Category: Central Asia

US Senate News:

Source: US Whitehouse
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION
During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of foreign nationals into the United States, which successfully prevented national security threats from reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court upheld.  In Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), I stated that it is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes. 
I also stated that the United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those aliens approved for admission into the United States do not intend to harm Americans or our national interests.  More importantly, the United States must identify such aliens before their admission or entry into the United States.  The United States must ensure that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.
I directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to identify countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f).  After completing that process, the Secretary of State determined that a number of countries remain deficient with regards to screening and vetting.  Many of these countries have also taken advantage of the United States in their exploitation of our visa system and their historic failure to accept back their removable nationals. 
As President, I must act to protect the national security and national interest of the United States and its people.  I remain committed to engaging with those countries willing to cooperate to improve information-sharing and identity-management procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks.  Nationals of some countries also pose significant risks of overstaying their visas in the United States, which increases burdens on immigration and law enforcement components of the United States, and often exacerbates other risks related to national security and public safety.
Some of the countries with inadequacies face significant challenges to reform efforts.  Others have made important improvements to their protocols and procedures, and I commend them for these efforts.  But until countries with identified inadequacies address them, members of my Cabinet have recommended certain conditional restrictions and limitations.  I have considered and largely accepted those recommendations and impose the limitations set forth below on the entry into the United States by the classes of foreign nationals identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons described in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.  I therefore hereby proclaim the following:
Section 1.  Policy and Purpose.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other national security or public-safety threats.  Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that policy.  These protocols enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United States.
(b)  Information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States.  Governments manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents. They also control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments, including information about known or suspected terrorists and criminal-history information.  It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate steps to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share their identity and threat information with the immigration screening and vetting systems of the United States.
(c)  Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14161 directed the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, within 60 days of the date of that order, to jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, a report identifying countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the entry or admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
(d)  On April 9, 2025, the Secretary of State, with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, presented the report described in subsection (c) of this section, recommending that entry restrictions and limitations be placed on foreign nationals of several countries.  The report identified countries for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full suspension of admissions and countries that warrant a partial suspension of admission.
(e)  In evaluating the recommendations from the Secretary of State and in determining what restrictions to impose for each country, I consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate Assistants to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  I considered foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.  And I further considered various factors, including each country’s screening and vetting capabilities, information sharing policies, and country-specific risk factors — including whether each country has a significant terrorist presence within its territory, its visa-overstay rate, and its cooperation with accepting back its removable nationals. 
I also considered the different risks posed by aliens admitted on immigrant visas and those admitted on nonimmigrant visas.  Persons admitted on immigrant visas become lawful permanent residents of the United States.  Such persons may present national security or public-safety concerns that may be distinct from those admitted as nonimmigrants.  The United States affords lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than it does to nonimmigrants.  Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to remove than nonimmigrants, even after national security concerns arise, which increases the costs and aggravates the dangers of errors associated with admitting such individuals.  And although immigrants are generally subject to more extensive vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is far less reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate maintains inadequate identity-management or information-sharing policies or otherwise poses risks to the national security of the United States.
I reviewed these factors and assessed these goals, with a particular focus on crafting country-specific restrictions.  This approach was designed to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances.  The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent the entry or admission of foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States.  The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
(f)  After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after accounting for the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have determined to fully restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 12 countries:  Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.  These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(g)  I have determined to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 7 countries:  Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.  These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants. 
(h)  Sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation describe some of the identity-management or information-sharing inadequacies that led me to impose restrictions.  These inadequacies are sufficient to justify my finding that unrestricted entry of nationals from the named countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.  Publicly disclosing additional details on which I relied in making these determinations, however, would cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and many such details are classified.
Sec. 2.  Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.  The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers described in section 5 of this proclamation:
(a)  Afghanistan
(i)   The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan.  Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Afghanistan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(b)  Burma
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent.  Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(c)  Chad
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent.  According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent.  The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for United States immigration laws.  
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Chad as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(d)  Republic of the Congo
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of the Republic of the Congo as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(e)  Equatorial Guinea
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Equatorial Guinea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(f)  Eritrea
(i)   The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea.  Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals.  Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(g)  Haiti
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent.  Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration.  This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats.  As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States. 
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Haiti as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(h)  Iran
(i)   Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.  Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Iran as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended.
(i)  Libya
(i)   There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya.  The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Libya as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(j)  Somalia
(i)   Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects.  A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory.  The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven.  Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations.  Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States.  The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement.  Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(k)  Sudan
(i)   Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent. 
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(l)  Yemen
(i)   Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  The government does not have physical control over its own territory.  Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active United States military operations.
(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Yemen as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
Sec. 3.  Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.
(a)  Burundi
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent. 
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Burundi as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Burundi to the extent permitted by law.
(b)  Cuba
(i)    Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism.  The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States.  Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Cuba as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Cuba to the extent permitted by law.
(c)  Laos
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent.  Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Laos as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Laos to the extent permitted by law.
(d)  Sierra Leone
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent.  Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Sierra Leone as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Sierra Leone to the extent permitted by law.
(e)  Togo
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent. 
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Togo as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Togo to the extent permitted by law.
(f)  Turkmenistan
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent. 
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Turkmenistan as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Turkmenistan to the extent permitted by law.
(g)  Venezuela
(i)    Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Venezuela as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B‑1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Venezuela to the extent permitted by law.
Sec. 4.  Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations.  (a)  Scope.  Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any exceptions made pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:
(i)   are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation; and
(ii)  do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation.
(b)  Exceptions.  The suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall not apply to:
(i)     any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
(ii)    any dual national of a country designated under sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by a country not so designated;
(iii)   any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in the following classifications:  A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO‑2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6;
(iv)    any athlete or member of an athletic team, including coaches, persons performing a necessary support role, and immediate relatives, traveling for the World Cup, Olympics, or other major sporting event as determined by the Secretary of State;
(v)     immediate family immigrant visas (IR-1/CR-1, IR-2/CR-2, IR-5) with clear and convincing evidence of identity and family relationship (e.g., DNA);
(vi)    adoptions (IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, IH-4);
(vii)   Afghan Special Immigrant Visas;
(viii)  Special Immigrant Visas for United States Government employees; and
(ix)    immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran.
(c)  Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made for certain individuals for whom the Attorney General finds, in her discretion, that the travel by the individual would advance a critical United States national interest involving the Department of Justice, including when individuals must be present to participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses.  These exceptions shall be made only by the Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(d)  Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made case-by-case for individuals for whom the Secretary of State finds, in his discretion, that the travel by the individual would serve a United States national interest.  These exceptions shall be made by only the Secretary of State or his designee, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security or her designee.
Sec. 5.  Adjustments to and Removal of Suspensions and Limitations.  (a)  The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director for National Intelligence, devise a process to assess whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented.  Within 90 days of the date of this proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, describing his assessment and recommending whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented.
(b)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately engage each of the countries identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation on measures that must be taken to comply with United States screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements.
(c)  Additionally, and in light of recent events, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide me an update to the review of the practices and procedures of Egypt to confirm the adequacy of its current screening and vetting capabilities.
Sec. 6.  Enforcement.  (a)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and organizations, to ensure efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of this proclamation.
(b)  In implementing this proclamation, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
(c)  No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
(d)  This proclamation shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum by the United States, to a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT).  Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT, consistent with the laws of the United States.
Sec. 7.  Severability.  It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States.  Accordingly:
(a)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and
(b)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.
Sec. 8.  Effective Date.  This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern daylight time on June 9, 2025.
Sec. 9.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b)  This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c)  This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty‑five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
                             DONALD J. TRUMP

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