Category: Business

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Azerbaijan: Seven journalists sentenced in latest shocking crackdown on free speech

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Reacting to the sentencing to lengthy prison terms of seven media workers in the “Abzas Media case” in Azerbaijan, Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Director, said:

    “The case against Abzas Media is an example of how Azerbaijan’s judicial system is being weaponized to muzzle independent journalism and calls for a strong international response. By pressing fabricated economic charges against journalists who exposed high-level corruption, the Azerbaijani authorities are sending a chilling message to anyone in the country who dares to challenge them. A strong international reaction should make clear that this is unacceptable.

    “The political repression in Azerbaijan today is staggering, yet we lack a united, principled stand against it from the international community, in defence of human rights. In stark contrast, major actors like the European Union persist in actively courting President Ilham Aliyev in search of lucrative gas deals.

    The political repression in Azerbaijan today is staggering, yet we lack a united, principled stand against it from the international community

    Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Director

    “The international community must exert real pressure on the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately release the Abzas Media journalists, imprisoned media workers from Toplum TV, Meydan TV and Kanal 13, and all other government critics imprisoned solely for exercising their right to freedom of expression, and to put an end to the Azerbaijani government’s systemic campaign against dissent.”

    Background

    On 20 June, the Baku Court of Serious Crimes sentenced seven media workers affiliated with the independent investigative outlet Abzas Media – including director Ulvi Hasanli, editor-in-chief Sevinc Vagifgizi, investigative journalist Hafiz Babaly, reporters Nargiz Absalamova and Elnara Gasymova, translator Muhammad Kekalov, and economist and Radio Free Europe correspondent Farid Mehralizade – to prison terms ranging from seven and a half to nine years. The charges included “currency smuggling,” “money laundering,” “tax evasion” and forgery of documents.

    Their prosecution and imprisonment are widely believed to be in retaliation for the media organization’s investigations into corruption among President Ilham Aliyev’s family and inner circle. These include reports on post-war reconstruction in Nagorno-Karabakh and illicit financial networks tied to state-linked companies. During the hearings, the defence highlighted numerous procedural irregularities, pressure on the defendants and witnesses, and a lack of credible evidence. Witnesses have withdrawn or denied previous statements, and defendants have reported ill-treatment in custody.

    At least 25 journalists are currently imprisoned in the country. Azerbaijan has the highest number of imprisoned media workers held on politically motivated charges since it joined the Council of Europe in 2001. Just on 7 May, independent journalist Ulviyya Ali, a contributor to Voice of America, was arrested.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 06/20/2025 Blackburn, Luján Call for Investigation into Spotify for Forcing Subscribers into Higher-Priced Subscriptions Without Their Consent

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)

    NASHVILLE, Tenn. – Today, U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) sent a letter to Andrew Ferguson, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), requestingan investigation into Spotify for converting premium subscriptions into higher-priced bundled subscriptions without consumers knowledge or consent:

    Americans Depend on a Healthy, Well-Functioning Market Built on Fair Prices and Compensation Through Music Royalty System

    “Millions of Americans who love and pay for music depend on a healthy, well-functioning market built upon fair prices and compensation through the music royalty system. We have serious concerns about Spotify’s recent move to convert all of its premium music subscribers into different—and ultimately higher-priced—bundled subscriptions without their knowledge or consent. These actions harm consumers and could deeply damage the marketplace and the music royalty system. We urge the FTC to investigate the impact of Spotify’s recent actions, to take steps to protect Americans from being forced into subscriptions without notice or choice, and to safeguard the music marketplace.”

    Spotify Has Forced Americans into Higher-Priced Bundled Subscriptions Without Their Knowledge or Consent

    “Tens of millions of Americans pay monthly fees for access to Spotify’s premium, ad-free, subscription music service through its ‘Premium Plans.’ The royalty rates that Spotify and other digital music service providers must pay songwriters and music publishers reside in federal regulations set by the Copyright Royalty Board. Current regulations allow digital music providers to pay a lower music royalty rate if their paid music subscription offering is bundled with other legitimate product offerings. Seeing an opportunity, Spotify has exploited this regulation by converting all Premium Plan music subscribers into a new, bundled subscription offering without consumers’ consent or any notice. Spotify’s intent seems clear—to slash the statutory royalties it pays to songwriters and music publishers. Not only has this harmed our creative community, but this action has also harmed consumers.”

    Spotify’s Bundled Plans Are Apparently Aimed at Boosting Its Profits While Lowering Royalties to Creators

    “Spotify’s Audiobook Access plan and the bundled Premium Plans are apparently aimed at increasing the company’s profits while lowering royalty payments to the creative community. Specifically, it seems clear that Spotify’s audiobooks service is set at an artificially high price for the purpose of gaming federal regulations and deeply cutting music royalty payments. For example, Spotify has priced its Audiobook Access plan with 15 hours of listening time per month from a limited catalog of 200,000 audiobooks at $9.99/month. In contrast, Spotify’s music-only Basic Plan—which includes unlimited hours of listening from a catalog of over 100 million songs—is priced only a dollar more. Under the regulations, the higher the Audiobooks Access plan is priced, the lower the music royalty Spotify must pay.”

    Click here to read the full letter. 

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Trade and Environment Week underscores members’ drive to advance environment discussions

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Since its launch in 2019, Trade and Environment Week has grown into a flagship forum for deepening the global conversation on the nexus between trade and the environment. Anchored around the CTE meeting, the Week was designed to complement the Committee’s work and spark inclusive dialogue on emerging environmental challenges with trade dimensions. It offers a unique platform for WTO members to engage directly with business leaders, international organizations, academic experts, civil society and environmental practitioners — fostering an exchange of insights, experiences and actionable ideas.

    In 2025, the Week will feature 15 sessions spanning a range of issues at the forefront of the trade and environment agenda. Topics include the global fight against plastics pollution, sustainable agriculture, the green transition in developing economies, carbon pricing mechanisms, deforestation-related regulations, the future of sustainable fuels, and trade-related climate policy measures.

    The CTE meeting will continue to advance discussions under a comprehensive work programme on trade and environment in line with the Committee’s mandate. Since its establishment in 1995, the CTE has facilitated dialogue among all WTO members on the interaction between trade and environmental policies.

    All 15 sessions are open to the public. The full programme for Trade and Environment Week, the live webcast link and registration information for in-person participation is available here.

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    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members agree on way forward for SPS transparency working group, launch mentoring system

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members agree on way forward for SPS transparency working group, launch mentoring system

    New working group on transparency
    In adopting the Report of the Sixth Review of the SPS Agreement at its last meeting in March, members endorsed a recommendation to establish a Transparency Working Group for a two-year period.  The Committee followed up by agreeing to initiate working group discussions in November to focus on how to improve SPS notifications, track how comments are taken into account, and examine possible enhancements to the ePing SPS&TBT Platform.  The working group will also consider revisions of key SPS transparency documents.
    The Chair of the Committee, Ms Maria Cosme (France), noted that New Zealand and Chile volunteered to be stewards of the working group, which will be guided by the agreed operational guidelines.  The Transparency Working Group will hold its first meeting back-to-back with the November Committee meeting. 
    Launch of mentoring system
    In line with another recommendation in the Sixth Review, the Committee launched a new SPS mentoring system to assist developing and LDC members with transparency and timely engagement on SPS matters. The system will start with a pilot phase between June 2025 and June 2026 in which informal, ad hoc supportive relationships will be established between individual mentors and mentees for knowledge-sharing, peer learning and engagement on SPS-related issues.
    With the Committee’s agreement, the WTO Secretariat has set up a dedicated mentoring webpage, which includes an online form for interested government officials seeking mentoring during the pilot phase. After this, the Secretariat will select a limited number of requests for the pilot and will launch a call for mentors who could support the selected mentees to achieve their objectives.
    Thematic session
    On 17 June, the Committee held a thematic session on addressing relevant risks associated with antimicrobial resistance (AMR) through SPS measures in international trade.  The recordings of the session are available on the dedicated webpage. The session was based on a proposal submitted by the European Union.
    The event focused on steps being taken by members to address relevant risks related to AMR in the context of the SPS Agreement and international trade. It also explored the relationship between AMR and the SPS Agreement, and provided members, international organizations, academia and other stakeholders with an opportunity to share experiences and best practices in addressing relevant AMR-related risks while facilitating safe trade.
    Specific trade concerns
    Members raised 56 specific trade concerns (STCs) — four for the first time — at the meeting. The new STCs raised by members related to uncertainty regarding coffee beans imports into China; Thailand’s regulation to mitigate aflatoxins in peanut kernels; a ban on imports of aquaculture shrimp in Thailand; and Viet Nam’s procedure for the listing of exporting establishments.
    A list of the STCs discussed is available here.
    As of early 2025, close to 60% of all STCs raised in the SPS Committee had been reported as resolved or partially resolved.
    STDF annual report and updates
    The Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) shared updates on its work, including the launch of its 2024 Annual Report, which highlights project results, lessons learned and reflections on its 20th anniversary. The report also covers monitoring, evaluation, learning and Trust Fund financing, aligning with the STDF 2025–2030 Strategy.
    Next meeting
    The next regular meeting of the Committee is scheduled for 5-7 November 2025.

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    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    NEW YORK, N.Y. –  Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) today announced the expiration and preliminary expiration date results of its Exchange Offers (as defined below) and the expiration of its Cash Offers (as defined below).

    Exchange Offers

    The first transaction consists of 10 separate private offers to exchange (the “Exchange Offers”) any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the table below (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), collectively the “Old Notes”) in exchange for newly issued 5.401% Notes due 2037 of Verizon (the “New Notes”), on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offering Memorandum”), the eligibility letter (the “Eligibility Letter”) and the accompanying exchange offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offering Memorandum and the Eligibility Letter, constitute the “Exchange Offer Documents”).

    The Exchange Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Exchange Offer Expiration Date”). The “Exchange Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Exchange Offers will be promptly following the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025. In addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price (as defined in the Offering Memorandum and set forth in the table below), Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange will receive a cash payment equal to the accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Exchange Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted, including those tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures (as defined in the Offering Memorandum).

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Exchange Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Exchange Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to exchange any and all of its outstanding notes listed below for New Notes:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Exchange by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $1,689,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $4,987,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $316,360,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $64,673,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $722,436,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $196,532,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $523,460,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $266,808,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $270,138,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $30,303,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, if the New Notes Capacity Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) and/or the corresponding Cash Offer Completion Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Old Notes for exchange in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, each an “Acceptance Priority Level,” with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level). It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for exchange even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered as reflected in the table above, does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to accept for exchange validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to a $2.5 billion cap on the maximum aggregate principal amount of New Notes that Verizon will issue in all of the Exchange Offers (the “New Notes Maximum Amount”). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    Based on the principal amount of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and the Total Exchange Prices set forth in the table above, Verizon expects that the Minimum Issue Requirement (as defined in the Offering Memorandum) will be satisfied.  Verizon will not receive any cash proceeds from the Exchange Offers. The actual aggregate principal amount of New Notes that will be issued on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date is subject to change, based on the amount of Old Notes delivered pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum, including the Cash Offer Completion Condition.

    If and when issued, the New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or any state securities laws. Therefore, the New Notes may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and any applicable state securities laws. Verizon will enter into a registration rights agreement with respect to the New Notes.

    Only a holder who had duly completed and returned an Eligibility Letter certifying that it was either (1) a “qualified institutional buyer” (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)); or (2) a person located outside the United States who is (i) not a “U.S. person” (as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act), (ii) not acting for the account or benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) a “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” (as defined below), was authorized to receive the Offering Memorandum and to participate in the Exchange Offers (such holders, “Exchange Offer Eligible Holders”).

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Exchange Agent for the Exchange Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Exchange Offers or for additional copies of the Exchange Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774.You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Exchange Offers. The Exchange Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://gbsc-usa.com/eligibility/verizon.

    Cash Offers

    The second transaction consists of 10 separate offers to purchase for cash (the “Cash Offers”) any and all of each series of Old Notes, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offer to Purchase”), the certification instructions letter (the “Certification Instructions Letter”) and the accompanying cash offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offer to Purchase and the Certification Instructions Letter, constitute the “Tender Offer Documents”).

    The Cash Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Cash Offer Expiration Date”). The “Cash Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Cash Offers will be promptly following the Cash Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Cash Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Tender Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to purchase any and all of its outstanding notes listed below:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Purchase by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $14,136,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $2,287,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $174,419,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $25,913,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $158,375,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $255,691,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $109,039,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $43,536,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $39,519,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $2,818,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, including if the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Notes for purchase in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above. It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for purchase even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered reflect the preliminary results of the Cash Offer and are subject to change following review of the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes to determine the validity of the tenders received pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. The principal amounts tendered does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to purchase validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to the Maximum Total Consideration Condition and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition (each as defined in the Offer to Purchase). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the Maximum Total Consideration Condition at any time.

    In addition to the applicable Total Consideration, Cash Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase will be paid accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Cash Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Cash Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Cash Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    Only holders who were not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (“Cash Offer Eligible Holders”) were eligible to participate in the Cash Offers. Holders of Old Notes participating in the Cash Offers were required to complete the Certification Instructions Letter and certify that they are Cash Offer Eligible Holders.

    Verizon is in the process of reviewing the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes pursuant to the Cash Offers to determine the validity of the tenders received in the Cash Offers pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. Verizon will announce the final principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered and accepted for exchange and for purchase as soon as practicable, but no later than 9:00 a.m. (Eastern time) on June 23, 2025.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Tender Agent for the Cash Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Cash Offers or for additional copies of the Tender Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Cash Offers. The Tender Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/verizon.

