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  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 26.02.2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    26 February 2025 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 26.02.2025

    Espoo, Finland – On 26 February 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 1,400,000 4.74
    CEUX – –
    BATE – –
    AQEU – –
    TQEX – –
    Total 1,400,000 4.74

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 26 February 2025 was EUR 6,629,280. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 259,917,814 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 931 580 507
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: African Development Bank, Pandemic Fund sign agreement to leverage resources for pandemic preparedness

    Source: African Development Bank Group
    The African Development Bank Group has signed an agreement to become an implementing entity of the Pandemic Fund. This enables the Bank to coordinate financing of the Fund’s approved projects in Africa, as well as to participate in a call for proposals for financing investments scheduled to launch next month.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Why Productivity Matters

    Source: Reserve Bank of Australia

    Introduction

    Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today at the Australian Business Economists’ Annual Forecasting Conference. There has been lots of discussion about productivity in recent years. In some economies this discussion has been about subdued growth in overall productivity, including in Australia since just before the pandemic. There has also been discussion about the outlook for productivity. For example, the extent to which artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other technologies will support future productivity growth. These are important issues that I expect will come up in discussions today.

    In my remarks I’m going to focus on a different question: why does productivity matter? At the central bank we’re not experts in how to improve productivity. But trends in productivity are very important for the macroeconomy. In the context of the Australian economy, I will discuss how stronger productivity growth can support growth in aggregate supply, incomes and aggregate demand. I will then spend some time discussing recent productivity outcomes in Australia and how we’ve been thinking about those in our assessment of economic conditions.

    But first, what is productivity? When we talk about productivity, we’re talking about how much output we get relative to what we put in. At an individual level, I increase my own productivity by making a shopping list before I buy groceries, so I don’t forget anything and avoid multiple trips to the supermarket. At the firm level, productivity might be improved by implementing customer relationship management software to streamline communication with clients and automate routine tasks. At the economy-wide level – which is what matters for the central bank and our dual mandate of full employment and low and stable inflation – productivity reflects a multitude of decisions like these. Ultimately it’s about how efficiently capital and labour are employed across the economy to produce goods and services.

    How do we measure productivity? Economists typically focus on two measures: labour productivity, which measures how much output is produced for every hour worked; and multifactor productivity (MFP), which reflects how efficiently all inputs to production – such as labour, capital, energy and raw materials – are combined to produce output.

    In a simple production function framework where a firm produces output using two inputs – labour and capital – labour productivity depends on two things. The first is how much capital each person has to work with. Providing workers with more or better capital – like machines or faster computers – can increase the amount of output each worker produces. This is referred to as ‘capital deepening’. The second is MFP. Improving MFP involves finding new ways to combine labour and capital to produce more output. For example, by reorganising a production line or using GPS technology to precisely guide machinery for planting, fertilising and harvesting. In this respect, labour productivity is not just about labour efficiency; it depends on firms’ decisions about how much capital to employ and how efficiently labour and capital work together to produce output.

    In thinking about the relationship between productivity and aggregate supply, incomes and demand, I will focus mainly on labour productivity. This is because labour productivity most closely aligns with measures of economic living standards. It’s also easier to measure than MFP.

    As you might sense, productivity is not about working harder, but working smarter. Many of the biggest productivity improvements have come from things that have made our lives easier, like computers, robots, the internet and smartphones – though personally I’m still questioning whether smartphones are productivity enhancing or a productivity sapping distraction.

    Economists talk about productivity a lot. So I’ll now turn to the question of why productivity matters.

    Productivity and supply

    If productivity increases, the economy can produce more goods and services from all the available economic inputs. As such, productivity is a key driver of growth in the supply capacity of the economy, or potential output.

    Productivity in Australia has been volatile in recent years but, looking through the volatility, is around the same level as in the few years before the pandemic. Productivity growth has also been consistently below the RBA’s projections for some time now (Graph 1). This has generated internal discussions about what trend labour productivity growth might look like in the period ahead, and what that means for estimates of potential output growth over the forecast period. The current assumption is that annual labour productivity growth will pick up to around one per cent in the medium term, which is close to its longer run average. This could be consistent with, for example, the rapid adoption of technology across many industries leading to higher productivity outcomes. However, the projected pick-up in productivity growth has not materialised in recent years and staff are currently assessing whether weak productivity outcomes are likely to persist.

    Weak productivity growth in recent years has contributed to slower growth in the supply capacity, or potential output, of the economy than otherwise. Graph 2 shows one of our estimates of potential output, which is based on actual productivity outcomes observed in the data. The graph also shows a counterfactual path where productivity growth in recent years was higher, at its average rate in the two decades prior to the pandemic. This suggests that the size of the economy is a lot smaller than it would have been, had productivity growth been more like in the past (all else equal).

    It’s important to keep in mind that, in this counterfactual world where supply capacity was much higher, incomes and demand would also have been higher too. Let me turn to that now.

    Productivity, incomes and wages

    While productivity growth contributes to growth in the supply capacity of the economy, it also contributes to growth in incomes and demand.

    At times, labour productivity (output per hour worked) and real income per hour track one another closely (Graph 3). Looking through the volatility, both are currently around similar levels as in the period prior to the pandemic.

    Other factors besides productivity can affect growth in incomes per hour. For example, higher prices for Australian exports can generate higher incomes domestically. So the terms of trade – the prices we receive for our exports relative to the prices we pay for our imports – can also be an important driver of incomes in the domestic economy. We can see this in the decade from the early 2000s: despite the slowing in productivity growth, real incomes per hour continued to increase, partly owing to substantial increases in the prices received for Australian exports like iron ore and coal. The surge in demand for our exports, particularly from China, supported profits in the mining industry and related parts of the Australian economy, as well as demand for labour and wages growth.

    Over the longer run, labour productivity and real wages – as measured by average earnings from the national accounts – also tend to move together (Graph 4). Over the inflation targeting period, labour productivity has grown at an average annual rate of 1.1 per cent and real labour earnings have grown at 0.9 per cent. So, higher productivity not only benefits firms, it also benefits workers by increasing their purchasing power. The Productivity Commission has previously pointed to the productivity of bakers as a reason we can consume more bread or spend that extra money elsewhere – in 1901 it took 18 minutes of the average worker’s time to afford a loaf of bread, while today it’s just 4 minutes. There must be a joke in there somewhere about how we spend our dough.

    In the short run, however, growth in real wages and labour productivity can and do diverge as the economy adjusts to economic shocks. For example, and as noted previously, increases in the prices received for Australian exports can have an impact on domestic profits and wages (and without an increase in labour productivity). Ultimately, however, it is very hard for an economy to support real wages growth in the longer run without productivity growth.

    Productivity and consumption

    Productivity growth also tends to support consumption growth. When productivity and incomes are growing more strongly, people are able to spend more and consumption grows more quickly. Weak growth in consumption per capita over recent years has coincided with weak growth in productivity, real incomes and real wages (Graph 5).

    Similar patterns have been evident in other economies, where subdued productivity growth has been associated with slower growth in household incomes and consumption (Graph 6). The exception is the United States, where growth in both productivity and consumption has been relatively strong.

    Recent trends in productivity

    So far I’ve focused on the importance of productivity growth for aggregate supply, incomes and demand over the longer run. I’ll now turn to recent trends in productivity growth in Australia and some potential implications for the near-term economic outlook.

    Discerning recent trends in productivity is difficult because of volatility in the data associated with the pandemic and other supply disruptions. Looking through the volatility, labour productivity growth has been low, averaging 0.2 per cent per year between 2017/18 and 2023/24 (Graph 7).

    Reverting to the simple production function framework that I noted earlier, the slow growth in labour productivity over recent years has reflected slow growth in both MFP and the amount of capital available to each worker.

    MFP growth averaged 0.2 per cent per year between 2017/18 and 2023/24, which was well below its historical average. Some have argued that slower MFP growth could reflect temporary factors. For example, tight labour market conditions over recent years have been associated with large numbers of individuals entering the workforce or changing jobs; this may have weighed on productivity as some individuals were trained or retrained and some firms adapted production processes to accommodate strong employment growth. If this was the case, MFP growth could pick up as the economy adjusts. However, work by some RBA staff finds that temporary factors like these have not been the primary cause of slow MFP growth, suggesting that structural factors could be weighing on productivity growth.

    Slow growth in the amount of capital available for each worker in the Australian economy – or a lack of ‘capital deepening’ – has also contributed to slow growth in labour productivity (Graph 8). Capital per worker was broadly unchanged for around five years leading up to the pandemic and – looking through the volatility in the data during the pandemic – is currently a bit below those levels. In other words, overall investment has not kept pace with the strong growth in employment recently.

    To help understand the recent slow growth in productivity, I’ll look at productivity outcomes in various parts of the economy.

    I’ll start with the non-market sector – which includes the health care, education and public administration industries – where employment growth has been very strong over recent years. The level of measured productivity in some parts of the non-market sector is low relative to the aggregate economy. So, as the non-market sector has become a larger share of the economy in recent years, this has weighed on overall productivity growth in the economy. Our estimates suggest that the rising share of non-market employment lowered the economy-wide measure of labour productivity growth by around 0.3 percentage points per year on average from 2017/18 to 2023/24, as shown by the yellow bars in Graph 9. This compares with around 0.15 percentage points per year over the previous decade, and so the recent effects have been a bit larger than in the past.

    But there is more to the story about productivity and the non-market sector. I have emphasised measured productivity because it is very difficult to measure output – and therefore productivity – in parts of the non-market sector. The central measurement problem is a lack of meaningful prices for some non-market output, such as public hospital services provided to public patients. This makes it very difficult to accurately identify quantities of output, which are needed to measure productivity. For example, research by the Productivity Commission suggests that productivity in the health care industry is higher than official estimates. As such, the drag on productivity from the non-market sector may be overstated.

    Noting the challenges of measuring productivity in the non-market sector, what’s been going on in the rest of the economy? Labour productivity growth in the market sector averaged around 0.6 per cent per year from 2017/18 to 2023/24 – below its average of 1.6 per cent over the previous two decades – though it picked up in 2023/24.

    Table 1: Growth in Labour Productivity

    Average annual growth rates (per cent)(a)
    Sector 1998/99 to 2017/18 2017/18 to 2023/24
    All industries 1.3 0.2
    Non-farm 1.1 0.1
    Market sector 1.6 0.6
    Market sector ex mining 1.4 1.0

    (a) Average growth rates calculated between financial years.

    Sources: ABS; RBA.

    While the level of productivity in the mining industry in Australia is higher than in other industries, productivity growth in that industry has declined over recent years. Excluding mining, productivity growth in the market sector since 2017/18 has averaged 1 per cent per year, though this is still lower than its average over the preceding two decades and well below the rates recorded during the high productivity growth period in the 1990s.

    More generally, a range of explanations have been provided for the slowing in productivity growth globally since the 1990s. A well-documented one for Australia is declining ‘economic dynamism’ – it now takes longer for inputs to production to move to higher productivity firms, and it also takes longer for firms to catch up to the global frontier of performance and technology. Evidence suggests that at least part of the decline in economic dynamism relates to declining competition in the economy. Regulatory barriers also appear to have played a role in Australia, notably in the construction industry. Other explanations include slowing human capital accumulation, declining trade integration, and mismeasurement.

    What does the recent subdued growth in productivity mean for our assessment of economic conditions? While productivity growth is associated with growth in incomes and wages over the longer run, in the short run there can be material divergences between these variables. Over the past year or so, real average hourly earnings in the economy have grown faster than labour productivity. This exerts upward pressure on firms’ unit labour costs and is consistent with our assessment that labour market conditions are still tight, notwithstanding some easing in those conditions over the past couple of years.

    What will happen from here? Our latest forecasts in the Statement on Monetary Policy incorporate a pick-up in productivity growth over the next couple of years, which would add to the economy’s supply capacity and help alleviate cost pressures. But there is considerable uncertainty around this projection. If productivity growth remains weak, the near-term outlook will depend critically on how the economy adjusts. If growth in demand is also weaker and wages adjust quickly to this slower growth in the supply capacity of the economy, there might not be a material impact on cost pressures. But if demand picks up as expected or wages adjust slowly to continued weak productivity outcomes, cost pressures could be higher than we expect. We will continue to monitor these developments carefully, alongside the full range of indicators we use to assess current economic conditions.

    Concluding remarks

    To conclude, productivity matters because it is a key driver of economic living standards. Over the longer run, higher productivity growth expands the supply capacity of the economy and supports growth in incomes, wages and aggregate demand. In the short run, however, there can be meaningful divergences in the growth rates of these important macroeconomic variables. Recent weak growth in productivity has constrained growth in aggregate supply. Whether productivity growth improves from here and how the economy adjusts are important questions for the economic outlook.

    Thank you for your time today. I look forward to your questions.

    MIL OSI News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Capito Leads Hearing on Surface Transportation Implementation of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito
    To watch Chairman Capito’s opening statement, click here.
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee, led a hearing examining the implementation of surface transportation policies and funding included in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA).  
    In her opening remarks, Chairman Capito spoke about the importance of examining both successes and shortcomings of the surface transportation portion of IIJA as the EPW Committee begins to focus on the next Surface Transportation Reauthorization Bill, as current provisions expire in September 2026. Additionally, Chairman Capito highlighted the reliability of formula funding for states, and the need for further implementation of project delivery provisions.
    Below is the opening statement of Chairman Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) as delivered.
    “Thank you for joining us this morning to continue our oversight of the implementation of the IIJA. Today, our focus is on the Surface Transportation Reauthorization Act, one of the foundational components of the IIJA, which was developed in a bipartisan manner by this Committee. 
    “This hearing comes at a critical time, I think, as we approach the expiration of those provisions at the end of 2026, in September. We want to continue what is working, but discontinue what isn’t working.
    “Since the law’s enactment on November 15, 2021, transportation stakeholders have been delivering on its promise but, at times, experiencing some challenges. We have some of those stakeholders with us today, I appreciate them coming, to provide us with an on-the-ground update of their efforts to deliver transportation projects in rural and urban communities.
    “On the positive side, the federal highway formula programs received approximately 90 percent of the funding in the IIJA, which was something that I strongly supported. This funding has provided states with certainty, and with the flexible project eligibilities to address the transportation needs of Americans across the country.
    “In my home state of West Virginia, that formula funding is upgrading and modernizing our roads and bridges, which will connect our communities to job and economic opportunities. I also championed commonsense provisions aimed at accelerating projects so that communities are not stuck waiting to realize the safety and reliability benefits that they will bring.
    “As an example, the IIJA codified the One Federal Decision policy, which expedites, or should expedite, the environmental review process for certain projects by setting a two-year goal for those reviews and allowing the use of a single, coordinated process to develop an environmental document.
    “I am curious to hear from our witnesses today, if these provisions are being used and whether they have been having the desired impact. Despite the many benefits, I am aware that we have some challenges with the implementation of the IIJA. 
    “Inflation is certainly a contributing factor. It has eaten into the overall funding increase provided by the IIJA and increased project costs. I look forward to our witnesses’ sharing the real-world impacts of this inflation on the work that they are doing. 
    “Another challenge is that many of the new discretionary grant programs established by the IIJA have been very slow in achieving their congressional intent. These programs require significant time and money from eligible applicants, and once a grant has been awarded, the project grant agreement was often taking more than a year to be negotiated and signed by the prior Administration, which delays the benefits of each project.
    “This slow-down has contributed to a ballooning amount of unused obligation authority that must be sent back to the states as part of a process known as the August Redistribution. In 2024, that amount was $8.7 billion.
    “This results in an end-of-the-fiscal-year scramble as states seek to put that amount of funding to use, often putting it towards lower-priority projects. We advanced a bipartisan fix to help with this issue last year, but the challenge remains and it’s growing.
    “I’m sure we’ll learn more about our witnesses’ experiences with applying for and managing a discretionary grant award today. In addition, the implementation of the IIJA was sometimes clouded by the executive overreach of the prior Administration.
    “My colleagues on this Committee have often heard me talk about the two examples of overreach. The December 16th policy memorandum that was issued, and the greenhouse gas performance measure final rule. The goal of this overreach was simply advancing the priorities of the prior Administration, even when those priorities were often specifically considered by this Committee and excluded from the IIJA. 
    “Ultimately, it took more than a year for the prior Administration to correct their misstep with the December 16th memo and it required litigation from 22 states, and action by the Trump administration, to finally end the unauthorized greenhouse gas performance measure final rule. With the opportunities and challenges of the IIJA implementation in mind, I look forward to receiving testimony from our panel of witnesses.
    “This review of the real-world impacts of the IIJA and the feedback on what is working, and what isn’t working, will inform this Committee’s bipartisan work on the upcoming surface transportation reauthorization bill.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI from POLITICO: Meet the Senate GOP’s ‘House whisperer’: Markwayne Mullin

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator MarkWayne Mullin (R-Oklahoma)

    ICYMI from POLITICO: Meet the Senate GOP’s ‘House whisperer’: Markwayne Mullin

    “He enjoys one of the closest relationships to Trump among Republican senators — making him, in Thune’s words, a ‘Senate whisperer’ for Trump just as he interprets House doings for his colleagues.”
    Washington, D.C. – ICYMI, POLITICO published the following story this morning highlighting U.S. Senator Markwayne Mullin (R-OK) as, “a key emissary between the chambers.”
    POLITICO credits Mullin with playing, “a role Republicans need now more than ever,” as the top Trump ally and former House Republican aims to help accelerate President Trump’s ambitious legislative agenda in Congress. The story also notes how the senator, “moved quickly after Trump’s election to start getting House and Senate GOP leaders talking to each other.”
    Read the full story from POLITICO HERE and below:
    POLITICO 
    House and Senate Republicans are divided. Markwayne Mullin insists it isn’t hopeless.
    By Jordain Carney | February 26, 2025 11:45AM ET
    With President Donald Trump’s agenda in flux, Oklahoma Sen. Markwayne Mullin has emerged as a key emissary between the chambers.
    Senate Republicans have long felt as though their House GOP counterparts speak a different language. Now, with the party agenda on the line, they’re leaning on the translator in their midst.
    Sen. Markwayne Mullin (R-Okla.) joined the Senate just two years ago after a decade in the House, but the 47-year-old former plumbing company owner and retired mixed martial arts fighter has already gotten comfortable in the trusted, if unofficial, role of House whisperer, as his Senate colleagues frequently call him.
    “He plays a very constructive role,” Senate Majority Leader John Thune said in an interview. “He’s just a guy who is always looking and driving to try to get things done.”
    It’s a role Republicans need now more than ever as they struggle to get on the same page on key issues roughly a month into their trifecta. The two chambers are at loggerheads over their competing plans for President Donald Trump’s policy agenda, with major fights over government funding and raising the debt ceiling also looming.
    Mullin moved quickly after Trump’s election to start getting House and Senate GOP leaders talking to each other, if not necessarily agreeing. As the strategic dispute over enacting the GOP agenda spilled into the open last year, Mullin arranged a meeting between two key players: Thune and House Ways and Means Chair Jason Smith, a longtime friend and D.C. housemate of Mullin’s.
    “There was a difference between the two and they needed to work it out and they are both friends of mine. So, I was like, ‘Hey, let’s get everybody in a room,’” Mullin said in an interview.
    While the closed-door powwow didn’t yield an immediate breakthrough, it created an informal back channel that quietly continues to this day. Thune credited Mullin, who participated in the meeting, with opening useful “lines of communication.”
    Disagreements between the House and Senate, of course, are a tale as old as Congress itself. But few lawmakers in its history have been quite as aggressive in establishing and maintaining cross-Rotunda relations as Mullin, who served five terms in the House before his 2022 election to the Senate.
    He is a frequent attendee of the House GOP’s weekly conference meetings and the Wednesday lunches of the Republican Study Committee — it’s otherwise rare for any senator to show up — and he is seen at key points shuttling in and out of Speaker Mike Johnson’s office. As House Republicans grappled Tuesday over the path forward on their own budget resolution, Mullin stopped by their conference meeting, telling reporters that he was just “listening.”
    Mullin’s unofficial position reflects a reputation dating back to his House days for having both a freewheeling style and a penchant for throwing himself into the middle of thorny situations. At times, getting in on the action as a problem-solver has come at personal risk — trying to talk down rioters inside the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, for instance, or seeking to enter Afghanistan amid the chaotic U.S. withdrawal. More recently it has been lower-stakes, such as transforming himself on social media to be a frequent explainer of Senate procedure and advocate for Trump’s Cabinet nominees.
    Right now, much of his energy is funneled into smoothing over the sometimes strained relationship between the two sides of the Capitol, including attending House GOP Conference meetings twice a month to hear out what they are thinking, swapping intel with Johnson and talking to Smith “constantly,” according to Mullin.
    “I think it’s helpful to have kind of a liaison between both chambers because there’s a lot of confusion that takes place,” Mullin said. “You would think that with us being in the same building we would know what each chamber is doing, but really we don’t.”
    Mullin added that while he’s rarely asked a question during the House GOP conference meetings, lawmakers afterward “come up and ask me a lot of questions” about the Senate “what’s going on, what’s the expectations, what do you need from us.”
    Another former House guy, Sen. Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), recalled that when he was in the other chamber, “I never really wanted to see senators.” Now he considers Mullin a “valuable source” of House intelligence.
    He also enjoys one of the closest relationships to Trump among Republican senators — making him, in Thune’s words, a “Senate whisperer” for Trump just as he interprets House doings for his colleagues. Notably, Mullin emerged as a key emissary for Thune during last year’s GOP leadership race, encouraging Trump to stay out of the three-way race to succeed Sen. Mitch McConnell as party leader.
    Trump gave Mullin a shout-out during a closed-door dinner earlier this month with Senate Republicans, referencing his well-known contretemps with Teamsters President Sean O’Brien. (The two exchanged sharp words at a Senate hearing, with Mullin threatening to fight the union boss. They later made up after reconnecting at Trump’s behest.)
    “Don’t fight him,” Trump joked at the dinner. “He almost got into a fight with a tough cookie, the Teamsters president … but [O’Brien] would’ve been in trouble with this one.”
    Now in his third year as a senator, he is one of four advisers to the elected GOP leadership, giving him a seat in their weekly meetings. He also serves on the whip team, as he did in the House. (He’s also taken over the Senate’s famed candy desk, though that has been surprisingly contentious: He irked some of his colleagues by stocking it with St. Patrick’s Day green sweets for last week’s vote-a-rama.)
    Mullin also provides more informal guidance to his colleagues, said Sen. John Hoeven (R-N.D.), using his House contacts to “let us know what they’re thinking and what might be a good way to work together with them and get stuff accomplished.”
    “I think it’s very helpful,” Hoeven added. “He’s just kind of taken on that unofficial role to become a liaison.”
    Mullin was an early interpreter inside the Senate GOP when Johnson and Smith broke with Thune to advocate for passing Trump’s domestic policy agenda in one massive bill rather than two. He explained the pressures House leaders are facing given the tight GOP majority and that it made more sense for them to whip a single high-stakes vote.
    But Mullin has since backed Thune’s decision to move ahead with his two-bill plan. He acknowledged the House has missed its own self-imposed deadlines, while downplaying the drama between the two chambers.
    Republicans aren’t expecting Mullin to pull off a miracle with the two chambers still locked on different tracks. But some GOP senators know they need to smooth things over quickly, and they view Mullin as their unofficial liaison to the House — a title some Senate GOP staffers now jokingly use for him.
    Sen. Katie Britt (R-Ala.) pointed to Mullin as someone who has “very strong and deep relationships,” including the ability to have “challenging conversations” with the House while helping Senate Republicans “understand what is going on over there.”
    “I think that oftentimes we aren’t talking until it’s too late,” Britt said about the House-Senate dynamic, “and finding ways to join forces to begin to work together earlier in the process, I think, will achieve a better result at the end.”
    Benjamin Guggenheim and Meredith Lee Hill contributed to this report.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Anti-DEI guidance from Trump Administration misinterprets the law and guts educators’ free speech rights

