scientific advice. These proven cases of overfishing, or of uncertainty owing to a lack of data, pose a threat to fish populations and the sustainability of fisheries, as in the case of the Northern prawn. Several indicative fishing opportunities have been reduced. The second noteworthy point is linked to the need for additional data regarding the targeted species and marine ecosystems.

     

    The programming of sectoral support will be adopted in the three months following the application of the Protocol. The sectoral support allocated in recent years has made it possible to support research and scientific assessments, the administration of Greenland’s fisheries, controls and also small-scale coastal fisheries. This is assessed positively in the evaluation of the last Protocol.

     

    Conclusions and recommendations 

     

    In the context of current diplomatic tensions with the United States and the climate crisis in the Arctic, your rapporteur recalls the importance of the SFPA and relations between Greenland and the European Union in the area of fisheries. Through its sectoral support, the fisheries agreement offers assistance that is welcomed by the authorities and a number of civil society actors in Greenland. Positive developments include the increase in the financial contribution paid by the European Union, in the amount of sectoral support and in the fees paid by vessel owners.

     

    Your rapporteur invites the European Union to provide increased support to coastal fishing communities, with respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples and the FAO’s Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. It is advisable to ensure that these peoples, as well as NGOs, are involved in the agreement. Another positive development is the European Union’s support in areas such as controls, the fight against IUU fishing, the collection of data and scientific research.

    Your rapporteur underlines the environmental challenges associated with the agreement. As already requested by Parliament in 2021, it is essential to continue efforts in relation to data collection and the fight against overfishing, by following the scientific advice for setting TACs in Greenland and allocating annual fishing opportunities to the European Union. Even though it fishes smaller quantities, the European Union must follow the precautionary principle. The definition of the surplus is controversial in certain cases. The fishing carried out by the European Union’s vessels furthermore has an impact on seabed ecosystems and the emphasis must be on identifying and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, with the sector’s help.

     

    Finally, your rapporteur asks for this fisheries agreement to be repositioned in the context of regional fisheries governance. Quota exchanges mean that post-Brexit relations with coastal countries, including Norway, are closely linked to the agreement. The European Union and Greenland must strengthen cooperation and transparency within the RFMOs and the agreements between coastal states. More broadly, the European Union must do more to protect species and the marine environment in the Arctic.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

    Entity and/or person

    Delegation of France to the European Union

    Delegation of Germany to the European Union

    Delegation of Denmark to the European Union

    Greenland Ministry of Fisheries

    Oceana

    Europêche

    DG MARE (Commission)

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Fisheries

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10‑0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    A. whereas the previous 4-year Implementing Protocol to the Agreement will expire on 21 April 2025;

    B. whereas the financial contribution for the entire duration of the new Implementing Protocol is EUR 103 781 000, based on:

    (a) an annual amount for access to fishery resources for the categories provided for in the Protocol, set at EUR 14 096 857 for the duration of the Protocol;

    (b) support for the development of Greenland’s sectoral fisheries policy amounting to EUR 3 200 000 per year for the duration of the Protocol;

    C. whereas the implementation of the Protocol requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:

    DG MARE

     

    Year
    N

    Year
    N+1

    Year
    N+2

    Year
    N+3

    Year
    N+4

    Year
    N+5

    TOTAL

    □ Operational appropriations

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Budget line 08 05 01

    Commitments

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    103.781

    Payments

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    103.781

    EUR million (to three decimal places)

    D. whereas on 21 November 2024, Parliament approved DEC 15/2024 submitted by the Commission on 25 October 2024, which makes available the necessary appropriations on operational line 08 05 01 to honour the 2024 financial obligations resulting from the new Implementing Protocol;

    E. whereas the Protocol with Greenland and Denmark was signed and entered into provisional application on 12 December 2024;

    1. Notes that the support allocated to the Protocol should meet the objectives of enabling Union vessels to fish in Greenland’s fishing zone, enabling the Union and Greenland to work closely together to further promote the development of a sustainable fisheries policy and the responsible exploitation of fishery resources in Greenland’s fishing zone, and ensuring that the Union and Greenland cooperate to contribute to decent working conditions in the fisheries sector; considers that there should be thorough scrutiny to ensure that the support meets those objectives effectively during the implementation of the Protocol;

    2. Recommends that, for future agreements, an impact assessment of the added value and socio-economic benefits derived from the previous agreement be taken into account; considers that this assessment should guide the negotiation and renewal of subsequent agreements to ensure that they align with the objectives of sustainable development and efficient use of the Union’s financial resources;

    3. Notes that the transfer of appropriations for an amount of EUR 16 992 434 in commitment appropriations, as submitted by the Commission in DEC 15/2024, was approved by the budgetary authority in the time limit provided for in the Financial Regulation; regrets that the decision on this budgetary matter is disconnected from, and had to be taken prior to, the decision on the consent to be given by Parliament to the new Implementing Protocol; underlines that decisions on the agreement itself and related budgetary matters are inextricably linked, and fears, therefore, that the disconnect risks de facto pre-empting the decision on consent and creating a fait accompli;

    4. Calls on the Commission to explain the need for the provisional application of the Implementing Protocol in question, since the existing Implementing Protocol remains in force until April 2025, thus allowing time for the agreement to be finalised without any risk of a gap; calls on the Commission to provide further information about the budgetary implications of the provisional application of the new Implementing Protocol as of 12 December 2024, given the fact that the current Implementing Protocol is still in force;

    5. Takes note that DEC 15/2024 does not include any transfer of payment appropriations to the operational line for 2024 on the basis that, according to the Commission, the first access payment linked to this Implementing Protocol will be due by 30 June 2025; asks the Commission to clarify the lack of synchronisation between commitment and payment appropriations;