    Verizon refers to the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, collectively, as the “Offers.”

    Verizon retained Barclays Capital Inc, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, RBC Capital Markets, LLC to act as lead dealer managers for the Offers and Scotia Capital (USA) Inc., Truist Securities, Inc. and U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. to act as co-dealer managers for the Offers.

    This announcement is for informational purposes only. This announcement is not an offer to purchase or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any Old Notes. The Exchange Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offering Memorandum and related documents and the Cash Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase and related documents. The Offers are not being made to holders of Old Notes in any jurisdiction in which the making or acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities, blue sky or other laws of such jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction in which the securities laws or blue sky laws require the Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer, the Offers will be deemed to be made on behalf of Verizon by the dealer managers or one or more registered brokers or dealers that are licensed under the laws of such jurisdiction.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offers have not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. Accordingly, this communication is only addressed to and directed at persons who are outside the United Kingdom and (i) persons falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Financial Promotion Order”)), or (ii) within Article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iii) high net worth companies and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iv) to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of Section 21 of the FSMA) in connection with the issue or sale of any securities may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (such persons together being “relevant persons”). The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on any document relating to the Exchange Offers or any of their contents.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offer are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), who are “Qualified Investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes, will be engaged in only with, Qualified Investors. The Exchange Offer is only available to Qualified Investors. None of the information in the Offering Memorandum and any other documents and materials relating to the Exchange Offer should be acted upon or relied upon in any member state of the EEA by persons who are not Qualified Investors.

    “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” means:

    (i)       in relation to any investor in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), a qualified investor as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) that is not a retail investor.  For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (a) a retail client as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, “MiFID II”); or (b) a customer within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client as defined in point (10) of Article 4(1) of MiFID II;

    (ii)      in relation to any investor in the United Kingdom, a qualified investor as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that is not a retail investor and that (a) has professional experience in matters relating to investments and qualifies as an investment professional within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the “Financial Promotion Order”), (b) is a person falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.”) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (c) is a person to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”)) in connection with the issue or sale of any notes may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (x) a retail client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/565 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA”); or (y) a customer within the meaning of the provisions of the FSMA and any rules or regulations made under the FSMA to implement Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the EUWA; or

    (iii)      any entity outside the U.S., the EEA and the United Kingdom to whom the Exchange Offer may be made in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of any applicable jurisdiction without registration of the Exchange Offer or any related filing or approval.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    In this communication Verizon has made forward-looking statements, including regarding the conduct and completion of the Offers. These forward-looking statements are not historical facts, but only predictions and generally can be identified by use of statements that include phrases such as “will,” “may,” “should,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “expect,” “plan,” “appear,” “project,” “estimate,” “hope,” “intend,” “target,” “forecast,” or other words or phrases of similar import. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals also are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those currently anticipated, including those discussed in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase under the heading “Risk Factors” and under similar headings in other documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase. Holders are urged to consider these risks and uncertainties carefully in evaluating the forward-looking statements and are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release, and Verizon undertakes no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events might or might not occur. Verizon cannot assure you that projected results or events will be achieved.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members advance Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO accession negotiations closer to conclusion

    The Chair of the Working Party, Ambassador Anita Pipan of Slovenia, said the meeting was an opportunity to “inject fresh momentum into Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession process, which is now in its 26th year and is technically advanced.”
    Ambassador Pipan asked delegations to clearly pinpoint the last outstanding issues of this accession process. She underlined that Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified by the WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as one of three accessions with a strategic focus for this year and the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) next year in Cameroon, alongside Ethiopia and Uzbekistan.
    “Today’s meeting offers an opportunity to take stock of where we are, identify remaining concerns, and consider possible next steps toward the conclusion of the accession process,” she added.
    Mr. Hamdo Tinjak, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations and Head of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s WTO Accession Team, led the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Geneva.
    He said that through the WTO accession process, alongside other integration efforts, the country has succeeded in establishing an open and liberal foreign trade regime grounded in the principles of free movement of people, goods, services and capital, and the removal of trade barriers.
    “We view this as one of the most significant achievements of the accession process. Full WTO membership would serve as formal recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country with harmonized and transparent trade legislation — a reliable partner for international trade and a favourable destination for foreign investment. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to the expansion of our foreign trade and, ultimately, to the broader economic development of the country,” said Mr Tinjak. See his full statement here.
    On the bilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina reported significant progress in the last remaining bilateral market access negotiations, following the resolution of a key outstanding issue relating to the regulation of petroleum fuels. On the multilateral track, Bosnia and Herzegovina stressed that the draft Working Party Report (the formal document that outlines the specific commitments an acceding government will undertake upon joining the WTO) is nearly complete, reflecting Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with WTO rules and principles.
    Deputy Director-General Zhang Xiangchen said that the reactivation of this accession process after seven years “stands as a testament to the recent constructive developments in this technically advanced accession file, which have provided a clear basis for the Working Party to take its work towards finalization.”
    DDG Zhang, who accompanied the Working Party Chair on a visit to Sarajevo in November 2024, stressed that the WTO Secretariat remains fully committed to supporting efforts “to cross the finishing line in the very near future”.
    Delegations commended Bosnia and Herzegovina’s technical engagement, and the substantive progress made in the accession process.
    Next steps
    Recognizing the value of securing a potential deliverable for the WTO before or at MC14, Ambassador Pipan urged the conclusion of the remaining bilateral market access negotiations, which would enable the WTO Secretariat to consolidate the draft schedules of commitments on goods and services. On the multilateral front, she requested members to submit additional questions and comments by 17 July that will be circulated to the Working Party.
    Subsequently, the Secretariat will update the draft Working Party Report. “I very much hope that this next version will be final,” Ambassador Pipan said.
    Keeping in mind Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspiration to finalize its accession process as soon as possible, the Chair added that the next Working Party meeting will depend on consultations with delegations and the Secretariat, particularly on the conclusion of the last outstanding bilateral market negotiations and the finalization of the draft Working Party Report.

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    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    Source: – Press Release/Statement:

    Headline: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    A unique conference, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE), recognizes the critical role of Indigenous engagement in Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 20, 2025—More than 120 people attended the Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit, held at the Winnipeg Art Gallery on June 18, 2025, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE).

    This unique, invitation-only event brought together key representatives from Manitoba’s Indigenous and renewable energy communities to discuss Manitoba Hydro’s recently launched wind energy procurement, entitled “Call for Power: Indigenous Majority Owned Wind,” part of the Manitoba Affordable Energy Plan. This is the province’s first significant wind-energy procurement in many years. An RFP for 600 MWs of wind energy is expected to be issued in August of this year, with a majority Indigenous-ownership criteria.

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities,” said Evan Wilson, CanREA’s Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs.

    The Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change, as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro, who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process.

    In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” Wilson moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Galvin Clancey (Nordex) and Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables), who shared lessons learned and ideas for how best to work together for Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Following this discussion, ICE’s Founding Executive Director, Chris Henderson, moderated a panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success,” featuring panelists Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation), and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision,” said Henderson.

    Later that morning, CanREA’s Director for Saskatchewan and Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, emceed a session on “Indigenous Loan Guarantees & Financing Options,” in which the Canada Infrastructure Bank’s Justin Lok presented on Financing Indigenous Equity, the Manitoba Finance Treasury Division’s Nicoleta Oprea presented on the Government of Manitoba Treasury, and the Canada Indigenous Loan Guarantee Corporation’s Pearl Yuzicappi presented on the Canada Development Investment Corporation.

    The afternoon was split into two simultaneous tracks: The CanREA track consisted of a session on “Wind Energy Procurement Guidance,” in which CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, hosted Bryce Wood and team from Manitoba Environment and Climate Change’s Environmental Approvals Branch, as well as Adrienne McGarrigle of Solas Energy, who offered guidance to help navigate the upcoming Wind Energy Procurement Process.

    The Indigenous Clean Energy track consisted of several sessions. It began with an “Indigenous Nation-Nation Experience Sharing Session,” with opening remarks by Kisik Energy Manitoba’s Darrell Brown, a Founding Chair at ICE. Next, the “Indigenous Renewables Turtle Island Landscape” session was facilitated by ICE’s Henderson and ICE Board Member Mihskakwan James Harper of NRStor.

    The “Indigenous Wind Project Development Discussion,” also facilitated by Henderson, featured Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation) and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    The Summit closed with an open Q&A discussion with the audience, facilitated by CanREA & ICE, with special guest Isabelle Deguise of Renewable Energy Systems (RES) Canada Inc., who is also a CanREA Board member.

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success.  Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba,” said Hall.

    CanREA thanks all attendees and speakers for participating in the Summit, with a special thanks to ICE for their collaboration in organizing, supporting and executing the Summit, and to our generous sponsors, Northland Power (the Wellness and Networking Break Sponsor), and MLT Aikins (the Networking Lunch Sponsor). Doing double duty, Drew Lafond and Kevin Mehi of MLT Aikins also presented at the Summit, focusing on “Legal Considerations for Indigenous Equity Ownership.”

    Photos

    Photo: In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” CanREA’s Evan Wilson (far right) moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including (from L to R) Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables) and Galvin Clancey (Nordex).

    Photo: The panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success” featured, from left to right: moderator Mihskakwan James Harper (NRStor & ICE board member), and speakers Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation), and Chris Henderson (Indigenous Clean Energy). 

    Photo: The Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change (left), as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro (right), who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process. Centre: Kelly Hall, CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement.

    Quotes

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities.”
    —Evan Wilson, Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision.” 
    —Chris Henderson, Founding Executive Director, Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE)

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success. Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba.”
    —Kelly Hall, Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan, and for Indigenous Engagement, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    For media inquiries or interview opportunities, please contact: 

    Communications Canadian Renewable Energy Association communications@renewablesassociation.ca 

    About CanREA 

    The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is the voice for wind energy, solar energy and energy storage solutions that will power Canada’s energy future. We work to create the conditions for a modern energy system through stakeholder advocacy and public engagement. Our diverse members are uniquely positioned to deliver clean, low-cost, reliable, flexible and scalable solutions for Canada’s energy needs. For more information on how Canada can use wind energy, solar energy and energy storage to help achieve its net-zero commitments, consult “Powering Canada’s Journey to Net-Zero: CanREA’s 2050 Vision.” Follow us on Bluesky and LinkedIn here. Learn more at renewablesassociation.ca. 

    The post First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success appeared first on Canadian Renewable Energy Association.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Director of Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of CPC Central Committee and Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of State Council Mr Xia Baolong meets representatives of commercial and financial sectors in Hong Kong

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    The Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Mr Xia Baolong, today (June 20) in Hong Kong, met with representatives of the commercial and financial sectors, and learned about Hong Kong’s major tourism development projects.

    At an engagement session, Mr Xia interacted with representatives of Hong Kong’s commercial and financial sectors, including those from major chambers of commerce and enterprises. The session was also attended by the Chief Executive, Mr John Lee; the Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan; the Deputy Financial Secretary, Mr Michael Wong; the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Christopher Hui; and the Acting Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development, Dr Bernard Chan.

    In the afternoon, Mr Xia visited Ocean Park in the company of Mr Lee; the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Miss Rosanna Law; the Chairman of the Board of the Ocean Park Corporation (OPC), Mr Paulo Pong; and the Chief Executive of the OPC, Mr Ivan Wong. 

    Afterwards Mr Xia took a boat trip to Lamma Island with Mr Lee, Mr Wong and the Secretary for Development, Ms Bernadette Linn, to gain an understanding of the ex-Lamma quarry site’s development plan. Mr Xia also received briefings en route on major tourism development projects.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report – P10_TA(2025)0129 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    –  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(2) (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(3) (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(4),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    –  having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    –  having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States(6);

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(9),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU(10),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(13),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(15),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(16),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(17),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021(25),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(26),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia(27),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(28),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU(29),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP(30),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union(31),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe(32),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’(33),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(34),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds(35),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(36),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland(37),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists(38),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (JOIN(2023)0051),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023(39),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime(40),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications(41),

    –  having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    –  having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    –  having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    –  having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    –  having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    –  having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)(42),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B.  whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected(43),(44); whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C.  whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D.  whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E.  whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1.  Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2.  Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3.  Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4.  Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5.  Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice; highlights its concern about repeated attacks on judges and prosecutors who are conducting high-profile political investigations linked to cases of corruption and abuse of power perpetrated against political opponents;

    6.  Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8.  Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States(45) and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9.  Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10.  Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11.  Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12.  Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13.  Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14.  Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15.  Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16.  Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive(46) to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17.  Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20.  Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21.  Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24.  Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25.  Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation(47) and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law(48) in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26.  Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27.  Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30.  Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking

    31.  Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32.  Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)(49) and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33.  Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive(50), as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(51), and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35.  Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36.  Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37.  Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

    38.  Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act(52) (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39.  Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40.  Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41.  Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343(53) on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43.  Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44.  Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)(54) and civil society networks(55); reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45.  Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups(56);

    46.  Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47.  Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49.  Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States(57) and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51.  Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52.  Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC(58) on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive(59) and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53.  Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54.  Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55.  Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56.  Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC(60) in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings(61) of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57.  Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; welcomes the CJEU’s opinion of 5 June 2025 stating that it considers Hungary to be in violation of EU law in prohibiting or restricting access to LGBTIQ+ content; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58.  Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59.  Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500(62) and Directive 2024/1499(63), which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61.  Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62.  Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63.  Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)(64); urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64.  Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65.  Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66.  Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67.  Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68.  Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69.  Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70.  Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71.  Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73.  Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74.  Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75.  Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76.  Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law(65), not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78.  Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79.  Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80.  Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81.  Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82.  Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83.  Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act(66), the AI Act(67), Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(68) and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84.  Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85.  Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86.  Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87.  Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms(69); recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88.  Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89.  Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91.  Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92.  Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93.  Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94.  Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95.  Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96.  Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97.  Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98.  Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99.  Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100.  Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102.  Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103.  Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104.  Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105.  Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    o
    o   o

