Source: European Central Bank
Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Domenico Conti
29 October 2024
At the latest press conference, President Lagarde spoke of a series of economic indicators pointing lower and of downside risks to growth. The Survey of Professional Forecasters published by the ECB foresees inflation of 1.9% in 2025, compared with 2.2% in the projections by ECB experts. In this context, will the Governing Council have the option to make back-to-back interest rate cuts, as occurred in September and October?
In short, on the current economic situation, we don’t have good news with respect to growth but we do have good news with respect to inflation.
On growth, we have revised down our projections twice – before the summer and in September. We see that the downside risks that we identified are crystallising, mainly because consumption is not recovering as expected. Even though real disposable income has increased because wages are catching up with past inflation, households are not increasing their spending. This could be due to structural factors, including a lack of confidence owing to past inflation, the pandemic or geopolitical risks. But it is clear that the recovery in consumption is not happening at the pace we had previously projected.
On inflation, we have the opposite happening. The latest figures are good, in terms of both headline inflation and underlying inflation. Most measures of underlying inflation are declining, and we are confident that we will be able to reach our 2% target over the medium term in the course of 2025.
Regarding possible future cuts, we have been very clear that we will keep all options open at forthcoming meetings, both in terms of the number of cuts and the size of these cuts. But what is most relevant for the transmission of monetary policy and the impact of financial conditions on aggregate demand is the medium-term trajectory, which is evidently that of an easing cycle. Fine-tuning monetary policy is very complex and the important signal is the medium-term trajectory.
Geopolitical risks will play a role in the forthcoming monetary policy decisions. To what extent are the risks associated with the conflicts in the Middle East and the risks of a further escalation in trade tariffs pushing the ECB to take a prudent approach in reducing interest rates?
Geopolitical factors play a very important role in our analysis. For example, the conflict in the Middle East has an impact on energy prices and upcoming elections could have an impact on international trade, global growth and inflation. This is one reason why we have to be very prudent with our decisions. When you are in a dark room full of uncertainty, for example because of geopolitical risks that you cannot control, you have to take very careful steps.
Another important element is fiscal policy. Governments are now submitting their medium-term budgetary plans to the European Commission. This will give us more clarity on the fiscal outlook, which is an element that we take into consideration in our analysis and decision-making. So geopolitical risks, the possibility of distortions in international trade plus what will happen with fiscal policy will all feed into our decisions in the near future.
In its new operational framework that came into force in September 2024, the ECB anticipates that a substantial contribution to providing liquidity to the banking sector will come from a structural portfolio of securities and from new longer-term refinancing operations, under conditions to be defined at a later date. What point has the discussion reached and what guidance is there?
The operational framework has to be used to implement our monetary policy, it cannot condition it. And we have said very clearly that all monetary policy instruments in our toolkit remain available to us. This will include, for example, non-conventional measures, such as targeted longer-term refinancing operations and quantitative easing.
Right now, we are in a situation of ample liquidity, which we are gradually reducing by discontinuing reinvestments, which will come to a complete halt at the beginning of next year. Once that liquidity has been significantly reduced, a combination of the monetary policy instruments at our disposal will help us deliver enough liquidity to the banking system.
In my view, when we discuss the structural portfolio, we will need to take into account the actual liquidity situation of the banks and look not only at the average, but also at the dispersion in the banking sector. We have not decided on the size of the structural portfolio, but it will need to be large enough to deliver sufficient liquidity to the banking system.
The latest monetary policy strategy review in 2021 took place at a time of strong deflationary pressures linked to various factors, including digitalisation and globalisation. Since then the landscape has changed. We find ourselves in a fragmented geopolitical context with the return of inflationary shocks. How will all this be reflected in the coming monetary policy strategy review? When will the discussion begin and what topics will it cover?
We have established a couple of workstreams at the technical level to examine these factors, namely how the landscape has changed, how the new environment could have an impact on inflation, and our evolving policy toolkit. But this will not be discussed by the Governing Council until next year, with conclusions expected in the second half of 2025.
What is crystal clear is that the definition of price stability as 2% inflation over the medium term will not be up for debate. And several other elements, such as the importance of financial stability considerations or accounting for climate change in our work, are already established. Instead, this review will mostly be an assessment of the previous strategy review while considering new elements, such as the changed economic and inflation environment, the possibility of deglobalisation and other structural elements that could affect the inflation outlook.