    6. Notes that the 2025 budget as voted on in plenary on 27 November 2024 includes amounts of EUR 150 560 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 135 300 000 in payment appropriations on line 08 05 01, as well as amounts of EUR 59 970 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 41 620 000 in payment appropriations for fishing activities on reserve line 30 02 02; regrets that the amounts are cumulative and not broken down by fisheries agreements, thus making it difficult for Parliament to scrutinise budget implementation in this field;

    7. Stresses that the financial programming of line 08 05 01 needs to be sufficient to cater for the financial obligations in the years 2026-2027 subject to the decision of the budgetary authority in the annual budgetary procedures; calls for scrutiny regarding the financial programming of line 08 05 01 in the annual budgets of 2026 and 2027;

    8. Concludes that the Committee on Budgets is in a position to advise the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to recommend approval of the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    References

    14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)

    Committee(s) responsible

    PECH

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    10.2.2025

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

    12.12.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    23

    0

    5

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Lucia Yar

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    23

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Bogdan Rzońca

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Hildegard Bentele, Andrzej Halicki, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Fabienne Keller, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Giuseppe Lupo, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino

     

     

    5

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    PfE

    Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    References

    14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)

    Date of consultation or request for consent

    18.12.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    PECH

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    10.2.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Emma Fourreau

    18.12.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    27.1.2025

    18.3.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.5.2025

     

     

     

    Budgetary assessment

     Date of budgetary assessment

    BUDG

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    24

    1

    2

    Members present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ton Diepeveen, Siegbert Frank Droese, Emma Fourreau, Nicolás González Casares, France Jamet, Nora Junco García, Isabelle Le Callennec, Isabella Lövin, Giuseppe Lupo, Giuseppe Milazzo, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, André Rodrigues, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Sander Smit, António Tânger Corrêa, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Sebastian Everding, Marco Falcone, Karin Karlsbro, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hélder Sousa Silva

    Date tabled

    28.5.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    24

    +

    ECR

    Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Nora Junco García, Giuseppe Milazzo, Bert-Jan Ruissen

    PPE

    Carmen Crespo Díaz, Marco Falcone, Isabelle Le Callennec, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, Sander Smit, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen, António Tânger Corrêa

    Renew

    Karin Karlsbro, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Nicolás González Casares, Giuseppe Lupo, André Rodrigues

    The Left

    Emma Fourreau

    Verts/ALE

    Isabella Lövin, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    1

    –

    ESN

    Siegbert Frank Droese

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    France Jamet

    The Left

    Sebastian Everding

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: EU noose now tightens on farm machinery

    Source: Traditional Unionist Voice – Northern Ireland

    Statement by TUV leader Jim Allister:-

    “The Irish Sea border has not operated in relation to the movement of agricultural vehicles and machinery until now.

    “But now, in the latest tightening of the noose, the EU by an express law (2023/1231) has dictated that all such movements from GB to NI must be subject to their prescribed labelling, because it is their Writ, not the UK’s, which runs.

    “The EU law which imposes this regime is one of the most audacious since Brexit, because it involves a foreign entity, the EU, making the law in the UK. It epitomises the sovereignty grab of Brussels, which cares nothing that the inter-UK trade in machinery will be inhibited- all with the common Protocol design of building north/south trade which discouraging our east/west trade and economy.

    “With every week that passes the big lie of the dud Donaldson/DUP deal that they had removed the Irish Sea border is exposed, while farmers and consumers continue to pay the price of being ruled by laws we don’t make and can’t change.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Britain’s new political divide delivers voters to Reform and the Greens

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By John Curtice, Professor of Politics, University of Strathclyde and Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Social Research

    The outcome of last year’s general election left an important question hanging in the air. Could the UK’s traditional system of two-party politics continue to survive?

    True, power did change hands in a familiar fashion. A majority Conservative government was replaced by a majority Labour one. Indeed, the new administration won an overall majority of no less than 174.

    However, the new government was elected with a lower share of the vote than that secured by any previous majority government. At the same time, the Conservatives won by far their lowest share of the vote ever. For the first time since 1922, when Labour replaced the then Liberal party as the Conservatives’ principal competitor, Labour and the Conservatives together won fewer than three in five of all votes cast.

    Over the past 12 months, the foundations of Britain’s two-party system have come to look even shakier. Nigel Farage’s Reform UK party tops the polls. Only just over two in five of those who express a party preference say they would vote Labour or Conservative – a record low.

    New analysis of last year’s election published by the National Centre for Social Research as part of the British Social Attitudes report confirms that Britain’s two-party system is in poor health.

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    The traditional anchor of Conservative and Labour support – social class – has been cast adrift. The ideological underpinning of the battle between them, the division between left and right, has been replaced by a division between social conservatives and social liberals. This second division draws people towards Reform and the Greens. At the same time, low levels of trust and confidence in how they are being governed is also encouraging voters to back these two challenger parties.

    From class divide to identity politics

    Historically, middle-class voters voted Conservative, while their working-class counterparts were more likely to support Labour. In decline ever since the advent of New Labour, that pattern disappeared entirely in 2019 in the wake of a Brexit debate that drew pro-Leave working-class voters towards the Conservatives and pro-Remain middle-class supporters towards Labour.



    Read more:
    Know your place: what happened to class in British politics – a podcast series from The Conversation Documentaries

    Although Brexit was no longer in the news, the traditional link between social class and voting Conservative or Labour did not reappear in 2024. Labour won the support of just 30% of those in routine and semi-routine occupations, compared with 42% of those in professional and managerial jobs. At 17% and 21% respectively, the equivalent figures for Conservative support are also little different from each other.

    As in the EU referendum, what now shapes how people vote is their age and education, not the job they do. Younger voters and graduates are more likely to vote Labour, while older people and those with less in the way of educational qualifications are more inclined to vote Conservative.

    The problem is that the two parties now face competition for these demographic groups from the Greens and Reform. Last year the Greens won as much as 21% of the vote among under-25s. Reform secured 25% among those who do not have an A-level or its equivalent, nearly matching the Tories.