    106.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 433, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (4) OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.
    (5) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162.
    (6) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 21.
    (7) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13.
    (8) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 117.
    (9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.
    (10) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 13.
    (11) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 45.
    (12) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.
    (13) OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 36.
    (14) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 70.
    (15) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.
    (16) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27.
    (17) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146.
    (18) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.
    (19) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.
    (20) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 48.
    (21) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.
    (22) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.
    (23) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.
    (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 108.
    (25) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 80.
    (26) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.
    (27) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 15.
    (28) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 22.
    (29) OJ C 161, 5.5.2023, p. 10.
    (30) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 74.
    (31) OJ C 341, 27.9.2023, p. 2.
    (32) OJ C, C/2023/442, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/442/oj.
    (33) OJ C, C/2024/6743, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6743/oj.
    (34) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (35) OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.
    (36) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (37) OJ C, C/2024/3995, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3995/oj.
    (38) OJ C, C/2024/2656, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2656/oj.
    (39) OJ C, C/2024/5739, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5739/oj.
    (40) OJ C, C/2024/5733, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5733/oj.
    (41) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.
    (42) For all DRFMG monitoring activities, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundament/product-details/20190103CDT02662.
    (43) Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.
    (44) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 42.
    (45) COM(2024)0800, Annex with recommendations, pp. 1, 9, 11, 19 and 24.
    (46) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj).
    (47) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (48) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (49) Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj).
    (50) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (51) OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj.
    (52) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (53) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/343/oj).
    (54) EESC opinion of 14 February 2024 entitled ‘Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward’.
    (55) Civil Society Europe, ‘Joint Civil Society Contribution on Civic Space to the 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report’, June 2024.
    (56) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Addressing racism in policing, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (57) Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Drozd v. Poland, 15158/19 of 6 April 2023, and Mándli and Others v Hungary, 63164/16 of 26 May 2020.
    (58) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj).
    (59) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (60) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj).
    (61) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
    (62) Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU (OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj).
    (63) Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC (OJ L, 2024/1499, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1499/oj).
    (64) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (65) Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518).
    (66) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (67) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (68) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (69) Europol, ‘AI and policing – The benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence for law enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Stifel Welcomes Olympic Gold Medal Cyclist Kristen Faulkner as Newest Brand Ambassador

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ST. LOUIS, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Stifel Financial Corp. (NYSE: SF) announced today the signing of Olympic gold medalist Kristen Faulkner as the firm’s newest brand ambassador. Faulkner made history at the 2024 Paris Olympics by winning gold in both the women’s individual road race and the women’s track cycling team pursuit. She brings extraordinary drive, determination, and a compelling personal story to Stifel, perfectly aligning with the firm known as a place “Where Success Meets Success.”

    Before becoming a world-class cyclist, Faulkner began her career in venture capital, working at Bessemer Venture Partners and Threshold Ventures. Her bold leap from finance to Olympic champion has made her a symbol of resilience, ambition, and excellence. She is the first American woman to win gold in both road and track cycling in a single Olympic Games.

    “We are incredibly proud to welcome Kristen Faulkner to the Stifel team,” said Ronald J. Kruszewski, Chairman and CEO of Stifel. “As our sports partnership portfolio continues to grow, Kristen’s commitment to excellence and inspiring journey, together with her experience as a financial professional, align perfectly with Stifel’s values. Her story is remarkable, and we are excited to have her represent our brand.”

    As a brand ambassador, Faulkner will collaborate with Stifel on initiatives promoting financial wellness and empowering individuals to pursue their financial goals. She will participate in community outreach programs, engaging with Stifel clients and associates, represent Stifel at key events, and appear in select Stifel creative campaigns.

    “I am honored to join Stifel and their impressive group of brand ambassadors,” said Faulkner. “Both financial success and athletic success require discipline, patience, and hard work. I’m excited to partner with a firm that shares these same values.”

    Faulkner joins a roster of decorated athletes who serve as Stifel ambassadors, including all-time leader in World Cup alpine skiing victories Mikaela Shiffrin, three-time Olympic medalist in cross-country skiing Jessie Diggins, and two-time Olympic medalist in halfpipe skiing Alex Ferreira.

    Stifel is also a proud partner of the Stifel U.S. Ski Team, the St. Louis Cardinals, the St. Louis Blues, and the Stifel Charity Classic of the PGA Tour Champions.

    Stifel Company Information
    Stifel Financial Corp. (NYSE: SF) is a financial services holding company headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, that conducts its banking, securities, and financial services business through several wholly owned subsidiaries. Stifel’s broker-dealer clients are served in the United States through Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated, including its Eaton Partners and Miller Buckfire business divisions; Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc.; and Stifel Independent Advisors, LLC; in Canada through Stifel Nicolaus Canada Inc.; and in the United Kingdom and Europe through Stifel Nicolaus Europe Limited. The Company’s broker-dealer affiliates provide securities brokerage, investment banking, trading, investment advisory, and related financial services to individual investors, professional money managers, businesses, and municipalities. Stifel Bank and Stifel Bank & Trust offer a full range of consumer and commercial lending solutions. Stifel Trust Company, N.A. and Stifel Trust Company Delaware, N.A. offer trust and related services. To learn more about Stifel, please visit the Company’s website at www.stifel.com. For global disclosures, please visit https://www.stifel.com/investor-relations/press-releases.

    Media Contact
    Neil Shapiro, +1 (212) 271-3447
    shapiron@stifel.com

    Brian Spellecy, +1 (314) 342-2000
    spellecb@stifel.com

    The MIL Network

  • Amit Shah inaugurates new MACCIA headquarters in Mumbai; highlights Maharashtra’s role in India’s economic growth

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    nion Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Amit Shah inaugurated the newly constructed headquarters of the Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (MACCIA) in Mumbai today. The event also featured a state-level cooperative industrial conference, with Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, Union Minister of State for Cooperation Murlidhar Mohol, and other dignitaries in attendance.

    Shah reflected on the enduring legacy of Seth Walchand, a pioneering industrialist whose contributions have continued to benefit Maharashtra and the nation. Shah emphasized that institutions celebrating a centenary must not only take pride in their legacy but also use the occasion for introspection and renewal.

    He remarked that in the century since MACCIA’s founding, the global and national economic landscape has undergone transformative changes. With globalization reshaping commerce, industry, and agriculture, Shah called on Chambers of Commerce across the country to adapt their methods and reassess their relevance. He urged them to engage professional institutions to align operations with the evolving economic and policymaking frameworks of both state and central governments.

    Highlighting India’s economic trajectory, Shah said that the country has emerged as the world’s fourth-largest economy, overtaking former colonial powers. He credited policy reforms and their robust implementation under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership for this significant progress, including the rising global standing of the Indian passport.

    Shah said that Maharashtra has become a symbol of India’s industrial growth, hosting the country’s financial capital and contributing 39% of India’s total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). He cited that the state also leads in startups, tourism, income tax filings by women, and infrastructure development — including the upcoming Vadhavan Port and the bullet train project.

    Addressing the development of Mumbai and its surrounding areas, Shah revealed that the central and state governments, operating under a “double-engine” governance model, are investing over ₹7 lakh crore in transformative projects. This effort, he said, is infusing Maharashtra with new energy and fostering long-term development.

    Drawing a comparison between two decades, Shah stated that Maharashtra received ₹1.91 lakh crore in central devolution and grants between 2004 and 2014, whereas this amount increased to ₹7.82 lakh crore during the Modi government’s tenure from 2014 to 2024.

    Emphasizing the importance of cooperative federalism, Shah said that Prime Minister Modi’s vision of “Team India” is central to the nation’s development. He added that the joint efforts of the Centre and the States, along with a constructive mindset, are driving the country’s rapid progress.

    MACCIA’s role, he added, remains crucial as it continues to raise demands for policy changes, infrastructure upgrades, and solutions for issues in trade, industry, and agriculture. Shah called upon all Chambers of Commerce to evolve with the times and continue contributing meaningfully to India’s economic journey.

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and SACE provide EUR250 Million to Africa Finance Corporation


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    Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) (www.AfricaFC.org), the continent’s leading infrastructure solutions provider, has secured a landmark EUR 250 million 10-year term loan facility from Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) the Italian Financial Institution for Development Cooperation. The transaction is backed by a guarantee from SACE, the Italian insurance and financial group fully owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, covering up to 80% of the facility amount.

    The financing builds on engagement at the Mattei Plan-Global Gateway summit, attended by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, CDP, SACE and AFC, where the parties confirmed their intent to collaborate. The facility is structured to cultivate Italian supply chain opportunities in infrastructure and renewable energy generation, including the supply of components for the Lobito Railway Corridor – a commercial railway line that will run through Angola and extend to the borders of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    This long-term facility deepens AFC’s strategic partnership with both CDP and SACE, while reinforcing its mandate to mobilise high-quality, long-tenor capital in support of delivering sustainable infrastructure across Africa.

    “Cassa Depositi e Prestiti confirms its role as a strategic partner in supporting infrastructure projects with a high social and economic impact in Africa. With this financing – said Dario Scannapieco, Chief Executive Officer of CDP – we are strengthening business and technological relations between Italy and Africa, enhancing talent and innovation. We are convinced that investing in strategic projects not only creates new opportunities for our companies but also helps to build lasting and shared ties capable of fostering growth and well-being for local communities.”

    “We are proud to contribute to the involvement of Italian companies in the transport and logistics sector to realise a significant strategic project like the Lobito Railway Corridor within the Mattei Plan,” said Alessandra Ricci, CEO of SACE. “This collaboration reaffirms SACE’s commitment to promoting new connections for Italian companies seeking to diversify their exports and embrace new growth opportunities.”

    Our partnership with CDP, further strengthened by SACE’s guarantee, exemplifies the power of blended finance in unlocking capital for infrastructure development in Africa,” said Banji Fehintola, Executive Board Member and Head, Financial Services, AFC. The Lobito Corridor is a transformational project that will open new trade routes for resources, support regional industrialisation, accelerate job creation and strengthen Africa’s position in global value chains, while delivering long-term, inclusive growth.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Africa Finance Corporation (AFC).

    SACE Media gallery: https://apo-opa.co/4ecSix5

    Media Enquiries:
    Communications
    Africa Finance Corporation
    Email: communications@africafc.org

    SACE
    Press Office
    ufficiostampa@sace.it

    CDP Media Relations
    ufficio.stampa@cdp.it 
    Tel: +39 06 42213990
    Website: www.CDP.it

    Follow CDP on:
    LinkedIn: https://apo-opa.co/4kNl4H7
    X: https://apo-opa.co/4kU1x8a
    Facebook: https://apo-opa.co/3T3VMbE
    Instagram: https://apo-opa.co/43TpIO3
    YouTube: https://apo-opa.co/3T3UZYh

    About Lobito Corridor Rail Project:
    The railway line will be approximately 830 km long and will connect Chingola in Zambia to Luacano in Angola with the aim of facilitating the transportation of agricultural products, minerals and consumer goods. The greatest opportunities for the Italian supply chain in the region lie in sectors such as energy, renewables, transportation and logistics.

    About CDP:
    Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is the National Promotional Institute which has been supporting the Italian economy since 1850. The main goal of CDP is to accelerate the industrial and infrastructural development of Italy to boost its economic and social growth. CDP focuses its activities on sustainable development at local level, supporting the innovation and growth of Italian enterprises, also in the international arena. It partners local authorities, in a financing and advisory capacity, to create infrastructures and improve services of public value. CDP also participates actively in international cooperation initiatives to realize projects in developing countries and emerging markets. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is entirely financed by private capital, through the issuing of Postal Savings Bonds and Postal Savings Passbooks, and through issues on national and international financial markets.

    About SACE:
    SACE is the insurance and financial group controlled by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, specialising in supporting the growth of Italian companies through a wide range of solutions to facilitate export and innovation, including financial guarantees, factoring, risk management and protection, advisory services and business matching. With a network of 11 offices in Italy and 13 worldwide in target countries for Made in Italy products, SACE serves over 60,000 companies, supporting their growth in Italy and globally, with a portfolio of insured operations and guaranteed investments totalling EU 267 billion across approximately 200 foreign markets.

    About AFC:
    AFC was established in 2007 to be the catalyst for pragmatic infrastructure and industrial investments across Africa. AFC’s approach combines specialist industry expertise with a focus on financial and technical advisory, project structuring, project development, and risk capital to address Africa’s infrastructure development needs and drive sustainable economic growth. Eighteen years on, AFC has developed a track record as the partner of choice in Africa for investing and delivering on instrumental, high-quality infrastructure assets that provide essential services in core infrastructure sectors. AFC has 45 member countries and has invested over US$15 billion since its inception.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson releases his fifth and final annual report

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    OTTAWA, June 20, 2025 – Canada’s Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson, Mr. François Boileau, has released his annual report, Clearing the Path, which was tabled today in the House of Commons. The report provides an overview of the activities of the Office of the Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson (OTO) between April 1, 2024, and March 31, 2025.

    The report details how the OTO influenced service improvements at the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) by reviewing service issues and complaints. It also includes two recommendations to the Minister of Finance and National Revenue and the Chair of the CRA’s Board of Management to improve the CRA’s service to Canadians.

    During the last fiscal year, the OTO released two systemic examination reports: Unintended Consequences, about the CRA’s administration of the 2023 bare trust filing requirements, and Timing Is Everything, about issues that may be causing delays in Canada child benefit (CCB) payments for temporary residents. Between these two reports, we made 16 recommendations, and the CRA accepted 13 of them.

