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Category: Child Poverty

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: The mistakes Keir Starmer made over disability cuts – and how he can avoid future embarrassment

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Thomas Caygill, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Nottingham Trent University

    Labour MPs have forced a major government climbdown over disability benefit cuts, in an embarrassing turn of events for Keir Starmer. The prime minister has blown a hole in his budget by agreeing to scrap plans to tighten eligibility criteria for disability benefits via the universal credit and personal independence payment bill.

    In return, MPs passed what was left of the bill – although 49 of them still rebelled, voting against the government. The bruising encounter bodes poorly for the future. Starmer’s Number 10 operation has been shown to be unable to communicate effectively with MPs. The team was neither able to win MPs over when the bill was being developed, nor bring them into line when agreement could not be reached.

    The question now must be whether Starmer will ever be able to push through any difficult legislation in the future. He now needs to give serious attention to his relationship with MPs.

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    The government has insisted that welfare costs are becoming unsustainable. Back in March, it unveiled plans to cut sickness and disability benefits in order to save £5 billion a year from the welfare budget by 2030. However, the government’s own figures suggested that 250,000 people could be pushed into poverty because of the changes, which led to criticism from many Labour MPs and disability charities.

    The threat of rebellion forced a partial u-turn by the government which appeased the vast majority of rebels. Although the remaining rebels failed to pass their wrecking amendment in the end, the fact the government was continuing to negotiate and offer concessions well into the debate on the night of the vote shows that the whips still felt there was a prospect of defeat. This behaviour during the debate is highly unusual and could all have been prevented.

    Labour MPs on the night of the vote.
    UK Parliament/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    Whenever there is disagreement between the government and its own backbench MPs, the role of the whips becomes even more vital. The whips have an important role in informing backbench MPs of which way the party leadership expects them to vote during divisions in the House of Commons.

    However, this is in fact a two-way channel of communication. Whips are also responsible for reporting concerns and dissension among MPs to the chief whip, who then has a duty to report such issues to the prime minister and cabinet.

    There has clearly been a breakdown in this two-way channel of communication in the case of the disability benefits cuts. Reports suggest that whips were warning that trouble was brewing to ministers but were being ignored.

    How to avoid a repeat incident

    A key complaint among Labour backbenchers was that they were not consulted on the proposals before they were announced. As the potential consequences of the changes became clearer, more MPs raised concerns about them.

    A lesson for the government here is that adequate groundwork is needed to get MPs on side with policies. That might mean allowing select committees to have more insight into the government’s thinking. It’s notable that select committee chairs were leading figures in this rebellion.

    It might also mean making greater use of departmental groups within the Parliamentary Labour Party to allow backbench MPs to feed into discussions at an earlier stage. Crucially, it also means more one-to-one, informal conversations.

    All this helps MPs feel like they have a vested interest in the policy and have had their voices heard. If you implement such a safety valve early on, the need for views and frustrations to be expressed so publicly later on in the process is reduced. Instead, in this case, we’ve had Labour backbenchers revealing to the media that, a year into office, they’ve still never even met Starmer.

    We have seen a trend in recent years of MPs becoming more focused on their constituency role. This, combined with the large rise in the number of MPs who hold marginal seats (meaning they are at greater risk of losing those seats at the next election) means that they prioritise constituents concerns over the party line. MPs who are worried about holding their seat at the next election have little to lose from threats about losing the whip.

    Labour’s position in the polls over recent months has exacerbated this problem. An analysis by the Disability Poverty Campaign Group in April suggested that for dozens of Labour MPs, the number of people claiming the benefits that were to be cut in their constituencies was greater than the size of their majority. In other words, there was a direct line to be drawn between voting for the bill and election loss.

    An additional factor that must be considered is that the sheer number of Labour MPs currently in parliament means that the usual incentives for loyalty don’t necessarily apply. Loyalty is often negotiated with promises of ministerial office in the future, but Starmer doesn’t turn over his team often and, in any case, there simply aren’t enough such carrots to dangle in front of everyone when a party has more than 400 MPs.

    Labour would also have to win a second term for such promises to be meaningful and that is currently in jeopardy. All this means there are fewer incentives for MPs to play the long game.

    What is clear is that Starmer’s approach to party management is not working. Given how the changing nature of politics in the UK, MPs are likely to get a taste for rebellion – particularly if, as happened in this case, rebellions deliver results. This is something any government should seek to avoid.

    Clearly there is a need for more groundwork to give MPs a sense of ownership over policy. There is also an argument for the prime minister and senior members of the cabinet to spend more time doing the rounds in the House of Commons tearooms, speaking to the parliamentary party at large and listening to their concerns directly. This might improve parliamentary party relations and keep the lid on future rebellions.

    Thomas Caygill is currently in receipt of a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant for research on post-legislative scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament and has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

    – ref. The mistakes Keir Starmer made over disability cuts – and how he can avoid future embarrassment – https://theconversation.com/the-mistakes-keir-starmer-made-over-disability-cuts-and-how-he-can-avoid-future-embarrassment-260254

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: The mistakes Keir Starmer made over disability cuts – and how he can avoid future embarrassment

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Thomas Caygill, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Nottingham Trent University

    Labour MPs have forced a major government climbdown over disability benefit cuts, in an embarrassing turn of events for Keir Starmer. The prime minister has blown a hole in his budget by agreeing to scrap plans to tighten eligibility criteria for disability benefits via the universal credit and personal independence payment bill.

    In return, MPs passed what was left of the bill – although 49 of them still rebelled, voting against the government. The bruising encounter bodes poorly for the future. Starmer’s Number 10 operation has been shown to be unable to communicate effectively with MPs. The team was neither able to win MPs over when the bill was being developed, nor bring them into line when agreement could not be reached.

    The question now must be whether Starmer will ever be able to push through any difficult legislation in the future. He now needs to give serious attention to his relationship with MPs.

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    The government has insisted that welfare costs are becoming unsustainable. Back in March, it unveiled plans to cut sickness and disability benefits in order to save £5 billion a year from the welfare budget by 2030. However, the government’s own figures suggested that 250,000 people could be pushed into poverty because of the changes, which led to criticism from many Labour MPs and disability charities.

    The threat of rebellion forced a partial u-turn by the government which appeased the vast majority of rebels. Although the remaining rebels failed to pass their wrecking amendment in the end, the fact the government was continuing to negotiate and offer concessions well into the debate on the night of the vote shows that the whips still felt there was a prospect of defeat. This behaviour during the debate is highly unusual and could all have been prevented.

    Labour MPs on the night of the vote.
    UK Parliament/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    Whenever there is disagreement between the government and its own backbench MPs, the role of the whips becomes even more vital. The whips have an important role in informing backbench MPs of which way the party leadership expects them to vote during divisions in the House of Commons.

    However, this is in fact a two-way channel of communication. Whips are also responsible for reporting concerns and dissension among MPs to the chief whip, who then has a duty to report such issues to the prime minister and cabinet.

    There has clearly been a breakdown in this two-way channel of communication in the case of the disability benefits cuts. Reports suggest that whips were warning that trouble was brewing to ministers but were being ignored.

    How to avoid a repeat incident

    A key complaint among Labour backbenchers was that they were not consulted on the proposals before they were announced. As the potential consequences of the changes became clearer, more MPs raised concerns about them.

    A lesson for the government here is that adequate groundwork is needed to get MPs on side with policies. That might mean allowing select committees to have more insight into the government’s thinking. It’s notable that select committee chairs were leading figures in this rebellion.

    It might also mean making greater use of departmental groups within the Parliamentary Labour Party to allow backbench MPs to feed into discussions at an earlier stage. Crucially, it also means more one-to-one, informal conversations.

    All this helps MPs feel like they have a vested interest in the policy and have had their voices heard. If you implement such a safety valve early on, the need for views and frustrations to be expressed so publicly later on in the process is reduced. Instead, in this case, we’ve had Labour backbenchers revealing to the media that, a year into office, they’ve still never even met Starmer.

    We have seen a trend in recent years of MPs becoming more focused on their constituency role. This, combined with the large rise in the number of MPs who hold marginal seats (meaning they are at greater risk of losing those seats at the next election) means that they prioritise constituents concerns over the party line. MPs who are worried about holding their seat at the next election have little to lose from threats about losing the whip.

    Labour’s position in the polls over recent months has exacerbated this problem. An analysis by the Disability Poverty Campaign Group in April suggested that for dozens of Labour MPs, the number of people claiming the benefits that were to be cut in their constituencies was greater than the size of their majority. In other words, there was a direct line to be drawn between voting for the bill and election loss.

    An additional factor that must be considered is that the sheer number of Labour MPs currently in parliament means that the usual incentives for loyalty don’t necessarily apply. Loyalty is often negotiated with promises of ministerial office in the future, but Starmer doesn’t turn over his team often and, in any case, there simply aren’t enough such carrots to dangle in front of everyone when a party has more than 400 MPs.

    Labour would also have to win a second term for such promises to be meaningful and that is currently in jeopardy. All this means there are fewer incentives for MPs to play the long game.

    What is clear is that Starmer’s approach to party management is not working. Given how the changing nature of politics in the UK, MPs are likely to get a taste for rebellion – particularly if, as happened in this case, rebellions deliver results. This is something any government should seek to avoid.

    Clearly there is a need for more groundwork to give MPs a sense of ownership over policy. There is also an argument for the prime minister and senior members of the cabinet to spend more time doing the rounds in the House of Commons tearooms, speaking to the parliamentary party at large and listening to their concerns directly. This might improve parliamentary party relations and keep the lid on future rebellions.

    Thomas Caygill is currently in receipt of a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant for research on post-legislative scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament and has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

    – ref. The mistakes Keir Starmer made over disability cuts – and how he can avoid future embarrassment – https://theconversation.com/the-mistakes-keir-starmer-made-over-disability-cuts-and-how-he-can-avoid-future-embarrassment-260254

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Trump is not like other presidents – but can he beat the ‘second term curse’ that haunts the White House?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Garritt C. Van Dyk, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Waikato

    Getty Images

    While he likes to provoke opponents with the possibility of serving a third term, Donald Trump faces a more immediate historical burden that has plagued so many presidents: the “second term curse”.

    Twenty-one US presidents have served second terms, but none has reached the same level of success they achieved in their first.

    Second term performances have ranged from the lacklustre and uninspiring to the disastrous and deadly. Voter dissatisfaction and frustration, presidential fatigue and a lack of sustainable vision for the future are all explanations.

    But Trump doesn’t quite fit the mould. Only one other president, Grover Cleveland in the late 19th century, has served a second nonconsecutive term, making Trump 2.0 difficult to measure against other second-term leaders.

    Trump will certainly be hoping history doesn’t repeat Cleveland’s second-term curse. Shortly after taking office he imposed 50% tariffs, triggering global market volatility that culminated in the “Panic of 1893”.

    At the time, this was the worst depression in US history: 19% unemployment, a run on gold from the US Treasury, a stock market crash and widespread poverty.

    More than a century on, Trump’s “move fast and break things” approach in a nonconsecutive second term might appeal to voters demanding action above all else. But he risks being drawn into areas he campaigned against.

    So far, he has gone from fighting a trade war and a culture war to contemplating a shooting war in the Middle East. His “big beautiful bill” will add trillions to the national debt and potentially force poorer voters – including many Republicans – off Medicaid.

    Whether his radical approach will defy or conform to the second term curse seems very much an open question.

    No kings

    The two-term limit was enacted by the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution in 1951. Without a maximum term, it was feared, an authoritarian could try to take control for life – like a king (hence the recent “No Kings” protests in the US).

    George Washington, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson all declined to serve a third term. Jefferson was suspicious of any president who would try to be re-elected a third time, writing:

    should a President consent to be a candidate for a 3d. election, I trust he would be rejected on this demonstration of ambitious views.

    There is a myth that after Franklin Delano Roosevelt broke the de facto limit of two terms set by the early presidents, the ghost of George Washington placed a curse on anyone serving more than four years.

    At best, second-term presidencies have been tepid compared to the achievements in the previous four years. After the second world war, some two-term presidents (Eisenhower, Reagan and Obama) started out strong but faltered after reelection.

    Eisenhower extricated the US from the Korean War in his first term, but faced domestic backlash and race riots in his second. He had to send 500 paratroopers to escort nine Black high school students in Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce a federal desegregation order.

    Reagan made significant tax and spending cuts, and saw the Soviet Union crumble in term one. But the Iran-Contra scandal and watered down tax reform defined term two.

    Obama started strongly, introducing health care reform and uniting the Democratic voter base. After reelection, however, the Democrats lost the House, the Senate, a Supreme Court nomination, and faced scandals over the Snowden security leaks and Internal Revenue Service targeting of conservative groups.

    Truly disastrous examples of second term presidencies include Abraham Lincoln (assassination), Woodrow Wilson (first world war, failure of the League of Nations, a stroke), Richard Nixon (Watergate, impeachment and resignation), and Bill Clinton (Lewinsky scandal and impeachment).

    Room for one more? Trump has joked about being added to Mount Rushmore.
    Shutterstock

    Monumental honours

    It may be too early to predict how Trump will feature in this pantheon of less-than-greatness. But his approval ratings recently hit an all-time low as Americans reacted to the bombing of Iran and deployment of troops in Los Angeles.

    A recent YouGov poll showed voters giving negative approval ratings for his handling of inflation, jobs, immigration, national security and foreign policy. While there has been plenty of action, it may be the levels of uncertainty, drastic change and market volatility are more extreme than some bargained for.

    An uncooperative Congress or opposition from the judiciary can be obstacles to successful second terms. But Trump has used executive orders, on the grounds of confronting “national emergencies”, to bypass normal checks and balances.

    As well, favourable rulings by the Supreme Court have edged closer to expanding the boundaries of executive power. But they have not yet supported Trump’s claim from his first term that “I have an Article 2, where I have the right to do whatever I want as President”.

    Some supporters say Trump deserves a Nobel Peace Prize. And he was only half joking when he asked if there is room for one more face on Mount Rushmore. But such monumental honours may only amount to speculation unless Trump’s radical approach and redefinition of executive power defy the second-term curse.

    Garritt C. Van Dyk has received funding from the Getty Research Institute.

    – ref. Trump is not like other presidents – but can he beat the ‘second term curse’ that haunts the White House? – https://theconversation.com/trump-is-not-like-other-presidents-but-can-he-beat-the-second-term-curse-that-haunts-the-white-house-260002

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: In search of Labour’s ‘working people’ – the paradox at the heart of Keir Starmer’s first year in power

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By George Newth, Lecturer in Politics and member of Reactionary Politics Research Network, University of Bath

    Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    It’s one year since Keir Starmer led the Labour party to a landslide victory. Starmer’s manifesto, “Change” had proposed “securonomics” as a solution to the UK’s many crises. This was sold as a way of ensuring “sustained economic growth as the only route to improving the prosperity of our country and the living standards of working people”.

    The document mentioned “working people” a total of 21 times. It was clear this demographic had been identified as the key target beneficiary of “securonomics”, otherwise referred to as “the plan for change”.

    But there is a paradox at the heart of the proposal to deliver “change” to “working people” – one that helps explain the chaos of Labour’s first year in government. By obsessively pitting this demographic against “non-working people”, Labour is in fact not promising any real change at all.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    One of the key premises of Labour’s securonomics is that growth must precede any significant investment. “Working people’s” priorities are therefore presented as being in line with that of a fiscally responsible state.

    In the autumn budget, there was a pledge to “fix the foundations of the economy and deliver change by protecting working people”. To do this, the chancellor needed to fix a “black hole” of £22 billion in government finances.

    The refusal to lift the two-child benefit cap, alongside “reforming the state to ensure […] welfare spending is targeted towards those that need it the most”, was framed as “putting more money in working people’s pockets”. There has, meanwhile, been a continued emphasis on encouraging those on benefits back to work.

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    Besides the clear deepening of inequality wrought by similar reforms in the past, welfare cuts make no sense on an economic or societal level. They undermine the economy, and the consequences put additional pressure on already underfunded social services.

    As highlighted by the Office of Budgetary Responsibility (OBR), such cuts fail to deliver the promised behavioural change to force people into work. People instead become more focused on day-to-day survival.

    Despite the government’s last ditch climbdown to save its flagship welfare reform policy its cuts are still forecast to push more than 150,000 people into poverty

    Such reforms carried out in the name of “working people” perpetuate a pernicious myth of us v them. Not only are people in work also affected by these cuts but people’s lives – including their jobs, income, family situations, and health – shift regularly, making the “strivers v skivers” divide both simplistic and inaccurate.

    Even “secure borders” and “smashing the criminal gangs” were positioned as “grown up politics back in the service of working people”. This association of working people with anti-immigrant attitudes links to a broader homogenisation of “working people” as both “patriotic” and in search of “security”. “Fixing the foundations” has been depicted in several social media posts as a patriotic act via use of the Union Jack.

    Starmer meets ‘working people: steel category’.
    Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    Meanwhile, stage-managed photoshoots of Starmer in factories with people wearing hard hats and hi-visibility jackets give a clear impression of the types of manufacturing jobs the government believes “working people” carry out. This gives an impressions that belies the reality of modern Britain – and an economy that is dominated by the service sector,, not manufacturing or building.

    Old wine in new bottles

    While Starmer framed his “plan for change” as a break with previous administrations, his “working people” narrative betrays this claim as anything but.

    The idea that the deserving “working people” are different and separate from people who don’t (or can’t) work has been deployed by government after government to justify austerity and cuts to services. It has always been useful to separate the “scroungers from the strivers” and there is no sign of Labour changing course.

    Hello! Are you working people?
    Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    The term “working people” also builds on a previous trope of the “hard-working family”.

    While initially coined by New Labour, this term has roots in Margaret Thatcher’s idea of the family, rather than the state, as the locus of welfare. It was not for the state to take care of you but your own kin.

    Like “working people” now, “hard-working families” were those who played by the rules and knuckled down to earn a living. Previous Conservative administrations have depicted “hard-working families” as burdened by the unemployed, the poor, the sick and disabled and immigrants.

    Add to this, the signalling continues to imply that the “authentic” working class of Britain are solely white – sometimes also male – and typically older, manual labourers, who are assumed to hold socially conservative views. This is another divide-and-rule trope which neglects the reality of the multiracial and multiethnic composition of the working classes.

    In light of all this, any real “change” promised in Labour’s manifesto has been betrayed by a continuity with tired and damaging tropes of deserving and undeserving people. This is contributing to the sense, a year in, that this Labour government is merely repeating past government failures rather than striking out in a new direction.

    George Newth works for University of Bath and is a member of the Green Party

    – ref. In search of Labour’s ‘working people’ – the paradox at the heart of Keir Starmer’s first year in power – https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-labours-working-people-the-paradox-at-the-heart-of-keir-starmers-first-year-in-power-260230

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: In search of Labour’s ‘working people’ – the paradox at the heart of Keir Starmer’s first year in power

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By George Newth, Lecturer in Politics and member of Reactionary Politics Research Network, University of Bath

    Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    It’s one year since Keir Starmer led the Labour party to a landslide victory. Starmer’s manifesto, “Change” had proposed “securonomics” as a solution to the UK’s many crises. This was sold as a way of ensuring “sustained economic growth as the only route to improving the prosperity of our country and the living standards of working people”.

    The document mentioned “working people” a total of 21 times. It was clear this demographic had been identified as the key target beneficiary of “securonomics”, otherwise referred to as “the plan for change”.

    But there is a paradox at the heart of the proposal to deliver “change” to “working people” – one that helps explain the chaos of Labour’s first year in government. By obsessively pitting this demographic against “non-working people”, Labour is in fact not promising any real change at all.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    One of the key premises of Labour’s securonomics is that growth must precede any significant investment. “Working people’s” priorities are therefore presented as being in line with that of a fiscally responsible state.