    Green party co-leader Carla Denyer speaks in the House of Commons.
    Flickr/UK Parliament, CC BY-NC-ND

    Equally, Brexit was not a divide between “left” and “right” – that is, between those who think the government should do more to reduce inequality and those who are more concerned about growing the whole economic pie. It was a battle between social liberals and social conservatives – between those who value living in a diverse society and those who believe that too much diversity undermines social cohesion.

    That second divide has now come to matter as much as the left-right divide in shaping how people vote – and thereby helps draw support away from the Conservatives and Labour.

    While the Conservatives are more popular among social conservatives, so also are Reform. Indeed, the competition between the two parties for these voters has intensified since the election. By this spring, Reform, on 37%, was winning the battle for their support, with the Conservatives supported by only 26%. Equally, although Labour are relatively popular among social liberals, both the Greens and the Liberal Democrats find them relatively fertile territory too. Three in ten (31%) social liberals backed the Liberal Democrats or the Greens last year, a figure that now stands at 37%.

    Meanwhile, trust and confidence in government remain at a low ebb. For example, nearly half (46%) say they “almost never” trust governments of any party to put the interests of the country above those of their own parties. This perception is seemingly accompanied by a reluctance to vote for the parties of government too. Nearly one in four (24%) of those who almost never trust governments backed Reform last year, while one in ten (10%) supported the Greens.

    This, of course, is not the first time that Britain’s two-party system has been under challenge. In the early 1980s the Liberal/SDP Alliance threatened to “break the mould of British politics”. In spring 2019, at the height of the Brexit impasse, the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats appeared poised to upset the traditional order. This time, however, the challenge to the Conservative/Labour duopoly seems more profound.

    John Curtice currently receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

    – ref. How Britain’s new political divide delivers voters to Reform and the Greens – https://theconversation.com/how-britains-new-political-divide-delivers-voters-to-reform-and-the-greens-259613

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark – A10-0103/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10‑0227/2024 – 2024/0263M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other (2025-2030) (14652/2024),

    – having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other (2025-2030) (14781/2024),

    – having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0227/2024),

    – having regard to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark on the other hand, and the Implementing Protocol thereto,

    – having regard to Article 62 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

    – having regard to the Convention of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),

    – having regard to the Convention of the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO),

    – having regard to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR),

    – having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

    – having regard to the Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,

    – having regard to Protocol No 34 to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on special arrangements for Greenland,

    – having regard to the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations,

    – having regard to the EU Competitiveness Compass,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, and in particular Articles 29 and 31 thereof[1],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/2403 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on the sustainable management of external fishing fleets, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008[2],

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) No 2021/1764 of 5 October 2021 on the association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union including relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other (Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland)[3],

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’ (JOIN(2021)0027),

    – having regard to the ex ante and ex post evaluation study of the 2021-2024 protocol and of a possible new implementing protocol to the SFPA between the European Union and Greenland,

    – having regard to EU’s biodiversity strategy for 2030,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food – Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations’ (COM(2025)0075),

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 June 2022 entitled ‘Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet – Joint Communication on the EU’s International Ocean Governance agenda’ (JOIN(2022)0028),

    – having regard to its non-legislative resolution of 5 October 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand, and the Implementing Protocol thereto[4],

    – having regard to the reports of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) entitled ‘Greenland Sea Ecosystem Overview’ of 2023, and ‘Greenland Sea Ecoregion – Fisheries Overview’ of 2024,

    – having regard to its legislative resolution of …[5] on the draft decision,

    – having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0103/2025),

    A. whereas Greenland, as an autonomous territory, is responsible for managing its fisheries resources and regulating commercial fishing in Greenland and its exclusive economic zone, and for regulating who is allowed to fish in its waters;

    B. whereas Greenland’s fisheries comprise coastal fisheries and deep-sea fisheries;

    C. whereas 88 % of Greenland’s population identifies as Greenlandic Inuit;

    D. whereas small-scale coastal fisheries and subsistence fisheries form an integral part of the traditional culture, economy and social structure of Greenland’s coastal communities and of the Greenlandic Inuit people, providing both livelihoods, in particular for isolated settlements, and cultural heritage;

    E. whereas inshore fisheries are key to ensuring food security in Greenland and contribute to addressing social challenges;

    F. whereas the SFPA between the EU and Greenland is the second most significant fisheries agreement for the EU in financial terms; whereas, according to the findings and conclusions of the ex post evaluation, the SFPA and the Protocol thereto have significantly contributed to Greenland’s fisheries policy, in particular by enhancing cooperation and collaboration and supporting sustainable fisheries management, thus creating a mutually beneficial arrangement between the EU and Greenland;

    G. whereas the EU-Greenland SFPA and the EU-Norway agreement are closely interlinked, with the EU exchanging fishing opportunities in Greenland for access to Norwegian waters; whereas in recent years, following the exchange of quotas with Norway, fishing opportunities have been granted to around 10 Community vessels under the Protocol;

    H. whereas the EU maintains a close relationship with Greenland, including through the fisheries partnership agreement that has been in place since 1984; whereas Greenland is the overseas country and territory (OCT) that receives the most EU funding by far; whereas EU support to Greenland for the period from 2021 to 2027 comes to EUR 225 million, which is equivalent to the total amount received by the other 12 OCTs combined;

    I. whereas, according to scientists, the Arctic region is warming up almost four times faster than the rest of the world, with rapid increases in ice melt and implications for fish populations, marine ecosystems and coastal communities, as well as for the fishing industry and the livelihoods of fishers, which depend on Arctic waters;

    J. whereas healthy fish populations and marine ecosystems are crucial for resilience to the growing effects of climate change and for guaranteeing the future of coastal fishing communities;

    K. whereas the accelerating pace of global warming in the region underscores the urgent need for coordinated global action, including in fisheries;