    As this is the final year of Mr. Boileau’s five-year mandate, the annual report also includes a chapter about his views on improving the CRA’s services for vulnerable and hard‑to-reach populations. This chapter analyzes the CRA’s efforts to make sure these populations get the benefits and credits they are entitled to. It looks at the CRA’s existing programs, including the Community Volunteer Income Tax Program, the Income Tax Assistance – Volunteer Program (in Quebec) and SimpleFile, and discusses how they could be improved to better meet Canadians’ needs.

    2024–2025 report highlights:

    Recommendations

    The Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson recommends:

    1. (…) that the CRA perform a comprehensive review of its content on Canada.ca, including its web page architecture and content, to remove redundant information and to make sure the information it provides is relevant, clear, concise and easy to find. It should complete this review by spring 2026 and start implementing changes by fall 2026.
    2. (…) that the CRA provide a permanently funded grant program for organizations participating in the Community Volunteer Income Tax Program and the Income Tax Assistance – Volunteer Program to support their free tax clinics for eligible taxpayers and help them offset their operating costs.

    Trends in complaints

    1. Contact centres: The top trend relates to issues with the information provided by contact centre agents. Many taxpayers who were able to reach the CRA’s contact centres claimed that agents provided them with incomplete, inaccurate, or unclear information, while others were unable to even reach an agent because the wait times were too long or they could not get into the queue.
    2. Income tax and benefit return processing and adjustments: Many complainants claimed that there were delays in processing returns beyond the CRA’s published service standard; however, it is important to note that the CRA’s service standard applies to returns received on or before filing due dates. As well, the standard excludes returns filed for deceased, bankruptcy, international and non-resident individuals as well as emigrants. It also does not apply in situations where returns are filed for multiple tax years or when the CRA has to contact the taxpayers for more information.
    3. Collection action: These complaints claimed the CRA did not consider the taxpayer’s personal circumstances when taking collection action, and in some cases the taxpayer claimed that the collection action put them in financial hardship.
    4. CCB: Many complainants said that the CRA’s review of their eligibility for the CCB put a burden on them. The CRA told them that the information they provided was not sufficient, even if they provided most of what was requested. They claimed that the CRA did not clearly inform them why what they provided was not sufficient and why additional documents were required.
    5. The CRA’s Service Feedback Program: These complainants said that the CRA’s Service Feedback Program did not respond to their complaint within its published service standard.

    Background information

    The Office of the Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson works independently from the CRA. Canadians can submit complaints to the Office if they feel they are not receiving the appropriate service from the CRA. Our main objective is to improve the service the CRA provides to taxpayers and benefit recipients by reviewing individual service complaints and service issues that affect more than one person or a segment of the population.

    The Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson assists, advises and informs the Minister of Finance and National Revenue about matters relating to services provided by the CRA. The Ombudsperson ensures, in particular, that the CRA respects eight of the service rights outlined in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Co-Founder of Los Cuinis Drug Cartel Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison; High-Ranking Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Operative Pleads Guilty

    Source: US State of California

    Today, a Mexican national and the co-founder of the armed, violent, and prolific Los Cuinis drug cartel was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy. 

    According to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia, 49, of Michoacan, Mexico, was one of the top leaders — alongside his brothers, Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia and Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia — of Los Cuinis, a major Mexican drug cartel responsible for trafficking multiple tons of cocaine from South America, through Mexico, into the United States. Los Cuinis financed the founding and growth of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which traffics hundreds of tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries, and is known for extreme violence, murders, torture, and corruption.

    In February 2025, President Trump designated CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. According to court documents, the top leader of CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” is the brother-in-law of the Gonzalez-Valencia brothers. Closely allied, Los Cuinis and CJNG form one of the most violent and prolific transnational criminal organizations in the world, responsible for sending staggering amounts of drugs into the United States and inflicting extreme violence to further that objective.

    Also today, as part of the Department of Justice’s focus on dismantling CJNG, another Mexican national, Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa, also known as “El Guacho,” a high-ranking CJNG member and El Mencho’s son-in-law, pleaded guilty to one count of international money laundering conspiracy.

    “Today, the Criminal Division dealt two more devastating blows to CJNG and Los Cuinis through the sentencing of Jose Gonzalez-Valencia and the conviction of Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These men and the cartels they led are responsible for immeasurable death and destruction in the United States and Mexico. The Justice Department will continue to dismantle CJNG, Los Cuinis and all other transnational criminal organizations that flood our streets with dangerous drugs and engage in extreme violence to control their operations.”

    “CJNG is one of the most powerful, influential, and ruthless criminal organizations to threaten our public safety and national security. Each leader and associate of CJNG who faces justice within the United States brings us one step closer to dismantling this terrorist organization,” said Acting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Robert Murphy. “DEA will continue to use all available resources to disrupt CJNG’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations and systematically destroy their network.”

    From at least 2006 to 2016, according to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed and coordinated numerous multi-ton shipments of cocaine destined for the United States using air, land, sea, and underwater methods. In 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard seized one shipment from a semi-submersible vessel that was transporting at least 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico for further distribution into the United States.

    As one of Los Cuinis’ top leaders, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed acts of extreme violence in furtherance of drug trafficking activities, including the murder of an individual who allegedly stole a shipment of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Los Cuinis, according to court documents. Jose Gonzalez-Valencia personally carried firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities and supplied weapons and ammunition to the CJNG.

    In 2015, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia went into hiding in Bolivia — a country that did not extradite anyone to the United States from 2001 to 2023, despite an existing extradition treaty — and resided there for over two years under a fictitious identity. In 2017, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia was arrested in Brazil while on vacation and was subsequently extradited to the United States. Brazil’s extradition treaty required that the U.S. Government not recommend more than a 30-year sentence.

    Pursuant to his plea agreement, Gutierrez-Ochoa admitted that he was a member of CJNG who was connected to CJNG’s top leadership. He also admitted that from at least 2023 until his arrest in 2024, he and other CJNG operatives used sophisticated money laundering methods involving real estate transactions, shell companies, and international money transfers to launder CJNG’s drug trafficking proceeds. For example, Gutierrez-Ochoa and others completed two wire transfers totaling $1.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds to purchase a luxury residence in Riverside, California, titled in the name of a Mexican entity owned and controlled by CJNG. When Gutierrez-Ochoa was arrested in November 2024, he was living at that property under a fictitious identity and possessed two untraceable and illegal firearms, approximately $2.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds, and numerous luxury items purchased with CJNG’s drug proceeds, including jewelry, watches, and vehicles.

    Gutierrez-Ochoa is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 7 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine his sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Today’s sentencing of Gonzalez-Valencia and conviction of Gutierrez-Ochoa follow several recent strikes into CJNG’s most inner circle.

    El Mencho’s older brother, Antonio Oseguera Cervantes, and Erick Valencia Salazar, an alleged co-founder of CJNG and El Mencho’s close advisor, were among the 29 wanted cartel leaders taken into U.S. custody on Feb. 27, 2025.

    Shortly after, on March 7, 2025, El Mencho’s son, Ruben Oseguera-Gonzalez, known as El Menchito, was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 30 years to run consecutively and ordered to forfeit over $6 billion in drug trafficking proceeds. Before his arrest, Oseguera-Gonzalez was CJNG’s second-in-command and led CJNG for nearly seven years. He is responsible for trafficking more than 50 metric tons of cocaine and supervising drug labs that produced more than 1,000 metric tons of methamphetamine in Mexico. In 2013, he was one of the first contributors to the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, pledging to “do it big” and build an empire from counterfeit oxycontin pills laced with fentanyl. As the evidence at trial showed, he also committed heinous acts of violence. According to statements made in court and trial testimony, Oseguera-Gonzalez ordered the murder of more than 100 people, some of whom he murdered himself.

    The DEA and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section have been systematically dismantling the leadership of the CJNG and Los Cuinis at the highest level. To date, the ongoing investigation has led to indictments of approximately 30 high-value CJNG and Los Cuinis command-and-control targets, including seven Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), the top drug trafficking command-and-control leaders. As of June 2025, 12 defendants have been convicted, including two at trial.

    A number of indicted leaders of CJNG and Los Cuinis remain fugitives, including El Mencho, whose capture reward was recently increased to $15 million under the State Department’s Narcotic Rewards Program. Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia, another top leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, was arrested in 2015 by Mexican authorities pursuant to the U.S. indictment but since then has been fighting extradition to the United States.

    The DEA Los Angeles Field Division investigated the cases. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance with obtaining foreign evidence and securing Jose Gonzalez-Valencia’s extradition to the United States.

    Trial Attorneys Lernik Begian, Gwen Stamper, and Douglas Meisel of the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell
    06.20.25
    Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs
    Cantwell presses Secretary Wright on whether DOE will renege on $1B promised for PNW green hydrogen hub On hydropower, Secretary acknowledges to Cantwell that “hydro has been a great resource for this country” that is “quite beneficial to our electricity grid”
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, pressed U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright on whether the Trump Administration is attempting to roll back hydrogen production investments secured and awarded under the Biden Administration — including a $1 billion grant awarded to the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association in 2023 to become a one of seven Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs, as well as a 2022 tax credit aimed at spurring more investment in clean hydrogen production called 45V.  The budget reconciliation bill passed last month by the House of Representatives eliminates the hydrogen credit, as would the proposal released earlier this week by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID).
    Sen. Cantwell: “I actually think getting rid of the tax credits that we have, some of the other ones, broadly, are going to lead to electricity increased cost. And so, can I get you to tell me about the hydrogen hubs, whether you believe you support the hydrogen hubs and moving forward on this?”
    Wright: “So, we put together, as I’m sure you’ve heard, and we’ve published it on the website, this project review process. We have a cross-functional team that evaluates every project. We’re going through 500 projects.”
    Sen. Cantwell: “But is that data call a way to kill the projects? Or no, you really believe in funding some?”
    Wright: “Oh, absolutely. No, we are funding plenty of projects right now, and we don’t stop funding any project. We’re funding all of the existing projects right now, and when we evaluate them – no, plenty of projects will pass. Plenty of projects will pass. Other projects we’ll say, “Hey, can you modify it this way to make it much more beneficial?” Some projects will be modified, and some projects will be ended. “
    Video of their Q&A is HERE; a transcript is HERE.
    Hydrogen is a clean fuel that, when consumed in a fuel cell, produces no dirty emissions — only water. Hydrogen can be produced from existing power resources, such as solar and hydropower.
    Sen. Cantwell helped secure the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (H2Hubs) program and other key hydrogen investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) during consideration in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee in July 2021, where she is a senior member, and push for its successful passage through the Senate. The H2Hubs program designated up to $7 billion in competitive grants to establish between six and 10 regional clean hydrogen hubs across the United States. These networks of hydrogen producers, consumers, and local connective infrastructure were meant to help accelerate the use of hydrogen as clean energy and work toward achieving former President Biden’s goal of a 100 percent clean electrical grid by 2035 and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.
    In October 2023, with support from the region’s Congressional delegation led by Sen. Cantwell, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association received a $1 billion grant through the H2Hubs program. With continued federal support, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association will be able to build out a robust network of hydrogen suppliers and off-takers in both the western and eastern parts of Washington and Oregon, as well as parts of Montana. Clean hydrogen can support decarbonization efforts already being made in the transportation, industrial, and agricultural sectors, as well as the rapidly expanding zero-carbon aviation sector being pioneered in the Pacific Northwest.
    In 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, which included the 45V hydrogen production tax credit to incentivize projects that produce clean hydrogen power. In July 2024, Sen. Cantwell joined a group of colleagues in sending a letter urging then-Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to issue guidance on 45V eligibility that capitalizes on the “opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions faster and enhance our energy security, while strengthening our economy, creating thousands of jobs, and combating the climate crisis.” The budget bill currently being negotiated in the House and the Senate would drastically shorten the timeline for projects to qualify for the 45V credits – requiring them to begin construction by Jan. 1, 2026 rather than the previous deadline of Jan. 1, 2033 – and cut funding for the H2Hubs program. The Trump Administration is also currently reviewing the remaining H2Hubs financing.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Urges Trump to Finally Bring TikTok Under U.S. Ownership: “We Are Allowing This National Security Issue to Fester”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

    06.20.25

    Cantwell Urges Trump to Finally Bring TikTok Under U.S. Ownership: “We Are Allowing This National Security Issue to Fester”

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – This week, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, delivered a speech on the Senate floor urging President Donald Trump to follow the law as passed by Congress and ensure TikTok is sold to a U.S. company so that America’s enemies will no longer be able to weaponize TikTok to spread their propaganda and turn the world against the United States. In her remarks, Sen. Cantwell cited studies that revealed an alarming rise in anti-Semitic content on TikTok.  

    Yesterday, President Trump announced that he would extend a June 19 deadline for ByteDance, the Chinese-owned company that owns TikTok, to sell the app. His extension – the third of its kind – would push the divestment date to mid-September.  Earlier today, he signed an Executive Order to extend the deadline until September 17, 2025  

    “I rise to express my concerns about reports that President Trump is going to again extend the deadline for getting TikTok out of the control of ByteDance and the Chinese government. Concern because that means that again, we are going to allow this national security issue to fester and to continue on, maybe for several more months,” she said.

    “I’m concerned that these extensions of the TikTok deal are illegal. Note that Congress passed this law, and the president extending the deadline to allow them to continue to operate in the United States under the control of ByteDance and the Chinese government is not what Congress intended,” Sen. Cantwell continued.