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Paul M. Collins Jr., Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science, UMass Amherst

    The Trump administration letter aims to stop teachers from discussing many topics with students. Hill Street Studios, DigitalVision/Getty Images

    The Trump administration’s attacks on diversity, equity and inclusion have continued in the form of a “Dear Colleague” letter from the Department of Education to educational institutions – from preschools through colleges and universities.

    This letter demands that schools abandon what the Trump administration refers to as “DEI programs” and threatens to withhold federal funding if schools don’t comply.

    According to President Donald Trump, these so-called DEI programs – found in the government, corporate and educational sectors and intended to reduce discrimination and promote the equitable treatment of people – are a form of antiwhite racism that hurt national unity and violate antidiscrimination laws.

    Although the letter does not have the force of law, it nonetheless signals how the Trump administration plans to aggressively take legal and financial action against educational institutions that refuse to comply, starting on Feb. 28.

    As a result, the Trump administration’s threat to remove federal funding, which both public and private educational institutions rely heavily on, is likely to coerce compliance, at least to some degree.

    As the letter explains, “The Department will vigorously enforce the law on equal terms as to all preschool, elementary, secondary, and postsecondary educational institutions, as well as state educational agencies, that receive financial assistance.”

    Thus, these directives have the potential to fundamentally change education in America.

    As professors of legal studies, we’ve taken a close look at the “Dear Colleague” letter. Here’s how the letter infringes on free speech, misunderstands the law and undermines education.

    Will professors still be able to teach about America’s history of racism?
    Jeff Gritchen/Digital First Media/Orange County Register via Getty Images

    Restricting free speech

    The First Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of the people to express viewpoints without fear of punishment by the government.

    The Trump administration’s attacks on DEI are part of a broader assault on freedom of speech in which Trump targets media, businesses and everyday Americans the president disagrees with.

    By directing schools, colleges and universities to stop DEI policies, the “Dear Colleague” letter clearly restricts free speech rights. That’s the case because creating and pursuing DEI policies is a type of freedom of expression. Banning DEI practices is a form of viewpoint discrimination, which is prohibited by Supreme Court precedent that covers the speech of educational institutions as well as their faculty and staff.

    For instance, the letter aims to prevent educational institutions from pursuing missions and policies that promote the concepts of DEI. Such missions are common in higher education and can be found in universities from the conservative Brigham Young University to the liberal University of Vermont.

    Frequently, these missions are pursued by requiring students to take courses that encourage them to learn about perspectives or cultures that are different from their own.

    While the letter is not clear about which courses it would consider a problem, targeting any topics serves to suppress the free speech rights and academic freedom of faculty, including their freedom to design and teach courses.

    This vagueness may be part of the threat. After all, if teachers aren’t sure what they might get punished for, they may be extra cautious and censor themselves.

    Misunderstanding the law

    Aside from being vague, the letter also seems to willfully misrepresent the 2022 Supreme Court decision ending race-based affirmative action in higher education, Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College.

    In that case, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a narrow majority opinion declaring simply that university admissions policies could not aim to create incoming classes with particular racial balances.

    Roberts’ opinion was silent on any other type of educational policy. It also states explicitly that “nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise,” so long as they are evaluated for admission as an individual.

    And yet, the “Dear Colleague” letter takes this decision and runs with it in multiple different directions. First, it falsely claims that the decision prohibits schools from eliminating standardized testing in their admissions process, something many schools have chosen to do in recent years.

    Second, the letter falsely states, in contradiction with the ruling’s own text, that the decision applies much more broadly than the context of admissions, to “hiring, promotion, compensation, financial aid, scholarships, prizes, administrative support, discipline, housing, graduation ceremonies, and all other aspects of student, academic, and campus life.”

    Thus, according to the letter, any program that targeted a particular group for differential treatment based on their race would come under government scrutiny, including programs designed to assist students of color, to house students according to affinity groups, and to diversify university faculty.

    There is simply no reading of the Students for Fair Admissions decision that suggests such an encroachment on the inner workings of educational institutions. Roberts’ majority opinion says only that students should be evaluated as individuals when applying to colleges and universities.

    Effort to undermine education

    What history will the Trump administration letter stop from being taught?
    Tomasz Śmigla, iStock/Getty Images Plus

    In sum, the letter places educators, especially those of us who teach about American law and government, in an impossible position.

    It states that “educational institutions have toxically indoctrinated students with the false premise that the United States is built upon ‘systemic and structural racism,’” suggesting that the U.S. does not have such a history.

    But, for example, in order to teach why affirmative action is now unconstitutional, we would have to explain the concept of strict scrutiny to our students. Strict scrutiny is when a court examines a law very carefully to make sure that it does not promote an unconstitutional racial or religious classification. It is a kind of review that is used routinely and appropriately by courts, and was used to strike down affirmative action in Students for Fair Admissions.

    That level of judicial review exists because, in the words of Roberts in Students for Fair Admissions, “for almost a century after the Civil War, state-mandated segregation was in many parts of the Nation a regrettable norm. This Court played its own role in that ignoble history, allowing in Plessy v. Ferguson the separate but equal regime that would come to deface much of America.”

    In other words, the Supreme Court created strict scrutiny as a judicial antidote to the systemic racism that it had helped perpetuate.

    Even more basically, it is impossible to teach constitutional law without acknowledging the Three-Fifths Compromise or the Fugitive Slave Clause, both of which embedded the property rights of slaveowners into the founding documents of this country, denying enslaved people full citizenship and its rights.

    To not teach students about such topics is, we believe, to fail in our role as educators. To forbid teaching it is an attack on the core mission of educational institutions in a democracy. And even more, this letter aims to prevent teachers from critiquing what the letter itself says and from explaining its own context and history.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Anti-DEI guidance from Trump Administration misinterprets the law and guts educators’ free speech rights – https://theconversation.com/anti-dei-guidance-from-trump-administration-misinterprets-the-law-and-guts-educators-free-speech-rights-250574

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Rights Council: Gaza ceasefire must hold, Türk insists

    Source: United Nations 4

    Human Rights

    UN human rights chief Volker Türk issued a strong appeal on Wednesday for the fragile ceasefire in Gaza to hold, amid delays to talks between Hamas and Israel on extending the truce into the second phase.

    Addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva on conditions inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Mr. Türk condemned the Hamas-led terror attacks on Israel that sparked the war in October 2023.

    The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also said there was no justification for Israel’s devastating military operations in Gaza, which have left more than 48,000 Palestinians dead, according to local authorities.

    Search for a better future

    “At this tenuous moment the world must ask itself how to resolve this decades old conflict and stop the cycle of violence,” he said.

    “Any plans for a better future must deal with the past, so accountability and justice for violations are crucial.”

    The High Commissioner added that each phase of the ceasefire must be implemented “in good faith, and in full. All of us must do everything in our power to build on it.”

    He said it must be for the Palestinians themselves to determine their own future.

    According to news reports, the delayed release by Israel of Palestinian prisoners is expected to go ahead imminently, in exchange for the return of the bodies of four hostages.

    ‘Unprecedented disregard’

    Summing up the “raft of human rights violations” inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory and lack of accountability, he said there had been “an unprecedented disregard” for basic principles of international humanitarian law by both sides since the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023.

    Mr. Türk maintained there were serious doubts over Israel’s capacity and will to deliver full accountability, notably in relation to unlawful killings in Gaza and the West Bank.

    With Hamas and other Palestinian militants who have taken and tortured hostages, fired indiscriminate projectiles into Israel – amounting to war crimes – there are concerns that they may also have committed serious breaches “including the intentional co-location of military objectives and Palestinian civilians.”

    “Any attempts at shaping a peaceful future where such horrors do not recur must ensure that perpetrators are held to account,” said the High Commissioner. 

    Impunity when given free rein, harms not only those directly impacted but generations down the line, he contended.

    In an apparent response to the outlawing of the UN Palestine refugee relief agency, UNRWA, by Israel and the sanctions against the International Criminal Court by the US earlier this month, the UN rights chief said that “delegitimising and threatening international institutions that are there to serve people and uphold international law also harms us all.”

    He also said any attempt to annex Palestinian land or “forced transfer” of civilians must be resisted.

    “This is the moment for voices of reason to prevail; for solutions that will deliver justice and make space for compassion, healing and truth telling,” said Mr. Türk.

    ‘Systemic’ repression in Nicaragua

    Investigators tasked by the UN Human Rights Council to track alleged grave abuses of power by top Nicaraguan officials insisted on Wednesday that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should prosecute what they called the systematic and systemic repression of the country’s people.

    The Group of Experts on Nicaragua – who act in an independent capacity and are not UN staff – have previously reported that the Government’s violations appear to constitute crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment and torture – including rape.

    Their latest report will be presented later this week to the Council.

    The group maintains that President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Rosario Murillo, have created “an authoritarian State where no independent institutions remain, opposition voices are silenced and the population…faces persecution, forced exile, and economic retaliation”.

    Stifling dissent

    It was in response to grave concerns about the severe repression of civil rights in Nicaragua that the international community decided in 2018 to establish an investigative body to report back to the Council.

    “We call on States to hold Nicaragua accountable for its violations of the UN Convention on Torture and the UN Convention on Statelessness before the International Court of Justice…the international community cannot just bear witness. It needs to take concrete measures,” said Reed Brody, member of the Group of Experts.

    “No country in the world has used the arbitrary detention of nationality against political opponents at the same scale that Nicaragua has done; and this is a violation of its obligations under international law under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,” Mr. Brody continued.

    ‘Machine of repression’

    According to the panel’s chair, Jan-Michael Simon, State machinery and the ruling Sandinista party “have virtually fused into a unified machine of repression with domestic and transnational impact.”

    This development – which has reduced the judicial, legislative and electoral powers “to mere bodies coordinated by the presidency” – has resulted in myriad deaths, “arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, expulsion of nationals, arbitrary deprivation of nationality,” Mr. Simon insisted.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: 8 Charged in North Charleston Public Corruption Schemes, including 3 City Councilmen

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CHARLESTON, S.C. — Eight people have been charged in federal court for a series of bribery, kickback, extortion, and money laundering schemes following a public corruption investigation in North Charleston. Three of the individuals charged are elected members of the North Charleston City Council.

    Four individuals have been charged by Information and have agreed to plead guilty:

    Jerome Sydney Heyward, 61, North Charleston City Councilmember;

    Sandino Savalas Moses, 50, North Charleston City Councilmember;

    Donavan Laval Moten, 46, founder of Core4Success Foundation; and

    Aaron Charles-Lee Hicks, 37, resident of North Charleston.

    A federal grand jury returned indictments against four others:

    Mike A. Brown, 46, North Charleston City Council Member;

    Hason Tatorian (“Tory”) Fields, 51, a Goose Creek resident;

    Rose Emily Lorenzo, 65, a North Carolina resident; and

    Michelle Stent-Hilton, 56, a North Charleston resident.

    Heyward is charged in three separate schemes with corruptly using his position as a North Charleston City Councilman to personally enrich himself through bribes, kickbacks, and extortion and to deprive the citizens and the government of North Charleston of their intangible right to the honest and faithful services of the North Charleston City Council. In the first scheme, Heyward extorted a businessman by soliciting payments in exchange for his official action as a City Councilman. In the second scheme, Heyward conspired with Mike A. Brown and Aaron Hicks to solicit and accept bribes from Aaron Hicks—working on behalf of a company with business before North Charleston City Council—in exchange for his support of the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site. In the third scheme, Heyward conspired with Donavan Moten, Rose Lorenzo, and Michelle Stent-Hilton to embezzle funds belonging to North Charleston by soliciting and accepting kickbacks from non-profit organizations run by Moten and Stent-Hilton that received violence reduction grant funds from the City.

    Heyward has agreed to plead guilty to: extortion under color of official right and using fear of economic harm; multiple counts of conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud; multiple counts of bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud; theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds; and multiple counts of money laundering. Heyward faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000, and a term of supervised release of three years. Heyward has agreed to cooperate with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

    Mike A. Brown is charged with conspiring with Heyward and Hicks to commit bribery and honest services wire fraud. The indictment alleges that Mike A. Brown, while serving as a North Charleston City Councilmember, solicited and accepted bribes from Hicks—working on behalf of a company requesting the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site—in exchange for his support of the rezoning application. Mike A. Brown faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $250,000, and a term of supervised release of three years. He will be arraigned on these charges in March.

    Aaron Hicks is charged with a conspiracy to pay bribes to Mike A. Brown and Jerome Heyward and a separate conspiracy with Hason Tatorian Fields to bribe Sandino Moses in exchange for their influence on North Charleston City Council and their support of the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site. Hicks has agreed to plead guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud; bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, and honest services wire fraud. Hicks has agreed to cooperate fully with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Hicks faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $250,000, and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Hason Tatorian (“Tory”) Fields is charged with conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, and honest services wire fraud. The indictment alleges that Fields conspired with Hicks to pay bribes to Sandino Moses. Thereafter, Fields paid Moses two bribes in an attempt to influence him in connection with his official action regarding the rezoning of the Baker Hospital site. Fields faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $250,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Sandino Moses is charged with misprision of a felony. The Information alleges that Moses knew that Fields and others attempted to bribe him and paid him bribes but he failed to disclose that criminal conduct and instead took steps to conceal the bribes by returning the money to Fields. Moses has agreed to plead guilty and to cooperate fully with federal state and local law enforcement agencies. He faces a maximum term of imprisonment of three years, a fine of $250,000, and a maximum term of supervised release of one year.

    Donavan Laval Moten has agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, honest services wire fraud, and money laundering. The information alleges that Moten conspired with Jerome Heyward and Rose Lorenzo to kick back a portion of funds that Moten’s nonprofit received from North Charleston to Heyward, who at the time was on North Charleston’s City Council. The indictment further alleges that after receiving the money from North Charleston, Moten laundered Heyward’s portion through Lorenzo. Moten has agreed to cooperate fully with federal, state, and local enforcement officials. Moten faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Michelle Stent-Hilton is charged with conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, honest services wire fraud, and money laundering. The indictment alleges that Stent-Hilton, who is affiliated with a non-profit and served as Jerome Heyward’s personal assistant, promised to pay Heyward a portion of money the non-profit received from the city of North Charleston. At the time, Heyward was serving on North Charleston City Council and voted on the grant proposal to distribute funds to non-profits, including Stent-Hilton’s. The indictment further alleges that after receiving money from North Charleston, Stent-Hilton laundered Heyward’s kick back through Rose Lorenzo. Stent-Hilton faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Rose Emily Lorenzo is charged with conspiracy to commit bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds and honest services wire fraud, theft with respect to programs receiving federal funds, bribery with respect to programs receiving federal funds, honest services wire fraud, and money laundering. The indictment alleges that Lorenzo conspired with Jerome Heyward and others to kick back a portion of City of North Charleston grant funds that were awarded to non-profits affiliated with Donavan Moten and Michelle Stent-Hilton to Heyward. The indictment further alleges that Lorenzo agreed to launder the funds by acting as an intermediary who received the funds from Moten and Stent-Hilton, and then wired them to Heyward for the purpose of concealing the true purpose of the transaction. Lorenzo faces a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, a fine of $500,000 and a term of supervised release of three years.

    Heyward, Moten, Hicks, and Moses are scheduled to plead guilty before the Honorable Richard M. Gergel on Friday, Feb. 28.

    “When elected officials take their oath of office, they make a sacred promise to the people they serve.  They pledge to uphold the law, to act with integrity, and to place the public interest above their own,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Brook B. Andrews for the District of South Carolina. “Public service should never merely be a job – it is a public trust. The allegations in this case describe a profound betrayal of that trust.”

    “Public corruption at any level of government cannot be tolerated,” said Steve Jensen Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Columbia Field Office. “Citizens have a right to expect honesty, fairness, and integrity from their leaders. The FBI, in collaboration with our law enforcement partners, is dedicated to aggressively investigating corruption and ensuring those responsible are held accountable.”

    “SLED Agents worked hand-in-hand with our federal partners to ensure that justice will be served,” said SLED Chief Mark Keel. “No matter who you are, or what position you hold, you will be held accountable for breaking the law. Elected officials and citizens should be working together to better their community, not exploiting others.”

    The case was investigated by the FBI Columbia Field Office and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Emily Limehouse and Whit Sowards are prosecuting the case.

    All charges in the indictment are merely accusations and defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: BRADFORD COUNTY – Governor Shapiro, DDAP Secretary Davis-Jones to Visit Sayre Hospital, Discuss Proposed Investments to Solve Rural Health Care Workforce Shortage

    Source: US State of Pennsylvania

    February 27, 2025 – Sayre, PA

    ADVISORY – BRADFORD COUNTY – Governor Shapiro, DDAP Secretary Davis-Jones to Visit Sayre Hospital, Discuss Proposed Investments to Solve Rural Health Care Workforce Shortage

    Governor Josh Shapiro will visit Guthrie Robert Packer Hospital in Bradford County to talk about the major investments his 2025-26 Budget Proposal would make to address rural health care workforce shortages and his plans to expand Pennsylvania’s rural health care workforce.

    The Governor’s budget proposal includes $10 million to provide support to rural hospitals that have been forced to cut or shutter services – and proposes making significant investments in loan forgiveness specifically for rural health care workers, modeled on the success of the substance use disorder (SUD) loan repayment program at the Department of Drug and Alcohol Programs (DDAP).

    WHO:
    Governor Josh Shapiro
    Dr. Latika Davis-Jones, Secretary of Drug and Alcohol Programs
    Senator Gene Yaw
    Representative Tina Pickett
    Dr. Sabanegh, President and CEO of the Guthrie Clinic
    Barbara Vanaskie, LCSW, SUD loan repayment program awardee
    Deb Raupers, MSN, RN, Chief Nurse Executive for Guthrie Robert Packer Hospital
    Kevin Gibbs, Guthrie Robert Packer Hospital patient

    WHEN:
    Thursday, February 27, 2025 at 10:45AM

    WHERE:
    Guthrie Robert Packer Hospital
    1 Guthrie Square,
    Sayre, PA 18840

    **Please RSVP for exact location and arrival logistics.

    LIVE STREAM:
    pacast.com/live/gov
    governor.pa.gov/live/

    RSVP:
    Press who are interested in attending must RSVP with the names and phone numbers for each member of their team to ra-gvgovpress@pa.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Partners Value Split Corp. Increases Size of Public Offering of Class AA Preferred Shares, Series 15 to $200 Million

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR FOR DISTRIBUTION TO U.S. WIRE SERVICES

    TORONTO, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Partners Value Split Corp. (the “Company”) announced today that as a result of strong investor demand for its previously announced offering, it has agreed to increase the size of the offering and sell 8,000,000 Class AA Preferred Shares, Series 15 (the “Series 15 Preferred Shares”) to a syndicate of underwriters led by Scotiabank, BMO Capital Markets, CIBC Capital Markets, RBC Capital Markets and TD Securities Inc. on a bought deal basis.