    In the autumn budget, there was a pledge to “fix the foundations of the economy and deliver change by protecting working people”. To do this, the chancellor needed to fix a “black hole” of £22 billion in government finances.

    The refusal to lift the two-child benefit cap, alongside “reforming the state to ensure […] welfare spending is targeted towards those that need it the most”, was framed as “putting more money in working people’s pockets”. There has, meanwhile, been a continued emphasis on encouraging those on benefits back to work.

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    Besides the clear deepening of inequality wrought by similar reforms in the past, welfare cuts make no sense on an economic or societal level. They undermine the economy, and the consequences put additional pressure on already underfunded social services.

    As highlighted by the Office of Budgetary Responsibility (OBR), such cuts fail to deliver the promised behavioural change to force people into work. People instead become more focused on day-to-day survival.

    Despite the government’s last ditch climbdown to save its flagship welfare reform policy its cuts are still forecast to push more than 150,000 people into poverty

    Such reforms carried out in the name of “working people” perpetuate a pernicious myth of us v them. Not only are people in work also affected by these cuts but people’s lives – including their jobs, income, family situations, and health – shift regularly, making the “strivers v skivers” divide both simplistic and inaccurate.

    Even “secure borders” and “smashing the criminal gangs” were positioned as “grown up politics back in the service of working people”. This association of working people with anti-immigrant attitudes links to a broader homogenisation of “working people” as both “patriotic” and in search of “security”. “Fixing the foundations” has been depicted in several social media posts as a patriotic act via use of the Union Jack.

    Starmer meets ‘working people: steel category’.
    Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    Meanwhile, stage-managed photoshoots of Starmer in factories with people wearing hard hats and hi-visibility jackets give a clear impression of the types of manufacturing jobs the government believes “working people” carry out. This gives an impressions that belies the reality of modern Britain – and an economy that is dominated by the service sector,, not manufacturing or building.

    Old wine in new bottles

    While Starmer framed his “plan for change” as a break with previous administrations, his “working people” narrative betrays this claim as anything but.

    The idea that the deserving “working people” are different and separate from people who don’t (or can’t) work has been deployed by government after government to justify austerity and cuts to services. It has always been useful to separate the “scroungers from the strivers” and there is no sign of Labour changing course.

    Hello! Are you working people?
    Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    The term “working people” also builds on a previous trope of the “hard-working family”.

    While initially coined by New Labour, this term has roots in Margaret Thatcher’s idea of the family, rather than the state, as the locus of welfare. It was not for the state to take care of you but your own kin.

    Like “working people” now, “hard-working families” were those who played by the rules and knuckled down to earn a living. Previous Conservative administrations have depicted “hard-working families” as burdened by the unemployed, the poor, the sick and disabled and immigrants.

    Add to this, the signalling continues to imply that the “authentic” working class of Britain are solely white – sometimes also male – and typically older, manual labourers, who are assumed to hold socially conservative views. This is another divide-and-rule trope which neglects the reality of the multiracial and multiethnic composition of the working classes.

    In light of all this, any real “change” promised in Labour’s manifesto has been betrayed by a continuity with tired and damaging tropes of deserving and undeserving people. This is contributing to the sense, a year in, that this Labour government is merely repeating past government failures rather than striking out in a new direction.

    George Newth works for University of Bath and is a member of the Green Party

    – ref. In search of Labour’s ‘working people’ – the paradox at the heart of Keir Starmer’s first year in power – https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-labours-working-people-the-paradox-at-the-heart-of-keir-starmers-first-year-in-power-260230

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Parents who oppose sex education in schools often don’t discuss it at home

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Robin Pickering, Professor and Chair, Public Health, Gonzaga University

    Lawmakers and school boards across the country have established policies that limit what schools can teach about gender, sexuality and reproductive health. Alexmia/iStock via Getty Images

    Public battles over what schools can teach about sex, identity and relationships, often framed around “parental rights,” have become more intense in recent years.

    Behind the loud debate lies a quiet contradiction. Many parents who say sex education should be taught only at home don’t actually provide it there, either.

    As a scholar of sex education, I found that parents strongly opposed to comprehensive sex education in schools were the least likely to discuss health-promoting concepts such as consent, contraception, gender identity and healthy relationships. I discuss similar themes in my book, “A Modern Approach to the Birds and the Bees.”

    Comprehensive sex education delays sexual activity, increases contraceptive use and reduces teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted infection rates. It has a complex history, but has long received bipartisan support.

    In recent years, however, old debates over sex education and funding have taken a sharper turn.

    In June 2025, the Trump administration ordered California to remove gender-identity materials from sex education lessons or risk losing over US$12 million in federal funding.

    This directive is part of a broader shift. Since the early 1980s, abstinence-focused policy has existed at the federal level under Reagan with the Adolescent Family Life Act. In recent years, however, a wave of state-level legislation, often driven by conservative advocacy groups, has tried to limit what schools can teach about sexuality.

    The parents’ rights movement

    In 2023, Florida expanded its Parental Rights in Education, also known as the “Don’t Say Gay” law, to extend limits on discussing sexual orientation and gender identity to all K–12 grades. The law states that sex can be defined only as strictly binary, limits discussions of gender and sexuality, imposes rules on pronoun use and increases school board authority over curricula.

    Other states, including Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Kentucky, have imposed similar restrictions.

    Federal, state and local efforts have sought to control or limit sex education in schools.
    tupungato/iStock via Getty Images

    Local school boards in states such as Florida, Idaho, Tennessee and Utah have removed textbooks, cut health courses and banned books with LGBTQ+ themes. Conservative, local school boards are reshaping sex education nationwide even though the vast majority of Americans oppose efforts to restrict books in public schools and are confident in public schools’ selection of books.

    Who’s having the talk?

    A national survey on parental attitudes and beliefs about school-based sex education revealed that some families do not practice what they preach.
    diane39/iStock via Getty Images

    As laws limit teaching about sex, gender and identity, I wanted to explore whether parents are stepping in to fill the gaps.

    About 10% of the surveyed parents said sex education should happen only at home. Those parents were also most likely to say they “almost never” or “never” discussed sex, sexuality and romance with their children.

    By contrast, parents who supported comprehensive, school-based sex ed were significantly more likely to discuss subjects including consent, contraception, identity and healthy relationships at home.

    The survey also found that parents who opposed comprehensive sex education were more likely to believe commonly circulated misinformation, such as the idea that talking about sex encourages early sexual activity and that condoms are not effective.

    These preliminary findings align with a robust body of peer-reviewed literature suggesting that parents who are more resistant to school-based sex ed are also less likely and less equipped to have open, informed conversations at home.

    These findings point to a gap between expert recommendations and what parents do.

    At the federal level, the Trump administration slashed funding for comprehensive sex education. The administration also expanded funding for abstinence-only programs, despite evidence of their ineffectiveness.

    Risks rise without education

    Teenagers learn about sex online, and pornography is among the top sources of information.
    redhumv?E+ via Getty Images

    A 2022 report from Common Sense Media found that nearly half of teens report learning about sex online, with pornography among the top sources.

    Research indicates that even when schools and families avoid topics related to sexuality, young people still encounter sexual content. Yet, advocacy groups such as Moms for Liberty support the removal of what it considers “age-inappropriate” or “sexually explicit” materials from classrooms and school libraries.

    The absence of structured, accurate education likely has implications for public health. According to the CDC, individuals ages 15 to 24 account for nearly half of all new sexually transmitted infections in the U.S.

    Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas have some of the highest teen birth and sexually transmitted infection rates. Yet, these states are also among those with the most restrictive sex education policies and poorest sex ed ratings.

    These communities also face higher poverty, limited health care access and lower educational attainment. The combination deepens health disparities.

    LGBTQ+ youth are especially vulnerable to sexually transmitted infections and related health challenges. This vulnerability is compounded in regions with limited access to inclusive education.

    A 2023 CDC report found that students who receive inclusive sex education feel more connected to school and experience lower rates of depression and bullying. These benefits are especially critical for LGBTQ+ youth.

    As debates over sex education continue, I believe it’s important for policymakers, school boards and communities to weigh parental input and public health data.

    I am the author of the book, “A Modern Approach to the Birds and the Bees” which I mentioned in the article and do benefit from its sale.

    – ref. Parents who oppose sex education in schools often don’t discuss it at home – https://theconversation.com/parents-who-oppose-sex-education-in-schools-often-dont-discuss-it-at-home-258892

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Employers are failing to insure the working class – Medicaid cuts would leave them even more vulnerable

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sumit Agarwal, Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine, University of Michigan

    The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 7.8 million Americans across the U.S. would lose their coverage through Medicaid – the public program that provides health insurance to low-income families and individuals – under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act making its way through Congress.

    That includes 248,000 to 414,000 of my fellow residents of Michigan based on the House Reconciliation Bill in early June 2025. There are similarly deep projected cuts within the Senate version of the legislation.

    Many of these people are working Americans who would lose Medicaid because of the onerous paperwork involved with the proposed work requirements.

    They wouldn’t be able to get coverage in the Affordable Care Act Marketplaces after losing Medicaid. Premiums and out-of-pocket costs are likely to be too high for those making less than 100% to 138% of the federal poverty level who do not qualify for health insurance marketplace subsidies. Funding for this program is also under threat.

    And despite being employed, they also wouldn’t be able to get health insurance through their employers because it is either too expensive or not offered to them. Researchers estimate that coverage losses would lead to thousands of medically preventable deaths across the country because people would be unable to access health care without insurance.

    I am a physician, health economist and policy researcher who has cared for patients on Medicaid and written about health care in the U.S. for over eight years. I think it’s important to understand the role of Medicaid within the broader insurance landscape. Medicaid has become a crucial source of health coverage for low-wage workers.

    A brief history of Medicaid expansion.

    Michigan removed work requirements from Medicaid

    A few years ago, Michigan was slated to institute Medicaid work requirements, but the courts blocked the implementation of that policy in 2020. It would have cost upward of US$70 million due to software upgrades, staff training, and outreach to Michigan residents enrolled in the Medicaid program, according to the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.

    Had it gone into effect, 100,000 state residents were expected to lose coverage within the first year.

    The state took the formal step of eliminating work requirements from its statutes earlier this year in recognition of implementation costs being too high and mounting evidence against the policy’s effectiveness.

    When Arkansas instituted Medicaid work requirements in 2018, there was no increase in employment, but within months, thousands of people enrolled in the program lost their coverage. The reason? Many people were subjected to paperwork and red tape, but there weren’t actually that many people who would fail to meet the criteria of the work requirements. It is a recipe for widespread coverage losses without meeting any of the policy’s purported goals.

    Work requirements, far from incentivizing work, paradoxically remove working people from Medicaid with nowhere else to go for insurance.

    Shortcomings of employer-sponsored insurance

    Nearly half of Americans get their health insurance through their employers.

    In contrast to a universal system that covers everyone from cradle to grave, an employer-first system leaves huge swaths of the population uninsured. This includes tens of millions of working Americans who are unable to get health insurance through their employers, especially low-income workers who are less likely to even get the choice of coverage from their employers.

    Over 80% of managers and professionals have employer-sponsored health coverage, but only 50% to 70% of blue-collar workers in service jobs, farming, construction, manufacturing and transportation can say the same.

    There are some legal requirements mandating employers to provide health insurance to their employees, but the reality of low-wage work means many do not fall under these legal protections.

    For example, employers are allowed to incorporate a waiting period of up to 90 days before health coverage begins. The legal requirement also applies only to full-time workers. Health coverage can thus remain out of reach for seasonal and temporary workers, part-time employees and gig workers.

    Even if an employer offers health insurance to their low-wage employees, those workers may forego it because the premiums and deductibles are too high to make it worth earning less take-home pay.

    To make matters worse, layoffs are more common for low-wage workers, leaving them with limited options for health insurance during job transitions. And many employers have increasingly shed low-wage staff, such as drivers and cleaning staff, from their employment rolls and contracted that work out. Known as the fissuring of the workplace, it allows employers of predominately high-income employees to continue offering generous benefits while leaving no such commitment to low-wage workers employed as contractors.

    Medicaid fills in gaps

    Low-income workers without access to employer-sponsored insurance had virtually no options for health insurance in the years before key parts of the Affordable Care Act went into effect in 2014.

    Research my co-authors and I conducted showed that blue-collar workers have since gained health insurance coverage, cutting the uninsured rate by a third thanks to the expansion of Medicaid eligibility and subsidies in the health insurance marketplaces. This means low-income workers can more consistently see doctors, get preventive care and fill prescriptions.

    Further evidence from Michigan’s experience has shown that Medicaid can help the people it covers do a better job at work by addressing health impairments. It can also improve their financial well-being, including fewer problems with debt, fewer bankruptcies, higher credit scores and fewer evictions.

    Premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid are minimal compared with employer-sponsored insurance, making it a more realistic and accessible option for low-income workers. And because Medicaid is not tied directly to employment, it can promote job mobility, allowing workers to maintain coverage within or between jobs without having to go through the bureaucratic complexity of certifying work.

    Of course, Medicaid has its own shortcomings. Payment rates to providers are low relative to other insurers, access to doctors can be limited, and the program varies significantly by state. But these weaknesses stem largely from underfunding and political hostility – not from any intrinsic flaw in the model. If anything, Medicaid’s success in covering low-income workers and containing per-enrollee costs points to its potential as a broader foundation for health coverage.

    The current employer-based system, which is propped up by an enormous and regressive tax break for employer-sponsored insurance premiums, favors high-income earners and contributes to wage stagnation. In my view, which is shared by other health economists, a more public, universal model could better cover Americans regardless of how someone earns a living.

    Over the past six decades, Medicaid has quietly stepped into the breach left by employer-sponsored insurance. Medicaid started as a welfare program for the needy in the 1960s, but it has evolved and adapted to fill the needs of a country whose health care system leaves far too many uninsured.

    Sumit Agarwal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Employers are failing to insure the working class – Medicaid cuts would leave them even more vulnerable – https://theconversation.com/employers-are-failing-to-insure-the-working-class-medicaid-cuts-would-leave-them-even-more-vulnerable-259256

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: One year in, Labour has a surprising amount to celebrate. But you wouldn’t know it

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Rohan McWilliam, Professor of Modern British History, Anglia Ruskin University

    A year in, Starmer still has a mountain to climb. Flickr/Number 10 , CC BY-NC-ND

    In the build-up to the 2024 election, Keir Starmer worked hard to show that his party could run Britain better than the Tories. He promised his government would offer stability after years of chaos – but also change. He stood for honesty but also a technocratic approach that resisted the easy answers of the populist right. The grown ups would be back in charge.

    A year on, as he marks his first year in office, we might ask: how much difference did Labour’s 2024 election win make in the longer trajectory of British life? Are historians in future likely to say (as they often do about the 1945 and 1979 elections) that it led to political and social transformation?

    Of course, it’s too early to say for certain, but not too early to look for signs.

    In electoral terms, Labour gained a stonking 174-seat majority in 2024. But this victory came off the back of a remarkably slim vote share of 33.7% in an election with a near-historically low turnout. That suggests an emotional connection had not been made with the electorate (although it also reflected the way that the traditional two-party system is falling apart).

    This result has defined Labour since then. It is a government that is undoubtedly in power but with a leader who few really understand. At a conference on the Starmer government held at Anglia Ruskin University in June 2025, I asked the audience how many could produce a one-sentence summary of what the government’s ideology was. Only a few felt they could do so.

    In July 2024, Labour promised change. But what did “change” mean? Starmer’s Labour has failed to really spell out its sense of purpose. Starmer admits that he finds ideas difficult. In this sense (and this sense alone) he resembles President George H.W. Bush, who admitted he had trouble with the “vision thing”.

    Starmer looks for solutions to particular problems rather than offering a view of the kind of Britain he wants to create. Without some kind of clear ideological purpose, however, the government ends up merely reacting to events whereas it should be shaping the narrative.

    The good, the bad, and the not-very-Labour

    When Labour returned to power in 1945, 1964 and 1997, there had been extensive discussions about the direction of Labour policy and how it could change society. In 1945, Clement Attlee’s focus was on welfare. Harold Wilson in 1964 drew on Tony Crosland’s revisionist approach to socialism, while in 1997 Tony Blair promised a “third way” in politics, reflecting the ideas of intellectuals such as Anthony Giddens.

    This openness to new ideas barely happened between 2020 and 2024 beyond a sense that Labour needed to re-connect with the “red wall” voters it had lost.

    On top of this, the government has become known for doing some remarkably un-Labour things. In September 2024, it changed the rules on winter fuel benefits to limit them to only some pensioners (although it has since partially backtracked under immense pressure from Labour MPs).

    It continues to resist calls to abolish the two child-benefit cap that restricts some forms of support to families with a maximum of two children, despite clear evidence that doing so is an easy way to reduce child poverty. Most catastrophically, it has been humiliated by a backbench rebellion which forced it to gut its welfare bill.



    Read more:
    The mistakes Keir Starmer made over disability cuts – and how he can avoid future embarrassment

    The government claims it is having to correct the dismal economic inheritance left by the Tories, preventing it from splashing the cash in the way Labour supporters want. Chancellor of the exchequer Rachel Reeves talks about “hard choices” in order to show how disciplined Labour is, thus hopefully reassuring investors and the bond market.

    The result was the winter fuel payment crisis, which (despite a u-turn) threatens to become Labour’s poll tax – an iconic policy the electorate refuses to forgive.

    Starmer and Reeves demonstrated very limited understanding of the politics of this decision: they seemed prepared to hurt poorer people while apparently leaving the wealthy largely untouched.

    Starmer would argue that his government’s ideology has been expressed through its five missions, the most important of which is to stimulate economic growth. The June 2025 spending review was aimed at directing investment particularly towards the north of England and building infrastructure, including investment in transport. The government has also retained its focus on getting to net zero (which suggests a degree of radicalism).

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    Another mission that is also more obviously Labour in character is rebuilding the NHS, particularly by reducing waiting lists. Breaking down barriers to opportunity (another mission) has led to investment in education and the creation of breakfast clubs so that all children start the day properly fed.

    Labour still talks the language of class, recognising how poorer people face obstacles. Similarly, the focus on stopping crime and making Britain’s streets safe has echoes of both Jim Callaghan and Tony Blair. The government’s preparedness (so far) to negotiate increased pay awards in the public sector also suggests a distinctive Labour approach – evidence that it is not simply offering austerity-lite. Starmer has even started the process of renationalising the railways.

    Despite claims that it is maintaining austerity, the government has increased public expenditure by the highest level in decades. In that sense, the 2024 election has led to a new direction for the country.

    Labour can make the claim that it is building a state that can respond to the demands of an ageing population, in a challenging global environment, who will be affected by the results of climate change. This (in one sentence) should be its message.

    A familiar refrain

    If we look at the new government in historical perspective, we should note that it is not unusual for people to complain that Labour lacks ideology or a moral purpose: such things were said about every prime minister the party has produced, from Ramsay MacDonald onwards. Starmer may well seem better in retrospect.

    The overall impression of the prime minister, however, is that he is consumed by caution. Much of the time his government seems to chase the talking points put out by Reform UK, the best example being the “island of strangers” speech.

    It may be that future historians will argue that the real significance of the 2024 election was not Labour’s capture of seats but the way it exposed the latent support for Nigel Farage’s new party that had been building across the country. However, there are still several years to recover this legacy, should Starmer commit to learning from the mistakes made in the first year of his tenure.

    Rohan McWilliam is affiliated with The Labour Party (ordinary member).

    – ref. One year in, Labour has a surprising amount to celebrate. But you wouldn’t know it – https://theconversation.com/one-year-in-labour-has-a-surprising-amount-to-celebrate-but-you-wouldnt-know-it-259837

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Somalia at 65: what’s needed to address its dismal social development indicators

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ali A. Abdi, Professor, University of British Columbia

    Somalia ranks among the lowest scoring countries in the United Nations Human Development Index. The index of 195 countries is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, years of schooling, and access to a decent standard of living. Ali A. Abdi, a scholar of social development education, examines Somalia’s failure to advance social development programmes.