    “Simply put, we cannot continue to allow foreign adversaries to control technology that can fuel domestic and political polarization and civil unrest. We need the president to follow the law that Congress passed — bring TikTok under U.S. ownership.”

    Video of her floor speech is HERE; a transcript is HERE.

    In January 2025, following the Supreme Court’s 9-0 decision to uphold the law requiring the sale of TikTok, Sen. Cantwell issued a statement urging the administration to “find a solution to shut the Chinese government backdoor, improve the platform, and help content creators earn more revenue for their work.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Co-Founder of Los Cuinis Drug Cartel Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison; High-Ranking Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Operative Pleads Guilty

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Today, a Mexican national and the co-founder of the armed, violent, and prolific Los Cuinis drug cartel was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy. 

    According to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia, 49, of Michoacan, Mexico, was one of the top leaders — alongside his brothers, Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia and Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia — of Los Cuinis, a major Mexican drug cartel responsible for trafficking multiple tons of cocaine from South America, through Mexico, into the United States. Los Cuinis financed the founding and growth of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which traffics hundreds of tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries, and is known for extreme violence, murders, torture, and corruption.

    In February 2025, President Trump designated CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. According to court documents, the top leader of CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” is the brother-in-law of the Gonzalez-Valencia brothers. Closely allied, Los Cuinis and CJNG form one of the most violent and prolific transnational criminal organizations in the world, responsible for sending staggering amounts of drugs into the United States and inflicting extreme violence to further that objective.

    Also today, as part of the Department of Justice’s focus on dismantling CJNG, another Mexican national, Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa, also known as “El Guacho,” a high-ranking CJNG member and El Mencho’s son-in-law, pleaded guilty to one count of international money laundering conspiracy.

    “Today, the Criminal Division dealt two more devastating blows to CJNG and Los Cuinis through the sentencing of Jose Gonzalez-Valencia and the conviction of Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These men and the cartels they led are responsible for immeasurable death and destruction in the United States and Mexico. The Justice Department will continue to dismantle CJNG, Los Cuinis and all other transnational criminal organizations that flood our streets with dangerous drugs and engage in extreme violence to control their operations.”

    “CJNG is one of the most powerful, influential, and ruthless criminal organizations to threaten our public safety and national security. Each leader and associate of CJNG who faces justice within the United States brings us one step closer to dismantling this terrorist organization,” said Acting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Robert Murphy. “DEA will continue to use all available resources to disrupt CJNG’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations and systematically destroy their network.”

    From at least 2006 to 2016, according to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed and coordinated numerous multi-ton shipments of cocaine destined for the United States using air, land, sea, and underwater methods. In 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard seized one shipment from a semi-submersible vessel that was transporting at least 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico for further distribution into the United States.

    As one of Los Cuinis’ top leaders, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed acts of extreme violence in furtherance of drug trafficking activities, including the murder of an individual who allegedly stole a shipment of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Los Cuinis, according to court documents. Jose Gonzalez-Valencia personally carried firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities and supplied weapons and ammunition to the CJNG.

    In 2015, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia went into hiding in Bolivia — a country that did not extradite anyone to the United States from 2001 to 2023, despite an existing extradition treaty — and resided there for over two years under a fictitious identity. In 2017, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia was arrested in Brazil while on vacation and was subsequently extradited to the United States. Brazil’s extradition treaty required that the U.S. Government not recommend more than a 30-year sentence.

    Pursuant to his plea agreement, Gutierrez-Ochoa admitted that he was a member of CJNG who was connected to CJNG’s top leadership. He also admitted that from at least 2023 until his arrest in 2024, he and other CJNG operatives used sophisticated money laundering methods involving real estate transactions, shell companies, and international money transfers to launder CJNG’s drug trafficking proceeds. For example, Gutierrez-Ochoa and others completed two wire transfers totaling $1.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds to purchase a luxury residence in Riverside, California, titled in the name of a Mexican entity owned and controlled by CJNG. When Gutierrez-Ochoa was arrested in November 2024, he was living at that property under a fictitious identity and possessed two untraceable and illegal firearms, approximately $2.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds, and numerous luxury items purchased with CJNG’s drug proceeds, including jewelry, watches, and vehicles.

    Gutierrez-Ochoa is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 7 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine his sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Today’s sentencing of Gonzalez-Valencia and conviction of Gutierrez-Ochoa follow several recent strikes into CJNG’s most inner circle.

    El Mencho’s older brother, Antonio Oseguera Cervantes, and Erick Valencia Salazar, an alleged co-founder of CJNG and El Mencho’s close advisor, were among the 29 wanted cartel leaders taken into U.S. custody on Feb. 27, 2025.

    Shortly after, on March 7, 2025, El Mencho’s son, Ruben Oseguera-Gonzalez, known as El Menchito, was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 30 years to run consecutively and ordered to forfeit over $6 billion in drug trafficking proceeds. Before his arrest, Oseguera-Gonzalez was CJNG’s second-in-command and led CJNG for nearly seven years. He is responsible for trafficking more than 50 metric tons of cocaine and supervising drug labs that produced more than 1,000 metric tons of methamphetamine in Mexico. In 2013, he was one of the first contributors to the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, pledging to “do it big” and build an empire from counterfeit oxycontin pills laced with fentanyl. As the evidence at trial showed, he also committed heinous acts of violence. According to statements made in court and trial testimony, Oseguera-Gonzalez ordered the murder of more than 100 people, some of whom he murdered himself.

    The DEA and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section have been systematically dismantling the leadership of the CJNG and Los Cuinis at the highest level. To date, the ongoing investigation has led to indictments of approximately 30 high-value CJNG and Los Cuinis command-and-control targets, including seven Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), the top drug trafficking command-and-control leaders. As of June 2025, 12 defendants have been convicted, including two at trial.

    A number of indicted leaders of CJNG and Los Cuinis remain fugitives, including El Mencho, whose capture reward was recently increased to $15 million under the State Department’s Narcotic Rewards Program. Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia, another top leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, was arrested in 2015 by Mexican authorities pursuant to the U.S. indictment but since then has been fighting extradition to the United States.

    The DEA Los Angeles Field Division investigated the cases. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance with obtaining foreign evidence and securing Jose Gonzalez-Valencia’s extradition to the United States.

    Trial Attorneys Lernik Begian, Gwen Stamper, and Douglas Meisel of the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Co-Founder of Los Cuinis Drug Cartel Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison; High-Ranking Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) Operative Pleads Guilty

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Today, a Mexican national and the co-founder of the armed, violent, and prolific Los Cuinis drug cartel was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in a major drug trafficking conspiracy. 

    According to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia, 49, of Michoacan, Mexico, was one of the top leaders — alongside his brothers, Gerardo Gonzalez-Valencia and Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia — of Los Cuinis, a major Mexican drug cartel responsible for trafficking multiple tons of cocaine from South America, through Mexico, into the United States. Los Cuinis financed the founding and growth of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which traffics hundreds of tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries, and is known for extreme violence, murders, torture, and corruption.

    In February 2025, President Trump designated CJNG a foreign terrorist organization. According to court documents, the top leader of CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho,” is the brother-in-law of the Gonzalez-Valencia brothers. Closely allied, Los Cuinis and CJNG form one of the most violent and prolific transnational criminal organizations in the world, responsible for sending staggering amounts of drugs into the United States and inflicting extreme violence to further that objective.

    Also today, as part of the Department of Justice’s focus on dismantling CJNG, another Mexican national, Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa, also known as “El Guacho,” a high-ranking CJNG member and El Mencho’s son-in-law, pleaded guilty to one count of international money laundering conspiracy.

    “Today, the Criminal Division dealt two more devastating blows to CJNG and Los Cuinis through the sentencing of Jose Gonzalez-Valencia and the conviction of Cristian Fernando Gutierrez-Ochoa,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “These men and the cartels they led are responsible for immeasurable death and destruction in the United States and Mexico. The Justice Department will continue to dismantle CJNG, Los Cuinis and all other transnational criminal organizations that flood our streets with dangerous drugs and engage in extreme violence to control their operations.”

    “CJNG is one of the most powerful, influential, and ruthless criminal organizations to threaten our public safety and national security. Each leader and associate of CJNG who faces justice within the United States brings us one step closer to dismantling this terrorist organization,” said Acting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Robert Murphy. “DEA will continue to use all available resources to disrupt CJNG’s drug trafficking and money laundering operations and systematically destroy their network.”

    From at least 2006 to 2016, according to court documents, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed and coordinated numerous multi-ton shipments of cocaine destined for the United States using air, land, sea, and underwater methods. In 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard seized one shipment from a semi-submersible vessel that was transporting at least 4,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico for further distribution into the United States.

    As one of Los Cuinis’ top leaders, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia directed acts of extreme violence in furtherance of drug trafficking activities, including the murder of an individual who allegedly stole a shipment of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Los Cuinis, according to court documents. Jose Gonzalez-Valencia personally carried firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking activities and supplied weapons and ammunition to the CJNG.

    In 2015, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia went into hiding in Bolivia — a country that did not extradite anyone to the United States from 2001 to 2023, despite an existing extradition treaty — and resided there for over two years under a fictitious identity. In 2017, Jose Gonzalez-Valencia was arrested in Brazil while on vacation and was subsequently extradited to the United States. Brazil’s extradition treaty required that the U.S. Government not recommend more than a 30-year sentence.

    Pursuant to his plea agreement, Gutierrez-Ochoa admitted that he was a member of CJNG who was connected to CJNG’s top leadership. He also admitted that from at least 2023 until his arrest in 2024, he and other CJNG operatives used sophisticated money laundering methods involving real estate transactions, shell companies, and international money transfers to launder CJNG’s drug trafficking proceeds. For example, Gutierrez-Ochoa and others completed two wire transfers totaling $1.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds to purchase a luxury residence in Riverside, California, titled in the name of a Mexican entity owned and controlled by CJNG. When Gutierrez-Ochoa was arrested in November 2024, he was living at that property under a fictitious identity and possessed two untraceable and illegal firearms, approximately $2.2 million of CJNG’s drug proceeds, and numerous luxury items purchased with CJNG’s drug proceeds, including jewelry, watches, and vehicles.

    Gutierrez-Ochoa is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 7 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine his sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Today’s sentencing of Gonzalez-Valencia and conviction of Gutierrez-Ochoa follow several recent strikes into CJNG’s most inner circle.

    El Mencho’s older brother, Antonio Oseguera Cervantes, and Erick Valencia Salazar, an alleged co-founder of CJNG and El Mencho’s close advisor, were among the 29 wanted cartel leaders taken into U.S. custody on Feb. 27, 2025.

    Shortly after, on March 7, 2025, El Mencho’s son, Ruben Oseguera-Gonzalez, known as El Menchito, was sentenced to a term of life in prison plus 30 years to run consecutively and ordered to forfeit over $6 billion in drug trafficking proceeds. Before his arrest, Oseguera-Gonzalez was CJNG’s second-in-command and led CJNG for nearly seven years. He is responsible for trafficking more than 50 metric tons of cocaine and supervising drug labs that produced more than 1,000 metric tons of methamphetamine in Mexico. In 2013, he was one of the first contributors to the fentanyl epidemic in the United States, pledging to “do it big” and build an empire from counterfeit oxycontin pills laced with fentanyl. As the evidence at trial showed, he also committed heinous acts of violence. According to statements made in court and trial testimony, Oseguera-Gonzalez ordered the murder of more than 100 people, some of whom he murdered himself.

    The DEA and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section have been systematically dismantling the leadership of the CJNG and Los Cuinis at the highest level. To date, the ongoing investigation has led to indictments of approximately 30 high-value CJNG and Los Cuinis command-and-control targets, including seven Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs), the top drug trafficking command-and-control leaders. As of June 2025, 12 defendants have been convicted, including two at trial.

    A number of indicted leaders of CJNG and Los Cuinis remain fugitives, including El Mencho, whose capture reward was recently increased to $15 million under the State Department’s Narcotic Rewards Program. Abigael Gonzalez-Valencia, another top leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, was arrested in 2015 by Mexican authorities pursuant to the U.S. indictment but since then has been fighting extradition to the United States.

    The DEA Los Angeles Field Division investigated the cases. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance with obtaining foreign evidence and securing Jose Gonzalez-Valencia’s extradition to the United States.

    Trial Attorneys Lernik Begian, Gwen Stamper, and Douglas Meisel of the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are prosecuting the cases.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Sagteс Finalizes Strategic AI Acquisition to Accelerate SaaS Revenue and Multi-Sector AI Deployment

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Sagtec Global Limited (NASDAQ: SAGT) (“Sagtec” or the “Company”), a next-generation provider of customizable AI and automation platforms, today announced the signing of a definitive Share Sale Agreement (SSA) to acquire an 80% equity stake in Smart Bridge Technology Limited (“Smart Bridge”), a rapidly scaling agentic AI software company with proven profitability. 

    The acquisition reinforces Sagtec’s strategic shift into an AI-first, SaaS-driven growth model. Closing remains subject to customary regulatory approvals and conditions.

    Profitable AI Acquisition to Fuel SaaS Margin Expansion

    Smart Bridge brings a profitable, enterprise-ready AI platform, having reported a net profit of US$2.1 million for FY2024. With successful deployments across fintech, retail, and logistics, its proprietary agentic AI engine offers:

    • Advanced behavioural analytics and fraud detection
    • Intelligent decision automation
    • Real-time pricing, demand forecasting, and optimization tools

    These capabilities seamlessly complement Sagtec’s hospitality and point-of-sale (POS) and hospitality infrastructure, enabling immediate integration and monetization through a unified AI stack.