    The Series 15 Preferred Shares will be issued at a price of $25.00 per share, for gross proceeds of $200,000,000. The Series 15 Preferred Shares will carry a fixed coupon of 5.15% and will have a final maturity of March 31, 2031. The Series 15 Preferred Shares have a provisional rating of Pfd-2 from DBRS Limited. The net proceeds of the offering will be used by the Company to pay a special dividend on the Company’s capital shares.

    Closing of the offering is expected to occur on or about March 5, 2025.

    The Company owns a portfolio consisting of approximately 119 million Class A Limited Voting Shares of Brookfield Corporation and approximately 30 million Class A Limited Voting Shares of Brookfield Asset Management Ltd. (collectively, the “Brookfield Securities”), which are expected to yield quarterly dividends that are sufficient to fund quarterly fixed cumulative preferential dividends for the holders of the Company’s preferred shares and to enable the holders of the Company’s capital shares to participate in any capital appreciation of the Brookfield Securities.

    Brookfield Corporation is a leading global investment firm focused on building long-term wealth for institutions and individuals around the world. Brookfield Corporation has three core businesses: alternative asset management, wealth solutions, and its operating businesses which are in renewable power, infrastructure, business and industrial services, and real estate. Brookfield Corporation is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol BN.

    Brookfield Asset Management Ltd. (“BAM”) is a leading global alternative asset manager with over US$1 trillion of assets under management across renewable power & transition, infrastructure, private equity, real estate, and credit. BAM’s objective is to generate attractive, long-term risk-adjusted returns for the benefit of its clients and shareholders. BAM is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol BAM.

    Jason Weckwerth, Chief Financial Officer, will be available at (416) 363-9491 to answer any questions regarding the offering.

    This news release contains “forward-looking information” within the meaning of Canadian provincial securities laws and regulations. The words “expected”, “will”, “agreed” and “enable” and other expressions which are predictions of or indicate future events, trends or prospects and which do not relate to historical matters or identify forward-looking information. Forward-looking information in this news release includes statements with regard to the provisional rating on the Series 15 Preferred Shares, which is not a final rating, the use of proceeds of the offering and quarterly dividends from the Company’s portfolio of Brookfield Securities which are expected to fund quarterly fixed cumulative preferential dividends for holders of the Company’s preferred shares and to enable holders of its capital shares to participate in any capital appreciation of the Brookfield Securities. Although the Company believes that the anticipated future results or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking information and statements are based upon reasonable assumptions and expectations, the reader should not place undue reliance on the forward-looking information and statements because they involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors which may cause the actual results, performance or achievements of the Company to differ materially from anticipated future results, performance or achievement expressed or implied by such forward-looking information and statements. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those contemplated or implied by the forward-looking information and statements include: the behaviour of financial markets, including fluctuations in interest and exchange rates, availability of equity and debt financing and other risks and factors detailed from time to time in the Company’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities regulators. We caution that the foregoing list of important factors that may affect future results is not exhaustive. When relying on our forward-looking information to make decisions with respect to the Company, investors and others should carefully consider the foregoing factors and other uncertainties and potential events. Except as may be required by law, the Company undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking information or statements, whether written or oral, that may be as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. Reference should be made to the Company’s short form base shelf prospectus dated September 19, 2024 for a description of the major risk factors.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Ninepoint Partners Announces First Closing of Ninepoint 2025 Flow-Through Limited Partnership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ninepoint Partners LP (“Ninepoint”) is pleased to announce that the Ninepoint 2025 Flow-Through Limited Partnership (the “Partnership”) has completed the first closing in connection with its offering of Class A and Class F limited partnership units (the “Units”) pursuant to a prospectus dated January 30, 2025. The Partnership issued 863,072 Units for aggregate gross proceeds of $21,576,800. The Partnership will have a second closing in respect of the Units on or about April 3, 2025. The Units are being offered at a price per Unit of $25.00 with a minimum subscription of 100 Units ($2,500).

    The Partnership intends to provide liquidity to limited partners through a roll-over to the Ninepoint Resource Fund Class in the period between January 15, 2027 to February 28, 2027.

    Investment Objective of the Partnership
    The Partnership’s investment objective is to achieve capital appreciation and significant tax benefits for limited partners by investing in a diversified portfolio of Flow-Through Shares (as defined in the Prospectus) and other securities, if any, of Resource Issuers (as defined in the Prospectus).

    Attractive Tax-Reduction Benefits
    Flow-through partnerships are one of the most effective tax reduction strategies available to Canadians. Ninepoint anticipates that investors participating in the Partnership will be eligible to receive a tax deduction of approximately 100% of the amount invested.

    Resource Expertise
    The Partnership will be sub-advised by Sprott Asset Management LP (“Sprott”), one of Canada’s leading investment advisors in small and mid-cap resource companies. Over its long history of investing in the resource sector, Sprott has developed relationships with hundreds of companies. Its experienced team of portfolio managers is supported by a team of technical experts with extensive backgrounds in mining and geology.

    Portfolio manager Jason Mayer will manage the portfolio of the Partnership and will be supported by Sprott’s broader team of experienced resource investment professionals.

    Agents
    The offering is being made through a syndicate of agents led by RBC Dominion Securities Inc. which includes CIBC World Markets Inc., TD Securities Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., Manulife Wealth Inc., iA Private Wealth Inc., Raymond James Ltd., Richardson Wealth Limited, Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc., Ventum Financial Corp. and Wellington-Altus Private Wealth Inc.

    About Ninepoint Partners LP
    Based in Toronto, Ninepoint Partners LP is one of Canada’s leading alternative investment management firms overseeing approximately $7 billion in assets under management and institutional contracts. Committed to helping investors explore innovative investment solutions that have the potential to enhance returns and manage portfolio risk, Ninepoint offers a diverse set of alternative strategies spanning Equities, Fixed Income, Alternative Income, Real Assets, F/X and Digital Assets.

    For more information on Ninepoint Partners LP, please visit www.ninepoint.com or for inquiries regarding the offering, please contact us at (416) 943-6707 or (866) 299-9906 or invest@ninepoint.com.

    Certain statements included in this news release constitute forward-looking statements, including, but not limited to, those identified by the expressions “expects”, “intends”, “anticipates”, “will” and similar expressions to the extent that they relate to the Partnership. The forward-looking statements are not historical facts but reflect the Partnership’s, Ninepoint’s and Sprott’s current expectations regarding future results or events. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results or events to differ materially from current expectations. Although the Partnership, Ninepoint and Sprott believe the assumptions inherent in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and, accordingly, readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements due to the inherent uncertainty therein. Neither the Partnership, nor Ninepoint or Sprott undertake any obligation to update publicly or otherwise revise any forward-looking statement or information whether as a result of new information, future events or other such factors which affect this information, except as required by law.

    This offering is only made by prospectus. The Partnership’s prospectus contains important detailed information about the securities being offered. Copies of the prospectus may be obtained from one of the dealers noted above. Investors should read the prospectus before making an investment decision.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Trian Comments on Solventum’s Sale of its Purification & Filtration Business

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Trian Fund Management, L.P. (“Trian”), which beneficially owns ~5% of Solventum Corporation (NYSE: SOLV) (“Solventum” or the “Company”) and is the Company’s largest active shareholder, commented on Solventum’s recently announced sale of its Purification & Filtration business to Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc (NYSE: TMO) (“Thermo Fisher”). Trian issued the following statement:

    “Trian commends Solventum on the announced sale of its Purification & Filtration business and believes this is an important first step in the Company’s value creation journey. We believe that part of what attracted strategic interest at such a high valuation multiple was the division’s differentiated technology and material science – attributes inherited from 3M which are present at Solventum’s remaining businesses, and which we believe remain underappreciated by the market today.

    Notably, in conjunction with the acquisition, Thermo Fisher issued public comments which Trian believes confirm that there is a meaningful cost reduction opportunity at Solventum:

    “Excluding financing costs, the transaction is expected to be accretive by $0.28 in that period. This reflects the very strong day one cost synergies when Solventum’s allocated segment costs are replaced by lower run rate costs within Thermo Fisher.”

    Thermo Fisher’s release goes on to suggest that it believes it can more than double the profitability of Purification & Filtration under its corporate umbrella, relative to the business’ current profit as part of Solventum, with much of that improvement driven by lower allocated costs.

    Trian, in its January letter to shareholders, highlighted that Solventum has a significant opportunity to right size costs and realize higher margins while reinvesting more in growth.

    Inside of 3M, Solventum averaged 3-4% organic growth and a 26-27% EBIT margin. Trian believes that Solventum should be able to deliver faster organic growth and higher margins as a focused, standalone company. Trian looks forward to the Company delivering a Long Range Plan that reflects the business’ potential when it hosts its investor day in March.”

    About Trian Fund Management, L.P.
    Founded in 2005, Trian Fund Management, L.P. (“Trian”) is a multi-billion dollar investment management firm. Trian is a highly engaged shareowner that combines concentrated public equity ownership with operational expertise. Leveraging the 50+ years’ operating experience of our Founding Partners, Nelson Peltz and Peter May, Trian seeks to invest in high quality but undervalued and underperforming public companies and to work collaboratively with management teams and boards to help companies execute operational and strategic initiatives designed to drive long-term sustainable earnings growth for the benefit of all shareholders.

    Media Contacts:
    Anne A. Tarbell
    (212) 451-3030
    atarbell@trianpartners.com

    Paul Caminiti / Pamela Greene / Jacqueline Zuhse
    Reevemark
    (212) 433-4600
    Trian@reevemark.com

    Investor Contact:
    Matt Underhill
    (212) 451-3171
    munderhill@trianpartners.com

    Disclaimer

    Except as otherwise set forth in this press release, the views expressed in this press release reflect the opinions of Trian Fund Management, L.P. and its affiliates (“Trian”), and are based on publicly available information with respect to Solventum Corporation (the “Company”). Trian recognizes that there may be confidential information in the possession of the Company that could lead it or others to disagree with Trian’s conclusions. Trian reserves the right to change any of its opinions expressed herein at any time as it deems appropriate and disclaims any obligation to notify the market or any other party of any such change, except as required by law. Trian disclaims any obligation to update the information or opinions contained in this press release. For the avoidance of doubt, this press release is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Company.

    This press release is provided merely as information and is not intended to be, nor should it be construed as, an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security nor as a recommendation to purchase or sell any security. Funds managed by Trian currently beneficially own shares of the Company. These funds are in the business of trading – buying and selling– securities and intend to continue trading in the securities of the Company. You should assume such funds may from time to time sell all or a portion of their holdings of the Company in open market transactions or otherwise (including via short sales), buy additional shares (in open market or privately negotiated transactions or otherwise), or trade in options, puts, calls, swaps or other derivative instruments relating to such shares.

    Some of the materials in this press release contain forward-looking statements. All statements contained herein that are not clearly historical in nature or that necessarily depend on future events are forward-looking, and the words “anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “potential,” “could,” “opportunity,” “estimate,” “plan,” and similar expressions are generally intended to identify forward-looking statements. The projected results and statements contained herein that are not historical facts are based on current expectations, speak only as of the date of these materials and involve risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results, performances or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performances or achievements expressed or implied by such projected results and statements. Assumptions relating to the foregoing involve judgments with respect to, among other things, future economic competitive and market conditions and future business decisions, all of which are difficult or impossible to predict accurately and many of which are beyond the control of Trian.

    Certain financial projections and statements made herein have been derived or obtained from filings made with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or other regulatory authorities and from other third-party reports. Trian shall not be responsible or have any liability for any misinformation contained in any third-party, SEC or other regulatory filing or third-party report.

    There is no assurance or guarantee with respect to the prices at which any securities of the Company will trade, and such securities may not trade at prices that may be implied herein. The estimates, projections and potential impact of the opportunities identified by Trian herein are based on assumptions that Trian believes to be reasonable as of the date of this press release, but there can be no assurance or guarantee (i) that any of the proposed actions set forth in this press release will be completed, (ii) that the actual results or performance of the Company will not differ, and such differences may be material, or (iii) that any of the assumptions provided in this press release are accurate.  This press release does not recommend the purchase or sale of any security.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Quidnet Energy Demonstrates Long-Duration Geomechanical Energy Storage at MWh Scale and Completes Accelerated Lifetime Testing

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Quidnet Energy (“Quidnet”), a pioneer in long-duration energy storage solutions for delivering baseload power, announced today that the company has successfully completed demonstration and testing of its Geomechanical Energy Storage (GES) technology at megawatt-hour (MWh) scale. The tests confirm that Quidnet’s innovative GES solution is prepared to deliver robust, grid-scale energy storage to meet the fast-growing demand for reliable power.

    At the company’s test site in Greater Houston, Quidnet completed MWH scale functional testing and accelerated lifetime testing of the GES technology. In addition to proving the viability of its technology at grid-scale, Quidnet’s results validated the capabilities of the GES technology across critical performance benchmarks, including negligible self-discharge and capacity degradation. These metrics provide real-world validation of GES as a long-life asset for supporting grid stability and delivering reliable power.

    “Achieving this level of performance and scale marks a major milestone in our development of the GES technology,” said Joe Zhou, CEO of Quidnet Energy. “These tests confirm that our storage technology is ready for commercial deployments just as electrical grids grapple with the rapid rise in load growth from industrial electrification and AI data centers. With a mature, well-established supply chain and proven technology, we look forward to delivering GES at scale at a critical time for the energy industry.”

    In conducting its MWh field test in Texas, Quidnet highlights the great market potential for reliable power in its home state, which will experience one of the largest increases in electricity demand in the years ahead. The growth in energy-intensive data centers and the need to prepare for weather-related grid events underscore the essential demand for the stable power provided by Quidnet’s GES. These tests also mark a key technology milestone in Quidnet’s developmental support from Dallas-based Hunt Energy Network following their $10 million investment announced in 2024.

    “With the completion of these tests, we are excited to see Quidnet demonstrate the viability of their GES technology at MWh scale and further establish confidence for the durability of this storage solution,” said Pat Wood, CEO of Hunt Energy Network. “As Quidnet prepares for commercial projects, we look forward to collaborating with the company on our 300 MW partnership for storage in Texas.”

    Learn more about GES and Quidnet at https://www.quidnetenergy.com/.

    About Quidnet Energy
    Houston-based Quidnet Energy is an energy storage company that uses the subsurface as a sustainable natural resource. Quidnet Energy’s patented Geomechanical Energy Storage technology utilizes excess electricity from the grid to store water beneath the ground under pressure, delivering that energy later to provide firm, reliable power to the grid. Visit www.quidnetenergy.com to learn more.

    Media Contact
    Justin Williams
    Trevi Communications for Quidnet Energy
    justin@trevicomm.com
    +1 (978) 539-7157

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/42e702a8-b47e-4c84-b9d1-ac2ff0f6cd36
    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/e8fc0257-d7f9-447d-bdb8-db70f259a2bc
    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/4cdfe456-aea6-437a-af50-5fad7e911f34

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: AlphaSavings Unveils Hands-Free Investing with Fully Managed Wealth Solutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    London, UK, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AlphaSavings, a leading provider of innovative financial solutions, has launched its fully managed wealth solutions, offering investors a hands-free approach to stock and bond investing. With an advanced portfolio management system that integrates professional expertise and real-time market analytics, AlphaSavings is transforming how individuals and institutions manage their investments.

    As financial markets become increasingly complex, many investors struggle to allocate their assets effectively while keeping up with market shifts. AlphaSavings’ hands-free investment solutions provide a seamless experience, allowing clients to enjoy professionally managed stock and bond portfolios without the need for constant monitoring or decision-making.

    A New Era of Hands-Free Investing

    AlphaSavings’ fully managed wealth solutions are designed for individuals who seek stable, long-term financial growth without the complexity of active trading. By leveraging expert portfolio management, real-time market adjustments, and data-driven investment strategies, AlphaSavings enables investors to maximize returns while minimizing risk exposure.

    How Hands-Free Investing Works at AlphaSavings:

    • Personalized Portfolio Construction – Investments are tailored to individual financial goals, risk tolerance, and market conditions.
    • Automated Asset Allocation – Portfolios maintain an optimal mix of stocks and bonds, adjusting dynamically based on economic trends.
    • Real-Time Market Monitoring – AI-enhanced analytics track stock and bond markets 24/7, ensuring timely investment decisions.
    • Risk-Managed Growth – Strategies are designed to minimize volatility while maximizing long-term wealth accumulation.
    • No Manual Trading Required – Investors no longer need to analyze markets, pick stocks, or make buy/sell decisions—the system does it all.

    What Sets AlphaSavings Apart from Traditional Investing?

    Traditional investment methods often require active involvement, whether through stock trading, bond selection, or frequent portfolio rebalancing. AlphaSavings removes these challenges by offering a fully automated, expert-managed investment experience.

    Key Benefits of Hands-Free Investing with AlphaSavings:

    • Stress-Free Wealth Growth – No need for clients to spend time researching or managing investments.
    • Consistent, Market-Beating Performance – AlphaSavings’ expert portfolio managers use data-driven strategies to deliver high returns.
    • Diversified Stock & Bond Portfolios – Investments are spread across multiple asset classes to ensure risk-adjusted growth.
    • Smart Rebalancing – Portfolios are adjusted regularly to maintain optimal performance and respond to market fluctuations.
    • Transparency & Control – Clients can track their portfolio’s progress without needing to make investment decisions themselves.

    Bringing Institutional-Grade Investment Management to Everyday Investors

    Historically, fully managed investment services were reserved for high-net-worth individuals and institutional investors. AlphaSavings is democratizing access to these expert-guided wealth solutions, ensuring that everyday investors can benefit from hands-free, data-driven portfolio management.

    By integrating advanced financial modeling, AI-driven risk assessments, and human expertise, AlphaSavings provides the same level of sophisticated asset management that top hedge funds and wealth managers use.

    How AlphaSavings’ Fully Managed Wealth Solutions Work

    Step 1: Tailored Investment Strategy Development

    Clients answer a few questions about their financial goals, investment horizon, and risk tolerance. AlphaSavings then designs a personalized, diversified portfolio suited to their individual needs.

    Step 2: Smart Asset Allocation & Investment Execution

    AlphaSavings selects a mix of high-growth stocks and stable bonds to ensure both capital appreciation and risk mitigation. Investments are automatically adjusted in response to market trends.

    Step 3: Continuous Market Monitoring & Risk Management

    Unlike traditional investment firms that rebalance portfolios quarterly or annually, AlphaSavings monitors investments in real-time, making instant adjustments when necessary to protect investor capital.

    Step 4: Hands-Free Wealth Growth & Performance Tracking

    Clients can track their investment performance through AlphaSavings’ intuitive platform, receiving updates on returns, portfolio adjustments, and market insights.

    Who Can Benefit from Hands-Free Investing?

    • Professionals & Business Owners – Those who lack the time to research or actively manage investments.
    • First-Time Investors – Individuals who want to grow their wealth without the complexity of trading.
    • Retirement Planners – Investors looking for stable, long-term asset appreciation.
    • High-Net-Worth Individuals – Those seeking professional wealth management with minimal involvement.
    • Institutional Investors – Companies and organizations looking for expertly managed investment strategies.

    A Smarter, Safer Approach to Stock & Bond Investing

    Stock and bond markets are often unpredictable, with interest rate changes, inflation concerns, and geopolitical factors influencing market performance. AlphaSavings’ hands-free investment system ensures clients stay ahead of market shifts while protecting their capital from excessive volatility.

    By combining expert-driven financial strategies with automated portfolio adjustments, AlphaSavings reduces risks associated with emotional decision-making, market timing, and investment mismanagement.

    How AlphaSavings Mitigates Market Volatility:

    • Adaptive Portfolio Strategies – The investment team dynamically adjusts asset allocations to reduce risk exposure.
    • Diversification Across Asset Classes – Stocks, bonds, and fixed-income securities are balanced to ensure stability.
    • AI-Powered Predictive Analytics – Market trends are analyzed in real-time to anticipate potential downturns before they occur.
    • Automatic Stop-Loss & Risk Controls – The system prevents excessive losses by reallocating assets in response to market turbulence.

    Regulatory Compliance & Transparency

    AlphaSavings adheres to industry best practices, regulatory guidelines, and fiduciary responsibilities to provide investors with a secure, trustworthy investment experience. Clients receive:

    • Regular financial reports detailing portfolio growth and market performance.
    • Full visibility into investment allocations, risk assessments, and wealth management strategies.
    • Transparent pricing with no hidden fees or commissions.

    The Future of Wealth Management: Hands-Free, Data-Driven Investing

    As financial technology evolves, hands-free investing is becoming the future of wealth management. Investors are shifting away from traditional, manual stock and bond selection processes toward AI-driven portfolio management and automated financial strategies.