Importantly, we will look at the consequences of measures we have used in the past. For every monetary policy decision, we need to look not only at short-term effects but also further ahead at possible unwanted effects. Quantitative easing, for example, is an instrument that proved to be very useful to fight deflation and the impact of the pandemic, but it also caused some side effects. In that respect, now that we have started the opposite process of quantitative tightening, we have much more information on the potential consequences of quantitative easing.
Are you referring to fiscal side effects?
No. I’m referring, for instance, to the impact on financial stability or on national central banks’ profit and loss accounts. These are side effects that can be better taken into consideration and that were not obvious at the time.
Italy has seen inflation fall to below 2% from a high of close to 12% two years ago, and its growth rate is in line with the European average. While real disposable income is improving, investment is feeling the effects of a still restrictive monetary policy and politicians have criticised the ECB’s cautious stance in the last few months. How would you explain to Italian politicians and households the need for a cautious approach in reducing interest rates, and how do you plan to reassure them about the current transition from still restrictive interest rates to a more neutral stance?
Above all else, we listen to all opinions carefully and with an open mind. The ECB and central banks are independent institutions, meaning that they need to display an additional level of responsibility and accountability.
What I would say to Italian and European citizens is that it’s important to be cautious and prudent. We have reduced interest rates and the trajectory of our monetary policy is very clear, but there is a huge amount of uncertainty and we cannot make mistakes. That’s why a gradual approach to implementing monetary policy is essential.
That being said, I’d like to reassure them that things are moving in the right direction. Inflation has fallen significantly. Most people look more closely at price levels than at inflation, but at the end of the day, current price levels are a consequence of past inflation. We can’t claim victory yet, but we have made good progress so far. And despite an economic slowdown, we have so far managed to reduce inflation without causing a recession in the euro area. When you look at the labour market, the situation remains positive. So I hope that in the medium term it will become more evident that we are on the right track.
In its draft budget, the Italian government is seeking a contribution of around €3.5 billion from the banking sector by targeting deferred tax assets (DTAs). Has the ECB been consulted on the merits of this approach and what guidance is being formulated on this measure?
In general, our assessment of banking sector taxes is quite clear from the legal opinions we have issued on proposals by several countries. Our view is that such taxes should not impair banks’ solvency or the transmission of monetary policy in terms of hampering the flow of credit to the real economy.
In this specific case, we don’t have the definitive version of the tax yet, so it’s difficult to form an opinion about it. But I hope that solvency will be one of the items taken into consideration, which would be positive from our perspective.
In my view, the design of the previous version of the tax was balanced, for example, because it made tax revenues and bank solvency compatible. Of the many approaches taken by other European countries that imposed taxes on the banking sector, I believe this was the most balanced one.
Completing the banking union is one of the most urgent objectives that will make Europe more resilient and more competitive. Despite this, a cross-border merger like the potential merger between Unicredit and Commerzbank currently under discussion is treated as a national matter in both countries. What lessons can we learn from this and why is a cross-border merger between European banks still hitting the headlines in Europe in 2024?
Given the importance of banks’ funding for the real economy, completing the banking union should be the number one priority on the European Union’s economic agenda. I acknowledge that there are political hurdles to achieving that, but it will be very difficult to have a real economic and monetary union without a banking union. Greater coordination of fiscal policy, for example through a common fiscal instrument or progress towards the capital markets union, would also be important.
If you want a single banking market, you need to have genuine pan-European banks. This is why cross-border consolidation of the banking sector is important. I don’t discuss the merits of individual cases, but in my view, a European approach should prevail over a national one. That’s the way forward for European integration.
In any case, our assessment of any merger and acquisition transaction is always based exclusively on prudential and solvency criteria. This is the guiding principle for us, based on European regulation.
The Italian government has voiced its support for the merger between Unicredit and Commerzbank, which would strengthen European banking consolidation. At the same time, Italy is the only Member State that hasn’t ratified the treaty to reform the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is an important element in completing the banking union. How important will it be to remove this obstacle?
In my previous answer, I referred to how important it is for a European approach to prevail over a national one. But this principle has to be consistent from all angles and in all kinds of situations. In my opinion, a pro-European approach to the integration of the economy, the banking system and the capital markets should be the one that prevails for all the items under discussion, including ESM reform. Ratifying the reformed ESM Treaty would be a clear pro-European decision.