    Sagtec expects the acquisition to be immediately earnings-accretive, while accelerating its rollout of high-margin, subscription-based AI modules. Key applications include:

    • AI-powered upselling engines and dynamic menu optimization
    • Behavioural anomaly detection and real-time fraud prevention
    • Predictive inventory automation and demand planning
    • Modular AI toolkits adaptable for logistics, fintech, and hospitality sectors

    This acquisition unlocks access to a combined total addressable market (TAM) exceeding US$130 billion. According to Markets and Markets, the global AI in retail market is projected to reach US$43 billion by 2032, driven by automation and personalized customer engagement. IDC forecasts that the SME-focused AI software segment will surpass US$25 billion as smaller enterprises increasingly adopt cost-effective intelligent tools. Meanwhile, Grand View Research estimates the intelligent point-of-sale (POS) and behavioral analytics market will exceed US$65 billion, fueled by digital transformation and enterprise optimization.

    “This acquisition delivers the intelligence layer our platform needed. With Smart Bridge, we can now scale high-margin, cross-vertical AI solutions across our client base and unlock exponential value,” said Kevin Ng, Chairman, Executive Director, and Chief Executive Officer of Sagtec.

    Strategic Integration and Product Launch Set for Q3 2025

    Following the closure of the transaction, integration will begin immediately. Sagtec plans to launch its first AI-powered SaaS modules in the third quarter of 2025, beginning with the hospitality segment and expanding into fintech and logistics through its existing distribution network.

    The transaction supports Sagtec’s commitment to driving scalable, recurring SaaS revenue, executing a disciplined AI-focused M&A strategy, and delivering long-term margin expansion and shareholder value creation.

    The Company will provide further updates on its product roadmap, earnings impact, and regional expansion strategy during its upcoming half-year investor call.

    About Sagtec Global Limited

    Sagtec is a leading provider of customizable software solutions, primarily serving the Food & Beverage (F&B) sector. The Company also offers software development, data management, and social media management to enhance operational efficiency across various industries. Additionally, Sagtec operates power-bank charging stations at 300 locations across Malaysia through its subsidiary, CL Technology (International) Sdn Bhd.

    For more information on the Company, please log on to https://www.sagtec-global.com/.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of applicable U.S. securities laws. These statements are not historical facts, but rather are based on the current expectations, assumptions, and projections of Sagtec Global Limited (the “Company”) regarding future events. Forward-looking statements are generally identified by words such as “anticipates,” “believes,” “expects,” “intends,” “plans,” “projects,” “seeks,” “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” “estimates,” “potential,” or similar expressions, including the negative thereof.

    These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors that may cause actual results, performance, or achievements to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the Company’s ability to expand its regional presence, scale its Robotics-as-a-Service (RaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) offerings, strengthen its AI software and automation infrastructure platforms, and commercialize its AI-powered service robotics; as well as broader risks relating to macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical developments, global health crises, competitive dynamics, and evolving data privacy and cybersecurity regulations.

    The Company disclaims any obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements contained herein, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as required under applicable law. Investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any such forward-looking statements.

    Further information on these and other risks is included in the Company’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Contact Information:

    Sagtec Global Limited Contact:
    Ng Chen Lok
    Chairman, Executive Director & Chief Executive Officer
    Phone: +6011-6217 3661
    Email: info@sagtec-global.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Alectra marks Indigenous History Month with key achievement towards truth and reconciliation efforts

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MISSISSAUGA, Ontario, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Alectra announced today its achievement of Phase 1 certification in the Partnership Accreditation in Indigenous Relations (PAIR) program, marking an important milestone in its ongoing commitment to advancing Truth and Reconciliation. The announcement coincides with National Indigenous History Month, a time to reflect on the diverse cultures, contributions, and histories of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis Peoples.

    Offered by the Canadian Council for Indigenous Business (CCIB), PAIR is a progressive certification framework that evaluates and strengthens corporate performance in Indigenous relations. Completion of Phase 1 signals Alectra’s commitment to building respectful, reciprocal, and meaningful relationships with Indigenous communities across its service territory.

    “As an organization operating on the traditional territories of Indigenous Nations, we recognize that reconciliation is not a one-time act, but a continued responsibility that requires action, accountability, and partnership,” said Brian Bentz, President and Chief Executive Officer, Alectra Inc. “Marking this milestone during National Indigenous History Month and approaching National Indigenous Peoples Day, reinforces our commitment to learning, listening, and engaging.”

    Key elements of Alectra’s Phase 1 certification include:

    • Alectra’s Indigenous Relations Policy: A guiding framework that outlines Alectra’s commitments across leadership, employment, business development, and community relationships.
    • Leadership Statement: A formal affirmation of Alectra’s support for reconciliation and its responsibility to promote equitable Indigenous relations.
    • The PAIR Working Group: A cross-functional employee team focused on implementing a transparent and culturally aware approach to Indigenous engagement.
    • Identifying Indigenous Communities: A respectful and collaborative process to identify Indigenous communities within Alectra’s service area to support shared objectives.
    • Cultural Awareness Training – Company-wide learning initiatives to build knowledge, understanding, and allyship among employees.

    Phase 1 certification lays the foundation for Alectra’s broader Indigenous strategy. Work is already underway to advance toward Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the PAIR program, which will deepen Alectra’s commitments and ensure its activities continue to align with the priorities of Indigenous communities.

    To learn more about Alectra’s 2025 Community Support Plan, visit: alectra.com/investing-people-alectras-2025-community-support-plan.

    About Alectra’s Family of Companies

    Serving more than one million homes and businesses in Ontario’s Greater Golden Horseshoe area, Alectra Utilities is now the largest municipally-owned electric utility in Canada, based on the total number of customers served. We contribute to the economic growth and vibrancy of the 17 communities we serve by investing in essential energy infrastructure, delivering a safe and reliable supply of electricity, and providing innovative energy solutions.

    Our mission is to be an energy ally, helping our customers and the communities we serve to discover the possibilities of tomorrow’s energy future.

    X: https://twitter.com/alectranews

    Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/alectranews/

    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/alectranews/?hl=en

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/16178435/admin/

    Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/alectranews.bsky.social

    YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/alectranews

    Media Contact

    Ashley Trgachef, Media Spokesperson ashley.trgachef@alectrautilities.com |
    Telephone: 416.402.5469 | 24/7 Media Line: 1-833-MEDIA-LN

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: WhatsApp introducing advertising is a potentially lucrative but risky move

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Yusuf Oc, Associate Professor of Digital Marketing and AI, City St George’s, University of London

    shutterstock metamorworks/Shutterstock

    The decision to start advertising on WhatsApp marks a major shift for a private messaging service that has long positioned itself as being different from other social media platforms.

    Back when Meta (then known simply as Facebook) bought it in 2014 for US$19 billion, WhatsApp had an unusual and simple business model. Users were required to pay a very small annual fee (US$1 (£0.69)) in return for a minimalist, ad-free experience.

    That fee was scrapped in 2016, and WhatsApp became fully free. But it always had the potential to eventually align with Meta’s wider operation of offering free services for users to connect to others – while making money from targeted advertising.

    Since then, WhatsApp has taken slow, deliberate steps toward making money. These strategies relied on income from businesses, which paid to use WhatsApp as a way of communicating with their customers.

    By 2024, over 700 million businesses were using a separate version of the app called WhatsApp Business for customer service replies or promotional updates. Brands including Zara and Adidas use WhatsApp to send order updates, respond to queries and offer personalised shopping assistance.

    But this is still a limited revenue stream compared to the massive ad-based profits Meta generates elsewhere. Estimates suggest that WhatsApp brings in only a tiny fraction of Meta’s US$160 billion annual revenue, most of which comes from Facebook and Instagram.

    So perhaps it’s no surprise that the company is now turning to WhatsApp’s nearly 3 billion users across the world. After all, the decision mirrors a broader industry trend, with other apps like Snapchat and Telegram exploring monetisation more actively.

    Yet WhatsApp’s move still feels different.

    The platform’s identity is deeply tied to privacy, simplicity and intimacy. It is not a social media feed, it’s a communication tool. And a tool which many people use to share personal or sensitive information.

    And even if adverts are not based on message content, they may still end up being quite personal to users because of all the other data Meta has access to through Facebook and Instagram. Information about who you talk to, and how often, is still accessible – and can be used for targeted advertising.

    So if Meta already knows your favourite sports team or holiday destination for example, it may show ads related to this information. If you’ve been chatting with friends on Whatsapp about a recent fixture or planned trip, it may feel strange if you then start seeing ads on those themes.

    Business message

    WhatsApp faced a backlash in 2021 over a privacy policy update that suggested more data sharing with Facebook. The company proceeded with the update, but millions of users downloaded alternatives like Signal and Telegram in protest.

    And even if research suggests that younger generations are more comfortable with personalised content, trust is still a fragile thing – which can quickly erode. If users perceive that WhatsApp no longer protects their privacy or becomes too commercial, many might switch to rivals, at no cost, especially if their social circles are already active on rival platforms.

    WhatsAd.
    BigTunaOnline/Shutterstock

    A separate concern is that as ads appear more frequently in private communication spaces, there’s a greater risk of users, especially young people, encountering inappropriate or manipulative content.

    This is especially risky in spaces where people feel psychologically safe. Whereas users are typically wary of TV advertising, their guards might be down on platforms where they exchange intimate messages with loved ones.

    When it comes to children, parents and schools have a role to play. Rather than advocating for bans or strict age controls, which are difficult to enforce and often ignored, digital literacy needs to be embedded into education.

    Teenagers should learn how social media and messaging apps work, how data is used, how to identify manipulative content and how to manage screen time and exposure.

    Too often, adults assume that younger users are “digital natives” and tech savvy – but in reality, many are vulnerable to psychological nudges and online targeting. Research suggests that empowering them with the tools to recognise these tactics is far more sustainable than trying to shield them completely.

    Those tactics will soon be visible on what has been, for a long time, a simple messaging service. WhatsApp’s introduction of ads is not just a business decision, it’s a cultural shift. It reflects some economic logic, but also challenges the assumptions many users have about their private digital spaces.

    If done carefully, WhatsApp could strike that fine balance between making a profit and maintaining trust. But if users sense their private sphere is being commodified, the backlash may be swift.

    Because for platforms like WhatsApp, success hinges not just on what they do, but how they are perceived to do it.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. WhatsApp introducing advertising is a potentially lucrative but risky move – https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-introducing-advertising-is-a-potentially-lucrative-but-risky-move-259317

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: WhatsApp introducing advertising is a potentially lucrative but risky move

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Yusuf Oc, Associate Professor of Digital Marketing and AI, City St George’s, University of London

    shutterstock metamorworks/Shutterstock

    The decision to start advertising on WhatsApp marks a major shift for a private messaging service that has long positioned itself as being different from other social media platforms.

    Back when Meta (then known simply as Facebook) bought it in 2014 for US$19 billion, WhatsApp had an unusual and simple business model. Users were required to pay a very small annual fee (US$1 (£0.69)) in return for a minimalist, ad-free experience.

    That fee was scrapped in 2016, and WhatsApp became fully free. But it always had the potential to eventually align with Meta’s wider operation of offering free services for users to connect to others – while making money from targeted advertising.

    Since then, WhatsApp has taken slow, deliberate steps toward making money. These strategies relied on income from businesses, which paid to use WhatsApp as a way of communicating with their customers.

    By 2024, over 700 million businesses were using a separate version of the app called WhatsApp Business for customer service replies or promotional updates. Brands including Zara and Adidas use WhatsApp to send order updates, respond to queries and offer personalised shopping assistance.

    But this is still a limited revenue stream compared to the massive ad-based profits Meta generates elsewhere. Estimates suggest that WhatsApp brings in only a tiny fraction of Meta’s US$160 billion annual revenue, most of which comes from Facebook and Instagram.

    So perhaps it’s no surprise that the company is now turning to WhatsApp’s nearly 3 billion users across the world. After all, the decision mirrors a broader industry trend, with other apps like Snapchat and Telegram exploring monetisation more actively.

    Yet WhatsApp’s move still feels different.

    The platform’s identity is deeply tied to privacy, simplicity and intimacy. It is not a social media feed, it’s a communication tool. And a tool which many people use to share personal or sensitive information.

    And even if adverts are not based on message content, they may still end up being quite personal to users because of all the other data Meta has access to through Facebook and Instagram. Information about who you talk to, and how often, is still accessible – and can be used for targeted advertising.

    So if Meta already knows your favourite sports team or holiday destination for example, it may show ads related to this information. If you’ve been chatting with friends on Whatsapp about a recent fixture or planned trip, it may feel strange if you then start seeing ads on those themes.

    Business message

    WhatsApp faced a backlash in 2021 over a privacy policy update that suggested more data sharing with Facebook. The company proceeded with the update, but millions of users downloaded alternatives like Signal and Telegram in protest.

    And even if research suggests that younger generations are more comfortable with personalised content, trust is still a fragile thing – which can quickly erode. If users perceive that WhatsApp no longer protects their privacy or becomes too commercial, many might switch to rivals, at no cost, especially if their social circles are already active on rival platforms.

    WhatsAd.
    BigTunaOnline/Shutterstock

    A separate concern is that as ads appear more frequently in private communication spaces, there’s a greater risk of users, especially young people, encountering inappropriate or manipulative content.

    This is especially risky in spaces where people feel psychologically safe. Whereas users are typically wary of TV advertising, their guards might be down on platforms where they exchange intimate messages with loved ones.

