Category: Brexit

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Support for EU farmers in accessing seed potatoes – E-001404/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001404/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Maria Walsh (PPE), Nina Carberry (PPE), Seán Kelly (PPE), Regina Doherty (PPE)

    The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union created many challenges for sectors involved in bilateral trade. Since Brexit, the Commission has made significant efforts to negotiate various bilateral agreements, including the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, to address these challenges and facilitate trade. However, one sector for which a solution has not been found is the trade in seed potatoes. Since 1 January 2021, the import of seed potatoes from the UK to Ireland and the rest of the EU has been prohibited, which has had a negative impact on European, and particularly Irish, potato production.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Assuming that the UK is unlikely to commit to dynamic alignment, how does the Commission intend to proceed in addressing this critical issue?
    • 2.Is there a possibility of finding a solution under the current Plant Health Regulation to reopen bilateral trade in seed potatoes?
    • 3.Given that the Commission conducted an audit in the UK at the end of 2024, what are the next steps envisaged in discussions with the UK authorities to find a compromise and reinstate bilateral trade in seed potatoes?

    Submitted: 7.4.2025

    Last updated: 14 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Are Britons really poorer than they were 20 years ago, or does it just feel that way?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Marcel Lukas, Senior Lecturer in Banking and Finance and Director of Executive Education, University of St Andrews

    pxl.store/Shutterstock

    Millions of UK households are facing what’s been dubbed “awful April” after rising council tax, water bills and broadband costs coincided with the new tax year. It could all start to hurt quite quickly. And it has led many people to ponder whether they’re genuinely worse off than previous generations – or simply experiencing a temporary pinch.

    Council tax has risen by an average of 5% across England (some rises in Scotland and Wales are even greater). Water bills are up by £10 per month on average, while many broadband and mobile providers have imposed rises several percentage points above the rate of inflation.

    This comes after years of economic volatility, from the 2008 financial crisis through Brexit, the COVID pandemic and the subsequent inflation surge.

    But beyond the immediate pain of these April increases, there’s a deeper question. Has there been a fundamental shift in British prosperity over the past two decades?

    Data from the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) reveals a complex picture around real household disposable income (RHDI). This is the amount of money from all income that households have available for spending or saving after taxes and benefits, adjusted for inflation. As such, it’s a reliable way to see how much money people have to spend right now, compared to previous years or decades.

    Between 2000 and 2008, RHDI grew steadily at approximately 3% per year. The financial crisis brought this growth to an abrupt halt, with the period between 2008 and 2023 characterised by unprecedented stagnation.

    While there have been periods of modest recovery in 2023 and 2024, the overall trajectory shows sustained minimal growth in disposable income ever since the 2008 financial crisis.

    When broken down by income groups, the data tell a more nuanced story. The bottom 20% of households have experienced virtually no growth in real disposable income since 2008, while the top 20% recovered more quickly after initial setbacks. Income inequality, which narrowed slightly during the early 2010s, has widened again in recent years.

    Underlying the income stagnation is Britain’s productivity problem. Labour productivity growth, which averaged around 2% annually in the five decades before 2008, has grown at less than 1% per year since. This has directly impacted wage growth.

    Several factors contribute to this productivity puzzle – under-investment in infrastructure and skills, a shift toward service-sector jobs with traditionally lower productivity growth, and economic uncertainty discouraging business investment.

    Housing – the great divider

    Perhaps the most significant factor in understanding why people might feel poorer is housing costs. The ratio of average house prices to average earnings has nearly doubled over the past 20 years. In 2002, a typical house cost around five times the average salary. But by 2023, this had risen to approximately nine times.

    For renters, the situation is also very challenging. Private rental costs increased faster than wages in the year to January 2025 in most regions, particularly in London. The proportion of income spent on rent increased from roughly 25% to more than 30%) for the average renter between 2022 and 2024.

    This housing cost burden creates a stark divide between generations. Those who bought property before the mid-2000s housing boom have generally seen their housing costs decline as a proportion of income as their mortgages were paid down. Meanwhile, younger generations face significantly higher barriers to home-ownership and higher ongoing costs.

    Housing costs are a big determiner of whether you feel wealthy in the UK.
    Alex Segre/Shutterstock

    Another important part of the overall picture is the consumer experience – and how the quality and variety of goods and services have changed. Technology has made many products more affordable and accessible. Smartphones, computers and TVs were significantly more expensive (or didn’t even exist in current forms) 20 years ago.

    But essential services such as childcare have seen costs rise faster than general inflation. The same is true for grocery costs, which have seen a substantial increase since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. This has created a confusing dual experience where discretionary purchases may feel more affordable while essential costs consume a greater proportion of income.

    So are Britons actually poorer? The facts suggest that while the average Briton isn’t necessarily worse off in absolute terms than 20 years ago, many are certainly no better off. This in itself is a stark contrast to the expectation of continual improvement that characterised previous generations.

    When accounting for housing costs, younger generations are demonstrably worse off than their predecessors at the same life stage. For many, the combination of stagnant incomes and rising costs for essentials has created a genuine decline in living standards and financial security.

    “Awful April” isn’t just a seasonal discomfort. It is a manifestation of long-term economic trends that have fundamentally altered Britain’s prosperity trajectory. The coming local and mayoral elections in England will no doubt see these issues take centre stage. There will likely be a thorny debate around the expectation that each generation should be better off than the last.

    Marcel Lukas receives funding from The British Academy.

    ref. Are Britons really poorer than they were 20 years ago, or does it just feel that way? – https://theconversation.com/are-britons-really-poorer-than-they-were-20-years-ago-or-does-it-just-feel-that-way-254097

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Preparing Scotland for the future

    Source: Scottish Government

    FM: Government fighting Scotland’s corner.

    First Minister John Swinney has announced he will bring forward the Scottish Government’s legislative programme to ensure the country is as prepared as possible to secure its future in the face of the uncertainty facing the global economy.

    Speaking during a press conference at Bute House, the First Minister announced the Programme for Government will be presented to the Scottish Parliament on Tuesday 6 May 2025.

    It will set out the actions the Scottish Government will take to ensure resilience and deliver on the four core priorities to eradicate child poverty, grow the economy, tackle the climate emergency and ensure high quality and sustainable public services.

    The First Minister also set out plans to immediately begin work with key partners in the business community and trade unions to map out the actions required in Scotland, and the UK as a whole, to respond to emerging economic challenges and ensure the needs of the devolved nations are at the heart of UK decision-making.

    First Minister John Swinney said:

    “I know that this is a time of great uncertainty for people, that many families and businesses are worried about what global events will mean for them.

    “We face yet another storm, after almost two decades of knocks and challenges – the financial crisis, austerity, Brexit, Covid, the energy price spike following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the subsequent inflation spike. Each has weakened us in some way, but none has defeated us.

    “The Programme for Government will be laser-focused on delivery. It will set out what I believe my government can and will deliver for the people of Scotland over the coming year.

    “The economic headwinds are blowing strong across the Atlantic and they demand a response that is both immediate and measured. My Programme for Government will set out what practical steps we will take to strengthen our response to those headwinds and ensure Scottish business and our economy is positioned well to create jobs and grow the economy.

    “I want to make sure the UK Government understands where we need them to do much more to protect Scotland’s economic interests. As a result, I will be bringing together our key partners in the business community and the trades union movement on Wednesday to map out the actions we can take, here in Scotland, and which can be complemented across the UK, to respond to the emerging economic realities. That work will influence my government’s approach, and I want it to shape the response at a UK level into the bargain.

    “A Scotland that is wealthier, fairer, more resilient – that is my ambition. I want people feeling more confident about the future and more secure in the midst of the uncertainties, because they have a government that is fighting Scotland’s corner.

    “A government that is bringing people together, so that our response to the challenges we face is rooted in a Scotland that is united, prepared and determined, a Scotland confident in its ability to, once again, weather the storm and come out of that storm a great deal stronger.”

    Background

    The first roundtable with the business community and trade unions to determine the actions required to ensure the resilience of Scotland’s economy will be held on Wednesday 16 April 2025.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Council receives analysis of Constitutional Change Engagement

    Source: Northern Ireland – City of Derry

    Council receives analysis of Constitutional Change Engagement

    14 April 2025

    Derry City and Strabane District Council has published a detailed independent analysis of the engagement that was carried out in 2023 relating to the issue of Constitutional Change and its implications for the Council area and the North West.

    The engagement was carried out following a notice of motion agreed by Council and members of the public, and other stakeholders were invited to inform themselves on the issue of constitutional change and give their views, experiences and research relating to Constitutional Change and the implications for the Derry and Strabane Council area.  The engagement process was carried out over a four-month period and the results of the findings have been collated and independently analysed by Professor Mark Slevin of Ulster University, and are now available for the public to read via the Council website at – Unity-Thematic_Analysis-(1-1-2025).pdf Unity-Thematic_Analysis-(1-1-2025).pdf

    A total of 242 responses were received as part of the public consultation exercise that were subsequently screened and categorised into subthemes with commentary used as supporting evidence to capture the diverse perspectives and to provide a comprehensive understanding of the overall exercise. The outcome of the analysis highlighted that while there is a wide range of perspectives on constitutional change, the majority of views expressed in the survey were positive.

    Professor Slevin in his report said:  “While most participants supported reunification as a means to promote equality, economic growth, and governance reform, other expressed concerns about economic stability, identity preservation and political instability.”

    Professor Slevin said the findings emphasised the need for careful planning, inclusive dialogue and a transparent process such as a Citizens Assembly, to accurately address the aspirations and fears of everyone. He said participants in the engagement exercise stressed the need for lessons to be learned from the Brexit process and for all voices and views to be heard. He said participants were of the view that “to create a fair and stable transition process, detailed planning, economic analysis and social inclusion needed to be prioritised.”

    The five themes identified in the analysis was – Support for Irish Unity; Economic and Infrastructural Development; Governance and Political Reform; Social Justice and Historical Grievances and Concerns and Opposition to Change.

    Under the first theme of Support for Irish Unity many participants expressed support for Irish unity referencing potential economic, social and cultural benefits with many viewing it as an opportunity to address inequalities that some have seen to be caused by partition. Some participants viewed it as an opportunity to restore Ireland’s position within the European union and to create new and effective governance structures, with some saying it was a pathway towards fairness, equality and sovereignty, whilst highlighting the need for inclusivity and democratic planning to ensure a successful transition process.

    The second theme of Economic and Infrastructural Development emerged as a very central theme in the engagement process with many participants arguing that Irish unity would go some way towards addressing economic deficiencies created by partition and the duplication of services and would improve current infrastructure and transport, attract international investment and streamline governance.

    Many of the participants in the engagement process expressed their dissatisfaction with the political structure under Stormont and Westminster and were of the view that a united Ireland would provide better governance, accountability and policy-making under the third theme of Governance and Political Reform while under the Social Justice and Historical Grievances theme, the need for social justice and for historical grievances to be acknowledged, was highlighted. Many respondents cited systematic inequalities in education, access to employment and healthcare, as well as a legacy of discrimination as issues that could be addressed as part of Constitutional Change.

    Under the theme of Concerns and Opposition to Change a few respondents expressed concerns about the impact on economic stability, identity preservation and political instability. Unionist perspectives were a recurring theme with some participants opposing change outright while others highlighting the need for inclusive planning and dialogue to address fears and opposition to any constitutional change.

    Professor Slevin in his conclusion of the analysis report cautioned on the limitations of the engagement exercise saying that the sampling of those taking part was opportunistic and self-selecting and for that reason the views expressed could not be generalised to the wider population. He said: “The nature of the issued being explored may have impacted on who chose to engage with the survey, and how they answered. The study was qualitative in nature, and this means that themes can be identified but their overall significance and importance cannot be assessed.”

    It was agreed at the March meeting of Full Council that the results of the Engagement would be made public for the public to access via the website at – https://www.derrystrabane.com/Constitutional-Change

    It was also agreed at the meeting that representative organisations would be invited to attend further meetings of the Unity Working Group, that was set up for elected members to discuss this issue, and that a third tranche of engagement with the community would be considered, subject to a further report with details and costings.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Patrick Harvie calls for Greens to provide hope in final conference as leader

    Source: Scottish Greens

    We must remain hopeful and keep making positive change happen.

    Scottish Green Co-Leader Patrick Harvie has delivered his final conference speech as party Co-Leader.

    Addressing a hall of members Mr Harvie called for his party to offer hope and challenge the hateful politics of the far right.

    Mr Harvie said: “Ours must be a movement that offers vision, ambition, and clarity; only if we do that will we deserve the trust of voters; and our message is even more urgent and important in these unsettling times.

    “Green politics could hardly be more of a contrast with the rise of dangerous forces in today’s political climate; the far right threat is very real, and too much of the political spectrum is still behaving as though it can be defeated by imitation.

    “They tried that with anti-immigrant and anti-asylum prejudice, making policy ever more hostile and brutal. It harmed people, and it also didn’t work.

    “They tried it with Brexit, parroting meaningless slogans like ‘make Brexit work’ even though they knew it never could. It harmed people, and it also didn’t work.

    “They are now doing the same thing with the so-called culture war agenda, with transphobia and the right wing’s attempt to redefine free speech. It’s harming people, and it also cannot work to defeat the far right – playing into their agenda will only ever give the far right more political space.

    “Their ideas can only be defeated by openly and consistently challenging them, not by imitating them.”

    In closing his speech, Mr Harvie said:

    “For much of our party’s early history, people voted Green as a protest. That’s not enough. It’s not enough to win the chance to make change happen. It should never be enough to satisfy us.

    “Green politics must be about making a difference in the real world, because the challenges, and crises, that we exist to face are far too urgent.

    “Not just during my time in a leadership role, but throughout the two and a half decades of the devolution era, that’s what we’ve built – the capacity and the credibility to make change happen.

    “It took hard work, by many people over many years, to build this party into a political force in Scotland that’s capable of making the country a better place, and that can now point to a track record of doing it instead of just talking about it.

    “So that’s still the task before us – to take Green politics forward, to achieve more positive change in people’s lives, and to live up to our values in the way we do our politics, because that’s the only way to truly deserve people‘s trust, not just for ourselves, but for democracy.

    “So as I close my last speech as Co-Leader, I look forward to our party having the debate we deserve, the debate we need, about how to build on the most impactful period in our party’s history, and go forward to achieve even more positive change for people and for planet.

    “Thank you once again for the opportunity to serve.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Patrick Harvie Spring Conference speech 2025

    Source: Scottish Greens

    Patrick Harvie gave his final conference speech as Co-Leader of the Scottish Greens, urging his party to present a bold and inspiring alternative to a broken status quo and the far right Reform party.

    Now as you know, I’ve given more than a few co-leader speeches at our conferences, and I can’t really begin today without recognising that I’m turning the page now, both for myself and for the party.

    I’m want to say how grateful I am to everyone who has offered kind words since I announced that I won’t be standing for re-election as Co-Leader.

    And I want to thank everybody who has given me the opportunity to serve the party as co-convenor and then as Co-Leader; and everyone I’ve worked with across the party over many years.

    And naturally, having made that decision, I’ve been reflecting on the journey we’ve all been on.

    I think back to the public perceptions, and the internal reality, of the party I joined in 2001.

    A party with just one MSP, no councillors, and a handful of members. A party so strapped for cash that it only narrowly escaped being bankrupted by a photocopier contract. A party with so little profile or recognition that when you said told people you were a member, people thought you meant Greenpeace.

    I think back also to my experience of becoming part of our new parliamentary group in 2003, when we suddenly jumped up from one seat to seven. It was an exciting time, of course, but we knew that to most voters, to most politics watchers and to most of the media, we were an unknown quantity at best. 

    The Daily Mail knew what to make of us. As the first MSP to be elected as an out candidate, when I started talking about equal marriage and civil partnership, they splashed a front page with the headline “Green threat to the family.”

    In the article that followed, they fretted “describing himself as bisexual, enjoying relationships with both men and women!”. I mean if they’d written “hoping for…” it would at least have been accurate.

    And not long after that I was dubbed the voice of the “irresponsible left led anti family anti-Christian gay whales against the bomb coalition.” Because they hadn’t thought of the word woke by then.

    But even beyond the odd worldview of the Mail, much of the media saw us as nothing more than a novelty act, something to do with the environment, something a bit eccentric, but nothing like a serious political force.

    We wanted to change that perception. And slowly and surely, by taking our jobs seriously, and taking parliament seriously, we started to make others take us seriously. We built credibility. But that early success didn’t have a strong foundation.

    Though our national membership was still measured in the hundreds, we had run a decent campaign, on half a shoestring, but in truth the electoral weather had been very kind to us. We did need to build that political credibility, but we hadn’t yet built the strong campaigning party in the country that we would need when we faced a tougher election. 

    In 2007 we just about held on by our fingernails. We lost most of our seats, most of our staff, most of our profile, and most of our ability to achieve change.

    I never want that to happen to the Scottish Green Party again.

    We began the slow process of rebuilding the party, and because Parliament was so tightly balanced we did manage to find opportunities to keep making change happen, from funding climate work in communities, to passing hate crime laws. 

    But it was 2014, and in fact the few years running up to it, that changed everything.

    As soon as it was clear that Scotland would be making this historic decision on independence, we saw the opportunity not only to set out why independence fits with the Green vision, but why the Green vision is the path to making independence work – why a sustainable independent Scotland, able to move quickly and fairly away from the fossil fuel age, is the best future we can choose. 

    Some independence voices hadn’t yet moved on from “it’s Scotland’s oil.” To be honest, a few still haven’t even today. But we saw, and we seized, an opportunity to change the debate, and change the story of Scotland’s future.

    More than that, we wanted to show that people could debate that choice in good spirit, and that people can disagree and still be friends. And that positive ideas and vision are of more value than fear, opportunism, or insults. That Scotland was capable of the standard of debate we deserved.

    Our message reached more people than ever before, and more people than ever before decided to join. 

    There are people here today who joined in that surge, who attended branch meetings in the wake of the referendum, meetings where the overspills rooms needed overspill rooms.

    With the capacity and the profile that we gained in that period, 2016 restored our parliamentary group, and with the SNP returning to minority government we were able to achieve real change; passing legislation, winning the case for progressive tax reform, and forcing policy change from government, but – critically – building out political relevance; and we laid the groundwork for our best ever result in 2021.

    And on the back of that result, the opportunity to become part of the government presented itself. In the biggest and most participative democratic process our party has ever undertaken, our members first shaped and then approved the Bute House Agreement.

    Doing that was a clear statement that we’re here to make change happen, and that we were ready to step up and do the hard work that’s necessary to make change on a far bigger scale than ever before.

    Clearly, it was shorter lived than it could have been, and now some of our most important work is being undone or watered down by the SNP. But even without the chance to complete a lot of the work we got started, we made a bigger difference in people’s lives than ever.

    It’s the reason three quarters of a million young people today have a bus pass in their pocket today, making public transport an affordable and natural first choice. 

    It’s the reason investment in climate and nature hit record highs, investment that was needed because for far too long politicians had been setting targets and then blocking the action needed to reach them; and it’s the reason why better planning policies ensured that Loch Lomond has been protected from the damage threatened by FlamingoLand.

    This commitment to making change happen instead of only talking about it went well beyond the environmental agenda that Green politics is most strongly rooted in. The actions we took showed how Green ideas apply to social and economic policy, in ways that other parties have shied away from.

    It’s the reason tenants across the country were spared thousands of pounds in avoidable extra rent rises during a cost of living crisis.

    It’s the reason Scotland has continued on the path of more progressive taxation to help protect public services from the austerity first of the Conservative and now of a UK Labour Government.

    And it was also the reason that more people than ever before gave us their support. While the SNP’s legal woes and Nicola Sturgeon’s resignation led to a decline in their support, we saw the highest sustained period of polling in our party’s history, and an election in 2022 that exceeded all expectations.

    I’ll never forget the frustration of some of the SNP’s right wingers, furious at their own party for working with us, desperate to blame their loss of support on Green policies, but looking at our growing success with utter bewilderment. 

    So what now? How do we build on that success, and take Green politics forward in Scotland?

    In this party, it has never just been leaders who answer questions like that, but I’ve no doubt that over the coming months as we choose the leadership team for the 2026 election, these are the questions we will debate. 

    And I want that debate to be a positive, collaborative debate; just like that positive debate that we aimed for about the country’s future, that’s what our party deserves as we debate our own future.

    At any time, but especially now with basic democratic values facing new and very real threats, political parties should be willing to ask ourselves – why do people vote for us?

    For the Greens, many people see us as the political wing of the environment movement. That’s fundamental to our origins and our purpose, but it was never the whole of the answer

    Some people might vote for specific policies; whether that’s on climate & nature, housing, transport, independence, or anything else.

    These policy stances really matter, of course; they matter most if we can actually make them happen. And we should never lose sight of the need to build a reputation for actually turning ideas into reality; all those achievements we’ve made – Scotland is a fairer, better, and greener place because of this work; they are the achievements that are only possible thanks to the political credibility we’ve earned and the support people have given us at election time.

    But it’s a common error for people in politics to think these individual policy issues are what drive most people to the ballot box.

    For far more people, it’s more about who we are.

    We’re a party that’s always tried to be hopeful, even when that is hard work. We’re a party that’s always tried to be constructive – challenging others by putting forward better ideas, but also seeking out the common ground where cooperation can happen – and that’s ever more important in these dangerously polarised times.

    These have been parts of our political character that people really value.

    And I’m truly sorry to say that there have been times recently when I’ve had to ask if we really live up to those values? Times when instead of speaking up in an open and democratic way, a small minority of members have taken to anonymous leaks, smears, insults, undermining the work of fellow members and damaging our whole party and our reputation by doing so.

    I want to appeal to everyone, lets make sure that the next few months see a positive campaign that lifts our party up, one that lives up to the best of our values, not one that descends to the factionalism and toxicity that characterises too much of political debate.

    The vast majority of our members and our voters have had more than enough of that. I’m asking everyone in our party to call it out when they see it, and show those who behave that way that it’s not welcome in this party.

    Ours has to be a movement that offers vision, ambition, and clarity. It’s only if we do so that we will deserve the trust of voters; and our message is even more urgent and important in these unsettling times.

    Green politics could hardly be more of a contrast with the rise of dangerous forces in today’s political climate; the far right threat is very real, and too much of the political spectrum is still behaving as though it can be defeated by imitation.

    They tried that with anti-immigrant and anti-asylum prejudice, making policy ever more hostile and brutal. It harmed people, and it also didn’t work.

    They tried it with Brexit, parroting meaningless slogans like ‘make Brexit work’ even though they knew that it never could. It harmed people, and it also didn’t work.

    They are now doing the same thing with the so-called culture war agenda, with transphobia and the right wing’s attempt to redefine free speech. It’s harming people, and it also cannot work to defeat the far right – playing into their agenda will only ever give the far right more political space.

    Their ideas can only be defeated by openly and consistently challenging them, never by imitating them. 

    And that goes for the right’s contempt for democracy too – undermining trust in the democratic process is easy, and utterly destructive. Greens have a harder job to do, but a far more important one. We have to rekindle belief that in the idea that democratic politics is capable of making our society better, fairer and more liveable. 

    For much of our party’s early history, people might voted Green as a bit of a protest. That’s not enough. It’s not enough to win the chance to make change happen. It should never be enough to satisfy us.

    Green politics must be about making a difference in the real world, because the challenges, and crises, that we exist to face are far too urgent.

    Not just during my time in a leadership role, but throughout the two and a half decades of the devolution era, that’s what we’ve built – the capacity and the credibility to make change happen.

    It took hard work, by many people over many years, to build this party into a political force in Scotland that’s capable of making the country a better place, and that can now point to a track record of doing it and not just talking about it.

    So that’s still the task before us – to take Green politics forward, to achieve more positive change in people’s lives, and to live up to our values in the way we do our politics, because that’s the only way to truly deserve people‘s trust, not just for ourselves, but for democracy.

    So as I close my last speech as Co-Leader, I look forward to our party having the debate we truly deserve in the coming months, the debate we need, about how to build on the most impactful period in our party’s history, and go forward to achieve even more positive change for people and for planet.

    Thank you once again for the opportunity to serve.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Tory crony peerages underline need to scrap House of Lords

    Source: Scottish Greens

    The House of Lords is an undemocratic relic.

    Reports that former Tory Ministers Michael Gove and Alister Jack are to be given peerages and jobs for life underline why we urgently need to scrap the House of Lords, say the Scottish Greens.

    The Party’s co-leader, Lorna Slater, said:

    “The House of Lords is an archaic and embarrassing relic of an institution. Its very existence is an affront to democracy.

    “It has no legitimacy whatsoever and is already stuffed full of donors, cronies and former politicians.

    “Michael Gove and Alister Jack both supported and implemented policies that did a huge amount of damage, from a Brexit that has cost jobs and hiked up prices to the hostile environment policies that punished refugees and a series of cuts that fell on people with the least.

    “The problem is much bigger than any individual. It is the system that has allowed unelected peers to have so much influence for so long. It is ridiculous for us to be ruled by people that we have no way to remove.

    “One of the many advantages of independence would be the chance to finally abolish the undemocratic House of Lords.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why Keir Starmer’s psychological profile is different from other prime ministers – and what it means for his dealings with Donald Trump

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Consuelo Thiers, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Edinburgh

    Flickr/10 Downing Street, CC BY-NC-ND

    The question “Who is Keir Starmer?” echoed across headlines before and after he took office in 2024. Despite leading the Labour party for years, his personality, leadership style and core motivations remained something of a mystery. Now in office, that question matters more than ever. In moments of crisis, a national leader’s psychology plays a decisive role.

    The UK faces a difficult foreign policy landscape. Post-Brexit Britain is still rebuilding alliances amid economic strain and Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency has put a more transactional, Russia-friendly approach in the White House. The UK’s balancing act has become even more precarious. Starmer must back Ukraine, strengthen ties with the EU and manage an unpredictable relationship with Trump. For any leader, it’s a high-stakes task.

    Traditional international relations theories often treat states as rational actors, with little attention paid to who is making the decisions. In this view, leaders are interchangeable; internal traits are “black-boxed” and considered irrelevant.

    But political psychology challenges this. Leaders are not all the same. How they perceive and respond to constraints – be they economic, institutional, or geopolitical – varies dramatically.

    Faced with similar conditions, different leaders make different choices. Their decisions are shaped by traits, motivations, emotions and deeply held beliefs.

    Starmer: psychologically different to other PMs

    Political psychology provides tools for assessing leaders by analysing their public statements. Since traditional psychological assessments are rarely feasible, researchers rely on at-a-distance methods, based on the premise that the way leaders speak and the language they use can reveal underlying traits, motivations and beliefs.

    One of the most widely used approaches is leadership trait analysis (LTA), developed by psychologist Margaret Hermann. It employs computational content analysis to systematically code language and produce comparable personality profiles.

    To reduce the influence of speechwriters, the analysis focuses on spontaneous material such as interviews and press conferences. The framework identifies seven core traits that are particularly relevant to foreign policy decision-making.


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    Applying this framework to Starmer’s public appearances since taking office reveals notable differences between his profile and that of the average UK prime minister.

    Of the seven core traits measured by the framework, Starmer scores within the typical range on task orientation, in-group bias, self-confidence, and conceptual complexity. But he stands out in three areas: distrust, belief in his ability to control events, and need for power. In these, he scores significantly above average.

    These traits suggest a leader who is confident in his influence, driven to shape outcomes, and inclined to assert control when faced with obstacles. Leaders high in belief in their ability to control events tend to be proactive and view challenges as manageable. When paired with a high need for power, this reflects a strong drive to steer the political environment, often through strategic manoeuvring and behind-the-scenes influence.

    These leaders test boundaries and thrive in direct, high-stakes negotiations. This combination has been seen in figures like Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair.

    Compared with his most recent predecessors – Rishi Sunak, Liz Truss and Boris Johnson – Starmer shares certain traits but also diverges in meaningful ways. Like Johnson and Sunak, he shows a strong belief in his ability to control political events and a high need for power.

    However, what sets him apart most clearly is his elevated level of distrust, which surpasses even Sunak’s. Research links this trait to risk-prone, uncooperative leadership styles.

    Distrustful leaders often view others as potential threats, are less inclined to compromise, and fall back on control rather than collaboration. It’s a hallmark of hawkish leadership and has been associated with costly policy errors, such as George W. Bush’s misjudgement of Iraq’s weapons capabilities.

    At the same time, Starmer differs from Johnson and Sunak in his greater cognitive complexity. He sees nuance, tolerates ambiguity and avoids black-and-white thinking.

    He appears more open to new information and more flexible in adapting his approach. While Johnson and Sunak were more people-focused and scored low on task orientation, Starmer brings a balanced leadership style, combining interpersonal awareness with a clear focus on results. He can build relationships while staying goal-driven – an essential combination in today’s global landscape.

    Starmer and Trump

    What does this suggest about Starmer’s potential relationship with Trump? While research on leader-to-leader dynamics is still developing, Trump’s leadership profile is well-established.

    He scores high in self-confidence, low in task orientation, places a strong emphasis on loyalty, and shows high levels of distrust. His self-confidence means he rarely seeks disconfirming information, often filtering reality to fit his beliefs.

    His low task focus reflects a preference for group loyalty over detailed policy. Combined with a deep suspicion of others, this results in a transactional, uncompromising leadership style centred on personal allegiance.

    This presents challenges for Starmer, whose high distrust and tendency to defy constraints could complicate efforts to build mutual understanding. Yet his adaptability, pragmatism, and balanced focus on people and tasks, combined with confidence in his ability to shape outcomes, may help him navigate this volatile relationship.

    His assertive style, however, could still surprise or alienate some supporters as he makes bold moves beyond expectations.

    Starmer’s leadership may lack the charisma or flair of his predecessors, but his personality profile reveals a distinct and consequential approach to power. Confident, strategic, and distrustful, he is not a passive figurehead but a leader likely to assert control, challenge limits, and drive his vision.

    When the stakes are this high, Starmer’s psychology may not just influence Britain’s path – it could determine it.

    Consuelo Thiers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Why Keir Starmer’s psychological profile is different from other prime ministers – and what it means for his dealings with Donald Trump – https://theconversation.com/why-keir-starmers-psychological-profile-is-different-from-other-prime-ministers-and-what-it-means-for-his-dealings-with-donald-trump-254242

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: US tariffs will squeeze the UK economy. Could the government buy itself some breathing space?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Linda Yueh, Fellow in Economics/Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of Oxford

    William Barton/Shutterstock

    “Iron-clad” and “non-negotiable” is how UK prime minister Keir Starmer recently described the country’s fiscal rules. The government has been coming under pressure to relax the rules and cut itself some financial slack. But according to the PM, these self-imposed restrictions are vital for maintaining UK economic stability.

    What Starmer is referring to is notably the “stability” rule, which says that the UK will balance day-to-day public spending with tax receipts, rather than by borrowing, over the course of the parliament.

    But the volatility unleashed by US president Donald Trump’s tariff plans has challenged this rule. US tariffs could have a significant economic impact on the UK and the world economies.

    Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that 10% across-the-board tariffs, if they ultimately result in retaliation from China and the EU, could cut global economic growth by 0.5% in 2026.


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    Unsurprisingly, the UK’s independent economic forecaster, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), estimates a similar impact on the UK. It predicts that if the trade wars result in 20% tariff rates between the US and the rest of the world, it could reduce economic growth by as much as 1%. This, it says, could slash the expected UK budget surplus in 2029-30 to “almost zero”.

    And herein lies the challenge for the UK’s fiscal rules. Due to the stability rule, a cut to GDP growth would reduce the tax take. That would require either raising taxes or cutting public spending, due to the rule that this cannot be funded by borrowing.

    Fear that the government’s nearly £10 billion spending buffer will disappear by the end of the parliament puts pressure on the government to say how it would continue to stick to its fiscal rule. If it did result in spending cuts or tax rises, this could dampen economic growth and negatively affect people’s lives. And the decisions would have been taken on the basis of economic forecasts that may not come to pass.

    This is particularly true when the forecasts are based on US tariffs that were imposed and then paused in the space of just a week.




    Read more:
    Hopes of a ‘Brexit benefit’ from tariffs were short-lived. Here’s what Trump’s pause means for the UK


    This problem was also evident in the spring statement in March, when the chancellor of the exchequer, Rachel Reeves, announced spending cuts because the GDP growth forecast had been halved from 2% to 1% for this year.

    And the vast swaths of tariffs later announced by US president Donald Trump could have a similar impact on the UK’s growth rate.

    If the UK were to relax or abolish its fiscal rules, that may ease the pressure to react to a potential growth downgrade – which may or may not happen given the volatile nature of the US tariffs announced so far.