    AlphaSavings is at the forefront of this transformation, providing a scalable, intelligent investment solution that eliminates the stress of daily portfolio management while delivering superior long-term results.

    Get Started with Hands-Free Investing Today

    For those looking to grow their wealth with minimal effort, AlphaSavings offers the perfect solution. Clients can access fully managed stock and bond portfolios, backed by expert analysis, automated market insights, and risk-optimized investment strategies.

    Visit AlphaSavings today to explore fully managed wealth solutions designed for long-term financial success.

    About AlphaSavings

    AlphaSavings is a leading provider of fully managed stock and bond investment solutions, offering hands-free investing for individuals and institutions. By combining expert-driven portfolio management with automated market insights, AlphaSavings delivers stress-free wealth growth with market-beating returns.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: More tools for businesses to deal with retail crime

    Source: New Zealand Government

    The Government is clamping down on retail crime by giving businesses more powers to detain those stealing from them, Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith and Associate Justice Minister Nicole McKee say. 

    “Retail crime increased 85 per cent between 2019 and 2023, including a 91 per cent increase in victimisations relating to theft,” Mr Goldsmith says.

    “Currently, no one, including retailers and security guards, is protected from civil or criminal liability if they arrest and detain a person stealing goods valued at less than $1,000 during the day. The operation of the Crimes Act 1961 hinders people from stopping offending as it occurs right in front of them.

    “This initial package of reforms, put forward by the Ministerial Advisory Group 

    for victims of retail crime, will give Kiwi businesses additional tools to deal with those that are robbing them of their livelihood and economic growth.”

    These reforms include:

    • Amending the Crimes Act so that citizens can intervene to stop any Crimes Act offence at any time of the day.
    • Requiring that a person making an arrest contact Police and follow Police instructions.
    • Clarifying that restraints can be used, when reasonable, when making an arrest. 
    • Changing the defence of property provisions to the Crimes Act so it is clear that reasonable force may be used. 

    “The economic cost of retail crime in New Zealand is in the billions, and retailers and security guards face abuse and assault that no New Zealander should be subjected to. This Government will ensure that people working in the retail sector are being effectively protected, are empowered to stop offending, and that offenders are caught and deterred from future offending,” Mr Goldsmith says.

    “About 230,000 New Zealanders work in the retail sector. Increasingly, they are experiencing the personal and economic trauma of violent and theft-related crimes. The impact of crime on this group can have flow-on effects for their families and wider communities,” Mrs McKee says.

    “We established the advisory group to provide first-hand insight into the issues being faced by Kiwi retailers on the ground. The recommendations the group has come up with are sensible reforms that will enable retail offenders to be more readily stopped and deterred from future offending.

    “This is just the first suite of initiatives put forward by the Ministerial Advisory Group that the Government will be implementing. Watch this space.”

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon sets new 5G upload speed record as it continues to advance its network to manage AI and other emerging workloads

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon sets new 5G upload speed record as it continues to advance its network to manage AI and other emerging workloads

    NEW YORK – As the ecosystem around 5G evolves, Verizon has been actively optimizing its network with 5G advanced technology, high-speed fiber, edge computing and intelligent management to efficiently handle the massive data demands of real-time applications, seamless cloud connectivity, and data-intensive demands of AI-driven workloads.

    Verizon and its collaborators Ericsson and Qualcomm Technologies, Inc., just made another large leap forward in advancing that ecosystem. Using a combination of two TDD carrier component aggregation with C-band spectrum and uplink MIMO (Multiple Input, Multiple Output) technology, the companies achieved a US record-breaking 480 Mbps uplink speed using sub-6 GHz spectrum.

    “Emerging applications, such as smart surveillance, industrial automation, augmented reality devices and generative AI models, require massive amounts of data to be continuously uploaded for analysis, decision-making, and model training,” said Srini Kalapala, Senior Vice President of Technology and Product Development at Verizon. “Faster uplink speeds, in combination with the other advancements we’ve been introducing into our network, ensure that AI-driven systems can process real-time video feeds, sensor data, and user interactions without lag, improving responsiveness and accuracy. The work we are doing to drive uplink speeds is a key variable that will allow our customers to take advantage of these AI applications on our network.”

    Extremely fast upload speeds are particularly critical for time-sensitive applications like healthcare diagnostics, remote robotics, and live broadcasting, where delays in data transmission can impact outcomes. Higher uplink speeds for solutions such as these provide seamless data transmission from customers’ devices to the cloud, enable low-latency interactions and reduce bottlenecks in data-heavy applications. With the 5G enhanced uplink capabilities demonstrated in this trial, businesses and industries will be able to unlock many benefits of AI, enabling smarter automation, improving efficiencies, and delivering more immersive user experiences. Real-time applications such as video conferencing, cloud gaming, IoT communications, and augmented reality (AR) also rely on robust uplink capabilities for seamless performance. Additionally, as more users generate and upload high-resolution content to platforms like social media and streaming services, strong uplink capabilities help maintain smooth performance and enhance customers’ experience.

    “Reaching 480 Mbps uplink speeds is a remarkable achievement and highlights the strength of Ericsson’s RAN technology,” said Hannes Ekström, Vice President and Head of Customer Unit Verizon for Ericsson North America. “This breakthrough not only boosts data upload efficiency but also meets the high demands of real-time applications and AI-driven tasks. Our technology is essential for providing smooth performance and outstanding user experiences across enterprise and consumer applications alike.”

    About the trial

    In this demonstration of technological capabilities, Verizon, Ericsson and Qualcomm Technologies used 200 MHz of C-band spectrum, employing 2×2 MIMO on each 100MHz channel, hosted on Ericsson’s state-of-the-art Generation 4 RAN Processor 6672 and Massive MIMO TDD antenna integrated radio AIR 6449.

    MIMO is a technology that uses multiple antennas on both the network and the device to send and receive multiple data streams simultaneously. It enhances throughput, reliability, and coverage by leveraging multiple antennas to combat interference and improve signal strength.

    The trial also employed TDD (Time Division Duplex.) TDD is a method that allows both uplink and downlink to share the same frequency band but at different time slots. It is used to dynamically allocate time for uploads and downloads based on dynamically shifting network demands, and improves spectral efficiency, especially in scenarios where download and upload needs vary.

    “This achievement is a powerful demonstration of Verizon, Ericsson, and Qualcomm Technologies’ commitment to advancing the 5G frontier. Fast upload speeds are essential for applications where every second matters, ensuring seamless data transmission from devices to the cloud for real-time interactions. We are thrilled to be at the forefront of empowering businesses to fully leverage AI, driving smarter automation, greater efficiency, and more engaging user experiences,” said Sunil Patil, vice president, product management, Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.e MIMO TDD antenna integrated radio AIR 6449.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: New WTO publication “Trade for Peace: Pathways to Sustainable Trade and Peace” launched

    Source: WTO

    Headline: New WTO publication “Trade for Peace: Pathways to Sustainable Trade and Peace” launched

    The book launch highlighted how the Trade for Peace publication “Pathways to Sustainable Trade and Peace” supports the work of policymakers, academics and practitioners by providing an in-depth exploration of the complex relationship between trade and peace.
    The publication is composed of 16 chapters written by 31 authors, representing more than nine partner institutions, including the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Trade Centre (ITC), Interpeace, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the World Economic Forum.
    “Trade is an indispensable part of building the secure, sustainable, and inclusive world we want and need,” notes WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in the publication’s foreword. “For trade to yield peace dividends, particularly in the difficult context of FCS, the trade community needs to work with other partners. It is my hope that this volume can help lay the groundwork for such collaboration to advance a 21st century vision of Trade for Peace,” she adds.
    WTO Deputy Director-General Xiangchen Zhang delivered the opening remarks, highlighting the importance of the publication in the current challenging times. “This book is a concrete output from the research pillar of the Trade for Peace Programme, which aims at deepening the understanding of the trade-peace nexus and addressing the gap in literature on the interlinkages between trade and peace in its various dimensions. It is the first WTO publication on the topic with the goal of providing insights on how trade and peace interact and how governments and other stakeholders can leverage trade to foster economic development and stability,” he said. His remarks are available here.
    Panellists included the co-editor of the publication Mustapha Sadni Jallab, Chief of the Knowledge Management Section at the WTO, and five authors — Alan W. Wolff, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at PIIE and former WTO Deputy Director-General, Itonde Kakoma, President and CEO of Interpeace, Franck Bousquet, Deputy Director of the Institute for Capacity Development at the IMF, Barbara Ramos, Chief of Strategies and Policies for Trade and Investment at the ITC, and Serge Stroobants, Director of Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region at the IEP.
    Participants in the hybrid event also included Maika Oshikawa, Director of the WTO Accessions Division, co-editors Patrick Low, former Chief Economist at the WTO, and Roberta Piermartini, Chief of the Applied Economic Research Section at the WTO, as well as several other authors featured in the publication.
    Moderated by Amanda Miashiro, Legal/Economic Affairs Officer at the WTO Accessions Division and co-editor of the publication, the event discussed the complexity of trade and peace in light of a changed global political landscape. Panellists emphasized that fragility worldwide is increasing, with the average levels of peace at historical lows.
    The discussion raised key questions about which legal frameworks and conditions must be in place for trade to be a driver of peace and stability and how to transform the capacity of actors operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts to not only be conflict-sensitive but also to actively contribute to peace outcomes. The recording of the event is available here.
    Panellists further recalled that peace is intertwined with the history of the multilateral trading system. They also highlighted the role of the g7+ WTO Group in advancing the Trade for Peace agenda for FCS. Shedding light on how fragility issues deeply affect societies, small and medium-sized enterprises and the economy, panellists stressed the importance of understanding conflict drivers and specificities of fragile regions to be able to fortify macroeconomic policies and state capacity, improve competitiveness and contribute to socioeconomic recovery.
    According to IEP data, the global economic impact of violence was more than US$ 19.1 trillion in 2023, which prompted a discussion on how trade could play a more effective role in reducing the cost and impact of economic violence by promoting peace. The full publication is available here.
    In addition to the publication launch, this session unveiled the Trade for Peace Research and Knowledge Database. This hub is dedicated to collecting ongoing research studies and other resources on the linkages between trade and peace, serving as a tool for stakeholders to support evidence-based policy development and strategy.
    For more information, see WTO Trade for Peace, 4th edition of Trade for Peace Week

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australia could make it easier for consumers to fight back against anti-competitive behaviour. Here’s how

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mel Marquis, Deputy Associate Dean and Senior Lecturer in Law, Monash University

    From the supermarket to the petrol pump, many Australians are concerned about the power of large corporations. Are consumers getting a fair deal? Do they have enough choice?

    This week, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is due to hand the government the final report from its inquiry into Australia’s supermarket sector. They have already said the sector is highly concentrated, with just a few sellers controlling prices and exploiting small suppliers.

    This advocacy highlights a key source of pressure on wallets. The ACCC is also pursuing consumer law claims against the big supermarkets for creating the “illusion” of discounted prices.

    But across the economy, it is unlikely consumer interests are being protected as much as they could be. Further reforms in competition law would help.

    In some countries, consumers can band together to sue private companies and demand compensation if they’ve been harmed by anti-competitive behaviour.

    Australian consumers can sue companies too – but it can be burdensome, expensive and complicated. In fact, consumer suits seeking damages for such conduct are rare. Australia could make it easier to fight back.

    The problem

    Treasury will wrap up a major review of competition law in August.

    Two areas of reform have rightly been given particular attention: a merger law for the whole economy, and special rules for large digital platforms.

    The ACCC is Australia’s competition regulator and consumer law advocate.
    Jarretera/Shutterstock

    The merger reform has led to amendments to help the ACCC protect markets and a consultation on regulating platforms which has recently concluded.

    Treasury is considering other reforms as well. However, putting consumers in a better position to claim damages for anti-competitive conduct is not on the agenda.

    That is unfortunate. Consumers should feel more secure using competition law to demand compensation for anti-competitive harm. As the ACCC has said, the annual damage caused by cartels could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, a staggering figure.

    Even when the ACCC and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions succeed in bringing cartellists to court to obtain penalties or even criminal sentences, it is a way to punish and deter. It does not make victims whole.

    Overseas solutions

    Australia lags behind its global counterparts.

    In 2005, the European Union launched a debate on this subject. Laws were passed to ensure victims of anti-competitive conduct have a right to full compensation.

    The European Union has seen a growth in private competition law actions.
    MDart10/Shutterstock

    Since then, it appears to have become easier for consumers there to seek damages. From 2014 to 2019, one study showed a fivefold increase in the number of cases lodged in the EU, from 50 up to 239 private claims seeking compensation.

    In the United States, private antitrust enforcement thrives due to large class actions, where consumers with a similar grievance come together to take action against corporate defendants.

    US antitrust law allows treble damages, which means consumers can in theory receive three times the value of any harm suffered plus the costs of the lawsuit. In reality they recover less than that, but with large classes of claimants, the incentives to pursue claims through litigation and settlements are strong.

    The Australian situation

    On paper, private enforcement of competition law already exists in Australia. However, incentives appear weaker here.

    In the EU and US, class actions are designed to encourage claimants to seek compensation for anti-competitive harm, but the rarity of such claims in Australia suggests the settings aren’t quite right.

    Google is currently subject to antitrust action in Australia.
    JHVEPhoto/Shutterstock

    A class action against major banks for allegedly rigging exchange rates, and a recently lodged class action against Google relating to its AdTech operations, are the exceptions, not the rule.

    A 2012 article in the UNSW Law Journal said it was “time for an Australian debate”, but little has happened since.

    What now? Here are some possible reforms

    Various reforms and initiatives could bolster private enforcement in Australia, including:

    1. Reviewing evidence rules to allow judges to order the disclosure of documents collected during investigations, provided the public interest is not compromised. If evidence is too hard to access, victims of cartels have no chance of proving their case.

    2. Making it easier for a willing defendant to settle out of court. Sometimes, one defendant in a cartel case may be open to settling out of court but the other defendants are not. In such a case, to make it easier for the willing defendant to settle, it could be clarified that the non-settling defendants – if eventually ordered to pay the claimants – cannot then reclaim part of those damages as a “contribution” from the defendant that did settle.

    Without this assurance, individual defendants that would otherwise be ready to settle may hesitate for fear of paying more than their share.

    3. The ACCC could also more aggressively seek redress for consumers, which would reduce the need for damages actions. So far, the ACCC and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions have not made enough use of their ability to seek orders granting such compensation in cartel cases.

    Competition law is not just about promoting dynamism and productivity growth, and fairer prices and potential wage growth, though these are clearly desirable.

    Competition law should also be about securing relief for victims to make them whole, and to boost their trust in markets. Facilitating private rights of action for consumers can help to elevate justice in this area of the law.

    Mel Marquis has in the past received research grants funded by the Commonwealth of Australia and administered by the ACCC. He is a member of the Competition and Consumer Committee of the Law Institute of Victoria. The views expressed are personal to the author.

    – ref. Australia could make it easier for consumers to fight back against anti-competitive behaviour. Here’s how – https://theconversation.com/australia-could-make-it-easier-for-consumers-to-fight-back-against-anti-competitive-behaviour-heres-how-250505

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: There’s a new ‘rapid review’ into school bullying. Research shows we need to involve the whole school to stop it

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Fiona MacDonald, Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities, Victoria University

    shutterstock LBeddoe/Shutterstock

    About one in four students report being regularly bullied in Australian schools.

    Children who are bullied can feel anxious and excluded, stop sleeping and eating well, and lose interest in school. There are serious potential long-term effects, which include anxiety and depression. Being bullied is also a risk factor for suicidal thoughts and behaviours.

    Following the 2024 death of Sydney Year 7 student Charlotte O’Brien, the federal government wants to develop a national standard to address bullying in schools.

    It has just announced a “rapid review” of bullying in schools, to be done in six months (though not before the federal election). This will look at what schools currently do to address bullying and what they should be doing.

    What does the research tell us works when it comes to addressing bullying in schools?

    What is bullying?

    Bullying is behaviour that is aggressive, intentional, repetitive and unprovoked.

    It also involves a power imbalance in favour of the perpetrator.

    As well as physical abuse, these behaviours can involve verbal teasing, harassment, damaging property, and antisocial behaviours such as spreading gossip or excluding someone. It can happen in person or online.

    Bullying can mean a child stops wanting to go to school.
    Doria Nippot/Shutterstock



    Read more:
    5 questions your child’s school should be able to answer about bullying

    Initial responses to bullying

    Much of the early research response to incidents on school bullying focused on the perpetrator and victim, and what the school should do in response to the bullying incident.

    This involved senior teachers such as the principal and school counsellor meeting with the perpetrator and victim and their parents/guardians. Here they would work out strategies to try and make amends and prevent future incidents.

    For example, a perpetrator may have had to apologise to the victim and take on additional responsibilities in the school. They may also be warned about suspension or exclusion.

    But these responses do not address the complexity of bullying. This includes the reasons why a child might bully another as well as its broader impact. Often other students are also inadvertently involved in or affected by bullying. Seeing someone else being bullied can be upsetting, students may feel angry, sad or concerned they may also be bullied.

    The shift to prevention

    So more recent research has emphasised the importance of prevention to reduce rates of school bullying. This could include anti-bullying policies, classroom rules and discussions about bullying as well as information for parents.

    This relies on what researchers call a “whole school approach”. Instead of bullying being seen as the responsibility of the principal or other senior teachers to deal with a few “at risk” kids, it is the responsibility of all staff, students and parents – and even the broader community.

    This means students are educated to understand what is and is not bullying and what to do if they witness it. It also means teachers have clear policies to follow and a clear understanding of “gateway behaviours,” which can escalate into bullying. Parents likewise know what to do if their child is being bullied or the kinds of behaviours that can lead up to it – such as namecalling or eyerolling.

    Other measures could include a dedicated staff member to champion anti-bullying measures in the school and partnerships with community members and organisations. This could be junior sporting clubs or even the school crossing guard (who can provide information about antisocial behaviours they observe).

    The aim is to create a school culture which is safe and supportive for students, where harmful behaviour is clearly understood and dealt with early if it happens.

    A whole school approach sees students invovled in prevention bullying at their school.
    Monkey Business Images/ Shutterstock



    Read more:
    Why do kids bully? And what can parents do about it?

    The importance of data

    Current research also emphasises the importance of schools regularly collecting, analysing and acting on data about bullying and the school environment. This enables schools to identify changes within the school environment before they escalate to bullying.

    Schools already collect data about their students and behaviours, including attendance, playground incidents and their attitudes to school. But many don’t have the time or expertise to analyse it.

    Listening to students

    Research also shows anti-bullying efforts are more effective when students are involved.

    This helps build trust between students, families and school staff, gives students a sense of ownership about solutions. Importantly it also enables young people to share their perspectives about what will work in their lives and classrooms.

    This could include schools regularly asking students about bullying and other issues they are having at schools and genuinely considering their suggestions about how to improve both prevention and responses.

    Fiona MacDonald received funding from Alannah & Madeline Foundation for this research.

    Nina Van Dyke received funding from the Alannah & Madeline Foundation for this research.

    – ref. There’s a new ‘rapid review’ into school bullying. Research shows we need to involve the whole school to stop it – https://theconversation.com/theres-a-new-rapid-review-into-school-bullying-research-shows-we-need-to-involve-the-whole-school-to-stop-it-250519

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: The atmosphere is getting better at cleaning itself – but that’s not all good news

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hinrich Schaefer, Research Scientist Trace Gases, National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA)

    Baring Head station, overlooking Cook Strait, is one of the places where air samples are collected to track greenhouse gases. Author provided, CC BY-SA

    Imagine for a moment the atmosphere is a kitchen sink. Wildfires, industry emissions, plants and microbes dump their grimy dishes into it in the form of noxious and planet-heating gases.

    The only reason why these gases are not continuously accumulating in the atmosphere and we are not choking in a giant smog cloud is that the atmosphere makes its own detergent: hydroxyl.

    The hydroxyl radical (OH) is generated in complex chemical cycles and removes organic gases by reacting with them. This includes the potent greenhouse gas methane – OH removes about 90% of it from the atmosphere.

    An important question for climate scientists is whether our ongoing emissions could use up the OH detergent and leave the atmosphere less able to cleanse itself.

    While that may seem likely, we also emit compounds like nitrogen oxides (from engines and power plants) that increase OH production. Which of the two processes dominates and whether OH levels are going up or down has been hotly debated.

    But as we show in our new study, OH has been increasing and the atmosphere’s self-cleaning ability has been strengthening since 1997.

    This finding gets us a step closer to understanding what happens to methane once it enters the atmosphere. While it is good news that the atmosphere’s scrubbing capacity has been increasing, it also suggests that methane emissions are rising faster than scientists and policy makers assumed.

    Complex measurements

    OH is very challenging to measure directly. It only exists for a second before it reacts again.

    Instead, we used the radiocarbon content of carbon monoxide (14CO) as a footprint of OH activity. Only reaction with OH removes 14CO, which makes it a robust tracer and indicates how much OH is in the air.