    L. whereas Greenland efficiently manages fishing activities within its EEZ, with the Greenland Fisheries and Hunting Control Authority (GFJK) responsible for registering and monitoring both domestic and foreign catches and landings and for ensuring compliance with international control and enforcement agreements, while also facilitating daily data exchanges with the countries that have fisheries agreements with Greenland;

    M. whereas the evaluation of the previous protocol reveals that overfishing can be ruled out with certainty for only five of the fifteen stocks exploited under the Protocol, but that there is a lack of scientific data for some of the stocks, and four of them are regarded as still overexploited;

    N. whereas fishing opportunities are established by a joint committee on the basis of the best available scientific advice and the recommendations made by NAFO, NEAFC and ICES;

    O. whereas fisheries are a crucial economic sector for Greenland, providing a livelihood for many; whereas it is essential to ensure that fishing practices do not harm marine ecosystems, particularly given that according to ICES, the greatest physical disturbance of the seabed and benthic habitats in the Greenland Sea ecoregion is caused by mobile bottom-contacting fishing gear and there is a considerable overlap between the distribution of corals, sponges and sea pens and the areas trawled[6]; whereas to safeguard both the marine environment and the future of fisheries, it is vital that all forms of trawling are conducted in a manner that minimises damage to the seabed; whereas according to the ex post and ex ante evaluation study, the management measures applicable to EU vessels operating in Greenland, and the risk levels of EU vessels having negative impacts on ecosystems, mean that bycatch levels and impacts on ecosystems are minimal;

     

    P. whereas ICES also points out that other activities causing marine pollution, marine litter or underwater noise, as well as climate change, are having an impact on the marine ecosystems and upsetting the balance of the ecoregion;

    Q. whereas the European Union and Greenland, on behalf of Denmark, hold seats on NEAFC and NAFO;

    Context and general principles of the SFPA

    1. Notes the importance of the fisheries sector for Greenland, given that seafood exports account for over 90 % of the autonomous territory’s total exports, and that fishing and the fishing industry together account for 15 % of all jobs; highlights the great professionalism of Greenlandic people in the fishing sector and their extensive knowledge, skills and experience in fisheries management and maritime operations; notes that their deep-rooted expertise reflects a strong commitment to maintaining the economic and cultural significance of fisheries in Greenland; stresses that the share of Greenlandic total allowable catches (TACs) allocated to the EU under the Protocol is relatively small;

    2. Recalls Greenland’s geostrategic position within the Arctic region; underlines the importance of the SFPA for relations between the European Union and Greenland in the current geopolitical context, particularly in the light of the recent diplomatic and geopolitical tensions caused by the new US Government, but also given the reality of the climate crisis and its impact on the region;

    3. Highlights the importance of using the SFPA as a key framework for addressing common challenges such as the climate crisis and geopolitical, security and preparedness concerns, for promoting sustainable fisheries policy, scientific cooperation and environmental resilience in Arctic waters, and for fostering economic cooperation; points out the need to strengthen the EU’s Arctic policy and its cooperation with the Government of Greenland;

    4. Underlines that, while guaranteeing fishing opportunities for the EU fleet, the SFPA should contribute to the exploitation of fisheries resources within sustainable limits and the preservation of marine biodiversity in Greenland’s waters, in line with the standards laid down by the European Union and international forums such as regional fisheries management organisations, in order to achieve economic, social and environmental benefits; recalls that EU vessels are to fish only the available surplus, as established in Article 3 of the SFPA;

    5. Highlights that the agreement has provided benefits to both parties, including EU and Greenlandic stakeholders, particularly in terms of sustainability, transparency, equity, scientific research, capacity-building and national development;

    6. Points out that the sectoral support available under the Protocol will help the Government of Greenland to implement its national fisheries and maritime economy strategy, including in the fight against illegal, unreported and undeclared (IUU) fishing, while promoting decent working conditions for fishing activity;

    7. Notes that the new Protocol has been concluded for a term of six years, which means improved visibility for stakeholders, in particular the fisheries sector;

    8. Notes the increase in the total financial contribution paid by the European Union and the fees paid by fishing operators, which ensure that Greenland receives economic benefits from access rights to its waters and that EU vessels operate under regulated and monitored conditions, reducing risks of overfishing or environmental damage;

    9. Underlines the high value of the SFPA and that every EUR 1 invested from the EU budget in the compensation payment for access supports the creation of EUR 6.88 of added value, with EUR 4.32 for the EU and EUR 2.12 for Greenland;

    Sustainability of fisheries under the SFPA

    10. Welcomes the robust monitoring system, the comprehensive framework for managing bycatch and the ban on discards that apply in Greenland waters; considers positively the effort made in terms of controls of fishing operations and the presence of observers in these activities, to which the sectoral support provided under the SFPA has contributed; highlights that all catches, including bycatches and discards, must be recorded and reported by species according to the applicable Greenlandic legislation; acknowledges the fundamental role of observers in ensuring compliance with the applicable rules, contributing to transparency and supporting sustainable fisheries management in the region;

    11. Reaffirms its concerns regarding the lack of precise scientific data about the state of fish stocks, which are assessed with limited data or using a precautionary approach; regrets, in particular, the situation of the Northern prawn, targeted by both Greenland vessels and Community vessels (which account for a more marginal share); notes, in this respect, the positive step taken by reducing indicative annual fishing opportunities for several fish stocks on the basis of the available scientific data;

    12. Remains concerned by the exploitation of the Northern prawn, particularly in certain areas of West Greenland, where stocks have shown signs of decline as a result of fishing pressure, global warming and increased predation by cod; emphasises the importance of strengthening sustainable management measures, including adjusting catch quotas on the basis of scientific recommendations from ICES and NAFO, and of improving fishing practices to reduce bycatch and preserve the marine ecosystem; calls on the Commission to enhance cooperation with the Greenlandic authorities to ensure a sustainable and balanced exploitation of this resource, which is essential to the local economy;