    The debt burden

    But the prime minister and the chancellor have both resisted this change. They are concerned about the UK’s credibility in the eyes of its creditors, who buy government debt in the bond markets based on their assessment of the fiscal position of the British government.

    The UK, like other advanced economies, borrows from bond markets to fund its budget deficits. The government is concerned that with a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 95%, creditors may be reluctant to lend to the UK. To do so, they might want to charge more.

    A higher interest rate on the UK’s national debt would of course reduce the amount available for public spending.

    The UK spends more than £100 billion a year on debt interest payments. This is more than it spends on education or investment.

    The amount increased rapidly in recent years due to the global financial crisis and the COVID pandemic. And, relatively speaking, the UK spends more money on paying interest on its debt than other G7 economies (3.3% of its GDP compared with the G7 average of 1.7% in 2022).

    Part of this is due to the UK having more inflation-linked debt than comparable economies. About one-quarter of the UK’s debt repayment is linked to inflation, which is double that of Italy, the next highest in the G7, at 12%. And, as everyone in the UK has experienced, inflation has been high in the past few years.

    High inflation over the past few years has squeezed consumers – as well as the government.
    Edinburghcitymom/Shutterstock

    This makes the UK particularly susceptible to movements in bond markets. For instance, if the UK’s borrowing costs were to decline by one percentage point, that would save £21 billion over five years. That’s double the current “fiscal headroom” (effectively the government’s spending buffer) that is at risk from US tariffs.

    Without knowing for sure how bond markets would react, it would be challenging for the government to change its fiscal rules. But it’s also challenging to apply the stability rule during times of high volatility like this. Given the unpredictable nature of the US tariff regime, this debate is likely to go on for some time.

    Linda Yueh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. US tariffs will squeeze the UK economy. Could the government buy itself some breathing space? – https://theconversation.com/us-tariffs-will-squeeze-the-uk-economy-could-the-government-buy-itself-some-breathing-space-254347

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Hopes of a ‘Brexit benefit’ from tariffs were short-lived. Here’s what Trump’s pause means for the UK

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Maha Rafi Atal, Adam Smith Senior Lecturer in Political Economy, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow

    The US has decided – again – to upend the global trading system. With the latest raft of tariffs just beginning to kick in, and after a week in which markets worldwide fell precipitously, the Trump administration announced that it would be suspending high tariffs on nearly 60 countries for 90 days.

    The announcement is only a partial reprieve. High tariffs on Mexico, Canada and China, as well as on global imports of steel, aluminium and automotives, remain, as does a 10% baseline tariff on all imports. US tariffs remain the highest they have been since the Great Depression, at levels unprecedented since the modern trade system was created after the second world war.

    Before the pause, the UK was already in line for the 10% rate – which some commentators described as a Brexit benefit when compared to the EU’s prospective 20%.

    While markets soared on the news of the pause, the damage is was already done. The subsequent rally is recouping some, but not all, losses incurred due to the tariffs already.

    Businesses that had prepared for tariffs by bulk-buying imported components ahead of time will have made cuts elsewhere to pay for it. They will not easily be able to reverse course.

    The implications for the UK of the latest developments are mixed. All the tariffs imposed on direct UK exports to the US (chiefly steel, automotives and aircrafts, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment) remain in place.

    While the US represents the second-largest market for UK goods, the majority of UK exports are in services (like banking and insurance), which the tariffs do not target. If tariffs were to hit direct UK-US goods trade only, the UK would likely be able to weather the shock.

    Unfortunately, that’s not how trade works in the 21st century. Instead, two-thirds of trade takes place in what are known as “global value chains”. These are complex networks through which companies move the component parts of products between their own facilities around the world and those of their subcontractors.

    Many UK businesses supply components that are incorporated by companies overseas into finished goods ultimately destined for the US. When the US imposes tariffs on those goods, UK manufacturers suffer too – even if direct UK exports to the US remain unchanged.

    Global value chains will also reorient in response to trade barriers, as already took place in Asia during Trump’s first term. If businesses reroute their supply chains to avoid the tariff markets, the UK (which is not imposing retaliatory tariffs) could become a “sacrifice zone” (a place where cheaply made, poor-quality or environmentally harmful items are dumped or disposed of, “sacrificing” the wellbeing of local people) for excess supply, undercutting domestic producers.

    Yet choosing not to retaliate is key to the UK’s diplomatic strategy. It hopes to stay close to the US in the hope of preferential treatment.

    The UK’s pursuit of a US trade deal has been politically sensitive since the previous Trump administration.
    JessicaGirvan/Shutterstock

    So far, that strategy is yet to bear fruit. The UK hopes to avoid the tariffs through a US trade deal, an objective that the countries have pursued since the UK left the European Union.

    The US has repeatedly sought access to the UK agrifood market, a demand that has always been refused due to political opposition to importing American beef and chicken.

    The sticky Brexit issue

    Brexit adds to this complexity, as the Windsor framework requires food products sold in Northern Ireland to conform to European Union standards. The more standards in the rest of the UK diverge from those of the EU (as they would have to do to secure a US trade deal), the more onerous the checks in the Irish Sea would become.

    Keir Starmer’s government has also sought to renegotiate parts of the agreement with the EU, seeking tighter economic ties that will require closer regulatory alignment. Pursuing deregulation to meet US trade demands, however, makes that unlikely.

    The tariffs compound this dilemma. If the higher rates return after 90 days, Northern Irish exports to the US will face a lower rate than those from the Republic of Ireland. But US imports to Northern Ireland will be hit with EU tariffs while imports to the rest of the UK will remain tariff-free.

    That will create some opportunities. Businesses might choose to operate in Northern Ireland to access a lower tariff rate on their US exports while also producing goods for the EU market.

    But it also creates risks. With three different tariff regimes in Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, goods flowing across both the Irish Sea and the Irish land border could require additional checks. This would risk the very thing the Windsor Framework was meant to avoid.

    Given these risks, a 90-day reprieve is a window of opportunity. But with US government policy that can change on a dime (or a post), the UK risks being caught between the rival powers of the US and EU – and trampled in the crossfire.

    Maha Rafi Atal is a volunteer organizer with the US Democratic Party.

    ref. Hopes of a ‘Brexit benefit’ from tariffs were short-lived. Here’s what Trump’s pause means for the UK – https://theconversation.com/hopes-of-a-brexit-benefit-from-tariffs-were-short-lived-heres-what-trumps-pause-means-for-the-uk-254307

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Sweden’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 07-04-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Sweden’s national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) is financed by the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). The NRRP’s total volume increased from an initial €3 289 million to €3 502 million in the revised version. The total amount of funds under the RRF was revised in June 2022, which reduced the final amount allocated to Sweden to €3 181 million. Adding to this its REPowerEU grant allocation of €198 million and the requested transfer of €66 million of its share of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the NRRP, the amended plan now includes €3 445.7 million in EU grants. The difference between the EU grants and the plan’s total value (€57 million) is to be covered by national financing. The NRRP is of comparatively limited scope, and exclusively in the form of grants, as Sweden did not apply for loans. The revised amount represents 0.5 % of the entire Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), equal to 0.7 % of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF represented 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). Sweden will receive payments in five instalments, contingent on progress in implementing the plan. On 20 December 2024, Sweden requested the first disbursement of €1.6 billion in grants, covering the first two instalments. The amended plan contributes 43.6 % of resources to climate related objectives, surpassing the minimum target of 37 % set in the RRF Regulation. At 23.1 %, its allocation for digital expenditure also exceeds the threshold, which was set at 20 % of resources (excluding the REPowerEU chapter). The European Parliament has been a major supporter of establishing a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part in interinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss and scrutinise implementation of the European Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III – P10_TA(2025)0051 – Wednesday, 2 April 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027(1) and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context(2) and the related unilateral declarations(3),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4),

    –  having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(5) (MFF Revision),

    –  having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

    –  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570) and its position of 23 November 2022 on the proposal(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(12) (the Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)(13),

    –  having regard to the EU’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and its commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

    –  having regard to the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing European Union Recovery Instrument borrowing costs(14),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(15),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(16),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights(17) of 13 December 2017,

    –  having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025(18) and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’, presented in the European Parliament on 21 October 2024,

    –  having regard to Mario Draghi’s report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, presented in the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,

    –  having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report entitled ‘Safer together – Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’, presented in the European Parliament on 14 November 2024,

    –  having regard to the presentation of the EU Competitiveness Compass by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 29 January 2025,

    –  having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 for European Defence Readiness providing a framework for the ReArm Europe plan (JOIN(2025)0120),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 February 2025 on the budget guidelines for 2026,

    –  having regard to Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the letters from the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0042/2025),

    Budget 2026: building a resilient, sustainable and prosperous future for Europe

    1.  Highlights the anticipated economic growth projected for 2025 and 2026 within the EU(19), accompanied by an easing of inflation; notes nonetheless the uncertainties stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly threatens the security of the EU, and the worsening effects of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, also manifested in the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which are compounded by new significant geopolitical changes and a deteriorating international rules-based order, heightened security threats and a rise in global protectionism; emphasises that, in such an increasingly volatile landscape, it is imperative for the EU to enhance its defence and security capabilities, social, economic and territorial cohesion and political and strategic autonomy, decrease its dependence, increase its competitiveness and ensure a prosperous future for the continent and its people, who are currently facing an increasingly high cost of living;

    2.  Is determined to ensure that the 2026 budget, by focusing on strategic preparedness and security, economic competitiveness and resilience, sustainability, climate, as well as strengthening the single market, provides the people in the EU with a robust ecosystem and delivers on their priorities, thus reinforcing a socially just and prosperous Europe; underlines the need for additional investment in security and defence, research, innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, energy, migration, as well as land and maritime border protection, inclusive digital and green transitions, job creation, and the provision of opportunities for young people; insists that this be accompanied by administrative simplification, as indicated in the Competitiveness Compass; insists that the EU budget is the largest investment instrument with leverage effect, complementing national budgets and therefore enabling the EU to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing world while ensuring prosperity, social cohesion and stability for its people; is strongly of the opinion that the EU should use this leverage effect to the maximum degree to boost the Union’s objectives and policymaking, as well as private investment;

    Investing in a solid, sustainable and resilient economy

    3.  Is adamant that sound economic resilience and sustainability can be achieved in the EU by boosting public and private investment, increasing innovation and supporting competitiveness, including by addressing the skills gap and fostering more industrial production in Europe as a source for robust economic growth and quality jobs, and thereby guaranteeing the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring that the EU remains agile and self-reliant in the face of global challenges, disruptions and volatility; highlights the need to promote innovation, prioritise education, reduce costs and the administrative burden, and strengthen the single market, particularly as regards services;

    4.  Reaffirms, in this regard, that research and innovation remain crucial for the EU’s success in cutting-edge industries and new clean and sustainable technologies; recalls the long-standing goal of increasing research and innovation investment to 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP); calls, therefore, for increased funding to be provided under Horizon Europe to fund at least 50 % of all excellent proposals in all scientific disciplines, enable researchers as well as companies, especially SMEs, to bring new developments to the market, and to scale up, ensure solid economic growth and boost the Union’s competitiveness in the global economy, thereby preventing actors from leaving for competing regions while also ensuring that Europe has the knowledge base it needs to pursue the Green Deal commitments;

    5.  Highlights the importance of targeted support in encouraging public-private partnerships and accessible and increased financing to support SMEs as the backbone of the European economy and a vector for pioneering innovation, emphasising the role of the European Innovation Council, InvestEU and the SME component of the single market programme in empowering start-ups and scale-ups of innovative companies, supporting them in their growth and contributing to a greater role for the EU economy on the global stage; expresses its concern that, according to the interim evaluation of InvestEU, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; takes note of the Commission proposal in this regard; underlines, furthermore, the importance of the single market programme to leverage the full potential of the EU’s cross-border dimension;

    6.  Stresses that the modernisation of the economy will require blending public and private investment; emphasises, in this regard, the necessity of private investments to maximise the leverage effect of public spending; recalls that these efforts should lead to simplification and reduce the financial burden for the EU’s SMEs while maintaining EU standards;

    7.  Underscores the urgency of further accelerating the digital and green transitions as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy that remains attractive for innovative businesses and that is based on market-driven investments providing quality jobs and leaving no one behind; advocates substantial investment in forward-looking digital infrastructure, underpinned by well-regulated, human-centred and trustworthy artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; stresses the need to improve citizens’ basic digital skills to match the needs of companies and to equip citizens to counter disinformation; stresses, further, the need to increase the resilience of the Union’s democracy in fighting malign foreign interference;

    8.  Recognises the strategic value of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for contributing to the economic, social and climate goals of the EU’s cross-border transport infrastructure; calls for network extensions, particularly towards candidate countries and the EU’s strategic partners, as regards the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and the complementarities between the TEN-T and the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);

    A better-prepared Union, capable of effectively responding to crises

    9.  Underlines the need to enhance EU security and defence capabilities to create a genuine defence union and to better prepare for and respond to unprecedented geopolitical challenges and new hybrid security threats; stresses the essential role of common investment, research, production and procurement mechanisms, including in new disruptive technologies supporting an independent EU defence industry; considers that there is an EU added value in security and defence cooperation that not only makes Europe and its people safer but also leads to greater efficiency, potential savings, quality job creation and enhanced strategic autonomy; calls therefore for immediate upscaling and much better coordination of defence spending by Member States; stresses in particular the need to provide adequate resources to innovate and enhance Member States’ military capabilities, as well as their interoperability; takes note, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, of its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry while safeguarding their operations and financing capacity; recalls the importance of investing in and developing dual-use equipment and, particularly, of strengthening EU military mobility as regards funding dual-use transport infrastructure along priority axes; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of using calls for this purpose under the CEF transport programme, in the light of the military mobility funding gap; underlines the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capabilities to fight hybrid warfare;

    10.  Recalls the role of the EU’s space programme in enhancing the strategic security of the Union through a variety of civil and military applications; underlines that a strong European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, the protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions, and therefore requires sufficient resources;

    11.  Highlights, in the face of new challenges in internal and external security, the importance of ensuring proper implementation of the Asylum and Migration Pact, in full compliance with international human rights law, and of respecting the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility; stresses that effective management and protection of the EU’s external borders, inland, air and maritime, are essential for maintaining the freedoms of the Schengen area and crucial for the security of the EU and its citizens; emphasises the need to better protect people by preventing trafficking and enhance support to strengthen cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the Union in combating terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and criminal networks, particularly those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, so as to reinforce law enforcement and the judicial response to these criminal networks, as well as to support Member States facing hybrid threats, in particular the instrumentalisation of migrants on the Union’s borders as defined in the Crisis Regulation(20);

    12.  Expresses its deep concern over the fact that the Commission has funded or co-financed campaigns promoting the wearing of the veil, asserting, for example, that ‘freedom is in the hijab’; emphasises that the Union’s budget must no longer finance future campaigns that directly or indirectly promote the wearing of the veil;

    13.  Recalls the vital role that the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund play in protecting external borders; calls, in addition, for adequate funding for border protection capabilities as an essential part of a comprehensive migration policy, including physical infrastructure, buildings, equipment, systems and services required at border crossing points, as provided for in Annex III to the BMVI Regulation(21), and for the requirements to be met in terms of reception conditions, integration, return and readmission procedure; reaffirms that cooperation agreements on migration and asylum management with non-EU countries in full respect of international law can help to prevent and counter irregular migration and strengthen border security;

    14.  Acknowledges the common agricultural policy (CAP) as a key strategic European policy for food security and greater EU autonomy in affordable and high-quality food production; stresses the crucial role of the CAP in ensuring a decent income for EU farmers as well as a productive, competitive and sustainable European agriculture; regrets that direct payments have significantly decreased in real terms due to inflation, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; urges the Commission to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining high production standards and the requirement to implement EU legislation; calls for adequate resources and for direct payments to be protected to help farmers cope with the impact of inflation, fuel costs, changes in the global food and trade market and adverse climate events, affecting agricultural production and threatening food security, including in the outermost regions; highlights, in this regard, the role of the agricultural reserve; emphasises the need to help small and medium-sized farms and new and young farmers by supporting generational renewal and ensuring continued support for the promotion of EU agricultural products; underlines the need for appropriate support for research and innovation to make the agricultural sector more sustainable, including water management, in particular through the Horizon Europe programme, without reducing European agricultural production and while preventing European farmers from facing unfair competition from imported products that do not meet our standards; welcomes the Commission’s preparation of a second simplification package; underscores that food security is an essential component for geopolitical stability;

    15.  Stresses the strategic role of fisheries and aquaculture and the need for them to be adequately supported financially; acknowledges that the common fisheries policy ensures a stable income and long-term future for fishers by contributing to protecting sustainable marine ecosystems, which are key to the sector’s competitiveness; insists that special attention must be devoted to the EU’s fishing fleet in order to improve safety and security, including by combating illegal fishery actions and improving working conditions, energy efficiency and sustainability, as well as by renewing the fleet; reaffirms that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should support a human resources policy capable of addressing future challenges, in order to promote an inclusive, diversified and sustainable blue economy; expresses its concern about the effect of the end of the Brexit transition period in June 2026 on the fishing and aquaculture sectors;

    16.  Points out that, at the end of 2023, around 20 million children were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, which is roughly one quarter of all children in the EU; believes, therefore, that the EU’s budget needs to step up efforts to combat poverty among children, including migrant children, children with disabilities and children living in precarious family situations, in accordance with the European Child Guarantee; reiterates its earlier calls for the ESF+ envelope to include a specific and significant budget for fighting child poverty;

    17.  Stresses that enhancing energy security and independence remains fundamental for the EU; highlights the EU’s role in ensuring security of energy supply, assisting households, farmers and businesses in mitigating price volatility and managing price gaps in comparison to the rest of the world; calls, therefore, for additional investment in critical infrastructure and connectivity, including large-scale cross-border electricity grids and hydrogen infrastructure for hard-to-abate sectors, which are an essential prerequisite to the decarbonisation of European industry, in low-carbon and renewable energy sources and connectivity, in particular by properly funding the CEF, as well as in energy efficiency; highlights the need to adapt European infrastructure to meet future energy demands as part of the transition to a clean and modern economy; underlines the importance of investing in new, expanding and modernising interconnector capacity for electricity trading, in particular cross-border capacity, for a fully integrated EU energy market that enhances Europe’s diversified supply security and resilience to energy market disruptions, reducing external dependencies and ultimately ensuring affordable and sustainable energy for EU citizens and businesses; stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen cooperation with Africa;

    18.  Recalls, in this context, the current housing crisis in Europe, including the lack of decent and affordable housing; calls, therefore, for swift additional investments through a combination of funding sources, including the EIB and national promotional banks, in areas with a positive impact on reducing the cost of living for households, improving the energy efficiency of buildings and deploying renewable energy sources; calls for a coordinated approach at EU level that respects the principle of subsidiarity, encourages best practices and effectively uses all relevant funding mechanisms in addressing this pressing challenge;

    19.  Is highly concerned by the strong impacts of climate change and the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and globally and by the fact that the year 2024 was assessed to be the planet’s warmest year on record; calls for sufficient funding for the LIFE programme to finance climate and environment-related projects, including in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for increased budgetary flexibility to adequately respond to natural disasters in the EU; regrets that increasing numbers of natural disasters have led to a high number of victims, as well as to long-term devastating effects on citizens, farmers and businesses based and working in the regions concerned, as well as in the ecosystems impacted; calls for increased funding for the EU Solidarity Fund, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, including for increasing rescEU capacities, which allow for more cost-efficient capacity building, in order to support Member States quickly and effectively in overwhelming crisis situations; recognises the EU’s role as a hub for coordinating and improving Member States’ preparedness and capacities to respond immediately to large-scale, high-impact emergencies, and its added value both for Member States and citizens; stresses, in this regard, that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a tangible expression of European solidarity, reinforcing the EU’s role as a crisis responder; acknowledges that the European Union Solidarity Fund or any other fund alone cannot fully compensate for the extreme weather events of increased frequency and severity caused by climate change today and in the future; stresses the need to invest in and prioritise preparedness, prevention, and adaptation measures, prioritising nature-based solutions; stresses that it is crucial to ensure that Union spending contributes to climate mitigation, adaptation efforts and water resilience infrastructure; emphasises that these investments are far lower than the cost of climate inaction;

    Enhancing citizens’ opportunities in a vibrant society

    20.  Insists that continued investment in EU4Health and Cluster Health in Horizon Europe are key to improving health and preparedness for future health crises, thereby improving the health status of EU citizens; stresses the need for health investments for maximum impact; highlights its support for a holistic regulatory and funding approach to Europe’s life sciences and biotech ecosystem, including the creation of cutting-edge European clusters of excellence, as a central pillar of a stronger European health union, to which a European plan for cardiovascular diseases and lifestyles should be added, focusing on primary and secondary prevention as key objectives to increase life expectancy in the EU; highlights the need to create a more supportive care system to respond to demographic challenges and the ageing population; reiterates its support for Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, as well as the importance of European investment in tackling childhood diseases, rare diseases and antimicrobial resistance; reiterates the importance of the gender aspect of health, including sexual and reproductive health and access to services; is highly concerned by the current mental health crisis in Europe, affecting in particular the young generation, exacerbated by recent global events, which requires immediate action to be taken; underlines the need to prevent shortages of critical medicines, medical countermeasures and healthcare workers faced by some Member States; calls, in this respect, for better coordination at EU level and joint procurement of medicines in order to reduce costs;

    21.  Stresses the importance of investing in young generations and their skills, as major agents of change and progress, by ensuring access to quality education; considers it essential that all students, without discrimination and in every EU Member State, should have full access to the Erasmus+ programme and underlines the essential role of Erasmus+ in facilitating cultural exchange, strengthening European identity and promoting peace through mutual understanding and cooperation, making it a cornerstone of European integration and unity; recalls the need to tackle the skills deficit, the brain drain and the correlation between market needs and skills; considers that for the EU workforce to remain competitive in the future, establishing key areas for training and reskilling is needed; stresses that further investment is required in modernising the Union’s education systems, by equipping them for the digital and green transitions, creating talent booster schemes and incentivising young entrepreneurs; points, in this respect, to the relevance of sufficient financial resources for EU programmes such as the European Social Fund Plus, Erasmus+ and the EU Solidarity Corps, which have proven highly effective in helping to achieve high employment levels and fair social protection, in broadening education and training across the Union, as well as in promoting new job opportunities and fostering skills, youth participation and equal opportunities for all; calls on the Commission to do its utmost so that all university students remain eligible to participate in the Erasmus+ programme, including in Hungary;

    22.  Recalls that families are the main pillar that supports the burden of social expenditure in the EU, especially those with children in their care; notes, at the same time, that families are also those who are suffering the most and enduring the consequences of the successive economic crises that we have suffered over the last 15 years; stresses, for all these reasons, that they must be the subject of special attention in the relevant aspects of the EU budget and of the European Pillar of Social Rights priorities;

    23.  Recalls the role of the EU budget in contributing to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights; highlights the role of the EU budget in contributing to initiatives that reinforce social dialogue and facilitate labour mobility, including in the form of training, networking and capacity building;

    24.  Highlights the ever-increasing threats and dangers of organised and targeted disinformation campaigns against the EU by foreign stakeholders undermining European democracy; calls for the mobilisation of all relevant Union programmes, including Creative Europe, to fund actions in 2026 that promote inclusive digital and media literacy, in particular for young people, combating disinformation, countering online hate speech and extremist content, while encouraging active participation of citizens in democratic processes and safeguarding media freedom and pluralism for good cultural resilience, all of which are fundamental to a thriving democracy; deplores the recent decisions by the US administration to cut funding to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America and calls on the Commission and the Member States to explore all the possible options to provide further funding to these media outlets in the light of these developments;

    25.  Calls on the Commission to increase EU funding for protecting citizens of all religions and public spaces against terrorist threats, combating radicalisation and terrorist content online, as well as countering hate speech and rising antisemitism, anti-Christian hatred, anti-Muslim hatred and racism;

    26.  Regrets the increasing number of hate crimes directed against Christians and other religious communities; recalls that Christians are the most persecuted religious community in the world; further urges the Commission to dedicate funding to prevent the targeting of religious communities, and in particular Christian and Jewish communities, which have been targeted in Europe in recent months; urges the Commission to prioritise the protection of citizens and all religious communities and to support the combating of terrorist threats, particularly focusing on radicalisation and terrorist content online;

    27.  Calls on the Commission to ensure the swift, full and proper implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act(22), the Digital Market Act(23) and the Artificial Intelligence Act(24), also by allocating sufficient human resources; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability and the integrity of the digital public space;

    28.  Underlines the added value of funding programmes in the areas of democracy, rights and values; recalls the important role that the EU budget plays in the promotion of the European values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in supporting the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, inclusiveness, justice, non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality; reaffirms, furthermore, the essential role of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme in promoting European values and citizens’ rights, in particular its Union Values strand, as well as gender equality, thereby sustaining and further developing an open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive society based on the rule of law; stresses the need for targeted measures to address gender disparities and promote equal opportunities through EU funding allocations; stresses that supporting investigative journalism with sufficient resources is a strategic investment in democracy, transparency and social justice; reiterates the importance of the Daphne and Equality and Rights programmes, and stresses that necessary resources should be devoted to combating discrimination in all its forms, as well as tackling forms of violence;

    29.  Emphasises the valuable work carried out under the Union Values strand, which provides, among other things, direct funding to civil society organisations as key actors in vibrant democracies; stresses that citizens and civil society organisations, promoting the will and interest of citizens, represent the core of European democracy; underlines, in this regard, the importance of all EU programmes and increased funding in supporting the genuine engagement of civil society, particularly in the context of the impact of reduced funding for civil society by the EU’s international partners;

    30.  Calls for the full and urgent implementation of the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union; believes that the Huawei corruption scandal adds special urgency to starting the work of the body without delay; commits to providing the necessary financial and human resources to allow the body to fulfil its mandate and implement its tasks properly;

    31.  Considers it essential for the Union’s stability and progress and its citizens’ trust to ensure the proper use of Union funds and to take all steps towards protecting the Union’s financial interests, in particular by applying the rule of law conditionality; underscores the undeniable connection between respect for the rule of law and efficient implementation of the Union’s budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management under the Financial Regulation; reiterates that under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation(25), the imposition of appropriate measures must not affect the obligations of governments to implement the programme or fund affected by the measure, and in particular the obligations they have towards final recipients; insists, therefore, that in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments, the Commission should explore alternative ways to implement the budget, including by assessing the possibility of diverting sources to directly and indirectly managed programmes, in order to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding, without weakening the application of the regulation; highlights the role of the European Court of Auditors and its constant activity in defence of transparency, accountability and strict compliance with the regulations on all of the funds and programmes;

    A strong Union in a changing world

    32.  Observes that the need for the EU to maintain and augment its presence on the global stage is increasingly crucial amid escalating global conflicts, geopolitical shifts and foreign influence efforts worldwide, particularly considering developments with other major global providers of aid; stresses that in order to achieve this, the Union requires sufficient funding and resources to act, including to respond to major crises in its neighbourhood and throughout the world, in particular in the light of the sudden decrease in international funding; stresses the importance of the humanitarian aid programme and regrets that resources are not increasing in line with record-high needs; underscores the need to strengthen the EU’s role as a leading humanitarian actor while effectively addressing emerging crises, particularly in regions facing protracted conflict, displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters; emphasises that the Union also requires sufficient resources for long-term investments in building global partnerships, and points out the importance of the participation of non-EU countries in Union programmes, where appropriate;

    33.  Underlines that the EU’s security environment has changed dramatically following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and unpredictable changes in the policies of its main allies; recalls the importance of enhancing citizens’ safety and of achieving efficiency in the area of defence and strategic autonomy, through a comprehensive approach to security that covers military and civilian capabilities, external relations and internal security; stresses the importance of the Internal Security Fund to ensure funding to tackle increased levels of serious organised crime with a cross-border dimension and cybercrime; recognises the pressure which increased defence spending represents for Member Sates’ national budgets; stresses the importance of Member States stepping up their efforts and increasing funding for their defence capabilities, in a consistent and complementary manner in line with the NATO guideline;

    34.  Stresses that, beyond the enormous sacrifices of the people of Ukraine in withstanding Russia’s war of aggression for our common European security, this war has also had substantial economic and social consequences for people throughout Europe; recalls that certain Member States, in particular those with a land border with Russia and/or Belarus in the Baltic region, and frontline Member States, as well as vulnerable sectors of the economy, remain particularly exposed to the consequences of the war and deserve support in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and military mobility, in the spirit of EU solidarity;

    35.  Firmly reiterates its unconditional and full support for Ukraine in its fight for its freedom and democracy against Russian aggression, as the war on its soil has passed the three-year mark; underlines the ongoing need for high levels of funding, including in humanitarian aid and for repairs to critical infrastructure, and for improved capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes; welcomes the renewed and reinforced intention of the Commission and Member States to work in a united way to address Ukraine’s pressing defence needs and to further support the Ukrainian economy by providing regular and predictable financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets through the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, in order to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, as well as to foster Ukraine’s progress on its path to EU accession; stresses the importance of ensuring accountability regarding core international crimes;

    36.  Insists on the benefits of pre-accession funds, both for the enlargement countries and for the EU itself, as the funding creates more stability in the region; welcomes the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans to further support the economic convergence of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s single market through investment and growth in the region; insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support Moldova’s accession process, in line with the EU’s commitment to enlargement and regional stability; underlines the role of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova and highlights the necessity of securing sufficient financial resources for its full implementation; underlines the importance of sustained support for candidate countries in implementing the necessary accession-related reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, anti-corruption and democracy and in enhancing their resilience and preventing and countering hybrid threats; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society, independent media organisations and journalists;

    37.  Underlines, furthermore, that EU neighbourhood policy, namely its Eastern and Southern Partnerships, contributes to the overall goal of increasing the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU’s neighbours and thereby of increasing the security of our continent; stresses, therefore, the importance of reinforcing the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood budget lines in order to support political, economic and social reforms in the regions, facilitate peace processes and reconstruction and provide assistance to refugees, in particular through continuous, reinforced and predictable funding and continuous implementation on the ground; recalls that the EU must continue to alleviate other crises and assist the most vulnerable populations around the world through its humanitarian aid programme, as well as by maintaining its global positioning with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for supporting global challenges and promoting human rights, freedoms and democracy, as well as for the capacity building of civil society organisations and for delivering on the Union’s international climate and biodiversity commitments, within a comprehensive monitoring and control system;

    Cross-cutting issues in the 2026 budget

    38.  Underlines that the repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the EU and therefore non-discretionary; notes that borrowing costs depend on the pace of disbursements under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as well as on market fluctuations in bond yields and are therefore inherently partly unpredictable and volatile; insists, therefore, on the need for the Commission to provide reliable, timely and accurate information on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) borrowing costs and on expected RRF disbursements throughout the budgetary procedure as well as on available decommitments; expects the Commission to update the decommitments forecast when it presents the draft budget; recalls that the three institutions agreed that expenditures covering the financing costs of NGEU must aim at not reducing EU programmes and funds;

    39.  Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposals for the introduction of new own resources; is highly concerned by the complete lack of progress on the new own resources in the Council, in particular in view of increasing investment and unforeseen needs; considers that the introduction of new own resources, in line with the roadmap in the interinstitutional agreement of 2020, is essential to cover NGEU borrowing costs while shielding the margins and flexibility mechanisms necessary to cater for these needs;

    40.  Highlights again Parliament’s full support for the cohesion policy and its key role in delivering on the EU’s policy priorities and its general growth; reiterates that the cohesion policy’s optimal added value for citizens depends on its effective and timely implementation; in the same vein, urges the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the implementation of operational programmes under shared management funds as well as of the recovery and resilience plans so as to ensure swift budgetary execution and to avoid accumulated payment backlogs in the two last years of the MFF period, in particular through additional capacity building and technical assistance for Member States; reaffirms the imperative of a robust and transparent mechanism for accurately monitoring disbursements to beneficiaries;

    41.  Notes that particular attention must be paid to rural and remote areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as islands and outermost, cross-border and mountain regions and all those affected by natural disasters; stresses that these regions should benefit from adequate funding to offset the special characteristics and constraints of their structural social and economic situation, as referred to in Article 349 TFEU; stresses the vital importance of the POSEI programme for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions and bringing food to local markets; calls for the programme budget to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in these regions; notes that there has been no such increase since 2013, despite the fact that farmers in these regions face higher production costs due to inflation and climate change; stresses also that the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU, as referred to in Articles 198-204 TFEU, should benefit from adequate funding for their sustainable economic and social development, in the light of their geopolitical importance for global maritime trade routes and key partnerships such as those on sustainable raw materials value chains;

    42.  Reiterates that EU programmes, policies and activities, where relevant, should be implemented in such a way that promotes gender equality in the delivery of their objectives; welcomes the Commission’s work on developing gender mainstreaming in order to meaningfully measure the gender impact of Union spending, as set out in the interinstitutional agreement;

    43.  Takes note that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be met by 33,5 % in 2025, while the biodiversity target will be below 8,5 % in 2025, and unless dedicated action is undertaken the 10 % target will not be met in 2026; stresses the need for continuous efforts towards the achievement of the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets laid down in the interinstitutional agreement in the Union budget and the EURI expenditures;

    44.  Stresses that the 2026 Union budget should be aligned with the Union’s ambitions of making the Union climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, as well as the Union’s international commitments, in particular under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, and should significantly contribute to the implementation of the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy;

    45.  Recalls that effective programme implementation is achievable only with the backing of a committed administration; emphasises the essential work carried out by bodies and decentralised agencies and asserts that they must be properly staffed and sufficiently resourced, while taking into account inflation, so that they can fulfil their responsibilities effectively and contribute to the achievement of the Union political priorities, also when given new tasks and mandates;

    46.  Recalls that, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, when implementing the budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and respect the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines in particular Articles 137, 138 and 158 of the Financial Regulation and recalls the Commission and the Member States’ obligation to exclude from Union funds any persons or entities found guilty by a final judgment of terrorist offences, as well as by final judgments of terrorist activities, inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences, and corruption or other serious offences; highlights the need to leverage efforts in tackling fraud both at Union and Member State level and to this end ensure appropriate financial and human resources covering the Union’s full anti-fraud architecture; recalls the importance of providing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme with sufficient financial resources;

    47.  Underlines the importance of effective communication and the visibility of EU policies and programmes in raising awareness of the added value that the EU brings to citizens, businesses and partners;

    o
    o   o

    48.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

    (1) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
    (2) OJ C 444 I, 22.12.2020, p. 4.
    (3) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 252.
    (4) OJ L 325, 20.12.2022, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2496/oj.
    (5) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (6) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
    (7) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/1195, 23.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1195/oj.
    (9) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
    (10) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
    (11) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 162.
    (12) OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (13) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
    (14) OJ C, C/2023/1084, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1084/oj.
    (15) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (16) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
    (17) OJ C, 2017/428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (18) OJ L, 2025/31, 27.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/budget/2025/31/oj.
    (19) European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European economic forecast – Autumn 2024, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (20) Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 (OJ L, 2024/1359, 22.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1359/oj).
    (21) Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, p. 48, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (23) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (24) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (25) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Support Grows for President Trump’s America First Reciprocal Trade Plan

    Source: The White House

    One day after President Donald J. Trump announced a new chapter in American prosperity, support continues to roll in for his bold vision to reverse the decades of globalization that has decimated our industrial base.

    The support is bipartisan, with Democrat Rep. Jared Golden lauding President Trump’s plan: “I’m pleased the president is building his tariff agenda on the foundation of a universal 10 percent tariff like the one I proposed in the BUILT USA Act. This ring fence around the American economy is a good start to erasing our unsustainable trade deficits. I’m eager to work with the president to fix the broken ‘free trade’ system that made multinational corporations rich but ruined manufacturing communities across the country.”

    Here’s what else they’re saying:

    Coalition for a Prosperous America Chairman Zach Mottl: “A permanent, universal baseline tariff resets the global trade environment and finally addresses the destructive legacy of decades of misguided free-trade policies. President Trump’s decision to implement a baseline tariff is a game-changing shift that prioritizes American manufacturing, protects working-class jobs, and safeguards our economic security from adversaries like China. This is exactly the type of bold action America needs to restore its industrial leadership. Today’s action will deliver lasting benefits to the U.S. economy and working-class Americans, cementing President Trump’s legacy as one that ushered in a new Golden Age of American industrialization and prosperity.”

    National Cattlemen’s Beef Association SVP of Government Affairs Ethan Lane: “For too long, America’s family farmers and ranchers have been mistreated by certain trading partners around the world. President Trump is taking action to address numerous trade barriers that prevent consumers overseas from enjoying high-quality, wholesome American beef. NCBA will continue engaging with the White House to ensure fair treatment for America’s cattle producers around the world and optimize opportunities for exports abroad.”

    Steel Manufacturers Association President Philip K. Bell: “President Trump is a champion of the domestic steel industry, and his America First Trade Policy is designed to fight the unfair trade that has harmed American workers and weakened manufacturing in the United States. The recently reinvigorated 232 steel tariffs have already started creating American jobs and bolstering the domestic steel industry. President Trump is working to turn America into a manufacturing powerhouse and the steel tariffs are driving that movement. President Trump’s initial 232 steel tariffs and the historic tax cuts led to investments of nearly $20 billion by steel manufacturers in the United States. Since the revised tariffs took effect, Hyundai Steel announced a $5.8 billion steel mill in Louisiana, demonstrating that the tariffs are working to bring more steel investments and production to the United States. The domestic steel market is stronger when other nations are forced to compete on a level playing field. On a level playing field, American workers can outcompete anyone. We look forward to continuing working with President Trump and his administration to ensure a level playing field for Americans and a robust domestic steel industry that strengthens our national, economic and energy security.”

    Alliance for American Manufacturing President Scott Paul: “Today’s trade action prioritizes domestic manufacturers and America’s workers. These hardworking men and women have seen unfair trade cut the ground from beneath their feet for decades. They deserve a fighting chance. Our workers can out-compete anyone in the world, but they need a level playing field to do it. This trade reset is a necessary step in the right direction.”

    National Electrical Contractors Association CEO David Long: “President Trump has consistently prioritized policies that put the electrical industry as a priority, and we recognize his commitment to strengthening our nation’s economy. As these new tariffs take effect, we look forward to working with the Administration to ensure that electrical contractors and the entire electrical industry can continue powering America efficiently while navigating potential cost and supply chain challenges.”

    American Compass Chief Economist Oren Cass: “The new policies announced by President Trump today confirm the end of the disastrous WTO era and lay the groundwork for a new set of arrangements in the international economy that prioritize the national interest and the flourishing of the nation’s working families.”

    National Council of Textile Organizations CEO Kim Glas: “We strongly commend President Trump and his administration on their tariff reciprocity plan to finally begin rebalancing America’s trade positioning in markets at home and abroad. We want to thank President Trump on behalf of the U.S. textile industry and the 471,000 workers we employ.”

    Southern Shrimp Alliance Executive Director John Williams: “We’ve watched as multigenerational family businesses tie up their boats, unable to compete with foreign producers who play by a completely different set of rules. We are grateful for the Trump Administration’s actions today, which will preserve American jobs, food security, and our commitment to ethical production.”

    American Iron and Steel Institute President Kevin Dempsey: “AISI thanks President Trump for standing up for American workers by restoring fairness in international trade and addressing non-reciprocal trade relationships. American steel producers are all too familiar with the detrimental effects of unfair foreign trade practices on domestic industries and their workers. Driven by subsidies and other foreign government trade-distorting practices, global overcapacity in the steel industry reached 573 million metric tons in 2024 and has spurred high levels of exports of steel from countries like China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia that continue to produce steel in volumes that significantly exceed their domestic demand. These exports directly and indirectly injure steel producers in the U.S. and government action to address this unloading of steel overproduction on world markets is overdue.”

    Americans for Limited Government Executive Director Robert Romano: “Thank you, President Trump, for putting America first and finally once and for all levying the same tariffs on trade partners that they have levied mercilessly on the United States for decades. This was not an easy decision to make, but one that is long overdue with a record $1.2 trillion trade in goods deficit in 2024 after the failed rule of former President Joe Biden. … Under President Trump’s leadership, America will be the industrial and technology leader of the world, with commitments for hundreds of billions of investments in the United States. For countries that want to avoid the tariffs, it’s simple: Build in America. … Thank you again, President Trump, for your leadership in restoring reciprocity in trade and for having the courage that all of our other leaders have lacked.”

    American Petroleum Institute: “We welcome President Trump’s decision to exclude oil and natural gas from new tariffs, underscoring the complexity of integrated global energy markets and the importance of America’s role as a net energy exporter. We will continue working with the Trump administration on trade policies that support American energy dominance.”

    National Association of Home Builders Chairman Buddy Hughes: “NAHB is pleased President Trump recognized the importance of critical construction inputs for housing and chose to continue current exemptions for Canadian and Mexican products, with a specific exemption for lumber from any new tariffs at this time. NAHB will continue to work with the administration to find ways to increase domestic lumber production, reduce regulatory burdens, and create an environment that allows builders to increase our nation’s housing supply.”

    International Dairy Foods Association SVP of Trade and Workforce Policy Becky Rasdall Vargas: “The U.S. dairy industry exports more than $8 billion of high-quality dairy products every year to approximately 145 countries around the world. To meet growing global demand, dairy businesses have invested $8 billion in new processing capacity here in the United States—creating jobs, strengthening rural economies, and positioning America as the world’s leading dairy supplier. This growth depends on strong trade relationships and access to essential ingredients, finished goods, packaging, and equipment to provide Americans with safe, affordable, and nutritious dairy foods and beverages. IDFA supports the Trump Administration’s efforts to hold trading partners accountable and expand market access for U.S. dairy.”

    Bienvenido Empresarios: “As an organization committed to empowering Hispanic Americans and strengthening our nation’s future, Bienvenido supports policies that build a more resilient American economy, safeguard our communities, and reassert U.S. leadership on the global stage. President Trump’s emphasis on using economic leverage — including tariffs — reflects a broader strategy to counter China, confront the deadly fentanyl crisis, and bring critical industries back home. Now is a time for tough, decisive action when national security and American livelihoods are at stake. Our hope is that these measures lead to stronger enforcement, fairer trade, and long-term prosperity for all Americans.”

    America First Policy Institute: “Tariffs worked then—and they’ll work again. Under President Trump, tariffs brought back jobs, lowered inflation, and strengthened national security. It’s not just economic policy—it’s America First in action.”

    Author Batya Ungar-Sargon: “[President Trump] is saying we’re going to invest heavily in our middle class. We are no longer going to be a country in which our economy is an upward funnel of wealth from the hardest-working Americans into the pockets of the international global elites.”

    Fox Business Network’s Charles Payne: “President Trump ran on tariffs. What we just saw was a president who did what he said he was going to do … This system is unsustainable … Is our patriotism tied to Wall Street? Or should it be tied to our own personal ability to achieve the American Dream?”

    Republic Financial Chairman Nate Morris: “As someone who was raised by a proud autoworker – thank you President Trump for putting AMERICAN workers first again!”

    Commentator Geraldo Rivera: “The family did visit Japan… we did not see a single American car on the road in Tokyo — not a Caddy, not a Buick, not a Ford, not a Chevy… I have an innate sense that there’s something unfair going on… if they are screwing us, we got to tax them.”

    Commentator Bill O’Reilly: “We’ve been getting hosed since World War II by the trade imbalance … You can do what Biden and Obama did, which is just ignore it completely … The numbers are staggering, and the best part of Trump’s speech today was that he said that if you go to Japan or South Korea or China or Germany, you’re not going to see any American cars because they won’t let them in … Trump is right.”

    CPAC Chairman Matt Schlapp: “America cannot afford to be taken advantage of any longer.  Even our friends and strategic allies have for too long assumed that the United States could absorb unfair treatment, including high tariffs on American goods.  We applaud the steps taken by President Trump today to defend American manufacturers not because we like higher taxes, but because we know that trade is only free when both sides follow similar rules.  What President Trump understands is that America needs to get back on track by improving our domestic competitiveness by cutting taxes and regulations AND we need to take on the globalists who believe Americans should not always have to take it in the chops.  Real respect begins with economic reciprocity.”

    Speaker Mike Johnson: “President Trump is sending a clear message with Liberation Day: America will not be exploited by unfair trade practices anymore. These tariffs restore fair and reciprocal trade and level the playing field for American workers and innovators. The President understands that FREE trade ONLY works when it’s FAIR!”

    Gov. Jeff Landry: “Pro Jobs. Pro Business. Pro America.”

    Senate Majority Whip John Barrasso: “President Trump is acting boldly to put America first. America needs fair and free trade. We can’t allow other countries to keep abusing our workers and job creators. It’s time we had a level playing field. I applaud President Trump’s 100% commitment to Made in America.”

    Sen. Jim Banks: “The decision by President Trump today to impose reciprocal tariffs will be so good for Indiana. … Those are the manufacturing jobs that President Trump is bringing back from overseas.”

    Sen. Bill Cassidy: “The president’s trade agenda can pave the way for stronger trade deals, fairer rules, and real results. I am excited to work with President Trump to make it happen. Louisiana’s workers and families deserve nothing less.”

    Sen. John Kennedy: “America is rich. We buy a lot of stuff. President Trump is saying that if you foreign businesses want to sell in America, then move your business here and hire American workers.”

    Sen. Roger Marshall: “President Donald Trump is fighting for long-term solutions to put America’s farmers and ranchers first.”

    Sen. Ashley Moody: “It’s liberation day in America! Today, @POTUS sent a message to the world that the era of America being taken advantage of is over.”

    Sen. Bernie Moreno: “President Trump is finally reversing their failed policies and fighting back for American workers.”

    Sen. Markwayne Mullin: “President Trump is going to charge foreign countries roughly half of what they *already* charge us to do business. Literally who can argue with this?”

    Sen. Pete Ricketts: “President Trump is delivering on his campaign promises to level the playing field and stand up for the American people. Reciprocal tariffs will ensure equal treatment for American businesses. @POTUS is working to reshore jobs lost overseas and secure our supply chains. He is working to open new markets for our nation’s agriculture products. He is demonstrating to foreign adversaries like China that we will no longer be taken advantage of.”

    Sen. Rick Scott: “The days of the U.S. being taken advantage of by other countries are OVER! Pres. Trump is making it clear that he will ALWAYS put American jobs, manufacturing and our economy first. As Americans, let’s stand with him and support one another by buying products MADE IN AMERICA.”

    Sen. Eric Schmitt: “President Trump is bringing America back. We won’t be ripped off by other countries anymore. We’re bringing back manufacturing, unleashing energy production, and paving the way for prosperity.”

    Sen. Tim Sheehy: “They tariff us at up to 50% of our exported ag products and then dump mass produced ag products into our market severely hurting our farmers and ranchers. It’s about time we have a level playing field for businesses.”

    Sen. Tommy Tuberville: “For too long, other countries have ripped us off with bad trade deals – resulting in American jobs and manufacturing moving overseas. But change is coming. The Golden Age of America’s economy is here. Happy Liberation Day.”

    House Majority Leader Steve Scalise: “The United States and American workers will no longer be ripped off by other countries with unfair trade practices. Thank you President Trump for putting America’s workers and innovators first with reciprocal tariffs that level the playing field and make trade FAIR.”

    House Majority Whip Tom Emmer: “For too long, foreign countries have taken advantage of us at the expense of American workers. President @realDonaldTrump says NO MORE.”

    House Republican Conference Chairwoman Lisa McClain: “Tariffs work! @POTUS has proven tariffs are an effective tool in achieving economic and strategic objectives. The President’s long-term strategy will pay off.”

    Rep. Elise Stefanik: “I strongly support President Trump’s America First economic policies to strengthen American manufacturing and create millions of American jobs. For too long, Americans have suffered under unfair trade practices putting America Last. We will not allow other countries to take advantage of us and we must put America and the American worker first.”

    Rep. Jason Smith: “America shouldn’t reward countries that discriminate against American workers and manufacturers. On Liberation Day, President Trump is correcting this and demanding fair treatment for American producers.”

    Rep. Mark Alford: “The days of the United States being taken advantage of are OVER. Republicans are putting American workers FIRST.”

    Rep. Rick Allen: “@POTUS is undoing decades of unfair trade practices and putting American workers, businesses, and manufacturers FIRST. These reciprocal tariffs are simply leveling the playing field and will help ensure the U.S. is no longer on the losing end of global trade.”

    Rep. Jodey Arrington: “For too long, our leaders have allowed other nations to rip us off through numerous unfair trade practices resulting in suppressed wages, lost opportunities, and unrealized economic growth. Just as he did in his first term, President Trump is fighting to ensure an even playing field for our manufacturers, farmers, and workers so we can unleash American prosperity and Make America Great Again.”

    Rep. Brian Babin: “Trump’s tariffs aren’t starting a trade war—they’re ending one. For decades, other countries ripped off American workers with unfair tariffs and barriers. Now, we’re finally fighting back.”

    Rep. Andy Biggs: “Past administrations have allowed the United States to be ripped off by allies and adversaries alike. President Trump said “NO MORE!” The Art of the Deal.”

    Rep. Vern Buchanan: “For too long, unfair trade practices devastated America’s manufacturing base and stole millions of blue-collar jobs. It’s time to level the playing field and bring those jobs back. @POTUS is fighting for American workers.”

    Rep. Eli Crane: “America First policies are what the American people voted for.”

    Rep. Michael Cloud: “America-First means putting the American people first. We will no longer be taken advantage of as a nation and people.”

    Rep. Andrew Clyde: “For far too long, the U.S. has been ripped off by countries across the globe with unfair trade practices. Now, we’re finally leveling the playing field. THANK YOU, President Trump, for putting American workers and manufacturing FIRST.”

    Rep. Mike Collins: “This is fair. Whether it’s our military or economy, other countries have taken advantage of the U.S. for far too long. That time is over.”

    Rep. Byron Donalds: “For decades, a lot of these countries have built their economies on the back of the American economy … These nations have become, not just developing nations, they are now strong economies. And so, we have to have fair trade if we’re going to have free trade.”

    Rep. Chuck Edwards: “Many countries are taking advantage of the United States by imposing tariffs against us while we don’t have reciprocal tariffs against them. @POTUS has used tariffs to produce successful trade deals for us in his first term, and I support his plan to use them again to create a more level playing field and secure fairer trade deals for America. The quicker other countries agree to fairer trade deals, the quicker the tariffs can end.”

    Rep. Gabe Evans: “This admin puts America first from strengthening our economy & national security to prioritizing hard working Americans. Farmers in #CO08 have been disadvantaged in foreign trade deals & will benefit from reciprocal tariffs that promote FAIR & free trade.”

    Rep. Scott Franklin: “For years the US handcuffed itself and played nice while other countries imposed massive tariffs and took advantage of us. We’re done putting America last. @POTUS is leveling the playing field, ending trade imbalances and prioritizing American workers and manufacturing again!”

    Rep. Mike Flood: “Biden did nothing for four years on trade. Five years after Brexit, America doesn’t have a free trade deal with the UK. President @realDonaldTrump is rightsizing our trade relationships.”

    Rep. Russell Fry: “HAPPY LIBERATION DAY. Thanks to @POTUS, America is DONE being taken advantage of. A new era has begun.”

    Rep. Lance Gooden: “For decades, Washington allowed Texans to be ripped off by foreign countries. Those days are now over. @POTUS is committed to making America wealthy again!”

    Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene: “If you want to do business in America, you need to play by our rules. For too long, American businesses, big and small, have been ripped off by bad trade deals and unfair competition. President Trump is putting a stop to it. He’s standing up for our workers, our companies, and our consumers.”

    Rep. Abe Hamadeh: “The America First Republican party is the party of the working class, the forgotten men and women. On this Liberation Day, we further our commitment to them, that we will reshore our manufacturing, restore fair trade, and rebuild the greatest economy in the world.”

    Rep. Pat Harrigan: “If you want access to the most powerful economy in the world, treat us fairly. If not, don’t expect a free ride. That’s real leadership and @POTUS is delivering it!”

    Rep. Andy Harris: “President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs will put the American worker first and bring fairness back to international trade. America is being respected again.”

    Rep. Diana Harshbarger: “President Trump is bringing back the American Dream. Our taxpayers have been ripped off by foreign countries for far too long, but those days are over. President Trump is right to impose these reciprocal tariffs.”

    Rep. Clay Higgins: “.@POTUS’ trade agenda puts American industry and America first. I support the President’s action to protect our domestic producers.”

    Rep. Wesley Hunt: “Today, President Trump empowered the American middle class.  His policies on tariffs will bring automotive manufacturing back to America.”

    Rep. Morgan Luttrell: “President Trump is putting America First on trade—standing up to foreign adversaries, protecting American workers, and rebuilding our manufacturing base. The days of unfair trade deals and economic surrender are OVER.”

    Rep. Nicole Malliotakis: “Since President Trump has been elected, we’ve attracted $5 trillion in private investment, foreign & domestic companies have announced Made in USA manufacturing, countries have reduced tariffs or changed foreign policies. President Trump is sticking up for American workers & farmers, repatriating our supply chain and protecting our national security.”

    Rep. Addison McDowell: “My district was hit hard over the years by unfair trade deals. Finally, we have a President who wants to put the American worker FIRST.”

    Rep. Dan Meuser: “We have been treated unfairly. Free trade has become synonymous with unfair trade, and @POTUS is recognizing that… We needed a reckoning; we needed a correction. President Trump is bringing it.”

    Rep. Mary Miller: “America will no longer be taken advantage of! This is how you put America First.”

    Rep. John Moolenaar: “For far too long, the Chinese Communist Party has exploited America’s generosity, stolen our intellectual property, and undermined our workers. President Trump’s recent tariffs and the Restoring Trade Fairness Act, which I introduced earlier this year to revoke China’s permanent normal trade relations status, will finally put an end to this abuse—holding China accountable and protecting American jobs. For decades, we’ve accepted one-sided trade deals that hurt our industries while benefiting our adversaries. Trade deficits reflect that imbalance, but they also reveal something deeper: the strength of the American consumer. It’s time we stopped allowing that strength to be used against us and started putting American workers first.”

    Rep. Riley Moore: “For decades, foreign countries have enjoyed free access to the greatest consumer marketplace on the face of the planet, all while still charging our domestic producers hefty duties or imposing significant barriers to access their markets. Today that ends. President Trump is the only president in my lifetime to acknowledge how unfair trade has gutted the heartland and shipped countless jobs overseas. By finally reciprocating in-kind, we’ll force foreign competitors to the negotiating table, lower trade barriers, and ultimately create real free and fair trade across the board. I’m confident this move will boost our domestic manufacturing industry and fuel demand for American products across the globe.”

    Rep. Tim Moore: “President Trump is leveling the playing field for American workers and bringing back MADE IN AMERICA!”

    Rep. Troy Nehls: “President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs make it clear that our country will not be ripped off anymore. We are bringing back American manufacturing and putting America First.”

    Rep. Ralph Norman: “Happy LIBERATION Day … ✅Protect the American worker ✅Strengthen manufacturing ✅Reduce unfair trade practices … Our economy will be competitive again!!”

    Rep. Andy Ogles: “He’s resetting the negotiating table. He’s resetting the deck here to say, ‘You know what? For too long, you’ve taken advantage of our free market and you’ve literally leached jobs away from the American people … Let’s have a serious conversation and let’s do something that’s fair and mutually beneficial for both sides.’”

    Rep. Guy Reschenthaler: “I fully support President Trump’s critical efforts to right this generational wrong, bring manufacturing jobs home, and rejuvenate American working families. Made in America is back.”

    Rep. John Rutherford: “Tariffs help bring American jobs back home, incentivize buying American, AND put pressure on Canada and Mexico to stop the flow of fentanyl and illegal immigrants from their countries into ours. Even the Biden Admin kept or increased tariffs that President Trump imposed during his first presidency. Under Trump, inflation stayed around 2% and our GDP grew to 3%. Smart tariffs are a long-term investment in the American economy that are worth the short-term cost.”

    Rep. Adrian Smith: “Reducing trade barriers is necessary to ensuring American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, small businesses, and innovators can sell their products in other markets. President Trump has made it clear other countries can avoid tariffs by reducing or eliminating their existing barriers to U.S. products. Engagement on trade is vital to our economy and opportunity for U.S. workers. In his first term, President Trump proved robust engagement can be productive as he moved the ball down the field on several agreements with our top trade partners. To achieve economic stability, we must continue to fight to give our producers the chance to compete in a global marketplace.”

    Rep. Greg Steube: “What many fail to realize: Trump’s reciprocal tariffs are a long-overdue response to years of unfair trade policies against America. For decades, America has been ripped off by other countries who have repeatedly slapped tariffs on our goods, blocked our products, and flooded our markets with theirs. The numbers don’t lie–the rest of the world has profited at the expense of American workers and businesses. President Trump is finally putting America First by taking bold, necessary actions that past leaders wouldn’t take.”

    Rep. Marlin Stutzman: “If Australia doesn’t want our beef – WE DON’T WANT THEIRS! Thank you @POTUS for opening the door of fair treatment for America’s Cattlemen‼️”

    Rep. Tom Tiffany: “Gone are the days of America being taken advantage of by foreign countries. The American worker comes FIRST.”

    Rep. William Timmons: “President Trump’s tariffs are a necessary move to protect American workers and rebuild our economy. We are finally breaking free from decades of unfair trade deals that gutted our industries. These tariffs will bring jobs back to our districts, strengthen manufacturing, and ensure our children inherit a country that is not just a consumer, but a producer. Thank you, @POTUS.”

    Rep. Beth Van Duyne: “For far too long, the United States has been taken advantage of by our foreign trade partners. The American people re-elected President Trump to bring back truly fair trade with other countries. Reciprocal tariffs are a first step to have a level playing field for American products and to start bringing back manufacturing to our country!”

    Rep. Daniel Webster: “President @realDonaldTrump is delivering on his mandate to restore America’s economic strength. For too long, unfair trade deals have hollowed out our factories and shipped American jobs overseas. By standing up to bad actors like China and Venezuela and enforcing fair trade, President Trump is defending American industries and putting American workers first.”

    Rep. Tony Wied: “President Trump has made it clear with these reciprocal tariffs that we will no longer allow other countries to take advantage of us. His goal is simple: to bring jobs and manufacturing back to our country and open up foreign markets to American products. If companies want to avoid these tariffs, they will do business in the United States. I applaud the President for taking a stand against years of unfair trade practices and making sure we put American workers and consumers first. It’s time our foreign trading partners finally live up to their end of the bargain.”

    Rep. Roger Williams: “For too long, America Last policies have put the U.S. auto industry at a disadvantage. As a car dealer and small business owner, I support @POTUS’ Executive Order to increase competition, boost revenue, and bring back American jobs.”

    Mississippi Commissioner of Agriculture and Commerce Andy Gipson: “I applaud President Trump’s actions today to reset global trade relations through the President’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariff plan. America is not only in a trade war, we’ve been in a trade war for years now. This trade war has resulted in historic trade deficits that continue to hurt our farmers. … I believe President Trump’s actions today will set the stage for the renegotiation of better trade deals that will benefit American farmers and all our domestic industries going forward and will also serve to spur more local production.”

    U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Jamieson Greer: “Today, President Trump is taking urgent action to protect the national security and economy of the United States. The current lack of trade reciprocity, demonstrated by our chronic trade deficit, has weakened our economic and national security. After only 72 days in office, President Trump has prioritized swift action to bring reciprocity to our trade relations and reduce the trade deficit by leveling the playing field for American workers and manufacturers, reshoring American jobs, expanding our domestic manufacturing base, and ensuring our defense-industrial base is not dependent on foreign adversaries—all leading to stronger economic and national security.”

    Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick: “Today, the world starts taking us seriously. Our workforce will finally be treated fairly.”

    Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent: “President Trump signed the Declaration of Economic Independence for the American people. For decades, the trade status quo has allowed countries to leverage tariffs and unfair trade practices to get ahead at the expense of hardworking Americans. The President’s historic actions will level the playing field for American workers and usher in a new age of economic strength.”

    Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins: “FARMERS COME FIRST — @POTUS is leveling the playing field, ensuring American farmers and ranchers can compete globally again!”

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio: “Thank you, @POTUS! ‘Made in America’ is not just a tagline — it’s an economic and national security priority.”

    Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem: “For too long, America has been targeted by unfair trade practices that made our supply chain dependent on foreign adversaries, eroded our industrial base, and hurt American workers. This has gravely impacted our national security. President Trump’s strong action will help make America safe again. @DHS, primarily through @CBP, is ready to collect these new tariffs and put an end to unfair trade practices. Thank you President @realDonaldTrump for putting America FIRST.”

    Secretary of Labor Lori Chavez-DeRemer: “Promises made, promises kept”

    Secretary of Energy Chris Wright: “President Trump is a businessman; he’s a negotiator. The result of that has been and will continue to be improvements for the American people. We are in the midst of a negotiation, and he is fighting every day to make the cost-of-living conditions better for Americans.”

    Secretary of Education Linda McMahon: “At the White House this afternoon, we celebrated Liberation Day — setting our economy on the path of future prosperity for our children. Business owners, workers, and taxpayers have been waiting for strong economic leadership.

    @POTUS’ actions today prove we are done being taken advantage of in international trade.”

    Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum: “President Trump’s Liberation Day reciprocity plan is commonsense. If you tariff us, we’ll tariff you. This will strengthen our economy and make America wealthy again!”

    Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy: “Today is the day we will liberate ourselves from unfair trade practices and outdated ways of thinking. Tariffs are an important tool in the President’s toolbox to stop foreign countries from ripping us off, protect America’s workers, and restore U.S. manufacturing. I stand with @POTUS as he finally levels the playing field. Happy Liberation Day!”

    Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Scott Turner: “For four years, Americans couldn’t afford groceries, let alone a house. This Liberation Day, @POTUS is bringing manufacturing and jobs back. President Trump is making the American Dream achievable again!”

    Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lee Zeldin: “Massive announcement by @POTUS today restoring U.S. dominance, cementing his America First vision, and Powering the Great American Comeback.”

    Small Business Administration Administrator Kelly Loeffler: “Small businesses will no longer be crushed by foreign governments and unfair trade deals. Instead, we will put American industry, workers, and strength FIRST. Thank you @POTUS for bringing back Made in America!”

    National Security Advisor Mike Waltz: “Economic security is national security. Thank you President Trump for putting America first.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Government Legal Department Celebrates Ten Years of Excellence

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Government Legal Department Celebrates Ten Years of Excellence

    GLD celebrates ten years of providing outstanding legal service to help the government govern well, within the rule of law.

    • Government Legal Department marks a decade of an exceptional legal service that has transformed legal support to government in support of our core purpose of helping the government to govern well, within the rule of law
    • A modern, inclusive workplace based across the UK, GLD is the largest in-house legal firm in the country

    The Government Legal Department (GLD) marks its 10th anniversary on 1st April 2025 celebrating a decade of transforming legal service that has strengthened government operations and public service delivery across the United Kingdom.

    Established in 2015, GLD built on the success of the Treasury Solicitor’s Department by bringing together previously separate legal teams in a unified model, creating a modern and efficient legal services provider across government. The department has now grown to over 3000 employees as further departmental legal teams have joined, delivering better value for taxpayers and creating meaningful career opportunities for government lawyers.

    The department delivers consistent, high-quality legal support whether that is litigating on behalf of the government in court or through the development of policy and subsequent legislation. Implementing the priorities of the government of the day for fellow citizens up and down the country.  

    Over the past decade, GLD has continued to grow and develop its specialisms to meet the legal needs of government, for example seeking out the international trade skills needed in a post-Brexit UK, we have built a specialist employment law group and centralised our commercial expertise to ensure we continue to build the capability to deal with large-scale commercial contracts and disputes.

    The department also aims to lead the sector and improve access to the law, championing alternative routes into the legal profession. Whether that be through early talent, including the solicitor apprenticeship scheme and Summer Diversity Scheme, or our supportive approach to flexible working.

    Our flexible working policies offer carers, parents and those returning to the profession the ability to pick up their legal career at any point and at any level. We strive to build a workforce that represents the society we serve and encourage diversity of thought and leadership. Over the last 10 years this has resulted in 80% of the Executive team being women, as are over 60% of the department. 

    GLD has been central in enabling the government to respond to the biggest issues of our time, including:

    • Developing the Coronavirus Act 2020 which enabled the UK government to take swift action in response to the Covid-19 pandemic
    • Preparing the Withdrawal Agreement to enable the UK’s to withdraw from the European Union 
    • Delivering Free-Trade Agreements following the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union
    • Supporting the design and launch of the Homes for Ukraine Scheme, housing over 100,000 Ukrainians fleeing the war
    • Playing a central role in the UK’s legislative commitment to net zero greenhouse gas emissions
    • Advising the Department for Transport on the Space Industry Bill which prepared the way for the first commercial spaceflight from UK soil
    • Supporting the Employment Rights Bill which aims to abolish exploitative zero-hours contracts and legislate for other employment rights

    GLD’s Permanent Secretary and Treasury Solicitor, Susanna McGibbon KC (Hon), said:

    This anniversary marks a significant milestone in our journey. By bringing together diverse legal expertise into one organisation we’ve created a more responsive, efficient service for government.

    Our strapline, delivering much more than law, underlines the impact of our work on society. I am proud to lead an organisation committed to the highest standards of public service playing an important role across the legal profession generally.

    Updates to this page

    Published 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Unfair trade practices of Türkiye at the expense of Cyprus and the EU single market – E-000068/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The United Kingdom-Türkiye free trade agreement came into effect on 1 January 2021, coinciding with the day of Brexit.

    The consecutive conclusions of the Council[1] and the European Council emphasised the EU’s readiness to engage with Türkiye in areas of common interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and recalled the need to address difficulties in the implementation of the Customs Union, including ensuring its effective application to all Member States .

    The Commission reiterates the imperative to apply the Customs Union to Cyprus in all the high-level meetings with Türkiye. Most recently the issue was discussed at the EU-Türkiye Customs Union Joint Committee on 4 December 2024.

    • [1] See for most recent conclusions: Council conclusions on Enlargement as approved by the Council on 17 December 2024, recitals 98 and 99.
    Last updated: 2 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Liverpool and Dublin reignite twin city agreement

    Source: City of Liverpool

    Liverpool and Dublin have begun the process of reinvigorating their twinning agreement.

    A sister city arrangement was signed back in 1997 as a mark of the long and shared history between the two.

    Now, the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Emma Blain, has visited Liverpool to meet with her counterpart Cllr Richard Kemp, Council Leader, Cllr Liam Robinson, and Mayor of the Liverpool City Region, Steve Rotheram.

    They have discussed mutually beneficial ways in which the two cities can work together in areas such as culture, tourism and the wider economy.

    Councillor Robinson said: “Here in Liverpool, 75% of us have some form of Irish heritage, so it was brilliant to welcome the Lord Mayor of Dublin, so we could talk about how we reinvigorate our partnership.

    “We have a great opportunity to work together post-Brexit, and focus on some of the economic links that we share as two cities and how we can strengthen that over the years ahead.”

    Lord Mayor Blain said: “It is my immense pride and pleasure to visit the city of Liverpool to reactivate the twinning agreement between Dublin and Liverpool.

    “Our two cities have long shared a much cherished connection and I hope that this visit will help strengthen those bonds.

    “Dublin and Liverpool have strong historic cultural, social and economic connections which extend across all aspects of Liverpool’s renowned reputation for music and arts, commerce and industry, sport and education.

    “I am looking forward to visiting the University of Liverpool Materials Innovation Factory and Institute of Irish Studies as part of my visit, and wish to thank them for hosting us.

    “Like many Dubliners, I have a family connection to the City of Liverpool, it is a place I have visited many times and am always struck by the warmth and welcoming of the people. I hope that my visit will be seen as a reciprocation of this warmth and welcoming from the people of Dublin.

    “My sincere thanks to The Lord Mayor of Liverpool, Richard Kemp CBE, and to the Leader of Liverpool City Council, Liam Robinson, for their gracious invitation and their eagerness to develop this connection even further.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olamide Samuel, Track II Diplomat and Expert in Nuclear Politics, University of Leicester

    At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, intensified by strategic dynamics involving the US, Nato and Russia over Europe’s security, nuclear weapons are back on the agenda.

    In recent times, Russia has openly threatened to use nuclear weapons. The UK and France are considering ways to rapidly increase their nuclear weapons stockpiles.

    Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, South Korea and Japan are now seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

    Even a limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to catastrophic global climatic effects. Huge amounts of debris thrown high into the atmosphere would block sunlight, causing global temperatures to drop sharply. It would be much harder to grow food around the world.

    This would severely threaten Africa’s food security, exacerbating mass migration, disrupting supply chains and potentially collapsing public order systems.

    How should African countries respond to this growing threat?

    Based on my experience in nuclear non-proliferation and politics, I argue that African leaders need to proactively confront the risks, while there is still time.

    All African states, except for South Sudan, abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is an international agreement which limits the spread of nuclear weapons. And 43 African states have gone further to join the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). This was negotiated in the belief that it would “protect African states against possible nuclear attacks on their territories”.

    As conflict and uncertainty pushes many western leaders to support the madness of nuclear weapons proliferation, African leaders are in a unique position to push back against this.

    Africa’s strength in numbers in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty, is a vehicle the continent can use to address nuclear weapons risks, head-on.

    Global divide

    On one side, nuclear-armed states cling to deterrence for their national security. They insist that possessing nuclear arsenals keeps them safe.

    At present, there are nine nuclear-armed states: the US, Russia, the UK, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. These countries possess around 12,331 nuclear warheads (as of 2025).

    The use of only 10% of these weapons could disrupt the global climate and threaten the lives of up to 2 billion people.

    On the other side, African countries and other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ireland, Austria, New Zealand and Mexico highlight how deterrence creates unacceptable risks for the entire international community.

    This global majority – the 93 countries that have signed the Nuclear Ban Treaty and 73 that are party to it – argue that real safety comes from eliminating nuclear threats.

    The Nuclear Ban Treaty became international law on 22 January 2021. It is the first instance of international law challenging the legality and morality of nuclear deterrence.

    Since 2022, states parties to the Nuclear Ban Treaty have held formal meetings to address current nuclear risks. In March 2025, at their third meeting, 17 African states officially recognised nuclear deterrence as a critical security concern. They called on nuclear armed states to end deterrence.

    The deterioration of the international security environment is so palpable that there has been a noticeable shift in nuclear ban states’ perception of nuclear threats. Nuclear disarmament is no longer just a humanitarian or moral concern to these states, it is now a national security concern.

    South Africa warned that

    any use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would have a global impact.

    Ghana likewise stressed that Africa is not immune to nuclear war’s fallout:

    Africa, despite its geographic distance from the immediate hotspots of nuclear conflict, is not immune to the repercussions of nuclear weapons.

    Africa bears a unique historical connection to nuclear issues. Nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in the 1960s, when France detonated nuclear bombs in Algeria, had devastating consequences. Widespread radioactive contamination harmed local communities, caused long-lasting health problems, displaced populations, and left large areas environmentally damaged and unsafe for generations.

    For its part, Nigeria recalled that Africa had “long acknowledged the existential threat nuclear weapons posed to human existence.”

    The meeting determined that it is unacceptable that states parties are exposed to nuclear risks, “created without their control and without accountability”. It stressed that eliminating nuclear risks “is a prime and legitimate concern and national responsibility” of states.

    Next steps

    Delegates effectively asked whether their own national security concerns had less value than those of nuclear-armed states. I think this is a valid question.

    Africa’s leaders and their allies in the Nuclear Ban Treaty are reframing what “national security” means in the nuclear age.

    Rather than accepting a world perpetually held hostage by the madness of nuclear deterrence, they are asserting that the security of nations – and of peoples – is best served by dismantling this threat to humanity.

    They are prioritising human life, development and international law over the threat of overwhelming force.

    The outcome of this contest will have profound implications, not just for Africa but for the entire globe.

    Olamide Samuel is affiliated with the Open Nuclear Network.

    ref. Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban – https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-threat-why-africas-pushing-for-a-complete-ban-253171

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olamide Samuel, Track II Diplomat and Expert in Nuclear Politics, University of Leicester

    At a time of heightened geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, intensified by strategic dynamics involving the US, Nato and Russia over Europe’s security, nuclear weapons are back on the agenda.

    In recent times, Russia has openly threatened to use nuclear weapons. The UK and France are considering ways to rapidly increase their nuclear weapons stockpiles.

    Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, South Korea and Japan are now seeking nuclear weapons capabilities.

    Even a limited nuclear war in Europe would lead to catastrophic global climatic effects. Huge amounts of debris thrown high into the atmosphere would block sunlight, causing global temperatures to drop sharply. It would be much harder to grow food around the world.

    This would severely threaten Africa’s food security, exacerbating mass migration, disrupting supply chains and potentially collapsing public order systems.

    How should African countries respond to this growing threat?

    Based on my experience in nuclear non-proliferation and politics, I argue that African leaders need to proactively confront the risks, while there is still time.

    All African states, except for South Sudan, abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is an international agreement which limits the spread of nuclear weapons. And 43 African states have gone further to join the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). This was negotiated in the belief that it would “protect African states against possible nuclear attacks on their territories”.

    As conflict and uncertainty pushes many western leaders to support the madness of nuclear weapons proliferation, African leaders are in a unique position to push back against this.

    Africa’s strength in numbers in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Ban Treaty, is a vehicle the continent can use to address nuclear weapons risks, head-on.

    Global divide

    On one side, nuclear-armed states cling to deterrence for their national security. They insist that possessing nuclear arsenals keeps them safe.

    At present, there are nine nuclear-armed states: the US, Russia, the UK, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. These countries possess around 12,331 nuclear warheads (as of 2025).

    The use of only 10% of these weapons could disrupt the global climate and threaten the lives of up to 2 billion people.

    On the other side, African countries and other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ireland, Austria, New Zealand and Mexico highlight how deterrence creates unacceptable risks for the entire international community.

    This global majority – the 93 countries that have signed the Nuclear Ban Treaty and 73 that are party to it – argue that real safety comes from eliminating nuclear threats.

    The Nuclear Ban Treaty became international law on 22 January 2021. It is the first instance of international law challenging the legality and morality of nuclear deterrence.

    Since 2022, states parties to the Nuclear Ban Treaty have held formal meetings to address current nuclear risks. In March 2025, at their third meeting, 17 African states officially recognised nuclear deterrence as a critical security concern. They called on nuclear armed states to end deterrence.

    The deterioration of the international security environment is so palpable that there has been a noticeable shift in nuclear ban states’ perception of nuclear threats. Nuclear disarmament is no longer just a humanitarian or moral concern to these states, it is now a national security concern.

    South Africa warned that

    any use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would have a global impact.

    Ghana likewise stressed that Africa is not immune to nuclear war’s fallout:

    Africa, despite its geographic distance from the immediate hotspots of nuclear conflict, is not immune to the repercussions of nuclear weapons.

    Africa bears a unique historical connection to nuclear issues. Nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in the 1960s, when France detonated nuclear bombs in Algeria, had devastating consequences. Widespread radioactive contamination harmed local communities, caused long-lasting health problems, displaced populations, and left large areas environmentally damaged and unsafe for generations.

    For its part, Nigeria recalled that Africa had “long acknowledged the existential threat nuclear weapons posed to human existence.”

    The meeting determined that it is unacceptable that states parties are exposed to nuclear risks, “created without their control and without accountability”. It stressed that eliminating nuclear risks “is a prime and legitimate concern and national responsibility” of states.

    Next steps

    Delegates effectively asked whether their own national security concerns had less value than those of nuclear-armed states. I think this is a valid question.

    Africa’s leaders and their allies in the Nuclear Ban Treaty are reframing what “national security” means in the nuclear age.

    Rather than accepting a world perpetually held hostage by the madness of nuclear deterrence, they are asserting that the security of nations – and of peoples – is best served by dismantling this threat to humanity.

    They are prioritising human life, development and international law over the threat of overwhelming force.

    The outcome of this contest will have profound implications, not just for Africa but for the entire globe.

    – Nuclear war threat: why Africa’s pushing for a complete ban
    – https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-threat-why-africas-pushing-for-a-complete-ban-253171

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Honorary King’s Counsel ceremony

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Honorary King’s Counsel ceremony

    Treasury Solicitor Susanna McGibbon receives Honorary King’s Counsel in Westminster Hall ceremony

    Permanent Secretary of GLD and Treasury Solicitor, Susanna McGibbon KC (Hon), and Director General of Attorney General’s Office, Douglas Wilson KC (Hon) OBE

    Permanent Secretary of GLD and Treasury Solicitor, Susanna McGibbon KC (Hon), received her Honorary King’s Counsel last week at a ceremony in Westminster Hall.

    The appointment is in recognition of her extensive legal advice as the most senior lawyer in the Civil Service, regularly advising on high profile and complex matters at the heart of government.

    Susanna was nominated for her legal advice on complex and sensitive issues within government especially in public and administrative law and national security. Also, for her leadership in a range of high-profile cases and inquiries and for her advocacy for diversity and inclusion across the legal profession.  

    On her appointment, Susanna McGibbon KC (Hon) said:

    “I am deeply honoured to be appointed as Honorary King’s Counsel, and to have received the award in this prestigious ceremony. It is a privilege to lead the government legal profession doing such important work for the government and the country. I would like to pay tribute to those colleagues whose work is reflected in this award.”

    Douglas Wilson KC (Hon) OBE, Director General of the Attorney General’s Office, joined Susanna at the ceremony for receipt of his Honorary King’s Counsel.

    He was nominated for advising on issues such as Brexit, military operations, and intelligence cooperation, which shaped the law on the use of military force, cyberspace, and investigatory powers. Furthermore, he has promoted effective and inclusive legal practice within government.

    Douglas Wilson KC (Hon) OBE, said:

    “It is an honour to be appointed Honorary King’s Counsel by the Lord Chancellor, and I’m grateful to those who nominated me. 

    I would like to express my thanks and admiration to my fantastic colleagues in the Attorney General’s Office and across the Government Legal Profession for their work and support.”

    Updates to this page

    Published 31 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-Evening Report: These 3 arguments are part of the long game in Trump’s trade wars

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Markus Wagner, Professor of Law and Director of the UOW Transnational Law and Policy Centre, University of Wollongong

    Since returning to office in January, US President Donald Trump has doubled down on using trade measures – mostly tariffs – to reshape global trade. He plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on what he has labelled “Liberation Day”, April 2.

    The Trump administration claims US producers face higher tariffs and more restrictions abroad than foreign producers when they export to the US.

    The administration also examined tax systems such as Europe’s Value Added Tax and Australia’s GST, import regulations and other factors. It believes – mostly wrongly – these unfairly disadvantage American businesses and contribute to the US trade deficit.

    As with many Trump initiatives, actual tariffs often change significantly between announcement and implementation, if they are implemented at all.

    His reciprocal tariffs have been narrowed to imports from the US’ largest trading partners instead of imports from all countries. There may also be tariffs on specific sectors. Last week, Trump announced 25% tariffs on cars from overseas. At the weekend said he “couldn’t care less” if this made cars more expensive for US consumers.

    Coercive control, revenue and re-shoring

    President Trump has raised a myriad of puzzling arguments in favour of tariffs. They largely fall into three categories:

    The first is the use of tariffs as a coercion tool against other countries. In the first Trump presidency, trading partners were pressured to renegotiate trade agreements such as the renamed but largely identical US-Mexico-Canada agreement.

    Similarly, the Trump administration used the threat of tariffs to gain market access, elicit better trade terms or as a form of weaponised trade to achieve unrelated foreign policy goals.

    Last week, Trump suggested he would consider a reduction in tariffs on China in exchange for a sale of TikTok by its Chinese owner.

    The second category is the use of tariffs as a source of revenue. The Trump administration envisions tariffs to be collected by a yet-to-be-created External Revenue Service. This would form the flip side of the powerful and much-maligned Internal Revenue Service.

    Trump claims tariffs will be paid by the exporting country. This would be in theory to finance future tax cuts. In practice, tariffs are almost always paid by the importer of goods and usually get passed on to consumers.

    There is a potential contradiction between these two rationales. It appears the Trump administration wants to make at least some tariffs permanent. But doing so would almost nullify the use of tariffs as a bargaining chip and coercion tool.

    The final category is to encourage companies to “re-shore” production to the US to avoid tariffs and to support US jobs.

    This would signal a reversal of what 1994 presidential candidate Ross Perot, speaking of the North American Free Trade Agreement, called the “giant sucking sound going south”. Some manufacturing may return to the US. But the high costs of building new factories, re-routing supply chains and uncompetitive US labour costs will hinder large-scale re-shoring efforts.

    A long-term plan?

    The Trump administration’s trade moves can be seen as part of a larger strategy to reshape the US domestic and the global economic system.

    In a recent speech, US Vice-President JD Vance argued for a structural reshaping of the US economy, to increase domestic innovation capacity.

    Vance warned “deindustrialisation poses risks both to our national security and our workforce”. Vance himself sums up this approach by characterising tariffs as a “necessary tool to protect our jobs and our industries”.

    This line of argument overlooks a number of critical factors. Tariffs lead to higher prices for consumers. Unless currencies adjust, the inflationary impact could disadvantage the very people that can least afford it.

    The same is true if other countries respond to US trade measures by responding in kind, as Canada and the European Union already have.

    American farmers and other export-oriented industries will be hard hit. From a strategic perspective, the US position as global leader has suffered a severe blow. Some countries are openly pivoting to its geopolitical and economic rival, China.

    If this scenario comes to pass, the US pullback – an outright withdrawal is unlikely – from the highly integrated international trading system might end up a more chaotic version of the UK’s pursuit of Brexit.

    A step back in time

    The world of liberalised trade that followed the end of the Cold War in 1990 is ending. Countries will turn inwards, prioritising their economic security and resilience. The costs of this turn away from multilateralism and international institutions, however, are not just economic.

    The close economic integration we have witnessed post-1990 has led to reduced uncertainty in international economic relations, increased international security and greater prosperity.

    A return of the “beggar thy neighbour” policies of the 1930s would be a dangerous path, with the world inching closer to the abyss. “Liberation Day” might push the world over the edge.




    Read more:
    What are non-tariff barriers – and why is agriculture so exposed?


    Markus Wagner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. These 3 arguments are part of the long game in Trump’s trade wars – https://theconversation.com/these-3-arguments-are-part-of-the-long-game-in-trumps-trade-wars-252516

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Audit of the Polish poultry industry – E-001195/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001195/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tilly Metz (Verts/ALE)

    In her reply on 10 June 2024 to written question E-001344/2024 on hygiene issues in the Polish poultry sector, former Commissioner Kyriakides stated that ‘the audit planned for this year will contribute to this follow-up and assess the effectiveness of the actions taken’.

    The Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety published a report in 2024 on an assessment of Poland’s controls on antimicrobial veterinary medicinal products[1]. Commission experts state that there has been significant improvement in this important area of human safety, but there are still significant problems. I concluded from the response to written question E-001344/2024 that the Polish poultry industry would also be audited to assess progress in reducing salmonella contamination. An article published on 31 January 2025 in The Guardian entitled ‘Delays to post-Brexit border checks may have let diseased chicken enter UK’ stated: ‘officials were also worried that the salmonella contamination had become more widespread, involving multiple producers from Poland and a greater number of food products, the documents show. While attention had initially focused on breaded chicken and other highly processed products, testing had revealed that fresh chicken and raw pet food was also implicated’.

    Can the Commission please state whether an audit of the Polish poultry industry was carried out in 2024, and if so, what was found?

    Submitted: 20.3.2025

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/download/16871.
    Last updated: 28 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Can Peter Dutton flip Labor voters to rewrite electoral history? It might just work

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mark Kenny, Professor, Australian Studies Institute, Australian National University

    They are neither as leafy nor as affluent as much of the Liberal heartland, but Peter Dutton believes the outer ring-roads of Australia’s capitals provide the most direct route to power.
    He has been telling his MPs these once-safe Labor-voting suburbs are where the 2025 election can be won.

    From the moment the Queenslander assumed control of the Liberal Party in 2022, he was intent on this suburbs-first strategy, even if it seemed historically unlikely and involved repositioning his formerly business-loyal party as the new tribune of the working class. As he told Minerals Week in September 2023:

    The Liberal Party is the party of the worker. The Labor Party has become the party of the inner city elite and Greens.

    This has been Dutton’s long game. It’s an outsider approach reminiscent of what US President Donald Trump had achieved with disaffected blue-collar Democratic supporters in the United States, and what Boris Johnson managed by turning British Labour supporters in England’s de-industrialised north into Brexiteers and then Conservative voters.




    Read more:
    Labor’s in with a fighting chance, but must work around an unpopular leader


    A political gamble

    It was not the obvious play but it may prove the right one.

    After a tumultuous period in which the Liberals had cycled through three prime ministers and ignored a clear public clamour for policy modernisation on women, anti-corruption and climate change, the Morrison government had been bundled from office.

    Morrison hadn’t merely failed to attract disengaged undecideds in the middle-ground, but had haemorrhaged engaged constituents from some of Australia’s safest Liberal postcodes.

    Nineteen seats came off the Coalition tally in that election, yet Labor’s gain was only nine.

    Something fundamental had happened. Six new centrist independents now sat in Liberal heartland seats – all of them professional women.

    Numerically, they formed a kind of electoral Swiss Guard around the new Labor government’s otherwise weak primary vote and thin (two-seat) parliamentary majority.

    In a sharp visual contrast to the Coalition parties, women made up around half of Anthony Albanese’s new Labor government and he moved to prioritise the very things on which the Coalition had steadfastly refused to budge – including meaningful constitutional recognition of First Peoples.

    Albanese, it seemed, had tuned in to the zeitgeist. He would even go on to break a 102-year record a year later, becoming the first PM to increase his majority by taking a set off the opposition in a byelection. One more urban jewel shifted out of the Liberals’ column.

    Dutton, however, never blinked.

    His first press conference as leader in 2022 had been notable for the absence of the usual mea culpa – a suitably contrite acknowledgement that he’d heard the message from erstwhile Liberals who had abandoned their party for more progressive community independents.

    Instead, Dutton confidently responded that the 2025 election would be decided not in these comfortable seats but in the further-flung parts of Australia’s cities where people make long commutes to work and struggle to find adequate childcare and other services.

    It was a bold strategy because it meant targeting seats with healthy Labor margins.
    Canberra insiders wondered privately if this was brave or simply delusional. Some concluded it could only work as a two-election strategy.

    Many asked where a net gain of 19 seats would come from if not through the recovery of most or all of what became known as the “teal” seats?

    Yet the combative Liberal continued to focus on prising suburbanites away from Labor with a relentless campaign emphasising the rising cost-of-living under Labor.

    Three years later and even accounting for the first interest rate cut in over four years, it is Dutton’s strategy that has looked the more attuned to the electoral zeitgeist.

    So much so that he goes into this election with a realistic chance of breaking another longstanding electoral record: that of replacing a first-term government.

    This hasn’t been done federally since the Great Depression took out the Scullin Labor government of 1929-1931.

    It’s all about geography

    While only votes in ballot boxes will tell, the Coalition’s rebounding support appears to have come from the outer mortgage belt, just as he predicted.

    These voters absorb their political news sporadically via social media feeds, soft breakfast interviews, and car-radio snippets.

    These are media where Dutton’s crisp sound-bite messaging around cost-of-living pressures has simply been sharper and more resonant than Labor’s.

    And it is by this means that these voters may have picked up that a Dutton government would seek to deport dual citizens convicted of serious crimes, stop new migrants from buying property (a policy first ridiculed as inconsequential by Labor and since copied), and cut petrol excise, temporarily taking around $14 off the price of a tank of fuel.

    These voters may have noticed Dutton’s campaign against the supermarket duopoly, which includes the option of forced divestiture for so-called “price-gouging”.

    Recently, he added insurance conglomerates to that divestment hit-list.

    And they might have heard his dramatic nuclear “solution” to high energy costs and emissions (in reality, devilishly complex and expensive).

    On top of these, semi-engaged voters might recall Dutton’s culture-war topics for which he has regularly received generous media minutes, including:

    • his opposition to what he called “the Canberra Voice”
    • his defence of Australia Day
    • his refusal to stand in front of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags
    • his oft-made claim that a Greens-Teals-Labor preoccupation with progressive issues has left the cost-of-living crisis unaddressed.

    Beyond such rhetoric, Dutton has had little to say in detailed policy terms. But will that matter? However comprehensive, Labor’s list of legislated achievements has, arguably, achieved even less purchase in the electoral mind.

    Polls taken as the election campaign neared showed Dutton’s Coalition was well-placed to win seats from Labor in suburban and outer-suburban areas of Perth, Melbourne, and Sydney, as well as regional seats in the NSW Central Coast.

    These include seats such as Tangney and Bullwinkel in outer Perth; McEwen and Chisolm in suburban Melbourne, and as many as seven seats in NSW – mostly on the periphery of Sydney or in the industrial Hunter Valley region.

    There may be other seats to move also. Liberal sources say they like their chances in Goldstein, currently held by the Teal, Zoe Daniel. And with a recent conservative turn in the Northern Territory election to the CLP, seats like the ultra-marginal Lingiari and the numerically safer Solomon could also be in play.

    A YouGov MRP poll reported by the ABC on February 16 put Dutton’s chances of securing an outright majority after the election at 20%.

    It measured the Coalition’s two-party-preferred support at 51.1% over Labor on 48.9%. That represents a swing towards the Coalition of 3.2%. But it is where the swing occurs that matters most.

    Seat-by-seat assessment of the YouGov results suggested the Coalition would be likely to win about 73 seats (median), with a lower estimate of 65 and an upper estimate of 80, if a federal election was held today.

    The same modelling indicates Labor would go backwards, holding about 66 seats in the next parliament, with a lower estimate of 59 and an upper estimate of 72. This is just one, albeit unusually large poll, but it will concern Albanese that even on its upper margin of Labor seat holds, he would not retain a majority.

    Of course, the campaign can change things and already, the delayed start caused by Cyclone Alfred introduced further variables in the form of a federal budget, replete with income tax cuts.

    A succession of polls conducted through March point to a Labor recovery with a Redbridge poll of 2,007 respondents, taken over March 3–11 putting Labor ahead 51%–49%. The same poll however showed a majority of people worry that the country is heading in the wrong direction.

    The final contest

    In political circles, people talk about momentum in campaigns, and say things like “the trend is our friend”. If true, that electoral amity has leaned decisively towards Dutton for the past year, and only recently to Labor.

    But caution is always advised. Election counts invariably throw up oddities – swings being more (or less) marked in one state compared to others, and seats retained (or lost) against a broader national trend on the night.

    Such surprises give the lie to the concept of uniform swings and makes prediction of a final seat count more difficult.

    If the polling consensus is broadly correct – rather than being the result of herding – and the source of Dutton’s rising support is former Labor suburbs, the question is, will those vote gains materialise at sufficient scale to translate into seat gains?

    If so, this election could redraw the political map and require new thinking about major party voting bases, policies and strategies into the future.

    The final outcome seems likely to turn on three things:

    1. Dutton’s ability to stay on message about the cost-of-living through the campaign when others in his team, buoyed by Trump’s war on wokeness, want to raise tendentious social issues.

    2. Albanese’s effectiveness in convincing wayward Labor voters that Labor has in fact delivered, that the economy has turned the corner, and that Dutton’s comparative toughness is code for budget cuts that would hit them hardest.

    3. Unforeseen events – at home or abroad.

    The Liberal leader is surprisingly well-placed. But remember, he is coming from a long way back.

    Mark Kenny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Can Peter Dutton flip Labor voters to rewrite electoral history? It might just work – https://theconversation.com/can-peter-dutton-flip-labor-voters-to-rewrite-electoral-history-it-might-just-work-248664

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Global: Canadians are anxious as they ponder how to vote this election. Which leader can ease their fears?

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Lori Turnbull, Professor of Political Science in the Faculty of Management at Dalhousie University, Dalhousie University

    This federal election is being described as the most consequential in modern Canadian history. The country is in a tariff and trade war with its closest ally, the United States, and President Donald Trump is threatening Canada’s sovereignty.

    No wonder Canadians are feeling anxious and fearful. And in times of crisis, people tend to look extra hard for leaders they can trust.

    Liberal Leader Mark Carney, a rookie in politics but an internationally respected economist, is enjoying a wave of momentum. Due to his stints as governor of the Bank of Canada during the 2008-09 financial crash and the Bank of England during Brexit, he’s well-qualified to manage economic roller-coasters. Can his impressive CV help calm the fears of Canadians?

    Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre, on the other hand, has been connecting with supporters by giving voice to their worries about the economy, jobs, crime and the housing crisis. He’s made people feel heard, but he’s also been accused of building his brand appeal by stoking — rather than soothing — Canadians’ fears about the future.

    Carney’s track record as a fixer could give him the edge now that the election campaign is in full swing and Canada’s fears are being amplified.

    Liberals wildly unpopular

    Before Justin Trudeau announced his plans to leave politics, the next federal election was shaping up to be a showdown between Trudeau and Poilievre, two career politicians with likeability problems and a palpable mutual resentment.

    Each of them often used fear as a tool to warn Canadians about the dangers of electing the other. The mood in the country was sour.

    In July 2024, an Abacus Data poll indicated only 23 per cent of Canadians felt the country was headed in the right direction. The affordability crisis was weighing on people, as 45 per cent of respondents reported having a hard time keeping up with daily expenses due to rising prices.

    The long-standing consensus around the benefits of immigration was crumbling due to the lack of suitable housing for everyone.




    Read more:
    Canada at a crossroads: Understanding the shifting sands of immigration attitudes


    A third of Canadians also self-identified as “political orphans” who felt that none of the political parties truly represented them.

    Most of the public was blaming the Liberals for the broad mismanagement of various important complex policy files, and the Conservatives were the largest beneficiaries of voter frustration. They looked like they had the next election in the bag.

    Dramatically altered landscape

    It’s now March 2025 and the political playing field looks wildly different. Though the aforementioned issues remain salient, Trudeau has resigned and Carney has erased the lead in public support that Poilievre and the Conservatives held not long ago.

    Most polls suggest the parties are in a dead heat while others have Carney pulling ahead. In the hope of winning enough votes to form a majority government — in Carney’s own words, he’s asked the public for a “strong, positive mandate” — he is running on a platform aimed at the political centre to offer a home to those political orphans.

    Carney’s pitching tax cuts, pipeline projects, reduced trade barriers between the provinces and balanced operational spending while running deficits for investments that would grow the economy. He’s done away with the unpopular consumer carbon tax.

    Given that Carney is pulling the Liberals back to the centre, and that there is actually overlap between the Conservatives and the Liberals — both spent the first full day of the campaign promising income tax cuts — it seems the real choice in this election is about leadership rather than dramatically different policy platforms.

    It’s no surprise that Carney’s unique professional experience elevates his bid to be prime minister in the current political climate. So far, he’s been a calm presence amid a volatile and developing storm. Despite Conservative efforts to try to diminish him, his credentials speak for themselves.

    This helps him to build trust among voters. At any other time, his snippiness with the media when asked about his financial holdings might cost him some political capital, but in the current moment, he will likely be given a pass.




    Read more:
    Can Mark Carney truly connect with Canadian voters? Canada will now find out


    Poilievre no longer has Trudeau for a target

    As British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once explained, politics is about “events, dear boy, events.”

    Much to the certain chagrin of Conservatives, the polls suggest this moment was custom-made for Carney.

    Trump’s attacks and threats against Canadian sovereignty tee up Carney’s pitches for Canada’s economic independence perfectly. His campaign material basically writes itself, and his economic gravitas makes him a solid messenger.

    Carney is both reassuring Canadians in this moment of anxiety as well as tapping into Canadian pride, in his own words and through celebrity proxies like comedian Mike Myers who are helping him reach audiences who tuned out Trudeau a long time ago.

    Mike Myers appears with Mark Carney in this ad on Carney’s YouTube channel.

    This is not to count out Poilievre. With the Conservative base firmly behind him, he could be poised to form a government or keep Carney to a minority.

    But the question on the ballot is no longer about Trudeau — it’s about who Canadians trust to lead them through a disruptive and unpredictable time.

    Poilievre has been working tirelessly for years to position himself as the person for the job.

    But the peculiar circumstances of the moment — and the fear and anxiety that Canadians are having trouble shaking amid Trump’s continuing threats — might drive many voters towards the non-politician whose track record as a fixer gives people the reassurance they are looking for.

    Lori Turnbull does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Canadians are anxious as they ponder how to vote this election. Which leader can ease their fears? – https://theconversation.com/canadians-are-anxious-as-they-ponder-how-to-vote-this-election-which-leader-can-ease-their-fears-252701

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Mayor to invest more than £10m to boost creative industries and add more than £2.5bn to London’s economy

    Source: Mayor of London

    • Sadiq commits more than £10m funding into London’s creative economy over the next four years
    • The funding for the British Fashion Council, Film London, Games London and the London Design Festival, is expected to add more than £2.5bn to the economy
    • The creative industries play a key part in the capital’s economy and supporting them is at the heart of the Mayor’s London Growth Plan to increase prosperity

     

    The Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan has today announced plans to invest more than £10m into the capital’s creative and cultural industries over the next four years, helping to generate more than £2.5bn for the capital’s economy.

    The British Fashion Council, Film London, Games London and the London Design Festival will receive the funding as part of the Mayor’s plans to boost growth, this follows the announcement of his London Growth Plan last month.

    The funding will help the organisations to support creative businesses and boost jobs, deliver annual trade shows, festival and events including the London Games Festival, London Fashion Week, London Film Festival and London Design Festival. This hugely successful work helps to maintain London’s global reputation as a world leader in the creative industries, generate business and provide new opportunities for young people across film, television, animation, visual effects, games, fashion and design.

    It is expected to leverage more than £2.5bn in film investment in the capital, up to £60m in fashion sales, up to £17m in games investment, and up to £15m in sales and exports for up to 800 design businesses. It will support more people into work, improve access for Londoners to skills and training, and attract world-class talent to the capital by creating up to 42,000 film and TV crew employment opportunities, 150 games jobs and 300 training and employment opportunities. Previous funding for the British Fashion Council, Film London and the London Design Festival has helped to secure over £7.5.bn in sales, trade and investment since 2016.  

    London’s creative industries bring £51.7bn to the economy each year and account for one in five jobs. The industries grew faster than the UK economy between 2010-2023, but face a number of challenges following the impact of Brexit and the pandemic. The Mayor is committed to supporting the capital’s creative industries and is a key part of his London Growth Plan, which will kickstart the capital’s productivity and make London’s economy £107bn larger by 2035.

    The Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, said:  “I want London to grow and thrive over the next decade and our creative industries have a central role to play. They help make London the greatest city in the world and are vital to London’s success and future as well as the whole of the country. That’s why, as part of the London Growth plan, I’m investing in fashion, design, film and gaming to keep our capital at the forefront of these industries and drive growth, as we build a better London for everyone.”

    Justine Simons OBE, Deputy Mayor for Culture and the Creative Industries, said: “Culture and creativity are our DNA in London and key to our success as a global city. It’s vital for industry and Government to work together to help us keep our position on the world stage, and this investment shows our ongoing commitment to fostering creativity and innovation within the capital. London’s flagship cultural events not only draw considerable global interest, they also play a crucial role in generating employment, nurturing creatives’ careers and boosting tourism.”

    Caroline Rush CBE, Chief Executive, British Fashion Council, said: “Investing in London’s creative industries is essential and enables us to bolster London Fashion Week, which delivers in commercial and cultural impact. This continued funding from the Mayor of London is critical in providing emerging designers with showcasing opportunities and access to market, enabling them to grow their businesses in an increasingly challenging environment. Investment like this not only bolsters individual careers but also reinforces the UK’s position as a global leader for fashion and creativity.”

    Adrian Wootton OBE, Chief Executive of Film London, said: “London is a global centre for film, TV, animation and games, generating billions of pounds and thousands of jobs. With its stage space, award-winning talent, infrastructure and new tax credits, London is on course for real, game-changing economic opportunities. This investment in Film London and Games London will help us to seize those opportunities, driving growth in the capital’s screen industries through innovation, nurturing talent and championing new generations of story-tellers and audiences in London. Our thanks go to the Mayor of London for this continued support and investment in the industry.”

    Michael French, Head of Games London & Festival Director, London Games Festival, said: “London’s potent and vibrant creative energy has built world-leading creative industries of which games and interactive are an important element. Funding from the Mayor of London has so far enabled Games London and the London Games Festival to support the city to become the games capital of Europe, and it is still growing. This renewed investment will support programmes that continue to drive investment back into businesses across London, create well-paid skilled full time jobs, uplift the games sector and create growth opportunities for the capital and beyond.”

    Ben Evans CBE, Director of London Design Festival, and Executive Director of London Design Biennale: “To sustain and grow London’s position as a global design city we must invest in showcasing. It is why the ongoing support of the London Design Festival by the Mayor is so critical. Now over 200 international cities have design promotion activities increasing competitiveness for London and the UK. Our now mature design and creative sector needs to fuel growth through international investment as well as stimulating domestic demand. Awareness of the breadth of opportunity and the depth of talent based in London must be strong for the design industry to thrive.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Britons increasingly trust each other – but trust in politicians has slumped since the pandemic

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ben Seyd, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Kent

    ITS/Shutterstock

    One surprise in the early days of the pandemic was people’s increased willingness to trust political authorities. According to the British Social Attitudes survey (BSA), the proportion of people trusting government ministers rose from 15% in 2019 to 23% in 2020. Data from Ipsos MORI showed a similar bounce for trust in government ministers and politicians in 2021. Trust in government was also a significant factor in whether people complied with lockdown rules and other restrictions.

    Since then, however, people’s trust in government has plummeted. The latest BSA survey finds that, in 2023, just 14% of the population said they trust government “always” or “most of the time”. Fully 45% of the population trust government “almost never”. These are the most negative set of figures since the BSA began asking questions on trust almost four decades ago.

    This collapse in trust is perhaps unsurprising given the various government shenanigans over the past few years, notably Boris Johnson’s Downing Street lockdown parties and Liz Truss’s disastrous prime ministerial tenure. However, there is also evidence that Britons have become less trusting as a result of dashed expectations over the benefits of Brexit, negative views of government performance in areas like health, and cost of living pressures.

    Yet while Britons are less trusting of those with political authority, they appear to be more trusting in each other. Back in 1999, 29% of the population believed that “most people [in Britain] can be trusted”. Four decades on, that proportion has increased to 46%, topping the previous high of 43% in 1981. This might partly reflect the sense of collective endeavour and neighbourliness that was instilled during the pandemic, when we were encouraged to look out for, and help, other people. There is also evidence that, while people see the country as a whole as becoming more divided, at the local level perceptions of unity outweigh perceptions of division.

    This is a welcome shift, particularly since trust in other people is associated with a range of positive outcomes, including support for international cooperation and international organisations. In an uncertain and dangerous world, social trust may be an important factor shaping the willingness of states to work together.

    Wellbeing of politicians

    The decline of popular trust in government and politicians is concerning. Low trust is associated with support for populist politicians such as Donald Trump and upheavals like Brexit. Low trust could also significantly compromise public acceptance of, and compliance with, official messages and rules in a future pandemic.

    Distrust can also cause direct harm to public figures. As one of us (James) has shown, politicians are generally poor estimators of public trust in themselves. But where they do perceive widespread distrust, often because of repeated experiences of physical or online abuse and intimidation, this has a significant negative effect on their mental health and wellbeing.

    Messages of kindness and community around London during lockdown.
    Alex Yeung/Shutterstock

    Increased security around MPs – the cost of which jumped from £77,234.67 to £4,381,733.40 between 2014 and 2022 – is likely to protect them from the worst excesses of public distrust where it trickles over into extreme behaviour. Yet given the importance of contact for people’s trust, it could also inadvertently fuel more cynicism by increasing the physical distance between politicians and the public.

    The public’s declining regard for politicians and government should be a source of concern. We are hardly likely to recruit the calibre of politician we expect (and need), or indeed encourage a more diverse population of aspiring representatives, if the personal costs of holding elected office are so high.

    At the same time, a look at the bigger picture offers some reassurance. As one of us (Ben) has recently shown, there is little evidence that low trust induces popular scepticism towards democracy itself, or that it weakens public support for state spending or government programmes in key areas like healthcare.

    Trust on the frontline

    The nature and strength of Britain’s civic ties are revealed not only in our trust of politicians and institutions, but also in how we treat the people who provide public services, such as police officers and health workers.

    On the face of it, the picture is not pretty. Over the past few years, rates of public abuse towards frontline service providers have increased. In 2021, 18% of teachers reported having experienced verbal abuse from a parent or carer in the past year. In 2023, that figure had risen to 30%.

    A survey of police officers in 2022 found that 37% had experienced verbal insults at least once a week over the past year. This was an increase from the 29% of officers who reported a similar level of insults in 2020, although the figure dropped slightly in 2023 to 34%.

    Rates of physical abuse of London ambulance staff have more than doubled in four years, with 346 incidents recorded in 2019, increasing to 728 incidents in 2023. A similar picture of public abuse is found for frontline workers in the health service. Polling in 2023 found that 85% of GPs across the UK had received verbal abuse from members of the public during the past year. A 2021 survey by the British Medical Association found more than half of GPs, and one in five hospital doctors, had experienced verbal abuse in the past month.

    While majorities of the British public express trust in many frontline workers such as nurses and doctors (who currently attract 94% and 88% trust ratings), others appear to take a more negative view, extending even to abusive behaviour.

    Given the range of service providers facing such rising antipathy, it seems unlikely that the trigger for this was the pandemic. A better clue is provided by longer-term data on public treatment of doctors.

    Responses are to a survey question reading ‘In the last 12 months, have you personally experienced harassment, bullying or abuse at work from patients, their relatives or members of the public?’.
    Author provided, data from NHS Staff Survey

    NHS survey figures show that rates of abuse towards doctors declined between 2003 and 2011. (The wording of the relevant survey question changed in 2012, which restricts our ability to compare the more recent data). This was precisely the period when resources were pumped into the health service and public satisfaction with the NHS increased. This suggests that public interactions with frontline service workers like doctors are strongly shaped by the quality of the service they face.

    Indeed, GPs themselves ascribe the verbal abuse they and their staff experience to people’s dissatisfaction with the service, including discontent with access to health services. One underappreciated effect of austerity might thus be an increased public frustration with healthcare workers, which on occasion appears to extend to outright abuse.

    More accessible (read: better funded) public services might reduce some negativity towards frontline service workers. However, the important task of rebuilding people’s trust in politicians is – particularly given the negative coverage by much of Britain’s media – likely to be a trickier task.

    James Weinberg receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

    Ben Seyd does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Britons increasingly trust each other – but trust in politicians has slumped since the pandemic – https://theconversation.com/britons-increasingly-trust-each-other-but-trust-in-politicians-has-slumped-since-the-pandemic-252762

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission – A10-0042/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027[1] and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context[2] and the related unilateral declarations[3],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4],

     having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5] (MFF Revision),

     having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[9],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom[10],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570) and its position of 23 November 2022 on the proposal[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[12] (the Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[13],

     having regard to the EU’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and its commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

     having regard to the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing European Union Recovery Instrument borrowing costs[14],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[15],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights[17] of 13 December 2017,

     having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025[18] and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’, presented in the European Parliament on 21 October 2024,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, presented in the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,

     having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report entitled ‘Safer together – Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’, presented in the European Parliament on 14 November 2024,

     having regard to the presentation of the EU Competitiveness Compass by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 29 January 2025,

     having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 for European Defence Readiness providing a framework for the ReArm Europe plan (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 February 2025 on the budget guidelines for 2026,

     having regard to Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the letters from the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0042/2025),

    Budget 2026: building a resilient, sustainable and prosperous future for Europe

    1. Highlights the anticipated economic growth projected for 2025 and 2026 within the EU[19], accompanied by an easing of inflation; notes nonetheless the uncertainties stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly threatens the security of the EU, and the worsening effects of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, also manifested in the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which are compounded by new significant geopolitical changes and a deteriorating international rules-based order, heightened security threats and a rise in global protectionism; emphasises that, in such an increasingly volatile landscape, it is imperative for the EU to enhance its defence and security capabilities, social, economic and territorial cohesion and political and strategic autonomy, decrease its dependence, increase its competitiveness and ensure a prosperous future for the continent and its people, who are currently facing an increasingly high cost of living;

    2. Is determined to ensure that the 2026 budget, by focusing on strategic preparedness and security, economic competitiveness and resilience, sustainability, climate, as well as strengthening the single market, provides the people in the EU with a robust ecosystem and delivers on their priorities, thus reinforcing a socially just and prosperous Europe; underlines the need for additional investment in security and defence, research, innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, energy, migration, as well as land and maritime border protection, inclusive digital and green transitions, job creation, and the provision of opportunities for young people; insists that this be accompanied by administrative simplification, as indicated in the Competitiveness Compass; insists that the EU budget is the largest investment instrument with leverage effect, complementing national budgets and therefore enabling the EU to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing world while ensuring prosperity, social cohesion and stability for its people; is strongly of the opinion that the EU should use this leverage effect to the maximum degree to boost the Union’s objectives and policymaking, as well as private investment;

    Investing in a solid, sustainable and resilient economy

    3. Is adamant that sound economic resilience and sustainability can be achieved in the EU by boosting public and private investment, increasing innovation and supporting competitiveness, including by addressing the skills gap and fostering more industrial production in Europe as a source for robust economic growth and quality jobs, and thereby guaranteeing the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring that the EU remains agile and self-reliant in the face of global challenges, disruptions and volatility; highlights the need to promote innovation, prioritise education, reduce costs and the administrative burden, and strengthen the single market, particularly as regards services;

    4. Reaffirms, in this regard, that research and innovation remain crucial for the EU’s success in cutting-edge industries and new clean and sustainable technologies; recalls the long-standing goal of increasing research and innovation investment to 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP); calls, therefore, for increased funding to be provided under Horizon Europe to fund at least 50 % of all excellent proposals in all scientific disciplines, enable researchers as well as companies, especially SMEs, to bring new developments to the market, and to scale up, ensure solid economic growth and boost the Union’s competitiveness in the global economy, thereby preventing actors from leaving for competing regions while also ensuring that Europe has the knowledge base it needs to pursue the Green Deal commitments;

    5. Highlights the importance of targeted support in encouraging public-private partnerships and accessible and increased financing to support SMEs as the backbone of the European economy and a vector for pioneering innovation, emphasising the role of the European Innovation Council, InvestEU and the SME component of the single market programme in empowering start-ups and scale-ups of innovative companies, supporting them in their growth and contributing to a greater role for the EU economy on the global stage; expresses its concern that, according to the interim evaluation of InvestEU, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; takes note of the Commission proposal in this regard; underlines, furthermore, the importance of the single market programme to leverage the full potential of the EU’s cross-border dimension;

    6. Stresses that the modernisation of the economy will require blending public and private investment; emphasises, in this regard, the necessity of private investments to maximise the leverage effect of public spending; recalls that these efforts should lead to simplification and reduce the financial burden for the EU’s SMEs while maintaining EU standards;

    7. Underscores the urgency of further accelerating the digital and green transitions as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy that remains attractive for innovative businesses and that is based on market-driven investments providing quality jobs and leaving no one behind; advocates substantial investment in forward-looking digital infrastructure, underpinned by well-regulated, human-centred and trustworthy artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; stresses the need to improve citizens’ basic digital skills to match the needs of companies and to equip citizens to counter disinformation; stresses, further, the need to increase the resilience of the Union’s democracy in fighting malign foreign interference;

    8. Recognises the strategic value of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for contributing to the economic, social and climate goals of the EU’s cross-border transport infrastructure; calls for network extensions, particularly towards candidate countries and the EU’s strategic partners, as regards the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and the complementarities between the TEN-T and the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);

    A better-prepared Union, capable of effectively responding to crises

    9. Underlines the need to enhance EU security and defence capabilities to create a genuine defence union and to better prepare for and respond to unprecedented geopolitical challenges and new hybrid security threats; stresses the essential role of common investment, research, production and procurement mechanisms, including in new disruptive technologies supporting an independent EU defence industry; considers that there is an EU added value in security and defence cooperation that not only makes Europe and its people safer but also leads to greater efficiency, potential savings, quality job creation and enhanced strategic autonomy; calls therefore for immediate upscaling and much better coordination of defence spending by Member States; stresses in particular the need to provide adequate resources to innovate and enhance Member States’ military capabilities, as well as their interoperability; takes note, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, of its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry while safeguarding their operations and financing capacity; recalls the importance of investing in and developing dual-use equipment and, particularly, of strengthening EU military mobility as regards funding dual-use transport infrastructure along priority axes; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of using calls for this purpose under the CEF transport programme, in the light of the military mobility funding gap; underlines the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capabilities to fight hybrid warfare;

    10. Recalls the role of the EU’s space programme in enhancing the strategic security of the Union through a variety of civil and military applications; underlines that a strong European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, the protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions, and therefore requires sufficient resources;

    11. Highlights, in the face of new challenges in internal and external security, the importance of ensuring proper implementation of the Asylum and Migration Pact, in full compliance with international human rights law, and of respecting the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility; stresses that effective management and protection of the EU’s external borders, both land and maritime, are essential for maintaining the freedoms of the Schengen area and crucial for the security of the EU and its citizens; emphasises the need to better protect people from trafficking and enhance support to strengthen cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the Union in combating criminal networks, particularly those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, so as to reinforce law enforcement and the judicial response to these criminal networks, as well as to support Member States facing hybrid threats, in particular the instrumentalisation of migrants as defined in the Crisis Regulation[20];

    12. Recalls the vital role that the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund play in protecting external borders; calls, in addition, for appropriate funding for border protection capabilities, including physical infrastructure, buildings, equipment, systems and services required at border crossing points, as provided for in Annex III to the BMVI Regulation[21], and for the requirements to be met in terms of reception conditions, integration, return and readmission procedure; reaffirms that cooperation agreements with non-EU countries in full respect of international law can help to prevent irregular migration and strengthen border security;

    13. Acknowledges the common agricultural policy (CAP) as a key strategic European policy for food security and greater EU autonomy in affordable and high-quality food production; stresses the crucial role of the CAP in ensuring a decent income for EU farmers as well as a productive, competitive and sustainable European agriculture; regrets that direct payments have significantly decreased in real terms due to inflation, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; urges the Commission to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining high production standards and the requirement to implement EU legislation; calls for adequate resources and for direct payments to be protected to help farmers cope with the impact of inflation, fuel costs, changes in the global food and trade market and adverse climate events, affecting agricultural production and threatening food security, including in the outermost regions; highlights, in this regard, the role of the agricultural reserve; emphasises the need to help small and medium-sized farms and new and young farmers by supporting generational renewal and ensuring continued support for the promotion of EU agricultural products; underlines the need for appropriate support for research and innovation to make the agricultural sector more sustainable, including water management, in particular through the Horizon Europe programme, without reducing European agricultural production and while preventing European farmers from facing unfair competition from imported products that do not meet our standards; welcomes the Commission’s preparation of a second simplification package; underscores that food security is an essential component for geopolitical stability;

    14. Stresses the strategic role of fisheries and aquaculture and the need for them to be adequately supported financially; acknowledges that the common fisheries policy ensures a stable income and long-term future for fishers by contributing to protecting sustainable marine ecosystems, which are key to the sector’s competitiveness; insists that special attention must be devoted to the EU’s fishing fleet in order to improve safety and security, including by combating illegal fishery actions and improving working conditions, energy efficiency and sustainability, as well as by renewing the fleet; reaffirms that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should support a human resources policy capable of addressing future challenges, in order to promote an inclusive, diversified and sustainable blue economy; expresses its concern about the effect of the end of the Brexit transition period in June 2026 on the fishing and aquaculture sectors;

    15. Stresses that enhancing energy security and independence remains fundamental for the EU; highlights the EU’s role in ensuring security of energy supply, assisting households, farmers and businesses in mitigating price volatility and managing price gaps in comparison to the rest of the world; calls, therefore, for additional investment in critical infrastructure and connectivity, including large-scale cross-border electricity grids and hydrogen infrastructure for hard-to-abate sectors, which are an essential prerequisite to the decarbonisation of European industry, in low-carbon and renewable energy sources and connectivity, in particular by properly funding the CEF, as well as in energy efficiency; highlights the need to adapt European infrastructure to meet future energy demands as part of the transition to a clean and modern economy; underlines the importance of investing in new, expanding and modernising interconnector capacity for electricity trading, in particular cross-border capacity, for a fully integrated EU energy market that enhances Europe’s diversified supply security and resilience to energy market disruptions, reducing external dependencies and ultimately ensuring affordable and sustainable energy for EU citizens and businesses; stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen cooperation with Africa;

    16. Recalls, in this context, the current housing crisis in Europe, including the lack of decent and affordable housing; calls, therefore, for swift additional investments through a combination of funding sources, including the EIB and national promotional banks, in areas with a positive impact on reducing the cost of living for households, improving the energy efficiency of buildings and deploying renewable energy sources; calls for a coordinated approach at EU level that respects the principle of subsidiarity, encourages best practices and effectively uses all relevant funding mechanisms in addressing this pressing challenge;

    17. Is highly concerned by the strong impacts of climate change and the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and globally and by the fact that the year 2024 was assessed to be the planet’s warmest year on record; calls for sufficient funding for the LIFE programme to finance climate and environment-related projects, including in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for increased budgetary flexibility to adequately respond to natural disasters in the EU; regrets that increasing numbers of natural disasters have led to a high number of victims, as well as to long-term devastating effects on citizens, farmers and businesses based and working in the regions concerned, as well as in the ecosystems impacted; calls for increased funding for the EU Solidarity Fund, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, including for increasing rescEU capacities, which allow for more cost-efficient capacity building, in order to support Member States quickly and effectively in overwhelming crisis situations; recognises the EU’s role as a hub for coordinating and improving Member States’ preparedness and capacities to respond immediately to large-scale, high-impact emergencies, and its added value both for Member States and citizens; stresses, in this regard, that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a tangible expression of European solidarity, reinforcing the EU’s role as a crisis responder; acknowledges that the European Union Solidarity Fund or any other fund alone cannot fully compensate for the extreme weather events of increased frequency and severity caused by climate change today and in the future; stresses the need to invest in and prioritise preparedness, prevention, and adaptation measures, prioritising nature-based solutions; stresses that it is crucial to ensure that Union spending contributes to climate mitigation, adaptation efforts and water resilience infrastructure; emphasises that these investments are far lower than the cost of climate inaction;

    Enhancing citizens’ opportunities in a vibrant society

    18. Insists that continued investment in EU4Health and Cluster Health in Horizon Europe are key to improving health and preparedness for future health crises, thereby improving the health status of EU citizens; stresses the need for health investments for maximum impact; highlights its support for a holistic regulatory and funding approach to Europe’s life sciences and biotech ecosystem, including the creation of cutting-edge European clusters of excellence, as a central pillar of a stronger European health union, to which a European plan for cardiovascular diseases and lifestyles should be added, focusing on primary and secondary prevention as key objectives to increase life expectancy in the EU; highlights the need to create a more supportive care system to respond to demographic challenges and the ageing population; reiterates its support for Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, as well as the importance of European investment in tackling childhood diseases, rare diseases and antimicrobial resistance; reiterates the importance of the gender aspect of health, including sexual and reproductive health and access to services; is highly concerned by the current mental health crisis in Europe, affecting in particular the young generation, exacerbated by recent global events, which requires immediate action to be taken; underlines the need to prevent shortages of critical medicines, medical countermeasures and healthcare workers faced by some Member States; calls, in this respect, for better coordination at EU level and joint procurement of medicines in order to reduce costs;

    19. Stresses the importance of investing in young generations and their skills, as major agents of change and progress, by ensuring access to quality education; considers it essential that all students, without discrimination and in every EU Member State, should have full access to the Erasmus+ programme and underlines the essential role of Erasmus+ in facilitating cultural exchange, strengthening European identity and promoting peace through mutual understanding and cooperation, making it a cornerstone of European integration and unity; recalls the need to tackle the skills deficit, the brain drain and the correlation between market needs and skills; considers that for the EU workforce to remain competitive in the future, establishing key areas for training and reskilling is needed; stresses that further investment is required in modernising the Union’s education systems, by equipping them for the digital and green transitions, creating talent booster schemes and incentivising young entrepreneurs; points, in this respect, to the relevance of sufficient financial resources for EU programmes such as the European Social Fund Plus, Erasmus+ and the EU Solidarity Corps, which have proven highly effective in helping to achieve high employment levels and fair social protection, in broadening education and training across the Union, as well as in promoting new job opportunities and fostering skills, youth participation and equal opportunities for all; calls on the Commission to do its utmost so that all university students remain eligible to participate in the Erasmus+ programme, including in Hungary;

    20. Recalls the role of the EU budget in contributing to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights; highlights the role of the EU budget in contributing to initiatives that reinforce social dialogue and facilitate labour mobility, including in the form of training, networking and capacity building;

    21. Highlights the ever-increasing threats and dangers of organised and targeted disinformation campaigns against the EU by foreign stakeholders undermining European democracy; calls for the mobilisation of all relevant Union programmes, including Creative Europe, to fund actions in 2026 that promote inclusive digital and media literacy, in particular for young people, combating disinformation, countering online hate speech and extremist content, while encouraging the active participation of citizens in democratic processes and safeguarding media freedom and pluralism for good cultural resilience, all of which are fundamental to a thriving democracy;

    22. Calls on the Commission to increase EU funding for protecting citizens, religious communities and public spaces against terrorist threats, combating radicalisation and terrorist content online, as well as countering hate speech and rising antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred and racism;

    23. Calls on the Commission to ensure the swift, full and proper implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act[22], the Digital Market Act[23] and the Artificial Intelligence Act[24], also by allocating sufficient human resources; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability and the integrity of the digital public space;

    24. Underlines the added value of funding programmes in the areas of democracy, rights and values; recalls the important role that the EU budget plays in the promotion of the European values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in supporting the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, inclusiveness, justice, non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality; reaffirms, furthermore, the essential role of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme in promoting European values and citizens’ rights, in particular its Union Values strand, as well as gender equality, thereby sustaining and further developing an open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive society based on the rule of law; stresses the need for targeted measures to address gender disparities and promote equal opportunities through EU funding allocations; stresses that supporting investigative journalism with sufficient resources is a strategic investment in democracy, transparency and social justice; reiterates the importance of the Daphne and Equality and Rights programmes, and stresses that necessary resources should be devoted to combating discrimination in all its forms, as well as tackling forms of violence;

    25. Emphasises the valuable work carried out under the Union Values strand, which provides, among other things, direct funding to civil society organisations as key actors in vibrant democracies; stresses that citizens and civil society organisations, promoting the will and interest of citizens, represent the core of European democracy; underlines, in this regard, the importance of all EU programmes and increased funding in supporting the genuine engagement of civil society, particularly in the context of the impact of reduced funding for civil society by the EU’s international partners;

    26. Considers it essential for the Union’s stability and progress and its citizens’ trust to ensure the proper use of Union funds and to take all steps towards protecting the Union’s financial interests, in particular by applying the rule of law conditionality; underscores the undeniable connection between respect for the rule of law and efficient implementation of the Union’s budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management under the Financial Regulation; reiterates that under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation[25], the imposition of appropriate measures must not affect the obligations of governments to implement the programme or fund affected by the measure, and in particular the obligations they have towards final recipients; insists, therefore, that in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments, the Commission should explore alternative ways to implement the budget, including by assessing the possibility of diverting sources to directly and indirectly managed programmes, in order to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding, without weakening the application of the regulation; highlights the role of the European Court of Auditors and its constant activity in defence of transparency, accountability and strict compliance with the regulations on all of the funds and programmes;

    A strong Union in a changing world

    27. Observes that the need for the EU to maintain and augment its presence on the global stage is increasingly crucial amid escalating global conflicts, geopolitical shifts and foreign influence efforts worldwide, particularly considering developments with other major global providers of aid; stresses that in order to achieve this, the Union requires sufficient funding and resources to act, including to respond to major crises in its neighbourhood and throughout the world, in particular in the light of the sudden decrease in international funding; stresses the importance of the humanitarian aid programme and regrets that resources are not increasing in line with record-high needs; underscores the need to strengthen the EU’s role as a leading humanitarian actor while effectively addressing emerging crises, particularly in regions facing protracted conflict, displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters; emphasises that the Union also requires sufficient resources for long-term investments in building global partnerships, and points out the importance of the participation of non-EU countries in Union programmes, where appropriate;

    28. Underlines that the EU’s security environment has changed dramatically following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and unpredictable changes in the policies of its main allies; recalls the importance of enhancing citizens’ safety and of achieving efficiency in the area of defence and strategic autonomy, through a comprehensive approach to security that covers military and civilian capabilities, external relations and internal security; stresses the importance of the Internal Security Fund to ensure funding to tackle increased levels of serious organised crime with a cross-border dimension and cybercrime; recognises the pressure which increased defence spending represents for Member Sates’ national budgets; stresses the importance of Member States stepping up their efforts and increasing funding for their defence capabilities, in a consistent and complementary manner in line with the NATO guideline;

    29. Stresses that, beyond the enormous sacrifices of the people of Ukraine in withstanding Russia’s war of aggression for our common European security, this war has also had substantial economic and social consequences for people throughout Europe; recalls that certain Member States, in particular those with a land border with Russia and/or Belarus in the Baltic region, and frontline Member States, as well as vulnerable sectors of the economy, remain particularly exposed to the consequences of the war and deserve support in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and military mobility, in the spirit of EU solidarity;

    30. Firmly reiterates its unconditional and full support for Ukraine in its fight for its freedom and democracy against Russian aggression, as the war on its soil has passed the three-year mark; underlines the ongoing need for high levels of funding, including in humanitarian aid and for repairs to critical infrastructure, and for improved capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes; welcomes the renewed and reinforced intention of the Commission and Member States to work in a united way to address Ukraine’s pressing defence needs and to further support the Ukrainian economy by providing regular and predictable financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets through the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, in order to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, as well as to foster Ukraine’s progress on its path to EU accession; stresses the importance of ensuring accountability regarding core international crimes;

    31. Insists on the benefits of pre-accession funds, both for the enlargement countries and for the EU itself, as the funding creates more stability in the region; welcomes the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans to further support the economic convergence of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s single market through investment and growth in the region; insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support Moldova’s accession process, in line with the EU’s commitment to enlargement and regional stability; underlines the role of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova and highlights the necessity of securing sufficient financial resources for its full implementation; underlines the importance of sustained support for candidate countries in implementing the necessary accession-related reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, anti-corruption and democracy and in enhancing their resilience and preventing and countering hybrid threats; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society, independent media organisations and journalists;

    32. Underlines, furthermore, that EU neighbourhood policy, namely its Eastern and Southern Partnerships, contributes to the overall goal of increasing the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU’s neighbours and thereby of increasing the security of our continent; stresses, therefore, the importance of reinforcing the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood budget lines in order to support political, economic and social reforms in the regions, facilitate peace processes and reconstruction and provide assistance to refugees, in particular through continuous, reinforced and predictable funding and continuous implementation on the ground; recalls that the EU must continue to alleviate other crises and assist the most vulnerable populations around the world through its humanitarian aid programme, as well as by maintaining its global positioning with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for supporting global challenges and promoting human rights, freedoms and democracy, as well as for the capacity building of civil society organisations and for delivering on the Union’s international climate and biodiversity commitments, within a comprehensive monitoring and control system;

    Cross-cutting issues in the 2026 budget

    33. Underlines that the repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the EU and therefore non-discretionary; notes that borrowing costs depend on the pace of disbursements under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as well as on market fluctuations in bond yields and are therefore inherently partly unpredictable and volatile; insists, therefore, on the need for the Commission to provide reliable, timely and accurate information on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) borrowing costs and on expected RRF disbursements throughout the budgetary procedure as well as on available decommitments; expects the Commission to update the decommitments forecast when it presents the draft budget; recalls that the three institutions agreed that expenditures covering the financing costs of NGEU must aim at not reducing EU programmes and funds;

    34. Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposals for the introduction of new own resources; is highly concerned by the complete lack of progress on the new own resources in the Council, in particular in view of increasing investment and unforeseen needs; considers that the introduction of new own resources, in line with the roadmap in the interinstitutional agreement of 2020, is essential to cover NGEU borrowing costs while shielding the margins and flexibility mechanisms necessary to cater for these needs;

    35. Highlights again Parliament’s full support for the cohesion policy and its key role in delivering on the EU’s policy priorities and its general growth; reiterates that the cohesion policy’s optimal added value for citizens depends on its effective and timely implementation; in the same vein, urges the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the implementation of operational programmes under shared management funds as well as of the recovery and resilience plans so as to ensure swift budgetary execution and to avoid accumulated payment backlogs in the two last years of the MFF period, in particular through additional capacity building and technical assistance for Member States; reaffirms the imperative of a robust and transparent mechanism for accurately monitoring disbursements to beneficiaries;

    36. Notes that particular attention must be paid to rural and remote areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as islands and outermost, cross-border and mountain regions and all those affected by natural disasters; stresses that these regions should benefit from adequate funding to offset the special characteristics and constraints of their structural social and economic situation, as referred to in Article 349 TFEU; stresses the vital importance of the POSEI programme for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions and bringing food to local markets; calls for the programme budget to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in these regions; notes that there has been no such increase since 2013, despite the fact that farmers in these regions face higher production costs due to inflation and climate change; stresses also that the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU, as referred to in Articles 198-204 TFEU, should benefit from adequate funding for their sustainable economic and social development, in the light of their geopolitical importance for global maritime trade routes and key partnerships such as those on sustainable raw materials value chains;

    37. Reiterates that EU programmes, policies and activities, where relevant, should be implemented in such a way that promotes gender equality in the delivery of their objectives; welcomes the Commission’s work on developing gender mainstreaming in order to meaningfully measure the gender impact of Union spending, as set out in the interinstitutional agreement;

    38. Takes note that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be met by 33.5 % in 2025, while the biodiversity target will be below 8.5 % in 2025, and unless dedicated action is undertaken the 10 % target will not be met in 2026; stresses the need for continuous efforts towards the achievement of the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets laid down in the interinstitutional agreement in the Union budget and the EURI expenditures;

    39. Stresses that the 2026 Union budget should be aligned with the Union’s ambitions of making the Union climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, as well as the Union’s international commitments, in particular under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, and should significantly contribute to the implementation of the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy;

    40. Recalls that effective programme implementation is achievable only with the backing of a committed administration; emphasises the essential work carried out by bodies and decentralised agencies and asserts that they must be properly staffed and sufficiently resourced, while taking into account inflation, so that they can fulfil their responsibilities effectively and contribute to the achievement of the Union political priorities, also when given new tasks and mandates;

    41. Recalls that, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, when implementing the budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and respect the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines in particular Articles 137, 138 and 158 of the Financial Regulation and recalls the Commission and the Member States’ obligation to exclude from Union funds any persons or entities found guilty by a final judgment of terrorist offences, as well as by final judgments of terrorist activities, inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences, and corruption or other serious offences; highlights the need to leverage efforts in tackling fraud both at Union and Member State level and to this end ensure appropriate financial and human resources covering the Union’s full anti-fraud architecture; recalls the importance of providing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme with sufficient financial resources;

    42. Underlines the importance of effective communication and the visibility of EU policies and programmes in raising awareness of the added value that the EU brings to citizens, businesses and partners;

    °

    ° °

    43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (20.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Welcomes the fact that the multiannual financial framework (MFF) revision in 2024 provided for additional funding under Heading 6 and for the EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility; deplores, however, the fact that the MFF revision fell short of the needs identified by Parliament; reiterates the urgent need to increase funding, particularly in crisis-affected regions where the needs are greatest, and to address the various challenges in the neighbourhood, invest in partnerships and strengthen the geopolitical position of the EU; underlines in particular the need for continued efforts to finance Ukraine’s immediate funding needs; emphasises that the EU should without any delay intensify its efforts to enable frozen and immobilised Russian assets to be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction, reparations and budgetary needs, in full compliance with EU and international law; underlines that the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the Global Gateway are crucial instruments within the Union’s external action toolbox; stresses the importance of the EU’s humanitarian aid policies and instruments; calls in general for a more strategic and impactful approach to EU funding abroad while advancing open strategic autonomy;

    2. Reiterates that an increased level of funding should be allocated for the Southern Neighbourhood in 2025 to support political, economic and social reforms in the region; highlights in particular the pressing need to contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Gaza and to provide additional humanitarian aid in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria; recalls that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) has up to now been the principal humanitarian assistance structure in Gaza and the West Bank as well as an essential service provider in the region; recalls the need to continue supporting key regional partners such as Jordan in order to foster peace in the region;

    3. Welcomes the new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans and the proposed Facility for Moldova, as well as the role of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III in financing actions in the region; underlines that the Reform Agendas, which beneficiaries need to develop, are a promising instrument to speed up transformation and compliance with EU norms; calls on the Commission, in the interests of a successful accession process, to strictly apply the conditionalities enshrined in the two facilities; calls furthermore on the Commission to accompany all 10 enlargement countries on their path to European integration and to provide tailored assistance to address their respective challenges; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society and independent media organisations and journalists; calls on the Commission to ensure that it retains the possibility to withhold funds, either temporarily or indefinitely, if those funds would contribute to the budgets of governments – whether at the national or sub-national level – whose actions are significantly undermining the stability of the country or its neighbours, or the country’s progress towards European integration, particularly regarding democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to present a proposal for an instrument for pre-accession assistance for the next MFF that incorporates the facilities to avoid overlaps and covers all 10 enlargement countries and which should ensure strong institutional and economic preparedness for EU membership; calls also on the Commission to speed up the integration of all candidate countries in the EU roaming area;

    4. Highlights the importance of the EU’s ensuring that EU funds do not go towards financing educational literature that romanticises martyrdom, violence or terrorism;

    5. Underlines the need for the Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to be provided with sufficient financial and human resources to promote peace, prosperity, security and EU values and interests in both the European neighbourhood and across the globe; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to both the EEAS and the Commission for strategic communication and to counter disinformation; highlights the need to maintain the current structure of the network of EU delegations around the world and to provide financing that is commensurate with the role that the Union expects all delegations to play on the ground; notes, furthermore, that the EEAS, with 145 delegations around the globe, cannot be measured according to the same logic as that applied to European institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Council not to apply the 2 % logic to the EEAS; insists on a budgetary increase for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) actions and common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, as well as other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments; stresses the need to improve IT and security protocols within EEAS headquarters, EU Delegations and in Commission directorates-general with responsibilities in EU External Action; stresses the importance of investing in European security and defence by bolstering the Union’s strategic autonomy and collective defence capabilities;

    6. Welcomes the establishment of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls on the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025, while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women globally, as enshrined in the EU Gender Action Plan III (2021–2025); calls for increased resources to support women’s rights, including efforts to eliminate gender-based violence, strengthen women’s participation in decision-making processes and promote economic empowerment; emphasises the importance of gender mainstreaming across all budgetary and policy initiatives to ensure equal opportunities and inclusivity; stresses that gender equality is not only a fundamental right but also a crucial driver of social and economic development;

    8. Calls on the Commission to collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the transatlantic relationship, including exchange programmes for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the United States;

    9. Underlines that any disbursements from the European budget must depend on the beneficiary country’s respect for the rule of law, human rights and compliance with international obligations, and with respect for international agreements;

    10. Considers that more EU funds need to be allocated to joint cyber defence in order to counter the digital threats from Russia, the People’s Republic of China and others; considers that the Commission needs to secure the necessary funding for a future cyber army that can help EU institutions and Member States to defend themselves against cyberattacks from hostile states;

    11. Stresses the need for the visibility and communication of EU aid, particularly in candidate countries, but also in other partner countries;

    12. Stresses the urgent need for the EU to invest in research and development concerning low-cost drones, not only in order to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself against Russia, but also to strengthen European defence; considers that the EU should cooperate with Ukraine on the development of a drone system following their successful use of drones.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    40

    13

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ľuboš Blaha, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Helmut Brandstätter, Sebastião Bugalho, Tobias Cremer, Danilo Della Valle, Loucas Fourlas, Alberico Gambino, Giorgos Georgiou, Christophe Gomart, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Marion Maréchal, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Hannah Neumann, Urmas Paet, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Mounir Satouri, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Reinier Van Lanschot, Nicola Zingaretti, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Krzysztof Brejza, Jaroslav Bžoch, Engin Eroglu, Tomasz Froelich, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Catarina Mendes, Alessandra Moretti, Ana Miguel Pedro, Chloé Ridel, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Marco Tarquinio

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Mélissa Camara, Alexander Jungbluth, Erik Marquardt, Leire Pajín, Kristian Vigenin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    40

    +

    ECR

    Cristian Terheş

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Krzysztof Brejza, Sebastião Bugalho, Loucas Fourlas, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon, Davor Ivo Stier, Riho Terras, Željana Zovko

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Engin Eroglu, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

    S&D

    Robert Biedroń, Tobias Cremer, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Alessandra Moretti, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Chloé Ridel, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marco Tarquinio, Kristian Vigenin, Nicola Zingaretti

     

    13

    ECR

    Rihards Kols, Marion Maréchal

    ESN

    Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Jungbluth, Alexander Sell

    NI

    Ľuboš Blaha, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jaroslav Bžoch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan

     

    8

    0

    ECR

    Alberico Gambino, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

    Verts/ALE

    Mélissa Camara, Erik Marquardt, Hannah Neumann, Mounir Satouri, Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) has been a highly successful EU instrument for strategic investment in the development of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), aimed at transforming the EU’s roads, railways, ports, inland waterways and airways into a connected, safe, efficient, sustainable and competitive transport system; whereas the completion deadlines of 2030 for the core network, 2040 for the extended core network and 2050 for the comprehensive network are binding on the Member States and often require massive and sustained infrastructure investments; whereas the CEF-T should remain an important transport funding instrument in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    B. whereas modern, interconnected and multimodal transport infrastructure within a single European transport area is central to creating growth and jobs in the EU, completing the European single market and ensuring territorial cohesion, including for the benefit of peripheral, rural, mountainous, island and outermost regions and other geographically disadvantaged areas; whereas the Draghi and Letta reports call on the EU to step up its efforts to develop a competitive industrial strategy in the face of global competition; whereas successful decarbonisation that safeguards the global competitiveness of European industries requires significant investment in renewable-energy-based transport networks and alternative fuel infrastructure for sustainable transport; whereas digitalisation across all transport sectors can yield significant efficiency gains, which often have the potential to exceed the initial investments; whereas sufficient investment is required to achieve this and other technological solutions to enhance interoperability between digital, energy and transport networks and to maximise network benefits; whereas increased investment in road safety is necessary to achieve the goals of the EU’s Vision Zero strategy and ensure the safety of roads and road users; whereas the transport sector faces labour and skills shortages, combined with sometimes poor working conditions;

    C. whereas the efficient use of EU funds is paramount to achieving strategic objectives within limited financial envelopes, particularly in the light of inflationary pressures that have led to significant increases in construction, energy and raw material costs, threatening the financial feasibility of key infrastructure projects of common European interest; whereas resilient and coordinated EU funding mechanisms are vital for maintaining project momentum despite economic volatility; whereas the imperative of maximising the impact of EU spending requires inflation-adjusted budgetary provisions, the reallocation of underutilised funds, as well as clear monitoring and improved reporting frameworks;

    D. whereas delays in planning, permitting and procurement processes also hinder the timely implementation of transport and infrastructure projects, jeopardising EU transport and infrastructure development; whereas establishing optimised approval procedures is crucial to accelerating project timelines and ensuring budget absorption;

    E. whereas, as envisaged under the Omnibus simplification package outlined by the Commission in its Competitiveness Compass, reducing regulatory and administrative burdens and simplifying implementation are key to ensuring equal access to funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional authorities and disadvantaged regions; whereas the simplification of EU regulatory and administrative processes at all levels, coupled with streamlined access to funding, are essential for achieving the timely and efficient implementation of projects under CEF-T and tourism programmes, particularly for SMEs and regional authorities;

    F. whereas the action plan on military mobility 2.0 outlines ambitious EU-level initiatives; whereas, however, inadequate funding remains a significant obstacle to their effective implementation;

    G. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, like the COVID-19 pandemic, has underscored the vulnerability of the EU’s transport and tourism sectors to external shocks; whereas it is more necessary now than ever before to strengthen transport connections with Ukraine and Moldova; whereas the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, which facilitates road freight transport and transit by setting up solidarity corridors, has been extended until 30 June 2025, with the possibility of tacit renewal for a further six months; whereas the European transport network is critical infrastructure facing increasing digital and/or physical security risks and needs to be protected from external threats to maintain the societal functions for which it is vital;

    H. whereas tourism, a major economic activity accounting for almost 10 % of the EU’s GDP and identified in the Commission’s 2021 industrial strategy as a critical ecosystem for the EU’s economy and for employment, continues to face economic, environmental, employment-related and digital challenges;

    1. Calls for a significant increase in the CEF-T budget to secure adequate funding for ongoing and planned TEN-T projects, focusing on cross-border infrastructure with the highest added value for the EU and on the elimination of bottlenecks and missing links, including within Member States, in order to enhance passenger and freight flow throughout Europe; underlines, furthermore, the value of smaller-scale projects in improving cross-border connectivity and their eligibility for EU funding;

    2. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop an EU industrial action plan for the automotive sector, as proposed in the Draghi report, and calls for swift progress in the ongoing strategic dialogue;

    3. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop a new maritime industrial strategy to enhance the competitiveness, sustainability and resilience of the European maritime manufacturing sector; appreciates the Commission’s announcement that it would present a European port strategy to limit the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage linked to the economic presence and operational involvement of entities from non-EU countries in EU ports;

    4. Calls, further, for a strategic action plan for the EU aviation sector to identify potential reductions in administrative burdens and to assess financial needs for maintaining the sector’s competitiveness in the face of decarbonisation pressures and the associated risks, including an uneven playing field and carbon leakage, and geopolitical challenges, and with regard to a cross-country analysis of working conditions as a determinant in attracting and retaining skilled workers and boosting productivity;

    5. Welcomes the commitment to put forward a plan to develop an ambitious European high-speed rail network to help connect EU capitals, including through night trains, and to accelerate rail freight, as well as to set up a single digital ticketing and booking system for railways as soon as possible, as already outlined in the revised TEN-T guidelines; underlines the need for ambitious support for the deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS);

    6. Advocates a comprehensive strategy on hyperloop, with clear timelines, detailed investment frameworks and support for research, development and deployment;

    7. Welcomes, in this respect, the Commission’s announcement under the Competitiveness Compass presenting a sustainable transport investment plan and calls on the Commission to define financing measures for the above-mentioned strategies and action plans, including by de-risking the investment needed to swiftly ramp up charging infrastructure as well as for the production and distribution of renewable and low-carbon transport fuels, without jeopardising existing market choices;

    8. Underlines again the role of the Social Climate Fund in supporting investment for an inclusive transition towards more sustainable mobility and calls on the Member States to address transport poverty with specific policies and financing measures in their national Social Climate Plans;

    9. Highlights the need to address the shortage of qualified labour, women’s employment and an ageing workforce in the transport sector; calls, in this regard, for sufficient support for the safety and good working conditions of transport workers as well as for the funding of safe and secure truck parking areas across the EU;

    10. Calls for the digitalisation of transport through intelligent solutions and digital booking platforms to facilitate seamless cross-border travel; calls for the systematic reduction of EU regulatory burdens across all transport modes to free up resources, including EU budgetary means, for increased investment in transport infrastructure; underlines the strong need for prior impact assessments of all new legislative initiatives with respect to their budgetary implications but also the regulatory or administrative burdens that the proposals would create or resolve;

    11. Calls on the Commission to address inflationary pressures and resource scarcity by incorporating inflation adjustments into the budget; notes that the inclusion of realistic price adjustments is essential to safeguarding the viability of transport and infrastructure projects against the impact of inflation-induced cost increases; supports the reallocation of unused funds to strategic clusters, such as transport infrastructure, sustainable transport solutions and innovation; calls strongly for the integration of inflation-resilient frameworks and adaptive budget mechanisms within the MFF to avoid financing challenges in upcoming cycles;

    12. Emphasises the importance of bolstering co-financing mechanisms, particularly for large-scale projects such as the Clean Aviation, Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and Europe’s Rail Joint Undertakings, to ensure their timely implementation despite economic constraints; insists on the leveraging of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to mobilise additional resources;

    13. Advocates innovative financing models, in particular the facilitation of PPPs by providing guarantees or implementing risk-sharing mechanisms, in order to attract private investment in transport and tourism infrastructure, including for a faster transition to alternative fuels; stresses that these PPPs can also contribute to knowledge-sharing, innovation and support for SMEs and start-ups;

    14. Stresses the need to reinforce the budgets of transport agencies, in particular the EU Aviation Safety Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, and the EU Agency for Railways, so that they can fulfil the additional tasks assigned to them by the co-legislators in recently adopted EU legislation, as well as in order to support critical safety, sustainability, interoperability, competitiveness, innovation and modernisation initiatives;

    15. Calls resolutely for the streamlining of application and reporting procedures in relation to EU funds in line with Directive 2021/1187[26]; insists on transparent and fair allocation of EU transport funding using digital platforms in order to simplify access for SMEs and regional stakeholders; calls for the establishment of expedited review processes for critical transport and infrastructure projects in order to reduce delays; proposes the implementation of the ‘once-only’ principle for administrative processes, allowing applicants to provide information once and reuse it across EU programmes, thus reducing redundancy and delays, including for the increased blending of EU funds;

    16. Insists on the restoration of the military mobility budget to the originally proposed EUR 6.5 billion over seven years; reiterates that the drastic cut of 75 % to military mobility funding within the transport pillar considerably weakens this policy; highlights the critical role of that funding in adapting parts of the TEN-T infrastructure for dual use along priority axes, in order to facilitate the short-notice, large-scale movement of military equipment and humanitarian aid across the continent, enabling a joint response to military threats to the EU Member States and their allied nations; calls for military mobility to be included in the white paper on the future of European defence;

    17. Reiterates that, to help Ukraine withstand Russia’s war of aggression and to accelerate its post-war recovery and integration into the EU market, alongside the upcoming decisions on the renewal of the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, it is imperative to pursue projects to improve the capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, encompassing railway upgrades, improved border crossings and the crucial step of integrating relevant lines of Ukraine’s rail system into the EU’s standard gauge to facilitate the uninterrupted movement of goods and services; considers that the 2026 budget should also help alleviate the economic and social hardship faced by the people of the EU’s eastern border regions, especially the Baltic states, Finland, Poland and Romania, who have been particularly affected by economic losses and the suspension of cross-border mobility as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the financing of further EU measures against the Russian shadow fleet;

    18. Reiterates its repeated request to create a specific EU programme and a dedicated budget line for tourism in the current MFF and beyond, increasing the sector’s resistance to economic shocks and contributing to further growth and jobs across the value chain, bringing significant benefits and long-term well-being to local people and their businesses; highlights the need to reduce administrative burdens for SMEs operating in the tourism sector by simplifying rules, minimising data collection requirements, where appropriate, and providing tailored financial support; notes that the tourism sector stands to benefit greatly from digital innovations, such as smart tourism platforms and integrated digital ticketing systems for attractions and services, which enhance visitor experiences while driving significant economic growth for local communities; stresses that the further development of sustainable tourism, including through the promotion of regional products to strengthen local value chains or the management of tourist flows, could foster economic growth in less popular, more remote and peripheral areas, improve urban-rural connectivity and bolster the climate resilience of EU territories.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    36

    6

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Daniel Attard, Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Benoit Cassart, Carlo Ciccioli, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Devaux, Siegbert Frank Droese, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, François Kalfon, Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Milan Mazurek, Alexandra Mehnert, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Matteo Ricci, Arash Saeidi, Marjan Šarec, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Kosma Złotowski

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Arno Bausemer, Ondřej Krutílek, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Beata Szydło, Flavio Tosi, Kathleen Van Brempt

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Marie Dauchy, Elisabeth Grossmann

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    36

    +

    ECR

    Carlo Ciccioli, Ondřej Krutílek, Beata Szydło, Kosma Złotowski

    PPE

    Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Alexandra Mehnert, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Flavio Tosi, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi

    Renew

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Benoit Cassart, Valérie Devaux, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marjan Šarec

    S&D

    Daniel Attard, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Elisabeth Grossmann, François Kalfon, Ştefan Muşoiu, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Kathleen Van Brempt

    The Left

    Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Arash Saeidi

    Verts/ALE

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff

     

    6

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Milan Mazurek

    NI

    Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus

    PfE

    Marie Dauchy, Philippe Olivier

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget – Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gabriella Gerzsenyi

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas pursuant to Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions’;

    B. whereas cohesion policy is a key instrument for reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions within the Union and for addressing the fact that the least-favoured regions lag behind, playing a vital role in promoting sustainable development and also addressing environmental challenges, complementing national budgets and enhancing the EU’s ability to navigate global complexities;

    C. whereas among the regions concerned, particular attention must be paid to rural areas, areas affected by the industrial and automotive transitions, less-developed areas inside the so-called developed regions, eastern EU regions bordering on Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, as well as outermost regions, islands and Mediterranean regions facing environmental and economic vulnerabilities;

    D. whereas the absorption rate of cohesion policy funds remains very low partly owing to delays to the start of programmes and the high level of bureaucracy and complexity required in cohesion-funded projects, which can lead to unforced errors;

    E. whereas among the beneficiaries concerned, particular attention should be paid to vulnerable people, such as persons with disabilities;

    1. Considers that, as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument, cohesion policy is based on solidarity, creates sustainable growth and jobs across the Union and contributes to key Union objectives and priorities, including its climate, energy and biodiversity targets, competitiveness, as well as sustainable and socially inclusive economic growth, to tackle demographic challenges and ensure equitable access to affordable housing;

    2. Recalls that cohesion policy has proven to be a helpful tool in tackling challenges in various crises, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its effects on the energy supply, the high cost of living, inflation, and the needs of refugees and displaced persons, as well as natural disasters; underlines, however, that the resulting legislative amendments to cohesion policy have repeatedly brought unexpected changes to its objectives and resources, while cohesion policy should, when needed, complement rather than replace other financial instruments designed for emergency response;

    3. Reiterates the need for coordination at budgetary level between all the financial instruments supporting cohesion policy; believes that, to make the most of NextGenerationEU funds, these should support and complement cohesion policy measures;

    4. Emphasises the need to ensure that the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle is observed across the EU budget; stresses, in this regard, that cohesion policy should not undergo any fundamental changes which could jeopardise the structural and investment funds’ ability to deliver on their goals; stresses that the setting of new priorities should entail new resources and underlines that the long-term investment objectives of cohesion policy are to reduce regional disparities and enhance competitiveness;

    5. Is concerned about the state of implementation of cohesion policy programmes for 2021-2027; urges the Commission to step up monitoring efforts, ensuring respect for the rule of law, a transparent, fair and responsible use of EU resources, as well as their sound financial management; urges the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with the Member State authorities at all levels in order to reduce bureaucracy to make cohesion funds more accessible to local and regional authorities, among others, and to avoid decommitments, unfinished projects and any political manipulation of fund allocation; stresses, therefore, the need to introduce a ‘smart conditionality’ mechanism;

    6. Notes that the Just Transition Fund needs adequate financial resources and a long-term perspective to ensure its effectiveness in supporting regions’ transition towards climate neutrality, while ensuring that the most vulnerable regions are properly supported in the transition process; emphasises the need for a realistic and balanced approach to the just transition, ensuring economic, social and environmental sustainability, with the meaningful participation of local and regional authorities, as well as economic and social partners;

    7. Calls for further simplification of cohesion policy to reduce the growing administrative burden, enhance fund accessibility and ensure investments tailored to the specific needs of regions while enabling the effective management of funds in line with the needs of final beneficiaries; highlights, in this context, the importance of the newly-created EU Councillors network, which is jointly run by the European Committee of the Regions and the European Commission, as a key tool for strengthening the ability to gather evidence of how the Union operates at local level;

    8. Underlines that rural areas are a core part of Europe’s identity and economic potential; welcomes cohesion policy measures that recognise the contribution of more prosperous and resilient rural areas to Europe’s overall resilience; calls for adequate funding to enhance their role in environmental protection, food production, tourism and ensuring ‘the right to stay’; calls for increased public investment to tackle demographic challenges and support young people by improving services and infrastructure, expanding access to digital education, technologies and innovations, so as to raise living standards, increase the stock of affordable housing and foster equal access for citizens and families to culture and high quality education, essential social services and other public services, while making more efficient use of resources, reducing the impact on the environment and creating new opportunities for rural SMEs;

    9. Notes that the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund support investments in sustainable urban development, underlining its importance as a key component of integrated territorial development, with at least 8 % of ERDF resources at the national level being allocated to urban areas through the relevant mechanisms; further notes that this should include special attention to the sustainable development of functional urban and metropolitan areas, facilitating the digital, green and industrial transitions;

    10. Calls for increased investment in digitalisation and innovation to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs in less-developed regions, including rural and peripheral areas, in order to bridge the digital divide and foster inclusive economic growth;

    11. Underlines that sustainable development is directly linked to having a highly skilled work force; insists, therefore, on the need for increased efforts to ensure an adequate degree of upskilling and reskilling of all relevant working age individuals, as well as initiatives to increase citizens’ acceptance of the economic, industrial and energy transitions;

    12. Recalls the importance of mechanisms and strategies adapted to the diversity of the EU’s territories, and therefore calls for a full use of Article 349 TFEU to adapt cohesion policy to the specificities of the outermost regions; reiterates that the outermost regions should receive specific additional allocations to offset the extra costs incurred as a result of permanent constraints on their development; calls for an Islands Pact to be considered by the EU institutions with the participation of the principal stakeholders, along the lines of the Urban Pact and the future Rural Pact;

    13. Reaffirms the need for close cooperation between national, regional, local and other authorities as well as their dialogue with civil society organisations and all relevant stakeholders, including economic and social partners, universities and innovation centres; recognises the importance of research and innovation policy in driving economic growth and enhancing competitiveness in order to fulfil cohesion policy objectives; highlights the need to support the commercialisation and scaling up of interregional innovation projects, underlining the importance of developing value chains, particularly in less-developed regions;

    14. Reiterates the need to strengthen the administrative capabilities and capacity of local, regional and national authorities, which are key components in the effective planning and implementation of initiatives and projects at the local level; highlights the importance of stronger ownership, responsibility, partnership and decentralisation; strongly considers that increased financial resources dedicated to technical assistance are key to effective project implementation;

    15. Emphasises that the implementation of cohesion policy must respect horizontal principles, including its place-based nature, multilevel governance, sustainability, the partnership principle, gender equality and non-discrimination, ensuring that all projects contribute to a more equitable and inclusive Union;

    16. Stresses the need to strengthen awareness-raising among European citizens about cohesion policy achievements and calls for further information measures promoting it such as accessible data platforms, as cohesion policy is a particularly effective means of promoting strong and balanced European regions.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    29

    0

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Gordan Bosanac, Irmhild Boßdorf, Daniel Buda, Klára Dobrev, Klara Dostalova, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Valentina Palmisano, Vladimir Prebilič, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere, André Rougé, Antonella Sberna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Rody Tolassy, Francesco Ventola, Marta Wcisło

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Dan Barna, Sofie Eriksson, Denis Nesci, Jacek Protas

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Francisco Assis

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    29

    +

    ECR

    Denis Nesci, Antonella Sberna, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Francesco Ventola

    PPE

    Daniel Buda, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Jacek Protas, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Klara Dostalova, André Rougé, Rody Tolassy

    Renew

    Dan Barna, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen

    S&D

    Francisco Assis, Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Klára Dobrev, Sofie Eriksson, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere

    The Left

    Valentina Palmisano

    Verts/ALE

    Gordan Bosanac, Vladimir Prebilič, Mārtiņš Staķis

     

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Irmhild Boßdorf

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Dario Nardella

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights the crucial role of agricultural and rural development policies, particularly the common agricultural policy (CAP), in achieving the Union’s objectives under Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; highlights the fact that these policies are tools for farmers to provide safe, healthy, affordable and sustainable food of high quality, while ensuring fair and viable incomes for all farmers, in particular active, small-scale and young farmers, including targeting to prevent land abandonment and promoting short food supply chains; underlines that these policies aim to foster sustainable food systems and secure the long-term viability, profitability, sustainability and safety of EU agricultural production, the development of rural areas and the Union’s food sovereignty, while taking into consideration animal welfare standards, climate protection, mitigation and biodiversity measures; recalls, in this regard, that the strong and simplified EU financial support for a competitive and sustainable farming sector should be increased in the 2026 CAP budget allocation to better reflect the growing challenges in rural areas, including depopulation, and keep rural areas alive; underlines that, according to the latest Eurobarometer survey, support for the CAP has reached an all-time high, with over 70 % of respondents agreeing that the CAP fulfils its role in providing safe, healthy and sustainable food of high quality;

    2. Notes that spending under the CAP significantly exceeds the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets and requests that this surplus be used to allocate funds that directly contribute to achieving the primary objectives of the CAP;

    3. Calls on the Commission to secure additional funding for further nature objectives rather than relying on the CAP, which must above all remain a fund that ensures food security and a viable income for our farmers;

    4. Upholds the promotion of EU agricultural products as a cornerstone of agricultural policy, with the aim of strengthening the competitiveness and relevance of all production sectors, especially that of wine and high-quality products, which need to have better access to both internal and external markets so as to promote diversification and internationalisation; recalls the success achieved by such promotion programmes in the opening up and consolidation of new markets; stresses the need to ensure an adequate promotion-policy budget in the coming financial years;

    5. Stresses the need for a stronger, better equipped, flexible and more reactive agricultural reserve, with adequate funding to cope with market imbalances or unpredictable external factors, such as extreme and recurring weather events, animal diseases, water stress or an evolving geopolitical context, which are having an increasing impact on agricultural production and markets, farmers’ incomes, farm continuity and food security; calls on the Commission to make use of the crisis reserve in the most efficient, expeditious and transparent way; stresses the need to simplify administrative procedures in order to guarantee the swift disbursement of that aid; points out that an increase in the agricultural reserve must not affect direct payments; calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive crisis management strategy for each major agricultural sector, ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of the crisis reserve, while considering the establishment of new crisis and risk management instruments; acknowledges though that the agricultural reserve alone cannot fully compensate for the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by climate change; stresses the need to fund preventive mitigation and adaptation measures that enhance the resilience, including climate resilience, of rural areas and food production systems;

    6. Strongly opposes any proposals to reduce the level of pre-allocated funds from the CAP in the future budget; points out that those funds should be increased by at least the equivalent of cumulative inflation since the start of the current budget period in order to avoid hidden reductions in CAP funding; stresses that farmers need the continuity and predictability of the CAP and that emerging new priorities cannot lead to cuts to the CAP budget; advocates for transparency and accountability in the allocation of CAP funds and encourages Member States and the Commission to enhance cooperation and strengthen anti-fraud measures; stresses the need for a fair distribution of CAP support between and within Member States; calls on the Commission to mobilise funds outside the CAP, given the challenges facing EU agriculture and to simplify the administrative procedures for farmers who receive aid; insists that any revenue accruing to the Union budget from assigned revenue or repayments of irregularities relating to agriculture should remain under the agriculture component of Heading 3 of the multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    7. Underlines that CAP simplification measures adopted in 2024 must be the starting point for the next CAP reform;

    8. Recalls that innovation can play a key role in enhancing the productivity, competitiveness, resilience and adaptability of agriculture; underlines, in this regard, the importance of increasing funding for research, thereby avoiding additional bureaucracy, both in the future budget allocations in the framework of the Horizon Europe research programme, as well as in the CAP, while creating funding mechanisms that ensure the continuity of existing and successful agri-food projects, established and funded through the NextGenerationEU instrument; calls therefore for adequate funding for climate change mitigation, precision agriculture, circular economy projects, renewable energy production in rural areas, development and technology-neutral innovation, including for projects promoting animal and plant health and the efficient use of resources, such as water, in agriculture; notes that production efficiency may also be an aim in itself, and that such funding should, in addition to improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, increase its resilience to challenges such as climate change and the spread of animal diseases; stresses the importance of ensuring adequate resources for training and knowledge exchange through European instruments, such as the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems;

    9. Highlights the fact that digitalisation is a crucial tool in the development and enhancement of the value of rural areas, including inner areas, and plays a key role in addressing depopulation and attracting young people to these areas; welcomes the digital transformation in agriculture and rural areas, including its use in irrigation, to improve the efficiency, environmental, social and economic sustainability, traceability and precision of agricultural systems, ensuring more effective use of the EU’s budgetary resources and promoting entrepreneurship in rural areas, thus making them more attractive to people and businesses; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this context, to strengthen the technological and communications infrastructure in rural areas, including broadband internet coverage, and encourages them to leverage technologies to enhance access to critical information and digitalise administrative processes for CAP support so as to reduce the bureaucratic burden and enable more efficient access to support and services; recalls that the uptake of innovative digital technologies requires sufficient funding, as well as targeted training, education and support programmes for farmers, particularly for small-scale and older farmers, to ensure equitable and affordable access to digital tools;

    10. Notes with concern the continuing loss of farms and farmers, which has a significant socio-economic impact on rural areas; urges, therefore, the EU institutions and Member States to address labour and skills shortages by stepping up their efforts to promote generational renewal in the agricultural sector and rural areas, including in outermost regions and inner areas; highlights the importance of improving the profitability of the agricultural sector by enhancing fiscal and support measures that make farming activities more attractive and by improving access to land, financing and insurance, particularly for women, families involved in small-scale farming, marginalised groups and first-time farmers, such as young people; underlines that young farmers have the potential to be a driving force in sustainable and climate-friendly farming and highlights the need to empower them, including through the use of Union funds and adapted advisory and training tools; underlines that building and modernising rural infrastructure improves the quality of life in rural areas, which is essential for generational renewal; proposes, in this context, the inclusion of a specific indicator in future policies to monitor the rate of generational renewal and the level of services and infrastructure in rural areas;

    11. Calls for EU programmes to prioritise projects that safeguard existing jobs in the agricultural sector and promote the creation of quality employment; stresses that all jobs in the agricultural sector must respect workers’ rights, provide stable and regulated pay, and ensure good working conditions; emphasises the importance of effectively combating poverty and social exclusion in rural areas;

    12. Recalls the challenges that the agri-food sector has faced and is facing, such as the COVID-19 crisis, the harmful effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, natural disasters and rising input costs; regrets that direct payments and CAP subsidies have decreased significantly in real terms due to inflation, resulting in difficulties in implementing rural development measures, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to help farmers cope with those inflationary effects, including fuel costs, and underscores that the 2 % deflator of the current MFF does not compensate for the loss of value resulting from inflation; asks the Commission to provide a more flexible deflator in the next MFF and, furthermore, to work closely with the Member States to implement best practices at national and European levels to help farmers cope with inflation and record costs;

    13. Requests that, following the repeated economic crises and extreme weather events caused by climate change that have affected agricultural companies, the unspent resources of the 2014-2022 rural development plans be spent by 31 December 2026 as a derogation from the N+3 rules laid down in Article 38 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[27];

    14. Welcomes the decision of the European Investment Bank to identify agriculture and the bio-economy as key priorities in its 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap;

    15. Expresses its concern about the adverse effects on the European agri-food sector of political instability in certain Member States and at global level, as well as of geopolitical tensions related to trade or international crises; underlines that the signing of the Mercosur Agreement in December 2024 will have implications for Union farmers and producers; invites the Commission to improve trade agreements to protect EU farmers, to ensure fair competition and a level playing field, and to allocate sufficient funds to mitigate the negative effects of trade agreements on the agricultural sector; recalls that European farmers may face unfair competition from third country producers who do not meet the same production standards as those in the EU and calls therefore for a proper level of reciprocity; reiterates the negative cascade effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on global food security and farmers’ livelihoods; highlights the need to make sure that the reform of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine provides stability and protection for EU farmers; highlights the need to start better preparation for an enlargement of the Union, taking account of European farmers’ interests, especially with regard to the adoption of balanced and enhanced measures to safeguard the European agricultural sector, while also ensuring support for Ukraine;

    16. Calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to revise their national strategic plans, including the rapid use of funds from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and to provide funding to strengthen the relative negotiating positions of farmers in value chains, and for the Commission to swiftly approve these modifications;

    17. Stresses the vital importance of the programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions of Europe, for the provision of food and agricultural products there and for the food sovereignty of the EU as a whole; calls for the budget of the scheme, which has not been increased since 2013, to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in the outermost regions, as farmers in those areas are facing higher production costs; calls therefore on the Commission to apply without delay a 2 % deflator to the POSEI financial envelopes in order to mitigate the substantial losses for producers in real terms and ensure fairer support for all farmers;

    18. Urges the Commission to ensure adequate resources for the implementation of an EU water management strategy and to continue developing water collection, storage and distribution activities, while preserving the status of water bodies, in order to render the use of water reserves more efficient in agriculture, both in crop irrigation and livestock farming, given that droughts are becoming increasingly severe across the Union.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    18.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    34

    2

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Sergio Berlato, Stefano Bonaccini, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Daniel Buda, Waldemar Buda, Gheorghe Cârciu, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ivan David, Valérie Deloge, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Carlo Fidanza, Luke Ming Flanagan, Maria Grapini, Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Elsi Katainen, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, Gilles Pennelle, André Rodrigues, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Eric Sargiacomo, Christine Singer, Raffaele Stancanelli, Anna Strolenberg, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Veronika Vrecionová, Thomas Waitz, Maria Walsh

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Peter Agius, Benoit Cassart, Ton Diepeveen, Elisabetta Gualmini, Esther Herranz García

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    34

    +

    ECR

    Sergio Berlato, Waldemar Buda, Carlo Fidanza, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Veronika Vrecionová

    NI

    Katarína Roth Neveďalová

    PPE

    Peter Agius, Daniel Buda, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Esther Herranz García, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Maria Walsh

    PfE

    Raffaele Stancanelli

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Elsi Katainen, Christine Singer

    S&D

    Stefano Bonaccini, Gheorghe Cârciu, Maria Grapini, Elisabetta Gualmini, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, André Rodrigues, Eric Sargiacomo

     

    2

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen

    The Left

    Luke Ming Flanagan

     

    8

    0

    ESN

    Ivan David

    PfE

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Valérie Deloge, Gilles Pennelle

    Verts/ALE

    Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Anna Strolenberg, Thomas Waitz

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Budgetary Control has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 18 February 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    Yours sincerely,

    Niclas Herbst

     

    CONT Chair

    Rapporteur for the Commission Discharge

    OPINION

    1. Recalls its strong commitment to the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

    2. Stresses the fundamental importance of respect for the rule of law to protect the financial interests of the Union in the implementation of EU funds; recalls the improvements needed in the application of the Rule of law Conditionality Regulation and a swifter follow-up by the Commission on breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or risk affecting the EU financial interests, including the Single Market dimension, as for example procurement and state aid;

    3. Stresses that the sound and timely implementation of the budget contributes to addressing more efficiently and effectively the needs and challenges faced by the Union and its citizens in different policy areas; warns that the implementation of the budget under time pressure may lead to an increase in errors and irregularities;

    4. Recalls that for the last years all available flexibility measures in the EU Budget were used; reiterates the need for flexibility in the EU Budget to address potential new circumstances where EU action is necessary; notes that increasingly the headroom in the EU Budget is used to provide funding to respond to crises; notes in addition, that exposure of the EU Budget to guarantees and contingent liabilities is projected to rise in the coming years, putting additional strain on the headroom in the Budget which further limits the flexibility of the EU Budget, as are the increased interest payments for NGEU related borrowing; urges the Commission to work on a more stringent risk assessment framework to define the exposure more accurately to prevent over-burdening of the EU Budget;

    5. Stresses the need to protect the EU Budget from any misuse, particularly fraud and corruption, and calls on the Commission to continue to be vigilant and proactive in the current and future cases when the lack of respect for Union values and the Rule of Law affect or threaten to affect the Union’s financial interests;

    6. Stresses the importance of the EU anti-fraud architecture and the need to provide increased resources and to strengthen the role of the European anti-fraud office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) in the fight against fraud and corruption; stresses the need for a comprehensive cooperation between all these institutions;

    7. Notes that while the digital transformation is indispensable to increase the efficiency, control and transparency of the EU Budget, this shift has also heightened its exposure to cyber fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient funds to strengthen EU digital infrastructure, research and development while ensuring that investments in cybersecurity are impactful and contribute to the overall protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    8. Is concerned that total outstanding commitments are reaching record levels for several years now; notes that the Commission projects outstanding commitments to decrease after 2024, when NGEU draws to a close; considers that until the projected decrease of the RAL, the risk of decommitments, and a related reduction of EU added value for the EU Budget, remains high; calls on the Commission to enact a more strategic, transparent, and proactive approach to managing decommitments, also considering the use of decommitments in the cascade mechanism;

    9. Is concerned that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences on the EU’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas; encourages the Commission to explore options to reduce the overall debt burden, such as optimising the timing and structure of debt issuance, and consider alternative financing mechanisms that could reduce reliance on high-interest debt; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden for past debts;

    10. Expresses regret that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been increasing since the 2020 financial year, reaching 5,6 % for the 2023 financial year; notes significant variations in error rates across different budget headings, with some areas reporting error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 %, while cohesion policy has an error rate as high as 9,3 %; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities without at the same time either decreasing requirements or increasing ex ante checks and controls contributed to the high error rate; calls on the Commission to take careful consideration of the lessons learned from the implementation of EU crisis response tools, such as increased flexibility;

    11. Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; expresses concern that the Court found 7 out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were impacted by quantitative issues, with 6 of these payments being affected by material errors; notes in addition that absorption of RRF funds was delayed in 2023, and that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period; notes further that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period (post 2023) is more challenging with an increase in number of milestones and targets to be implemented, a shift from reforms to investments, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year; calls on the Commission to support the Member States’ authorities in the implementation of funds, in particular where additional administrative capacity is needed, to stimulate absorption and reduce the occurrence of errors; calls on the Commission to transparently inform the Parliament about the progress of implementation and absorption of funds and to timely propose solutions where bottlenecks in the implementation are observed;

    12. Recalls the importance of protecting the Union’s own resources from any fraudulent irregularity and, to that end, stimulate the cooperation between anti-fraud services and customs agencies to detect, prevent and correct fraud affecting Union revenue; recalls its position on the amended Commission proposals endorsing the introduction of new own resources.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND FOOD SAFETY (18.2.2025)

     

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

     

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    The Coordinators of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) decided on 16 December 2024 that ENVI would provide an opinion on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI)) in the form of a letter. Therefore, as both ENVI Chair and Standing Rapporteur for the Budget, let me provide you with ENVI’s contribution in the form of resolution paragraphs, which was adopted by ENVI at its meeting[28] of 18 February 2025 and which I kindly request will be taken into account by your committee:

    1. Highlights that the current serious geopolitical context requires the Union to allocate sufficient resources for accelerating the green transition to transform the EU into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure the full execution of the REPowerEU Plan to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources and of energy efficiency technologies to speed up the green transition and end dependency on fossil fuels

    2. Stresses the importance of the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping the global average temperature increase below 1,5°C compared to pre-industrial times; recalls the Union’s obligations to deliver the financial commitments made for international climate financing; considers that the Union should continue leading the efforts towards decarbonisation at global level;

    3. Stresses that the Union’s budget for 2026 should be aligned with the realisation of the European Union’s objectives to reduce pollution and enhance biodiversity, as well as the long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy, the legally enshrined objective to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and the Union’s intermediate climate targets for 2030 and 2040, as laid down in the European Climate Law;

    4. Points out that the European Green Deal is a growth strategy, whose effective implementation with adequate funding  is fundamentally connected to the Union’s strength and competitiveness; believes that the future Clean Industrial Deal and Circular Economy Act should further increase the Union’s competitiveness capacity and sustainability and resource-efficiency to achieve the European Green Deal objectives and ensure a just and inclusive transition;

    5. Reminds that the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027, together with NextGenerationEU, is aimed at implementing the EU’s long-term priorities in various areas, including climate and the environment; emphasizes, specifically, that 30 % of total EU expenditures under the MFF have to be allocated to climate-related projects, including clean-tech and innovation projects; stresses that the future Multi-Financial Framework post-2027 should maintain the level of ambition on climate and environment protection;

    6. Considers it unacceptable that the Union did not reach its objective of allocating at least 7.5 % of annual expenditure to biodiversity in 2024;  calls on the Member States and Commission to take the necessary measures to ensure that the 10 % objective will be reached in both 2026 and 2027 in order to achieve concrete outcomes, including the objectives set in the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, whilst ensuring cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability; notes the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to reach biodiversity objectives;

    7. Emphasises the need to allocate sufficient funding for each individual budget line that contributes to the achievement of the green transition, with a particular focus on sustainability, climate change, innovation, competitiveness, resource-efficiency and biodiversity conservation, such as attention to bees and pollinators’ protection and their role as indicators for healthy ecosystems; emphasizes the importance of the Social Climate Fund (SCF), established to support vulnerable groups in the Union’s green transition;

    8. Highlights the importance of improving disaster prevention and preparedness by implementing climate adaptation measures, allowing the Union to better prevent and respond to emergencies like recent climate change events; emphasizes the ongoing need to ensure sufficient funding for the Union’s civil protection mechanism;

    9. Notes the relevance of the reports adopted by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in relation to the management of EU funds linked to climate and environment; urges the Commission and the Member States to implement the recommendations of the reports, in particular report 15/2024 on climate adaptation[29] regarding the need to ensure that all relevant EU-funded projects are adapted to the current and future climate conditions; recalls the importance of the ECA recommendations in its special report 14/2024[30], emphasising the need for the Commission to better estimate climate spending under future funding instruments, to ensure their adequate design, and to enhance the performance of green transition measures; 

    10. Emphasises the need for more ambitious funding allocations for programs like LIFE to support climate and environment-related projects, as well as for the Just Transition Fund to assist the most vulnerable carbon-intensive regions in addressing the economic and social impacts of the climate transition to leave no one behind; emphasises that the funding under LIFE is crucial for the protection of nature and biodiversity, the transition towards an energy efficient, circular, climate neutral, competitive and climate resilient economy and for democratic participation in decision-making processes;  notes that efficient and result-driven climate and biodiversity financing should be integrated into programming activities, while remaining flexible enough to address the diverse needs of different regions and sectors;

    11. Reminds that a stronger European Health Union requires adequate funding with health-related expenditure that follows the ‘One Health’ and ‘Health in all policies’ approaches, securing the proper implementation of, inter alia, the European Health Data Space and of the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan;

    12. Strongly reiterates its regrets over the redeployment from the EU4Health programme of 1 billion EUR over the 2025-2027 period; considers that this funding shortfall threatens the programme’s ability to achieve its critical objectives; renews its call for the Commission, Member States, and other stakeholders to identify practical solutions to offset this cut, ensuring that the programme’s objective of building stronger, more resilient, and more accessible health systems is achieved; calls as well for increased amounts allocated to Cluster Health in Horizon Europe; recognises that stronger health systems directly contribute to economic stability and productivity by reducing health-related workforce disruptions and increasing the resilience of the labour market;

    13. Highlights the importance of effectively allocating sufficient human and financial resources to all relevant DGs for the implementation of the adopted legislation related to climate environment, chemicals and health as well as to the relevant European agencies, including the European Environment Agency (EEA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA);

    14. Highlights the need for a strengthened EU own resources system that can address current challenges while supporting the Union’s environmental, climate and health objectives; stresses the importance of implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism effectively, enabling the Commission to take compensatory measures to address any shortfalls in meeting the EU budget’s overall climate spending target.

    I have sent a similar letter to Mr Andrzej Halicki, general rapporteur for the 2026 budget.

    Yours sincerely,

    Antonio Decaro

     

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan VAN OVERTVELDT

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

     

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion in the form of a letter on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. On 19 February 2024, the committee adopted an opinion in the form of letter during its regular meeting.

    The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution.

    Yours sincerely,

    Borys BUDKA  

    ITRE Chair

     

    SUGGESTIONS

    1.  Recalls that the Union Budget for 2026 should concretely reflect the political priorities of the new legislative term, considering also the various pledges made by Commissioners during their confirmation hearings in Parliament in November 2024; insists that the 2026 budget needs to fully implement all programmes agreed under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), as well as set  in motion and finance new strategic EU initiatives, such as the Clean Industrial Deal for competitive industries and quality jobs; underscores that the 2026 budget must be aligned with the Union’s objectives and international commitments;

    2.  Notes that multiple challenges facing Europe require greater investment and coordination at European level, as well as more concrete action by Member States; calls on the Commission to propose a Union Budget for 2026 that reflects the urgent nature of these challenges; among others, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and hybrid attacks on Member States and their energy and digital infrastructure; maintains this requires multiple forms of EU and national level investments and preparedness, including improving the resilience of digital and energy infrastructure, direct support for Ukraine, accelerated investment in Europe’s defence industry, and support for the EU’s Eastern border regions most directly impacted by the war and Russian hybrid operations; the need to strengthen Europe’s economic competitiveness and industrial base in a volatile environment where global competitors benefit from extensive state support, leading to unfair competition for European companies; the urgent necessity to improve Europe’s research and innovation capabilities, including greater support for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; the digital revolution, including the acceleration of artificial intelligence and growing concerns about cybersecurity; and the need to achieve a just climate transition, as we adapt our economy to the Union’s long-term energy goals and climate neutrality by 2050, by accelerating the decarbonisation in Europe’s energy markets, implementing European Green Deal legislation and achieving a circular economy;

    3.  Notes that EU companies face considerably higher electricity and gas prices compared with the USA, China and other global actors, which presents a significant competitiveness disadvantage, especially but not only for Europe’s energy intensive industries; emphasises the need to  tackle energy poverty and limit the damaging effects of high energy prices on European consumers, many of whom are already struggling with a high cost of living; stresses the importance of reducing EU dependence on fossil-fuels and improving energy efficiency; underlines that security of supply concerns remain paramount and should be addressed in the 2026 budget, given  that energy supplies are easily weaponised by state actors; insists on the need to improve energy interconnections, modernise energy grids, integrate a higher share of renewables while ensuring sufficient clean baseload energy and system flexibilities, therefore calls for significantly increased funding for the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy, which is the flagship EU programme in this field but currently has limited resources to credibly advance Europe towards an interconnected, resilient and decarbonised energy system, able to deliver affordable prices; calls for urgently ending any remaining EU import dependencies on Russia:

    4.   Recalls the need to strengthen the resilience of the EU economy and the competitiveness of Union industries, with ambitious EU industrial policies that can create quality jobs and contribute significantly towards achieving the EU’s social, digital and green objectives, whilst preserving a level playing field in the Single Market; therefore believes that the Union Budget for 2026 should mark the start of the investment boost recommended in the Draghi report by investing strongly in industrial competitiveness, open strategic autonomy and creating pathways towards decarbonisation, while securing EU supply chains for strategic sectors and technologies and improving access to critical raw materials; insists that the 2026 budget must continue strengthening the Union’s competitiveness with increased support for SMEs, midcaps and start-ups, including greater support for scale up to compete globally, in particular through the European Innovation Council;

    5.  Recalls that the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe will be the first after the mid-term review of this strategic EU programme, and therefore needs to offer sufficient investment in fundamental and applied research, foster collaborative research and facilitate the scale-up and commercialisation of research results to ensure Europe can retain and further develop the necessary knowledge base to confront the scientific and economic challenges of the coming decades; regrets that the existing level of Horizon Europe funding is ultimately insufficient to develop the ideas and technologies necessary for the twin green and digital transitions, or to fully deliver on the stated EU goals of sustainable growth and open strategic autonomy; calls for an increase in the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe, including through the reuse of all available decommitments allowing each sub-programme to fund at least 50% of all excellent proposals, given that presently a majority of excellent proposals remain unfunded; calls for maintaining stable and sufficient funding of the ITER project;

    6.  Stresses that significant investments are necessary to address Europe’s connectivity gap and other Digital Decade 2030 targets; recalls that the European Commission estimates that achieving the full gigabit target could exceed €200 billion; calls therefore for adequate resources to be allocated to provide high speed connectivity including gigabit and 5G services, in addition to investments in next generation digital infrastructures and emerging technologies; calls for further investments that foster the development of European digital sovereignty and an EU-based digital sector in order to catch up in crucial areas such as quantum computing and Artificial Intelligence; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient resources to ensure the full implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability, and the integrity of the digital public space.

    7.  Underlines that a strong and sustainable European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions; regrets that EU and its Member States funding for space programmes is highly fragmented and only a fraction of the level in the US, while other global actors including China are rapidly increasing investments; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure sufficient funding for the European space industry, which includes fostering investments from the private sector; calls furthermore for a sufficient level of  EU investments supporting R&I in the field of space;

    8.  Calls for adequate funding and staffing for all agencies and Union bodies in the policy areas of industry, research, energy, space and cybersecurity, in order to cope with increased workload and new regulatory obligations; 

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget –Section III 2024/2110(BUI)

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    to above, the Committee on Culture and Education has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 3 December 2024, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It considered the matter at its meeting of 19 February 2025 and adopted the opinion at that meeting[31].

    The Committee on Culture and Education:

    1. Insists that funding for the most successful EU and crucial programmes like Erasmus+, the European Solidarity Corps (ESC), Creative Europe and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme has to be excluded from debt repayment needs for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) over the whole remaining MFF period; stresses that the ‘EURI cascade mechanism’ has to be implemented effectively, protecting important programme initiatives that directly benefit citizens;

    2. Welcomes further simplification in line with EP calls, e.g. through the use of lump sums in Erasmus+ , for the programmes that are close to the citizens and need to be accessible also for organisations with limited administrative capacities, and calls for further efforts to achieve that end; underlines that attention should be given to peripheral, mountainous and rural areas that experience more difficulties in accessing EU funds; calls on the Commission to continue to share regularly with Parliament, including the Committee on Culture and Education, updated indicators and statistics on the absorption of funds in these programmes;

    3. Welcomes that mobility grants under Erasmus+ were increased to offset rising living costs, upon Parliament’s insistence on an increase to the programme’s budget, to ensure that the programme remains accessible and inclusive;

    4. Stresses necessary efforts to widen participation and to meet inclusivity targets in order to widen the participation of the most vulnerable youth groups and people with disabilities;

    5. Strongly warns against any cuts, and calls for an increase of the funding for the programme, taking into account the high implementation rates and absorption capacities of the programme; calls in particular to preserve funding to initiatives that support teacher development, such as the European Universities and the Erasmus+ Teacher Academies; highlights the growing number of applicants – e.g. a 94% increase  in school education mobility applications from 2022 to 2023 ; regrets, however, the consequence of  lower success rates, notably for school accreditations, which underscores the need for a substantial funding increase to meet the growing demand;

    6. Insists that all funding initially allocated to the programme will be used for investing in the future of young people;

    7. Emphasises the need to support sport under Erasmus+ to promote its role in improving physical and mental health and social inclusion, and to fight discrimination;

    8. Deplores the additional, unanticipated costs for the media strand of Creative Europe, including the implementation of not only the AVMSD, but also of EMFA, including the secretariat of the European Board for Media Services, an additional expenditure that was not taken into account when the current MFF was set up; insists that new initiatives should always be financed from fresh money;

    9. Stresses that the budget for the Creative Europe programme is insufficient to meet the high demand for projects across all its strands, with alarmingly low success rates (e.g. 17% in 2023 under the culture strand); calls for an increase of its funding and highlights the need for synergies between Creative Europe and other EU funds.

    10. Calls for an increase in funding for the ESC programme, given the modest year-on-year increases of about 2% of its budget under the MFF, which is not sufficient to offset inflation rates, and the fact that it is heavily over-subscribed, resulting in a high rejection rate and, therefore, in many cases, disappointment for the young applicants; welcomes the fact that the number of participants with fewer opportunities in the programme (38%)  is the highest of any EU programme and should be maintained;

    11. Stresses the importance of the CERV programme for building bridges between European citizens from different Member States and promoting their engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union, while also contributing to preserving social cohesion and helping to prevent democratic backsliding, particularly in the current challenging political situation; insists, therefore, on an increase for its budget;

    12. Points out that pilot projects and preparatory actions (PPs and PAs) serve as testbeds for new policy initiatives and need adequate funding to properly fulfil that function; deplores any attempts to thwart potentially successful proposals for PPs and PAs already at the selection stage and calls for better cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament on the selection and implementation of PPs and PAs.

    Yours sincerely,

    Nela Riehl

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 29 January 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    The Committee on Constitutional Affairs considered the matter at its meeting of 18 February 2025. At that meeting[32], it decided to submit the opinion set out below to the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible.

    Yours sincerely,

    Sven Simon

     

     

    OPINION

    1. Points out that future substantial EU enlargement cannot be met without a larger EU budget and sufficient new own resources; calls for the necessary budgetary and institutional reforms to be agreed and adopted before substantial enlargement takes place;

    2. Reminds of the need to secure proper financing for the structures within the EU institutions that are responsible for communication with citizens and countering disinformation such as the Commission Representations and European Parliament Liaison Offices, in order to enable them to effectively fulfil their tasks;

    3. Recommends that the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations receives adequate resources, in particular for staffing purposes in view of the significant enlargement of its tasks as foreseen by the Commission proposal for the recast of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1141/2014;

    4. Urges the Committee on Budgets to incorporate the above mentioned budget lines augmentations in its position, as they serve the purpose of delivering concrete results and quality communication to citizens.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    27

    8

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thomas Geisel, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Ondřej Kovařík, Janusz Lewandowski, Victor Negrescu, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Stine Bosse, Mohammed Chahim, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Łukasz Kohut, Marit Maij, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Mirosława Nykiel, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    27

    +

    ECR

    Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Łukasz Kohut, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Stine Bosse, Olivier Chastel, Fabienne Keller, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mohammed Chahim, Marit Maij, Victor Negrescu, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Rasmus Nordqvist, Nicolae Ştefănuță

     

    8

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Kovařík, Julien Sanchez, Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The role of competition in promoting growth and innovation in the UK

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    The role of competition in promoting growth and innovation in the UK

    A speech by Jessica Lennard, CMA Chief Strategy & External Affairs Officer

    Good morning

    I’m Jessica Lennard and I’m the Chief Strategy Officer at the UK Competition and Markets Authority.

    Normally, I’d start with who we are… And I’ll come to that.

    But let me reframe things for a moment and start with who you are… And thanks to HSBC and Atomico for many of the insights I’m about to draw on.

    You are part of a European tech industry which contributes over 1.5 trillion Euros – or more than 8% – to European economic output.

    With a tenfold increase in venture capital… and a 24% compound annual growth rate in tech talent since 2015 – you are… quite simply… the growth champions of European industry.

    And for those of you based in the UK… You’re part of a tech sector that’s grown by 20% since 2023… and is now worth $1.2 trillion in enterprise value.

    You are the driving force behind the largest innovation economy in Europe… and the third globally… behind only the US and China.

    Maybe you’re even one of the 181 unicorns valued at over a billion dollars[1]

    And if you’re in AI… you’re driving a wave of innovation worth up to 47 billion pounds in potential productivity gains for the UK, each year, over a decade. [2]

    You are of critical national importance to our future prosperity. And I know you’re nowhere near done yet…

    But… I can see some of you waiting for the ‘but’…

    Of course, I know there are major challenges ahead if this sector is going to become truly, globally competitive… in the way we aspire for it to be.

    I know success depends on multiple factors…. I’ve heard these many times, from start-ups, investors, industry bodies – including those on the CMA’s own Growth and Investment Council.  

    To name just a few, and these will all be familiar…

    We need to attract and retain world-leading talent… We need to tackle the growth stage funding gap with the US… We need critical infrastructure and utilities that can keep up with demand.

    And we need a regulatory environment that inspires business and investor confidence.

    Which brings me back to who we are… and more importantly… how we can help you fulfil your extraordinary potential.

    It brings me to the role of competition… and the CMA, as the UK’s primary competition and consumer protection authority.

    My own background is largely private sector… I’ve worked for, and advised… start-ups, scale-ups and some of the world’s largest firms across a range of sectors… from clean tech and telecoms… to digital payments, data and AI.

    And I can tell you honestly that what drew me to the CMA was the knowledge of what really brought out the best in these diverse businesses… what really made them hustle, innovate, stretch every sinew to succeed… was the power of competition.

    So… we can’t solve all of the problems I’ve just listed… And I know there are more besides.

    But there are a number of things we can do:

    We can make markets work better… through studies or investigations which lead to greater opportunities for innovators, entrepreneurs, and investors… as well as improved price, choice and quality for consumers.

    We can keep markets open and competitive for all players… by investigating the small number of mergers each year that have the potential to lead to a substantial lessening of competition.

    We can protect the level-playing field and bring down barriers to entry through competition enforcement… giving you the confidence that your competitors can’t gain an unfair advantage by breaking the law.

    We can boost consumer confidence, spurring spending and adoption of new products and services across the economy… through robust enforcement of consumer protection.

    And, as of January this year, we can promote competition in digital markets… under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act… I’ll come on to this in more detail in a moment.

    Now, we talk about these powers… these ‘tools’ we have. But it’s the outcomes that matter… Lower prices… more choice, quality… diversity and security of supply… innovation, productivity… investment, economic dynamism.

    These are the foundations of growth.

    Not only that… but healthy competition also helps ensure the benefits of that growth are diffused across the whole UK economy, over both the short and long-term….

    That’s fundamental to achieving long-term prosperity for everyone in the UK… That’s our job.

    And, over the last decade… it’s delivered more than £20 billion of direct financial benefits for UK consumers.

    Which brings me something of a live debate here in the UK… Is driving economic growth really the job of regulators…? Shouldn’t a competition and consumer protection authority be focused on… well… competition and consumers?

    Our view is that of course it’s part of our role… The CMA can absolutely support an environment that’s strongly conducive to growth and investment… while upholding our fundamental responsibilities to promote competition and protect consumers.

     In fact… the link between competition and growth is well-established… and consumer confidence is, of course, the fuel that powers a thriving economy.   

    This’s not just a dry economic argument… As I say, we’re in the business of outcomes… So let me give you just a few examples particularly relevant to your sector.

    Our retail banking market investigation… paved the way for the UK’s Open Banking revolution, with startups and challenger fintechs… some of you, probably… powering a host of new services now used by over 70% of UK consumers… and worth over £4 billion to the UK economy annually.

    We recently investigated the conduct of a software company… supplying a critical management information system to schools…. We saw evidence of those schools being locked into longer-term contracts… when other cloud-based services offered by challengers and competitors were becoming particularly attractive. 

    As a result of our intervention… the company legally committed to give certain schools the choice to switch… And a considerable number of them now have. Many such cases, by the way… rely on us receiving intelligence from parties who see that the market’s not working as it should… and our door is always open.

    Some of you may remember the proposed merger of Experian and Clearscore which the CMA found could stifle product development and negatively impact consumers… The merger was abandoned and Clearscore returned to plan A… to grow as an independent, UK-based business.

    Since then, it hasn’t just grown… it’s doubled-down on innovation and new offerings… and now serves over 21 million users on four continents… Oh, and their CEO has joined the CMA Board.

    I don’t need to tell this audience… how critical… access to online platforms is for your businesses… In 2023, the CMA secured commitments from Amazon… to help third-party Marketplace sellers compete on a level-playing field… and from Meta… to prevent the misuse of data… through Facebook Marketplace, that could create unfair advantages.

    Millions of UK businesses now have a fair chance of being featured in the ‘Buy Box’… are subject to fewer tie-ins around logistics… and enjoy greater protections for their valuable user data.

    Lastly and most recently… for those of you in e-commerce… or on platforms relying on user-generated content…. Earlier this year, following a CMA investigation… Google committed to enhanced processes to tackle fake reviews… and to properly sanction reviewers and businesses who take part in this activity.

    With as much as £23 billion of UK consumer spending potentially influenced by online reviews each year… we simply can’t afford as a country for consumers and fair-dealing businesses… especially startups trying to build trustworthy brands…. to lose out to these unfair practices.

    And new powers under the DMCCA… mean we can also now take more direct action in this area.

    Before I move on… it’s worth noting for those of you less familiar with the CMA that although we’re part of government, our decisions are made independently.

    The fundamentals of what we do… promoting competition, protecting consumers… are core to our mandate from Parliament… And we also have a helpful frame from government, called a ‘strategic steer’… which guides our prioritisation as well as how we work.

    And… very much as I’ve just illustrated with these cases… the new draft steer from the incoming government…. highlights the importance of the CMA independently enforcing strong competition and consumer protection… whilst rooting our work squarely in the context of the contribution it can make to the government’s number one priority of economic growth.

    So, I’ve talked about you… I’ve talked about us… and some of the ways we can help…

    I want to spend some time in a moment talking about two areas I think will be of particular interest to this audience – mergers and digital markets.

    But before I do… I want to give you some important context about where we are as an organisation… and where we’re going.

    So far, I’ve talked about the ‘what’… What the CMA does, what value can we bring… But we know the ‘how’ is equally important.

    I think it’s fair to say that over the years the CMA gained a reputation for being something of an ivory tower… Not always easy to engage with… perhaps even somewhat daunting to deal with…. Some of you here may have direct experience of this.  

    But in this challenging economic environment, with companies experiencing this degree of uncertainty and volatility…

    … and with such a clear need to drive investment into our economy…

    … so we can rebuild critical services and infrastructure, so we can achieve that prosperity I talked about…

    … well, in that environment, it’s not just what we do that matters.

    How we go about things, even just perceptions of how we operate… that matters too. It matters to business and investor confidence… and to the attractiveness of the UK as a destination for capital… and a great place to start or grow a business.  

    That’s why we’ve spent a lot of time over the last 6 months talking directly to businesses and investors (…domestic and international), as well as leading trade bodies.

    We heard that four aspects of how we carry out our work really matter…

    Pace (so, streamlining our approach to reach sound outcomes as fast as possible);

    Predictability (so, being as clear as we can, to minimise uncertainty);

    Proportionality (meaning what we prioritise… how we address any concerns we find… and minimising burden on businesses throughout);

    And Process (which really means direct engagement with businesses)

    We’ve been working concertedly this year… to deliver carefully considered, meaningful changes based on these 4Ps.

    We started with merger control… where we had the most direct feedback from stakeholders… and we know this is particularly important to business and investor confidence.

    We’ve now launched a package of substantial reforms including:

    New KPIs for considerably shorter end-to-end merger reviews…

    A consultation on our approach to merger remedies… looking both at the efficiency and pace of our process… and how we strike the right balance between different types of remedies…

    New guidance… to clarify how we’ll apply the tests we use to decide whether we have jurisdiction to investigate a deal or not…

    UK law is actually unusually broad in this respect… and the government has now announced a consultation on refining those tests to give legislative backing to our evolving approach…

    A targeted outreach series to break down barriers to direct engagement… both in and outside of investigations… including more senior meetings early in the process… and deeper relationships with startups and investors…

    And finally… a Mergers Charter, which brings all of this together… and lays out really clearly what businesses should expect from a CMA merger review… and what we expect from them and their advisors in return ….

    Now, I mentioned the importance of perceptions.

    In reality, the vast majority of mergers raise no competition concerns… many can enhance investment, innovation and business dynamism…. That’s why… out of the 50,000 or so deals announced each year… the CMA usually prohibits 1 or 2.

    That number hasn’t changed much over recent years… even after Brexit… when we took on new powers for UK merger control from the European Commission…. We also recently raised de minimis thresholds from £15m to £30m… focusing on deals that truly require our attention.

    Our 2024 stats show that we formally investigated 38 mergers… 6 went to Phase 2… 1 was abandoned… 1 was prohibited.

    But that’s almost beside the point… if perceptions of our approach… and the real-life experiences of companies going through these processes… are undermining confidence.

    So, I want to be absolutely clear about three things:

    Firstly, that the CMA fully appreciates the importance of viable exit routes for startups, as well as routes to scaling organically…. And with half the enterprise value of the UK tech sector concentrated in pre-exit companies… we know how important this is for growth.

    Secondly, every deal that is capable of being cleared either unconditionally, or with effective remedies, should be… Only a truly problematic merger… where the harm to UK businesses and consumers can’t be effectively addressed through remedies… should not proceed.

    Thirdly, every business in a CMA merger process deserves to feel listened to by us… to understand what we are doing and why… and to recognise a sense of fairness and consistent treatment.

    I’m going to say this again… we will always uphold our duty to promote competition and protect UK consumers. That’s not going to change…. And if any of your advisors suggest now’s a good time to push through a bad merger, with weak remedies… I’m afraid you probably want to seek advice elsewhere.

    That said… I am confident that… implementing the changes I’ve outlined, we can uphold those responsibilities whilst also fostering a business environment that maximises growth, investment and business confidence.

    Beyond mergers… we’re making real progress on applying the 4Ps… pace, proportionality, predictability and process… to other areas of CMA work….

    Before I explain how we’re doing this in digital markets… some background may be helpful on the new digital markets competition regime… that came into force in January this year… and why we believe it’s going to unlock a new era of innovation and investment across the UK tech ecosystem.

    Procedurally, the regime enables the CMA to assess… over a 9-month investigation… whether a particular firm has strategic market status (‘SMS’) in respect of a particular digital activity…. It’s carefully designed to apply only to the very largest firms… with clear conditions related to turnover, market power, and strategic significance.

    And, rather than imposing blanket rules across all companies… if a firm is designated with SMS… the CMA can take a very tailored, very bespoke approach to identifying and addressing specific harms.

    In practice, this could mean… for UK businesses, more interoperability… greater access to data and functionality… and fair terms of access to platforms or marketplaces… so UK businesses aren’t overpaying, having to share valuable data… or restricted from making certain improvements to their offering.

    And for UK consumers… it could mean lower prices, more choice, easier switching… and protection from exploitation or misleading practices.  

    Far from tying up the sector in red tape, this is all designed to open up opportunities across the ecosystem… Opportunities for continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms…

    Opportunities to unlock a new wave of growth… by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups to succeed (many UK-based) …

    And opportunities to strengthen consumer confidence in these fast-evolving products and services.  

    So in January… we launched our first SMS investigations in relation to Google’s position in search… and search advertising services… and Apple’s and Google’s positions in their respective ‘mobile ecosystems’. Both of those conclude in October 2025.

    Coming back to the 4Ps… the potential for heavy-handed regulation to hamper innovation and growth is particularly high in fast-moving, technology-led sectors…. So once again, it’s not just the ‘what’ but also the ‘how’ which matters.

    And the design of the digital markets regime already reflects many aspects of the 4Ps.

    Tight statutory time limits… and a broad duty of expedition… bake in pace… and now we’re going further, by committing to streamline our approach to investigations… Still rigorous… but drilling down on potential concerns as fast as possible.

    Interventions are designed in an iterative, open way… providing all-important predictability… and now we’re going further, by committing to publish roadmaps of potential future interventions when we consult on a proposed designation decision.

    And the process itself is uniquely participative… based on deep, ongoing, constructive engagement with SMS firms and other stakeholders… We’re going further here too, with a pro-active ‘go to you’ approach to business engagement… including with startups and scaleups… and a commitment to taking this outside the tech sector to the UK businesses which rely on these markets.  

    Finally, proportionality… Unlike some other jurisdictions, there’s no automatic designation or regulatory requirements…. It’s highly tailored, highly flexible… We’re building on those foundations now… by laying out explicitly the prioritisation approach underpinning our choices about where and how to intervene.

    We’ve applied our own CMA prioritisation principles… impact… strategic significance… whether we’re best placed to act… as well as consideration of risk levels and resources… And we’ve reflected key parts of the government’s draft strategic steer… for example, taking into account the interplay with other regulators (domestically and internationally) when considering whether to act ourselves.

    I’ll close… by giving you a flavour of what’s to come from the CMA in the year ahead beyond everything I’ve talked about so far…. We’ll be publishing our Annual Plan very shortly… and I hope much of what we propose will be of interest and value to this audience.

    As you’d expect, the plan reflects our strong commitment to competition and consumer protection… along with a sharp focus on how we can use our powers – and evolve the way we work – to drive growth and investment, as well as business and consumer confidence.

    More specifically…

    We’ll look for opportunities through our markets work… to unlock investment in critical infrastructure… and to identify areas where key horizontal enablers (like access to data or technology adoption) can have a multiplier effect on growth.

    We’ll support the government’s industrial strategy… looking across the priority sectors to where effective competition could spur innovation or investment… or address anti-competitive practices which hold them back….

    Part of that… by the way… may be facilitating companies collaborating to advance nationally important goals (skills, for example)… as we’ve done previously around environmental sustainability and cutting-edge cancer therapies.

    We’ll deploy our deep anti-bid rigging expertise and AI capabilities… to help government identify and tackle bid rigging in public procurement, potentially opening up enormous opportunities for challengers… and saving taxpayers billions of pounds.

    We’ll support delivery of the government’s AI Opportunities Action Plan… looking for ways competition can spur the progress of a thriving UK AI ecosystem.

    We’ll continue working with the FCA, ICO, and Ofcom… as member of the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum… to enhance the clarity and coherence of digital regulation… as well as providing streamlined access to regulatory advice and support… through initiatives like our AI and Digital Hub.

    And we’ll work closely with our new CMA Growth and Investment Council… That includes CEOs and Chairs of twelve leading representative bodies across the UK economy… including the likes of Tech UK… the Scale-Up Institute… and the Start-Up Coalition.

    If there’s one message I want to leave you with today – to take to your boardrooms and pipeline meetings… into your risk committees and advisor discussions… it’s this:

    Our north star is a regulatory environment which maximises growth and investment to the greatest extent possible… while staying true to our mandate to promote competition and protect consumers…. So the confidence you have in the UK competition regime and in the CMA matters.

    That’s why we’re listening and engaging more than ever before… and we’ll keep doing that… We’ll keep going with our 4Ps… And we’ll keep delivering those fundamentals… which underpin growth and long-term prosperity for the benefit of all UK businesses and consumers.


    [1] All stats from HSBC Innovation Banking and Dealroom

    [2] Uk Government AI Opportunities Action Plan: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-sets-out-blueprint-to-turbocharge-ai

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Taking on Trump & Farage – and fixing church roofs

    Source: Liberal Democrats UK

    We meet at a time of great peril. For our continent, and for our country.

    Because Donald Trump is not only betraying Ukraine. It’s not only their sovereignty he’s selling out. It’s our security. The security of Europe and the security of our United Kingdom.

    And that is unforgivable.

    Putin might be able to fool Donald Trump into thinking that his ambitions do not extend beyond parts of Ukraine, but we know better. Just look at what he’s already doing in Georgia, in Moldova, in Romania – undermining their democracies and seeking to extend his grip further into Europe.

    Our brave Ukrainian allies are on the frontline. Fighting not just for their homes. Not just for their freedom. But for the freedom and security of people across Europe, including ours here in the UK. Their fight is our fight.

    So to our Ukrainian friends, on behalf of all Liberal Democrats, let me say once again – We thank you. We salute you. We stand with you. Today. Tomorrow. Always.

    And of course, that solidarity must go beyond mere words. That’s why I am proud that the United Kingdom has been Ukraine’s staunchest ally right from the start. Why I am so proud of the tens of thousands of British families who welcomed Ukrainians into their homes. Showing the incredible warmth and generosity of the British people. Why I am proud of all the military assistance we have given to the Ukrainian armed forces – the tanks and training, missiles and drones to repel Putin’s war machine. And it’s why I was proud that the Prime Minister brought Europe and Canada together here in Britain to chart a way forward, the day after those appalling scenes of Trump and Vance ambushing President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office.

    And Trump’s so-called “special envoy” might dismiss British leadership as pointless posturing, but we know what it really is… Britain, leading in Europe again, as we have done at the greatest moments in our nation’s history. And friends, it was good to see that again after such a long time, wasn’t it?

    But now we must step up our efforts and do more. Much more. For the defence of Ukraine, for the defence of Europe, and for our own national defence too.

    So we Liberal Democrats have led calls for far more support for Ukraine – funded by the tens of billions of pounds of Russian assets frozen in the UK, and the hundreds of billions of pounds frozen across the G7. We backed proposals for a new European Rearmament Bank, to finance a massive expansion of defence manufacturing here at home and across the continent. We pressed the Government to raise defence spending to 2.5% of GDP – and now we are continuing to push for cross-party talks to get it to 3%.

    Because the threat we face is existential.

    To our east, a murderous dictator hellbent on building a new Russian empire – and committing atrocities on European soil in pursuit of it. And to our west, for the first time in my life, a President of the United States willing not merely to turn a blind eye to Putin’s aggression – but actually to praise it. A President who has repeatedly demonstrated that he is not a reliable ally to Ukraine, to Britain, to Europe, or to anyone else.

    So the fundamental questions we now face are these:

    How do we deal with Putin?

    And how do we deal with Trump?

    Well, let me tell you how not to deal with them. Just like any bully, you don’t deal with them by curling up in a ball and hoping they’ll leave you alone. You don’t turn a blind eye as they attack your friends, praying that maybe they’ll stop there. You have to stand up. Stand tough. Stand together with our friends. Make clear that an attack on one is an attack on all.

    And that – for the vast majority of people in our country – is our instinctive response. Brits can’t stand a bully.

    What Trump and Putin are doing offends our fundamental British values of decency, fair play, respect for national sovereignty and the rule of law. Almost everyone I speak to – in every part of our country – feels that way. But there is one man who thinks differently.

    One lone holdout. Someone who simply doesn’t seem to get it. A man who splits his time between GB News, Mar-a-Lago… and weirdly selling nappies on social media, apparently. A man who can even, legend has it, occasionally be spotted in the House of Commons and – if you wait long enough – in the town of Clacton-on-Sea. Nigel Farage.

    Unlike you and me, Nigel Farage thinks Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are great. Not in a “look, we have to be pragmatic and work with them” kind of way. More in a teenager with a celebrity crush kind of way.

    Don’t forget, when Farage was asked which world leader he most admired, his answer was Vladimir Putin. Yes, really. Now, to be fair, that was before Donald Trump became President – so I guess Putin might have slipped to number two by now. 

    A tyrant responsible for the brutal suppression of Russia’s own people, and countless atrocities in Ukraine. Who has murdered thousands of innocent civilians. And abducted 20,000 children from their homes. Snatched them away from their families.

    That, apparently, is the sort of man who wins Nigel Farage’s admiration.

    How despicable. How completely out-of-touch with British values. With human values. How unpatriotic. How deeply un-British. And this from a man who thinks he can be our Prime Minister. Not on our watch.

    With war on our continent, an unpredictable President in the White House, and an increasingly volatile world… This is no time for a nationalist.

    We need real British patriotism instead. At home and abroad, our country has big problems to solve. And let’s be absolutely clear: Nigel Farage is not the least bit interested in solving them.

    If Farage had his way, he would turn our great country into little more than a Donald Trump tribute act. He has said it himself: he sees Trump as his inspiration. He wants to do to Britain what Trump is doing to America: All the division. The nasty culture-war nonsense. The economic self-harm of tariffs. Cruelty for the sake of being cruel. Siding with criminals and undermining the rule of law. And of course, limiting your access to healthcare. And making you pay more for it.

    Farage doesn’t like to talk about it much these days, but he has been very clear throughout his long political career that he doesn’t believe in the fundamental NHS principle of universal healthcare free at the point of use. He’s called for an American-style insurance-based model. He says he’s “open to anything” when it comes to the future of the NHS – including privatisation. Just like his idol Donald would want.

    And apart from that, isn’t it striking that Farage has nothing to say about the challenges facing our NHS? Nothing to say about how to make sure people can actually see a doctor or a dentist when they need one. Nothing to say about ambulance delays or crumbling hospitals. Nothing to say about fixing social care, so that our loved ones get the care they need and carers get the support they deserve. And I mean literally – nothing to say. 

    Farage has never uttered the word “care” once in Parliament. Because the truth is: Nigel Farage doesn’t care.

    He hasn’t mentioned the “NHS” once either – or GPs, hospitals, ambulances, dentists. Imagine that. A political party whose leader has nothing at all to say on one of the biggest issues on people’s lips, and the biggest challenges we face. Our country has big problems to solve. And Nigel Farage is not the least bit interested in solving them.

    But friends, that’s not the worst of it, is it? What worries us most about Farage and Reform is the deeply destructive, divisive brand of politics they deploy.

    The weaponisation of difference. The demonisation of diversity. The scapegoating of “the other”. The superficial, simplistic, snake-oil solutions they peddle. We know where it all will lead, if we don’t stop it.

    We know what happens when cynical, opportunistic politicians seize on the struggles and the anxieties of ordinary people – Anxieties about the cost of living. About cultural and technological change. About sovereignty and security. When they exploit those struggles and anxieties for their own selfish ends – When they point the finger of blame at those who differ from you because of their religion or their nationality or the colour of their skin – When they teach that those people threaten your job or your family or your way of life – When they manipulate new forms of media to spread lies, sow fear and stir hatred – When they use those tools to convince you that their cause alone is righteous and all who stand against them are evil… We know where that ends.

    We have seen it before across history – too many times. It is the populist playbook, and its pages are very well-worn. It is ugly. It is powerful. And it is incredibly destructive. Not only to the groups they target – the vulnerable, the minorities – but ultimately to us all. To our whole society. To the very idea of liberal democracy that our United Kingdom embodies.

    And if this sounds alarmist or over-the-top, remember this: It always starts that way.

    With a reasonable, even beguiling face. With an appeal to “common sense” and “plain speaking”. But if allowed to take root, it grows and mutates with such speed and ferocity, till it fills every crack in the foundations of our country… Until those cracks become chasms.

    And what is broken can never be mended. So we know where it leads. We know what is at stake. Not just an election. Not just a set of policies. But the very future of liberal democracy itself.

    That is what’s under threat. And friends – Liberal Democrats – it falls to us to save it.

    Because with the Conservatives desperately chasing Reform’s tail – And Labour sounding more and more like them every day – We Liberal Democrats are the only ones with the courage and the conviction to stand up and offer something different. Offer a positive alternative. Something better… Hope.

    And here’s the good news – Because I know it can feel like the tides of history are against us right now. I know that when you look at Trump in America, Le Pen in France, the AfD in Germany, Reform here in the UK – When the headlines are so often so bleak – It can be tempting to give in to despair.

    Well the good news is this: What we can offer people is even more powerful than all their lies. All their false promises. The easy answers of the populist right. Even more powerful, and even more popular. Real hope.

    Hope based not on empty rhetoric or magical thinking – But on hard work and concrete action that people can see making a difference to their lives and to their communities.

    That’s what good old-fashioned Liberal Democrat community politics has always been all about. Winning people’s trust by getting things done. Showing them what liberal democracy can do for them – not by talking about it, but by rolling up our sleeves and actually doing it. Putting our policies into practice and our ideals into action.

    I don’t know if you heard what Kemi Badenoch said about us recently. Did you hear this?

    She said – and I quote: “A typical Liberal Democrat will be somebody who is good at fixing their church roof. And people in the community like them.”

    Good at fixing the church roof. People in the community like them.

    I think she meant it as an insult! But I’ll happily wear it as a badge of honour.

    Because she’s right. Liberal Democrats fix things.

    And isn’t it telling, that attitude from the Leader of the Conservative Party? 

    Not that she doesn’t like us – I’m not surprised about that. She’s got good reason not to like the Liberal Democrats… After all, we did take 60 seats off them last July! I’ll say that again, Conference… We took 60 seats off the Conservatives! So you can hardly blame them for being a bit upset!

    But what I’m talking about is the sneering attitude of the Leader of the Conservatives. The sneering attitude that says fixing church roofs is somehow beneath her. Even beneath politics altogether. That what happens in our communities is trivial and insignificant compared to debating the true meaning of conservatism on Twitter.

    And it goes far beyond Kemi Badenoch and church roofs. It’s the whole Conservative Party – whether in Westminster or in town halls and county halls across the country. They have abandoned our communities.

    The Conservatives left schools and hospitals to crumble. Left whole areas without enough GPs or dentists. Left water companies to pump filthy sewage into our rivers and seas. And they have left decent, traditional Conservatives without a political home.

    Their out-of-touch, disdainful thinking is why the Conservative Party is in the mess it is today. Treating the day-to-day things that matter in people’s lives not just with indifference, but outright contempt.

    It’s why so many lifelong Conservative voters have turned to the Liberal Democrats. It’s why people rightly kicked them out of government last July – And why we must kick them out of our councils in May too.

    But that Conservative disdain and neglect is also what has opened the door to Reform. And that’s why it’s so important that we Liberal Democrats are rooted in our communities, getting things done.

    Fixing the church roof – and much more besides. Showing people that politics can work for them. That who they vote for can make a difference. That their voice matters. 

    That is how you defeat the populists. How you drain away the cynicism that feeds them. How you win back people’s trust and restore their hope.

    It’s not easy, our way of doing politics.

    Liberal Democrat MPs certainly have to spend a lot more time in our constituencies than Nigel Farage spends in Clacton – although I admit that’s a low bar.

    That’s why no one ever joins the Liberal Democrats as a shortcut to high office. And if that’s why any of you are here today, I’m sorry to have to let you down like this.

    We join because we want to make a difference to our communities and our country. Even though we know it’s hard work. 

    And we join – we all joined – because of a genuine belief in the core Liberal values that have made our country great: Freedom and equality. Community and internationalism. A commitment to human rights, to the environment, and to democracy. And those values are exactly what this moment in history demands.

    At a time when people are facing so many daily challenges on so many different fronts – The cost of living crisis. An economy that is still barely growing. Public services that just aren’t working the way they should. Opportunity that feels further and further out of reach for too many young people.

    These are challenges that can really test our values. When people feel so economically insecure. When times are so tough. Historically these are the times that liberalism has struggled, that progress has stumbled. But these are the times when our liberal values are needed more than ever.

    To build the fair, free and open society we all believe in. So that people can get on in life – with real power to make their own choices and pursue their own dreams.

    Because we understand that if you free people – If you empower them to make their voices heard and hold the powerful properly to account – Then you unleash the best in people and create a better society and a stronger economy as a result.

    So that everyone gets a fair deal. Every child gets the best possible start in life, and everyone sees their hard work and aspiration properly rewarded. Everyone gets the care they need when they need it, and a helping hand if they fall on tough times.

    And friends, how critical are our Liberal, internationalist values right now?

    Not just on Ukraine and defending Europe from Putin – critical though that is. But on so many big, global challenges – from the rise of China to the threat of climate change to the risks of artificial intelligence.

    These are challenges that no nation can afford to ignore. And challenges that no nation can tackle alone. Pulling up the drawbridge simply isn’t an option. Like I said, this is no time for a nationalist.

    What we need is a movement of proud internationalists – People who believe that our country and our people thrive when we are open and outward-looking. Who know that the UK can be an incredible force for good when it stands tall on the world stage. And stands up for what is right. Who recognise that the concerns of one nation inevitably become the concerns of all nations. A movement of proud internationalists. And Liberal Democrats, that is who we are.

    The only party that has consistently opposed the Conservatives’ damaging Brexit deal from the start. The only party arguing for a new deal with the EU, with a Customs Union at its heart – putting us on a path back to the Single Market. The only party still championing international aid, after first the Conservatives and now Labour shamefully cut it.

    And friends, we’re the only party in British politics speaking up in defiance of Donald Trump. The only ones willing to state the obvious truth: that he is no leader of the free world. I mean, this is a man who stands on the White House drive, flogging Teslas for Elon Musk like a particularly bad used car salesman. It’s hardly “Ask not what your country can do for you”, is it?

    And more despicably, this is a man who halted shipments of food, medicine and other essential aid supplies to people around the world who desperately need them. Locking whole shipping containers in port for their contents to rot. So much for Ronald Reagan’s “shining city on a hill”.

    And remember – this is the man Nigel Farage calls his “inspiration”. We’re the only ones willing to say that Trump cannot be relied upon to play by the rules, or stick to agreements. That his presidency is a threat to peace and prosperity in the UK, across Europe, and around the world. And that we must deal with him as he is. Bullying. Narcissistic. Unpredictable. We must deal with Trump from a position of strength, not weakness.

    Like on trade. If there’s one thing we know, it’s that Donald Trump loves tariffs. He says it’s “the most beautiful word in the dictionary”…

    Which, when you think about it, really is a very Donald Trump way of deciding your economic policy, isn’t it?

    Now, as Liberals, we profoundly disagree. After all, it was the Victorian Liberals who overturned centuries of protectionism and ushered in a new era of free trade and prosperity. We can already see the damage Trump’s tariffs are doing to the US economy, with forecasters saying he may plunge it into recession. And we fear the damage his trade war could do to the world economy, impacting jobs and living standards here in the UK too.

    So the question, again, is how do we deal with him?

    And the answer, we say again, is from a position of strength. Regrettably, that’s not Labour’s strategy. They say: “Let’s be nice to him and hope he won’t hurt us”.

    Now Labour’s even talking about scrapping Britain’s tax on social media giants. Changing the UK’s tax policy to appease Donald Trump – and Elon Musk. Well appeasement never works with bullies, and it doesn’t work with Trump – as his tariffs on British steel already show.

    And let me say this to Elon Musk, who I know is my biggest fan… We will make out-of-control social media giants like you pay more – so we can defend our children and young people from the harm you’re causing them.

    But it’s not just Labour bending the knee to this White House. It’s the Conservatives too. They’d have us go to Mar-a-Lago, begging bowl outstretched, pleading for a trade deal on whatever terms Trump will give us. The Conservatives would sell out British farmers to President Trump, just as they sold them out in their damaging trade deals with Australia and New Zealand. And then they’d let Trump’s billionaire mates carve up the NHS between them. 

    Another Elon Musk rebrand, this time to NH-X.

    More and more appeasement – in the futile hope it would protect us from more Trump tariffs in future. But we know it wouldn’t. Of course it wouldn’t.

    Just look at how he’s treated Canada – a steadfast ally who fought fascism alongside the US and the UK. He has hit them with outrageous tariffs, breaking the trade deal between their two countries. Because he doesn’t like the deal, so he doesn’t think he has to stick to it.

    Last month he asked “who would ever sign a thing like this”. The answer, of course, is you did Donald. Only five years ago. His signature means nothing.

    So no, a bad Trump deal won’t protect us from tariffs. And playing nice, being weak, is no way to deal with him either. So let’s stand up to Trump. Let’s stand side by side with the EU and with our Commonwealth ally Canada. I urge the Prime Minister to bring those leaders together here in the UK to agree a coordinated response to Trump’s trade war – just like he’s rightly done on Putin’s murderous war. As others have done, we should hit back with tariffs of our own – starting with those Teslas Trump is so desperate to sell. 

    And Conference, let’s put ourselves in the strongest possible position by rebuilding our trade with Europe – Strengthening British businesses and showing Trump we have other options.

    So you see, when it comes to dealing with Trump – as with the other looming threats in the world right now – it is our liberal belief in internationalism that offers the solution. Conference, with Trump in the White House and Farage leading a Trump tribute act here in the UK – Our role in British politics has never been more essential. Our precious liberal values are the only antidote to their destructive nationalism. Our trademark community politics is the only way to defeat their cynical populism.

    The threat they pose is grave. The challenge before us is great. This is a battle of competing values. A battle of competing visions. A battle for the future.

    We didn’t choose this fight. But friends, I know you are up for it. I know together we can win it.

    For the future of our democracy. For the good of our communities. For the love of our country. Let’s go to battle.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: US isn’t first country to dismantle its foreign aid office − here’s what happened after the UK killed its version of USAID

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sarah Stroup, Professor of Political Science; Director, Conflict Transformation Collaborative, Middlebury

    The U.S. and U.K. used to be major funders of global immunization programs for children. AP Photo/Sunday Alamba, File

    The Trump administration’s dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development is unconstitutional, a federal judge ruled on March 18, 2025. The court order to pause the agency’s shuttering came days after Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that 83% of its programs had been cut.

    USAID was created in 1961 as the lead agency for U.S. international development. Until recently, it funded health and humanitarian aid programs in more than 130 countries. Despite the administration’s claim of cost-cutting, USAID was a relatively small and economical operation. Its US$40 billion budget accounted for just 0.7% of annual federal spending. Congress also required regular reporting and evaluations on USAID, helping to ensure substantial oversight of how it spent its taxpayer dollars.

    USAID’s swift destruction has sent shock waves across the globe. But as a scholar of the global humanitarian aid sector and donor agencies, I know this assault on foreign aid is not unprecedented.

    In June 2020, Boris Johnson, then the prime minister of the United Kingdom, used similar claims of budget-tightening to effectively close the Department for International Development, Britain’s equivalent of USAID.

    A COVID merger

    Both the U.S. and British foreign aid programs have long prompted heated debates over the proper relationship between development, diplomacy and national security. The U.S. and Britain have long been among the top five providers of development assistance worldwide, and both USAID and DFID have played leading roles in the development community.

    Countries give foreign aid for both altruistic and self-interested reasons. Treating global diseases and addressing civil conflicts is a way for wealthy Western governments to limit threats that could destabilize their countries, as well as the rest of the world. It also burnishes their reputation and encourages cooperation with other governments.

    Scholars from across the political spectrum and around the world have questioned the general efficacy of foreign assistance, arguing that these programs are designed to serve the interests of donors, not the needs or recipients. Other development experts contend that foreign aid programs, while imperfect, have still made meaningful progress in improving health, education and freedoms.

    Britain’s DFID was created in 1997 as an independent, Cabinet-level department deliberately independent of partisan politics. It quickly developed a reputation as a model donor, even among skeptics of international aid.

    British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced the DFiD merger in June 2020.
    AP Photo/Kirsty Wigglesworth, file

    For example, a staffer at the international medical charity Doctors without Borders told me in a 2006 interview that he had scoffed at the idea of a politics-free aid agency.

    Yet, he said, he had found DFID “relatively easier to work with” than other donors.

    “I have never heard of someone being told, as a result of accepting DFID funds, what to do, either explicitly or behind closed doors,” he told me.

    But its good reputation could not protect DFID. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Johnson announced that DFID would merge with the Foreign Office, Britain’s equivalent of the State Department, to create a new government agency. By uniting aid and diplomacy, Johnson said, the new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office would get “maximum value for the British taxpayer,” and he cited the economic impact of COVID to justify his decision.

    Foreign aid dropped sharply after the merger, from 0.7% of Britain’s gross national income to 0.5% – a cut of about US$6 billion.

    Development professionals decried Johnson’s merger, arguing it could not have happened at a worse time, with the pandemic heightening the need for global health funding. And coming shortly after Brexit, Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, DFID’s demise further called into question Britain’s commitment to global cooperation.

    Less money, less impact

    Five years later, it’s not clear that dismantling DFID has made British foreign aid more efficient or effective, as Johnson pledged.

    “We have seen evidence of where a more integrated approach has improved the organisation’s ability to respond to international crises and events, which has led to a better result,” reads one 2025 report by the U.K.’s National Audit Office.

    Two departments in one – but not twice the budget.
    Mike Kemp/In Pictures via Getty Images

    Yet, the auditors add, the British government has spent at least £24.7 million – US$32 million – to merge its aid and diplomacy offices, and it failed to track these costs. Nor did the leaders of the merger set out a clear vision for its new purpose.

    Britain’s slimmer new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has also relinquished the U.K.’s past leadership in research and expertise, largely due to pay reductions and restrictions on hiring non-British nationals.

    From the outset, DFID had invested substantially in building expertise in global development, particularly in conflict-ridden states. In 2001, for example, it spent almost 5% of its budget – an unusually high amount – on research and policy analysis to design and assess its programs.

    DFID produced regular case studies of the projects it funded, which included getting Syrian refugee children back in school, building roads that help Rwandan farmers move their products to market, and providing health care after Pakistan’s 2010 floods.

    Given the “development expertise that was lost with the merger,” the U.K. government can no longer conduct “the kind of rigorous, long-term focus necessary to make a real impact,” said the Center for Global Development in a recent report.

    A 2022 study suggests that DFID’s dismantling was a fundamentally political move, “divorced from substantive analysis of policy or inter-institution relationships.”

    Britain’s new Prime Minister Keir Starmer, of the leftist Labour Party, initially promised to boost British foreign aid. But in early March 2025, he backtracked, announcing instead a further cut to foreign aid.

    By 2027, the U.K. government will spend just 0.3% of its budget on overseas aid. That’s roughly $11 billion less than before the merger in 2019.

    ‘Clear and easy target’

    USAID’s budget was much larger than DFID’s, and the administration apparently wants not to streamline U.S. foreign aid but halt it almost entirely. If this effort succeeds, it will have even more severe effects worldwide, at least in the immediate term.

    The global health programs administered by USAIDm which combat diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, have received bipartisan and global praise. The PEPFAR program, which USAID helps administer, distributes antiretroviral drugs worldwide. It alone has saved 25 million lives over the past two decades, including the lives of 5.5 million babies born healthy to mothers with HIV.

    Development professionals tend to see independent government agencies such as USAID and DFID as better able to prioritize the needs of the poor because their programming is run separately from partisan policies.

    Yet standalone agencies are also more visible – and so more vulnerable to political targeting.

    DFID was a clear and easy target when Johnson began his pandemic-era budget-slashing. USAID is now suffering a similar fate.

    Sarah Stroup does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. US isn’t first country to dismantle its foreign aid office − here’s what happened after the UK killed its version of USAID – https://theconversation.com/us-isnt-first-country-to-dismantle-its-foreign-aid-office-heres-what-happened-after-the-uk-killed-its-version-of-usaid-250868

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Bank lending and firm internal capital markets following a deglobalization shock | Discussion paper 05/2025: Björn Imbierowicz, Arne Nagengast, Esteban Prieto, Ursula Vogel

    Source: Bundesbank

    Non-technical summary

    Research Question

    The pace of globalization has slowed since the global financial crisis, and recent events have sparked fears of a more widespread deglobalization and market fragmentation. This paper aims to better understand the effects of deglobalization events in a globalized world, and the role that financial and economic integration play in this regard. We explore how an event implying a turn towards deglobalization affects a highly integrated economy as well as other economies, which are economically and financially connected.

    Contribution

    We use the unexpected outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016, a major deglobalization shock of the last decade, and investigate its impact on bank credit supply, international spillovers, and real economic outcomes. Leveraging a unique dataset that combines a credit register with foreign direct investment (FDI) data, we are able to observe both domestic and cross-border credit exposures of German banks as well as internal capital market dynamics within multinational corporations (MNCs) – a feature rarely available in other countries’ data. Our analysis consists of three parts. First, we investigate the effect of the deglobalization shock on cross-border bank lending. In the second part of our analysis, we investigate whether the credit supply shock amplifies the deglobalization shock’s immediate adverse effects to the real economy and the role of firms’ internal capital markets. In the last part of our analysis, we investigate whether banks shift their lending to borrowers outside the UK after the shock.

    Results

    German banks reduced lending to United Kingdom (UK) firms following the shock due to increased uncertainty about future losses. More prudent banks reduced their credit more extensively, and less profitable subsidiaries experienced greater reductions. However, UK subsidiaries of large MNCs, with access to internal capital markets, offset this credit supply shock through internal funding, shielding them from negative real effects. We find that non-UK subsidiaries play a crucial role in internal capital markets by securing external financing and reallocating funds to support UK affiliates. Well capitalized banks reallocated lending to firms outside the UK, particularly those of German MNCs. Our findings underscore that while international financial frictions following deglobalization shocks can imply negative real effects, firms integrated into global networks mitigate these impacts through internal capital markets.

    MIL OSI Economics