    The 14CO radioactive isotope (which is chemically the same as carbon monoxide but heavier) forms when cosmic rays start a chain of reactions in the atmosphere. We can calculate this production rate accurately and therefore know how much 14CO enters the atmosphere.

    For each of the hundreds of data points used in our study, we used air samples collected at two remote stations in New Zealand and Antarctica, respectively, over the past 33 years.

    From these samples, we isolated only the carbon monoxide, which we then turned into carbon dioxide and eventually into graphite (pure carbon) to measure how many of the graphite atoms represent the carbon isotope 14C.

    Confirmation by modelling

    We found a statistically significant decrease in 14CO over the past 25 years. This can only be caused by an increase in OH.

    Our computer model that calculates climate and atmospheric chemistry confirms this. The combination of measurements and simulations shows that OH is increasing, but proves it only for the Southern Hemisphere where we have collected samples.

    This is interesting because this part of the world is affected by the “grime” gases, including methane, that react with OH but is far from more industrialised regions that emit compounds that generate OH (especially nitrogen oxides).

    If we can detect an OH rise in the more pristine southern hemisphere, chances are the increase is global. Indeed, our model shows that OH is likely rising faster in the northern hemisphere.

    The simulations also suggest the main factors at play. Higher methane fluxes suppress OH, as expected, and by themselves would cause a downward trend. In contrast, nitrogen oxide emissions, ozone depletion in the stratosphere and global warming favour the formation of new OH, turning the balance to an overall increase.

    These findings are a big step in the understanding of atmospheric chemistry. They show that rising OH levels have so far saved us from even faster rising atmospheric methane levels and the associated warming.

    Currently, urban and industrial pollution of nitrogen oxides maintains this state. But the danger is that the very necessary efforts to clean up these pollutants could cut the OH supply to the atmospheric kitchen sink. With less detergent and the same input of grime, the dishwater will turn dirty.

    Hinrich Schaefer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article.

    – ref. The atmosphere is getting better at cleaning itself – but that’s not all good news – https://theconversation.com/the-atmosphere-is-getting-better-at-cleaning-itself-but-thats-not-all-good-news-248734

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australians can wait at least 258 days for their first psychiatry appointment, our new study shows

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yuting Zhang, Professor of Health Economics, The University of Melbourne

    chainarong06/Shutterstock

    Anyone who needs to make their first appointment with a psychiatrist may expect a bit of a wait. Our new research shows Australians are waiting an average 77 days for this initial appointment. But some were waiting for at least eight months.

    We also showed people are waiting longer and longer for these appointments over the past decade or so, particularly in regional and remote areas. And telehealth has not reduced this city-country disparity.

    Our study is the first of its kind to look at the national picture of wait times for a first appointment with a psychiatrist. Here’s why our findings are so concerning.

    What we did

    We analysed data from the Medicare Benefits Schedule from 2011 to 2022. This allowed us to analyse trends in wait times without accessing individual patients’ medical records.

    The particular dataset we used allowed us to look at the time from a GP referral to the first appointment with a private psychiatrist.

    A first appointment with a psychiatrist is crucial as it may lead to an official diagnosis if there is not one already, or it may map out future treatment options, including whether medicine or hospital admission is needed. Depending on the situation, treatment may start immediately, then be reviewed at subsequent appointments. However, with a delayed initial appointment, there’s the risk of delayed diagnosis and treatment, and symptoms worsening.

    We focused on wait times for initial outpatient appointments with private psychiatrists, and looked at wait times for face-to-face and telehealth attendances separately.

    We did not include wait times to see psychiatrists at public hospitals. And we couldn’t see what psychiatry appointments were for, and how urgent it was for a patient to see a psychiatrist at short notice.

    What we found

    We found wait times for the first psychiatry appointment after a GP referral had increased steadily in the past decade or so, especially since 2020. In 2011, the mean waiting time was 51 days, rising to 77 days by 2022.

    Waiting times varied substantially between patients. For example, in 2022, 25% of the wait times for a face-to-face appointment were under ten days. But 95% of wait times were under 258 days. This means the longest wait times were more than 258 days.

    For telehealth services in 2022, the equivalent wait times ranged from 11 to 235 days.

    Wait times also varied by location. People in regional and remote areas consistently had longer wait times than those living in major cities, for both in-person and telehealth services.

    The disparity remained over time, except for in-person services during the early years of the COVID pandemic. This is when rural areas in Australia had fewer lockdowns and less stringent movement restrictions compared to major cities.

    Why didn’t telehealth help?

    Our study did not look at reasons for increasing wait times. However, longer waits do not appear to be due to increased demand, considering the total number of visits has not gone up. For example, we showed the total number of visits for combined in-person and telehealth first appointments was 108,630 in 2020, 111,718 in 2021, and 104,214 in 2022.

    But what about telehealth? This has widely been touted as a boon for regional and remote Australians, as it allows them to access psychiatry services without the time and expense of having to travel long distances.

    Telehealth took off in 2020 due to COVID. There were 2,066 total first psychiatry visits between 2011 and 2019, increasing to 12,860 in 2020. But in 2022, there were 27,527.

    However, we found the number of telehealth visits offset the number of face-to-face visits, and the total visits remained stable in recent years. As telehealth still takes up psychiatrists’ time, it did not help to reduce wait times.

    What are the implications?

    The national rise in wait times over the past decade or so is concerning, especially for high-risk patients with severe mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, severe depression and bipolar disorder. Any delays in treatment for these patients could cause substantial harms to them and others in their communities.

    Our results also come at a time of increased pressure on mental health services more broadly including:

    Now, more than ever, we need to pay continued attention to access and distribution of psychiatric services across Australia.

    Yuting Zhang has received funding from the Australian Research Council (future fellowship project ID FT200100630), Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Department of Health, and National Health and Medical Research Council. In the past, Professor Zhang has received funding from several US institutes including the US National Institutes of Health, Commonwealth fund, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. She has not received funding from for-profit industry including the private health insurance industry.

    Ou Yang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Australians can wait at least 258 days for their first psychiatry appointment, our new study shows – https://theconversation.com/australians-can-wait-at-least-258-days-for-their-first-psychiatry-appointment-our-new-study-shows-248012

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mimi Zou, Professor, School of Private & Commercial Law, UNSW Sydney

    Dorason/Shutterstock

    When small Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek released a family of extremely efficient and highly competitive AI models last month, it rocked the global tech community. The release revealed China’s growing technological prowess. It also showcased a distinctly Chinese approach to AI advancement.

    This approach is characterised by strategic investment, efficient innovation and careful regulatory oversight. And it’s evident throughout China’s broader AI landscape, of which DeepSeek is just one player.

    In fact, the country has a vast ecosystem of AI companies.

    They may not be globally recognisable names like other AI companies such as DeepSeek, OpenAI and Anthropic. But each has carved out their own speciality and is contributing to the development of this rapidly evolving technology.

    Tech giants and startups

    The giants of China’s technology industry include Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. All these companies are investing heavily in AI development.

    Alibaba CEO Eddie Wu earlier this month said the multibillion dollar company plans to “aggressively invest” in its pursuit of developing AI that is equal to, or more advanced than, human intelligence.

    The company is already working with Apple to incorporate its existing AI models into Chinese iPhones. (Outside China, iPhones offer similar integration with OpenAI’s ChatGPT.)

    But a new generation of smaller, specialised AI companies has also emerged.

    For example, Shanghai-listed Cambricon Technologies focuses on AI chip development. Yitu Technology specialises in healthcare and smart city applications.

    Megvii Technology and CloudWalk Technology have carved out niches in image recognition and computer vision, while iFLYTEK creates voice recognition technology.

    Multibillion dollar Chinese tech company Alibaba plans to aggressively invest in AI.
    testing/Shutterstock

    Innovative paths to success

    Despite United States’ chip sanctions and China’s restricted information environment, these Chinese AI companies have found paths to success.

    US companies such as OpenAI have trained their large language models on the open internet. But Chinese companies have used vast datasets from domestic platforms such as WeChat, Weibo and Zhihu. They also use government-authorised data sources.

    Many Chinese AI companies also embrace open-source development. This means they publish detailed technical papers and release their models for others to build upon. This approach focuses on efficiency and practical application rather than raw computing power.

    The result is a distinctly Chinese approach to AI.

    Importantly, China’s state support for AI development has also been substantial. Besides the central government, local and provincial governments have provided massive funding through venture funds, subsidies and tax incentives.

    China has also established at least 48 data exchanges across different cities in recent years. These are authorised marketplaces where AI companies can purchase massive datasets in a regulated environment.

    By 2028, China also plans to establish more than 100 “trusted data spaces”.

    These are secure, regulated environments designed to standardise data exchanges across sectors and regions. They will form the foundation of a comprehensive national data market, allowing access to and use of diverse datasets within a controlled framework.

    A strong education push

    The growth of the AI industry in China is also tied to a strong AI education push.

    In 2018, China’s Ministry of Education launched an action plan for accelerating AI innovation in universities.

    Publicly available data shows 535 universities have established AI undergraduate majors and some 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes have also been created since 2017. (In comparison, there are at least 14 colleges and universities in the United States offering formal AI undergraduate degrees.)

    Together, these institutions are building an AI talent pipeline in China. This is crucial to Beijing’s ambition of becoming a global AI innovation leader by 2030.

    China’s AI strategy combines extensive state support with targeted regulation. Rather than imposing blanket controls, regulators have developed a targeted approach to managing AI risks.

    The 2023 regulations on generative AI are particularly revealing of Beijing’s approach.

    They impose content-related obligations specifically on public-facing generative AI services, such as ensuring all content created and services provided are lawful, uphold core socialist values and respect intellectual property rights. These obligations, however, exclude generative AI used for enterprise, research and development. This allows for some unrestricted innovation.

    There are 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes in China, including at Renmen University in Beijing.
    humphery/Shutterstock

    International players

    China and the US dominate the global AI landscape. But several significant players are emerging elsewhere.

    For example, France’s Mistral AI has raised over €1 billion (A$1.6 billion) to date to build large language models. In comparison, OpenAI raised US$6.6 billion (A$9.4 billion) in a recent funding round, and is in talks to raise a further US$40 billion.

    Other European companies are focused on specialised applications, specific industries or regional markets. For example, Germany’s Aleph Alpha offers an AI tool that allows companies to customise third-party models for their own purposes

    In the United Kingdom, Graphcore is manufacturing AI chips and Wayve is making autonomous driving AI systems.

    Challenging conventional wisdom

    DeepSeek’s breakthrough last month demonstrated massive computing infrastructure and multibillion dollar budgets aren’t always necessary for the successful development of AI.

    For those invested in the technology’s future, companies that achieve DeepSeek-level efficiencies could significantly influence the trajectory of AI development.

    We may see a global landscape where innovative AI companies elsewhere can achieve breakthroughs, while still operating within ecosystems dominated by American and Chinese advantages in talent, data and investment.

    The future of AI may not be determined solely by who leads the race. Instead, it may be determined by how different approaches shape the technology’s development.

    China’s model offers important lessons for other countries seeking to build their AI capabilities while managing certain risks.

    Mimi Zou has previously received funding from the British Academy. She is affiliated with the Asia Society Australia.

    – ref. DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry – https://theconversation.com/deepseek-is-now-a-global-force-but-its-just-one-player-in-chinas-booming-ai-industry-250494

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Scotland: Amnesty welcomes review of Scottish Enterprise human rights checks

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International have today welcomed the Scottish Government’s agreement to review the human rights checks conducted by Scottish Enterprise, following a Scottish Parliament debate brought by the Scottish Greens in which MSPs from a range of parties expressed concerns about Scottish Enterprise grants to arms companies.

    Commenting after the debate, Neil Cowan (Scotland Programme Director at Amnesty International UK) said:

    “Today’s debate made clear that is simply not acceptable to continue to award Scottish Enterprise grants to companies involved in the manufacture and sale of arms to states accused of grave human rights abuses, including Israel.

    So we strongly welcome the fact that the Scottish Government have listened to Amnesty’s long-standing call, and the call of many others including MSPs from a range of parties, and agreed to conduct a review of the human rights checks in place at Scottish Enterprise. It has long been clear that, with no company ever failing one of the checks, they are not credible and require overhaul.

    It is now essential that the Scottish Government sets out what that review will involve, with it being critical that it includes independent input, review and analysis, and that it is focused on meeting Scotland’s international obligations.”

    View latest press releases

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Hearings – Annual hearing with the Chairpersons of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – 14-10-2024 – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) held its first annual hearing in the 10th term with the Chairpersons of the ESAs, in accordance with Article 3 of the EBA, EIOPA and ESMA Regulations, on 14 October 2024:

    • Verena Ross, Chairperson of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) as well as Chairperson of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and, in that capacity, second Vice- Chairperson of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB);

    • José Manuel Campa, Chairperson of the European Banking Authority (EBA);

    • Petra Hielkema, Chairperson of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority(EIOPA).

    The discussion focused on the institutions’ experience throughout the previous year, including the Authorities’ role in rulemaking, supervision and coordination, as well as on the institutions’ expectations regarding their future development and key challenges in the context of their respective budgetary and resource needs.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – A10-0012/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024

    (2024/2081(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

    – having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

    – having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

    – having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

    – having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

    – having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

    – having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

    – having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

    – having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

    – having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

    – having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

    – having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

    – having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

    – having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

    – having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

    – having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

    – having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

    – having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

    – having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

    – having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

    – having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

    – having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

    – having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006[1],

    – having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

    – having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

    – having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe[3],

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

    – having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

    – having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

    – having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

    – having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

    – having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

    – having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

    – having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

    – having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

    – having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

    – having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

    – having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

    – having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[4],

    – having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

    – having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

    – having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

    – having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU[5],

    – having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy[6],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy[7],

    – having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)[8],

    – having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023[9], and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

    – having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    C. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    D. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    E. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    F. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    G. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    H. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    I. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    J. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    K. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    L. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    M. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    N. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    O. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    P. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to RSF, 47 journalists and media workers have been killed, most of them in conflict zones, and 573 have been imprisoned since 1 January 2024;

    Q. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    R. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    S. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and  ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil;

    5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative[10] as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of  Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    17. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    18. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    19. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation;

    20. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk, for instance streamlining visa procedures and promoting harmonisation in the EU’s visa application process;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    21. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012); supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    22. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    23. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    24. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    25. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    26. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    27. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    29. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    30. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    31. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    32. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to urge countries to release political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    33. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    34. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    35. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    36. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    37. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    38. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    39. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    40. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    41. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    42. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    43. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    44. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    45. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU[11], including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    46. Reaffirms that no agreement with a non-EU country designated as a transit country should be concluded without Parliament’s scrutiny, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to include robust human rights clauses, monitoring mechanisms and impact assessments therein; reiterates its call on the Commission to integrate ex ante human rights impact assessments into such agreements;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    47. Deplores the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for  the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    48. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    49. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    50. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    51. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    52. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    53. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    54. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; notes the number of journalists killed in conflict situations in 2023, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, has increased alarmingly – by 85 % – since 2022;

    55. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    56. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; urges the EU to help make reliable news sources available to more people living in countries that restrict press freedom;

    57. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    58. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    59. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    60. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    61. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by articifical intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    62. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market[12] and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    63. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    64. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry[13]; condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    65. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    66. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    67. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

    °

    ° °

    68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Each year, the European Parliament adopts three annual reports on the EU’s foreign, security and defence, and human rights policies.

     

    The three reports are on:

     

    • the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the AFET Committee,

    • Human Rights and Democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (based on the EU Annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World) – competence of the DROI Subcommittee, and

    • the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the SEDE Subcommittee.

     

    These reports monitor and assess the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the EU policy on Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy. They are a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU foreign policy making, most notably in regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is essential that the European Parliament responds to the annual reports issued by other institutions as soon as they are published.

    ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Partnership for Democracy/International Dalit Solidarity Network

    Clean Clothes Campaign

    Protection International

    Race & Equality

    FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights

    International Partnership for Human Rights

    Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

    Front Line Defenders

    Save the Children

    Avocats Sans Frontières

    Center for Reproductive Rights

    Reporters without Borders

    End FGM European Network

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do ), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

     

    COUNTRY

     

    Individual

    BACKGROUND

    ACTION TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

    AFGHANISTAN

     

    Manizha Seddiqi Ahmad Fahim Azimi

    Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee  Ezatullah Zwab

    Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab are human rights defenders who have been detained in Afghanistan.

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, including Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab;

     

    – Calls for victims of violence against women and girls to be released from prison, where they are being held in inhumane conditions to the detriment of their mental and physical health.

     

    ALGERIA

     

    Boualem Sansal

    French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal was detained on 16 November 2024 by the Algerian authorities, his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel; he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, and he is awaiting trial.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

     

    – Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

     

    – Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Ulvi Hasanli Sevinj Vagifgizi

    Nargiz Absalamova

    Hafiz Babali,

    Elnara Gasimova Aziz Orujov

    Rufat Muradli

    Avaz Zeynalli

    Elnur Shukurov

    Alasgar Mammadli

    Farid Ismayilov

     

    Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life.

     

    Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; he is facing up to 12 years in prison.

     

    Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev are political prisoners, and Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov are human rights defenders and journalists.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Political prisoner and 2024 Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest; the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his health condition is critical, requiring hospitalisation and urgent heart surgery.

     

    Civil society leader Anar Mammadli has been in pre-trial detention since April 2024 on bogus charges, with his health deteriorating due to denied healthcare.

     

    In early December 2024, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested MeydanTV journalists Aynur Ganbarova, Aytaj Ahmadova, Khayala Agayeva, Natig Javadli and Aysel Umudova, and journalists Ramin Jabrayilzade and Ahmad Mukhtar; they also arrested Baku Journalism School deputy director Ulvi Tahirov, political leader Azer Gasimli and human rights defender Rufat Safarov; all face unfounded, politically motivated charges.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately end the crackdown on all dissident groups and unconditionally release and drop all charges against human rights defenders, journalists and political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated, politically motivated charges;

     

    – Demands that the authorities immediately lift the travel ban on Ibadoghlu, unconditionally drop all charges against him and allow him to receive urgent treatment abroad; deplores the fact that Ibadoghlu was not allowed to attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony or connect remotely;

     

    – Calls on Azerbaijan to lift undue restrictions on independent media by aligning its laws on the registration and funding of non-governmental groups and media with Venice Commission recommendations; demands that the authorities end the repression of MeydanTV, ToplumTV, Abaz Media and Kanal13;

     

    – Calls for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including Fuad Alasgarov, Vilayat Eyvazov and Ali Naghiyev.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Marina Adamovich, Mikalai Statkevich  Tatsiana Seviarynets, Pavel Seviarynets Daria Losik

    Ihar Losik

    Mikalai Kazlou

    Ryhor Kastusiou Mikalai Statkevich Pavel Seviarynets

    Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich (political prisoner), Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets (political prisoner), and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik (political prisoner), have suffered interrogations and detentions by the KGB. 

     

    Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, all political prisoners, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour.

    In its resolution of 14 December 2023, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;

     

    – Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1 400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Mikola Statkevich

    Ales Bialiatski

    Maria Kalesnikava Siarhei Tsikhanouski Viktar Babaryka Maksim Znak

    Pavel Sevyarynets Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk

    Andrzej Poczobut  Ihar Losik

    Former presidential candidate and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikola Statkevich has been imprisoned on politically motivated charges for 14 years; he is kept in solitary confinement under maximum security; his health is deteriorating and his lawyers and family have been denied information and contact for over 300 days.

     

    Prominent Belarusian political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Pavel Sevyarynets, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik, have been subjected to similar isolation.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate, unconditional release of Mikola Statkevich and all 1 500 political prisoners; calls for the withdrawal of all charges against them, their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damage suffered as a result of being deprived of liberty;

     

    – Insists that the prisoners must receive proper medical assistance and access to lawyers, family, diplomats and international organisations, which can assess their condition and provide aid; regrets the inaction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Belarus;

     

    – Strongly condemns the unjustified, politically motivated sentences and continued repression of Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, clergy, political activists and their family members.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ding Yuande

    Ma Ruimei

     

    On 12 May 2023 Falun Gong practitioners Mr Ding Yuande and his wife Ms Ma Ruimei were arrested without a warrant; Ms Ma was released on bail, but was then intimidated by police because of a rescue campaign launched by their son abroad.

     

    Mr Ding was detained with no family visits for eight months; on 15 December 2023 he was sentenced to three years in prison with a CNY 15 000 fine.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly urges the PRC to immediately end the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Mr Ding and all Falun Gong practitioners in China;

     

    – Calls for the PRC to end domestic and transnational surveillance and control and the suppression of religious freedom; urges the PRC to abide by its obligations under international law and its own constitution to respect and protect human rights.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ilham Tohti

    Gulshan Abbas

    In 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize. Gulshan Abbas has been serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC.

     

     

    Gulshan Abbas, is a Uyghur retired doctor, who was forcibly disappeared in retaliation of her sisters public criticism of the treatment of Uyghurs. She has received a 20-year sentence in 2020, for participating in a terrorist organisation.

     

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;

     

    – Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;

     

    – Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

     

    – Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations.

     

    CUBA

     

    José Daniel Ferrer Garcia

     

    Human rights defender and opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer García was detained on 11 July 2021 in the context of widespread protests in Cuba, and has been held in isolation since 14 August 2021; the Cuban regime has imprisoned, harassed and intimidated him for over a decade for his peaceful political activism; since March 2023, he has been held incommunicado and his family have received no information about his health and have been denied the right to visit him.

    In its resolution of 19 September 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – The Cuban regime holds political prisoners in the most appalling conditions; whereas reports indicate that José Daniel Ferrer is in a critical condition and has been held without access to medical treatment, with inadequate food and in unsanitary conditions, which constitute forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment;

     

    – The human rights situation in Cuba is alarming, particularly for dissidents, who are subjected to worrying levels of surveillance and arbitrary detention; whereas the number of political prisoners is unknown but reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand prisoners, including minors; whereas among the many political prisoners are Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Lizandra Gongora, whose health condition is critical;

     

    – Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release José Daniel Ferrer and all persons politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

     

    – Condemns the torture and inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban authorities against José Daniel Ferrer and the other political prisoners; calls for the families of victims of the regime’s persecution to be granted immediate access to them, pending their release, and for the victims to be given medical care.

     

    CRIMEA

    Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

    Crimean journalist and human rights defender Iryna Danylovych was abducted in 2022, accused of possessing explosives and sentenced to 6 years and 11 months of imprisonment; NGO activist Tofik Abdulhaziiev was arrested in 2019 and sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security prison on trumped-up charges, and since 2023 is being held in a prison some 2 700 km away from Crimea; citizen journalist Amet Suleymanov was sentenced to 12 years of prison in 2021.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns Russia’s continuous targeting of ethnic Ukrainians and systematic persecution of indigenous Crimean Tatars, which aims to erase their identity, heritage and culture, echoing, for the Crimean Tatars, the genocidal deportations of 1944; considers that Crimea’s future is tied to its recognition as the Crimean Tatars’ historic homeland;

     

    – Condemns the persecution of journalists, civil society activists and human rights defenders and the deportation of civilians including political prisoners from Crimea to penitentiary institutions across Russia, contrary to international law;

     

    – Demands the immediate and unconditional release of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov and other political prisoners; calls for immediate medical care to be provided; denounces the upholding of verdicts against seriously ill individuals, which constitutes a blatant violation of international human rights standards; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN to establish the whereabouts of civilian detainees from Crimea.

     

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

     

    Jean-Jacques Wondo

    Jean-Jacques Wondo, a Belgian-Congolese security, military and political expert, was arrested following a failed coup on 19 May 2024, for which he was accused of being the ‘intellectual perpetrator’, on 13 September 2024, Wondo and 36 others were sentenced to death by a military court.

     

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the sentencing to death of Wondo and others and the grave violations of their right to a fair trial;

     

    – Urges the DRC Government to immediately overturn the death sentences, reinstate a moratorium on executions and take steps towards the full abolition of the death penalty;

     

    –  Expresses deep concern about Wondo’s deteriorating health, calls for him to be given immediate access to medical treatment and insists on his immediate release;

     

    – Calls for systemic reforms to be implemented in the DRC to rebuild the judiciary into an independent, fair and efficient institution that guarantees due process and the protection of fundamental rights.

     

    GREECE

     

    George Karaivaz

    George Karaivaz was a journalist who have been murdered on 9 April 2021.

    In its resolution of 7 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Is deeply concerned by the failure of law enforcement and the judicial authorities in Greece to make progress in the investigation into the murder of the Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021; notes that two suspects were arrested in April 2023, but otherwise there has not been any discernible activity in the police investigation; strongly urges the authorities to take all the necessary steps towards conducting a thorough and effective investigation, and to bring those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; urges the authorities to request assistance from Europol.

     

    HONG KONG

     

    Andy Li

    Joseph John

    Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities.

     

    Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists.

     

    HONG KONG/ CHINA

     

    Jimmy Lai

    Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; his trial started in 2023 after various delays; he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him. Jimmy Lai a British national since 1996, is a Hong Kong media tycoon, and a known pro- democracy supporter.  Political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison.

     

    45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

     

    In its resolution of 28 November 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau.

     

    IRAN

     

    Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi

    Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

     

    – Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

     

    – Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates.

     

    KYRGYZSTAN

     

    Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Temirlan Sultanbekov is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party (SDK), he and other party officials have been arrested for vote-buying allegations, with an audiotape of unknown origin serving as the primary evidence, for which the judicial authorisation is unclear and its connection with the detainees unknown.

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to immediately release Mr Sultanbekov and other party officials and adopt alternative measures to detention, while respecting their right to due process in line with the civil and political rights guaranteed under the Kyrgyz constitution and international obligations; calls on the authorities to ensure his safety and well-being;

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz government to halt its campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, independent media outlets and journalists; is concerned by the adoption of the Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to drop all charges against human rights defenders, including Makhabat Tazhibek Kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov and Ayke Beishekeeva, journalists from the Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese channels.

     

    RUSSIA

     

    Alexei Navalny

    Vladimir Kara-Murza

    Yuri Dmitriev

    Ilya Yashin

    Alexei Gorinov

    Lilia Chanysheva Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin

    Daniel Kholodny Vadim Kobzev

    Igor Sergunin

    Alexei Liptser Viktoria Petrova Maria Ponomarenko Alexandra Skochilenko

    Svetlana Petriychuk Evgenia Berkovich Dmitry Ivanov

    Ioann Kurmoyarov Igor Baryshnikov Dmitry Talantov Alexei Moskalev

    Oleg Orlov

    Boris Kagarlitsky

    Ivan Safronov

     

    Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence. He had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns.

     

    Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Liptser, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov are political prisoners.

     

    In its resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

     

    – Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons.

    TAJIKISTAN

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati Daler Imomali Zavqibek Saidamini Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva Khushruz Jumayev Khurshed Fozilov

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov Buzurgmehr Yorov

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati, Daler Imomali, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khushruz Jumayev and Khurshed Fozilov are journalists who have been sentenced to between seven and over 20 years in prison in retaliation for their coverage of social issues and human rights abuses, including in GBAO.

     

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov  are human rights lawyers who have been detained.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites, including the online media outlets Pamir Daily News, New Tajikistan 2 and Akhbor.com;

     

    – Condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them, stop the persecution of lawyers defending government critics and release human rights lawyers Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov;

     

    – Urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.

     

    TÜRKIYE

     

    Bülent Mumay

    Bülent Mumay is a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed.

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists, as well as political opponents, human rights defenders, civil servants and academics;

     

    –  Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism.

     

    VENEZUELA

     

    Rocío San Miguel

    General Hernández Da Costa 

    Ronald Ojeda

    María Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo Lopez Emil Brandt

     

    Rocío San Miguel is a lawyer and human rights activist with Spanish nationality, who got kidnapped by the Venezuelan regime on 9 February 2024, and sentenced on politically motivated grounds of suspected conspiracy against Nicolás Maduro and his regime; she is currently being detained in El Helicoide prison, which is known for human rights abuses, including torture.

     

    Hernández Da Costa has been a political prisoner since August 2018; on 19 February 2024, he was forcibly transferred to El Rodeo 1 prison, designed to detain political prisoners; an unknown number of prisoners, including some EU citizens, were also transferred; the general suffers from medical ailments that require constant treatment, which he is being denied.

     

    Ronald Ojeda was a former political prisoner who escaped the Maduro regime, and got murdered in Chile.

     

    Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro, Guillermo Lopez and Emil Brandt are four campaign coordinators working for the opposition to the regime’s presidential candidate, and have been detained on political grounds.

     

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, and the full restoration of their rights; exhorts the regime to cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

     

    – Strongly condemns the Maduro regime for imprisoning hundreds of political prisoners;

     

    – Calls on the international community to support a return to democracy in Venezuela, particularly in the light of the upcoming elections, in which the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, must be allowed to fully participate.

    VENEZUELA

     

    Maria Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo López

    Maria Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35 % of the votes in the primary elections. She got a disqualification of 15 years.

     

    For several months, members of María Corina Machado’s campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;

     

    – Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office;

     

    – Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians.

     

     

     

     

    ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

     

    Year of Sakharov Prize award

    Name and surname

    Laureate / Finalist

    Country

    Situation (Detention / house arrest / temporarily released)

    Length of prison sentence

    Start date of detention

    2024

    Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Finalist

    Azerbaijan

    Under travel ban

     

    A court rejected Ibadoglu’s appeal against the travel ban on 3/12/2024

    2021

    Alexei Navalny

    Laureate

     

    Russia

    Deceased in prison on 16/2/2024

     

    3,5 + 9 + 19 years

    Last detained 17/2/21, last sentenced 4/8/23

    2020

    Siarhei Tsikhanouski

     

    Maryia Kalesnikava

     

    Mikola Statkevich

     

     

    Ales Bialiatski

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

     

    Laureate

    Belarus

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

     

    Detention

    18 years

     

    11 years

     

    14 years

     

     

    10 years

     

    Detained 29/5/20, sentenced 14/12/21

    Detained 07/9/20, sentenced 06/9/21

    Last detained 31/5/20, last sentenced 14/12/21

    Last detained 15/7/21, last sentenced 03/03/23

    2020

    Porfirio Sorto Cedillo, José Avelino Cedillo, Orbin Naún Hernández, Kevin Alejandro Romero, Arnold Javier Aleman, Ever Alexander Cedillo, Daniel Marquez and Jeremías Martínez Díaz

    Finalists

    Honduras

    Detention

    Unknown

    1/9/2019, released on 24/2/2022, after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Honduras

    2019

    Ilham Tohti

    Laureate

    China

    Detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2014

    2018

    Nasser Zefzafi

     

    Finalist

    Morocco

    Detention

    20 years

    5/4/2019

    2017

    Dawit Isaak

    Finalist

    Eritrea

    Incommunicado detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2001

    2015

    Raif Badawi

    Laureate

    Saudi Arabia

    Released on 11/3/2022, since then under a 10-year travel ban

     

    10 years

    First sentenced on 17/12/2012, but announced on 30/3/2013

    2012

    Nasrin Sotoudeh

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Jafar Panahi

    Laureate

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Laureate

    Iran

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Iran

    Detention, on temporary medical furlough since July 2021, arrested again 29/10/2023 and released 15/11/2023

     

    Detained in 2022,

    released on 3/2/2023 after hunger strike

    38 years

     

     

     

     

     

     

    6 years

    6/3/2019 (most recent)

     

     

     

     

     

    compelled in July 2022 to serve a 10-years old prison sentence

    2011

    Razan Zaitouneh

    Laureate

    Syria

    Kidnapped in 2013. Presumptions of detention and death.

     

    9/12/2013

    2009

    Memorial – Oleg Orlov

    Laureate

     

     

    Russia

    Released on 1/8/2024 as part of a prisoner exchange with the US and Germany

    2.5 years

    Latest sentence in February 2024. Memorial as legal entity liquidated in January 2022.

     

     

    ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

    List of resolutions adopted by the European Parliament from December 2023 to January 2025 and related directly or indirectly to human rights violations in the world

     

     

    Country/Region

    Date of adoption in plenary

     

    Title

    Africa

     

     

    Algeria

    23.01.2025

    The case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Democratic Republic of the Congo

    23.01.2025

    The case of Jean-Jacques Wondo

     

    Gambia

     

    25.04.2024

    On the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia

    Nigeria

    08.02.2024

    On the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria

    Sudan

    18.01.2024

    On the threat of famine following the spread of the conflict in Sudan

    Tanzania

    14.12.2023

    On the Maasai Communities in Tanzania

    Americas

     

     

    Cuba

    29.02.2024

    On the critical situation in Cuba

    Cuba

    19.09.2024

    The case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba

    Guatemala

    14.12.2023

    On the attempt at a coup d’état in Guatemala

    Venezuela

    08.02.2024

    On further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado

     

    Venezuela

     

    14.03.2024

    On the case of Rocío San Miguel and General Hernández Da Costa, among other political prisoners in Venezuela

    Venezuela

    19.09.2024

    Situation on Venezuela

    Venezuela

    23.01.2025

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Asia

     

     

     

    Afghanistan

     

     

    14.03.2024

    On the repressive environment in Afghanistan, including public executions and violence against women

    Afghanistan

    19.09.2024

    The deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan due to the recent adoption of the law on the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”

     

    Azerbaijan

     

    25.04.2024

    On Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Azerbaijan

    19.12.2024

    Continued repression of civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Cambodia

    28.11.2024

    The shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL

     

    China

     

    18.01.2024

    On the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong in China, notably the case of Mr Ding Yuande

    China

     

    10.10.2024

    The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas

    China/ Taiwan

    24.10.2024

    Misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

     

    Hong Kong

     

    25.04.2024

    On the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John

    Hong Kong/ China

     

    28.11.2024

    Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law

    Kyrgyzstan

    19.12.2024

    Human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Tajikistan

    18.01.2024

    On Tajikistan: state repression against the independent media

     

    Tibet

     

    14.12.2023

    On the abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet

    Middle East

     

     

     

    Iran/Israel

     

    25.04.2024

    On Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response

     

    Iran

     

    08.02.2024

    On the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou

    Iran

    28.11.2024

    The increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran

    Iran

    23.01.2025

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran

    Iraq

    10.10.2024

    Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law

     

    Palestine

     

    18.01.2024

    On the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation

     

    Palestine

     

    14.03.2024

    On the immediate risk of mass starvation in Gaza and the attacks on humanitarian aid deliveries

    Europe and Eastern Partnership countries

     

     

     

    Azerbaijan/Armenia

     

    13.03.2024

    On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia

    Azerbaijan/ Armenia

    24.10.2024

    Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

     

    Belarus

     

    14.12.2023

    On the unknown status of Mikola Statkevich and the recent attacks on Belarusian politicians’ and activists’ family members

     

    Belarus

     

    08.02.2024

    on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members

    Belarus

    19.09.2024

    The severe situation of political prisoners in Belarus

    Belarus

    22.01.2025

    Actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus

    Crimea

    19.12.2024

    11th year of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the deteriorating human rights situation in occupied Crimea, notably the cases of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

     

    Georgia

     

    25.04.2024

    On attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society

    Georgia

    09.10.2024

    The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    Georgia

    28.11.2024

    Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

    Greece

    07.02.2024

    On the rule of law and media freedom in Greece

     

    Hungary

     

    24.04.2024

    On ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications

    Hungary

    18.01.2024

    On the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds

    Moldova

    09.10.2024

    Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

     

    Russia

     

    29.02.2024

    On the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia

     

    Russia

     

    08.02.2024

    On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

     

     

    Russia

     

     

    25.04.2024

    On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

     

    Russia

     

    25.04.2024

    On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

    Russia

     

    14.11.2024

    EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

    Russia

     

    23.01.2025

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Russia/ North Korea

    28.11.2024

    Reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

    Serbia

    08.02.2024

    On the situation in Serbia following the elections

     

    Slovakia

     

    17.01.2024

    On the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications for the rule of law

    Türkiye

    10.10.2024

    European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye

    Cross-cutting issues

     

     

    Children liberty

    13.12.2023

    On the situation of children deprived of liberty in the world

     

    LGBTIQ rights

     

    08.02.2024

    On the implementation of the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025

     

     

    Protection of journalists

     

     

    27.02.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings

     

    Human rights and democracy

     

    28.02.2024

    Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023

    Foreign and security policy

    28.02.2024

    Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023

     

     

    Media freedom

     

     

    13.03.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market

     

     

    Forced labour

     

     

    23.04.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market

    Right of abortion

    11.04.2024

    On including the right to abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter

     

     

    Due diligence

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive

     

    Fundamental rights

     

    18.01.2024

    On the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023

    Hate speech

    18.01.2024

    On extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime

     

     

    Business and human rights

     

     

    18.01.2024

    On shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims

    Freedom of scientific research

    17.01.2024

    On promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU

    Citizens, equality, rights and values

    16.01.2024

    On the implementation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 2021-2027

     

     

    Violence against women

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence

     

    Human beings traffic

     

    23.04.2024

    On preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Export credit agencies / development finance institutions and their role in lithium mining projects in Argentina – E-003069/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is supporting the sustainable development of critical raw material value chains, aligned with its commitment to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

    The EU-Argentina memorandum of understanding[1] and roadmap of activities aim to advance sustainable critical raw materials (CRM) value chains by emphasising environmental, social and governance standards.

    Additionally, the Commission promotes civil society engagement and transparency through initiatives such as the Responsible Business Conduct[2] in Latin America and the Caribbean programme.

    The Commission has also launched a project[3] that will utilise Copernicus data to monitor environmental implications of lithium operations in salt flats.

    A working group on CRM has been established, bringing together companies, financial institutions, and Member States. A pipeline of projects with EU interest is being developed.

    The selection criteria for such projects include sustainability. Environmental and socially adverse impacts need to be minimised and prevented, and human and indigenous people’s rights need to be respected. No funding agreements have been signed yet.

    The Commission is finalising a study aimed at gathering first-hand information on civil society’s needs in Argentina’s lithium-mining regions.

    This assessment will guide further EU engagement and support EU investments in Argentina’s critical raw materials sector, ensuring they respect ecosystems, local rights, and the well-being of local communities and indigenous people.

    Finally, financing institutions funding projects are subject to due diligence in line with international and EU standards.

    • [1] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/memorandum-understanding-eu-argentina-sustainable-raw-materials_en
    • [2] https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/wg-business/joint-project-responsible-business-conduct-latin-america-and-caribbean
    • [3] https://www.copernicuslac-chile.eu/en/noticia/chile-european-union-launch-monitoring-system-andean-salt-flats-south-america/

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Report by Adega (Association for the Environmental Defence of Galicia): lapsed application to Augas de Galicia for a water permit for a large-scale cellulose plant by Altri – E-000768/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000768/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Ana Miranda Paz (Verts/ALE)

    Following a press leak indicating that the Galician Government had received a positive report from the technicians of the public water company, Augas de Galicia, regarding the establishment of a large-scale celullose plant by Altri in Palas de Rei, the Association for the Environmental Defence of Galicia (Adega) published valuable information showing that such an assessment and authorisation could not take place, as neither the deadline nor the procedural requirements were met.

    Adega cites Article 116(5) of the Regulation on Public Water Resources (RDPH), which lays down a maximum period of 18 months for the competent authority to reach a decision on an application for a water permit. Adega therefore calls on Augas de Galicia to reject the application and to close the case on the grounds that it is out of time and form.

    There have been procedural shortcomings regarding the waer permit (E-001704/2024), a boycotting of the debate in the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament at the request of the Galician Government (E-000604/2025), leaks by vested interests in order to promote the project…

    In light of the above:

    Will the Commission take an interest in the irregular procedure that the Galician government is set to follow in an attempt to establish Altri’s large-scale cellulose plant, which would breach EU regulations if the project goes ahead?