    When it comes to children, parents and schools have a role to play. Rather than advocating for bans or strict age controls, which are difficult to enforce and often ignored, digital literacy needs to be embedded into education.

    Teenagers should learn how social media and messaging apps work, how data is used, how to identify manipulative content and how to manage screen time and exposure.

    Too often, adults assume that younger users are “digital natives” and tech savvy – but in reality, many are vulnerable to psychological nudges and online targeting. Research suggests that empowering them with the tools to recognise these tactics is far more sustainable than trying to shield them completely.

    Those tactics will soon be visible on what has been, for a long time, a simple messaging service. WhatsApp’s introduction of ads is not just a business decision, it’s a cultural shift. It reflects some economic logic, but also challenges the assumptions many users have about their private digital spaces.

    If done carefully, WhatsApp could strike that fine balance between making a profit and maintaining trust. But if users sense their private sphere is being commodified, the backlash may be swift.

    Because for platforms like WhatsApp, success hinges not just on what they do, but how they are perceived to do it.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. WhatsApp introducing advertising is a potentially lucrative but risky move – https://theconversation.com/whatsapp-introducing-advertising-is-a-potentially-lucrative-but-risky-move-259317

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: From Discovery to Delivery: Building a Legal Framework for Namibia’s Midstream Infrastructure (by Rachel Mushabati)

    By Rachel Mushabati, Senior Associate Attorney & Country Head – CLG Namibia (www.CLGGlobal.com)

    Namibia’s recent offshore oil discoveries mark a pivotal moment in the country’s energy sector. With major players such as Shell, TotalEnergies, QatarEnergy, and Galp uncovering significant reserves, Namibia is poised to become a key oil producer. However, while exploration and production activities have gained momentum, the midstream sector; involving transportation, storage, and refining of petroleum, remains underdeveloped.

    A strong legal framework for midstream infrastructure is essential to ensure that Namibia maximizes economic benefits, attracts investment, and builds a sustainable energy industry. CLG Legal and Business Advisory, with its extensive advisory experience across Africa, is uniquely positioned to support this transition. CLG has advised on midstream regulatory frameworks, infrastructure structuring, and investment promotion strategies in various jurisdictions, and brings this expertise to the Namibian context.

    Understanding Midstream Infrastructure and Its Importance

    Midstream infrastructure serves as the critical link between oil extraction and the end consumer. This includes pipelines, refineries, storage facilities, and specialized port infrastructure that facilitate the transportation of crude oil and natural gas. Without adequate midstream infrastructure, Namibia risks becoming an exporter of raw crude without capturing additional value through processing and distribution. A robust midstream sector can boost job creation, industrial development, and energy security, making it a strategic national priority.

    Market studies from other African producers have shown that well-developed midstream infrastructure can contribute up to 30% more in local value addition compared to direct crude exports.[1] In Ghana, for instance, domestic refining and pipeline infrastructure contributed significantly to its GDP growth in the petroleum sector between 2016–2022. Namibia has the opportunity to tap into similar economic potential.[2]

    Existing Legal Framework and Gaps

    Namibia’s petroleum sector is primarily governed by the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991 and the Petroleum Products and Energy Act 13 of 1990. These laws focus largely on upstream activities and the regulation of downstream petroleum products. However, there is no dedicated midstream regulatory framework. The absence of clear midstream regulations means there is little guidance on ownership structures, investment incentives, and operational guidelines for pipelines, storage, and refining facilities.

    For example, Nigeria’s midstream sector prior to the Petroleum Industry Act (2021) faced significant bottlenecks due to the absence of a clear regulatory framework, particularly regarding third-party access and tariff setting for pipeline infrastructure. These issues led to investor reluctance and underinvestment, which were only addressed after the establishment of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (Nigeria Petroleum Industry Act, 2021).

    Lessons from Other Oil-Producing Countries

    Namibia can draw inspiration from countries that have successfully developed midstream infrastructure through effective regulation. Norway, for example, has established a robust midstream legal framework that ensures state participation in pipelines and refineries while promoting private investment.[3] Ghana has a dedicated Petroleum Midstream Regulatory Authority that oversees infrastructure development and ensures compliance with environmental and safety standards. Similarly, Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act (2021) introduced the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority, which provides clear guidelines on pipeline ownership and operations.

    The Role of Key Stakeholders in Strengthening Namibia’s Legal Framework

    To unlock the full potential of the midstream sector, coordinated action is required among various stakeholders:

    1. Government Ministries and Regulators: Responsible for drafting legislation, setting environmental and safety standards, and issuing licenses.
    2. Private Sector and Investors: Bring in capital and technical expertise, while also needing legal certainty to invest confidently.
    3. State-Owned Entities: Can serve as infrastructure operators and strategic partners in public-private partnerships.
    4. Civil Society and Communities: Essential for ensuring environmental accountability and social license to operate.
    5. Legal Advisory Firms: Provide technical assistance in drafting laws, structuring transactions, and navigating policy reform.

    Strengthening Namibia’s Midstream Legal Framework

    To address the existing gaps, Namibia must develop a comprehensive legal framework that clearly defines the governance of midstream activities. A dedicated Midstream Act would be a crucial first step, providing legal certainty on pipeline infrastructure, refineries, storage, and transportation. Encouraging public-private partnerships can drive midstream development while ensuring local participation. Establishing an independent regulatory authority will help enhance transparency, streamline approvals, and enforce compliance.

    Additionally, Namibia should implement policies that prioritize local employment and skills transfer, ensuring that midstream investors contribute to national workforce development. Environmental and safety standards must also be strengthened to mitigate risks associated with pipeline integrity, spill prevention, and emergency response. To further attract investors, tax breaks, duty exemptions, and streamlined licensing processes should be introduced to make Namibia a more competitive destination for midstream infrastructure development.

    Conclusion

    For Namibia to fully capitalize on its oil discoveries, it must establish a strong midstream legal framework that facilitates the efficient transportation, storage, and processing of petroleum resources. Without this, the country risks losing significant economic value and remaining dependent on crude exports.

    By adopting best practices from other oil-producing nations and implementing strategic legal reforms, Namibia can create a thriving midstream sector that benefits both investors and citizens alike. CLG stands ready to support this transformation, leveraging its pan-African expertise in midstream regulation, infrastructure development, and legal advisory. Our team has been instrumental in shaping midstream legal regimes across West and Central Africa, and we are committed to helping Namibia build a regulatory foundation that supports sustainable growth and long-term prosperity.


    [1] Ruben, R., Kuijpers, R., & Dijkxhoorn, Y. (2022). Mobilizing the Midstream for Supporting Smallholder Intensification. Land11(12), 2319. https://apo-opa.co/4ngI2bu

    [2] Oxford Business Group. “Ghana’s energy production targets and exploration attract investment”. Retrieved from https://apo-opa.co/4kUZQHu.

    [3] Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2021). ‘Midstream Regulatory Framework and Investment Guidelines’.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of CLG.

    Contact:
    Email: info@clgglobal.com
    Phone: +27 11 245 5900

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Warren Gains Commitment from Hegseth to Follow Supreme Court Orders on Deploying Troops to American Cities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren

    June 20, 2025

    Trump has already ordered 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines to L.A.

    Hegseth: “We’ve got contingencies and plans for any number of capabilities should governors be unable…to actually secure (their) own federal agents in their cities.”

    Video of Exchange (YouTube)

    Washington, D.C. – At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) pressed Department of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on her concerns with President Trump’s deployment of the National Guard and U.S. Marines to Los Angeles despite state and local officials’ objections. 

    On June 7, President Trump announced he was deploying the National Guard and the Marines to Los Angeles (L.A.). As of April 2025, the Department of Defense reported there are about 167,951 Marines, 451,024 soldiers in the Army, and 433,000 members of the National Guard. About 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines have been sent to L.A., including about 500 National Guard troops who have been trained to accompany Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents on immigration operations.

    Senator Warren questioned Secretary Hegseth on the deployment of troops to Los Angeles over state and local officials’ objections, citing President Trump’s threat to deploy ICE agents to other cities, and whether troops would be deployed to cities like Chicago and New York if the President ordered it. Secretary Hegseth refused to answer whether he would send more Marines to other cities if President Trump ordered it. Senator Warren also asked for an analysis of the number of troops that can be deployed domestically without undermining readiness internationally, but Secretary Hegseth avoided providing specific numbers.

    On June 12, U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer ruled that the Guard deployment was illegal and violated the 10th Amendment, as the protests in LA “fall far short of a rebellion” that would authorize the President to call them up for federal service.

    Secretary Hegseth committed that he would follow Supreme Court orders if they ruled for troops to be removed from American cities, saying, “If the Supreme Court rules on a topic, we will abide by that.” 

    Last week, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem made remarks during a press conference, saying, “We are not going away. We are staying here to liberate the society from the socialists and the burdensome leadership that this governor and that this mayor have placed on this country and what they have tried to insert into the city.” Senator Warren criticized Secretary Noem’s comments, highlighting that both the mayor and the governor were democratically elected by a majority of voters in the city. 

    “This is un-American, and it makes us unsafe. I wish our Republican colleagues would speak up,” concluded Senator Warren.

    Transcript: Hearings to examine the President’s proposed budget request for fiscal year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program for the Department of Defense
    Senate Armed Services Committee
    June 18, 2025

    Senator Elizabeth Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, President Trump has deployed the National Guard and then the U.S. Marines to Los Angeles, over the objections of state and local officials, saying that the troops are needed to support immigration detention operations that are being carried out by ICE. On Sunday night, the president threatened to deploy ICE agents to other cities around the country that he sees as “the core of the Democrat power center,” specifically mentioning Chicago and New York. 

    Secretary Hegseth, if the President wanted to deploy Marines to Chicago and New York City like he did in Los Angeles, would you carry out that order, even if the local governors and mayors objected?

    Honorable Peter B. Hegseth, Secretary of Defense: Well, Senator, because Governor Newsom was unwilling to address protecting federal law enforcement agents in Los Angeles, President Trump had all the authorities, and the Defense Department happily supported defending our ICE agents in the conduct of their job. They have the right as Americans to be able to do their job without being attacked by mobs, and we will protect them in that process. And if others needed it, we would provide that.

    Senator Warren: I know that you heard my question, so you would be willing to send troops if the President ordered it to Chicago, New York City, is that right? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Well, thankfully, New York City, unlike California, unlike Gavin Newsom, is willing to step up and address the issue with their local law enforcement.

    Senator Warren: I will take that as a yes. How about if the President says he wants to send troops to 15 cities? Would you be willing to do that?

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, I don’t accept your hypothetical, because it’s—

    Senator Warren: That’s a hypothetical. That’s the question. You’re the Secretary of Defense, would you send troops to 15 cities? If the President thought it, said, “Do it.” Would you do it? 15 cities?

    Secretary Hegseth: Again, Senator, it’s a complete hypothetical, lacking any context at all. 

    Senator Warren: Look, you’re the Secretary of Defense —

    Secretary Hegseth: I refuse to box myself in based on questioning, on a hypothetical.

    Senator Warren: Well, you can refuse, but you’re here asking for a trillion dollars, and I want to know how you’re going to spend it. And so my question is, if Donald Trump tells you to send troops to 15 American cities, are you going to spend the money and send the troops?

    Secretary Hegseth: Thankfully, we’re spending money on securing our southern border. A way the previous administration abandoned and allowed 21 million illegals to enter our country. So defending our homeland is a real, serious priority under this administration, and we’re doing it.

    Senator Warren: I understand the question about defense. Secretary Hegseth, about 4000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines have been sent to LA. Is there a number of troops deployed to American cities over the objections of governors and mayors, at which you would be concerned that we are undermining our national defense? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, we’ve spent two decades guarding other people’s borders. We think at the Defense Department it’s about time we shore up ours. 

    Senator Warren: So, that’s my question. Is there a number at which sending those troops to Los Angeles or Chicago or New York starts to undermine our ability to defend ourselves around the globe? Is there a number?

    Secretary Hegseth: Senator, we look at capabilities and readiness around the globe all the time, and we’re quite satisfied with our capabilities to defend the homeland, and we’ll provide more if and when it’s necessary. 

    Senator Warren: So, you are satisfied with our capabilities? Let me just ask, have you actually done the analysis and figured out how many troops you can deploy domestically before you start to undermine readiness around the world? Have you done that analysis? 

    Secretary Hegseth: Yes, ma’am. 

    Senator Warren: Then would you let the rest of us in on it? We are the Senate Armed Services Committee, and you’re here to ask for a trillion dollars. What’s the number?

    Secretary Hegseth: We’ve got contingencies and plans for any number of capabilities should governors be unable, as Governor Gavin Newsom has been, to actually secure his own federal agents in their cities.

    Senator Warren: But can you give us a ballpark on what that number is? How many troops can you deploy domestically before you start to cut into our readiness internationally?

    Secretary Hegseth: As I said, previous administrations deployed our National Guard all around the globe in numbers far beyond what we were capable of supporting, so limited contingencies inside the United States to protect federal law enforcement is doable. 

    Senator Warren: You have a number, but you’re just not going to tell us? So, let me ask you one more question, if the Supreme Court orders you to remove troops from American city streets. Will you do so?

    Secretary Hegseth: Can you repeat the question, please? 

    Senator Warren: Yes. If the Supreme Court orders you to remove troops from American cities. Will you do so? 

    Secretary Hegseth: As I’ve said, Senator, I don’t believe district courts should determine national security policy, but if the Supreme Court rules on a topic, we will abide by that. 