    13. Reiterates that, on the basis of the SFPA, the Commission and Greenland should continue to apply a precautionary approach and use the best available scientific advice, including the scientific recommendations issued by the relevant regional fisheries management organisations, as a basis for setting annual fishing opportunities, while also taking into consideration the socio-economic aspects;

    14. Notes that a considerable share of the fishing opportunities granted to the European Union by Greenland go to Norwegian vessels in connection with the exchange of quotas; recalls that the same sustainability standards and fisheries control rules followed by EU vessels must apply to Norwegian vessels in order to ensure that they are treated equally;

    Improvement of scientific advice and data collection

    15. Recalls that reliable and robust data is required to calculate the available surplus; reiterates its concerns regarding the existing gaps for some stocks; recommends, in this regard, that particular attention be given to calculating available surpluses; welcomes the efforts of the fisheries sector to cooperate with scientific monitoring and data collection and invites the Commission to step up scientific and financial cooperation with Greenland, including, for instance, by continuing to support the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources;

    16. Underlines the limited availability of data about benthic habitats in the Greenland Sea ecoregion, such as habitats that could potentially be considered vulnerable marine ecosystems; stresses the need to obtain more comprehensive scientific data in order to map these habitats, to adopt appropriate measures, particularly technical and spatial measures aimed at mitigating the impact of fisheries on these ecosystems, and to encourage the reporting of encounters with vulnerable marine ecosystem species (VMEs) by vessels; invites the Greenlandic authorities to consider dedicating a share of sectoral support to consolidating the mapping and detection of VMEs;

    17. Recalls that use of vessel monitoring systems is crucial for monitoring fishing activities, as it allows the real-time tracking of fishing vessels, thus making it possible to monitor compliance with the applicable rules, including in sensitive marine areas;

    18. Calls on the Commission and on Greenland to provide a further assessment of the impacts on fish stocks of other activities affecting the ecosystems, such as maritime transport, seismological research, pollution and climate change;

    Support for fisheries policy in Greenland

    19. Notes that the SFPA has generated employment opportunities for Greenlandic nationals and that sectoral support is being implemented effectively, providing significant environmental, social and economic benefits to Greenland; underlines, nevertheless, the small share of landings carried out by the EU fleet in Greenland and the limited number of seafarers from Greenland signed on with EU vessels (five, according to the evaluation of the previous agreement, accounting for 2.5 % of total jobs);

    20. Recalls, in this regard, the limited number of EU vessels fishing in Greenland under the Protocol (8-10 vessels), and notes that the majority do not land in or visit Greenlandic ports; encourages operators to maintain good cooperation and further enhance employment opportunities; highlights that according to the ex ante and ex post evaluation study, there has been no reciprocal interest in establishing joint enterprises/ventures given the priorities of the private sector in Greenland and in EU Member States;

    21. Considers that the indirect added value delivered to Greenland’s economy by the Protocol has the potential to be higher than with previous protocols; believes that the goal is to ensure a mutually beneficial agreement for the EU and Greenland, and for Greenland to derive an overall benefit from such agreements through the sustainable development of fisheries and auxiliary sectors in Greenland, which will have a lasting positive impact on the local economy;

    22. Points out that resources for sectoral support under the previous protocol helped to strengthen Greenland’s scientific research and administrative capacity and contributed to better ocean governance in Greenland;

    23. Stresses the importance, for both sides, of respecting all the relevant international commitments when implementing the Protocol, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    24. Welcomes, too, the fact that a significant share of the sectoral support paid under the previous protocol was used to step up the monitoring of fisheries, scientific research and data collection, administration and support for small-scale coastal fisheries;

    25. Encourages the Commission and Greenland, within the framework of the SFPA, to provide further support to Greenland’s small-scale coastal fisheries, in line with the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries and the priorities and needs of the Greenlandic authorities;

    26. Considers that sectoral support can contribute to securing the livelihoods of coastal fishing communities through such measures as, but not limited to, access to training, support for co-management in coastal areas or measures to adapt fishing activities to climate change and improve data, including data about their fishing effort;

    27. Supports the appropriate inclusion of Greenland’s fishing communities and civil society throughout the process leading to the adoption of the protocols, and stresses the importance of helping to ensure their participation in the implementation of the SFPA;

    28. Highlights that EU vessels fish beyond 12 nautical miles from the baseline of Greenland, which prevents competition with small-scale coastal fisheries;

    29. Encourages both parties to facilitate the exchange of best practices in arrangements for access to and preservation of fisheries resources;

    30. Notes Greenland’s willingness to develop its fisheries sector further; takes note of the recent reform of its fisheries legislation; highlights that the SFPA can support the continued development of Greenland’s fisheries policy; notes that this policy includes elements such as ensuring the long-term health and productivity of Greenland’s marine ecosystems and the distribution of fishing resources, including for coastal fisheries communities; recalls that Greenlandic lawmakers have exclusive competence for such developments;

    Regional governance of fisheries and challenges for the Arctic

    31. Underscores the importance of repositioning the fisheries agreement in the broader context of post-Brexit fisheries governance and regional fisheries management, relations between the European Union and Norway, and other coastal states, in the area of fisheries and the European Union’s policy on the Arctic; stresses the critical need to maintain a strong and productive partnership with Greenland and its Nordic neighbours;

    32. Encourages Greenland to continue strengthening its already strong transparency and cooperation within the framework of regional fisheries management organisations and agreements between coastal states for the management of certain stocks;

    33. Calls on the Commission to further utilise the opportunities that the Commission office in Nuuk provides, especially in terms of strengthening cooperation with the Greenlandic Government;

    34. Recalls the joint communication of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’;

    °

    ° °

    35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of Greenland.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    At the end of 2024, Greenland and the European Union signed a new Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) (2025-2030). This is a mixed agreement that allows the European Union’s vessels to fish species such as cod, Greenland halibut, redfish and Northern prawn. In return, the European Union pays a financial contribution of EUR 17,296,857 per annum, comprising EUR 14,096,857 for access rights and EUR 3,200,000 for support and implementation of Greenland’s fisheries policy, plus the fees paid by vessel owners. In recent years, the fisheries agreement has allowed around 10 of the European Union’s vessels to operate in the autonomous territory’s waters. The new Protocol provides details of the rules and provisions governing this access.

     

    Fisheries in Greenland

     

    The fisheries sector is of central importance for Greenland in socio-economic and cultural terms. It accounts for 15% of the territory’s jobs and over 90% of its exports. Coastal fisheries mainly involve small vessels (dinghies), and sustain an economy and local jobs. Many remote Inuit communities rely on subsistence fishing. The territory also has a highly developed deep-sea fishing fleet, and has concluded fisheries agreements that allow foreign vessels to fish in the deep-sea fishing area. Greenland’s fisheries are suffering the effects of climate change on a vulnerable Arctic marine environment, with particular impacts on the species caught. Greenland has put measures in place to limit the impact of fisheries on the marine environment; these include a ban on discards, a plan for the management of bycatch etc.

     

    New Protocol implementing the SFPA

     

    The new Protocol that has been signed has a term of six years, providing stability and visibility for stakeholders. It contains provisions aimed at providing a framework for access to waters by European vessels and cooperation with Greenland: fishing opportunities, bycatch, scientific cooperation, monitoring, controls, surveillance, fishing areas, observers etc.

     

    A specific characteristic of the agreement is that catches are regulated on the basis of fishing opportunities that are set annually. Your rapporteur is concerned about the fact that, according to the ex-post evaluation, the TACs for several of the targeted species exceed the limits set on the basis of scientific advice. These proven cases of overfishing, or of uncertainty owing to a lack of data, pose a threat to fish populations and the sustainability of fisheries, as in the case of the Northern prawn. Several indicative fishing opportunities have been reduced. The second noteworthy point is linked to the need for additional data regarding the targeted species and marine ecosystems.

     

    The programming of sectoral support will be adopted in the three months following the application of the Protocol. The sectoral support allocated in recent years has made it possible to support research and scientific assessments, the administration of Greenland’s fisheries, controls and also small-scale coastal fisheries. This is assessed positively in the evaluation of the last Protocol.

     

    Findings and recommendations 

     

    In the context of current diplomatic tensions with the United States and the climate crisis in the Arctic, your rapporteur recalls the importance of the SFPA and relations between Greenland and the European Union in the area of fisheries. Through its sectoral support, the fisheries agreement offers assistance that is welcomed by the authorities and a number of civil society actors in Greenland. Positive developments include the increase in the financial contribution paid by the European Union, in the amount of sectoral support and in the fees paid by vessel owners.

     

    Your rapporteur invites the European Union to provide increased support to coastal fishing communities, with respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples and the FAO’s Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. It is advisable to ensure that these peoples, as well as NGOs, are involved in the agreement. Another positive development is the European Union’s support in areas such as controls, the fight against IUU fishing, the collection of data and scientific research.

    Your rapporteur underlines the environmental challenges associated with the agreement. As already requested by Parliament in 2021, it is essential to continue efforts in relation to data collection and the fight against overfishing, by following the scientific advice for setting TACs in Greenland and allocating annual fishing opportunities to the European Union. Even though it fishes smaller quantities, the European Union must follow the precautionary principle. The definition of the surplus is controversial in certain cases. The fishing carried out by the European Union’s vessels furthermore has an impact on seabed ecosystems and the emphasis must be on identifying and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, with the sector’s help.

     

    Finally, your rapporteur asks for this fisheries agreement to be repositioned in the context of regional fisheries governance. Quota exchanges mean that post-Brexit relations with coastal countries, including Norway, are closely linked to the agreement. The European Union and Greenland must strengthen cooperation and transparency within the RFMOs and the agreements between coastal states. More broadly, the European Union must do more to protect species and the marine environment in the Arctic.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: New industrial strategy brings Rachel Reeves’ securonomics to life – but will it protect Britain from more supply chain shocks?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Phil Tomlinson, Professor of Industrial Strategy, Co-Director Centre for Governance, Regulation and Industrial Strategy (CGR&IS), University of Bath

    Peter Titmuss/Shutterstock

    Brexit, COVID, the war in Ukraine and now Trump’s tariffs have all highlighted how vulnerable life in the UK is to disruptions in trade. Everyday items that people rely on can be subject to major shortages, delays and price rises, due to something as simple as a ship getting stuck in a canal.

    This is because the UK is hugely reliant on other countries to provide much of what it needs. Medical supplies, cars, electronics and fruit are just a few of Britain’s favourite things that it tends to buy in from elsewhere.

    Global supply chains deliver lower prices and wider choice to consumers but they are also often highly complex. In the car industry for example, components may move within and between companies and cross national boundaries many times, before ending up in the final assembled vehicle. This can make them vulnerable.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    In response to the disruption of recent years, Chancellor Rachel Reeves has long been arguing for what she calls “securonomics” – investing in domestic energy sources and resilient networks. So perhaps it was no surprise that the British government’s new industrial strategy plans emphasise the importance of supply chain security.

    A new industrial competitiveness scheme for example, is designed to cut energy costs for the UK’s most energy intensive firms, which manufacture things like steel, ceramics and glass. This should help domestic supply capacity.



    Read more:
    UK plan to cut energy bills for industrial firms threatens to leave small businesses out in the cold

    A reported £600 million has also been allocated to develop the UK’s logistics industry. And there is a proposal for a “national supply chain centre” to identify weaknesses, enhance domestic capability and build strategic international partnerships. Vulnerabilities and dependencies will also be more closely monitored.

    Another focus will be to diversify critical supply chains by reducing the UK’s dependence on single supplier nations (such as China for rare earth elements or semiconductors). One option should be strengthening alliances with friendly nations (known as “friendshoring”) with the aim of embedding supply chains in places that can be relied upon.

    The recently announced trade deals with the US and India, and signs of greater cooperation with the EU do offer some promise in this area. Trade deals help with supply chain cooperation, but could go further and include resilience initiatives (such as creating joint stockpiles of things like critical minerals) to reduce disruption in the future.

    An increased supply of cyber security.
    metamorworks/Shutterstock

    Manufacturing from home

    On the domestic front, the UK could still do more to incentivise “reshoring” (bringing some manufacturing or production of goods back to the UK). Reversing decades of decline in these sectors would be challenging, and require a long-term investment in domestic capacity and skills. But it could also deliver a boost to jobs and growth, potentially in parts of the UK which need it most.

    Given recent geopolitics, the government has also prioritised strengthening the defence supply chain, allocating £173 million of new funding on defence infrastructure and skills. Developments are are at an early stage, but the recent UK-EU security and defence partnership is a welcome start. And more work will be needed to make UK-EU collaboration on building a resilient defence industry across Europe a reality.

    Supply chains within that industry (and others, such as healthcare) can be vulnerable to cyberattacks and economic coercion from malicious groups and hostile foreign states. So enhancing cybersecurity in logistics and infrastructure will also be critical.

    This will mean better protection for ports, customs systems and logistics software. There is some limited additional funding on offer for this, but more will be required, which in turn will open up new opportunities for firms in the cyber industry. Indeed, a “cyber cluster” of businesses is already emerging in central England from the government defence and technology campus at Porton Down in Wiltshire across to GCHQ – the national centre for intelligence and security – in Gloucestershire.

    But with still much to do, overall Reeves has been right to stress the importance of supply chains. They are crucial to people’s jobs and homes, the medicines they need and the food they eat. And supply chain security is not just an economic issue. It is a strategic imperative for safeguarding the UK, its businesses and the welfare of its citizens.

    The tone of the new industrial strategy reflects Reeves’s “securonomics” rhetoric. But how far this goes in actually strengthening supply chains and boosting their resilience remains open to question, especially in the context of limited resources and a chancellor keen to build a reputation for fiscal prudence.

    Phil Tomlinson receives funding from the Innovation and Research Caucus (IRC).

    David Bailey receives funding from the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe programme.

    Paddy Bradley is affiliated with the National Innovation Centre for Rural Enterprise based at Newcastle University.
    He is Chair of TransWilts Community Interest Company which aims to increase public use of trains and buses in the Wiltshire area.
    He is Chair of Governors of Wiltshire College and University Centre.

    – ref. New industrial strategy brings Rachel Reeves’ securonomics to life – but will it protect Britain from more supply chain shocks? – https://theconversation.com/new-industrial-strategy-brings-rachel-reeves-securonomics-to-life-but-will-it-protect-britain-from-more-supply-chain-shocks-258410

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lucyl Harrison, PhD Candidate, School of Humanities, University of Hull

    Twenty-three years on from director Danny Boyle’s unforgettable film 28 Days Later, and five years on from COVID, horror is having a spectacular renaissance. With 28 Years Later, the franchise has returned to cinema as a mouthpiece for the unique pressures Britain is facing post-pandemic and post-Brexit.

    In 2020, speculative architect and director Liam Young said: “I’m sure the scripts for a new genre of virus fictions or ‘Vi-Fi’ are already in the works and perhaps that is the real opportunity of this present moment, to imagine the potential fictions and futures, and to prototype the new worlds that we all want to be a part of when the viral cloud lifts.” Well, here that vision is.

    In this film, Europe has contained the “rage virus” to Britain. There are French boats on quarantine patrols, Swedish soldiers mocking remaining mainlanders and St George’s flags burning.

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    28 Years Later is set on Holy Island, off the coast of the UK. There, an isolated community is protected by tides which conceal and reveal a causeway through which islanders can leave to get to the mainland to forage.

    One of the film’s most adrenaline-spiking scenes comes in the form of a terrifying chase back to the island. A young boy named Spike (Alfie Williams) is hurrying back after performing his rite of passage ceremony in which he is instructed to kill infected people on the mainland. It’s sound-tracked to the transcendental tones of Wagner’s Das Rheingold prelude.

    Twenty-eight years on from the events of the first film, the infected have evolved. Boyle has re-imagined them in even more monstrous forms. Gore-lovers will enjoy the menacing new brand of infected – seven-foot “alphas” – who rip heads from the living and dangle their severed spines.

    An ode to COVID

    Talking about how the pandemic inspired 28 Years Later, Boyle told Sky News:

    Suddenly everybody’s capital city, everywhere around the world was the same. And what was incredible about it was obviously just this idea which had previously only really belonged to films, like our film, where culture is suddenly just stopped dead.

    Danny Boyle speaks about 28 Years Later.

    The film’s stars, Jodie Comer and Aaron Taylor Johnson, meanwhile have both said that they drew from their real-life experiences of pandemic isolation for their roles as Spike’s Geordie parents. As Taylor explained:

    My son was 13, the same age as Alfie was when we were making this movie. I know what it was like to protect your family but also to not understand what was happening around us. And I thought it was interesting whilst reading this that an audience is going to understand that journey […] I drew upon a lot of those scenarios.

    The film ushers in a new age of “Vi-Fi” without succumbing to pulpy pandemic storytelling. Boyle gives us an antidote to cultural amnesia around the pandemic through Dr Kelson, the mad doctor played by Ralph Fiennes.

    Dr Kelson pushes against cultural erasure through his construction of a temple of bones: totems of tibias and a spire of skulls that honour the virus victims.

    The trailer for 28 Years Later.

    He touchingly explains that we are to remember death and remember love: “Every skull is a set of thoughts, these sockets saw, and these jaws swallowed.” Fiennes is adept at rendering this “crazy” loner character who has a knack for turning up at the right time; the effortlessness of his humanity is a pleasure to watch.

    Boyle explained: “The COVID memorial wall opposite parliament is one of the most beautiful things I’ve ever seen … it sort of inspired Ralph Fiennes’ character and what he’s building as a gesture towards remembering everyone as a way of actually looking forwards, not a way of looking back.”

    After the creative inertia brought on by the COVID lockdowns, I’ve detected tectonic shifts in pandemic storytelling in my interviews with COVID authors.

    Stories like 28 Years Later that “quietly” insert the pandemic and push COVID into the background are considered the easiest to digest. These stories are part of a new, radical literary avant-garde that has emerged in contemporary literature to chronicle the COVID era.

    Pandemic fiction has become an oft-maligned genre; conversations on my podcast, Pandemic Pages, with emergency planner Professor Lucy Easthope and horror author Kylie Lee Baker confirm that literary festivals and agents have expressed reluctance to read or publish COVID fiction. Professor Easthope explained that many people just don’t feel ready to read about the pandemic.

    For Baker, it’s that many people simply find the associations too traumatic. However, judging from the reactions of cinema-goers when I saw 28 Years Later, there is an audience hungry for another serving of Boyle’s insatiable trilogy.

    Lucyl Harrison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling – https://theconversation.com/the-spectacular-frenzy-of-28-years-later-offers-a-new-breed-of-pandemic-storytelling-259579

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lucyl Harrison, PhD Candidate, School of Humanities, University of Hull

    Twenty-three years on from director Danny Boyle’s unforgettable film 28 Days Later, and five years on from COVID, horror is having a spectacular renaissance. With 28 Years Later, the franchise has returned to cinema as a mouthpiece for the unique pressures Britain is facing post-pandemic and post-Brexit.

    In 2020, speculative architect and director Liam Young said: “I’m sure the scripts for a new genre of virus fictions or ‘Vi-Fi’ are already in the works and perhaps that is the real opportunity of this present moment, to imagine the potential fictions and futures, and to prototype the new worlds that we all want to be a part of when the viral cloud lifts.” Well, here that vision is.

    In this film, Europe has contained the “rage virus” to Britain. There are French boats on quarantine patrols, Swedish soldiers mocking remaining mainlanders and St George’s flags burning.

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    28 Years Later is set on Holy Island, off the coast of the UK. There, an isolated community is protected by tides which conceal and reveal a causeway through which islanders can leave to get to the mainland to forage.

    One of the film’s most adrenaline-spiking scenes comes in the form of a terrifying chase back to the island. A young boy named Spike (Alfie Williams) is hurrying back after performing his rite of passage ceremony in which he is instructed to kill infected people on the mainland. It’s sound-tracked to the transcendental tones of Wagner’s Das Rheingold prelude.

    Twenty-eight years on from the events of the first film, the infected have evolved. Boyle has re-imagined them in even more monstrous forms. Gore-lovers will enjoy the menacing new brand of infected – seven-foot “alphas” – who rip heads from the living and dangle their severed spines.

    An ode to COVID

    Talking about how the pandemic inspired 28 Years Later, Boyle told Sky News:

    Suddenly everybody’s capital city, everywhere around the world was the same. And what was incredible about it was obviously just this idea which had previously only really belonged to films, like our film, where culture is suddenly just stopped dead.

    Danny Boyle speaks about 28 Years Later.

    The film’s stars, Jodie Comer and Aaron Taylor Johnson, meanwhile have both said that they drew from their real-life experiences of pandemic isolation for their roles as Spike’s Geordie parents. As Taylor explained:

    My son was 13, the same age as Alfie was when we were making this movie. I know what it was like to protect your family but also to not understand what was happening around us. And I thought it was interesting whilst reading this that an audience is going to understand that journey […] I drew upon a lot of those scenarios.

    The film ushers in a new age of “Vi-Fi” without succumbing to pulpy pandemic storytelling. Boyle gives us an antidote to cultural amnesia around the pandemic through Dr Kelson, the mad doctor played by Ralph Fiennes.

    Dr Kelson pushes against cultural erasure through his construction of a temple of bones: totems of tibias and a spire of skulls that honour the virus victims.

    The trailer for 28 Years Later.

    He touchingly explains that we are to remember death and remember love: “Every skull is a set of thoughts, these sockets saw, and these jaws swallowed.” Fiennes is adept at rendering this “crazy” loner character who has a knack for turning up at the right time; the effortlessness of his humanity is a pleasure to watch.

    Boyle explained: “The COVID memorial wall opposite parliament is one of the most beautiful things I’ve ever seen … it sort of inspired Ralph Fiennes’ character and what he’s building as a gesture towards remembering everyone as a way of actually looking forwards, not a way of looking back.”

    After the creative inertia brought on by the COVID lockdowns, I’ve detected tectonic shifts in pandemic storytelling in my interviews with COVID authors.

    Stories like 28 Years Later that “quietly” insert the pandemic and push COVID into the background are considered the easiest to digest. These stories are part of a new, radical literary avant-garde that has emerged in contemporary literature to chronicle the COVID era.

    Pandemic fiction has become an oft-maligned genre; conversations on my podcast, Pandemic Pages, with emergency planner Professor Lucy Easthope and horror author Kylie Lee Baker confirm that literary festivals and agents have expressed reluctance to read or publish COVID fiction. Professor Easthope explained that many people just don’t feel ready to read about the pandemic.

    For Baker, it’s that many people simply find the associations too traumatic. However, judging from the reactions of cinema-goers when I saw 28 Years Later, there is an audience hungry for another serving of Boyle’s insatiable trilogy.

    Lucyl Harrison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling – https://theconversation.com/the-spectacular-frenzy-of-28-years-later-offers-a-new-breed-of-pandemic-storytelling-259579

    MIL OSI Analysis –