    Submitted: 19.2.2025

    Last updated: 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the assessment of the implementation of Horizon Europe in view of its interim evaluation and recommendations for the 10th Research Framework Programme – A10-0021/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the assessment of the implementation of Horizon Europe in view of its interim evaluation and recommendations for the 10th Research Framework Programme

    (2024/2109(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 179 to 188 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[1],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013[2],

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 of 10 May 2021 establishing the Specific Programme implementing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, and repealing Decision 2013/743/EU[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/819 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 on the European Institute of Innovation and Technology[4],

    – having regard to Decision (EU) 2021/820 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 on the Strategic Innovation Agenda of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) 2021-2027: Boosting the Innovation Talent and Capacity of Europe and repealing Decision No 1312/2013/EU[5],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[6],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[7],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 entitled ‘A new ERA for Research and Innovation’ (COM(2020)0628),

    _ having regard to the Commission communication of 22 October 2024 entitled ‘Implementation of the European Research Area (ERA) – Strengthening Europe’s Research and Innovation: The ERA’s Journey and Future Directions’ (COM(2024)0490),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2021 on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation Europe’s strategy for international cooperation in a changing world (COM(2021)0252),

    – having regard to its resolution of 6 April 2022 on a global approach to research and innovation: Europe’s strategy for international cooperation in a changing world[8],

    – having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the European Innovation Council[9],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 July 2023 entitled ‘EU Missions two years on: assessment of progress and way forward’ (COM(2023)0457),

    – having regard to its resolution of 14 December 2023 on young researchers[10],

    – having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 with recommendations to the Commission on promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU[11],

    – having regard to the European Research and Innovation Area Committee Opinion of 26 June 2024 on Guidance for the next Framework Programme for Research & Innovation,

    – having regard to the partnership evaluation reports published in 2024 on eight of the nine Knowledge and Innovation Communities, namely EIT Urban Mobility, EIT Climate-KIC, EIT Food, EIT InnoEnergy, EIT Health, EIT Manufacturing, EIT Raw Materials, and EIT Digital,

    – having regard to the Report of the CERIS Expert Group of November 2024 entitled ‘Building resilience in the civil security domain based on research and technology’,

    – having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 09/2022 of September 2022 entitled ‘Climate spending in the 2014-2020 EU budget– Not as high as reported’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 January 2016 entitled ‘On the Response to the Report of the High Level Expert Group on the Ex Post Evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme’(COM(2016)0005),

    – having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    – having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to the report by the Commission Expert Group on the Interim Evaluation of Horizon Europe of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Align, Act, Accelerate: Research, Technology and Innovation to boost European Competitiveness,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0021/2025),

    A. whereas Horizon Europe (HEU) is the EU’s largest centrally managed funding programme and the largest publicly funded research and development (R&D) programme in the world; whereas Parliament initially proposed a budget of EUR 120 billion rather than the EUR 93.4 billion left after the revision of the multiannual financial framework;

    B. whereas investments in R&D are essential for EU competitiveness, societal progress and innovation; whereas the report on the Future of European Competitiveness (the Draghi report) and the report by the Commission Expert Group on the Interim Evaluation of Horizon Europe (the Heitor report) recommended a budget for the 10th Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (FP10) of EUR 200 billion and EUR 220 billion respectively;

    C. whereas the FP must be founded on European values, scientific independence, freedom and excellence, as well as on high European ethical standards and a drive to improve European competitiveness as well as to address societal challenges;

    D. whereas the Draghi report showed that Europe is a world leader in science and innovation with the second highest share of high quality scientific publications and the third highest share of patent applications globally; whereas the Draghi report also concluded that the value chain that goes from research to innovative products that improve citizens’ lives in the EU is less effective compared to the US and China in translating good research into successful businesses providing quality jobs, new products and services to European citizens, as illustrated by the persistent gap between the US and EU in innovation performance, and the closing gap between the EU and China; whereas the Draghi report highlights that Europe lags particularly when it comes to the scaling up of start-ups;

    E. whereas Commissioner Zaharieva, in her hearing with Parliament, committed to fighting for an independent and simplified FP and expressed her support for an increased budget and more expert-driven governance;

    F. whereas the Heitor report outlines that in the first three years of Horizon Europe, 7 474 SMEs (34 % of all participants) were participating in the programme and that more than half of Horizon Europe SMEs are new to EU research, development and innovation programmes; whereas the success rates of SME applications has strongly improved (up to 19.9 % from 12 % in Horizon 2020);

    G. whereas the Letta report proposes the establishment of a ‘fifth freedom’ to encompass research, innovation and education as a new dimension of the single market, as the four original freedoms are fundamentally based on 20th-century theoretical principals;

    H. whereas the Letta report’s ‘freedom to stay’ reiterates the importance of avoiding internal brain drain, and the Heitor report’s ‘Choose Europe’ initiative sets out to foster research careers and turn the current European brain drain into a ‘brain gain’ by 2035;

    General observations on Horizon Europe and Research and Innovation (R&I)

    1 Recalls that we are at a crucial moment for R&I, and that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Europe needs to put ‘research and innovation at the heart of our economy’ during the presentation to Parliament of her programme for her second term as president of the European Commission in July 2024;

    2. Notes that the Draghi, Letta and Heitor reports consider R&I to be of central importance to achieving European competitiveness and stress the urgent need to act not to fall behind; stresses that a strong commitment is needed to achieve a future framework programme that constitutes a crucial contribution to the competitiveness of Europe and its overall welfare;

    3. Recalls that the Draghi and the Heitor reports are a wake-up call for Europe to face global competition and the significant rise of Chinese science in recent years; welcomes the higher success rate of HEU compared to Horizon 2020 (H2020); appreciates HEU’s responsiveness in crises, such as COVID-19 and geopolitical challenges, but regrets not only the lack of additional funding but also the continuous funding cuts, which compromise original priorities;

    4. Regrets that there have been negative experiences with the implementation of HEU because the shift from H2020 to HEU has mostly been experienced as an increase in complexity and bureaucracy; underlines that the success rates in some parts of the programme are still so low as to discourage potentially excellent applications, especially from researchers from research institutions with smaller budgets and SMEs; considers that strategic planning  should lead to more substantial benefits for the quality of the programming and a strengthened commitment of all R&I stakeholders, which so far do not seem to have materialised sufficiently; believes that FP10 should be built on instruments under Horizon Europe that have proven to be effective and efficient;

    5. Highlights the importance of an agile FP; notes that the Heitor report outlines the importance of responding to the fast-changing field of science and innovation and recommends a radical reform in engaging practitioners in the governance  of the  programme, notably through the two proposed new Councils as well as less prescriptive calls; recalls that the Draghi report notes that the current governance of the FP is slow and bureaucratic, that its organisation should be redesigned to be more outcome-based and evaluated by top experts and that the future FP should be governed by people with a proven track record at the frontier of research or innovation; notes that innovative ideas cannot always be predicted and programmed and underlines the need for sufficient funding that is not pre-programmed in order to tap the full potential of developing innovation;

    6. Highlights the importance of having an FP based on excellence in order to ensure the participation of the best researchers in Europe through the whole programme; argues that one of the critical weakness of the EU R&I policy landscape is also linked to the lack of a meaningful, integrated and complementary approach between place-based and excellence-driven R&I activities, in particular between the FP and the R&I window of the cohesion policy, which are of the same order of magnitude in terms of the EU budget; notes that the scale-up and commercialisation of research results remains a big challenge in Europe;

    7. Recalls the recommendation by the Heitor report to foster an attractive and inclusive European research, development and innovation ecosystem; recalls the recommendation by the Letta report to foster the development of a fifth freedom in the single market; recalls the observation of the Draghi report that the fragmentation of the EU innovation ecosystem is one of the root causes of Europe’s weak innovation performance; recalls that the Treaties situate the FP in the development of the European Research Area; is convinced that to maximise the impact of the framework programme, it needs to be embedded in a broader European research policy that ensures that Europe is an attractive location for research activities which attracts global talent, which effectively translates science into economic growth and societal progress, and which effectively addresses the innovation gap within the EU; considers that the upcoming European Research Area Act (ERA Act) should aim at achieving this Europe; recognises that there are still significant obstacles to ‘brain circulation’ among Member States, including the recognition of qualifications;

    8. Insists on the absolute need for that Member States to adopt concrete commitments to reach a target of 3 % of GDP spending on R&D by 2030; notes that the EU is investing significantly less than other global powers, and that it has failed to reach the 3 % target for more than two decades, investing 2.24 % of its GDP in R&D in 2022, for example, compared to 3.5 % in the US; underlines that each year the EU under invests in R&D worsens the situation and deepens the gap with third countries; specifies that major discrepancies exist between the R&D intensity of the 27 EU Member States, with five reaching the 3 % spending target, while some others are below 1 %; recalls that, at less than 7 % of the total[12], the EU budget’s contribution to R&D spending is a very minor share of the overall public spending on R&D in the EU; notes that national spending for research should not be cut in response to  the availability of EU research funding as alternative funding; highlights that a joint effort between European and national funding for research and innovation is needed; underlines as well the important role of private investment in research and innovation in order to complement public funding; regrets that European private investment in research, development and innovation is lagging behind that in China and the US, reaching 1.3 % of GDP in the EU, compared to 2.4 % in the US and 1.9 % in China; insists, therefore, on the vital role of EU intervention as a catalyst for R&D spending, and on the need for further coordination and alignment  between national and EU R&D spending;

    9. Insists on the vital role of long-term public funding to support excellent basic research, driven by scientific curiosity with the only aim of advancing scientific knowledge and without an obvious nor immediate benefit, sometimes characterised by serendipity;

    10. Highlights recital 72 of the Horizon Europe Regulation, which states that in order to guarantee scientific excellence, and in line with Article 13 of the Charter, the programme should promote the respect of academic freedom in all countries benefiting from its funds; underlines that while several incidents regarding academic freedom took place in several countries benefiting from Horizon Europe funds, the Commission has not used this recital effectively to address specific problems; welcomes the commitment by the Commissioner responsible for start-ups, research and innovation, in her hearing with Parliament, to propose a legislative proposal on the freedom of scientific research; calls on the Commission to present such a legislative proposal in line with Parliament’s resolution of 17 January 2024;

    11. Supports the high levels of climate spending in the first years of Horizon Europe; urges the Commission to stay on course to achieve the overall climate spending target of 35 % over the full lifetime of the programme;

    12. Highlights that Horizon Europe is on track to meet its climate spending targets without, according to the Horizon Europe Programme Guide, considering the Do No Significant Harm principle in the evaluation of proposals, unless it was relevant for the content of the call; underlines that there is no legal obligation or legal basis for the horizontal application of either the Do No Significant Harm principle or the Do No Harm principle; welcomes the commitment by the Commissioner responsible for start-ups, research and innovation, in her hearing with Parliament, to assess the current approach and the new approach to the application of the Do No Significant Harm principle, including the legal basis for its application, and to share the assessment with Parliament; urges the Commission to report to Parliament, before the start of FP10, on the impact of the use of Do No (Significant) Harm under Horizon Europe, including an estimate of the associated costs of its implementation for the Commission and beneficiaries, and its impact on the simplification of project applications;

    13. Considers that during the implementation of Horizon Europe, several major global events put thousands of researchers at risk, including in the EU’s neighbourhood, leading to significant spikes in applications by researchers at risk for an emergency placement in Europe; concludes, however, that under the current programme, the EU does not have sufficient funding available to support researchers at risk and that efforts by some Member States and NGOs are fragmented;

    14. Affirms the importance of international cooperation for the advancement of science; is concerned in this regard that international cooperation has declined under Horizon Europe compared to Horizon 2020; encourages the Commission to seek and conclude other association agreements with third countries, restates[13] and emphasises that Parliament’s ability to give meaningful consent to international agreements specifically concerning the participation of countries referred to in Article 16(1)d of the Horizon Europe Regulation in EU programmes is impeded where such agreements do not provide for a structure that guarantees parliamentary scrutiny under a consent procedure for association to a specific EU programme;

    15. Welcomes in particular the association of the UK and Switzerland to Horizon Europe as it recognises the fact that UK and Swiss science and innovation are an integral part of the European science and innovation ecosystem; restates its concern about the amended Protocol in 2023 and its provisions regarding the automatic rebate for the UK; emphasises that any international agreement on the association of Switzerland to EU programmes should fully respect the prerogative of Parliament to provide meaningful consent in line with its resolution on association agreements for the participation of third countries in Union programmes;

    16. Takes note of the Commission white paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential; considers that nearly all respondents to the public consultation on the white paper rejected option 3; emphasises that many respondents considered that the implications of options 1 and 2 were not clear enough to allow them to determine which option would be preferable; highlights that it is widely recognised that the current constellation requires improvement to ensure the efficient use of public funds and to boost Europe’s technological sovereignty; notes that Commissioner Zaharieva committed, in her hearing with Parliament, to continuing this evaluation, potentially through a new study to ensure the views expressed are representative of all stakeholders;

    17. Notes that significant advances have been made in the framework of Horizon Europe with gender equality plans (GEPs) as an eligibility criterion and the gender dimension in the content of R&I as an award criterion by default across the programme; recognises that recent analyses confirm that the GEP eligibility criterion has had a catalytic effect;

    Observations on competitiveness

    18. Is deeply convinced that EU spending on science, research and innovation is the best investment in our common European future and for increasing competitiveness and societal progress, and successfully closing the innovation gap; agrees with Mr Draghi that all public R&D spending in the EU should be better coordinated at EU level, meaning properly aligning investments with the EU’s strategic priorities, focusing on funding initiatives that achieve relevant impact and create added value, and that a reformed and strengthened FP is crucial to achieving this; underlines that, in order to ensure real added value, R&D spending should also be better coordinated at national level between Member States; reiterates that the reformed fiscal rules exclude national funds used to co-finance EU programmes, and calls for this possibility to be put to full use in order to boost EU research funding;

    19. Underlines the importance of standardisation activities to ensure that European companies can effectively capitalise on the competitive advantage from research and innovation;

    20. Underlines the significant role of research and innovation across different industrial sectors that contributes to creating jobs and increasing European competitiveness compared to third countries;

    21. Emphasises the importance of the European Innovation Council (EIC) for Europe’s competitiveness; highlights in this regard that investments under the EIC are bridging the ‘valley of death’ and lead to innovations of a disruptive nature that have breakthrough and scale-up potential; highlights also the unique proposition of the EIC Accelerator to provide tailor-made support for high-potential, non-bankable start-ups;

    22. Welcomes the fact that 44 % of the Horizon Europe budget to date has contributed to the digital and industrial transitions, most notably by stimulating cooperation for technology development, which are fundamental for European competitiveness;

    23. Strongly believes that, beyond their key role for long-term and sustainable competitiveness, applied research, development and innovation policies are instrumental to avoid, anticipate and cope with the main global and societal challenges;

    Observations on technical implementation

    24. Considers that administrative simplification stagnated under Horizon Europe given that 32 % of participants consider applying to Horizon Europe to be more burdensome than Horizon 2020, while nearly half of participants report no difference[14], is concerned about the ‘exploded cumulative transaction and administrative costs’[15]; notes that on average beneficiaries reported spending 6-10 % of their project budget on administrative costs, with 48 % reporting administrative costs of more than 10 %, including a 10 % share of beneficiaries reporting administrative costs of more than 20 %; deplores the fact that the time-to-grant under Horizon Europe is longer than it was under Horizon 2020, and that it exceeds the target of eight months set by the Commission[16]; insists on further administrative simplification, streamlining of the relevant procedures, cost cutting and a greater focus on applicants, and underlines that simplification must be for the benefit of the applicants, while ensuring that applications contain all the information needed for the evaluation of their excellence;

    25. Recalls that the first full version of the Annotated Model Grant Agreement for Horizon Europe was published only in May 2024, more than three years after the start of the programme; notes that without a full version of this document, beneficiaries are not fully informed of the legal and financial conditions associated with signing a Grant Agreement; recalls that the first version of the Annotated Model Grant Agreement for Horizon 2020 was published before the official start of the programme; notes that the apparent cause of the delayed publication is the corporate approach to Model Grant Agreements which the Commission took for EU programmes under the current multiannual financial framework;

    26. Notes that there are various opinions and experiences among different beneficiaries regarding the functionality of lump sums; recognises that some beneficiaries do not consider the introduction of lump-sum funding to be a simplification for them; underlines that the 2024 assessment of lump sum funding presents unclear data, which leaves important worries and questions unanswered, such as the uncertainty of the impact of an ex-post audit, while confirming other objections, such as the artificial increase of the number of work packages[17]; considers that this assessment confirms that lump-sum funding can be a simplification for some beneficiaries, but not for all[18];

    27. Considers that the simplification offered by lump-sum funding consists of removing all obligations on actual cost reporting by beneficiaries to the Commission and removing financial ex-post audits for projects; welcomes the fact that this results in a lower error rate; underlines, however, that the error rate is a tool to ensure proper spending of public funds and not a goal in itself; warns, in that context, against putting at risk the quality of the spending of a highly successful programme by ramping up the use of lump sums too quickly;

    28. Observes that the average size of consortia in Horizon Europe is significantly larger than in Horizon 2020[19]; considers that consortia foster collaboration and that bigger consortia contribute to broader, and potentially more diverse, collaboration; underlines, however, that managing bigger consortia also requires more time and effort both in the proposal preparation phase and in the project implementation phase, which takes away resources from performing research; considers, furthermore, that more complex consortia are less attractive to join for newcomers, given the complexity and the resources as well as the experience needed to manage them;

    29. Underlines the importance of an open and accessible programme with low thresholds for applying in order to ensure participation of newcomers as well as SMEs; underlines that more than half of SME participants in Horizon Europe are newcomers[20]; considers that administrative burdens, the time investments needed and the complexity of applications risk discouraging SMEs from participating in the programme[21]; notes that the simple, small and fast grants of the SME Instrument under H2020 were a magnet for newcomer SMEs[22];

    30. Considers that the Commission has not succeeded in creating agile but strong management of HEU, which has led to complex implementation; expects that the interim evaluation report should address shortages and possible solutions;

    Observations on Pillar 1

    31. Recognises the importance of Pillar 1 in promoting scientific excellence and attracting highly-skilled research, through the European Research Council (ERC), and programmes such as the Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions (MSCA);

    32. Welcomes the continued success of the ERC; underlines that its success is dependent on the independence of the Scientific Council; stresses that the last few years have shown that the presence of a capable and committed president of the Scientific Council with respected scientific credentials is essential for the functioning and independence of the ERC; notes that the bottom-up calls and independent governance of the ERC Scientific Council have proven highly effective;

    33. Highlights the ability of both the ERC and the MSCA to attract scientific talent to Europe; notes the valuable contribution of the MSCA to European scientific leadership; notes with worry the low success rates in the MSCA;

    34. Underlines that research projects funded under Pillar 1 should adhere to the principle of ‘high risk/high gain’; suggests clarifying evaluation criteria to strictly ensure the realisation of ‘high risk/high gain’ when evaluating research proposals; observes that ‘high risk’ also means employing new research methods;

    35. Emphasises that research infrastructures, in particular digital research infrastructures, provide a vital platform for researchers and innovators across disciplines and sectors to share data, methods and expertise, fostering the development and application of new technologies to strengthen Europe’s technological sovereignty; welcomes, particularly in this regard, the progress made on the European Open Science Cloud and the European Museums Cloud;

    Observations on Pillar 2

    36. Emphasises that collaborative research is at the heart of the European framework programmes; recognises the importance of Pillar 2, which serves as a vital strategic tool, fostering pan-European collaboration by pooling resources and knowledge, and aligning public and private R&I agendas; notes that collaboration would not occur without EU funding at a similar rate, highlighting the unique added value of EU collaboration programmes, in particular for enabling Europe to address complex societal challenges and integrate businesses into critical, continent-wide value chains; considers that Pillar 2 has fostered research collaboration and has in particular been able to support joint research and innovation agendas for technology maturation through the joint undertakings, which contributes to the competitiveness of the EU;

    37. Considers Pillar 2 a strategic tool for enabling pan-European collaboration and pooling of knowledge and resources, attracting private investments, and for bringing together public and private stakeholders across Europe to tackle complex societal challenges; believes it is important to continue support for these collaborations; acknowledges, however, the complexity of Pillar 2; believes that the implementation of this pillar remains too complex and should be improved, simplified and streamlined with a view to targeting results rather than solely addressing expenditure; notes that the number of instruments involved such as a multitude of partnerships, the complex, top-down administrative implementation of missions, and the many budgetary shifts have resulted in unnecessary complexity which discourages applicants, and especially newcomers, from participating; emphasises the importance of the accessibility of these instruments, particularly for SMEs from across all European regions, in order to enable participation for all excellent researchers and innovators as well as to foster the absorption capacities of companies; welcomes the announcement of the rebalancing in Pillar 2 towards a better equilibrium between the different types of R&I activities, from fundamental research to market-oriented innovation, as announced in the second strategic plan for Horizon Europe; notes in that context the conclusion in the European Research and Innovation Area Committee opinion on FP10 that the Cluster structure of Horizon Europe creates an unnecessary obstacle for participants looking for funding, in particular newcomers, as well as the conclusion of the Draghi report that ‘[t]he programme should consolidate the overall fragmented and heterogeneous activities’;

    Observations on Pillar 3

    38. Notes that scaling up and commercialising research outcomes remains Europe’s greatest challenge; recalls the decisive role of entrepreneurship, for instance in the commercial and economic exploitation of excellent applied research into breakthrough innovation;

    39. Highlights that the European Innovation Council is filling a widely recognised investment gap for scale-up finance for break-through innovations[23]; takes note of the very low success rate under the EIC and considers this a confirmation of the relevance of EIC funding as well as a worrying signal of underfunding of the programme; welcomes that fact that the EIC was completed as an instrument by the introduction of transition activities because these complete the innovator’s journey from early idea to scale-up by facilitating technology maturation and validation; underlines the quality and relevance of the advice provided by the EIC Board and recalls in this regard the importance of expert advice to guide the implementation of the framework programme;

    40. Considers that the EIC is a needed and excellent instrument in principle; agrees that streamlining and boosting the EIC, attracting private investments and supporting the commercialisation of research is at the core of Pillar 3, as confirmed by the Heitor report; regrets, however, that the Commission made some implementation decisions that led the EIC away from its intended purpose to help companies scale up; recognises that the EIC should have the flexibility to strategically maximise its potential to support breakthrough technology; firmly believes that the EIC can achieve its full potential if the legal and institutional setting of the programme is clarified and strengthened;

    41. Regrets that not all of Parliament’s recommendations set out in its resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the European Innovation Council have been implemented, most notably the recommendation that a thorough assessment be made of ways to improve the EIC’s implementation, considering as an option the establishment of an independent EU body under Article 187 TFEU as the main entity responsible for implementing the EIC; regrets, moreover, that its recommendation to ensure the implementation of both the equity and grant components with direct coordination between the two components has been ignored;

    42. Draws attention to the work of the programme managers in the EIC; strongly believes in the approach of strategic intelligence developed by experts with widely recognised expertise in the field to effective programming of strategic challenge-based calls; appreciates, in particular, the work done by programme managers to help projects find and realise added value by bringing together projects with a common interest;

    43. Notes the generally positive assessments (in particular in terms of EU added value) made by independent experts of the Knowledge and Innovation Communities; notes that EIT KICs contribute to strengthening links between higher education and business as well as to closing the ‘skills gap’, and that synergies should be explored with the academies introduced in recent EU legislation (e.g. Net Zero Industry Act, Critical Raw Materials Act, Cybersecurity Package); highlights, moreover, that the EIT regional innovation scheme (RIS) activities contribute to reducing the European innovation capacity divide; recalls that more synergies to bridge the innovation divide should be created between the EIT and other actions such as the EU preparatory action entitled ‘Innovation for place-based transformation’ and believes that the EIT KICs could improve synergies within the framework programme (in pillar 3 activities and between pillars), and establish concrete synergies between excellence-driven and place-based innovation, for instance via the implementation of successors of R&I activities led by the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, such as the Interregional Innovation Investments (I3) instrument;

    44. Regrets to conclude, however, that the relevance of the EIT as a programme is questioned by several stakeholders, including some of its biggest beneficiaries; underlines that in principle the concept of knowledge and innovation communities is appreciated by stakeholders as a useful instrument for effective innovation ecosystem development and integration; considers that the two main concerns raised are the financial self-sustainability requirement for KICs[24] and the central management by the EIT organisation which is too bureaucratic and burdensome, and which creates governance difficulties for the KICs[25]; concludes that for many stakeholders the financial and other costs, including the high burden of participating in a KIC, outweigh the benefits of the relatively little funding support relevant for them;

    45. Regrets that, although some efforts have already been made, synergies between the EIC, the EIT and the ERC are not sufficiently developed;

    Observations on Part 4

    46. Welcomes that participation of entities from widening countries has increased in HEU; acknowledges that the innovation divide persists, notwithstanding a slight decrease in the disparities in innovation performance across Europe, in spite of two decades of widening efforts; underlines, however, that the existence of this innovation gap in Europe has negative consequences for the EU as a whole given that it means available talent is left unused and economic disparities within the EU can be expected to grow; notes that this low participation can be partially explained by structural factors, including inadequate national public investment in R&D, which undermines the effectiveness of the national R&I systems, as reflected by low scores on the European Innovation Scoreboard; notes, furthermore, that there is a link between high levels of FP participation and high levels of national public investment in R&D; is strongly convinced that without national reforms, the innovation gap cannot be closed, regardless of the efforts made at European level, and refers to the European Court of Auditors Special Report 09/2022 on this matter; recognises that new and more effective mechanisms to increase widening are needed, but that financing for these actions should primarily come from the national level and be complemented by cohesion policy funds; calls on the Commission to ensure that the upcoming ERA Act lays down strong obligations for Member States to improve the functioning of their R&I system in order to eliminate subpar performance due to structural challenges;

    47. Underlines the importance of the Seal of Excellence under Horizon Europe; considers that the Seal in part mitigates the persistent issue of underfunding in Horizon Europe, which significantly hampers the ability to adequately support all high-quality proposals; acknowledges furthermore that the Seal can contribute to improving the relative participation of researchers from widening countries; emphasises, however, that the Seal cannot be considered as a substitute for direct financial support, particularly because the Seal is not a guarantee for funding;

    48. Notes that a thriving European innovation ecosystem requires strong and well-connected place-based innovation ecosystems and that a better connected European innovation ecosystem will be essential for enhancing the competitiveness of Europe, its resilience and strategic autonomy; recognises that collaboration among territorial ecosystems enables European regions to leverage their combined strengths to develop innovative solutions more efficiently; underlines that this collaboration also accelerates the commercialisation and scaling of technologies, bolstering the EU’s competitiveness also globally; recognises the vital role of public research organisations, including universities, as drivers of place-based innovation;

    Observations on missions and partnerships

    49. Highlights the science communication role of the missions and the need to strengthen this even further because this will bring research results closer to society and help address the challenge of distrust in R&I, while simultaneously helping gain societal approval for public investments in R&I; recalls that the Commission communication entitled ‘EU Missions two years on: assessment of progress and way forward’ did not constitute a positive assessment of the missions and concluded that missions had failed on core objectives such as crowding in external funding;

    50. Recalls the fundamental role of partnerships in bringing together the Commission and private and/or public partners, and is of the opinion that they must receive continuous support with a defined target and scope; emphasises that public-private partnership governance structures should be streamlined and simplified to avoid unnecessary burdens and enhance focus on key priorities; considers the joint undertakings as very useful instruments to foster better coordination and alignment of research agendas across the EU, as well as to foster co-investment in R&D between the public and private sectors; notes with regret that the Joint Undertakings have not yet resulted in increased R&D spending by European industry overall;

    Recommendations for the remaining part of Horizon Europe

    51. Notes that no significant changes in the implementation of the missions have taken place since the publication of the communication; concludes that the current approach to missions is not sufficiently oriented towards fostering creative novel and R&I ideas to address challenges; believes mission-oriented programming should have objectives that can be reached through R&I, should be implemented through open calls for bottom-up ideas to achieve the mission, and should be managed through a portfolio approach building on the experience of the EIC programme managers; considers that mission-oriented programming should first and foremost be a novel approach to research programming which puts more emphasis on bottom-up research ideas, which fosters interdisciplinarity and in particular creates space for synergies between Social Sciences, Humanities and the Arts (SSHA)-driven and technology-driven activities, to address problems; therefore calls on the Commission to pilot this approach in the remaining years of Horizon Europe by spending the majority of the funds allocated to the missions through openly formulated calls that invite proposals for R&I activities that can contribute to achieving a specific objective; encourages the Commission to consider whether it is appropriate to continue funding each mission under Horizon Europe and to find additional funding and support for the continuation of the missions in other parts of the EU budget and at national as well as regional level, where appropriate;

    52. Supports the proposal in the Heitor report to set up an experimental unit under Horizon Europe to experiment with new implementation methods and instruments in order to foster real simplification for participants and to develop a more agile implementation of the programme; urges the Commission to launch, from 2025, a task force to improve the efficacy of the European Semester, in line with the EU’s share towards the 3 % target, as clearly described in the Draghi and Heitor reports and reiterated by European leaders in the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal;

    53. Insists that the Commission should continue the use of lump-sum funding under HEU, and apply it to beneficiaries for which the assessments show it to be clearly experienced as a simplification, such as SMEs and projects for which there is solid evidence that it is a genuine simplification; underlines in that regard that the intended ramping up of the use of lump sums for the 2026-2027 work programme remains questionable given the existing worries and unknowns regarding the impact of lump sums with regard to the simplification they offer to some beneficiaries and their impact on the quality of the projects funded; calls on the Commission to take all necessary steps to ensure sound and efficient use of EU funds before increasing the share of the Horizon Europe budget spend through lump sums in the last years of Horizon Europe and to explore the further improvement of the system to ensure lump-sum funding leads to genuine simplification for beneficiaries; supports the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors to define the scope of ex-post controls for lump-sum grants;

    54. Supports the Heitor report’s urgent call to introduce a ‘Choose Europe’ co-funding line and to turn the current ‘European brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain’ by 2035, noting that this should be considered a major and unique opportunity for Europe in the current uncertain geopolitical context, in particular following the recent US election, and should therefore be implemented urgently from 2025;

    55. Calls on the Commission to restore EIC autonomy and agility without delay in order to get rid of existing complex processes that lead to lower implementation; believes the EIC transition activities should be open to proposals based on results from any FP project, regardless of which programme part funded that project;

    56. Urges the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, to rely on recital 72 of the Horizon Europe Regulation to enforce more respect for academic freedom in the EU as well as in associated countries, in particular to use it as a basis to openly and directly address blatant violations of academic freedom by national governments;

    57. Recommends that the use of the Do No (Significant) Harm principle should be accompanied by detailed guidance from the Commission on how compliance with the principle will be evaluated in the context of the specific call in which the principle is used;

    Recommendations for the 10th Research Framework Programme (FP10)

    58. Calls for FP10 to be a stand-alone EU programme, in the context of the upcoming discussion of the highly anticipated Competitiveness Fund, as announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her speech of 17 July 2024 in Strasbourg, dedicated to EU research and innovation excellence and strategic technology development, with a substantially higher budget appropriate  for achieving the 3 % GDP spending target and sufficient to fund  at least 75 % of the excellent[26] proposals submitted; recommends that FP10 focus on three core objectives:

    (a) creating a European competition of ideas, and a funnel to accelerate the development from fundamental science to innovation scale-up, providing support for blue-sky and basic research as well as strengthening the deployment and exploitation of innovative solutions,

    (b) supporting strategic research initiatives which require large-scale and European collaboration, as the programme’s ability to prioritise these initiatives will be of utmost importance for Europe’s ability to address the societal challenges it faces as well as for European industry and SMEs, including for technology maturation and fostering of European ecosystems, to address the competitiveness gap with our global competitors, focussing on the development of priority innovative advanced technologies and their translation into concrete applications of innovative products, processes and services,

    (c) advancing the ERA, including by addressing the innovation gap in Europe;

    59. Recommends that the Commission ensure user-oriented, science-led, effective and efficient implementation of the programme, including by:

    (a) implementing an improved governance, inspired by the findings of the Heitor expert group and the Draghi report, addressing the need to improve the programme’s agility, which should:

    i. be oriented towards facilitating the best science, technology development and innovation,

    ii. contribute to EU priorities on the terms of science and innovation,

    iii. be based on the principle of self-governance, through which recognised, independent specialists from the relevant field that act in the public interest can  advise on how research and innovation can best contribute to the achievement of the policy priorities set by policymakers; recommends, as part of implementing this principle, setting up new Councils in line with the Heitor report to deliver expert advice on the strategic priorities of the programme as well as on the formulation of call texts to ensure their quality,

    (b) including positions for programme managers for the EIC, comparable to programme managers at the American ARPA-style agencies, who are experts appointed from outside the Commission with a proven track record in the relevant field, appointed for a predefined period, as special advisers to the Commissioner responsible for research and innovation to ensure their seniority in the Commission, to manage strategic visionary portfolios of projects, fostering collaboration between projects where relevant across the whole programme for their mutual benefit and set out challenges based on strategic intelligence and with a view to fostering global leadership for Europe in specific areas of their field,

    (c) implementing a radical simplification in the administrative work related to the application for and management of FP10 projects, following the proposal of the Heitor report to trust first and check later for the application system as well as keeping the information requested in applications to an absolute minimum – no information which is not absolutely necessary for a good qualitative evaluation of the scientific or innovative quality of a proposal should be included in the proposal stage,

    (d) promoting synergies and coordinated programming and implementation with other programmes and sectoral policies in particular with the future new industrial policy and the next important projects of common European interest dealing with research, development and innovation at national and EU level;

    60. Recommends that the GEPs as eligibility criteria for funding should be maintained in FP10 in their current form as a permanent and integral element of EU research funding requirements;

    61. Recommends that the general objective on advancing the ERA should  lead to the development of an excellent, unified and well-functioning European Research Area that attracts  talent, integrates  newcomers in existing networks and provides access to world leading research and technology infrastructures while remaining open for excellent research proposals irrespective of the supporting research institution and supports joint early research programmes with national funders; underlines that the forthcoming ERA Act needs to ensure increased national investments, national reforms and the elimination of barriers to the free movement of knowledge, technology and researchers, to create the conditions for FP10 to support the achievement of a well-functioning ERA;

    62. Considers that the Research Infrastructures, COST and Teaming programmes should contribute to the achievement of this general objective; is convinced that FP10 should provide for an instrument for strategic investments in technology infrastructures; believes that the MSCA is a crucial instrument for achieving this objective as it facilitates the mobility across the EU and between sectors of the best and the brightest who are selected based on the excellence of their proposal; believes that, to further the integration of the ERA, participation of entities from areas with low research performance should be encouraged in the programme;

    63. Firmly believes that FP10 should include a newly established European fellowship programme for researchers at risk, incorporating the lessons learnt from the ongoing preparatory action, to achieve this general objective;

    64. Continues to support the knowledge triangle approach of the EIT to foster innovation in Europe; believes that a reformed and refocussed EIT should contribute to the achievement of this general objective, given its particular role of integrating the European innovation ecosystem;

    65. Believes that in FP10 an expanded and interlinked ERC and EIC should be the engine for a European competition of ideas and that an increase of their budgets should be prioritised in the FP10 budget; recommends that these programmes be designed so that they create a European, bottom-up funnel for innovation to develop quickly from fundamental science to innovation scale-up;

    66. Considers that the EIC can only succeed if it can (i) offer blended finance as a single project and (ii) act with the same predictability and agility as private actors on the venture capital market through a tailor-made legal entity for its implementation; underlines that the strengthened autonomy and self-governance of both the ERC and the EIC are crucial to achieving this; considers in this regard that new options must be investigated to ensure their independence and long-term stability, such as creating dedicated legal entities;

    67. Considers that the expansion of the EIC and ERC should include increased funding for blue-sky, collaborative and early research projects; recommends this expansion to fund smaller projects and consortia in order to lower the barrier to participation, to increase the success rate and to encourage experimentation with new ideas and collaborations; considers that both the EIC Pathfinder and the ERC Synergy Grants have a role to play in this expanded space for bottom-up collaborative research; underlines that the EIC Pathfinder should continue to fund Challenges, but they should be reformed from Challenge-based calls to ARPA-style Challenges which leave space for bottom-up proposals while securing strategic technology development;

    68. Urges the Commission to design FP10 such that it can effectively support strategic research, technology development and deployment initiatives, focussing on a limited number of priorities to support research-based competitiveness and the resilience of key sectors in the European economy as well as to address societal challenges with 2040 as the time horizon and which require cross-border collaboration due to the scale and complexity of the issue at hand; believes that these initiatives could take the form of (i) societal mission-oriented programmes which address socio-economic and/or ecological challenges, (ii) technology mission-oriented programmes to accelerate the development of strategic technologies in Europe, and (iii) joint undertakings to secure joint investments by the private sector, Member States and the EU;

    69. Is furthermore convinced that a share of the budget of FP10 should remain available for higher Technology Readiness Level collaborative calls to support strategic collaboration not covered in the strategic initiatives, in particular this budget could be used for strategic calls developed by the programme managers to further develop an emerging ecosystem;

    70. Emphasises that mission-oriented programmes under FP10 should be fundamentally differently organised than the current missions in Horizon Europe; calls on the Commission to implement mission-oriented programmes under FP10 that set objectives that can be reached through R&I, implemented through open calls for bottom-up ideas, fostering interdisciplinarity, including between SSHA-driven and technology-driven activities, to achieve the mission, and managed through a portfolio approach building on the experience of the pilot under Horizon Europe; underlines that the successful management of these mission-oriented programmes requires outstanding expertise on the topic of the missions rather than generic expertise;

    71. Underlines that procedures for obtaining support under FP10 must align with companies’ realities; is of the opinion that, to this end, an industry-oriented application procedure, building on the experience of the Fast Track to Innovation from Horizon 2020, should be re-introduced under FP10, in particular where the programme aims to support strategic initiatives;

    72. Is convinced that a strategic approach to international cooperation is more important than ever; believes that global collaboration in science is essential for the knowledge development of humanity, but cannot be pursued in a naive manner; recommends that the Commission develops a clear strategic policy framework for its decisions on international collaboration which includes (i) a clear policy on the association of third countries which recognises that association is a tool for political partnerships, (ii) a structured process for determining how open or closed FP10 projects need to be to foster the best possible research while also considering the strategic interests of the EU, and (iii) a plan to boost global collaboration through the programme;

    73. Underlines the importance of FP10’s compliance with the Council recommendation on research security; calls on the Commission to include in the strategic approach whether the right balance between security and openness can be best achieved at the level of programmes, calls or selected projects; believes as well that, beyond the agility of the framework programme itself, delivering resilience must be mainstreamed to become an integral part of all the applied research, development and innovation activities of the next framework programme, in a differentiated manner depending on the topic and the type of activity; believes in particular that innovation activities close to the market must take into account the risk of increased dependency on third countries stemming from them, and the necessary enhanced strategic autonomy of the EU;

    74. Recommends in principle maintaining the civilian nature of the next framework programme and leaving calls specifically for defence applications to the successor of the European Defence Fund; urges the Commission further to develop options to strengthen the synergies between civilian and defence R&D spending; calls on the Commission in particular to explore how the exploitation of dual-use potential can be maximised, especially through interventions after project selection rather than in call or programme definition; underlines that academic freedom includes the right of researchers to decide to what research and development they wish to contribute;

    75. Recommends that the programme should recognise the role of interdisciplinary research in addressing societal challenges, also including a better integration of SSHA; reiterates the need for sufficient funding for research projects that address societal challenges and that fall within the area of SSHA;

    76. Recommends the introduction of research actions in order to foster and encourage more lower Technology Readiness Level research and basic research;

    77. Notes that the allocation of at least 35 % of Horizon Europe expenditure to climate objectives served the general EU objective of mainstreaming climate actions into its sectoral policies and funds; considers this an ambitious target to ensure that FP10 adequately funds science, research and innovation that support the EU climate objectives;

    78. Underlines that any potential application of the Do No (Significant) Harm principle under FP10 should, in line with Article 33(2)d of the Financial Regulation, be set out in the FP10 legislation;

    79. Recommends that the central role of standardisation in driving innovation, enhancing competitiveness, and ensuring impactful, market-ready solutions be recognised in FP10 by ensuring that costs associated with standardisation activities, where relevant in projects, are clearly recognised as eligible for reimbursement under the programme as well as by offering support to researchers in their standardisation activities;

    80. Insists that rules regarding the association of third countries to FP10 should require that these associations can only be concluded through international agreements, which requires the consent of the Parliament for each specific association to a specific EU programme, including for the scope of that association;

    81. Notes that FP10 should take into account the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a way to foster European research and development while identifying specific risks that may arise form an abusive use of AI in the scientific environment and the corresponding mitigation measures;

    °

    ° °

    82. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Spain: EIB and Luzaro renew their commitment to boosting SMEs in the Basque Country with a new financing operation for up to €100 million

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The EIB and Luzaro signed the first tranche for €25 million today in San Sebastián.
    • The financing operation is being supported by the Basque Government.
    • It is expected to mobilise over €280 million in investment for more than 1 000 SMEs in the Basque Country.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) has approved a new financing package of up to €100 million for Luzaro, with the objective of increasing investment and liquidity for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps in the Basque Country.

    The first tranche of financing, for €25 million, was formally signed today in San Sebastián by Gemma Feliciani, Director of Financial Institutions at the EIB, and Elena Urbizu, Luzaro Managing Director at an event held by Luzaro to conclude new collaboration agreements with the Basque government and the EIB.

    The EIB financing is guaranteed by the Basque government, and will help mobilise more than €280 million in investment in the real economy, facilitating access to credit with favourable conditions for more than 1 000 Basque firms.

    The operation will further strengthen the collaboration between the EIB and Luzaro, and this fifth agreement will bring its total volume to €350 million in financing for Basque SMEs.

    EIB Director of Financial Institutions Gemma Feliciani stated, “This new agreement reaffirms our commitment to the business landscape in the Basque Country, providing crucial financing so that SMEs and mid-caps can grow, innovate and create quality jobs.”

    Luzaro Managing Director Elena Urbizu stated, “Thanks to this EIB loan guaranteed by the Basque government, we will continue to increase our lending and to build our own funds in order to grant financing to a greater number of companies. Our task is to promote business development in our region through cooperation between the public and the private sector.”

    Background information

    European Investment Bank

    The ElB is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. Built around eight core priorities, it finances investments that pursue EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund, signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Agreement, as pledged in the group’s Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects that contribute directly to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and a healthier environment.

    In Spain, the EIB Group signed €12.3 billion of new financing for more than 100 high-impact projects in 2024, helping power the country’s green and digital transition and promote economic growth, competitiveness and better services for inhabitants.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    Luzaro

    Luzaro is a financial institution granting long-term participatory loans. It was established in 1992 to promote, foster and provide capital to SMEs in the autonomous community of the Basque Country, and to spur and support SME creation, growth and financing with other initiatives and loans. It is a unique entity stemming from public-private partnership between the Basque government, Kutxabank, Laboral Kutxa, Abanca, Sabadell, IVF and Enisa. It also collaborates with the EIB, and certain operations enjoy the support of the ELKARGI Guarantee Society (SGR). Luzaro has agreements with different government institutions in the Basque Country, such as the SPRI Group’s Ekintzaile programme for young SMEs. It currently has seven members of staff.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Ongoing Investigations into E-Commerce Platforms – Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

    Source: European Parliament

    On 18 February, Members probed the European Commission about its ongoing investigations on e-commerce platforms’ compliance with EU laws. The Commission highlighted the role of the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network’s in tackling infringements, highlighting cases against Temu and Shein as key tests of EU enforcement. Concerns with Temu include dark patterns, gamification, and fake reviews, with voluntary commitments expected by year-end. The Shein investigation is at an earlier stage.

    The Commission representative also outlined Digital Services Act investigations into Aliexpress and Temu, focusing on hidden links and manipulative design, while Shein received a Request for Information. The European Board for Digital Services and national authorities support these efforts.

    The Commission designated nine online marketplaces as Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs), subject to VLOPs’ obligations, including risk mitigation, transparency of recommender systems, and Know Your Business Customer (KYBC) requirements.

    Members stressed the need for more timely enforcement and called for investigations to yield tangible outcomes. The European Parliament will strive for more scrutiny of decisions, requesting more action and results.

    MIL OSI Europe News –