    Senator Warren: Okay. You know, during her press conference last week, Secretary Noem said, “We are staying here to liberate the city from its mayor and its governor,” people who were elected by a majority of voters. Secretary Hegseth is saying he is ready to deploy more troops and won’t tell us what the implications are for our national defense. This is un-American, and it makes us unsafe. I wish our Republican colleagues would speak up.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Xbox and AMD on advancing the next generation of gaming together

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Xbox and AMD on advancing the next generation of gaming together

    Hear from AMD’s Lisa Su on what this means for the future of gaming:  

    Lisa Su, Chair and Chief Executive Officer of AMD, shares how Xbox and AMD are building on two decades of partnership, innovation, and trust. AMD will extend its console work to design full roadmap of gaming-optimized chips combining the power of Ryzen and Radeon for consoles, handhelds, PCs, and cloud. 

    [embedded content]

    Stay tuned for more as we continue to bring the next generation of Xbox to life—together.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Edge for Business provides a secure foundation for mobile work

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Edge for Business provides a secure foundation for mobile work

    Today, information workers expect to be able to access corporate resources from any device, including their personal smartphones and tablets. As an IT Pro in a mobile-driven workplace, you’re faced with the growing complexity of managing mobile browser access across a wide range of devices, with each requiring different management tools and policies. This fragmentation makes it difficult to enforce consistent security controls and ensure timely updates.

    Compounding this challenge, personal mobile devices may lack enterprise-grade protections, leaving gaps that unmanaged browsers can exploit—potentially exposing sensitive corporate data. The result? You’re faced with a delicate balancing act: empowering users with flexible access while maintaining rigorous security standards across a diverse and dynamic device landscape.

    That’s where Edge for Business and Intune deliver a streamlined, secure mobile browsing experience—using similar tools you already rely on for managing Edge for Business on desktop. As a secure enterprise browser built for work, Edge for Business extends the trusted security features of the desktop experience to iOS and Android devices, providing a secure foundation for mobile work. And by managing Edge for mobile through Intune, you can enforce a consistent set of security and compliance policies across both desktop and mobile environments—standardizing access and protection through a single, trusted browser.

    Lock down corporate data

    With Edge for mobile, managed through Intune, you get the control you need to protect sensitive data on personal devices—without compromising the user experience. By tapping into Intune’s data protection capabilities, like App Policy Protection (APP), organizations can control how data is accessed and shared by apps on mobile devices. Edge for mobile blocks data sharing such as copy-pasting data from the Edge app into unmanaged apps and restricting file uploads to unauthorized websites.

    Edge for mobile also disables printing and local saving, and offers encryption for sensitive data such as passwords, favorites, and autofill data within the Edge app for iOS users.

    Defend your organization against malicious actors

    Without proper management, personal mobile devices can become a gateway for cyber threats—especially when they connect to unsecured public networks, creating the perfect opportunity for malicious actors to slip into your organization’s data environment unnoticed. A device without proper restrictions is an open door to threats like phishing, malware attacks, and typosquatting—where a simple URL typo can lead users to malicious sites. Edge for mobile helps close that door with built-in protections designed to keep your corporate data safe.

    Defender SmartScreen plays a key role by performing real-time reputation checks to warn users before they land on suspicious or harmful websites. Powered by the Microsoft Intelligent Security Graph, SmartScreen taps into trillions of signals across Microsoft’s global network—giving users a safety net that evolves with the threat landscape.

    Website typo protection in Edge for mobile acts like a digital safety net—catching users before a simple keystroke mistake leads them somewhere dangerous. If a user accidentally mistypes a URL, Edge for mobile instantly flags the error and offers a safer path forward: either correct the address or proceed with caution. It’s a smart, proactive layer of defense that helps keep users—and your organization’s data—out of harm’s way.

    Edge for mobile, paired with Microsoft Tunnel for Mobile Application Management (MAM), creates a secure, encrypted pathway between users and corporate resources—even when they’re on public Wi-Fi. There’s no need for users to manually launch a VPN; once they sign into Edge for mobile with their Entra ID, Tunnel activates automatically in the background. This seamless experience gives users secure access to internal apps and data beyond the corporate network perimeter—without slowing them down or adding friction. And for you, it means stronger protection against interception and data leakage.

    Ensure compliance and customize feature access

    As your users shift more of their work to mobile devices, you need confidence that browser features align with your organization’s standards. What works well on desktop—such as Read Aloud or other productivity tools—might not be appropriate in a mobile context. With granular feature control, you can selectively enable or disable specific browser features based on your organization’s policies. Whether it’s turning off features that could introduce risk or simply tailoring the experience to fit your mobile strategy, you have the flexibility to shape Edge for mobile to meet your organization’s needs.

    Addressing shared device challenges

    Managing corporate-issued smartphones and tablets comes with its own set of challenges—especially when those devices are shared across multiple users. The good news? Edge for mobile brings the same security and manageability benefits to corporate-managed mobile devices as it does to personal mobile scenarios. And when it comes to shared use, Shared Device Mode (SDM)—powered by Entra ID—makes life easier for both users and IT. With SDM, users can sign in once to any supported Microsoft 365 app on iOS and Android, and they’re automatically signed in across all SDM-enabled apps. When their session ends, signing out of one app signs them out of all—ensuring a clean, secure handoff to the next user.

    Get started today with the secure enterprise browser, on mobile

    Edge for mobile is here to help you tackle the challenges of mobile work. By setting Edge for mobile as the required app for internet access for mobile devices, you can ensure that your organization’s security needs are met.

    Note:

    • Intune data protection and SDM capabilities are generally available in Edge for mobile with a Microsoft 365 E3 license.
    • Defender SmartScreen and website typo protection are available to all Edge users.
    • Access to Tunnel VPN for MAM requires a Microsoft Intune Plan 2 or Microsoft Intune Suite license.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Our 2025 Responsible AI Report: How we’re growing and supporting customers

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Our 2025 Responsible AI Report: How we’re growing and supporting customers

    In May 2024, we released our inaugural Responsible AI Transparency Report. We’re grateful for the feedback we received from our stakeholders around the world. Their insights have informed this second annual Responsible AI Transparency Report, which underscores our continued commitment to building AI technologies that people trust. Our report highlights new developments related to how we build and deploy AI systems responsibly, how we support our customers and the broader ecosystem, and how we learn and evolve. 

    The past year has seen a wave of AI adoption by organizations of all sizes, prompting a renewed focus on effective AI governance in practice. Our customers and partners are eager to learn about how we have scaled our program at Microsoft and developed tools and practices that operationalize high-level norms. 

    Like us, they have found that building trustworthy AI is good for business, and that good governance unlocks AI opportunities. According to IDC’s Microsoft Responsible AI Survey that gathered insights on organizational attitudes and the state of responsible AI, over 30% of the respondents note the lack of governance and risk management solutions as the top barrier to adopting and scaling AI. Conversely, more than 75% of the respondents who use responsible AI tools for risk management say that they have helped with data privacy, customer experience, confident business decisions, brand reputation, and trust.

    We’ve also seen new regulatory efforts and laws emerge over the past year. Because we’ve invested in operationalizing responsible AI practices at Microsoft for close to a decade, we’re well prepared to comply with these regulations and to empower our customers to do the same. Our work here is not done, however. As we detail in the report, efficient and effective regulation and implementation practices that support the adoption of AI technology across borders are still being defined. We remain focused on contributing our practical insights to standard- and norm-setting efforts around the world. 

    Across all these facets of governance, it’s important to remain nimble in our approach, applying learnings from our real-world deployments, updating our practices to reflect advances in the state-of-the-art, and ensuring that we are responsive to feedback from our stakeholders. Learnings from our principled and iterative approach are reflected in the pages of this report. As our governance practices continue to evolve, we’ll proactively share our fresh insights with our stakeholders, both in future annual transparency reports and other public settings.

    Key takeaways from our 2025 Transparency Report 

    In 2024, we made key investments in our responsible AI tools, policies, and practices to move at the speed of AI innovation.

    1. We improved our responsible AI tooling to provide expanded risk measurement and mitigation coverage for modalities beyond text—like images, audio, and video—and additional support for agentic systems, semi-autonomous systems that we anticipate will represent a significant area of AI investment and innovation in 2025 and beyond. 
    2. We took a proactive, layered approach to compliance with new regulatory requirements, including the European Union’s AI Act, and provided our customers with resources and materials that empower them to innovate in line with relevant regulations. Our early investments in building a comprehensive and industry-leading responsible AI program positioned us well to shift our AI regulatory readiness efforts into high gear in 2024. 
    3. We continued to apply a consistent risk management approach across releases through our pre-deployment review and red teaming efforts. This included oversight and review of high-impact and higher-risk uses of AI and generative AI releases, including every flagship model added to the Azure OpenAI Service and every Phi model release. To further support responsible AI documentation as part of these reviews, we launched an internal workflow tool designed to centralize the various responsible AI requirements outlined in the Responsible AI Standard. 
    4. We continued to provide hands-on counseling for high-impact and higher-risk uses of AI through our Sensitive Uses and Emerging Technologies team. Generative AI applications, especially in fields like healthcare and the sciences, were notable growth areas in 2024. By gleaning insights across cases and engaging researchers, the team provided early guidance for novel risks and emerging AI capabilities, enabling innovation and incubating new internal policies and guidelines. 
    5. We continued to lean on insights from research to inform our understanding of sociotechnical issues related to the latest advancements in AI. We established the AI Frontiers Lab to invest in the core technologies that push the frontier of what AI systems can do in terms of capability, efficiency, and safety.  
    6. We worked with stakeholders around the world to make progress towards building coherent governance approaches to help accelerate adoption and allow organizations of all kinds to innovate and use AI across borders. This included publishing a book exploring governance across various domains and helping advance cohesive standards for testing AI systems.

    Looking ahead to the second half of 2025 and beyond 

    As AI innovation and adoption continue to advance, our core objective remains the same: earning the trust that we see as foundational to fostering broad and beneficial AI adoption around the world. As we continue that journey over the next year, we will focus on three areas to progress our steadfast commitment to AI governance while ensuring that our efforts are responsive to an ever-evolving landscape: 

    1. Developing more flexible and agile risk management tools and practices, while fostering skills development to anticipate and adapt to advances in AI. To ensure people and organizations around the world can leverage the transformative potential of AI, our ability to anticipate and manage the risks of AI must keep pace with AI innovation. This requires us to build tools and practices that can quickly adapt to advances in AI capabilities and the growing diversity of deployment scenarios that each have unique risk profiles. To do this, we will make greater investments in our systems of risk management to provide tools and practices for the most common risks across deployment scenarios, and also enable the sharing of test sets, mitigations, and other best practices across teams at Microsoft.
    2. Supporting effective governance across the AI supply chain. Building, earning, and keeping trust in AI is a collaborative endeavor that requires model developers, app builders, and system users to each contribute to trustworthy design, development, and operations. AI regulations, including the EU AI Act, reflect this need for information to flow across supply chain actors. While we embrace this concept of shared responsibility at Microsoft, we also recognize that pinning down how responsibilities fit together is complex, especially in a fast-changing AI ecosystem. To help advance shared understanding of how this can work in practice, we’re deepening our work internally and externally to clarify roles and expectations.
    3. Advancing a vibrant ecosystem through shared norms and effective tools, particularly for AI risk measurement and evaluation. The science of AI risk measurement and evaluation is a growing but still nascent field. We are committed to supporting the maturation of this field by continuing to make investments within Microsoft, including in research that pushes the frontiers of AI risk measurement and evaluation and the tooling to operationalize it at scale. We remain committed to sharing our latest advancements in tooling and best practices with the broader ecosystem to support the advancement of shared norms and standards for AI risk measurement and evaluation.

    We look forward to hearing your feedback on the progress we have made and opportunities to collaborate on all that is still left to do. Together, we can advance AI governance efficiently and effectively, fostering trust in AI systems at a pace that matches the opportunities ahead. 
    Explore the 2025 Responsible AI Transparency Report 

    Tags: AI, AI for Good Lab, artificial intelligence

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Government’s Fair Funding Review should benefit city residents, Cabinet member says

    Source: City of Plymouth

    Plymouth residents should see the benefits of Government proposals to create a fairer system of local government funding that will direct support to areas where it is most needed, Cabinet member for Finance Councillor Mark Lowry says.

    The shake-up of the funding system announced today aims to ensure those areas that have been overlooked get their fair share, while also cutting out bureaucracy in allocating funding and providing greater certainty for councils through multi-year settlements.

    “The proposals for consultation announced today show that at last we have a government that recognises the devastating impact 14 years of cuts by the previous government have had on councils, who are also struggling with the huge pressures in adult social care, children’s services and temporary accommodation,” Councillor Lowry said.

    “It recognises that areas with low historical tax bases from which to raise income also have high levels of need that drive up demand for services. This has put councils close to breaking point, so it is heartening to hear that we could be moving to a fairer system that at last begins to address the bureaucratic and opaque system of funding local government that has left the councils most in need starved of money.

    “In Plymouth we have worked hard to protect local services from the sort of devastating cuts seen elsewhere but we have been starved of funding for basic services and have a relatively low tax base compared to better off areas. A fairer funding system that addresses need, combined with a new approach to council tax, should in future bring tangible benefits in areas we know matter to people – keeping the streets clean, cutting grass and keeping roads well maintained.

    “While the proposals are very welcome, we need to be realistic. The scale of the challenges facing local government are massive and the demand and cost pressures in areas such as social care are systemic, so we know things won’t change overnight. We will need to continue be ruthless in driving greater efficiency in everything we do but at least now we can be confident that the long-awaited changes to local government finance will finally start to happen and that we have a government that is listening.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom