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Category: Brexit

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Brexit blocking cancer treatments, slashing jobs & isolating Scotland

    Source: Scottish National Party

    Europe Day saw the SNP calling for urgent clarity and action from the UK government following alarming reports that Brexit is severely undermining doctors ability to offer NHS patients new cancer drugs and treatments.

    The devastating consequences of Brexit continue to mount, from blocking access to life-saving cancer treatments, to hiking the cost-of-living and undermining family travel.

    A leaked report has revealed that cancer patients in the UK are being denied access to life-saving medicine and that trials for cutting-edge treatment are being derailed due to increased red tape and spiralling costs created by Brexit.

    Meanwhile, the long-term consequences of Brexit continue to deepen across public services, the economy and everyday life.

    Despite these mounting problems, Keir Starmer’s Labour continues to back Brexit whilst tying the UK into trade negotiations with America – a scenario making the UK beholden to Donald Trump’s whims.

    This situation leaves the SNP as the only party in Scotland credibly offering a clear route back to the EU.

    SNP MSP Clare Haughey MSP, a former nurse, said that it was “utterly indefensible that cancer patients in Scotland are being denied access to life-saving treatments because of Brexit.”

    She described this situation as a direct consequence of Brexit and decisions made at Westminster – decisions which Scotland rejected.

    Ms Haughey continued, “Our NHS staff are doing their best under impossible circumstances, but they are being forced to navigate red tape and rising costs that are putting lives at risk.”

    She described Brexit as not just a political error but “a slow motion crisis” and added, “It is making people poorer, isolating our NHS, harming Scottish businesses, and stealing opportunities from our young people.”

    The SNP MSP concluded by saying, “Scotland did not vote for this and we should not be forced to accept it. Labour’s broken Brexit Britain is failing, and only independence can give us the tools to build a better future, back in the heart of Europe.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why Alberta’s push for independence pales in comparison to Scotland’s in 2014

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Piers Eaton, PhD Candidate in Political Science, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

    One day after the Liberal Party secured their fourth consecutive federal election victory, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith tabled legislation to change the signature threshold needed to put citizen-proposed constitutional questions on the ballot. She lowered it from the current 600,000 signatures to 177,000.

    Since the pro-independence Alberta Prosperity Project already claims to have 240,000 pledges in support of an Albertan sovereignty referendum, the change clears a path to a separation referendum.

    In 2014, Scottish voters went to the polls on a similar question to the one proposed by the Alberta Prosperity Project, but asking voters whether they wanted to regain their independence from Britain. Although the Scottish “Yes” campaign was defeated, it garnered 45 per cent of the vote, far exceeding what most thought was possible at the start of the campaign.

    The 2014 Scottish referendum injected a huge amount of enthusiasm into the Scottish separatist parties, with the largest, the Scottish National Party (SNP) — which led the fight for the Yes side — soaring from 20,000 members in 2013 to more than 100,000 months after the referendum.

    While the Yes campaign did not achieve its goals and the Scottish historical context is very different from Alberta’s, there are still important lessons about how people can be won over to the cause of independence. Albertan separatists don’t seem to be heading down the same path.

    Timeline

    Smith has suggested that if the necessary signatures were collected, that she would aim to hold a referendum in 2026. But the Alberta Prosperity Project’s Jeffrey Rath suggested the group would push Smith to allow a referendum before the end of 2025, giving the referendum a maximum of seven months of official campaigning.

    The broad ground rules of the Scottish referendum were established in the Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012. On March 2013, the SNP-led Scottish government announced the date of the independence referendum — Sept. 18, 2014. The long campaign period allowed a wide variety of grassroots campaign groups to organize in favour of independence.

    While Alberta separatism is less likely to be buoyed by artist collectives and Green Party activists like Scottish independence was, a longer independence campaign would allow a variety of members of Albertan society to make the case for independence.

    Dennis Modry, a co-leader of the Alberta Prosperity Project, recently told CBC News that the initial signature threshold of 600,000 was not all bad, as it would “get (us) closer to the referendum plurality as well.” That remark suggested Modry sees value having more time to campaign before a referendum is held.

    In this regard, he and Rath seem to be sounding different notes.

    Leadership

    Hints that the Alberta Prosperity Project is already divided raises broader questions of leadership. In 2014, the Scottish Yes side had a clear and undisputed leader — First Minister Alex Salmond, head of the SNP.

    The late Salmond led the SNP to back-to-back electoral victories in Scotland, including the only outright majority ever won in the history of the Scottish parliament in 2011.

    Salmond was able to speak in favour of independence in debates and to answer, with democratic legitimacy, specific questions about what the initial policy of an independent Scotland would be.

    The SNP government published a report, Scotland’s Future, that systematically sought to assuage skeptics. Its “frequently asked questions” (FAQ) section answered 650 potential questions about independence. The Alberta Prosperity Project, on the other hand, only answers 74 questions in its FAQ.

    Whereas Salmon’s rise to the leadership of the Scottish independence movement was done in full public view and according to party rules, the Alberta Prosperity Project’s leadership structure is far murkier.

    The organization claims there “is no prima facie leader of the APP, but there (is) a management team which is featured on the website https://albertaprosperityproject.com/about-us/.” Follow that link, however, and no names or management structures are listed.

    Clarity and democracy

    While independence always involves some unknowns, clear leadership can provide answers about where a newly independent nation might find stability. The Yes Scotland campaign promised independence within Europe, meaning Scotland would retain access to the European Union’s common market.

    By contrast, the Alberta Prosperity Project isn’t clear on the fundamental question of whether a sovereign Alberta should remain independent or attempt to join the United States as its 51st state.

    Despite the claim on its website that “the objective of the Alberta Prosperity Project is for Alberta to become a sovereign nation, not the 51st state of the USA,” the organization backed Rath’s recent trip to Washington, D.C. to gauge support for Albertan integration into the U.S.

    Rath has also said that becoming a U.S. territory is “probably the best way to go.”

    Rath in an interview with Rachel Parker, an Alberta-based independent journalist. (Rachel Parker’s YouTube channel)

    The 2014 referendum in Scotland was called a “festival of democracy”, and even anti-independence forces agreed the referendum had been good for democracy.

    It took time and leadership to put forward a positive case for independence, one that voters could decide upon with confidence.

    Alberta could learn from Scotland and strengthen its democracy by holding a referendum based on legitimate leadership, reasonable timelines, diverse voices and clear aims. Or it could lurch into a rushed campaign, with divided leaders of dubious legitimacy, arguing for unclear outcomes — and end up, no matter which side wins, weakening its democracy in the process.

    Piers Eaton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why Alberta’s push for independence pales in comparison to Scotland’s in 2014 – https://theconversation.com/why-albertas-push-for-independence-pales-in-comparison-to-scotlands-in-2014-256838

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: United Kingdom: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 27, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    • An economic recovery is underway. Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and will gain momentum next year, although weak productivity continues to weigh on medium-term growth prospects.
    • The authorities’ fiscal plans strike a good balance between supporting growth and safeguarding fiscal sustainability. It will be important to stay the course and deliver the planned deficit reduction over the next five years to stabilize net debt and reduce vulnerability to gilt market pressures. Further refinements of the fiscal framework could help minimize the frequency of fiscal policy changes. In the longer term, the UK will face difficult choices to align spending with available resources, given ageing-related expenditure pressures.
    • The Bank of England (BoE) should continue to ease monetary policy gradually, while remaining flexible in light of elevated uncertainty. Calibrating the monetary policy stance has become more complex, given the recent pickup in inflation, still fragile growth, and higher long-term interest rates.
    • The authorities’ Growth Mission focuses on the right areas to lift productivity. Given the breadth of the agenda, prioritizing and sequencing of structural reforms, along with clear communication, will be key to success.

    Washington, DC – May 27, 2025:

    Economic Outlook

    After a slowdown in the second half of 2024, an economic recovery is underway and is expected to gain momentum. Economic activity decelerated during 2024 H2, partly reflecting weaker export performance in the challenging global environment. In recent months, high frequency indicators have shown signs of improvement. Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026, as monetary easing, positive wealth effects, and an uptick in confidence bolster private consumption, while the boost to public spending in the October budget will also help support growth. The forecast assumes that global trade tensions lower the level of UK GDP by 0.3 percent by 2026, due to persistent uncertainty, slower activity in UK trading partners, and the direct impact of remaining US tariffs on the UK. The authorities’ structural reforms, including to planning, and the increase in infrastructure investment could increase potential growth if properly implemented. However, medium-term growth is still forecast to remain subdued relative to the pre-GFC trend, at 1.4 percent, given weak productivity.

    Risks to growth remain to the downside. Tighter-than-expected financial conditions, combined with rising precautionary saving by households, would hinder the rebound in private consumption and slow the recovery. Persistent global trade uncertainty could further weigh on UK growth, by weakening global economic activity, disrupting supply chains, and undermining private investment.

    Fiscal Policy

    The authorities’ fiscal strategy for the next five years appropriately supports growth while safeguarding fiscal sustainability. The new spending plans are credible and growth-friendly, taking account of pressures on public services and investment needs. They are expected to provide an economic boost over the medium term that outweighs the impact of higher taxation. As revenue is projected to increase, deficits are set to decline and stabilize net debt.

    It will be important to stay the course and reduce fiscal deficits as planned over the medium term. There are significant risks to the successful implementation of the fiscal strategy, from the high level of global uncertainty, volatile financial market conditions, and the challenge of containing day-to-day spending. Materialization of these risks could result in market pressures, put debt on an upward path, and make it harder to meet the fiscal rules, given limited headroom. To this end, staff recommends adhering to the current plans, and implementing additional revenue or expenditure measures as needed if shocks arise, to maintain compliance with the rules.

    In the longer term, difficult fiscal choices will likely be needed to address spending pressures and rebuild fiscal buffers. Under current policies, staff analysis suggests spending to be around 8 percent of GDP higher by 2050, mainly due to additional outlays on health and pensions from population ageing. There is limited space to finance this spending through extra borrowing, given high debt and elevated borrowing costs. Unless revenue is increased, for which there is scope, tough policy decisions on spending priorities and the role of the state in certain areas will be needed to better align the coverage of public services with available resources.

    While recent reforms of the fiscal framework enhance its credibility and effectiveness, further refinements could improve predictability and reduce pressure for frequent fiscal policy changes. The new current balance rule helps preserve space for investment, while the debt rule safeguards fiscal sustainability. The transition to a three-year rule horizon, aligned with the spending reviews, is expected to make the rules more credible, while allowing time to adjust gradually to shocks. Staff welcomes the authorities’ commitment to hold a single annual fiscal event, but notes that there is still significant pressure for frequent fiscal policy changes, given that small revisions to the economic outlook can erode the headroom within the rules, which is the subject of intense market and media scrutiny. Refinements to the fiscal framework could promote further policy stability. Options include (1) de-emphasizing point estimates of headroom in OBR assessments of rule compliance; (2) establishing a formal process so that small rule breaches do not trigger corrective fiscal action outside of the single fiscal event; or (3) assessing rules only once per year at the time of the fiscal event.

    Monetary Policy and Operations

    A gradual and flexible approach to monetary easing continues to be appropriate to support the economy and protect against inflationary risks. The pickup in inflation that began in 2024 is expected to last through the second half of this year, with a return to target later in 2026 as underlying inflationary pressures continue to recede. Although monetary policy calibration has become more difficult due to still-weak growth, the temporary rise in inflation and high long-term interest rates, staff sees the BoE’s gradual pace of easing as appropriate. Given the elevated uncertainty, the MPC is encouraged to retain flexibility to adjust the monetary stance in either direction if needed.

    The BoE should continue to strengthen its forecasting capacity and communications. Staff welcomes the implementation of the Bernanke Review and the use of scenarios and conditional guidance in the BoE’s communications. The BoE will benefit from continuing to invest in modeling capacity, data and personnel, to be able to tailor scenarios promptly as economic conditions change. In the scenarios, interest rates should be allowed to adjust to economic developments, so that the scenarios are more informative and consistent, rather than assume that interest rates follow current market expectations. Lastly, MPC members could make greater use of the information from the central forecast and the alternative scenarios to justify the MPC decision and explain their personal views.

    The BoE’s transition to a repo-based framework will mitigate balance sheet risks. QT continues to be conducted in a gradual and predictable manner. As the balance sheet normalizes, transitioning to a demand-driven approach, with reserves provided to banks mainly through repo operations, will reduce the market footprint of the BoE and limit its exposure to interest and credit risks. This will also maintain monetary control and the flexibility for new QE in the future, while providing sufficient reserves for financial stability reasons. The transition is being accompanied by a timely review of BoE instruments to consider the relative role of repo operations and asset purchases, as well as the balance between short and long-term repos.

    Financial Sector Policies

    The banking sector remains broadly resilient and macroprudential settings are appropriate, despite global financial stability risks increasing over the past year. The banking system is adequately capitalized and liquid with healthy levels of profitability, and the 2024 desk-based stress test showed that it can support households and businesses during times of severe stress. Macroprudential settings remain appropriate, as indicators of financial vulnerabilities are close to their long-term average, although global risks have risen in the past year given more volatile asset prices and credit spreads.

    Significant progress has been made assessing and reducing vulnerabilities in the non-bank sector and work should continue at the domestic and international levels. Managing risks in the sector is critical, as it accounts for over half of UK financial assets. The system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) has improved understanding of linkages with the banking sector and contagion risks, while the BoE’s new repo facility for non-banks is in line with previous AIV recommendations. The BoE could, in the future, consider expanding access to this facility so as to include a broader range of non-banks with a large gilt market footprint, provided they are adequately supervised and regulated. Ongoing work, including with the FSB, is essential to better monitor and manage non-bank leverage, concentration, and liquidity risks. Work should also continue on closing data gaps to enhance financial system surveillance.

    Recent episodes of global bond market turbulence underscore the importance of enhancing gilt market resilience. Gilt market functioning has remained orderly. Vulnerabilities have nonetheless risen, given increased supply and the reduction in demand by more patient investors, with hedge funds and non-residents playing a greater role, and the BoE reducing its holdings as part of QT. Staff recommends close monitoring as well as regular stress testing and engagement with market participants to detect and manage future risks. In this regard, the shift of issuance toward shorter-dated securities for FY2025/26 has been well received by the market. The authorities are considering policies to enhance structural resilience, such as central clearing for gilt repo transactions, which is welcome.

    Reforms to the financial sector and its regulation should balance promoting growth with preserving continuity and financial stability. While staff supports the government’s aim of enhancing the role of financial services as a driver of growth, risks will need to be carefully managed. Regulatory reforms should balance simplification and modernization with mitigating vulnerabilities, while being well-communicated. Consolidating pension funds has the potential to reduce fees and expand access to diverse asset classes, but it will be important to guard against possible unintended side-effects, including from reduced competition. Staff supports the FPC’s recommendation that the Pensions Regulator has the remit to take financial stability considerations into account. This would strengthen its ability to oversee the evolving pensions landscape and help manage potential risks from consolidation of funds and changes in investment strategies.

    Structural Policies

    Persistently weak productivity remains the UK’s primary obstacle to lifting growth and living standards. The UK has faced a decline in trend productivity growth since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), further widening the gap with the US. Along with adverse shocks, including Brexit, the pandemic and the energy price crisis, the slowdown has left the level of UK GDP around one quarter below what the pre-GFC trend would imply. This slowdown has multiple causes, including chronic under-investment, low private R&D, limited access to finance for businesses to scale up, skill gaps, and a deterioration in health outcomes.

    While the authorities’ Growth Mission focuses on the right areas, careful prioritizing and sequencing of policies will be key to success. The agenda is ambitious and impacts many parts of the economy. Reforms are broadly aligned with past IMF recommendations, although many of them are still at the formulation and consultation stage. Delivering on the Growth Mission involves significant challenges given limited fiscal space, the breadth of the reforms, and the volatile external environment. In refining their strategy, the authorities will thus need to carefully sequence reforms, ensure internal coherence among them, and prioritize early wins to build momentum and garner support for more complex initiatives. Continued clear communication with the public and markets will also be essential.

    Stability, capital, and skills are the most important aspects of the Growth Mission. Staff recommends prioritizing the following three most binding constraints to growth. First, policy stability is critical to support business confidence in an increasingly uncertainty global environment. In this context, recent efforts to strike trade agreements with key partners, including the EU, India, and the US, demonstrate the authorities’ commitment to finding common ground and establishing a more predictable environment for UK exporters. Second, the planning reform and complementary public infrastructure projects can lift the chronically-low private investment, which has weighed on productivity. Finally, boosting people’s skills, enhancing their health, and incentivizing work will address shortages in sectors like construction and healthcare, while providing the productive workforce needed by growth industries. Reforms in these three areas are likely to deliver the largest growth benefits, while laying a strong foundation for progress on other fronts.

    Industrial policy can play a complementary role to support particular sectors, but economy-wide reforms should remain the main tool to boost competitiveness and growth. Structural reforms that apply horizontally across the whole economy, such as easing planning restrictions, are likely to have the greatest impact. These reforms are prerequisites to realize the full potential of vertical interventions at the sectoral level, such as investments by the National Wealth Fund and initiatives under the new industrial strategy. Sectoral interventions should be focused on addressing market failures, identified using an evidence-based approach, and supported by rigorous appraisal processes, while being subject to strict budgetary limits, prudent risk management, and comprehensive risk reporting.

    The mission thanks the authorities and other counterparts for open discussions, productive collaboration, and constructive policy dialogue.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/cs-uk-aiv-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Linguistics could make language learning more relevant – and attractive – for school pupils

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Kasstan, Senior Lecturer in French and Linguistics, University of Westminster

    BearFotos/Shutterstock

    A 2023 YouGov poll found that only 21% of UK adults can hold a conversation in a language other than their mother tongue. About half of the other 79% regretted not engaging more with languages at school, and more than half of all those polled were interested in learning a new language.

    By comparison, some 60% of EU citizens surveyed in 2022 reported good or proficient foreign language skills.

    Something is clearly going wrong with foreign language learning in UK schools, and this is not improving. For example, A-level entries in modern languages in England as a percentage of all A-level entries has fallen since 2010.

    Yet our research shows that many pupils in England and Wales are curious about how language has been shaped by society, culture and history, and how contact between people from different backgrounds leads to language change. A languages curriculum oriented around linguistics – the critical and analytical study of language itself – could meaningfully address the decline in language learning.

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    In March 2025, the interim report of an ongoing review of school curriculum and assessment in England was published. This called for changes to how language learning takes place in schools.

    Some of the issues identified are not exclusive to the languages curriculum. The authors point out that, in general, pupils do not see their lives and interests represented in what they are taught, and that the curriculum is not responsive to social change. At the same time, the report recognises that young people’s understanding of culture through language is essential.

    The national languages curriculum has been recognised as problematic for some time. Unlike all other subjects at GCSE and A-level, including highly practical subjects like physical education and music, languages in schools are taught and assessed almost purely as skills: reading, writing, speaking and listening. They lack critical, theoretical and analytical dimensions.

    Furthermore, the topics covered, while broad, are socially skewed to the point that it can make them difficult for pupils to relate to: discussions of alpine skiing holidays abroad, for instance. This does little to change the view that studying languages is the preserve of the elite.

    Our work with language teachers, together with colleagues Alice Corr, Norma Schifano and Sascha Stollhans, suggests that including linguistics in the languages curriculum can tackle some of these shortcomings.

    Linguistics could also contribute to learning in other subjects.
    Juice Flair/Shutterstock

    Linguistics allows a language – with all of its richness and complexity – to be studied as a psychological, cultural and historical object, enabling pupils to probe how it is shaped by (and shapes) society. Rather than simply learning vocabulary and grammar, and using them to talk about, say, regional identity or multiculturalism, linguistics-based lessons focus on how language relates to these topics.

    Linguistics could also enhance the teaching of other subjects including English as a first or additional language, as well as subjects such as history, geography, maths and science. This is because linguistics encourages a framework for analysis that is readily applicable to other subjects.

    What’s more, the soft skills obtained from this approach to language learning can enhance employability, fostering language experts that are better prepared for the real world. This would make school languages an attractive choice even for those not wishing to pursue a languages degree.

    For the UK to meet its societal, economic and commercial challenges, we require more linguists of all kinds, as this 2020 proposal for a national languages strategy from institutions including the British Council and Universities UK highlights.

    Our own research shows that a languages curriculum enriched with linguistics is appealing to both students and teachers. It can enhance motivation and confidence among pupils, while contributing to a more diverse and comprehensive learning experience.

    We have also shown that it can easily be integrated into language teaching without additional teacher training. Above all, a linguistics-rich curriculum can help students feel represented in their learning, allowing them to reflect on cultural and social issues they understand and feel strongly about.

    The numbers speak volumes

    Language learning in schools in England in particular has long been in decline. The statistics mask wider systemic problems, too. School language departments are increasingly under-resourced or are closing altogether. This means fewer pupils learning languages at A-level and beyond, and many fewer training to be language teachers.

    Plugging this shortage with teachers from abroad has also become increasingly difficult, particularly since Brexit, creating a vicious circle.

    There is a knock-on impact for higher education. Ongoing closures of university language programmes have led to “cold spots” emerging in parts of the country: areas where no universities offer language degrees. Access to higher language learning thus risks becoming a postcode lottery, especially for those without the financial means to study far away from their home town.

    A significant change in how languages are taught is needed – and enriching language teaching with linguistics could be effective, feasible, and potentially transformative.

    Jonathan Kasstan receives funding from the British Academy.

    Michelle Sheehan receives funding from The British Academy and The Leverhulme Trust.

    Anna D. Havinga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Linguistics could make language learning more relevant – and attractive – for school pupils – https://theconversation.com/linguistics-could-make-language-learning-more-relevant-and-attractive-for-school-pupils-255068

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How the UK-EU deal turns the page on Brexit – and what happens next

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén, Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster

    At their first bilateral summit since Brexit, UK and EU leaders set out a range of areas they will seek to forge closer ties. European Council President António Costa, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer hailed the agreement as a historic landmark deal that opens a new chapter in the EU-UK relationship.

    But it is only the beginning of – potentially long – negotiations to thrash out the details of closer cooperation in areas like trade, youth mobility and energy.

    As the two parties sit down at the negotiating table, they will, for the first time since Brexit, agree on how to make trade and cooperation easier. For example, one anticipated agreement will align UK food safety and animal health standards with those of the EU, thereby removing the need for most border checks and ease the flow of agriculture and food products between the two parties. And the expected youth mobility scheme will allow young people to travel, work and study in the EU and the UK for a limited period of time.

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    The looming negotiations will be relatively narrow in scope. The Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement still provide the basis for the EU-UK relationship. The UK is not compromising on its red lines of not joining the single market, the customs union or allowing free movement of people.

    The negotiations will consequently not fundamentally alter the current relationship. While the impact of the agreements may be significant for specific sectors, the overall economic impact is expected to be relatively modest.

    This is not to say that the upcoming negotiations will be easy or void of controversies. Over the next months, negotiators will have to agree on quotas, time limits, exceptions and financial contributions. Compromises and trade-offs will have to be found.

    There will be domestic resistance on both sides. Concerns have already emerged that France might oppose the participation of British defence companies in EU defence procurement programmes.

    And in the UK, critics argue that the decision to dynamically align UK rules and standards with those of the EU in certain sectors will make the country a rule-taker once again.

    But the answer to the question on many people’s minds: “Will this bring us back to all those years of difficult and protracted Brexit negotiations?” is no – this time around, things are different.

    In comparison with the Brexit negotiations, these negotiations should be far easier and swifter. They are less consequential and backed by strong political will from both sides.

    Recent polling indicates that both Britons and EU citizens favour a closer relationship between the UK and the EU.

    The agreement reached at the summit is seen as the first concrete manifestation of Starmer’s long sought-after reset of the relationship.

    Moving on

    The Brexit negotiations focused on establishing less cooperation compared with when the UK was a member of the EU. It was a question of addressing increasing barriers to trade and cooperation – something many perceived as a lose-lose situation. The upcoming negotiations, on the other hand, are seen to lead towards a win-win reset of relations. The parties enter the negotiations with a mindset of finding solutions that increase trade and facilitate cooperation.

    The UK is now negotiating as an independent, sovereign country. During the Brexit negotiations the UK was an EU member (or a closely aligned former member in the case of the negotiations of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement).

    It was thus important for the EU to make the benefits of membership clear and to discourage other members from leaving. As a result, it drove a hard bargain and the UK had limited influence on the negotiations.

    However, unlike the UK – where Brexit has never fully disappeared from the political debate – the EU moved on quickly after Brexit. In Brussels, many now consider the UK an independent but like-minded strategic partner.

    This is seen not least in the area of security, where the two parties agreed on a security and defence partnership. They set out a framework for closer cooperation in areas of joint interest, such as sanctions, information sharing and cybersecurity, and allowing them to better respond to shared global challenges and uncertainties.

    Zooming out, the geopolitical picture has changed dramatically since the Brexit negotiations. With the war in Ukraine and the resulting instability in Europe, combined with the shifting priorities of US foreign policy, there is now an even greater need for EU-UK cooperation.

    Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How the UK-EU deal turns the page on Brexit – and what happens next – https://theconversation.com/how-the-uk-eu-deal-turns-the-page-on-brexit-and-what-happens-next-257158

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Next generation farming

    Source: Scottish Government

    Support for young people into agricultural careers.

    More than £2 million will be available to support young people entering farming through a pre-apprenticeship programme and training fund.

    Speaking at a joint NFU Scotland and Scottish Government summit on new entrants, Agriculture Minister Jim Fairlie launched a newly procured Land Based Pre-apprenticeship Programme with £1.8 million committed over three years. 

    Mr Fairlie also confirmed the relaunch and procurement of the Next Generation Practical Training Fund.  The fund is open from now until March 2027 with at least £300,000 a year to help young people access skills training in a flexible, individual way. 

    Mr Fairlie said:

    “I know from my own experience the hard work and dedication that it takes to enter the industry as a new entrant farmer and the challenges young people can face. These two funds will help more people get practical training to launch their agriculture careers.

    “The pre-apprenticeship programme has been expanded to take on close to 400 people and to date we have had more than 60 applications for the training fund. This is a really promising start and is a positive step towards improving safety on-farm and training up the depleted post-Brexit labour force.”

     

    Duncan Macalister, Vice President, NFU Scotland, said:

    “We welcome this vital investment in practical training and pre-apprenticeship opportunities. These programmes are not just about developing skills, they are about securing the future of Scottish agriculture.

    “We urgently need action on land access and capital support to complement this step forward, so that young people can see a clear, supported path into the sector.”

    Lantra Scotland Director Dr Liz Barron-Majerik said:

    “Lantra works to enhance Scotland’s natural environment and support the rural economy, by increasing the number and diversity of employees in Scotland’s land-based and aquaculture sector and driving their skills development. The training fund and the pre-apprenticeship programme are both of great benefit to new entrants to agriculture as they start on their career path, and so I’m delighted that we’re going to be managing them on behalf of, and in partnership with, FONE and the Scottish Government.

    “We look forward to working with our training provider partners on the delivery of the training funds, and the Scottish Machinery Rings, SRUC and Borders College on the pre-apprenticeship. We would also like to encourage others who are interested in becoming involved to please get in touch via scotland@lantra.co.uk.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why is it so hard for young people to get jobs?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Farooq Mughal, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor), Management Strategy & Organisation, University of Bath

    antoniodiaz/Shutterstock

    For generations, young people have been told the path to opportunity is clear. Study hard, get a degree, and success will follow. This promise – central to the idea of “meritocracy” – has shaped the aspirations and investments of millions (though in reality, access to university and employment is also shaped by factors like family income, schooling and geography).

    Today, however, many graduates in the UK and elsewhere find they are struggling to land a job – and it’s a problem which extends far beyond roles that match their qualifications. In some cases, graduates are being turned down for roles in supermarkets or warehouses – not because they’re unqualified, but because they’re seen as overqualified, too risky or surplus to requirements.

    In terms of the UK economy, this isn’t just a problem of job shortages. It signals a deeper breakdown in the social contract – the long-held promise that education leads to opportunity. And it exposes how the connection between learning and labour is coming undone.

    As the focus of employers, higher education providers and the state has shifted towards the notion of “employability” – the skills and attitudes that help people get and keep jobs – labour markets have become highly competitive and spoilt for choice.

    At the same time, it’s worth remembering that while employment remains a key concern, the value of education extends far further – shaping personal growth and civic engagement, for example.


    This article is part of Quarter Life, a series about issues affecting those of us in our twenties and thirties. From the challenges of beginning a career and taking care of our mental health, to the excitement of starting a family, adopting a pet or just making friends as an adult. The articles in this series explore the questions and bring answers as we navigate this turbulent period of life.

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    Employability places the burden squarely on young people to become work-ready while ignoring the wider barriers they face. These include hiring algorithms, labour market saturation as graduate numbers remain high while vacancies dry up, and uneven access to opportunity.

    Even with degrees and internships, many young people are finding themselves locked out of meaningful work. Research I undertook with colleagues on education-to-work transitions shows how graduates often invest heavily in becoming employable through a mix of soft skills, adaptability and professionalism. But these efforts now rarely guarantee a job.

    Instead, graduates frequently enter a labour market that is both oversaturated and under-responsive. Over the past two decades, the number of graduates in the UK has grown sharply. This surge has intensified competition, pushing many into roles below their qualification level.



    Read more:
    Britain has almost 1 million young people not in work or education – here’s what evidence shows can change that

    The UK government’s Get Britain Working white paper recognises this disconnect. It also highlights the legacy effects of the COVID pandemic, especially among young people aged 16–24 who are not in education, employment or training (Neets) – of which there are now estimated to be 987,000, and rising.

    But while the government’s proposed youth guarantee scheme offers basic training and apprenticeships, it does little for those already in the labour market.

    What’s blocking the way?

    Despite the emphasis on developing skills, many young people – both graduates and non-graduates – struggle to progress in the labour market. For example, the number of entry-level roles in retail, hospitality and logistics is shrinking due to rising costs, automation and algorithmic hiring systems that privilege some over others.

    Recent increases to employer national insurance contributions and the national minimum wage are putting pressure on payrolls, reducing already limited opportunities for young people.

    UK chancellor Rachel Reeves’s 2024 budget contained some shocks for employers.
    Fred Duval/Shutterstock

    This highlights the limits of the popular narrative that effort always leads to reward. The idea that young people just need to try harder collapses under the weight of such constraints.

    Businesses are also facing tight margins, as well as the problems that come with high staff turnover due to a lack of career development opportunities, as rising costs make it harder to invest in staff. But our research shows that even highly motivated graduates – those who network, gain skills, take internships and are adaptable – can struggle to get a foot in the door.

    The UK employment rights bill, which is making its way through parliament, is designed to curb exploitative labour market practices. But professional bodies and trade associations warn that some employers may respond by cutting staff and reducing flexible work.

    While reforms such as reframing the purpose of Jobcentres are critical in making unemployment seem unattractive, they are likely to fall short of creating sustained opportunities.

    Policy paradox

    All of this reveals a paradox. In trying to clamp down on job precarity, the UK government may be shutting young people out of the entry points they need, skilled or otherwise. Well-intentioned policies such as the youth guarantee and employment rights bill risk failure when the labour market often rewards privilege over merit.

    Today’s labour market can penalise young people twice over. First, they’re expected to be employable with the right skillset. Yet even when they are, many find the door shut.

    In my view, the way forward is to create new, accessible roles that reflect a broader duty of care on the part of employers, universities and policymakers. This includes building skills pathways along the lines of the Youth Futures Foundation programme, which works in deprived areas to create pathways that connect young people with support and jobs.

    It also means embedding hiring practices that ensure a closer focus on someone’s potential, such as blind recruitment or diverse hiring panels.

    Incentivising employers to hire and value young talent could be transformative, as could forging partnerships between universities and industry which focus on building the skills needed for employment.

    Government initiatives such as the Trailblazers scheme, which identifies young people at risk of falling out of education or employment, are a good start. But they could be more effective alongside a combination of digital tools that bring together mobile apps for tracking career progress, a skills dashboard, and AI career advice.

    Restoring the social contract means sharing responsibility. Our research finds that employers should regularly review how they assess talent and design career pathways.

    Universities should collaborate with industry to ensure graduate skills align with employer expectations. And the government must address deep-seated inequalities shaped by region, class, race and institutional prestige.

    Ignoring these issues mean they will continue to largely dictate who gets in, who gets ahead, and who gets left out. A collective responsibility ensures that education is recognised not just as a route to employment, but as a cornerstone of a fair, thoughtful and inclusive society.

    Farooq Mughal works for the University of Bath. He is also a Trustee and Director in a non-executive capacity for the Bath Royal Literary and Scientific Institution.

    – ref. Why is it so hard for young people to get jobs? – https://theconversation.com/why-is-it-so-hard-for-young-people-to-get-jobs-256532

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scottish Government reacts to UK-EU deal

    Source: Scottish Government

    Fishing deal puts any benefits “at risk”.

    External Affairs Secretary Angus Robertson has welcomed the closer co-operation between the UK and the EU following a series of new agreements but said not involving the Scottish Government in any negotiations was “an affront to devolution”.

    In a statement to the Scottish Parliament, Mr Robertson said the removal of obstacles to food and agricultural exports, greater support for energy trading and the UK rejoining the Erasmus exchange scheme for students, were all positive aspects of the UK-EU agreement.

    But Mr Robertson criticised the lack of consultation with the Scottish Government on key aspects of the deal, particularly on fishing.

    He said:

    “The Scottish Government welcomes the agreement as it represents long-overdue momentum in rebuilding our relationship with the European Union. But no agreement can deliver the economic, social and security benefits we lost with Brexit in 2020.

    “We argued for an ambitious package in the interests of people and businesses across Scotland, and there are some positive indicators here, including the agriculture, food and drink agreement which will reduce market barriers; and enhanced cooperation on energy and climate, and a clear intention to rejoin the Erasmus exchange programme.

    “The fact that this agreement – not least on fisheries – was reached without the explicit engagement of the devolved governments on the negotiation detail is not just an affront to devolution, it has put at risk, and will continue to put at risk, the benefits of any commitments for the people of Scotland.”

    He added:

    “We still believe Scotland’s best future lies as an independent country within the European Union but we will engage constructively and positively in the next phase of negotiations. We also hope to see the UK Government work collaboratively with devolved governments in developing its priorities – as the EU does with its Member States.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Labour governments have always struggled with immigration – here’s what Keir Starmer could learn from them

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Erica Consterdine, Senior Lecturer in Public Policy, Lancaster University

    The government has outlined its plans to reduce net migration to the UK. The proposals are generally restrictive: scrapping social care visas, tightening work visas, longer residency requirements, tougher English tests and restructuring student visas.

    While Reform’s recent success at the local elections hardened Keir Starmer’s rhetoric in announcing the changes, the thrust of this policy was to be expected. But will the political calculation pay off?

    Immigration has long been a headache for Labour. It is a topic that cuts across the party’s ideological factions – its protectionist roots, its universalist values, and its market-friendly third way leanings. Each of these calls for a different approach on immigration.

    Labour’s record on immigration is historically patchy. Previous Labour governments have been responsible for some of the most deplorable immigration acts, including the racially discriminatory 1968 act, which restricted non-white immigration in a betrayal of Kenyan Asians fleeing persecution.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    The British public then was far more illiberal on immigration than it is today. Trade unions were historically anti-immigrant, perceiving foreign labour as a threat to wages and job displacement. Labour, like their Tory counterparts, mostly operated on a bipartisan consensus of limiting immigration, on the idea that this was better for cohesion.

    This is exemplified in the Hattersley equation (named for former MP Roy Hattersley), a bipartisan political consensus that lasted from the postwar years up until Thatcher’s government. The compromise was between restrictive immigration policy and liberal integration measures (the Race Relations Act) to appease Labour’s liberal base.

    New Labour embraced the Thatcherite, neoliberal agenda, with Tony Blair declaring that there is no alternative to globalisation and therefore immigration. Framing immigration as an economic good, and humanitarian mobility as the bogeyman, Labour’s regime radically transformed the immigration system from one of the most restrictive in Europe to one of the most liberal labour regimes. But this was never for the benefit of migrants – it was simply economic calculation.

    We know what happened next: the political battleground, the cursed net migration target, Brexit and the lurches to the right ever since. In opposition, Labour has never been able to resolve this.

    Starmer’s approach

    A sticking point since 2010 has been traditionally working-class Labour constituents, viewed as “left behind” due to globalisation, and who now make up the red wall. The narrative goes that these voters have drifted rightwards due to dissatisfaction with immigration.

    But overall, Labour voters are still more positive than Conservatives towards immigration. A regressive policy on migrant rights could lose Labour some of its voter base.

    What’s more, net migration is likely to decrease over Labour’s term anyway, due to changes made by the last government and the tailing off of unprecedented migration from bespoke humanitarian schemes, like the one for Ukrainians. Arguably, Starmer’s reforms weren’t strictly necessary.

    Starmer could have framed the same policies around a softer rhetoric, one that embraces multicultural Britain while making the case for reforming the labour market. The enemy could have easily been cast as the Conservative government that neglected investment in the people at the expense of global corporations.

    Data from the Institute of Public Policy Research suggests that the UK public has become softer on immigration, but they want fairness. The easy way out here was to praise the benefits that immigration can bring while emphasising the need for control to maximise those benefits.

    Denigrating the current system as a “squalid chapter” of history is playing to Reform voters – arguably a foolish move, given that evidence shows you can’t beat the far right at its own game.

    Will the proposals work?

    If these proposals do reduce migration, it will come at a high cost for the country, not least in the consequences for the higher education and social care sectors. It may even increase irregular migration, as more people go underground in their attempts to reach Britain.

    The crux of the government’s problem is promising to reduce immigration in a system dependent on labour market flexibility. The proposals would make the UK extortionately expensive for both applicants and the employers who sponsor them, and make it economically unviable for the sectors that rely on foreign labour to recruit.

    A more social democratic immigration policy would invest in training, skills and wages of domestic workforces, while providing rights to the migrants who already reside here.

    Labour’s policy does not do this. It curtails rights significantly, for example in the doubling of the waiting period to apply for the right to stay indefinitely, and the plans to review how the right to family life is applied. Both of these are arguably counterproductive to the aims of integration and out of step with other countries.

    The theory behind the government reforms is that migrant workers will be replaced by the economically inactive domestic labour force – a win-win. Aside from the suspect simplicity of this equation, it will require more than sticks on employers and migrants. It necessitates a radical overhaul of the system, the economic model and a more interventionist state to move towards a coordinated market economy, one with more organisation and regulation on the labour market.

    Despite the government’s significant majority, a disciplined cabinet and an infighting opposition, the government appears reluctant to make such dramatic change, wedded to the existing paradigms of neoliberal free markets in a quest for growth in stagnating economies. If it wants its plans to work, Labour will have to be bolder and provide carrots to go with the sticks.

    Erica Consterdine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Labour governments have always struggled with immigration – here’s what Keir Starmer could learn from them – https://theconversation.com/labour-governments-have-always-struggled-with-immigration-heres-what-keir-starmer-could-learn-from-them-256737

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: The UK might have accepted the idea of youth mobility with the EU, but it’s not happening any time soon

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon Usherwood, Professor of Politics & International Studies, The Open University

    View Apart/Shutterstock

    The language might be dry, but the political shift is significant. Monday’s summit between the UK and EU leaders in London resulted in an acknowledgement of the “mutual interest to deepen our people-to-people ties, particularly for the younger generation”.

    This announcement is an important step forward in the creation of a youth mobility scheme between the EU and UK, even if it has required a name change to become a “youth experience scheme”. It is the first time that a British government has formally accepted this as something to negotiate and implement.

    However, there is scant detail about how it will work in practice and what the inevitable limits will be. While the permitted activities (“work, studies, au-pairing, volunteering, or simply travelling”) seem extensive, they are prefaced with the dreaded words “such as” – which means no one has actually agreed any of it.

    It was clear over a year ago that the basic models that the two sides have for youth mobility differ. The EU wants lengthy exchange periods and home tuition fees for students; the UK wants shorter stays, caps on numbers and retention of international fees for EU students at UK universities. The achievement of a deal would require at least one of them to move. This week makes this difference now the formal position, rather than showing whether movement is possible.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    It’s possible that discussion of British participation in the Erasmus+ scheme for student mobility might be a partial stopgap, making exchanges within study programmes easier. However, the ambition for creating those deeper people-to-people ties will need more to make it meaningful.

    As the troubled history of this idea should indicate, there’s still a very long way to go before anyone gets to use the scheme in practice.

    The founding irony of a youth mobility scheme with the EU after Brexit is that it was originally a British idea. It was produced under Rishi Sunak following his conclusion of the Windsor Framework on Northern Ireland, when he was looking for areas to rebuild ties with Europe.

    In 2023, feelers had been put out to various EU member states about concluding bilateral deals with the UK. While there was some interest, the general feeling was that this was best handled at an EU level, to avoid any cherrypicking of countries by London.

    A summary of UK-EU youth mobility proposals.
    Simon Usherwood, CC BY-NC-SA

    In April 2024, the European Commission produced an ambitious proposal for a scheme. It put forward that 18- to 30-year-olds would be able to get a visa for up to four years for any purpose – work, study, travel – without quotas on numbers.

    Both the Conservative government and the Labour opposition had rejected the proposal out of hand. This was partly out of concerns over the potential impact on immigration figures and on student finances: the commission suggested EU students should be able to pay UK university fees. Mostly, however, it came from a desire not to be seen to make a big agreement with the EU that looked a bit like freedom of movement.

    To be clear, youth mobility is very much not freedom of movement. The latter implies no limits on entry, length or purpose of stay, as well as access to any kinds of public services as if you were a resident national. The former still means paying for a visa and strict limits on those services. But such legal points remain rather marginal in the British political and media debate.

    Since last year, there has been some to and fro, but largely behind closed doors and with the incoming Labour government continuing the line that such a scheme wasn’t on the cards. While the UK has a number of youth mobility schemes with countries around the world, these are typically limited by quotas and time (normally to two years) and require the person to be working or studying.

    Moving on?

    On the British side, Home Office concern about immigration figures is clearly still critical, especially in the context of the recent white paper that aims to cut back migration. Universities too have been vocal about the financial impact of losing tuition fee income from EU students.

    But on the EU side, the matter is seen very differently. To some extent, the interest is in maintaining the links with the UK, especially for young people that could gain from experiencing more of how their neighbours live. But much more than this is the sense that youth mobility has become something of a test for the British government.

    Labour’s return to office last July marked the unleashing of a significant diplomatic effort to engage with European counterparts and to talk up the value of working together. Youth mobility is a test of that value for some in European capitals, both in terms of being able to negotiate an agreement and of being able to sell it to the British public.

    The coming weeks and months will therefore be a key period if the reset is to result in more sustainably improved relations. Even if the basic shape of UK-EU relations isn’t about to shift, the ability for both sides to be able to talk and act constructively will still matter in delivering from that long list of summit ambitions.

    Simon Usherwood receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, as a Senior Fellow of the UK in a Changing Europe initiative.

    – ref. The UK might have accepted the idea of youth mobility with the EU, but it’s not happening any time soon – https://theconversation.com/the-uk-might-have-accepted-the-idea-of-youth-mobility-with-the-eu-but-its-not-happening-any-time-soon-256628

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI China: UK-EU ties reset with new bilateral deal

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    British Prime Minister Keir Starmer (C), European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (L) and European Council President Antonio Costa are seen ahead of the UK-EU summit in London, Britain, on May 19, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Britain and the European Union (EU) reached a wide-ranging agreement on Monday, which is expected to generate nearly 9 billion pounds (about 12.02 billion U.S. dollars) for the British economy by 2040, Downing Street announced.

    The deal was unveiled ahead of the first-ever UK-EU summit held in London, a meeting hailed by both sides as a “historic moment.” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the agreement a “new chapter” in the relationship, as the two sides seek to reset ties after years of post-Brexit friction.

    Major highlights

    Hosted by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the summit brought together von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa. All three praised the deal as a major step forward during a joint press conference.

    One major highlight is a youth mobility scheme, described by Downing Street as “capped and time-limited,” and modeled on similar agreements with countries like Australia and New Zealand. The UK and EU will also work toward restoring British participation in the Erasmus+ academic exchange program, from which the UK withdrew during the current 2021-2027 cycle.

    Von der Leyen stressed that the mobility initiative will help rebuild long-term academic and cultural connections between European and British youth.

    The agreement also includes a sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) deal aimed at easing trade in food and agricultural goods. It will eliminate many routine checks on animal and plant products, cutting costs, reducing red tape, and reopening EU markets to British exports such as burgers and shellfish. It will also streamline goods movement between Britain and Northern Ireland under the Windsor Framework.

    “This deal slashes red tape for exporters and will bring down food prices in British supermarkets,” Starmer said. “It directly impacts working people across the country.”

    In the fisheries sector, Britain and the EU agreed to a 12-year framework that preserves British access to EU waters and maintains current quotas for EU vessels. The British government will invest 360 million pounds to modernize its fleet and upgrade technology.

    “Under the old arrangement, we moved to year-by-year negotiations, which brought instability,” Starmer said. “This new deal offers predictability. Over 70 percent of our seafood is sold to the EU, so reducing red tape makes a material difference.”

    The agreement also lays the groundwork for defense and security cooperation, including a framework for UK participation in the EU’s SAFE defense program, which supports joint military procurement. Further negotiations will address financial contributions and supply chain arrangements.

    British holidaymakers also stand to benefit. The deal will expand access to Europol data and enhance cooperation on biometric and vehicle information. British travelers will once again be able to use eGates at EU border controls, streamlining passport checks.

    Surrender or step forward

    Despite broad support, the agreement has also faced criticism. Opposition Conservative Party leader Kemi Badenoch pledged to reverse it if her party returns to power, while Reform UK’s Nigel Farage called the move a “surrender” to Brussels.

    Fisheries groups also voiced discontent. The National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations said the deal “gives away the best card we still had,” benefiting large exporters and supermarkets more than independent fishers.

    Still, analysts viewed the agreement as a pragmatic step forward.

    “Fishing is a tiny part of the British economy, but critics will latch onto it as symbolic,” said Iain Begg, a European politics expert at the London School of Economics and Political Science. “However, reducing barriers to UK exports carries much greater economic weight — especially for defense contractors who could benefit from EU military procurement.”

    On the mobility deal, Begg noted that relaxed passport controls will be welcomed by many Brits, especially as the holiday season approaches.

    While some critics view the deal as a British retreat, others argue it signals a more mature phase in UK-EU relations.

    “If you frame this as winners and losers, you miss the bigger picture,” said Steve Nolan, senior economics lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University, who sees the move as a mutual recognition that “we are close neighbors and strategic partners.” In a fragmented world, this is a sign that “grown-up negotiation is back on the table,” he added.

    No timeline has been set for the agreement’s full implementation, but Starmer said remaining negotiations would continue “with the same pace and intensity.” (1 British pound = 1.34 U.S. dollar) 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scotland’s future must be at the heart of Europe

    Source: Scottish Greens

    19 May 2025

    Patrick Harvie MSP comments on EU/UK trade deal

    Reacting to Starmer’s European Union trade deal, Scottish Greens Co-Leader Patrick Harvie has said, “the only deal good enough for Scotland is a deal to rejoin the EU”.

    The trade deal secured by the UK Labour Government and the European Union guarantees EU fishing boats access to UK waters until 2038, controversial carbon markets and farming agreements.

    Scottish Greens Co-Leader Patrick Harvie MSP said:

    “Five years after Brexit, we are still picking up the pieces of a disastrous decision that the people of Scotland overwhelmingly rejected.

    “Keir Starmer may celebrate this deal as if it’s the greatest possible outcome, but in reality, this is just another disappointment that lets Scotland down. We didn’t vote to leave the EU, but Scottish communities and businesses are being hit the hardest by decisions made in Westminster.

    “This deal fails to deliver for people or planet, it shows the true long-term economic damage that pandering to Nigel Farage and the far-right can have on the economy and our society. The only deal good enough for Scotland is a deal to rejoin the EU that allows Scotland to regain our rights as European citizens.

    “Scotland deserves better. As an independent nation, we could rejoin the EU and work together with our friends across the continent to tackle the climate emergency and build a fairer, greener Europe.”

    Alongside industrial trade agreements, the deal is set to include a youth experience scheme and potential access to the Erasmus+ programme, something the Scottish Greens have long called for.

    Mr Harvie added:

    “Rejoining Erasmus+ would be extremely welcome, but this hasn’t been included in the initial deal, and clearly hasn’t been a priority for Labour Ministers. Young people have already been missing out on life-changing opportunities, and their freedom of movement should be restored to them.

    “It’s more important than ever that the UK government get this part of the deal over the line to open doors for students in Scotland, the UK, and across Europe.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: UK and EU sign new trade, fishing and defence deal – what do economists think?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Maria Garcia, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Bath

    The UK and EU have announced a range of historic and wide-ranging new agreements touching on trade, defence and borders.

    Since the 2016 Brexit vote, COVID and conflict have changed the global economic landscape dramatically – with consumers feeling the effects every day. So the time could be ripe for a “reset” of relations between the UK and its largest trading partner.

    Beyond trade, the two sides have agreed to negotiate further on a youth mobility scheme. And in future, travellers with UK passports will be able to use e-gates and avoid lengthy queues in some European countries.

    But the agreement is also fraught with political risk, as opposition parties circle to capitalise on the vexxed question of tighter UK-EU relations. We asked a panel of experts for their analysis of the announcements.

    Fisheries agreement unlocks path to ‘reset’

    Maria Garcia, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Bath

    These were the first steps towards the much-vaunted Labour UK-EU “reset”. The announcement of agreements between the UK and EU covered security, energy and fisheries.

    But the announcement falls short of key UK priorities for the reset, which includes a series of measures to facilitate trade with what is still the UK’s largest trade partner and market. The bloc represented 48% of UK goods exports, 36% of services exports, and 51% of goods imports in 2024.

    Fisheries represent roughly 5% of UK agriculture, fisheries and forestry exports, and 0.03% of the UK economy. That may be a smaller slice of GDP than many people might think. But given the regional concentration of the fishing industry, it is vitally important to those communities. The situation is the same in EU countries.

    Fisheries was a difficult issue to tackle in the negotiations for the 2021 UK-EU trade and cooperation agreement (TCA). Under the TCA, the EU agreed to phase out 25% of its catch share in British waters.

    And there was an understanding on permits to fish species subject to fishing quotas that would allow fleets to fish in each others’ waters. The terms of this were due to expire in June 2026.

    French president Emmanuel Macron insisted that without a deal on fisheries he would not accept other areas of the reset. And North Sea countries joined the call to negotiate a deal on fish. This represented a difficult ask for the UK government, given fierce criticism from opposition parties.

    This agreement settles access to fisheries for the next 12 years. Despite its limited economic impact in absolute terms, the political significance should not be underestimated. It is a clear signal of the Starmer government’s commitment to move forward in the relationship with the EU – particularly relevant at a time of complicated global trading relations.

    Other proposed measures include waiving the requirement to submit safety declarations, agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and a veterinary agreement to facilitate agricultural trade. These matters are included in the newly published memo in which the UK and EU commit to work towards agreement on SPS. However, there is no announcement as to when this might be finalised.

    But the settlement on fisheries means an important hurdle has been overcome on the path towards the reset.

    Big boost for the UK’s top food export

    Mausam Budhathoki, PhD Researcher, Institute of Aquaculture, University of Stirling

    This UK-EU agreement has major implications for the Scottish salmon industry, a vital part of Scotland’s economy. In 2024, salmon exports hit a record £844 million, with France accounting for 55% of the total. Salmon is the UK’s top food export, and as such stands to benefit from the reduced customs checks and paperwork outlined in the deal. This will ease access to EU markets.

    Since Brexit, the industry has faced export delays, higher costs and an estimated loss of £80 million–£100 million in EU sales due to new regulatory hurdles. The UK government projects the agreement could add £9 billion to the economy by 2040, with agrifood sectors like salmon farming gaining. Yet, the deal extends EU fishing rights in UK waters until 2038, which may disrupt marine ecosystems essential to salmon farming.

    Although salmon are farmed in sea pens, they rely on clean, stable marine environments that could be affected by increased fishing activity. The agreement also remains politically sensitive. Future UK-EU disputes or changes could bring revisions, creating uncertainty for long-term planning and investment. While the deal offers clear trade benefits, the industry must balance growth opportunities with environmental and political risks.

    The agreement will ease the export process for UK goods to Europe.
    john abrams/Shutterstock

    Defence deal could boost UK economy as well as security

    Conor O’Kane, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Bournemouth University

    The deal looks like the beginning of a path to closer economic ties between the UK and EU, reversing a trend of UK disengagement from Europe following Brexit.

    Growth in the UK economy has been sluggish in recent years, and exporters are facing uncertainty as a result of recent US trade policies. So any opportunity for UK firms to have easier access to EU markets has to be seen as a positive for economic growth.

    Faster economic growth will be absolutely key for UK chancellor Rachael Reeves to meet her “fiscal rules” (reducing national debt and only borrowing money for investment). It will also help to avoid further cuts to government spending. UK borrowing is currently above what the Office for Budget Responsibility was projecting only a year ago.

    The agreement on security and defence is one area of particular interest where growth is concerned. According to the UK government, the agreement “paves the way” for the participation of UK firms in the EU’s €150 billion (£126 billion) joint procurement programme to rearm Europe.

    The EU is stepping up its security spending in light of the Trump administration’s desire to reduce its support for Nato, and there is real potential for the UK defence industry to benefit.

    Mausam Budhathoki receives funding from the EATFISH project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant 956697)..

    Conor O’Kane and Maria Garcia do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. UK and EU sign new trade, fishing and defence deal – what do economists think? – https://theconversation.com/uk-and-eu-sign-new-trade-fishing-and-defence-deal-what-do-economists-think-257052

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Green Party reaction to UK-EU deal

    Source: Green Party of England and Wales

    / by Green Party

    Reacting to the UK-EU deal announced today by the prime minister Keir Starmer, the co-leader of the Green Party, Carla Denyer MP, said:

    “Today’s reset is being broadly welcomed by businesses and is good news for UK consumers faced with the cost of living crisis. There is also hope for young people who want to live, work, study and form friendships freely across Europe. 

    “The Green Party would like to see an even closer relationship between the UK and EU starting with re-joining the customs union and full freedom of movement across the continent. But today’s agreement is definitely a step in the right direction and moves us forward from a place where Reform and the Tories would like us to stay stuck. Their Brexit betrayal rhetoric shows they are willing to disregard the damage inflicted on the country through Brexit and ignore the fact that the vast majority of the UK public now believe the UK was wrong to leave the EU.”  

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: EU deal still leaves Irish Sea border in place and NI captured by EU

    Source: Traditional Unionist Voice – Northern Ireland

    Statement by TUV leader Jim Allister:-

    “At one level the surrender of U.K. fishing waters for another 12 years to the EU is the most vivid illustration of the government’s agenda to sabotage Brexit.

    “The deal copper-fastens NI as EU territory. It is notable the SPS deal would be between EU and GB – simply because NI has already been captured by the EU.

    “As for seeking to mitigate some of the damage of surrendering sovereignty over NI in the Protocol by doing the same for GB, in terms of being a supplicant rule-taker from Brussels, this too is edging the whole UK back into the EU’s orbit of control.

    “But in regard to the spin of diminishing the Irish Sea border, the key points are these:-

    NI remains wholly subject to the EU Customs Code; there is no diminution of the customs border and its intrusive and expensive paperwork.
    Indeed, EU Regulation 2017/615, which treats NI as EU territory and GB as foreign/third country, seems unaffected, meaning EU tariffs and checks still apply – in fact the government continues to spend £190m building border posts at our ports. Without removal of NI from the ambit of EU 2017/625, the Irish Sea border stays!
    The recently imposed and trade-stifling parcel border remains.
    The transfer of non-food goods from GB to NI is wholly untouched by the deal.

    “The promise of Brexit was ‘taking back control’; today was about giving back control in GB to Brussels, and paying for the privilege!”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM secures new agreement with EU to benefit British people

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    PM secures new agreement with EU to benefit British people

    UK secures new agreement with the European Union to support British businesses, back British jobs, and put more money in people’s pockets.

    • UK secures new agreement with the European Union to support British businesses, back British jobs, and put more money in people’s pockets.
    • Package will help make food cheaper, slash red tape, open up access to the EU market and add nearly £9 billion to the UK economy by 2040.
    • Prime Minister hails agreement as ‘good for jobs, good for bills, and good for our borders’.

    The Prime Minister has today confirmed a new agreement with the European Union which will deliver on his core mission to grow the economy, back British jobs and put more money in people’s pockets.

    Extensive negotiations over the last six months have led to the third major deal struck by the government in as many weeks, following the US and India – which the Prime Minister says will be “good for jobs, good for bills and good for our borders”.

    As part of the deal, a new SPS agreement will make it easier for food and drink to be imported and exported by reducing the red tape that placed burdens on businesses and led to lengthy lorry queues at the border. This agreement will have no time limit, giving vital certainty to businesses.

    Some routine checks on animal and plant products will be removed completely, allowing goods to flow freely again, including between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Ultimately this could lower food prices and increase choice on supermarket shelves – meaning more money in people’s pockets. 

    The EU is the UK’s largest trading partner. After the 21% drop in exports and 7% drop in imports seen since Brexit, the UK will also be able to sell various products, such as burgers and sausages, back into the EU again, supporting these vital British industries.

    Closer co-operation on emissions through linking our respective Emissions Trading Systems will improve the UK’s energy security and avoid businesses being hit by the EU’s carbon tax due to come in next year – which would have sent £800 million directly to the EU’s budget.

    Combined, the SPS and Emissions Trading Systems linking measures alone are set to add nearly £9 billion to the UK economy by 2040, in a huge boost for growth.

    British steel exports are protected from new EU rules and restrictive tariffs, through a bespoke arrangement for the UK that will save UK steel £25 million per year.  

    The UK will enter talks about access to EU facial images data for the first time, on top of the existing arrangements for DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data. This will enhance our ability to catch dangerous criminals and ensure they face justice more quickly. 

    British holidaymakers will be able to use more eGates in Europe, ending the dreaded queues at border control. Pets will also be able to travel more easily, with the introduction of ‘pet passports’ for UK cats and dogs – eliminating the need for animal health certificates for every trip.

    Prime Minister Keir Starmer will say:

    It’s time to look forward. To move on from the stale old debates and political fights to find common sense, practical solutions which get the best for the British people.

    We’re ready to work with partners if it means we can improve people’s lives here at home.

    So that’s what this deal is all about – facing out into the world once again, in the great tradition of this nation. Building the relationships we choose, with the partners we choose, and closing deals in the national interest. Because that is what independent, sovereign nations do.

    Today will also see the agreement of the new Security and Defence Partnership, which will pave the way for the UK defence industry to participate in the EU’s proposed new £150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence fund – supporting thousands of British jobs and boosting growth.

    At a time of increasing global uncertainty and volatility, this will formalise UK-EU co-operation on defence to ensure Europe’s safety and security.

    Minister for European Union Relations and lead Government negotiator, Nick Thomas-Symonds said:

    Today is a historic day, marking the opening of a new chapter in our relationship with the EU that delivers for working people across the UK.

    Since the start of these negotiations, we have worked for a deal to make the British people safer, more secure and more prosperous. Our new UK-EU Strategic Partnership achieves all three objectives. It delivers on jobs, bills and borders. Today is a day of delivery. Britain is back on the world stage with a Government in the service of working people.

    The UK and the EU have also agreed to co-operate further on a youth experience scheme – which could see young people able to work and travel freely in Europe again. The scheme, which would be capped and time-limited, would mirror existing schemes the UK has with countries such as Australia and New Zealand.

    The Prime Minister is clear that bringing down migration remains an absolute priority for him, which is why today’s agreement also majors on further work on finding solutions to tackle illegal migration – including on returns and a joint commitment to tackle channel crossings.

    The UK and EU have also reached a new twelve year agreement that protects Britain’s fishing access, fishing rights and fishing areas with no increase in the amount of fish EU vessels can catch in British waters, providing stability and certainty for the sector. The UK will also back coastal communities by investing £360 million into our fishing industry to go towards new technology and equipment to modernise the fleet, training to help upskill the workforce, and funding to help revitalise coastal communities, support tourism and boost seafood exports. The British fleet will also benefit from the SPS agreement which slashes costs and red tape to help exports.

    This agreement meets the red lines set out in the government’s manifesto – no return to the single market, no return to the customs union, and no return to freedom of movement.

    The UK will continue to hold talks with the European Union on the details of each commitment.

    Updates to this page

    Published 19 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: First Minister urges Prime Minister to drop EU red lines

    Source: Scottish Government

    Scotland’s interests cannot be an afterthought in negotiations.

    First Minister John Swinney has urged the UK Government to reflect Scotland’s interests by dropping its EU red lines on the single market, customs union and freedom of movement.

    Ahead of tomorrow’s summit between the UK and EU, the First Minister has reiterated his calls for the closest possible co-operation with Europe and said the best future for Scotland is as an independent nation within the European Union.

    The Scottish Government has previously called for the UK Government to negotiate with the EU on a number of key areas including removing barriers to food and drink exports, closer energy and climate co-operation, a youth mobility agreement, and rejoining the Erasmus+ and Creative Europe programmes.

    The First Minister said:

    “Scotland’s best future lies as an independent country within the European Union. More than ever, the current uncertain economic and geopolitical environment reinforces the importance of Scotland having the security, stability and opportunity that comes with EU membership. 

    “Right now, the Prime Minister must negotiate the closest possible working relationship with the EU, in the interests of people and businesses across Scotland. To do that he must drop his ideological red lines on the single market, customs union and freedom of movement. This would remove significant trade barriers and red tape for Scottish businesses and give a much-needed boost to the Scottish economy which is still being badly impacted by Brexit.

    “If the UK Government wants to get serious about economic growth, it should recognise that the EU is one of our most important economic and security partners. At the very least we need to see a reduction in red tape for our food and drink exports, closer co-operation on energy and climate issues and greater freedom of movement for our young people. These areas and others can bring benefits both for us and our European partners.

    “The Scottish Government stands ready to work with the UK and the EU towards stability and progress but the UK Government must reflect the interests of Scotland in the upcoming talks. Given the appalling economic, social and cultural damage of Brexit, Scotland cannot be treated as an afterthought by the UK Government in these discussions.”

    Background

    The Scottish Government has published papers on some of our key priorities for closer cooperation:

    The Scottish Government has also published a number of reports on the impact of Brexit on Scotland and Scotland’s economy, including:

    In 2023, the Scottish Government published a paper setting out the Scottish Government’s vision for an independent Scotland in the EU:

    Building a New Scotland: an independent Scotland in the EU – gov.scot

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Oral question – The United Kingdom’s accession to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters – O-000016/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for oral answer  O-000016/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 142
    Ilhan Kyuchyuk
    on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs

    On 27 June 2024, the United Kingdom signed and ratified the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Judgments Convention), which has also been signed by Uruguay, Israel, Costa Rica, Russia, the United States and Ukraine. The Judgments Convention entered into force on 1 September 2023, one year after the first two parties deposited their instruments of ratification/accession. In accordance with Article 29(2) of the Judgments Convention, the EU can notify the depositary, before 27 June 2025, that ratification by the UK does not have the effect of establishing treaty relations between the UK and the EU. If no such notification is issued – that is, if the EU tacitly accepts the UK’s accession – the Judgments Convention will begin to apply between the two parties on 1 July 2025.

    Parliament understands that the Commission’s assessment of the UK’s accession is positive and that the Commission would be in favour of tacitly accepting it. However, the significance of private international law rules[1] for EU citizens in this particular area also has a political and legal impact, not only on the area of judicial cooperation but also beyond, bearing in mind the relevance of relations between the EU and the UK in a volatile international context.

    With respect for each EU institution’s prerogatives and Parliament’s consistent position[2], a statement would allow the Commission to tacitly accept the UK’s accession to the Judgments Convention on the EU’s behalf, under the relevant provisions of that Convention.

    • 1.Given the deadline set down in the Judgments Convention, the need for the EU institutions to act without delay to ascertain the EU’s acceptance of the UK’s accession to the Convention, and Parliament’s intention to make an appropriate statement in this regard, could the Commission confirm its assessment of the UK’s accession to the Convention?
    • 2.Having regard to the commitments made in November 2024[3] by Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič with regard to third countries’ accession to conventions and respect for Article 218(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, what concrete steps does the Commission intend to take in future to ensure that Parliament’s prerogatives relating to third countries’ accession to the Judgments Convention are always fully and formally respected under the Treaties, and what timetable does it envisage for taking these steps?

    Submitted: 13.5.2025

    Lapses: 14.8.2025

    • [1] Study requested by Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs – ‘Ensuring Efficient Cooperation with the UK in civil law matters – Situation after Brexit and Options for Future Cooperation’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, March 2023: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/743340/IPOL_STU(2023)743340_EN.pdf.
    • [2] European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2023 on supporting the accession of Ukraine to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (OJ C, C/2024/489, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/489/oj).
    • [3] https://hearings.elections.europa.eu/documents/sefcovic/sefcovic_writtenquestionsandanswers_en.pdf.
    Last updated: 16 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement – Committee on Culture and Education

    Source: European Parliament

    FISC Mission to London (UK) – 19 to 20 June 2023 © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

    On 20 May The CULT Committee will consider the draft opinion by Ms. Laurence Farreng, which looks at the impact of Brexit in education, youth, culture and media services and possible improvements. This will be followed by an exchange of views with experts from the European Commission and the UK delegation of the European External Action Service. The discussion will provide updates on the EU-UK summit held on 19 May and implications in the CULT remit.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Spain’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 15-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Spain’s national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) is the second largest (in absolute figures) financed by the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument and its main spending tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Following the October 2023 amendment of the Spanish NRRP, adding a REPowerEU chapter, the plan’s value reached €163 billion (or 13.1 % of national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019), an increase of roughly 135 % compared with the original plan of 2021 (€69.5 billion in grants only). The amended plan comes with an increased grant allocation of €79.8 billion and a freshly requested loan allocation of €83.2 billion. The grant part includes the June 2022 upward revision of Spain’s grant allocation of €7.7 billion and the country’s REPowerEU grant allocation of €2.6 billion. In addition, Spain has requested a transfer of its share from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve of €58 million to its NRRP. So far, €48.3 billion of RRF resources (29.6 % of the amended NRRP) have been received. These have been disbursed by the European Commission in form of pre-financing and four grant instalments. The amended plan focuses on the green transition, devoting almost 40 % of the resources to it, and fosters the digital transformation by committing 25.9 % of the funds (excluding REPowerEU) to digital projects. In the context of the European Semester, the Commission assessed the plan’s implementation as ‘under way’, yet warned about emerging delays hindering effective and swift implementation. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on its implementation and scrutinises the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Sixth edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Secretary of State visit highlights NI company’s major growth under Windsor Framework

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Secretary of State visit highlights NI company’s major growth under Windsor Framework

    Secretary of State for Northern Ireland visits food distribution company, PRM, as figures from the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency show the Northern Ireland economy grew faster than the UK as a whole in the final quarter of 2024.

    Secretary of State Hilary Benn with CEO and Founder of PRM Group Philip Morrow and Company Director Lynne Morrow.

    The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland today [Wednesday 14 May] visited PRM, a leading food distribution company based in Lisburn. While there, he learned more about the significant growth the company has seen from having the benefit of dual market access provided under the Windsor Framework. This status, unique only to Northern Ireland, allows the free movement of goods between Northern Ireland and Great Britain and the EU.

    PRM has said that dual market access to both the UK and EU is a major factor behind its growth strategy, which over the past year has enabled it to commit to a £15m investment in its Lisburn headquarters paired with the creation of 40 additional jobs. 

    The NI Composite Economic Index (NICEI) from the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) shows that in each of the five sectors it tracks, Northern Ireland grew in output between October and December 2024. Output rose by 0.9% in Q4, contributing to a yearly growth in output of 3.6% across NI. Whilst for the UK overall, Q4 growth was 0.1% and yearly growth was 1.4%.

    Today’s visit follows the Prime Minister’s recent announcement of two new trade deals with the US and India. Both deals will open up new export opportunities for businesses across Northern Ireland, providing them with full market access to two of the world’s largest economies and enabling them to grow further and thrive. Sectors said to benefit the most from these trade deals include agricultural food products, biotechnology manufacturing and whiskey.

    Speaking after his visit, the Secretary of State, Hilary Benn, said: 

    “PRM’s expansion is a great example of how dual market access is helping Northern Ireland’s businesses to expand and create more jobs.

    “With full access to both the UK and EU markets, and now new trade opportunities with the US and India, Northern Ireland  is uniquely placed for success. 

    “These are tangible  benefits that are strengthening Northern Ireland’s economy and creating prosperity.” 

    Philip Morrow, CEO and Founder of PRM Group, said:

    “While Brexit brought with it understandable apprehension, there’s no doubt that the Windsor Framework has unlocked unique advantages for businesses and individuals in Northern Ireland. 

    “We have found ourselves in a very favourable position perfectly positioned between the UK and EU with full access to both markets. That’s an enviable place to be, and it’s been instrumental in shaping our investment decisions and future growth. 

    “At PRM, it’s allowed us to commit £15 million to expanding our Lisburn headquarters and create over 40 new jobs. Businesses here have been handed the key to the best of both worlds and that’s something we should champion, celebrate and capitalise on.”

    Our Plan for Change sets out a bold vision for Northern Ireland’s economic future – to go further and faster in driving growth, attracting investment, and putting more money in the pockets of working people. Expanding international trade, cutting red tape and supporting innovation are key pillars to this plan. 

    The government continues to operate the Duty Reimbursement Scheme, allowing companies to claim back any additional duties paid on goods deemed “at risk” of entering the EU, ensuring fairness and competitiveness.

    Updates to this page

    Published 15 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Assisted dying bill: religious MPs were more likely to oppose law change in first round of voting

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By David Jeffery, Senior Lecturer in British Politics, University of Liverpool

    MPs are due to vote for a second time on the terminally ill adults (end of life) bill in parliament – a law that would legalise assisted suicide in England and Wales.

    The third reading stage will take place after a debate on Friday May 16 and would test MPs’ commitment to a change they initially supported at second reading in November 2024. In this first vote, the bill passed with 331 votes to 276 (with 35 abstentions), but in subsequent stages, the process has been more controversial. Emotions are running high and pressure groups have been vocal on both sides.

    As with many issues of morality, this is a free vote – MPs are not told what to do by their party. And after the second reading in November, MPs could, and did, give a range of reasons for how they voted, including their own experiences of loved ones’ final days, discussions with constituents, the experiences of other countries with assisted suicide – and also their religious views.

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    In that first vote, there were clear patterns in voting relating to religious affiliation. MPs with no religion were much more likely to support assisted dying.

    In this group, 76% voted for, while just 18% voted against. Christian MPs overall were more likely to oppose the bill, with 57% voting against with the most pronounced opposition coming from Catholics, who were 74% opposed.

    Muslim MPs were even more likely to vote against, with 84% of them on the no side. Jewish and Sikh MPs were both roughly twice as likely to support the bill as to oppose it, whereas Hindu MPs were more likely to oppose than support by the same margin. The one Buddhist MP – Suella Braverman – voted against.

    Beyond their own demographic, political or religious position, the views of their constituents are also expected to influence how MPs vote. To explore this, I conducted a regression analysis (a statistical method to find a relationship between factors) that included a range of constituency variables, such as the proportion of white residents and the percentage of each religious group (along with those identifying as non-religious).

    I also considered the percentage of constituents with no formal qualifications, graduates, and those reporting some form of disability. In the full model, which incorporated all these variables, none of the religious variables were found to be statistically significant, suggesting that localised religious lobbying did not have a measurable effect on MPs’ voting behaviour.

    However, an interesting finding is that MPs with a higher proportion of disabled people in their constituency were more likely to vote for assisted dying. It is not clear if this relationship is causal, suggesting they had been lobbied by their constituents to support the bill, or a correlation between disabled people being more likely to live in Labour constituencies.

    How MPs voted on assisted dying, November 2024

    Characteristic Overall Yes No Abstain
    Total 642 331 (52%) 276 (43%) 35 (5%)
    Female 261 143 (55%) 107 (41%) 11 (4.2%)
    Ethnic MP 90 30 (33%) 57 (63%) 3 (3.3%)
    LGBT 71 49 (69%) 18 (25%) 4 (5.6%)
    Elected As
    Labour 411 236 (57%) 155 (38%) 20 (4.9%)
    Conservative 121 23 (19%) 93 (77%) 5 (4.1%)
    Liberal Democrat 72 61 (85%) 11 (15%) 0 (0%)
    Scottish National Party 9 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 9 (100%)
    Independent 6 0 (0%) 6 (100%) 0 (0%)
    Democratic Unionist Party 5 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 0 (0%)
    Reform UK 5 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%)
    Green Party 4 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
    Plaid Cymru 4 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%)
    Social Democratic & Labour Party 2 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%)
    Alliance 1 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
    Traditional Unionist Voice 1 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
    Ulster Unionist Party 1 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
    MP Religion
    None 234 179 (76%) 43 (18%) 12 (5.1%)
    Christian (all) 351 132 (38%) 199 (57%) 20 (5.7%)
    Catholic 35 7 (20%) 26 (74%) 2 (5.7%)
    Muslim 25 2 (8.0%) 21 (84%) 2 (8.0%)
    Jewish 13 8 (62%) 4 (31%) 1 (7.7%)
    Sikh 12 8 (67%) 4 (33%) 0 (0%)
    Hindu 6 2 (33%) 4 (67%) 0 (0%)
    Buddhist 1 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%)

    Note: the vote tallies differ from that given by the parliament website because I have included tellers for both sides, and correctly assigned MPs who voted in both lobbies as abstentions.

    In the first vote, female MPs were slightly more likely to vote for assisted dying than against it. LGBT MPs leaned heavily towards support (with 69% voting in favour of the law change). And minority ethnic MPs leaned heavily in the opposite directions – with 63% voting against.

    Perhaps predictably, given the prime minister’s open support for assisted dying, Labour MPs supported the bill, with 57% voting in favour and 38% against.

    The Liberal Democrats were overwhelmingly supportive – 85% backed it – whereas 77% of Conservative MPs voted against. All Northern Irish unionist parties – as well as the independent unionist MP – voted against the bill, with no abstentions.

    Reform UK MPs were split, with two against and three in favour (albeit one of the three, the now-suspended Rupert Lowe, only after a survey of his own constituents).

    But there is an interesting story unfolding on the left of politics. The 2024 general election saw challenges to Labour from both the Green Party and so-called Gaza independents. In this free vote, we see the contrasting social views between these two groups play out.

    All Green MPs supported assisted dying, while all Gaza independents – and Jeremy Corbyn – opposed it. This divide echoes Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford’s framework in Brexitland, which distinguishes between “conviction identity liberals” and “ethnic minority ‘necessity liberals’”.

    The latter group aligns with conviction liberals on issues of discrimination due to self-interest, but often diverges on broader socially liberal issues such as assisted dying. Issues like assisted dying lay bare the tensions within this coalition.

    Identifying religion in parliament

    Religion is a personal matter so there is no official database that records the religious affiliation of MPs. It is therefore often impossible to test how religious views interact with voting behaviour. To address this gap, I built a dataset using a three-step methodology to determine MPs’ religious affiliation.

    Among MPs (excluding the Speaker and Sinn Fein MPs, who don’t take their seats), 54.7% (351) are Christian, including 5.5% (35) who are Catholic; 36.4% (234) have no religion; 3.9% (25) are Muslim; 2% (13) are Jewish; 1.9% (12) are Sikh; 0.9% (6) are Hindu; and 0.2% (1) is Buddhist.

    To work this out, I look first to see if an MP is a member of a religiously based group, such as Christians in Parliament. They are classified as belonging to that religion. Second, if an MP has publicly stated their religious beliefs – say, in a speech or interview – they are also classified accordingly.

    Labour MP John Healey is sworn in with a bible.
    Flickr/UK Parliament, CC BY-NC-ND

    These first two steps, however, cover only a fraction of MPs. Fortunately, all MPs are required to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown when sworn in. This oath can be made on a religious text or as a non-religious affirmation, and crucially MPs can choose which text to swear on, making this decision a meaningful and publicly visible indication of belief.

    That brings us to step three: the religious text (or lack thereof) used in the swearing-in ceremony is taken as an additional source of evidence for classification.

    These three sources are used in order of priority. For example, Tim Farron is a member of Christians in Parliament and has spoken openly about his faith, yet he chose to affirm without using a religious text. Even so, he is classified as Christian based on the first two criteria.

    What has been particularly interesting in this case has been the different voting patterns between Christian groups. I was able to set these groups apart because when MPs swear in, Catholics usually request specific versions of the Bible – such as the New Jerusalem Bible – whereas others might simply ask for “the Bible” and are given the King James Version.

    Treating Catholics as a distinct category allows for greater nuance in the analysis of the religious composition of parliament. A full breakdown of the religion of MPs, and the data used for this project, can be found here.

    We’ll soon be able to see how these markers interact with voting in the third reading.

    David Jeffery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Assisted dying bill: religious MPs were more likely to oppose law change in first round of voting – https://theconversation.com/assisted-dying-bill-religious-mps-were-more-likely-to-oppose-law-change-in-first-round-of-voting-256503

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to media reports that a ‘reset’ with the EU could require the precision breeding act to be dropped from UK legislation

    Source: United Kingdom – Science Media Centre

    Scientists comment on reports of an EU ‘reset’ which could mean the precision breeding act is dropped from UK legislation. 

    Dr Penny Hundleby, Senior Scientist at the John Innes Centre, said:

    “As a scientist with over thirty years in genetic technologies, I’ve seen how innovation can transform agriculture. The UK now has a rare opportunity to lead globally in precision breeding — with the legislation passed and the science ready.

    “To delay this progress in order to align with slower EU processes would undermine our ability to deliver resilient, sustainable crops at a time when food security and climate resilience are more urgent than ever. We risk forfeiting a clear post-Brexit advantage grounded in science, safety, and evidence.”

    Prof Huw Jones, Chair in Translational Genomics for Plant Breeding, Aberystwyth University, said:

    “Closer ties with the EU are a good thing but let’s not lose the logical regulatory progress we have made this side of the Channel. Simple gene editing is a speedier and more reliable breeding method to develop the crops we need in a changing world. It’s illogical to regulate these crops as GMOs and it is the EU that has been slow to follow the broad consensus on this. If there are no foreign genes, and the changes could have been generated by conventional breeding, they need regulation – but not as GMOs.”

     

    Prof Neil Hall, Director of the Earlham Institute, said:

    “Given the pressures on global food security, driven by climate change, the growing population and new diseases, it’s important that we harness all of the technical innovations at our disposal to ensure the sustainability of our agricultural systems. 

    “Over the past three years, including these last few months, Parliament has demonstrated important and legitimate leadership by passing the primary and secondary legislation to enable precision breeding in plants. It’s time to enable science research to help farmers adapt to our changing world.”

     

    Prof Jonathan Jones FRS, Group Leader at The Sainsbury Laboratory, said:

    “The Precision Breeding Act (PBA) provides an opportunity to protect our crops from pests and disease with biology rather than chemistry, and also enables new routes to more nutritious food, and I applaud this government and its predecessor for taking the legislation through to final approval and implementation.  It is to my mind the sole Brexit dividend. 

    “However, it takes a long time between producing an improved plant in a lab and creating and obtaining approval for a variety that farmers can plant.  I think it’s highly likely that by the time any precision bred varieties in the UK are ready to plant (likely at least 5 years from now) the EU will have approved its own version of the PBA.

    “So, the government should stick to its guns on the PBA but quietly point out to the EU that, although there are no scientifically credible safety concerns with using these methods, the timelines in this industry are such that it will be a long time before any products are authorized in the UK and thus before any potential problems might arise.”

     

    Prof Sarah Gurr, Chair in Food Security at Exeter University, said:

    “It is sad to realise that whilst we  embraced the need for GM vaccines during the recent COVID epidemic and we seem reticent to embrace gene edited crops. The need for climate proofed and disease resilient gene edited crops is paramount in our quest for sustainable agriculture.”

     

     

     

    https://www.thetimes.com/article/08fe3606-e6ab-4a66-bb31-017165028f08

    https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14710677/Concessions-Starmer-Brexit-reset-EU-demands-UK-abandons-GM-crops.html

     

     

     

    Declared interests

    Jonathan Jones “is a senior investigator at The Sainsbury Laboratory in Norwich, and uses molecular and genetic approaches to study disease resistance in plants. Jones co-founded Norfolk Plant Sciences in 2007 with Prof Cathie Martin of JIC, with the goal of bringing flavonoid-enriched tomatoes to market (www.norfolkplantsciences.com). Jones is on the board of www.isaaa.org, the science advisory board of the 2Blades foundation (www.2blades.org) and the board of NIAB Cambridge University Farm. Jones has isolated and is deploying new resistance genes against potato late blight from wild relatives of potato, and conducting field trials to evaluate how well they work to protect the crop in the field and to generate improved varieties of potato (see http://www.tsl.ac.uk/news/blight-resistant-maris-piper/). See also http://www.tsl.ac.uk/groups/jones-group/.”

    Penny Hundleby “is part of the Crop Transformation Group at the John Innes Centre and using genetic technologies to better understand the role of plant genes. The group provides gene editing resources to the UK and international research community and have been working with gene editing technologies in crops since 2014.”

    Huw Jones: “I am speaking as a researcher at Aberystwyth University and not representing other organisations that I am affiliated with.  I am a member of the FSA ACNFP and Defra ACRE. My declarations of interest are listed on the websites of those Depts.”

    For all other experts, no reply to our request for DOIs was received.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK-EU summit ‘should be the start, and not the end of strengthening ties with Europe’ – Plaid Cymru

    Source: Party of Wales

    Rejoining the Single Market and Customs Union in Wales’ economic interests –  Llinos Medi MP

    Plaid Cymru’s Business and Trade Spokesperson, Llinos Medi MP has urged the UK Government to “take action” to fix the UK’s damaged relationship with Europe.

     

    Ahead of next week’s EU-UK summit, the MP for Ynys Môn said that the people of Wales have been “let down” by those who promised that Brexit would lead to a brighter future and has instead caused “huge damage” to the communities and economy of Wales.

     

    By 2025, Brexit has cost the Welsh economy up to £4 billion and has reduced the value of Welsh exports by up to £1.1 billion.

     

    In a speech in the House of Commons on Tuesday 13 May, Ms Medi called on the UK Government to establish a Youth Mobility Scheme and join Erasmus+ to allow young people to study and work abroad.

     

    Llinos Medi MP also said that the UK should commit to the long-term goal of joining the Single Market and Customs Union, claiming that it would help the UK Government achieve its mission of growing the economy.

     

     

    Speaking in the House of Commons, Llinos Medi MP said:

    “The hard Brexit pursued by the previous UK Government has cost the Welsh economy up to £4 billion; it has reduced the value of Welsh exports by up to £1.1 billion, and post-Brexit trade deals such as with New Zealand and Australia have been unfavourable for Welsh agriculture and manufacturing.

    “Since Brexit, Wales has lost out on £1 billion in European structural and rural development funding which could have been used to support our deprived communities. 

    “This was despite the promise made by the then Conservative UK Government in 2019 to “at a minimum match the size” of former EU funding in Wales and the other nations of the UK.”

     

     

    Llinos Medi MP continued:

    “The Government should create Youth Mobility Scheme and join Erasmus+ so that our young people can study and work abroad, creating new skills and opportunities for the next generation. We also need to see cooperation on the environment, the arts and on defence.

    “I hope next week’s summit will be the start, and not the end of strengthening our ties to Europe. Any plan needs clear aims and goals – Plaid Cymru believes the goal should be to eventually join the Single Market and Customs Union.

    “This Government has said its first mission is to grow the economy. I can see no better opportunity to improve growth by committing the UK and Wales to the long-term goal of joining the Single Market and Customs Union.

    “Wales has suffered badly by those who championed the false promises of Brexit, this Government must now take action to fix our damaged relationship with Europe to protect the Welsh economy.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Metsola calls to “re-launch Europe as a global power”

    Source: European Parliament

    In a keynote speech at the event “Europe at the crossroads” on Tuesday, Parliament President Metsola outlined her vision for a smarter, stronger and safer Europe.

    The President argued that “the time of hypothetical crossroads is over. There is only one path left: forward and together”. She called for a different Europe, which is more realistic, more self-critical and supportive of its industries, with less regulation and more innovation. A Europe wary of populists and more in tune with what citizens expect. She made the case for a change in mind-set and a shift in priorities. President Metsola called on the European Union and the European Parliament to do things differently and to work faster, with confidence, as well as be braver in its decisions.

    A manifesto for change

    She cautioned that after the last European elections, “the political centre may well have held – just – but in an era of hyper-polarisation, ignoring the clanging alarm bells that went off would be foolhardy. “

    “We need the resolve – the political courage – to show that we are still a continent on the rise. To prove we are open for business. For ideas. For new ways to tackle old problems. That’s how we defy the cynics and defeat those determined to see Europe fail.”

    A smarter Europe

    “A smarter Europe is one that recognises that our way of individual freedoms and social safety nets depends on our competitiveness. One where it is possible to turn an idea into a business, to find investment, to fail and to begin again, and again. Where start-ups can scale up easily. Where bureaucracy is cut drastically – even in small things like ensuring road safety without over complicating peoples’ lives.”

    She pleaded for Europe to rise “to rise to the hype and ensure that we allow our businesses, our researchers, our engineers, our coders and our patent-holders, the space they need to compete, to innovate and to lead.”

    On the need to simplify and cut back regulation, she said: “Europe’s simplification agenda needs to signal the start of a new Europe and with the upcoming MFF, trigger an economic boom.”

    President Metsola argued that this European Parliament is fundamentally different from the one of 2019: “We reformed, we move faster without reducing our scrutiny and legislative obligations. It is why MEPs question attempts to tone down the involvement of the European Parliament on critical, often divisive issues. Europe is nothing without its people. Using Treaty provisions like Article 122 is not Smarter Europe, but the opposite. We will always insist on strengthening of Parliament’s right of initiative.”

    A stronger Europe

    “A strong Europe is an outward looking Europe that can sense opportunities and chase them down”. Speaking specifically about trade with the US, Metsola said: “A comprehensive deal should be the end goal of negotiations with the United States. There is no greater alliance, no stronger ‘meeting of democratic minds’, in the history of the modern world that has shaped so many lives and created so much prosperity. We must keep building and reinforcing it, while remaining ready for any scenario”.

    “Adapting must mean that we are capable of not shying away from the benefits of forging a new, closer, relationship not only with the US but with Canada and with the United Kingdom. Yes, Brexit still means Brexit. Yes, the realities of geography are what they are. But extraordinary times call for extraordinary moments and we need to get out of our traditional comfort zones. Ensuring a strong strategic partnership with the United Kingdom will benefit us all and boost transatlantic cooperation.”

    A safer Europe

    Referring to defence, Metsola said: “Spending more on defence and security is the first step. But throwing money at the problem will not solve it alone. Bringing our defence industries together, is the smart move forward. Of course, that means finding synergies between national security policies but more importantly, it means resisting the temptation of short-term gains in favour of a long-term, strategic approach.”

    “Every Member State now understands that for Europe to control its own destiny it must be able to operate in a world that that is more dangerous and unstable than before. We need to be ready as we double down on our efforts for peace and on our continued support for Ukraine. It was the message symbolised so importantly by President Macron, Chancellor Merz, Prime Minister Tusk and Prime Minister Starmer’s Europe Day visit to Ukraine.”

    Ending with a positive outlook, the President argued that “Europe is still the greatest political project in history. It is still the best place in the world to live and start a family in. We have no short of capacity, talent, capital, people and innovators – to lead and renew.”

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Green Party Amendment Blasts £100bn Brexit Bill

    Source: Green Party of England and Wales

    / by Green Party

    Today, Green Party MPs tabled an amendment to the Conservative Party’s Opposition Day motion on the upcoming UK/EU summit. The Greens called on the government to confront the ongoing damage of Brexit and to use the summit on the 19th of May as a key step towards practical re-engagement with the EU.

    Ellie Chowns, Green MP for North Herefordshire, said:

    “Brexiteers promised freedom but delivered decline. Five years on, British families, farmers and firms are paying the price of isolation. At the summit next week, Ministers must choose progress over pride: we must work to re-join the Customs Union, restore the right to live, work and study across Europe, and rebuild the networks that keep Britain secure and prosperous.”

    Speaking in the Chamber, co-leader Carla Denyer MP said:

    “Given the dire economic impacts of Brexit, including […] the cost of leaving the EU amounting to £1 million an hour in 2022 according to ONS data, will he agree with me that it makes total economic sense for the UK and for the people within it to use next week’s summit to start discussions with the EU on what the process of re-joining might be?” 

    Key points of the Green amendment include that this House:

    • Regrets the £100 billion annual cost in lost output since leaving the EU and that 14% of UK businesses have been forced to stop trading with the EU entirely since Brexit.
    • Notes reduced food and agricultural exports have led to an annual loss of £2.8 billion and that food inflation would be 8% lower had we stayed in the EU.
    • Observes that the UK–US agreement fails to compensate for Brexit’s economic damage.
    • Notes a confident Britain must work closely with Europe to tackle shared challenges—from the climate crisis to the rise of the hard right.
    • Calls on the Government to use the upcoming UK/EU summit to negotiate re-entry to the Customs Union, restore free movement and youth mobility, and rejoin the Erasmus programme.
    • Further calls on the government to kick-start talks with the EU on what the formal process to re-join the EU would involve, recognising the consistent majority opinion of the public which reflects a wish to do so.*

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Closing off social care jobs to migrant workers will only harm a sector that’s already in crisis

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Majella Kilkey, Professor of Social Policy, University of Sheffield

    shurkin_son/Shutterstock

    One big talking point to emerge from the UK government’s recently announced plans to reform the immigration system was the proposal to end recruitment of social care workers from overseas. Anyone who has experienced the sector recently will know that it is hugely dependent on workers from abroad. So the move – laid out in a new white paper which went further than many expected – will have huge implications.

    For those international workers already sponsored to work in the sector, a transition period will allow them to extend their visa until 2028. Other overseas nationals already in the UK with the right to work will be able to switch to a job in social care.

    Critics have argued for overhauling the visa system that allows employers to recruit care workers from overseas amid evidence of widespread and systemic exploitation of workers. But the plan to completely axe the health and care visa, without any proposed alternative, was unexpected.

    In fact, a 2024 strategy for adult social care, published by industry body Skills for Care, acknowledged that international workers are “crucial” for the sector. It also recommended that the UK’s immigration policy recognise the sector’s need to recruit care workers from abroad.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    The government’s decision to make reducing net migration the central plank of its immigration policy explains its apparent disregard of the care sector’s recommendation. This is based on the belief, contradicted by research, that becoming even tougher on migration will fight off the electoral threat posed by the rightwing Reform party.

    In fact, the share of net migration taken up by the care worker visa has been falling. This is not least because of the previous government’s decision to ban those on the visa from bringing their dependants.

    Care work was categorised as “low-skilled” work by the previous Conservative government when it introduced its new global points-based immigration system in January 2021. This categorisation made the sector particularly vulnerable in the context of the white paper’s preference for migration into “higher-skilled” jobs because of its purported economic benefits.

    This approach privileges particular sectors over others, leaving the care sector facing huge labour gaps. Yet, in contrast to the white paper’s position, evidence shows that 54% of people in the UK favour making it easier for people to come to the UK to do care work, implying that the public recognise the value of this sector.

    In contrast, while only 27% favour making it easier for people to come to work in the financial sector, the white paper proposes to give preferential treatment to this sector.

    The government’s vision is that “British workers” will replace migrants in the care sector. The white paper, however, presents no evidence that migrant workers have been displacing “British workers” in the industry. Instead, it acknowledges that low rates of domestic recruitment and retention are “largely driven by historic levels of poor pay and poor terms and conditions”.

    This is a systemic issue. Despite care being crucial to human survival and society’s functioning, the work that it requires is either unpaid or hugely underpaid.

    Labour unions and research evidence highlight the the key barriers to recruitment and retention: low rates of pay in the sector, the prevalence of zero-hours contracts (21% in March 2024), the limited opportunities for training and career progression, as well as the low status of care work.

    The government has defended its white paper by pointing to its plans to address these recruitment and retention challenges, most notably through measures like the fair pay agreement, the employment rights bill and the care workforce pathway, which aim to improve pay and conditions in the sector. But Care England has said these initiatives are “years away from delivery” and underfunded.

    The proposed fair pay agreement, through which the government hopes to tackle the staffing crisis in social care, would give care workers stronger collective bargaining powers and provide stricter enforcement of agreements on pay, terms and conditions. The government’s impact assessment suggests, however, that the agreement will increase costs to councils, as well as those funding their own care. Higher costs to councils would need to be mitigated by increased investment from central government.

    Martin Green, chief executive of Care England, and Christina McAnea, general secretary of trade union Unison, have said that the white paper’s depiction of care work as “low-skilled” adds to its low social status. It also runs contrary to the professionalisation agenda set out in the government-endorsed care workforce pathway. And, of course, it undermines efforts to attract “British workers” into the sector.

    A crisis in staffing

    In the meantime, the latest data from industry body Skills for Care show that the sector has 131,000 vacancies in England alone. Its vacancy rate at 8.3% is higher than the 6.9% for the NHS, and significantly higher than the 2.8% for the economy as a whole.

    The same data source estimates that 540,000 new social care posts will be needed by 2040 to meet rising demand, as more people live longer with major illnesses and disabilities. Relatives are put under immense pressure to fill these care gaps, without the pay or resources to do so.

    Without the international care workers who have helped the social care sector keep its head above water since Brexit, the prospects look unimaginably bleak for the health and wellbeing of workers in the sector. And this is before we consider the impact on some of society’s most vulnerable people who need their care and support, as well as their families and kin.

    Majella Kilkey receives funding from UKRI-ESRC.

    Jayanthi T. Lingham receives funding from the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF).

    – ref. Closing off social care jobs to migrant workers will only harm a sector that’s already in crisis – https://theconversation.com/closing-off-social-care-jobs-to-migrant-workers-will-only-harm-a-sector-thats-already-in-crisis-256626

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Ninth report on economic and social cohesion – P10_TA(2025)0098 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    –  having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(1) (Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013(4),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund(5),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(6),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak(8),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency(9),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)(10),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE(12),

    –  having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

    –  having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

    –  having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

    –  having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024(13), and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report(15),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

    –  having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024(16),

    –  having regard to a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2025 on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU)(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

    –  having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 21 November 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A.  whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B.  whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4,4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1,3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU(26);

    C.  whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24,6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D.  whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions(27), to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E.  whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F.  whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G.  whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H.  whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I.  whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J.  whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K.  whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L.  whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M.  whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N.  whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O.  whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q.  whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R.  whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions(28), which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S.  whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021(29), meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1.  Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2.  Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3.  Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4.  Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5.  Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6.  Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7.  Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8.  Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria(30) such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9.  Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10.  Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12.  Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13.  Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14.  Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15.  Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16.  Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17.  Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18.  Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19.  Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20.  Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21.  Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid(31), through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22.  Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23.  Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24.  Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25.  Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26.  Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 60, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1058/oj.
    (3) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 94, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1059/oj.
    (4) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj.
    (5) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1056/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (7) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 5, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/460/oj.
    (8) OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/558/oj.
    (9) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/461/oj.
    (10) OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2221/oj.
    (11) OJ L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/562/oj.
    (12) OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 23, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2039/oj.
    (13) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, 2024.
    (14) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Forging a sustainable future together: Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe – Report of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy, February 2024.
    (15) OJ C, C/2024/4668, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4668/oj.
    (16) European Parliament: Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Streamlining EU Cohesion funds – addressing administrative burdens and redundancy, 2024.
    (17) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (18) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (19) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 26.
    (20) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 125.
    (21) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 18.
    (22) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 100.
    (23) OJ C, C/2024/4207, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4207/oj.
    (24) OJ C, C/2024/4225, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4225/oj.
    (25) OJ C, C/2024/6562, 12.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6562/oj.
    (26) European Commission, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op.cit.
    (27) European Commission: Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op. cit.
    (28) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and Directorate-General for Communication, Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU Regional Policy, Flash Eurobarometer 531, 2023.
    (29) Flash Eurobarometer 531, op. cit.
    (30) European Court of Auditors, Rapid case review – Allocation of Cohesion policy funding to Member States for 2021-2027, March 2019.
    (31) Commission communication of 29 April 2021 entitled ‘Guidelines on regional State aid’ (OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Keir Starmer’s immigration plans: research shows you don’t beat the far right by becoming them

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katy Brown, Research Fellow in Language and Social Justice, Manchester Metropolitan University

    Keir Starmer gives press conference on migration Flickr/Number 10, CC BY-NC-ND

    As British prime minister Keir Starmer vowed to “finally take back control of our borders” in a landmark speech on immigration on May 12, it felt a little like déjà vu.

    Some nine years earlier, we had heard those exact words repeated over and over in the build-up to the Brexit referendum from former prime minister Boris Johnson and the Leave campaign. It was a refrain also used by Nigel Farage and UKIP.

    Of course, this direct reference was the point. Starmer used it to claim that the Labour government’s white paper on immigration was finally going to deliver on what had been promised and desired for many years.

    In these opening lines, the tone was set. And as the speech went on, there were echoes of far-right language and ideas reverberating throughout. Starmer lamented the “squalid” state of contemporary politics, the “forces” pulling the country apart, and the previous government’s so-called “experiment in open borders”.

    This speech and the white paper that it unveiled are but the latest indication of the rightward direction of travel within UK politics, led by mainstream and far-right parties alike – as exemplified in recent months by the footage released of immigration raids and deportations.

    Some will argue this is Labour’s response to the rising threat of Reform UK, with results in the recent local elections seen as evidence of the far right’s growing popularity. So the story goes, Labour is proving that they can be tough on immigration, showing would-be Reform defectors that they can be trusted after all.

    This familiar narrative seems to follow a prevailing wisdom which is parroted in political, media and public debates – that appeasing the far right is the way to defeat it. Rather than beating the far right at their own game, however, research shows that these techniques simply legitimise their key talking points and further normalise exclusionary politics.

    Starmer’s speech is a case in point. In using “take back control” from the outset, there was no hiding the intended audience or message. Starmer claimed that this project would “close the book on a squalid chapter for our politics, our economy, and our country”, implying that excessive immigration has directly caused these problems and that stopping it solves them. This chimes with classic far-right narratives where migration is framed as the root of all societal ills.

    When these kinds of ideas are pushed by those in government, with great authority and influence, they are given greater credence and weight. A strikingly clear example of this came in the summer of 2024 when participants in racist riots waved posters containing the slogan “stop the boats” (a phrase popularised by the previous Tory government).

    Another component of the speech that was reminiscent of far-right tropes was the idea that increased immigration was a deliberate tactic by the previous government. Starmer suggested that the Conservatives were actively pursuing a “one-nation experiment in open borders” while deceiving the British public of their intentions.

    Far-right conspiracies are often premised on the idea that elites are deliberately encouraging mass immigration. It’s not hard to see how Starmer’s words could act as a dog whistle in this scenario.

    These claims are especially damaging when we think about the draconian measures introduced under former Conservative governments, such as the Rwanda policy. Labour is now indicating that these proposals didn’t go far enough.

    To justify bringing far stricter immigration rules, Starmer stated that “for the vast majority of people in this country, that is what they have long wanted to see”. As far-right parties so often do, Labour suggests that they are delivering on “people’s priorities”. Yet are they really a priority for people, or are we told that they are a priority which then makes them more of a priority?

    Research by Aurelien Mondon, senior lecturer in politics at the University of Bath, illustrates how people’s personal and national priorities differ dramatically. When people in the UK were asked to name the two most important issues facing them personally, immigration didn’t even make it into the top ten.

    However, when asked the same question about the issues facing their country, immigration topped the list. How can something that doesn’t affect you in your day-to-day life suddenly become a top priority for your country? We need to challenge the narrative that the government is simply acting on people’s wishes and acknowledge its own capacity to set the agenda.

    Other priorities

    Some will say that harsher anti-immigration policies are a necessary evil to defeat the far right. However, if people’s personal priorities are really the cost of living, housing and education, why is the government not focusing more of its energy on these things rather than scapegoating migrants?

    What’s more, research shows that even based on these terms, these strategies are ineffective and can actually boost the success of the far right electorally. After all, its ideas are being repeatedly normalised.

    In all this tactical talk, we lose sight of the fact that people are living the consequences of this rhetoric and policies right now. Rather than focus on Reform’s potential performance in a general election that is probably years away, we should recognise the immediate consequences of the rhetoric that has accompanied this white paper. Even if this did put a dent in Reform’s prospects, what is the meaning of defeating them if the policies they promote become part of the mainstream in the process?

    The bottom line is that you do not beat the far right by becoming them. It doesn’t work electorally or ideologically, and even if it did, minoritised communities suffer the consequences regardless. The far right is not some threat lying waiting in the future – its normalisation is happening now.

    Katy Brown has received funding from UK Research and Innovation and the Irish Research Council. She is affiliated with the Reactionary Politics Research Network and Manchester Centre for Research in Linguistics.

    – ref. Keir Starmer’s immigration plans: research shows you don’t beat the far right by becoming them – https://theconversation.com/keir-starmers-immigration-plans-research-shows-you-dont-beat-the-far-right-by-becoming-them-256499

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • Indian economy has potential to surpass China in near future: Jim Rogers

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    ndia is poised to become one of the most exciting investment destinations in the world and may even outperform China in the coming years, according to ace investor Jim Rogers.

    In an interaction with IANS, Rogers said, “I have been around the investment world for decades, and for the first time in my life, I see that the people in Delhi understand economics.”

    “India is rising again. I think the people in Delhi understand what needs to be done and are trying to do it. That would be wonderful for India and for the world. If India can actually open up and engage in trade with the whole world, you cannot believe how exciting the country’s future could be,” said the American investor and financial commentator.

    “I don’t have investments in India right now, but I really, really want to invest more in the fastest-growing economy,” he added. Rogers also noted that if the market declines and stays down for a while, “I want to put more money in India.”

    India is projected to become the world’s fourth-largest economy in 2025, with the country’s nominal GDP expected to rise to $4,187.017 billion—surpassing Japan’s GDP, which is pegged at $4,186.431 billion—according to the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook report.

    Commenting on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Rogers told IANS that increased free trade is beneficial for the world, and particularly for India.

    “It will be extremely exciting for the world, including foreign investors,” he said.

    India has signed 13 FTAs with its trading partners and is currently negotiating several more, including: the India-EU FTA, the India-Australia Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), the India-Peru Trade Agreement covering goods, services, and investment, the India-Sri Lanka Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA), and the India-Oman FTA.

    India and the United Kingdom have signed a landmark FTA that is significant not only in terms of scope—covering reductions across 90 per cent of tariff lines—but also in its symbolic value, marking a shift in post-globalisation economic strategy.

    According to an SBI report, the agreement signals a new global trade strategy for India, which includes reducing dependence on China, navigating U.S. tariffs, and recalibrating post-Brexit relations with Britain.

    Moreover, India has also initiated a review of its existing FTAs, including the India-South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA).

    IANS