    What is socio-economic development and how does Somalia stack up?

    Somalia is celebrating its 65th year of independence. This was marked officially on 1 July 2025.

    Despite the pomp and circumstance, though, the country’s social development indicators are dismal.

    Social development generally means visible improvements in the quality of life. People’s well-being is based on aspects of national progress like:

    • universally available good quality education and adequate healthcare

    • employment opportunities that generate liveable incomes and upward socioeconomic mobility

    • governance structures that protect people’s rights to security.

    Somalia has failed to meet these human development targets.

    Its low score in the UN index can be understood by looking at the statistics relating to education and health. In any society these act as foundational blocks for social development. But in Somalia:

    • children can expect to get an average of 1.72 years of education (the continental African average is 7.7 years)

    • there are 0.23 doctors per 10,000 people, and many doctors serve in fee-based private clinics which are out of reach for ordinary citizens in a country with US$600 GDP per capita income

    • the capital city, Mogadishu, with a population of 2.8 million, has only two fully public hospitals and they lack specialist services; patients who require specialist care must go to private hospitals

    • the youth unemployment rate is just below 70%.

    With these social development liabilities, it’s no wonder that the country is the biggest per capita producer of both global refugees and internally displaced persons.

    How did Somalia come to this?

    The Somali state collapsed as a cohesive national entity in 1991. The military government that had been in power since 1969 was overthrown by armed opposition forces. The country slowly fragmented into quasi-self-governing regions. Transitional national governments have come and gone.

    The current federal political structure came into being in August 2012. The Federal Republic of Somalia comprised five founding member states (there are now six).

    The depressed social development situation is not the only obstacle facing Somalia. Other complexities include:

    A governance system built on cronyism and political loyalty: Somalia’s national political leadership entrenched cronyism. In fairness, the same selectively applies to sub-national, federal member states leadership. This corrupt system has found traction in a country where professionals, young graduates and traditional leaders lack legitimate sources of income. This undermines good governance while creating discord within and among the federal government and federal member states.

    Discord at national level and between national and sub-national leaders: The most recent example of this revolves around the national leadership’s 2024 attempt to change the interim constitution. The unilaterally proposed one-person-one-vote proposal runs counter to the 2012 framework through which the current federal system was created. This has fuelled yet another national controversy with less than a year to the next presidential election.

    Externally constructed political and economic interventions: Somalia receives significant international aid to address political and developmental challenges. But the strings attached include the management of these funds by external entities. These donor priorities can be detached from immediate social development needs. And aid creates and sustains dependency and entrenches poverty.

    What should the government prioritise and why?

    The political class always says fighting terrorism is the top policy priority. This thinking, while viable for the current situation, ignores the potential to minimise terrorism by putting the basic needs of the public first, and especially the youth.

    Somali leaders are duty-bound to shift focus. A good place to start is the basis of social development: security, education and healthcare. It falls upon them to marshal the country’s resources and capacities to improve the well-being of its citizens.

    The national leadership also needs to restructure its relationship with federal member states. Distribution of development resources (including foreign aid) must be fair, not based on political alliances.

    Somalia also needs to reform the government’s policy on public appointments. People must get jobs based on their educational background, professional experience, incorruptible character and institutional accountability.

    The country has impressive natural resources. There’s huge untapped potential for fisheries and agriculture, which is the country’s economic backbone. The country also has untapped minerals and hydrocarbons wealth.

    The above observations are not to say that the federal government should lose sight of the fight against the terrorist organisations. But the welfare of people, including job creation for young people, must be equally prioritised. That will surely advance much needed social development while also reducing the appeal of terrorism among the youth.

    Ali A. Abdi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Somalia at 65: what’s needed to address its dismal social development indicators – https://theconversation.com/somalia-at-65-whats-needed-to-address-its-dismal-social-development-indicators-258307

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: One year in, Labour has a surprising amount to celebrate. But you wouldn’t know it

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rohan McWilliam, Professor of Modern British History, Anglia Ruskin University

    A year in, Starmer still has a mountain to climb. Flickr/Number 10 , CC BY-NC-ND

    In the build-up to the 2024 election, Keir Starmer worked hard to show that his party could run Britain better than the Tories. He promised his government would offer stability after years of chaos – but also change. He stood for honesty but also a technocratic approach that resisted the easy answers of the populist right. The grown ups would be back in charge.

    A year on, as he marks his first year in office, we might ask: how much difference did Labour’s 2024 election win make in the longer trajectory of British life? Are historians in future likely to say (as they often do about the 1945 and 1979 elections) that it led to political and social transformation?

    Of course, it’s too early to say for certain, but not too early to look for signs.

    In electoral terms, Labour gained a stonking 174-seat majority in 2024. But this victory came off the back of a remarkably slim vote share of 33.7% in an election with a near-historically low turnout. That suggests an emotional connection had not been made with the electorate (although it also reflected the way that the traditional two-party system is falling apart).

    This result has defined Labour since then. It is a government that is undoubtedly in power but with a leader who few really understand. At a conference on the Starmer government held at Anglia Ruskin University in June 2025, I asked the audience how many could produce a one-sentence summary of what the government’s ideology was. Only a few felt they could do so.

    In July 2024, Labour promised change. But what did “change” mean? Starmer’s Labour has failed to really spell out its sense of purpose. Starmer admits that he finds ideas difficult. In this sense (and this sense alone) he resembles President George H.W. Bush, who admitted he had trouble with the “vision thing”.

    Starmer looks for solutions to particular problems rather than offering a view of the kind of Britain he wants to create. Without some kind of clear ideological purpose, however, the government ends up merely reacting to events whereas it should be shaping the narrative.

    The good, the bad, and the not-very-Labour

    When Labour returned to power in 1945, 1964 and 1997, there had been extensive discussions about the direction of Labour policy and how it could change society. In 1945, Clement Attlee’s focus was on welfare. Harold Wilson in 1964 drew on Tony Crosland’s revisionist approach to socialism, while in 1997 Tony Blair promised a “third way” in politics, reflecting the ideas of intellectuals such as Anthony Giddens.

    This openness to new ideas barely happened between 2020 and 2024 beyond a sense that Labour needed to re-connect with the “red wall” voters it had lost.

    On top of this, the government has become known for doing some remarkably un-Labour things. In September 2024, it changed the rules on winter fuel benefits to limit them to only some pensioners (although it has since partially backtracked under immense pressure from Labour MPs).

    It continues to resist calls to abolish the two child-benefit cap that restricts some forms of support to families with a maximum of two children, despite clear evidence that doing so is an easy way to reduce child poverty. Most catastrophically, it has been humiliated by a backbench rebellion which forced it to gut its welfare bill.



    Read more:
    The mistakes Keir Starmer made over disability cuts – and how he can avoid future embarrassment

    The government claims it is having to correct the dismal economic inheritance left by the Tories, preventing it from splashing the cash in the way Labour supporters want. Chancellor of the exchequer Rachel Reeves talks about “hard choices” in order to show how disciplined Labour is, thus hopefully reassuring investors and the bond market.

    The result was the winter fuel payment crisis, which (despite a u-turn) threatens to become Labour’s poll tax – an iconic policy the electorate refuses to forgive.

    Starmer and Reeves demonstrated very limited understanding of the politics of this decision: they seemed prepared to hurt poorer people while apparently leaving the wealthy largely untouched.

    Starmer would argue that his government’s ideology has been expressed through its five missions, the most important of which is to stimulate economic growth. The June 2025 spending review was aimed at directing investment particularly towards the north of England and building infrastructure, including investment in transport. The government has also retained its focus on getting to net zero (which suggests a degree of radicalism).

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    Another mission that is also more obviously Labour in character is rebuilding the NHS, particularly by reducing waiting lists. Breaking down barriers to opportunity (another mission) has led to investment in education and the creation of breakfast clubs so that all children start the day properly fed.

    Labour still talks the language of class, recognising how poorer people face obstacles. Similarly, the focus on stopping crime and making Britain’s streets safe has echoes of both Jim Callaghan and Tony Blair. The government’s preparedness (so far) to negotiate increased pay awards in the public sector also suggests a distinctive Labour approach – evidence that it is not simply offering austerity-lite. Starmer has even started the process of renationalising the railways.

    Despite claims that it is maintaining austerity, the government has increased public expenditure by the highest level in decades. In that sense, the 2024 election has led to a new direction for the country.

    Labour can make the claim that it is building a state that can respond to the demands of an ageing population, in a challenging global environment, who will be affected by the results of climate change. This (in one sentence) should be its message.

    A familiar refrain

    If we look at the new government in historical perspective, we should note that it is not unusual for people to complain that Labour lacks ideology or a moral purpose: such things were said about every prime minister the party has produced, from Ramsay MacDonald onwards. Starmer may well seem better in retrospect.

    The overall impression of the prime minister, however, is that he is consumed by caution. Much of the time his government seems to chase the talking points put out by Reform UK, the best example being the “island of strangers” speech.

    It may be that future historians will argue that the real significance of the 2024 election was not Labour’s capture of seats but the way it exposed the latent support for Nigel Farage’s new party that had been building across the country. However, there are still several years to recover this legacy, should Starmer commit to learning from the mistakes made in the first year of his tenure.

    Rohan McWilliam is affiliated with The Labour Party (ordinary member).

    – ref. One year in, Labour has a surprising amount to celebrate. But you wouldn’t know it – https://theconversation.com/one-year-in-labour-has-a-surprising-amount-to-celebrate-but-you-wouldnt-know-it-259837

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Somalia at 65: what’s needed to address its dismal social development indicators

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ali A. Abdi, Professor, University of British Columbia

    Somalia ranks among the lowest scoring countries in the United Nations Human Development Index. The index of 195 countries is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, years of schooling, and access to a decent standard of living. Ali A. Abdi, a scholar of social development education, examines Somalia’s failure to advance social development programmes.

    What is socio-economic development and how does Somalia stack up?

    Somalia is celebrating its 65th year of independence. This was marked officially on 1 July 2025.

    Despite the pomp and circumstance, though, the country’s social development indicators are dismal.

    Social development generally means visible improvements in the quality of life. People’s well-being is based on aspects of national progress like:

    • universally available good quality education and adequate healthcare

    • employment opportunities that generate liveable incomes and upward socioeconomic mobility

    • governance structures that protect people’s rights to security.

    Somalia has failed to meet these human development targets.

    Its low score in the UN index can be understood by looking at the statistics relating to education and health. In any society these act as foundational blocks for social development. But in Somalia:

    • children can expect to get an average of 1.72 years of education (the continental African average is 7.7 years)

    • there are 0.23 doctors per 10,000 people, and many doctors serve in fee-based private clinics which are out of reach for ordinary citizens in a country with US$600 GDP per capita income

    • the capital city, Mogadishu, with a population of 2.8 million, has only two fully public hospitals and they lack specialist services; patients who require specialist care must go to private hospitals

    • the youth unemployment rate is just below 70%.

    With these social development liabilities, it’s no wonder that the country is the biggest per capita producer of both global refugees and internally displaced persons.

    How did Somalia come to this?

    The Somali state collapsed as a cohesive national entity in 1991. The military government that had been in power since 1969 was overthrown by armed opposition forces. The country slowly fragmented into quasi-self-governing regions. Transitional national governments have come and gone.

    The current federal political structure came into being in August 2012. The Federal Republic of Somalia comprised five founding member states (there are now six).

    The depressed social development situation is not the only obstacle facing Somalia. Other complexities include:

    A governance system built on cronyism and political loyalty: Somalia’s national political leadership entrenched cronyism. In fairness, the same selectively applies to sub-national, federal member states leadership. This corrupt system has found traction in a country where professionals, young graduates and traditional leaders lack legitimate sources of income. This undermines good governance while creating discord within and among the federal government and federal member states.

    Discord at national level and between national and sub-national leaders: The most recent example of this revolves around the national leadership’s 2024 attempt to change the interim constitution. The unilaterally proposed one-person-one-vote proposal runs counter to the 2012 framework through which the current federal system was created. This has fuelled yet another national controversy with less than a year to the next presidential election.

    Externally constructed political and economic interventions: Somalia receives significant international aid to address political and developmental challenges. But the strings attached include the management of these funds by external entities. These donor priorities can be detached from immediate social development needs. And aid creates and sustains dependency and entrenches poverty.

    What should the government prioritise and why?

    The political class always says fighting terrorism is the top policy priority. This thinking, while viable for the current situation, ignores the potential to minimise terrorism by putting the basic needs of the public first, and especially the youth.

    Somali leaders are duty-bound to shift focus. A good place to start is the basis of social development: security, education and healthcare. It falls upon them to marshal the country’s resources and capacities to improve the well-being of its citizens.

    The national leadership also needs to restructure its relationship with federal member states. Distribution of development resources (including foreign aid) must be fair, not based on political alliances.

    Somalia also needs to reform the government’s policy on public appointments. People must get jobs based on their educational background, professional experience, incorruptible character and institutional accountability.

    The country has impressive natural resources. There’s huge untapped potential for fisheries and agriculture, which is the country’s economic backbone. The country also has untapped minerals and hydrocarbons wealth.

    The above observations are not to say that the federal government should lose sight of the fight against the terrorist organisations. But the welfare of people, including job creation for young people, must be equally prioritised. That will surely advance much needed social development while also reducing the appeal of terrorism among the youth.

    Ali A. Abdi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Somalia at 65: what’s needed to address its dismal social development indicators – https://theconversation.com/somalia-at-65-whats-needed-to-address-its-dismal-social-development-indicators-258307

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Employers are failing to insure the working class – Medicaid cuts would leave them even more vulnerable

    Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Sumit Agarwal, Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine, University of Michigan

    The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 7.8 million Americans across the U.S. would lose their coverage through Medicaid – the public program that provides health insurance to low-income families and individuals – under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act making its way through Congress.

    That includes 248,000 to 414,000 of my fellow residents of Michigan based on the House Reconciliation Bill in early June 2025. There are similarly deep projected cuts within the Senate version of the legislation.

    Many of these people are working Americans who would lose Medicaid because of the onerous paperwork involved with the proposed work requirements.

    They wouldn’t be able to get coverage in the Affordable Care Act Marketplaces after losing Medicaid. Premiums and out-of-pocket costs are likely to be too high for those making less than 100% to 138% of the federal poverty level who do not qualify for health insurance marketplace subsidies. Funding for this program is also under threat.

    And despite being employed, they also wouldn’t be able to get health insurance through their employers because it is either too expensive or not offered to them. Researchers estimate that coverage losses would lead to thousands of medically preventable deaths across the country because people would be unable to access health care without insurance.

    I am a physician, health economist and policy researcher who has cared for patients on Medicaid and written about health care in the U.S. for over eight years. I think it’s important to understand the role of Medicaid within the broader insurance landscape. Medicaid has become a crucial source of health coverage for low-wage workers.

    A brief history of Medicaid expansion.

    Michigan removed work requirements from Medicaid

    A few years ago, Michigan was slated to institute Medicaid work requirements, but the courts blocked the implementation of that policy in 2020. It would have cost upward of US$70 million due to software upgrades, staff training, and outreach to Michigan residents enrolled in the Medicaid program, according to the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.

    Had it gone into effect, 100,000 state residents were expected to lose coverage within the first year.

    The state took the formal step of eliminating work requirements from its statutes earlier this year in recognition of implementation costs being too high and mounting evidence against the policy’s effectiveness.

    When Arkansas instituted Medicaid work requirements in 2018, there was no increase in employment, but within months, thousands of people enrolled in the program lost their coverage. The reason? Many people were subjected to paperwork and red tape, but there weren’t actually that many people who would fail to meet the criteria of the work requirements. It is a recipe for widespread coverage losses without meeting any of the policy’s purported goals.

    Work requirements, far from incentivizing work, paradoxically remove working people from Medicaid with nowhere else to go for insurance.

    Shortcomings of employer-sponsored insurance

    Nearly half of Americans get their health insurance through their employers.

    In contrast to a universal system that covers everyone from cradle to grave, an employer-first system leaves huge swaths of the population uninsured. This includes tens of millions of working Americans who are unable to get health insurance through their employers, especially low-income workers who are less likely to even get the choice of coverage from their employers.

    Over 80% of managers and professionals have employer-sponsored health coverage, but only 50% to 70% of blue-collar workers in service jobs, farming, construction, manufacturing and transportation can say the same.

    There are some legal requirements mandating employers to provide health insurance to their employees, but the reality of low-wage work means many do not fall under these legal protections.

    For example, employers are allowed to incorporate a waiting period of up to 90 days before health coverage begins. The legal requirement also applies only to full-time workers. Health coverage can thus remain out of reach for seasonal and temporary workers, part-time employees and gig workers.

    Even if an employer offers health insurance to their low-wage employees, those workers may forego it because the premiums and deductibles are too high to make it worth earning less take-home pay.

    To make matters worse, layoffs are more common for low-wage workers, leaving them with limited options for health insurance during job transitions. And many employers have increasingly shed low-wage staff, such as drivers and cleaning staff, from their employment rolls and contracted that work out. Known as the fissuring of the workplace, it allows employers of predominately high-income employees to continue offering generous benefits while leaving no such commitment to low-wage workers employed as contractors.

    Medicaid fills in gaps

    Low-income workers without access to employer-sponsored insurance had virtually no options for health insurance in the years before key parts of the Affordable Care Act went into effect in 2014.

    Research my co-authors and I conducted showed that blue-collar workers have since gained health insurance coverage, cutting the uninsured rate by a third thanks to the expansion of Medicaid eligibility and subsidies in the health insurance marketplaces. This means low-income workers can more consistently see doctors, get preventive care and fill prescriptions.

    Further evidence from Michigan’s experience has shown that Medicaid can help the people it covers do a better job at work by addressing health impairments. It can also improve their financial well-being, including fewer problems with debt, fewer bankruptcies, higher credit scores and fewer evictions.

    Premiums and cost sharing in Medicaid are minimal compared with employer-sponsored insurance, making it a more realistic and accessible option for low-income workers. And because Medicaid is not tied directly to employment, it can promote job mobility, allowing workers to maintain coverage within or between jobs without having to go through the bureaucratic complexity of certifying work.

    Of course, Medicaid has its own shortcomings. Payment rates to providers are low relative to other insurers, access to doctors can be limited, and the program varies significantly by state. But these weaknesses stem largely from underfunding and political hostility – not from any intrinsic flaw in the model. If anything, Medicaid’s success in covering low-income workers and containing per-enrollee costs points to its potential as a broader foundation for health coverage.

    The current employer-based system, which is propped up by an enormous and regressive tax break for employer-sponsored insurance premiums, favors high-income earners and contributes to wage stagnation. In my view, which is shared by other health economists, a more public, universal model could better cover Americans regardless of how someone earns a living.

    Over the past six decades, Medicaid has quietly stepped into the breach left by employer-sponsored insurance. Medicaid started as a welfare program for the needy in the 1960s, but it has evolved and adapted to fill the needs of a country whose health care system leaves far too many uninsured.

    Sumit Agarwal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Employers are failing to insure the working class – Medicaid cuts would leave them even more vulnerable – https://theconversation.com/employers-are-failing-to-insure-the-working-class-medicaid-cuts-would-leave-them-even-more-vulnerable-259256

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Haiti, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Efforts to Establish a New Constitution, Raise Questions on Measures to Combat Gang-Related Gender-Based Violence and Lynchings

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the second periodic report of Haiti on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . Committee Experts appreciated the referendum to establish a new national Constitution, while raising questions as to how the State was tackling the high level of violence against women and girls perpetuated by gang members and lynchings carried out by citizens, against a backdrop of distrust in the police.

    One Committee Expert said they saw the referendum to establish a new Constitution in a positive light, as an attempt to reestablish the institutionality of the country.

    Another Expert said that the scale of violence against women and girls was reportedly considerable, with sexual violence, including rape of children as young as five years old, gang rape, and forced prostitution, used as a weapon of control by gangs. According to reports, the judiciary were not sensitive to cases of gender-based violence and victims were hesitant to report cases. What measures were taken to encourage women to file complaints? Was there a fund to help survivors of violence? How were they supported by State services?

    Lynchings continued to be regular and numerous, another Expert said, citing reports of more than 500 cases in 2023. These were often the work of self-defence groups in or around Port-au-Prince, who did not trust the police, mainly due to corruption. Was this violence investigated, including when the police were accused of supporting or encouraging it? Had the perpetrators of lynchings, stonings and mutilations been prosecuted and punished proportionately? How could trust be restored between the police and the civilian population?

    Pedrica Saint Jean, Minister for the Status of Women and Women’s Rights and head of the delegation, introducing the report, said from 2020 to 2025, Haiti was confronted with repeated political crises, marked by lockdown operations and successive protests. The COVID-19 pandemic, frequent floods and the earthquake of 14 August 2021, which devastated part of the Great South region, were additional challenges faced by the country. This complex situation was further aggravated by the assassination of the Haitian President on 6 July 2021.

    Ms. Saint Jean said an agreement for a peaceful transition was reached on 3 April 2024, establishing a transition period with a nine-member Transitional Presidential Council and a Prime Minister, with the aim of restoring security, continuing constitutional reform, and organising democratic elections.

    The delegation said several strategies had been undertaken to combat gender-based violence, including a national strategy that spanned from 2017 to 2024. An assessment of the strategy was almost completed. A gender-based violence cell had been established to train police officers to take the needs of female victims of violence into account. The Office to Combat Gender-Based Violence streamlined services for victims, enabling them to receive legal, psychosocial and medical assistance in one place. In areas with armed gangs, women were typically the primary victims. Violence was used as a weapon of repression.

    The delegation also said the Government had always condemned lynchings, which were not part of the country’s culture. Incidents needed to be reported at a police station so perpetrators could be incarcerated and tried for their crimes. The community police were carrying out an awareness raising campaign to progressively build trust with the general population. Training sessions were being organised for police officers, with a view to protecting the population. When complaints were made against the police force, the national inspector for the police carried out investigations and measures were taken as necessary.

    In concluding remarks, Ms. Saint Jean thanked the Committee for the kindness it had shown to the Haitian delegation, and the Experts for their insights. Haiti had taken due note of all recommendations and was determined to take further steps to develop effective, concrete responses to the Committee’s concerns relating to the implementation of the Covenant. Everybody was working to see the day when Haiti could leave the crisis behind.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, said the Committee acknowledged the profound political, economic and humanitarian challenges facing Haiti, which had hampered efforts to protect human rights. Haiti was encouraged to take this opportunity to advance necessary reforms to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Covenant were fully recognised for all Haitians.

    The delegation of Haiti was made up of representatives of the Ministry for the Status of Women and Women’s Rights; the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work; the Cabinet; the Government of Port-au-Prince; the Prime Minister’s Office; the Haitian National Police; the Anti-Violence Unit; and the Permanent Mission of Haiti to the United Nations Office at Geneva. Some members of the delegation were unable to attend the meeting in person due to travel restrictions.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage . Meeting summary releases can be found here . The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage .

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Monday 7 July to begin its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam (CCPR/C/VNM/4). 

    Report

    The Committee has before it the second periodic report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/2).

    Presentation of Report

    PEDRICA SAINT JEAN, Minister for the Status of Women and Women’s Rights and head of the delegation , said between 2020 to 2025, Haiti had experienced both positive and negative developments. From a positive perspective, the Government had multiplied efforts in many areas to improve the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, the country had been plagued by unprecedent insecurity that required the intervention of a foreign force, through the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission on October 2, 2024. This force intervened in the context of an agreement signed between Haiti and Kenya on police and security cooperation in March 2024, following the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2699.

    From 2020 to 2025, Haiti was confronted with repeated political crises, marked by lockdown operations and successive protests which accompanied them. The COVID-19 pandemic, frequent floods and the earthquake of 14 August 2021, which devastated part of the Great South region, were additional challenges faced by the country. This complex situation was further aggravated by the assassination of the Haitian President on 6 July 2021.

    An agreement for a peaceful transition was reached on 3 April 2024, establishing a transition period with a nine-member Transitional Presidential Council and a Prime Minister, with the aim of restoring security, continuing constitutional reform, and organising democratic presidential elections. The Council was also tasked with economic and judicial reforms and combating corruption. The agreement provided for the establishment of three key bodies, including the Body for the Control of Government Action, in charge of controlling the acts of the Executive, since Parliament was currently non-existent; the National Security Council, to respond to the various aspects of the country’s security crisis; and the National Conference, accompanied by a steering committee. The Government had already established the National Security Council and the National Conference and its steering committee. The referendum decree, resulting from the work of the National Conference and the steering committee, would allow Haiti to have a new Constitution. Currently, efforts were underway to strengthen the capacities of the Haitian National Police and the Armed Forces of Haiti, which had a budget increase of 11 per cent in 2024-2025. An agreement was concluded with Colombia to monitor the Haitian coast, to curb the illicit trafficking of firearms.

    The Government had attached great importance to the judicial reform already initiated by its predecessors. Six new Courts of First Instance and the corresponding Public Prosecutor’s Offices were created between September 2024 and April 2025. The law of 10 September 2018 created the National Council for Legal Assistance and established legal aid offices in 18 jurisdictions in Haiti, aiming to provide free legal assistance to those who were financially struggling. The Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure had previously been criticised by civil society in 2020. Following the revision of the two texts by a special commission, they were adopted on 24 June 2025. This marked an important step in the fight against insecurity, corruption and impunity.

    Two other important decrees had been adopted in the context of judicial reform. The first, adopted on 16 April 2025, which created two specialised judicial poles: one for the repression of complex financial crimes and offences and the other for the repression of mass crimes and sexual violence. The second decree of 4 May 2023 sanctioned money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Haiti.

    Despite Government efforts, due to the deteriorating security situation, the majority of prisons in Port-au-Prince had been vandalised, leading to the uncontrolled release of a number of detainees. The Government had been forced to relocate several jurisdictions to allow the resumption of judicial activities in minimum security conditions and the normal application of appropriate sentences and sanctions.

    The Haitian State aimed to follow up on complaints against police officers for excessive use of force, and it organised human rights training sessions for police personnel. However, it was regrettable that, despite the Government’s efforts, some citizens, driven by anger at the atrocities committed by criminal groups, resorted to extreme methods, including the lynching of captured gang members, instead of handing them over to the authorities. The Government recognised the severity of these acts and strongly condemned all forms of mob justice.

    The crisis in the country led to an increase in gender-based violence, particularly for displaced persons in camps. The Haitian State was working to protect and facilitate access to justice for survivors of violence, including through the creation of the Office for Combatting Gender-Based Violence as well as the organization of training adapted to the needs of survivors for police officers and judges. Medical, legal and psychosocial assistance were also offered to women and girls at internal displacement camps.

    Article 262 of the Penal Code, adopted by decree on 23 June 2025, punished the perpetrators of acts of torture and barbarism, with sentences ranging from 15 to 20 years in prison. Prison overcrowding remained a major problem, especially with the destruction of the main prisons in March 2024. Instructions had been issued to the Public Prosecutor’s Offices and Courts of First Instance to carry out regular criminal hearings, with the aim of relieving overcrowding in the prisons in provincial cities.

    The Transitional Presidential Council was making every effort to organise general elections in 2025 and to install a President elected on 7 February 2026. Despite its efforts, the Haitian State was aware that the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant had not yet reached a satisfactory level. However, Haiti pledged to do everything in its power to implement the provisions on the Covenant.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert acknowledged how difficult it was for the State party to participate in person in the dialogue and expressed gratitude to the delegation in Geneva. The Committee was aware of the grave humanitarian crisis suffered by Haiti for decades, compounded with the assassination of the President in 2021. In that context, the Committee noted an increase in widespread human rights violations and growing control of armed gangs in significant parts of Port-au-Prince, leaving the population more vulnerable to violence and human rights abuses, and leading to the displacement of more than one million people.

    Were courts in Haiti directly applying the Covenant? Could examples be provided? Were courses on international human rights law and the Covenant provided in training to judges? The Committee had been informed of situations where civil servants had opposed the execution of orders handed down by judges to free individuals. Could this be explained? What role did these civil servants play in the judicial system? Had steps been taken to ratify the Optional Protocol of the Covenant on individual communications? In May 2025, a bill of law was presented on the development of a new constitution, with a decree adopted to hold a referendum on the issue. Was this bill in line with the rights enshrined in the Covenant? Was it realistic to carry out a referendum in the context of violence? When was the state of emergency ordered? Was it still in force? Which articles of the Covenant were suspended?

    Did the current budget of the Office for Citizen Protection allow it to carry out its functions and extend its activities to the most remote parts of the country? Were there plans to expand the powers of the Office to allow it to consider human rights violations that had their origin in the acts of private entities?

    What steps had been taken to end discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons? Were there laws in place to punish acts of discrimination against these groups? Had the State taken actions been to allow these people to carry out public demonstrations and to protect them? Had it adopted measures to change discriminatory cultural attitudes in Haitian society, to end stigmatisation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons? 

    Another Expert said despite the crisis in the country, Haiti remained bound by its international obligations. The dialogue would address problems such as insecurity, the deep humanitarian crisis that the population was experiencing, the endemic violence of gangs, the forced displacement of the population, the dysfunction of the justice system, chronic impunity and serious challenges to the rule of law. All these problems were linked to corruption. The report published in 2023 by the United Nations Expert on Human Rights in Haiti stated that corruption in Haiti was “public enemy number one” and found that more than 90 per cent of Haitian civil servants did not comply with the national anti-corruption law. The Anti-Corruption Unit and the Central Financial Intelligence Unit, which were suspected of lacking independence, had brought nearly 100 major cases of corruption to justice, but these had not led to any convictions.

    Did the State plan to set up a financial prosecutor’s office or judges specialised in the fight against corruption? Could more information be provided on the decree adopted on the creation of financial judicial units? What measures were being taken to support the work of the Anti-Corruption Unit and the Central Financial Intelligence Unit and to ensure that the cases referred were followed up independently?

    Haiti had expressed its commitment to ensuring accountability for the serious violations committed during Jean-Claude Duvalier’s presidency. However, a case assessing these violations had been in the courts of cassation since 2014, and there had not been any progress. What explained the delay? Could the delegation enlighten the Committee on the situation of Jean Gabriel Robert, who was convicted in absentia in the case of the “Raboteau massacre”?

    Information showed that the scale of violence against women and girls was considerable, with sexual violence, including rape, which was sometimes perpetrated against children as young as five years old; gang rape; and forced prostitution, used as a weapon of control by gangs. According to reports, the judiciary were not sensitive to cases of gender-based violence and victims were hesitant to report cases. What measures were taken to encourage women to file complaints? Was there a fund to help survivors of violence? How were they supported by State services?

    According to information received by the Committee, lynchings continued to be regular and numerous, with more than 500 in 2023. These were often the work of self-defence groups in or around Port-au-Prince, who did not trust the police, mainly due to corruption. In addition, the 2024 report of the United Nations Expert on Human Rights in Haiti noted that police were passive, and it appeared that some murders were encouraged, supported or facilitated by the police forces. Was this violence investigated, including when the police were accused of supporting or encouraging it? Had the perpetrators of lynchings, stonings and mutilations been prosecuted and punished proportionately? How could trust be restored between the police and the civilian population?

    Another Expert said specific steps had not been taken to combat impunity. What hope existed, looking forward to the immediate and long-term future, regarding a reversal of the situation? There were several cases in which there had been impunity for human rights violations. Attacks against the population in the La Saline suburb in 2018 had not been condemned by the Government and no steps had been taken to provide support to victims. What measures had been taken against the involvement of political agents in these cases? Why was the La Saline case withdrawn from the original judge?

    Data showed that 28 percent of civil servants in Haiti were women. In 2019 a strategy was presented to ensure equality for women by 2030. What progress had been made? How would the State party solve the problem of the low rate of political representation of women in Haiti?

    What actions were being taken to guaranteed women’s access to health care, in situations where criminal groups took control of health centres? How was access to medicines ensured?

    Another Expert asked what Haiti’s prospects were looking forward? What urgent measures were envisaged to protect women and girls in areas under gang control? What mechanisms had been established to guarantee security and safety for survivors of sexual violence, and to encourage the reporting of cases? Could Haiti provide updated information on the draft law preventing violence against women and girls? Was there a timeline for its adoption? What had been done to bolster the amount of medical, legal and psychosocial services for survivors, particularly in areas under gang control? What measures were envisaged to protect the right to life of those in extreme poverty? Was there an intersectional strategy to prevent avoidable deaths linked to poverty?

    What measures were taken to protect civilians living in areas under the control of armed gangs? What had been the result of the assistance from Kenya? Was it meeting the challenges? What guarantees existed when it came to the investigation of its own officers by the Haitian police? How was it ensured that the police did not carry out disproportionate use of force during protests? How was action being bolstered in areas under gang control?

    Was there a road map regarding ratification of the Covenant’s Second Optional Protocol concerning the death penalty? How did the State party intend to ensure that those who had served their sentence were properly released? Had the system for monitoring judicial cases been reactivated? What efforts were underway to improve detention conditions? Were construction projects for new prisons still planned? How many women had access to shelters in the last three years? What measures were envisaged to guarantee all police stations should have trained personnel, particularly in areas most affected by police insecurity?

    Responses by the Delegation

    PEDRICA SAINT JEAN, Minister for the Status of Women and Women’s Rights and head of the delegation , said the Government had priorities outlined in the April 2024 agreement on the peaceful transition, including combatting insecurity, conducting the referendum and bringing the country to elections to appoint a robust Government. To combat insecurity, the budget allocated to the police and armed forces had been increased, allowing them to better contain the problems they were confronting. The police, the Haitian armed forces, and the security mission needed to work together to combat insecurity to allow for the milestone referendum to be held. Nine electoral commissioners were currently out in the field assessing the requirements. Haiti was not waiting for the security issues to subside before moving to the referendum.

    Haiti was doing its utmost to implement its commitments under the Covenant through a raft of measures. Six new courtrooms had been established in the country, allowing proximity between those needing to access the justice system and the infrastructure in place. Bureaus had been established to work on specific criminal areas, including mass crimes which had remained unpunished. For some time, courts had not been operational because they were in the hands of gangs. Two bureaus would be responsible for crimes of sexual violence, and another was responsible for financial crimes. Some 34 new judges and prosecutors had been appointed to support the justice system.

    The method of choosing judges for the Anti-Corruption Unit had not hindered its independence. Cases were currently going ahead at the Court of First Instance. Three prisons had been built to international standards, with one dedicated to female inmates. Institutional measures had been put in place to freeze the funds of certain agencies which were found to be corrupt but had impunity from the Anti-Corruption Unit, and those responsible were being brought before the court.

    The Government of Haiti had always condemned lynchings, which were not part of the country’s culture. Incidents needed to be reported at a police station so perpetrators could be incarcerated and tried for their crimes.

    The delegation said several assessment missions had been established to gain an understanding of the situation of detention centres and propose tangible solutions. One of the main challenges was the provision of food, due to lack of access to main roads. To address this situation, the Justice Ministry sought to ensure that providers of food should be placed directly in situ. In the last few months, prisons had greater autonomy and managed their needs themselves, providing a better and tailored approach to local realities.

    Haiti had done a lot to combat gender-based violence. This phenomenon was topical in Haiti, particularly when it came to displaced women. Several strategies had been undertaken to combat gender-based violence, including a national strategy that spanned from 2017 to 2024. An assessment of the strategy was almost completed. A gender-based violence cell had been established within the police, to train police officers to take the needs of female victims of violence into account. The Office to Combat Gender-Based Violence streamlined services for victims, enabling them to receive legal, psychosocial and medical assistance in one place. Psychosocial support services had been set up for women victims in internal displacement camps. Several initiatives had been adopted to bolster protections for minors, including host families and prevention and readaptation programmes for children recruited by armed games. Training and awareness raising sessions were organised for judges.

    In areas with armed gangs, women were typically the primary victims. The number of victims was increasing, particularly against younger women, but violence by armed gangs was also affecting children and the elderly. Violence was used as a weapon of repression. There were still people in Haiti who did not want to report. During times of political turbulence, the phenomenon of violence against women was heightened. There was a need for awareness raising to eradicate the phenomenon. Women should not be used as an instrument to place pressure on the Government.

    Incest had never been part of Haitian culture, but it did not mean this phenomenon did not exist. When incest occurred, people usually preferred to solve the issue in the family. Attention needed to be paid to the phenomenon of incest involving displaced people. The State sanctioned based on the relevant 2006 decree and used case law when dealing with these offences. It was important to continue legislating to bring tangible solutions to this phenomenon.

    For 15 years, judges had been receiving training on the Covenant from the Government and the Haitian police.

    Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons had been looked down on in Haiti; they were formerly not given the right to complain. While progress was not significant, these people were now considered to be fully fledged citizens who needed to be protected by the State and to enjoy their full human rights.

    Quotas had been implemented calling for at least 30 per cent of decision-making posts to be held by women. This issue had been poorly addressed. In the new Constitution, the State was advocating for parity. Until there was a critical mass of women in decision-making posts, the problems they faced would persist. A series of consultations had been launched with officials to create incentive measures to promote equality regarding candidate lists.

    The law on the organization of the Ministry on the Status of Women had not properly been reformed, which was why the Ministry had difficulties in playing its primary role. The Ministry submitted a law on its reorganization to ensure it could achieve its goals. By the start of next year, the State would launch its first national action plan covering the participation of women in restoring peace and security in Haiti. Work was being done with survivors in internal displacement camps to transform them into fully-fledged actors. Women, including young girls and survivors of violence in these camps, had been appointed as peace ambassadors, to sensitise the message of peace throughout Haiti.

    Haiti was relying on the work of the Multinational Security Support Mission and the international community to help the police and armed forces overcome the corruption and security issues in the country.

    Follow-up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked follow-up questions, including on the functions to be undertaken by the bureaus on mass crimes, sexual crimes and financial crimes. This was a fantastic idea, but the bureaus needed to have the resources to operate properly. Other questions were asked on measures planned to restore the trust between the police and the justice system; lynchings committed by the police force; steps to tackle the circulation of weapons; and the mandate of the Office for Citizens’ Protection.

    An Expert said they saw the referendum to establish a new Constitution in a positive light, as an attempt to reestablish the institutionality of the country. Who drafted this bill? Did it go through various sectors, with participation from civil society? What did the “green and red zones” mean? Were green zones under Government control? Did red zones mean there was no State control? What happened if there was a referendum in the red zones?

    More questions were asked on how the long tradition of impunity could be alleviated; alternative measures to detention; detention beyond the lengths of sentences; efforts to prevent discrimination against women; and access to voluntary interruption of pregnancy. What was the Government’s perception of the processes involving the participation of the international community that aimed to improve the situation for the population of Haiti?

    According to information received by the Committee, around 40 per cent of births enjoyed the proper medical support. How did midwives treat risky pregnancies? Did the State intend to include the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol in the planned reform of the draft Constitution?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the death penalty was abolished in Haiti through a decree adopted in 1987.

    Regarding the red and green zones, there were currently zones under gang control, where the State was doing everything possible to convert them to green zones. Green zones were placed where the State could provide appropriate services to the population. The police were trying to gain access to the red zones to bring about peace and security. Progress had been made in penetrating many of the red zones; it was expected that there would be further progress in this area.

    The referendum was a compulsory, milestone measure to lay the groundwork for national elections and allow the population to get their new Constitution. All different sectors of society had been consulted in the drafting of the new Constitution.

    Haiti had implemented measures that aimed to provide a structure to prevent the free circulation of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction.

    The delegation said there was a legal bureau on mass crimes and sexual violence in Port-au-Prince and another on financial crimes. The bureaus were comprised of 10 judges who worked with the police and financial oversight and regulatory bodies. Their operations were ensured by donors from the international community and the State.

    The community police were carrying out an awareness raising campaign to progressively build trust with the general population. Training sessions were being organised for police officers, with a view to protecting the population. When complaints were made against the police force, the national inspector for the police carried out investigations and measures were taken as necessary.

    Haiti had a plan to set up scanners at customs to prevent the flow of illegal weapons into the country. Controls at the border with the Dominican Republic and checks of containers coming from the United Staes had been strengthened, and strict checks were being conducted on private vehicles, including motorbikes. Authorities had also suspended land imports from the Dominican Republic, ensuring seizures of illegal imports. Despite this, Haiti was facing increased criminal activity and corruption, with the need for increased international support to reduce the weapons flow into Haiti.

    Green zones were safe zones while red zones were ones where there was a heightened risk.

    A draft of the new Constitution had been shared across different sectors to receive their inputs, which had been sent to the Committee responsible for the drafting of the new Constitution.

    Haitian midwives played a key role in early detection of illnesses and in responding to complications during birth. They carried out post monitoring operatives in rural areas, while caesarean procedures were performed by obstetric doctors.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked if there were obstacles preventing Haiti from ratifying the Covenant’s Second Optional Protocol? Murderous attacks by gangs against ambulances had been reported, and health staff had fled the country. Did the Government have any plans to confront these problems? Haiti had an astonishing overcrowding rate in its prisons, at allegedly over 300 per cent. There was a lack of access to the appellate procedure for all inmates and for persons with disabilities. How did Haiti plan to resolve this problem?

    Another Expert appreciated Haiti’s delegation comprised of high-level women. It was reported that police agents or persons acting with their complicity tortured inmates on a daily basis in prisons and police custody facilities. Why had the perpetrators of cases of torture not been prosecuted and brought to justice? Had there been capacity building of law enforcement in the area of torture? Why had the State not ratified the Convention against Torture?

    Reports received by the Committee stated that forced evictions had become widespread since the earthquake in 2010, but this was denied by the State. It was alleged that these evictions affected a wide number of families and were not addressed by the State. What information was available about three resident families who had not taken up possession of reconstructed homes? Which Government civil servants were responsible for these families’ forced evictions? How had the Government taken steps to prosecute those involved?

    Hurricane Matthew had affected more than 2.6 million people, including 600,000 children; what measures had been taken to protect them? Could information be provided on the distribution of financial aid and the resources used to reconstruct infrastructure following this natural disaster? During the imposed state of emergency, was it only economic rights which were affected? What solutions were available for those still awaiting assistance from the damage 10 years ago? What resources had been allocated to address housing issues?

    A Committee Expert asked about the implementation of the National Plan to Combat Child Labour, adopted in 2019; what was the duration of the plan? Was it still in force or had a new plan been adopted? Could data on the number of children exploited and those in situations of begging be provided? What work had been done specifically on the exploitation of children by the Committee to Combat Human Trafficking?

    Various reports had documented violence against children, who were recruited and used by the gangs and injured or killed as a result. An even more severe impact was felt by children with disabilities. The Secretary-General’s report had outlined 383 grave violations against children in 2024. In December 2024, the gangs had committed a high number of abductions, including of 17 girls and 10 boys. What measures had been taken by the State to combat these grave violations? To help minors, child soldiers and victims of armed groups, a Commission had been created to support the creation of a national network of shelters and rehabilitation centres. How did the State ensure that the Commission had the human and financial resources necessary to support its functions? What did its work consist of? Was the National Committee for Combatting Human Trafficking able to carry out its functions? What measures had been adopted along the Dominican-Haitian border to prevent trafficking of children who were then sold in the Dominican Republic?

    It was understood that a commission to implement criminal reform was created in July 2024. What were the main reforms being carried out? What measures had been adopted to deal with the firebomb attacks on judges? How was the safety and security of judges being ensured? What was the current situation of the National Council for Legal Assistance? Regarding the appointment of judges in the Cassation Council, how was it ensured that the involvement of the Senate did not affect the Council’s independence? What role did the Council play in combatting corruption in the judicial sphere?

    Another Committee Expert said people who were displaced often lost their identification documents. What was the State party doing to resolve this issue? Two journalists reporting on insecurity in Haiti had been executed in 2022. The Committee had also received information that five journalists were murdered in 2024, with no investigations carried out. Gang violence had also led to the closure and restriction of media, including the suspension of popular programmes on suspicion of serving as platforms for gangs. Journalists had also been threatened by gangs. How could elections take place if the State could not facilitate the free circulation of ideas? How did Haiti intend to combat impunity surrounding executions or ill-treatment of journalists? What was done to protect human rights defenders? How was it ensured that social media platforms were regulated?

    In March 2025, anti-Government protests were held to decry the security context and inaction by the State. What measures had been taken to establish the responsibility of police directly involved in the use of force in suppressing peaceful demonstrations? What had been done to guarantee the work of non-governmental organizations in full security and free from harassment?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said overcrowding in prisons remained a major issue for the Government which it was working to address. Instructions had been issued to the prosecution offices and tribunals of the Courts of First Instance to encourage the holding of more criminal sessions, including sessions in which a jury was not present, with a view to relieving overcrowding in provincial prisons. In 2023 and2024, this occurred in 14 jurisdictions, leading to 159 convictions. In 2024, the total number of people detained in the country was around 12,000. The State had managed to capture around 12 prisoners who had escaped. The drop in the number of detainees in 2025 was explained primarily due to the escapes that followed the armed attacks carried out against certain penitentiary infrastructure. Courts had been actively engaged to implement non-custodial measures when appropriate, as a means of alleviating prison overcrowding. The Government recognised the need to prevent arbitrary arrests. Men, women and children were placed in different prisons. Despite the State’s efforts, there was only one police officer per every 14 detainees.

    The Government remained committed to improving prison conditions, despite security constraints. The mortality rate had dropped between 2024 and 2025 thanks to coordinated action to provide medical care and humanitarian aid. Healthcare services had been established in several penitentiaries. In 2017, a Presidential Commission was established to shed light on deaths in the Port-au-Prince prison. It highlighted aggravating factors including severe overcrowding, insufficient hygiene and a lack of medical support, among others. Measures were implemented to improve nutrition, detention conditions and investigate causes of deaths.

    The internal regulations of the penitentiary administration outlawed all forms of torture and inhumane treatment. Finances had been provided to the National Anti-Trafficking Committee to support the implementation of its national action plan. A protocol had been signed to guarantee legal aid to victims of trafficking. Some 100 students from the University of Haiti had received training on the issue of human trafficking. Several human traffickers had been prosecuted, however following the mass escapes in March 2024, a number of these traffickers were unfortunately able to escape.

    The Constitution guaranteed that judges could not be dismissed. In the judicial hierarchy in Haiti, the Constitution had the highest ranking, followed by international conventions. In Haiti, the Constitution outlawed the death penalty in all areas, meaning there was no need to fear its reinstation. The ratification of the Second Optional Protocol could be discussed when the legislature was functional.

    Families who were forcibly evicted due to the development of road infrastructure or for airport security purposes had a right to fixed compensation, as well as the right to appeal decisions blocking their access to redress.

    A State project had been launched to combat domestic labour by children, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The project had been launched in 16 regions in the country and included a concrete list of jobs banned for children. Twenty-three surveys of young people had been conducted, allowing them to express themselves on themes including domestic labour, birth registration, violence against children, and education. A social protection project ensured monetary transfers for children under the age of five, pregnant women and persons with disabilities. The project was financed by the World Bank and allowed vulnerable families to provide care to their children. Around 25,000 homes received regular monetary transfers to the value of 40 United States dollars per month.

    A professional training programme had been launched in conjunction with the International Labour Organization, allowing for the training of more than 800 vulnerable teenagers in various technical and farming activities. Some 9,200 children had received support for school re-enrolment. Four thousand vulnerable homes at risk of family separation received monetary transfers to support income-generating activities, as well as financial education. A pilot programme had been launched in targeted communes with the United Nations Children’s Fund, which had developed a foster programme for children taken out of situations of domesticity to support their reintegration.

    Legal assistance officers had been established in 12 jurisdictions and the rollout was ongoing. A decision would be made on the draft Constitution based on a participatory process. A Commission had been established to follow up on gender-based violence cases in the country.

    Steps had been taken to prevent the phenomenon of forced evictions, but results were still limited. The Government had not been encouraging forced evictions and had taken new steps to support victims. Demolished homes had been rebuilt and several previous owners had already taken ownership of their new homes. Authorities ensured that no one living in camps or informal housing was evicted without a humane alternative provided.

    The Haitian State reiterated its commitment to freedom of the press and its respect for the work of human rights defenders. Efforts were made to ensure journalists could freely conduct their work, including by strengthening protection mechanisms. Haitian authorities reaffirmed their desire to shed light on the murders of several journalists, which were currently at being investigated by the Public Prosecutor.

    The courts did not all apply the Covenant in the same way, but it was often evoked in individual cases. Alternative measures to prison were allowed for in the new Criminal Code, which had been adopted in June 2025. Judges were equipped with armed vehicles and would have security details at their disposal for their personal safety. The police force was taking steps to bolster security in zones with a heightened level of insecurity and ensure that the referendum could take place. The Government was engaged in an intense campaign to fight the armed violence being perpetrated by gangs.

    Follow-up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions regarding identification papers, which more than 70 per cent of the population did not have, as well as the role of the Government Commissioners within the courts of justice.

    A Committee Expert expressed hope that the programme being laid out by the State for elections would bring about the enjoyment of rights by the population. It seemed impossible to bring this about given the current insecurity in Haiti. Was the State in a position to achieve peace given the current context? The context in Haiti required international, shared responsibility, with involvement from all States parties.

    Closing Statements

    PEDRICA SAINT JEAN, Minister for the Status of Women and Women’s Rights and head of the delegation , thanked the Committee for the kindness it had shown to the Haitian delegation, and the Experts for their insights. Haiti had taken due note of all recommendations and was determined to take further steps to develop effective, concrete responses to the Committee’s concerns relating to the implementation of the Covenant. One day, in the not-too-distant future, the country would exit the crisis. Everybody was working to see the day when Haiti could leave the crisis behind. Despite the efforts it had made, the Haitian State was aware that the implementation of the Covenant and progress in bolstering of the rule of law had not yet reached a satisfactory level. Haiti had a massive raft of problems to resolve, including travel restrictions, which had prevented some members of the delegation from traveling to Geneva. The State of Haiti was committed to doing its utmost to implement the provisions of the Covenant.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee acknowledged the profound political, economic and humanitarian challenges facing Haiti, which had hampered efforts to protect human rights. The Committee underscored the importance of continued diligence and commitment to the rights enshrined in the Covenant, especially in times of crisis. During the dialogue, the Committee had raised serious issues regarding the right to life, gang violence, lynchings, protection of vulnerable populations, corruption, protection of journalists and the need to combat impunity, among other concerns. Despite these challenges, the Committee appreciated the State party’s willingness to engage in dialogue. Haiti was encouraged to take this opportunity to advance necessary reforms to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Covenant were fully recognised for all Haitians.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently. 

    CCPR25.015E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Morocco, Ecuador Reiterate Willingness to Further Bolster Bilateral Ties

    Source: APO


    .

    The Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Ecuador reiterated on Friday in Rabat their mutual willingness to further strengthen the development of their bilateral relations.

    Following the meeting held between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, Mr. Nasser Bourita, and the Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, Mrs. Gabriela Sommerfeld, both parties underscored the outstanding bilateral ties of friendship and solidarity, and agreed on the importance of sustaining these exchanges and regularly reviewing them to further strengthen cooperation.

    The ministers stressed that International Law is fundamentally based on mutual respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of States, as well as on fulfilling obligations under treaties and other sources of international law.

    Bourita and Sommerfeld said they were pleased with the convergence of their views on regional and international issues and reiterated their commitment to working for global peace and security.

    They agreed to pool efforts to address global challenges within various international and multilateral bodies, such as climate change, gender issues, human rights, the blue and green agendas, food security, health, pandemic prevention and response, and combating insecurity and corruption.

    The two sides also tackled the significance of implementing the SDGs in an integrated and holistic manner to eradicate poverty and fight climate change while promoting sustainable land use and water management.

    During their meeting, the two ministers also exchanged views on regional and international issues, including the situations in Africa and Latin America, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    They reaffirmed the importance of people-to-people exchanges in strengthening mutual understanding, friendship, and cooperation in communication, culture, education, sports, arts, youth, civil society, and the economy.

    They also expressed their strong commitment to boosting investments through fluid commercial information exchange, promoting strategic alliances with the private sector, and actively supporting initiatives that facilitate and expand bilateral trade, in order to multiply business opportunities and explore the potential for diversified trade and investment between the two countries.

    The two parties explored collaborative prospects within various Atlantic cooperation initiatives. They also voiced their aspiration to make this space a geostrategic framework for dialogue, aimed at promoting development and ensuring security and solidarity, as well as bringing together the peoples of the Global South and North.

    Regarding migration, Morocco and Ecuador commended the efforts made in the area, especially within the framework of the Marrakesh Pact, the Rabat Process, and the Los Angeles Declaration, and reaffirmed their shared commitment to dynamic mobility that enables a safe, smooth, and orderly movement of people.

    The two officials also expressed their shared will to further strengthen the bilateral legal framework to address common areas of interest in cooperation.

    To this end, the ministers welcomed the signing of two legal instruments: a Memorandum of Understanding on diplomatic training and exchange of experiences between Morocco’s Institute of Training, Research, and Diplomatic Studies (IMFRED) and the “Galo Plaza Lasso” Diplomatic Academy of the Ecuadorian Foreign Affairs Ministry; and a Memorandum of Understanding establishing a mechanism for bilateral political consultations.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Kingdom of Morocco – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: VAALCO Energy Scales Up African Operations, Joins African Energy Week (AEW) 2025 as Platinum Partner

    Source: APO – Report:

    U.S. oil and gas company VAALCO Energy has begun refurbishing its FPSO facility at the Baobab field in Block CI-40, offshore Ivory Coast. The modernization is set to increase production beyond the current 2,891 barrels of oil equivalent per day and extend the field’s economic life. A new drilling campaign is planned for 2026 to further develop both the Baobab field and the nearby Kossipo discovery. In addition, VAALCO farmed into Block CI-705 as operator in March 2025, reinforcing its long-term commitment to Ivory Coast’s energy sector.

    In line with the African Energy Week: Invest in African Energies agenda – which centers on maximizing resource development to end energy poverty and drive industrial growth – VAALCO Energy is participating in the 2025 edition as a Platinum Partner. Held under the theme, Invest in African Energy: Positioning Africa as the Global Energy Champion, this year’s event will spotlight the contributions of companies like VAALCO in unlocking the continent’s estimated 125 billion barrels of crude oil and 620 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With over 600 million people in Africa lacking access to reliable electricity and 900 million without clean cooking solutions, Africa’s hydrocarbon resources remain critical to closing the energy access gap.

    Recognizing this, VAALCO is expanding its investments and footprint across key African markets. In Gabon, the company operates the Etame Marin block with a 58.8% working interest and is preparing to launch a new drilling campaign in Q3 2025. To support its efforts in both Gabon and Ivory Coast, VAALCO secured a $300 million revolving credit facility from Standard Bank of South Africa in March 2025.

    In Egypt, VAALCO brought five new wells online in 2025, boosting daily output and enhancing regional energy stability. The company also identified new reserves and a production zone during a Q4 2024 exploration campaign. Its Egyptian portfolio spans the Eastern Desert – including the West Gharib, West Bakr and North West Gharib concessions – as well as the South Ghazalat concession in the Western Desert.

    Meanwhile, in Equatorial Guinea, VAALCO is progressing toward FID for the Venus field development in Block P, with front-end engineering and design currently underway. Drilling is set to commence following FID, with first oil targeted for 2026. As the company scales up its operations across the continent, AEW: Invest in African Energies offers a strategic platform for VAALCO to engage with partners, investors, buyers and regulators and to solidify its role in advancing Africa’s industrialization.

    “VAALCO Energy’s growing footprint across Africa speaks to the vast opportunities available on the continent. Their commitment to investing in infrastructure, boosting production and supporting local economies aligns perfectly with our mission to position Africa as a global energy frontier,” states Tomás Gerbasio, VP of Commercial and Strategic Engagement, African Energy Chamber.

    – on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    About African Energy Week:
    AEW: Invest in African Energies is the platform of choice for project operators, financiers, technology providers and government, and has emerged as the official place to sign deals in African energy. Visit www.AECWeek.com for more information about this exciting event.

    Media files

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    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: bp South Africa Enhances Fuel Distribution Through Retail Site Upgrades

    Source: APO

    bp South Africa – a subsidiary of global energy major bp – is undergoing a strategic transformation to modernize its services, infrastructure and customer experience across the country. In May 2025, the company launched a comprehensive nationwide upgrade of its existing service stations and announced plans to construct 40 new retail sites equipped with expanded offerings, including electric vehicle charging stations and a low-carbon battery rental service. These efforts underscore bp South Africa’s commitment to driving innovation while addressing energy poverty and decarbonization.

    As part of this strategic evolution, bp South Africa returns to African Energy Week (AEW) 2025: Invest in African Energies as a Platinum Partner, reaffirming its commitment to Africa’s energy future. Held under the theme Positioning Africa as the Global Energy Champion, AEW: Invest in African Energies serves as the continent’s premier platform for high-level dialogue, deal-making and partnership-building. The event brings together key stakeholders to accelerate progress toward a just and inclusive energy transition.

    AEW: Invest in African Energies is the platform of choice for project operators, financiers, technology providers and government, and has emerged as the official place to sign deals in African energy. Visit www.AECWeek.com for more information about this exciting event.

    In line with its growth strategy, bp South Africa is enhancing fuel logistics through partnerships with DP World and Makwande Supply & Distribution, ensuring more efficient and cost-effective delivery of petroleum products nationwide. The company signed an agreement with the two logistics firms in 2024, enabling bp South Africa to outsource highly-specialized, non-core functions These initiatives aim to improve fuel accessibility and operational resilience across urban and rural markets.

    Beyond infrastructure, bp South Africa is deeply invested in local economic development, gender empowerment and inclusive growth. The company places a strong emphasis on diversity, with various programs being implemented to empower local businesses, enhance skills development and outreach. Notably, through a R58 million partnership with the Small Enterprise Finance Agency, bp South Africa is supporting black-owned SMEs with funding and technical skills to operate service stations, contributing to broader economic empowerment. A cooperation agreement was signed in 2023, aimed at supporting black-owned businesses across the country’s fuel retain space.

    bp in Africa

    These efforts align with the broader goals of the larger bp group to advance energy projects in Africa. Driven by a commitment to innovation and inclusive growth, bp is scaling up its operations across the continent through strategic investments and partnerships. In Angola, the company merged its assets with those of energy major Eni in 2022, creating Azule Energy – the country’s largest independent equity producer of oil and gas. Azule Energy targets 250,000 barrels per day in Angola, with several projects coming online in the coming months. These include the Agogo Integrated West Hub Development and Angola’s first non-associated gas project. In the MSGBC region, bp leads the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim LNG project – situated on the maritime border of Senegal and Mauritania. The project achieved first gas flow in January 2025. The company also plays a major role in North Africa’s gas sector. Notably, in February 2025, bp went onstream with the second-phase development of the Raven field, offshore Egypt. In Libya, the company is driving a multi-well drilling campaign following its return to the country in 2024. These investments underscore bp’s commitment to Africa.

    “bp South Africa has played a foundational role in shaping the country’s energy sector for over 100 years. As the energy landscape evolves, the company’s inclusive approach, focus on innovation and support for women and entrepreneurs will continue playing an instrumental part in driving sustainable solutions,” said NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the African Energy Chamber.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    Media files

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    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: One year of Keir shows only the SNP will stand up for Scotland

    Source: Scottish National Party

    When Keir Starmer stood up shortly after taking office and told us things were going to get worse, even he could not have envisaged the extent to which broken promises, infighting, bad decisions and shambolic u-turns would define his first 12 months as Prime Minister.

    Barely a household in the country has not been left disappointed or downright angry by the actions of a Labour government which – time and time again – has found itself on the wrong side of the argument, defending the frankly indefensible.

    I am well aware, from the office I hold, that governments must be driven by consistent values and clear direction – both of which appear to be completely lacking at Westminster.

    When I became First Minister, I set clear missions around eradicating child poverty, growing the economy, improving public services and tackling the climate emergency.

    SNP-run Scotland is the only part of the UK where child poverty is expected to fall, and soon we will take another step forward by abolishing Labour’s two-child cap.

    We are introducing more measures to help with the cost of living, such as scrapping peak rail fares permanently.

    And when it comes to the NHS, I am putting in place lasting solutions around the country which will deliver sustained long-term improvements.

    Incidentally, I have managed to do all this – and much more besides – without the enormous parliamentary majority that Keir Starmer enjoys.

    I intend to build on this progress over the next year, and as we approach the 2026 election, the SNP will set out ambitious plans to move Scotland into the next decade.

    The dividing lines for that election are already becoming clear.

    People wanting to know what a Labour government would be like in Scotland need look no further than the shambles of the last twelve months at Westminster.

    Anas Sarwar has defended Keir Starmer every mis-step of the way, and there is little doubt that a Scottish Labour government would be equally determined to balance the books on the backs of the poor, the disabled and older people.

    Labour could have avoided the fiscal nightmare currently tearing them apart if Keir Starmer had the courage to do what the SNP have done, and ask higher earners to pay more tax. This is therefore a strange moment for Mr Sarwar to begin arguing for precisely the opposite – but that is what he has begun doing.

    Much like every Conservative leader who makes similar demands, Mr Sarwar will have to explain what he would cut in Scotland to pay for his tax cuts for the rich. NHS funding? Free university tuition? The Scottish Child Payment?

    The Prime Minister’s many mistakes in his first twelve months add up to a much bigger problem – he has taken the hope people felt last year and has extinguished it.

    Hope must be the defining feature of next year’s election, and hope is what I intend that the SNP offer – a vision of an independent Scotland free from Westminster chaos.

    The last year has demonstrated Labour cannot be trusted with government in Scotland – but it has also shown that no matter who we vote into Downing Street, Westminster will simply never work for Scotland.

    This article was first published in the Scotsman on the 4th of July 2025.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Somalia at 65: what’s needed to address its dismal social development indicators

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ali A. Abdi, Professor, University of British Columbia

    Somalia ranks among the lowest scoring countries in the United Nations Human Development Index. The index of 195 countries is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, years of schooling, and access to a decent standard of living. Ali A. Abdi, a scholar of social development education, examines Somalia’s failure to advance social development programmes.

    What is socio-economic development and how does Somalia stack up?

    Somalia is celebrating its 65th year of independence. This was marked officially on 1 July 2025.

    Despite the pomp and circumstance, though, the country’s social development indicators are dismal.

    Social development generally means visible improvements in the quality of life. People’s well-being is based on aspects of national progress like:

    • universally available good quality education and adequate healthcare

    • employment opportunities that generate liveable incomes and upward socioeconomic mobility

    • governance structures that protect people’s rights to security.

    Somalia has failed to meet these human development targets.

    Its low score in the UN index can be understood by looking at the statistics relating to education and health. In any society these act as foundational blocks for social development. But in Somalia:

    • children can expect to get an average of 1.72 years of education (the continental African average is 7.7 years)

    • there are 0.23 doctors per 10,000 people, and many doctors serve in fee-based private clinics which are out of reach for ordinary citizens in a country with US$600 GDP per capita income

    • the capital city, Mogadishu, with a population of 2.8 million, has only two fully public hospitals and they lack specialist services; patients who require specialist care must go to private hospitals

    • the youth unemployment rate is just below 70%.

    With these social development liabilities, it’s no wonder that the country is the biggest per capita producer of both global refugees and internally displaced persons.

    How did Somalia come to this?

    The Somali state collapsed as a cohesive national entity in 1991. The military government that had been in power since 1969 was overthrown by armed opposition forces. The country slowly fragmented into quasi-self-governing regions. Transitional national governments have come and gone.

    The current federal political structure came into being in August 2012. The Federal Republic of Somalia comprised five founding member states (there are now six).

    The depressed social development situation is not the only obstacle facing Somalia. Other complexities include:

    A governance system built on cronyism and political loyalty: Somalia’s national political leadership entrenched cronyism. In fairness, the same selectively applies to sub-national, federal member states leadership. This corrupt system has found traction in a country where professionals, young graduates and traditional leaders lack legitimate sources of income. This undermines good governance while creating discord within and among the federal government and federal member states.

    Discord at national level and between national and sub-national leaders: The most recent example of this revolves around the national leadership’s 2024 attempt to change the interim constitution. The unilaterally proposed one-person-one-vote proposal runs counter to the 2012 framework through which the current federal system was created. This has fuelled yet another national controversy with less than a year to the next presidential election.

    Externally constructed political and economic interventions: Somalia receives significant international aid to address political and developmental challenges. But the strings attached include the management of these funds by external entities. These donor priorities can be detached from immediate social development needs. And aid creates and sustains dependency and entrenches poverty.

    What should the government prioritise and why?

    The political class always says fighting terrorism is the top policy priority. This thinking, while viable for the current situation, ignores the potential to minimise terrorism by putting the basic needs of the public first, and especially the youth.

    Somali leaders are duty-bound to shift focus. A good place to start is the basis of social development: security, education and healthcare. It falls upon them to marshal the country’s resources and capacities to improve the well-being of its citizens.

    The national leadership also needs to restructure its relationship with federal member states. Distribution of development resources (including foreign aid) must be fair, not based on political alliances.

    Somalia also needs to reform the government’s policy on public appointments. People must get jobs based on their educational background, professional experience, incorruptible character and institutional accountability.

    The country has impressive natural resources. There’s huge untapped potential for fisheries and agriculture, which is the country’s economic backbone. The country also has untapped minerals and hydrocarbons wealth.

    The above observations are not to say that the federal government should lose sight of the fight against the terrorist organisations. But the welfare of people, including job creation for young people, must be equally prioritised. That will surely advance much needed social development while also reducing the appeal of terrorism among the youth.

    – Somalia at 65: what’s needed to address its dismal social development indicators
    – https://theconversation.com/somalia-at-65-whats-needed-to-address-its-dismal-social-development-indicators-258307

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Housing Bill: Recommended Consultation Response

    Source: Scottish Greens

    04 Jul 2025

    You can use this template for your response to the Scottish Government’s Housing Bill consultation. However, personalise your responses if possible to ensure maximum impact. You can email your response to rentcontrolconsultation@gov.scot or you can complete the consultation online.

    Exemptions – properties let below market rent – mid-market rent properties 

    1. Should MMR properties be exempted from the application of rent controls under the Bill? 

    No. Rent Controls should apply equally.  

    Rents across all types of private-rented tenancies have soared, leaving many people in crisis. Exempting any type of property would deprive tenants of the right to live in a home that doesn’t trap them in poverty. Many tenants may not know whether or not their property is a Mid-Market Rent, making a basically fairly simple system excessively complicated. 

    2. We have set out some possible criteria which could be incorporated into a definition of MMR for the purpose of a possible exemption. Do you agree with these criteria? 

    No. I oppose any and all exemptions, but if a MMR exemption is included, it should offer the exemption only to MMRs not charging more than Local Housing Allowance. 

    Exemptions – purpose-built rental housing – build to rent 

    6. Should build to rent properties be exempted from the application of rent controls under the Bill? 

    No. Rent Controls should apply equally. Rents across all types of private-rented tenancies have soared, leaving many people in crisis. Exempting any type of property would deprive tenants of the right to live in a home that doesn’t trap them in poverty. Many tenants may not know whether or not their property is a Build-to-Rent property, making a basically fairly simple system excessively complicated. 

    Other circumstances where exemptions would be appropriate 

    7. Do you agree with the criteria we have set out which could be incorporated into a definition of build to rent for the purpose of a possible exemption? 

    No. I oppose any and all exemptions.  

    But if a BtR exemption is included, “Build-to-Rent” must be classed the same as other rented housing after 2 years and quality improvements must be linked to a point based system that evaluates a property’s quality. 

    Other circumstances where exemptions would be appropriate 

    11. Excluding mid-market rent and build to rent/purpose built private rented accommodation, are there other categories of housing provision that should be exempted from rent controls? 

    No. 

    Modified rent control area restrictions – landlords who charge rent significantly below advertised rate  

    16. Should landlords be able to increase their rent by more than the level of the rent cap at the beginning of a new tenancy, where the previous tenancy was let significantly below market rates? 

    No. This would create an incentive to evict tenants and would again make the system too complicated for tenants and landlords to understand easily. 

    Modified rent control area restrictions – landlords who make improvements to their property 

    18. Should landlords be able to increase rents by more than the level of the rent cap to recover costs, where they have undertaken certain improvements which may enhance the rental value or bring additional benefit to the tenant? 

    No. This would likely be subject to gaming, whereby landlords may make minor changes to justify increases in rent. 

    Again, it would also take away from the simplicity of the current proposed system, which is one of its major advantages. 

    It is difficult to see how such a system would work in practice. Unless there is a flat-rate system, which would lead to the perverse incentives outlined above, there would need to be an excessively complicated system of classing different types of improvement and then linking them to different rent caps. There would then need to be inspections done to check the improvements have been made, which would be a major burden on the Local Authority. Such a system is unlikely to be practicable.  

    20. Are there any other types of improvements that should potentially qualify for this kind of increase above the level of the cap? 

    No 

    Modified rent control area restrictions – other costs a landlord may face 

    24. Are there any other cost increases for rental properties that would justify raising the rent above the level of the rent cap? 

    No. 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Tourism Deputy Minister G20 Tourism Priorities programme in the Northern Cape

    Source: Government of South Africa

    Tourism Deputy Minister Maggie Sotyu has engaged with communities in the Northern Cape on the G20 Tourism Priorities and their potential to advance tourism growth and sustainability.

    The Tourism G20 Community Outreach in the Northern Cape was the first in a number of planned events that will bring the G20 agenda closer to tourism communities in the country. 

    In the quest for global sustainable development, the Deputy Minister emphasised the importance of balancing the need for economic growth with social inclusion to meet present and future needs.

    “Bringing the G20 agenda closer to our communities is critical to enable us to chart a path for inclusive global sustainable development. The G20 Tourism Working Group (TWG) has been hard at work, meeting with senior officials, authorities and experts to recommend decisions in line with the agenda and priorities identified by the G20 Presidency,” Sotyu said.

    These recommendations will play a critical part in the overall goal of addressing the global socioeconomic challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

    “It is therefore imperative that we engage the communities we serve to align our proposed recommendations with their present and future needs,” Sotyu said.

    The Northern Cape province is South Africa’s largest province and the most sparsely populated. Renowned for its red dunes and black-maned lions, the province is a popular tourism destination, and a haven for nature and adventure enthusiasts who enjoy exploring its diverse attractions within its national parks. 

    The province’s rich Khoi-San heritage is evident in ancient rock art sites scattered across the region. Its natural wonders, historical landmarks or the warm hospitality of its people makes the Northern Cape a must-see destination for all visitors.

    The Tourism G20 Community Outreach was held in partnership with the Northern Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism. 

    The community engagement featured presentations on skills and empowerment programmes and tourism incentive initiatives from the Department of Tourism. 

    Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) from the local communities were afforded an opportunity to showcase and sell their crafts and products at the event.

    The communities in the Northern Cape were introduced to the four G20 Tourism Priorities that will inform the 2025 G20 Action Plan on Tourism Development, namely:

    • A People-Centered Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Innovation to enhance Travel and Tourism Start-Ups and SMMEs;

    • Tourism Financing and Investment to Enhance Equality and Promote Sustainable Development;

    • Air Connectivity for Seamless Travel, and

    • Enhanced Resilience for Inclusive, Sustainable Tourism Development.

    The G20 Tourism Priorities facilitated robust discussion with the community on the need for greater consultation and collaboration between government and communities. 

    Frequent and continuous engagement will serve to better align the socio-economic needs of tourism communities to domestic and international developmental policies.

    Echoing the community’s sentiments, Sotyu affirmed government’s national development plans that reinforce increased partnerships with communities to build sustainable societies. 

    “Frequent and continuous engagement with our communities will enable us to work towards a people-centred, progressive, and solution-driven policies that find solutions to our domestic and global challenges, whilst accelerating global cooperation and multilateralism.

    “The G20 provides a significant opportunity for our provinces, cities and communities to work together to promote our culture, heritage, tourism and industrial and commercial advances.

    “I also encourage our communities to actively participate in the empowerment programmes that are offered by the three spheres of our government and help us build a nation that works for all,” Sotyu said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI China: Qinghai: Clean energy drives green prosperity

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    For Zhao Guofu, life has taken an unexpected turn. After spending two decades as a migrant worker far from home, he returned to his roots, herding sheep as he once did in childhood, but this time, in his own neighborhood in Gonghe county, northwestern China’s Qinghai province.

    What greeted him was a landscape transformed. The once arid deserts had given way to rolling pastures, blanketed with rows of glistening solar panels. What he never imagined was that he would not only become part of China’s solar energy push, but also thrive because of it.

    Zhao Guofu speaks by solar panels in Talatan, Qinghai province, July 1, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Jiaqi/China.org.cn]

    From June to October each year, Zhao grazes his sheep across the sun-drenched land, now shared with a sprawling solar farm. In between tending his flock, he picks up odd jobs cleaning the panels, earning extra income. The once-barren highland deserts of Talatan have been transformed into quality pastures, powered by clean energy — and Zhao’s life has been transformed along with them.

    Go cleaner, and greener

    The transformation started in 2012, when construction of China’s first 10 million kilowatt-class solar power base initiated in Talatan, an area blessed with nearly 3,000 hours of sunshine annually.

    The solar farm built on arid and semiarid land unexpectedly stimulated rapid vegetation growth beneath the panels. Monitoring data shows that the panels helped reduced evaporation by 30%, cut wind speed by half, and boosted vegetation coverage to 80% within just three years.

    The solar power base in Talatan, Qinghai province, on July 1, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Jiaqi/China.org.cn]

    By the end of 2024, the base had expanded to cover around 420 square kilometers, hosting millions of solar panels with a grid-connected installed capacity of 17.73 million kilowatts. It is now the world’s largest photovoltaic (PV) power park by installed capacity.

    A win-win way

    The cleaning of PV panels, a maintenance must, also contributed to vegetation growth. Data shows that the runoff water helps desert grasslands produce quadruple the fodder while supporting twice as many plant species compared to untreated areas. However, overgrown grass later began shading solar panels and creating fire risks in dry seasons.

    A flock of sheep grazes at the Talatan solar power base, Qinghai province, on July 1, 2025. [Photo by Zhang Jiaqi/China.org.cn]

    Talatan’s PV operators devised an innovative fix: inviting local herders to graze sheep within the facility free of charge. Zhao was one of them who took up the call.

    During summer and early autumn, herds freely forage beneath panels, with herders cutting residual grass for winter fodder. This lawnmower system eliminates fire hazards, saves weeding and feeding costs, while manure naturally fertilizes the revitalized soil.

    Zhang Jingang, executive vice governor of the People’s Government of Qinghai Province, called this an “agrivoltaic grazing” model. “Nature and neighbors both prosper under this agrivoltaic grazing model that pairs environmental protection with economic gains,” Zhang explained.

    Data from the provincial government shows that this innovative model has benefited 173 previously poverty-stricken villages.

    For Zhao, apart from extra pay from solar panel cleaning and grass cutting sometimes, the yearly gross profits for herding sheep averages around 200,000 yuan (US$27,900), but he is not sure about this year’s net profits yet.

    “It depends on how well the grass grows,” Zhao explained. “Good vegetation means better profits, but I won’t overgraze the sheep either way — protecting the ecosystem comes first.”

    Industrial synergy

    Beyond benefiting local communities, Qinghai’s clean energy also has boosted a greener computing power industry.

    “Qinghai’s strengths in natural resources and energy enable it to generate abundant, cost-effective green electricity and provide reliable renewable power for large-scale computing centers,” said the executive vice governor.

    Data from the provincial government shows that Qinghai boasted a 95% clean energy share in its 75 million kilowatts of installed power capacity last year, all Qinghai’s computing centers are currently powered by over 90% green electricity, and province-wide computing power has grown 40-fold since the beginning of last year.

    “Green power attracts green computing with its eco-friendly and cost-effective advantages, while green computing’s massive energy demand efficiently absorbs renewable electricity,” said Zhu Yuanqing, director of the electricity department of Qinghai’s energy bureau.

    Meanwhile, a PV industrial line has been established in the province, with considerations for the future: With PV modules expected to retire en masse post-2030, Qinghai has launched China’s first industrial-scale recycling line, processing 4,000 metric tons annually while recovering 94.27% of high-value materials like aluminum, glass, and ultra-pure silicon.

    “Renewable energy has become Qinghai’s most competitive and promising pillar industry,” Executive Vice Governor Zhang noted.

    For local herders like Zhao, gone are the days of endless nomadic wandering. Now, he can corral his sheep during the day and return home to his wife and son in town by evening. A grin tugs at his lips as he talks about his new life — one where green energy has brought both prosperity and a sweeter, more stable life.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Rwanda to Restore Ecosystems and Boost Climate Resilience in the Nyungwe–Ruhango Corridor

    Source: APO


    .

    Communities in Rwanda’s Southern Province are set to benefit from restored ecosystems, improved agricultural productivity, and expanded sustainable livelihood opportunities in areas vulnerable to climate-related shocks. Thanks to a newly approved $9 million grant from the Global Environment Facility, Rwanda will receive support for integrated landscape restoration and climate-smart land management across the Nyungwe–Ruhango Corridor.

    The Ecosystem-Based Restoration Approach for Nyungwe-Ruhango Corridor Project is one of 20 projects of the GEF-8 Ecosystem Restoration Integrated Program (ERIP) across the globe. ERIP scales up ecosystem restoration efforts by transforming degraded lands into thriving ecosystems and promotes private sector engagement and South-South exchange across the beneficiary countries. Conservation International is the ERIP lead agency.

    “This project reflects the strong partnership between the World Bank and the Government of Rwanda in building climate resilience and driving inclusive green growth,” said Sahr Kpundeh, World Bank Country Manager for Rwanda. “It aligns with our Country Partnership Framework and global priorities on climate adaptation, biodiversity conservation, and empowering local communities to lead sustainable change.”

    The Rwanda GEF-8 will support the rehabilitation of 2,162 hectares of forests and wetlands, promote sustainable land management practices across 8,931 hectares of farmland, and help develop income-generating activities that reduce pressure on fragile ecosystems, directly benefiting more than 289,000 people in Ruhango, Nyanza, and Nyamagabe Districts.

    The project will contribute to the World Bank Group’s core objective of creating more and better jobs to reduce poverty and unlock economic opportunities, especially for the youth.  Early estimates suggests that the project could generate over 2,200 jobs through sustainable livelihoods interventions. These include the development of non-timber forest product value chains, fruit tree planting, and support for small businesses in the green economy. The project will also engage the private sector to explore investment opportunities that promote climate-smart land use and sustainable forest management.

    “This is a timely intervention that combines ecological restoration with community resilience,” said Tuuli Bernardini, Senior Environmental Specialist at the World Bank. “By centering the role of women, youth, and local enterprises in landscape management, the project supports inclusive development and paves the way for scalable nature-based solutions.”

    Implemented by the Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA), the project adopts a landscape-based approach to address environmental degradation, food insecurity, climate risks, such as floods and landslides; threats that disrupt infrastructure, destroy crops, and deepen poverty in the Southern province. At its core, the Rwanda GEF-8 aims to restore ecosystems that provide critical services such as erosion control, flood regulation and habitats for biodiversity. Key interventions will include afforestation, reforestation, riverbank and wetland rehabilitation and the promotion of agroforestry and other climate-smart agricultural practices.

    The Rwanda GEF-8 forms part of a broader suite of World Bank-supported investments in conservation and sustainable land management along the Congo-Nile divide covering parts of the Northern, Western, and Southern Province. These include the Volcanoes Community Resilience Project  and Commercialization and De-Risking for Agricultural Transformation Project. Building on lessons from Rwanda’s earlier efforts such as the Landscape Approach to Forest Restoration and Conservation (LAFREC), these initiatives align with the National Strategy for Transformation (NST2), and are expected to deliver significant outcomes in biodiversity conservation, resilience building and improved community livelihoods.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of The World Bank Group.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Booker Introduces Critical Legislation to Fund Community Violence Intervention

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Jersey Cory Booker
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) introduced the Break the Cycle of Violence Act, legislation that would create a new Office of Community Violence Intervention (CVI) and a new grant program within the Department of Health and Human Services to award $5 billion in grants to community-based, nonprofit organizations and eligible units of local government to create or support evidence-based and prevention programs to interrupt cycles of violence. U.S. Representative Steven Horsford (D-NV-04) introduced companion legislation in the House. 
    Community violence should no longer be a problem for law enforcement to react to after it has occurred. We must invest in community-based violence intervention and prevention initiatives that stop this violence from happening in the first place. This legislation would provide resources to community outreach programs, hospital-based violence intervention programs, gun violence interventions strategies, and violence interruption and crisis management initiatives.
    “Too many people in New Jersey and across our country continue to lose loved ones to senseless gun violence,” said Senator Booker. “By investing federal dollars into programs and methods that work to prevent gun violence, we can do something about the violence plaguing our communities before it happens. The Break the Cycle of Violence Act will empower communities with the resources they need to reduce gun violence, save lives, and make our neighborhoods safer.” 
    Over the past decade, gun violence has risen sharply in communities across the United States, with a particularly devastating impact on predominantly Black and Brown neighborhoods. Between 2018 and 2021, the rate of firearm-related deaths increased by 100 percent for Black youth and by 50 percent for Hispanic youth. In 2021, Black children represented 46 percent of youth firearm deaths though they represent only 14 percent of the youth population in the U.S. In 2023, there were 46,278 gun deaths—the third-highest annual total on record, trailing only 2022 and 2021. Shootings, homicides, and group violence continue to pose a serious and disproportionate threat to too many communities across the country.
    This violence has enormous human, social, and economic costs. Research by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Division of Violence Prevention found that “one-in-three youth living in inner cities show a higher prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder than soldiers” in the U.S. military during wartime. Gun violence harms rural communities as well, which suffer from a 37 percent higher death rate due to gun violence than urban communities. Gun violence costs the country approximately $280 billion per year.
    The Break the Cycle of Violence Act is endorsed by Community Justice, Sandy Hook Promise, Giffords Gun Violence Prevention & Advocacy, and Everytown for Gun Safety.
    “Over the last several years, cities across the country finally saw decreases in homicides and shootings, and that is only because of significant federal investment in community violence intervention (CVI) strategies,” Adzi Vokhiwa, Vice President of Policy at Community Justice, said. “However, Black and Brown communities continue to bear the brunt of gun violence. Without a doubt, more funding is needed to support CVI programs especially after the cancellation of many federal CVI grant awards earlier this year. If signed into law, the Break the Cycle of Violence Act would provide the largest federal investment in community-based and community-led efforts to end gun violence, expand workforce training for youth at the highest risk of violence, and help ensure the implementation of a public health approach to gun violence prevention. We thank Congressman Horsford and Senator Booker for recognizing the effectiveness and importance of CVI strategies and introducing this important legislation to save lives across the country.”
    “Gun violence manifests itself differently across U.S. communities, with children in many Black and Brown communities being disproportionally affected as well as children living in areas with high poverty rates,” Mark Barden, co-founder and CEO of Sandy Hook Promise Action Fund, and father of Daniel, who was killed in the Sandy Hook Elementary School tragedy, said. “Lives can and will be saved when local leaders are equipped with the tools, training, and resources to address the unique circumstances of violence in their regions. We applaud the reintroduction of the ‘Break the Cycle of Violence Act,’ and encourage Congress to pass this important bill to protect children throughout our country.” 
    “Seemingly never-ending cycles of gun violence crush families, hurt the economy, and suppress communities’ ability to thrive. In particular, Black and Latino Americans bear the brunt of America’s gun violence and gun crime epidemic. But we have strategies and programs that are proven to save lives—all they need is sufficient funding,” Emma Brown, Executive Director of the national gun violence prevention organization GIFFORDS, said. “Every lawmaker, Republicans and Democrats alike, should support Representative Horsford and Senator Booker’s Break the Cycle of Violence Act. This bill, which GIFFORDS is proud to have shaped, will not only fund essential programs, but also provide jobs to American youth that will allow them to thrive and break the cycle of violence.”
    “Communities most impacted by gun violence need real resources—and the Break the Cycle of Violence Act delivers,” Angela Ferrell-Zabala, Executive Director of Moms Demand Action, said. “It invests in proven, lifesaving programs and puts support where it’s needed most: in the hands of grassroots leaders. We’re grateful to Rep. Horsford for reintroducing this critical bill.” 
    The Break the Cycle of Violence Act provisions include: 
    ·         $5 billion investment in anti-violence programs to create and support violence interruption and crisis management initiatives.
    ·         $1.5 billion investment in workforce training and job opportunities, including improved youth employment and training activities, paid work experience for school aged youth, and partnerships with community-based organizations to serve youth in high-crime and high-poverty areas.
    ·         An Office of Community Violence Intervention at HHS to implement evidence-based violence reduction initiatives.
    ·         A Community Violence Intervention Advisory Committee to ensure people with expertise in community violence intervention have a voice in CVI policies.
    ·         A National Community Violence Response Center to provide technical assistance for implementing community violence intervention and prevention programs.
    The Break the Cycle of Violence Act is cosponsored by U.S. Senators Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Chris Coons (D-DE), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Ed Markey (D-MA), Tina Smith (D-MN), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Jack Reed (D-RI), Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI). 
    To read the full text of the bill, click here. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, July 3, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    July 3, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF Press Briefing. It’s wonderful to see all of you, both those of you here in person and, of course, colleagues online as well. I’m Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF.  As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  I’ll start as usual with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center. 

    Starting with the announcements, the First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, will participate in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings in Durban, South Africa, on July 17th to 18th. 

    Second, in the coming weeks, we will be releasing two flagship publications, our External Sector Report and the World Economic Outlook Update.  These reports will offer fresh insights into current global economic trends and external imbalances.  Stay tuned.  We will share more details soon. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions.  For those of you who are connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  And now the floor is open. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.  I have two questions on Ukraine.  In its Eighth Review, the IMF highlighted that Ukraine needs to adopt a supplementary budget for 2025 and enact critical reforms to restore fiscal sustainability and implement the National Revenue Strategy.  Could you please elaborate on this?  What specific reforms should Ukraine implement and when?  And secondly, could you also please inform us when the next review of Ukraine is scheduled?  Thank you.  

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you, Julie.  How concerned is IMF about the Ukraine’s debt sustainability?  Taking into account recent highlights in the IMF’s release.  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine? And no one online on Ukraine?  Okay, let me go ahead and answer these questions on Ukraine. 

    So, first, just stepping back to remind everyone where we are on Ukraine. On June 30th, so just a few days ago, the IMF’s Executive Board completed the Eighth Review of the EFF arrangement with Ukraine that enabled a disbursement of U.S. $0.5 billion, and it brought total disbursements under the program to $10.6 billion.  In that review, we found that Ukraine’s economy remains resilient.  The authorities met all end-March quantitative performance criteria, a prior action, and two structural benchmarks that were needed to complete the review. 

    Now, with respect to the specific questions. On the supplementary budget, what I can say there is that  from our discussions over time and from the program documents, restoring fiscal sustainability in Ukraine does require a sustained and decisive effort to implement the National Revenue Strategy.  And that strategy includes modernization of the tax and customs system, including timely appointment of a customs head.  It includes the reduction in tax evasion and harmonization of certain legislation with EU standards.  And the idea behind this package of reforms is that these reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks and medium-term budget preparation, as well as fiscal risk management, altogether, these are going to be critical to helping Ukraine underpin growth and investment over the medium term. 

    With respect to the Ninth Review, right now we expect the Ninth Review to take place toward the end of the year.  It will combine basically the Ninth and the Tenth Reviews together under this new schedule.  And of course, we do remain closely engaged with the Ukrainian authorities.

    And then on the question on debt, what I can say there is that Ukraine has been able to preserve macroeconomic stability despite very difficult circumstances and conditions under the Fund’s program.  Given the risks to the outlook and the overall challenges that Ukraine continues to face, it is essential that reform momentum is sustained.  And we talked about the measures for domestic revenue mobilization, which are critical, as well as  how important they are for restoring debt sustainability over the medium term. 

    It is also important for Ukraine to complete the remaining elements of the debt restructuring in line with program objectives.  And that will be essential for the full restoration of debt sustainability under the program. 

    QUESTIONER: Two questions.  Had the IMF confirmed any involvement by President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’ Ivoire in supporting Senegalese ongoing negotiations with the Fund, particularly considering the recent data misreporting issues? This is the first question. 

    The second one, what are the IMF’s views on Senegal’s debt sustainability after the recent leak of the 119 percent national debt, as opposed to 99.7 which was indicated in the recent audit of the nation’s finances?  Do you trust the last numbers on debt, 119 percent of GDP, communicated by the Ministry of Finance?  Are they reliable?  Thank you very much. 

    QUESTIONER: Are there any other questions on Senegal?  Okay, so let me step back and remind where we are on Senegal. 

    So our team remains closely engaged with the Senegalese authorities.  As you know, a Staff Mission visited Dakar in March and April, just a few months ago, to advance resolution of the misreporting case, which was confirmed by the Court of Auditors and which, as you know, revealed underreporting of fiscal deficits and public debt over a number of years.  And we’re working closely with the authorities on the design of corrective measures and actions to address the root causes of the misreporting that took place.  And we’re also working closely with the authorities to strengthen capacity development. 

    What I can say with respect to the question on the debt numbers is we strongly welcome the new government’s commitment to transparency in revealing the discrepancies in the reported debt and the fiscal deficits.  The authorities are conducting their own audit and that audit is ongoing. We understand that the audit is close to being finalized.  And we’re waiting for its completion to better understand the challenges and how we can move forward.  And so ultimately, as we wait for that report, we are going to refrain from commenting on any numbers.  We’re waiting for the report, and we will remain very closely engaged. 

    And on your other question on President Ouattara, I don’t have any information for you at this time, but of course, we’ll keep you updated if we have anything to report on that. 

    QUESTIONER: Question about Russia.  So, the Bank of Russia has recently indicated that it can cut key interest rates for another one percentage point if the inflationary pressure remains to ease in Russia.  So, from the IMF standpoint, how – well-timed and appropriate will this step be, taking into account your view on the current economic situation in Russia?  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Russia? Okay, so let me start a little bit with our assessment of the economy, and then I’ll speak to your question on monetary policy. 

    So, in terms of how we see the Russian economy following last year’s overheating, what we see is that the Russian economy is now slowing sharply.  Inflation is easing, but is still high.  And Russia, like many countries, is affected by high risks and uncertainty.  In our April WEO, we projected growth to slow to 1.5 percent in 2025.  Recent developments since April suggest that growth may even be lower.  And we will, like for many countries, we will be updating our forecast for Russia in the July WEO update, which will come in a few weeks. 

    With respect to monetary policy, as I said, inflation remains high.  Annual inflation is above the Central Bank of Russia’s target.  But based on our April forecast, we do expect inflation to come down and to decline over time.  In April, we had expected inflation to return to target in the second half of 2027.  And so, we see that for the Central Bank policymaking is going to need to balance the fact that inflation is still high, and that unemployment is still very low in Russia, with the fact that the economy is rapidly slowing and that risks are rising.  So that will be the challenge for the Central Bank that we see in its making of monetary policy in the near future. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, can I just follow up on that Russia question? So you said that because of the current conditions, can you just explain why your forecast is going to be revised downward for Russia’s growth? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I want to be clear, we will provide the revised forecast in July as part of the WEO. What the team has been seeing is that some recent data suggests that growth may be lower than we had forecast.  But I don’t want to preempt their actual forecast.  What we see is that the slowdown that we see in Russia reflects a few things.  First, tight policies.  The other factors are cyclical factors.  So, coming off of a period of overheating, you often see a cyclical slowdown.  And that’s what we’re seeing in Russia.  And also, the fact that oil prices are lower, which is also affecting Russia as well.  And we also do see some impact on the economy from tightening sanctions. 

    QUESTIONER: A couple of questions on the U.S. Congress, as you know, is about to pass the, what they call the One Big Beautiful Bill, the sweeping budget tax spending policy bill, which is going to, by all accounts, increase the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over 10 years.  It contains major cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, which is going to be very hard on the poorest Americans.  Just wondering if you can provide any perspective from the IMF on this bill.  It kind of goes against everything that the IMF recommends that the U.S. do on the fiscal front, which is to bring deficits under control and tocreate more equality in the economy.  So just wondering if you can shed some light on sort of how the IMF is going to view this, including your perspective on what it might do for financial markets with extra U.S. debt, perhaps increasing U.S. interest rates in real terms and forcing other countries to pay higher interest rates.  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there any other questions on the U.S.? You have another question?

    QUESTIONER: It’s a trade question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, well, if it’s on the U.S., go for it.

    QUESTIONER: So next week is the July 9th deadline for the U.S. to potentially raise tariff rates on many, many countries.  As you know, the president had lowered those tariff rates temporarily. It’s likely that a lot of countries are going to see much higher interest rates.  And I’m just wondering if you can comment on that and how it will affect whether that’s being factored into your WEO update, and the impact that  will have on the global economy.  Thanks.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, a follow-up?

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up to that question with regard to the U.S. and trade.  Now, one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners is the U.S.  Now, President Trump has already signaled deals with countries like Vietnam and India.  But, for small economies like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, there is still uncertainty around it.  So, given the uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking at changes in certain targets with these countries that are already in programs, or will there be any revisit to the financing already given to these countries?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start by saying, I think, to your first question, so at this stage, and as you noted, it’s fair to say there’s a consensus that the recent bill that was approved in the Senate and is now under discussion in the House would add to the fiscal deficit and it appears to run counter to reducing federal debt over the medium term. From the IMF side, we have been consistent in saying that the U.S. will need to reduce its fiscal deficit over time to put public debt-to-GDP on a decisive downward path.  And since a fiscal consolidation will ultimately be needed to achieve or to put debt on a downward path, of course, the sooner that process starts to reduce the deficit, the more gradual the deficit reduction can be over time. 

    And of course, there are many different policy options that the U.S. has to reduce its deficit and debt.  And it is, of course, important to build consensus within the United States about how it will address these chronic fiscal deficits.  We’re currently examining the details of the legislation and the likely impact on the U.S. economy.  We will be providing a broader update of our views in terms of the outlook for the U.S. and also, of course, for the global economy in the July WEO update, which, as I noted, will be coming in the next few weeks.  And of course, we will take into account in the update all updated developments, including potential new policies or legislation. 

    And that goes a little bit to your other question on July 9th and the tariff deadline, to the extent possible and feasible, we will take into account as many of the trade deals or announcements that are made, and we will take those into account in our July WEO update.  And we’re paying, of course, close attention to the situation globally. 

    As we’ve been saying, this is a moment for the global economy marked by high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is something that is still with us.  And we’re also taking the fact that we’re at a moment of high uncertainty into account in thinking about our forecasts for the global economy. 

    QUESTIONER: When will the Board will address the first revision of the agreement with Argentina?  It’s a simple question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay. Other questions on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Is there a concern in the IMF that the external deficit exceed $5 billion in the first quarter of this year?  

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie.  Wanted to ask what the IMF is expecting in terms of Argentina’s ability to meet its reserves target, or whether the IMF will be considering a waiver to ask about the timing for the next $2 billion disbursement.  And finally, how the YPF court order this week influences the outlook for Argentina and the need to build foreign reserves.  

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie.  Good morning.   I would like to address the question of my colleague.  Do you think the court ruling of YPF will have significant implications for both, I mean, the company and Argentina’s economic stability?  

    QUESTIONER: Also, on the YPF issue, if that challenges in any way Argentina’s goal to return to international financial markets by the end of the year.  And if you could comment on the mission that was in Buenos Aires’ findings last week.  

    QUESTIONER: A recent JP Morgan report recommended that selling LECAP bonds due to their increased risk because of the lack of reserve accumulation. Also, Argentina failed to rise to MSCI Emerging Market status. Is this a cause for concern for the IMF? Could it obstruct Argentina’s return to international markets in 2026 as the Staff Report indicates? Thank you.

    MS. KOZACK: All right, anyone else on Argentina? Okay, so maybe just stepping back for a moment.  As you know, a recent IMF Staff Technical Mission visited Buenos Aires recently.  The mission concluded on June 27th.  And this mission was part of the First Review under the program under the new $20 billion EFF program.  Discussions for the First Review continue, and they remain very productive. 

    What I can also add is that the program, as we’ve said before, it continues to deliver positive results.  The transition to a more robust FX regime has been smooth.  The disinflation process has resumed.  The economy continues to expand.  High-frequency indicators suggest that poverty is on a downward trend in Argentina.  Argentina has also reaccessed international capital markets for the first time in seven years.  And all of this progress, of course, under the program, is being underpinned by appropriately tight fiscal and monetary policies.

    Discussions now are focused on policies to sustain the stabilization gains, including by continuing to rebuild buffers to address risks from a more complex external backdrop.  Both the IMF Staff and the Argentine authorities are closely engaged on these issues, and it reflects the ongoing collaboration that we have with the authorities as well as a shared commitment to the success of the program. 

    On some of the more specific questions with respect to targets under the program and the potential for waivers, at this stage, given that the discussions are ongoing, I’m not going to speculate on the potential for waivers or the outcome of those discussions.  But we will, of course, keep you updated in due course.

    On the broader question of reserve accumulation, what I can add is that, as I mentioned, Staff and the authorities do have a shared commitment to the success of the program, which I noted.  But I can add that this, of course, includes a shared recognition of the need to continue to build buffers against external risks.  We’re closely engaged with the authorities on the issue. 

    On the question of YPF, we’re obviously paying close attention, monitoring this situation.  However, as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on legal matters involving our member countries, and that includes this IMF case. 

    I need to apologize because a question was asked in the last round which I did not answer.  So, I’m going to repeat the question, and then I’m going to answer it.  The question is the U.S. is one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners and countries are racing to strike deals.  President Trump already signaled a deal with India.  Given this uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking to change targets or revisit financing?  So here I think, they were asking really about program countries, and they mentioned Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and one other country. 

    So, what I can say on this one is that in all program countries, in all program contexts, the reason why we have reviews during the program is there’s a backward-looking part to the review, which is to assess whether the country has complied with the targets and the commitments that they have made.  But the other part is what we call a forward-looking part.  And that part really looks at what has happened to the economy, globally, what are the trends, and how should those be taken into account going forward.  So to the extent that uncertainty or changes in trading relations or in the trading environment has an effect on the economy, which is significant enough to affect the program, of course, those will be taken into account.  But it will be done on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific circumstances of every program country that we have. 

    Let’s continue then.   

    QUESTIONER: Do you know when the Board will meet? 

    MS. KOZACK: Ah, I apologize. So, with respect to the First Review, just in terms of the process, first, the discussions between the team and the authorities will need to come to a conclusion, and a Staff-Level Agreement would need to be reached.  And once that happens, we will submit the documentation to our Board for review.  So, I don’t yet have a timing for the Board meeting, but we will, of course, keep you informed as the discussions continue.

    MS. KOZACK: I’m not going to speculate at all. I want to give time, of course, for the authorities and the team to complete the discussions, and we will abide by our process, the first step of which is a Staff-Level Agreement, and then we will submit the documents for consideration by the Executive Board. 

    QUESTIONER: Can I have a short follow-up? Do you expect Minister Caputo in the upcoming days in Washington D.C.?

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say is that the discussions are continuing. There is a technical team here in Washington to have those discussions. But it’s a technical team. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go online.

    QUESTIONER: I have a couple of questions on Egypt specifically. The first is we all in Egypt were expecting the Fifth Review to be completed before the end of fiscal year, which ends by end of June.  So, could you please update us on the ongoing negotiations regarding the Fifth Review?  My second one is on the RSF financing.  We want to also know an update on that. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there other questions on Egypt.

    QUESTIONER:  I have another question on Egypt.  So, what are the current points of contention that delayed this disbursement of the fifth tranche?  And do you think there is any room to extend the loan repayment due to the current challenges, especially that there were more effects that have affected Egypt recently, because of the war that happened during June?  And I have another question on Syria.  I don’t know if I could put it in now.  Maybe you can answer that later on.  How will lifting the sanctions change or expedite any program with the IMF regarding Syria? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let’s first see if there’s other questions on Egypt and I’ll answer on Egypt and then I’ll turn to Syria.

    QUESTIONER: I just want to add to what my colleagues said before whether you’re able to confirm or say any more about reports recently that the Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be combined into one review that would then take place in September. 

    MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?   

    So, on Egypt, an IMF team, as you know, visited Cairo in May, from May 6th to 18th, for discussions with the Egyptian authorities.  The discussions were productive.  Egypt continues to make progress under its macroeconomic reform program.  And we can say that there’s been notable improvements in inflation and in the level of foreign exchange reserves, which have increased.

    To move further and to really safeguard macroeconomic stability in Egypt and to bolster the country’s resilience to shocks, it is essential to deepen reforms, and this is particularly important to reduce the state footprint in the economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Some of the key policies that are under discussion and key priorities are advancing the state ownership policy and asset [divestment diversification] program in sectors where the state has committed to withdraw.  These steps are critical to really enabling the private sector to drive stronger and more sustainable growth in Egypt.  And our commitment, of course, is strong to Egypt.  We’re committed to supporting Egypt in building this resilience and in fostering growth. 

    With respect to the reviews, the discussions suggest that more time is needed to finalize the key policy measures, particularly related to the state’s role in the economy and to ensure that the critical objectives of the program, the authority’s economic reform program, can be met.  Our Staff team is continuing to work with the authorities on this goal.  And for that reason, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF will be combined.  And the idea is for them to be combined into a discussion or a combined review for the fall.  So that’s the rationale for combining the reviews.  More time [is] needed. 

    And I think there was also a question on Egypt’s RSF and what I can say on thisis that as the RSF was approved recently for Egypt and as per the schedule approved by the board, the First Review of the RSF is aligned with the Sixth Review under the EFF. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, would you allow me to follow up on something they’ve just said? 

    So, you said that the Fifth and the Sixth Review will be combined for the fall.  Does this mean that the Fifth and the Sixth disbursements will be together?  Could this be possible? Is this on the table? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, given that the discussions are still underway, a part of the discussions that will, of course, take place around combining the reviews will be to look at what are Egypt’s financing needs and around that, what should be the size of the disbursement around the combined Fifth and Sixth Review. So that’s all part of the discussions, the ongoing discussions that are taking place.  So, it would be premature for me to speculate at this stage. 

    Okay, you had a question on Syria.  So, let me see if anyone else has a question on Syria.  I don’t see anyone else on Syria. 

    So, turning to Syria. So, as I think you know, an IMF team visited Syria from June 1st to 5th.  And this was the first visit of an IMF team to Syria since 2009.  The team was in Syria to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity-building priorities.  And all of this, of course, is to support the recovery of the Syrian economy. 

    As we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused, you know, immense human suffering.  And the conflict has reduced the economy to a fraction of its former size.  The lifting of sanctions can help facilitate Syria’s rehabilitation by supporting its reintegration into the global economy.  And as part of our ongoing engagement with the Syrian authorities, we will, as needed, of course, you know, assess the implications of the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian economy. 

    So, again, that’s going to be part of the work of the team as they are putting together a picture of the Syrian economy, but also of the very important and deep capacity development needs that the Syrian authorities will have. 

    QUESTIONER: I just wanted to follow up on a colleague’s follow-up.  The comments that you made a few minutes ago regarding Argentina having a technical team in Washington for discussions with the IMF.  I just wanted to confirm my understanding.  Were you saying that they have a — that there is currently a technical team in Washington, and can you tell us anything more about the dates of the meetings or anything beyond that technical team being currently in Washington, if I understood you correctly? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I think all I can add to that is that I can confirm that there is a technical delegation in Washington, you know, from Argentina in Washington, visiting headquarters this week. And the goal is to advance discussions on the First Review under the program.  I hope that clarifies. 

    QUESTIONER: Yes, I wanted to ask you on Mozambique — sorry, just pulling up my note here — which was that –excuse me.  Regarding Mozambique, is it feasible to agree to a new program with Mozambique by year-end, as the president of that country is hoping, or do you have anything on any of the hurdles and the process there?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: I’m sort of looking. I don’t have anything off-hand in terms of an update on Mozambique. So, we’ll come back to you separately on Mozambique.  I’m sorry about that. 

    All right, let’s go online.  You had a question?

    QUESTIONER: I have a quick follow-up on Ukraine and then another one.  On Ukraine, when you are talking about combining the Ninth and Tenth Reviews, what would that mean also in terms of the disbursement?  But you know, in the case of Egypt, you’re giving the authorities more time to execute reviews.  What is the reason for combining them in the case of Ukraine? 

    And then, how many more reviews, I just don’t remember, how many more reviews were planned to get to the $15.5 billion?  So, we’ve got $10.6 billion dispersed already.  Like, how much is left to go, and how much of that notionally would come in the Ninth and Tenth Reviews?

    And then separately, I just want to come back to the trade question and perhaps broaden it out a little bit.  So, as the United States under the administration of Donald Trump is imposing quite significant tariffs on many, if not all, of its trading partners, that raises costs, obvious for everyone.  At the same time, the government has also been reducing, significantly slashing its foreign aid for development systems.  And you know, obviously, there’s a lot of concern about that.  We’ve seen some reports recently from the Lancet that millions of people could die as a result of this money not being in — in those countries.  That has follow-on consequences for all the countries whose, you know, economies you’re guiding and accompanying.  And I just want to know if you — if you’ve done a sort of broader analysis about this trade environment.  For many years, you have been warning about trade restrictions, and we are now fully into a period where trade restrictions seem to be increasing.  So, just asking a broad question.

    And then finally, we do have the G20 meeting coming up. The United States has not participated in the initial G20 meetings this year.  What would it mean to the organization if the United States also chose to skip this July meeting?  What is the importance of that as in that body?

    QUESTIONER: So, on Ukraine, what I can say is the Ninth Review, as I said, we expect it to take place by the end of the year and it is going to combine the previously envisaged Ninth Review, which was scheduled for the fall, and the Tenth Review, which we expected to take place in the fourth quarter.  And the team is going to remain closely engaged with Ukraine over this period.  I don’t have more details on the reason that the reviews are being combined, but I believe the Staff Report has been published for Ukraine.  And so, I would refer you to that document, which should have the relevant details.

    On your broader question about the trade environment and the aid environment.  I think if you think about it, or if we look back at it, you know, what has the IMF been saying?  If we look back to the Spring Meetings, one of the main messages from the Managing Director’s Curtain Raiser and her global policy agenda, as well as our broader messages, was that it is very important for countries to, we were saying, kind of, or the Managing Director was saying to get their own house in order.  So, there’s — and the message really behind that was that yes, the trade environment is shifting, and we see very significant shifts in the trade environment. 

    But there is a lot that countries can and need to do domestically related to their own reforms to build their own resilience.  There’s a lot that countries can do in terms of policy, and that really relates in many countries to fiscal policy, which is about, because we’ve been talking about a low-growth, high-debt environment for some time.  High uncertainty and weaker trade affects that environment.  But the fact still remains that we have a low-growth and high-debt environment globally.  So, for countries, that means taking measures to reduce the high debt problem. 

    That’s on the fiscal side.  And that is a general piece of policy advice that we’ve given to many, many countries.  And on the growth side, we are strongly encouraging countries to take measures to boost productivity and medium-term growth.  So, this is really at the crux of our policy advice to countries. 

    And on the aid side, what we’ve been warning about for quite some time is that official development assistance, in general, has been on a declining downward trend for many, many years.  And we see the impact of the decline in official development assistance in low-income countries.  So, this is a broad trend that we observe globally across many countries, affecting low-income countries.  But what it means for those countries is that they are going to have to both work with the IMF, other MDBs [multinational development banks], [and] donors who are still providing financing.  But most importantly, those countries are going to need to look for ways to mobilize domestic resources so that they can fund many of their own development needs. 

    And so this is also part of, we call it a three-pillar approach where we look at the need for domestic reforms in countries, the need for assistance and stepped-up  assistance from multilateral organizations to provide needed financing for countries, and of course ways to ultimately reduce the cost of financing and also looking to mobilize private financing for countries.  So, there is a very rich and large agenda on this broad topic that we have been discussing for quite some time.

    And on the G20, this is really a matter, I think, for the G20 presidency and for the — for the United States. 

    Let me look online. 

    QUESTIONER: So, I have like two questions regarding the finalizing the four-year Extended Credit Facility that is linked between the International Monetary Fund and the government of Ethiopia.  So again, the IMF Staff has been paying a review visit to Ethiopia many times to review Ethiopia’s section and disperse the money.  In this point, I have two questions.  The first one is how does the IMF evaluate Ethiopia’s move and current achievement towards liberalizing its economy?  And the second one is what are the parameters to indicate whether the mission is going on the right track, as the people of the country are facing heavy life burden?

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Other questions on Ethiopia? 

    QUESTIONER: I noted [that] in the Third Review that came out late last night that most of the macroeconomic forecasts are looking up compared to the second.  Apart from public debt-to-GDP, I can’t really figure out why.  So, could you maybe walk me through that?  And I have a separate question on Lebanon.  Maybe we’ll take that later.

    MS. KOZACK: Anything else on Ethiopia? All right. So, with respect to Ethiopia, the IMF Executive Board approved the 2025 Article IV consultation and the Third Review under the ECF on July 2nd, and that enabled Ethiopia to access about U.S. $260 million. 

    What I can add is that the completion of the review reflects both the assessment of the Staff and our Executive Board that Ethiopia’s strong adherence to the program and the program goals, and it also reflects continued confidence in the government’s reform agenda.  The Ethiopian authorities have made significant progress in implementing some really important and fundamental reforms under the ECF.  Key economic indicators such as inflation, fiscal balance, and external balance are all showing signs of stabilization.  And that suggests that the country and the economy are kind of progressing on the right track. 

    With respect to your more detailed question, we will have to come back to you bilaterally.  I’m not sure exactly why.  I don’t know off the top of my head the answer to that, but we will come back to you on that one. 

    I know there’s a few more questions online, so let’s try to get to them. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Sorry.  So, I wanted to — my question is regarding what is going on in Kenya.  President Ruto announced that he planned to privatize some of the public assets.  And I was wondering if you could provide any views from the IMF?  I also wanted to ask you, next week, President Donald Trump will be meeting with several African leaders.  Some of those countries have critical minerals.  So perhaps the meeting we resolve around critical minerals.  As you know, a lot of countries, the U.S., China, as well as European nations, are very interested in African critical minerals.  So, I was wondering if you could share your view, giving what has happened in the past and the corruption around critical minerals and the mismanagement of the Fund received from the minerals.  What is the IMF’s recommendation to nations across the African continent right now, on how to —

    MS. KOZACK: I think we lost you.

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so, we lost you for a bit in the middle, but I think I got the gist of your question. So, let me now ask, does anyone else have a question on Kenya? 

    QUESTIONER: Yeah, I do.  Hello? 

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about that Diagnostic Mission.  I know I’d asked you about it before, but now it’s completed, and does the IMF want that report to be made public, or does it expect it to be made public?  I have a question on Barbados, too, but I’ll wait on that one. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start with Kenya. So, on Kenya, maybe just to remind everyone where we are on Kenya. Our Staff team is actively engaged with the authorities on recent developments.  As you know, we’ve been discussing with them the timing of the next Article IV Mission and also their request for a new program. 

    And I will come to your question on the Government Diagnostics Mission in just a minute. 

    So, a big part of our work with Kenya now is this Government Diagnostics Mission.  The Technical Mission just concluded on June 30th, and they released a short press release, which was just issued.  This was kind of the first step of a process that we expect to take until the end of the year.  So, collaboration on government diagnostics.  It will continue over the next several months.  A draft diagnostic assessment report is expected to be shared with the Kenyan authorities before the end of the year.  So that first report will go to the authorities, and then the report will be published once consent is received from the authorities.  So that is the process that we’ll have.  But it will take quite some time to get that report prepared and ready.  So, kind of hold this space.  We’ll continue to work on it. 

    And then on your question on Kenya, what I can say is that we look forward to learning more details about the President’s statement that was made yesterday.  What I can say more broadly is that our engagement with the Kenyan authorities on privatization has been focused on establishing a solid framework to ensure that transparency and good governance, with the aim to unlock potential benefits. 

    So again, our discussions have very much focused on having a framework, and if done well, we see potential benefits that could include, for example, increased efficiency of improved private investment, reducing the fiscal burden, and improving service delivery. 

    On your second question, I think the way I will approach it is to say that, and Kenya is an example of this in some ways, with this governance Diagnostic Mission that, of course, at the IMF, we are concerned about not only in Africa, but in all countries where it’s a — where corruption affects economic activity, we are concerned about governance.  We have a strong governance program, and it includes a Government Diagnostic Mission.  Government diagnostic assessments allow our experts to go and do a deep assessment of governance in a country, look at where governance weaknesses exist, and to recommend a path forward to improve governance and reduce corruption over time. 

    We recognize that in many of our member countries, governance and corruption issues do have a significant impact on economic activity, and we are very committed to working with our member countries to improve governance as an important part of enabling countries to achieve stronger growth and better livelihoods for their people. 

    And let me go — I have Jermine.  You haven’t had a question yet, and I think we are over time.  So,  I am going to wrap up with you as the last question. 

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions pertaining to the Caribbean region, more specifically to the Citizenship by Investment programs.  What’s IMF’s position regarding the decisions made by St. Kitts and Nevis and other territories to establish a regulatory body to oversee these programs? 

    MS. KOZACK: Go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Regarding the looming threat of visa waivers by the Schengen region, the European Union, regarding these particular passport holders, knowing that the CBI programs are the pillars of the economies of the region. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say on the CBI, the citizenship by investment programs, is that our position has been that we generally advocate for common CBI program standards across the region, including in the area of transparency. And this was noted in our 2024 Regional Consultation Report on the ECCU. 

    And with respect to specific countries such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, for those specific countries, we have provided country-specific information, and the information on those can be found in the respective Article IV reports for those countries. 

    With respect to the question on the Schengen region, this is really a matter between the individual countries in the Caribbean and the countries in the Schengen region.  It’s not really a matter for the IMF. 

    So, with that, given that we’ve taken more time than we normally allocate, I want to thank everyone very much for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made later — available later on IMF.org.  And of course, in case of any clarifications, additional queries, if you didn’t get a chance to ask your questions today, please do be in contact with my colleagues at media@imf.org, and we will be sure to give you a response.  I wish you all a wonderful day and a wonderful long weekend, and I look forward to seeing you all next time.  Thanks very much.  

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Rahim Kanani

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, July 3, 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    July 3, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF Press Briefing. It’s wonderful to see all of you, both those of you here in person and, of course, colleagues online as well. I’m Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF.  As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  I’ll start as usual with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center. 

    Starting with the announcements, the First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, will participate in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings in Durban, South Africa, on July 17th to 18th. 

    Second, in the coming weeks, we will be releasing two flagship publications, our External Sector Report and the World Economic Outlook Update.  These reports will offer fresh insights into current global economic trends and external imbalances.  Stay tuned.  We will share more details soon. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions.  For those of you who are connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  And now the floor is open. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.  I have two questions on Ukraine.  In its Eighth Review, the IMF highlighted that Ukraine needs to adopt a supplementary budget for 2025 and enact critical reforms to restore fiscal sustainability and implement the National Revenue Strategy.  Could you please elaborate on this?  What specific reforms should Ukraine implement and when?  And secondly, could you also please inform us when the next review of Ukraine is scheduled?  Thank you.  

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you, Julie.  How concerned is IMF about the Ukraine’s debt sustainability?  Taking into account recent highlights in the IMF’s release.  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine? And no one online on Ukraine?  Okay, let me go ahead and answer these questions on Ukraine. 

    So, first, just stepping back to remind everyone where we are on Ukraine. On June 30th, so just a few days ago, the IMF’s Executive Board completed the Eighth Review of the EFF arrangement with Ukraine that enabled a disbursement of U.S. $0.5 billion, and it brought total disbursements under the program to $10.6 billion.  In that review, we found that Ukraine’s economy remains resilient.  The authorities met all end-March quantitative performance criteria, a prior action, and two structural benchmarks that were needed to complete the review. 

    Now, with respect to the specific questions. On the supplementary budget, what I can say there is that  from our discussions over time and from the program documents, restoring fiscal sustainability in Ukraine does require a sustained and decisive effort to implement the National Revenue Strategy.  And that strategy includes modernization of the tax and customs system, including timely appointment of a customs head.  It includes the reduction in tax evasion and harmonization of certain legislation with EU standards.  And the idea behind this package of reforms is that these reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks and medium-term budget preparation, as well as fiscal risk management, altogether, these are going to be critical to helping Ukraine underpin growth and investment over the medium term. 

    With respect to the Ninth Review, right now we expect the Ninth Review to take place toward the end of the year.  It will combine basically the Ninth and the Tenth Reviews together under this new schedule.  And of course, we do remain closely engaged with the Ukrainian authorities.

    And then on the question on debt, what I can say there is that Ukraine has been able to preserve macroeconomic stability despite very difficult circumstances and conditions under the Fund’s program.  Given the risks to the outlook and the overall challenges that Ukraine continues to face, it is essential that reform momentum is sustained.  And we talked about the measures for domestic revenue mobilization, which are critical, as well as  how important they are for restoring debt sustainability over the medium term. 

    It is also important for Ukraine to complete the remaining elements of the debt restructuring in line with program objectives.  And that will be essential for the full restoration of debt sustainability under the program. 

    QUESTIONER: Two questions.  Had the IMF confirmed any involvement by President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’ Ivoire in supporting Senegalese ongoing negotiations with the Fund, particularly considering the recent data misreporting issues? This is the first question. 

    The second one, what are the IMF’s views on Senegal’s debt sustainability after the recent leak of the 119 percent national debt, as opposed to 99.7 which was indicated in the recent audit of the nation’s finances?  Do you trust the last numbers on debt, 119 percent of GDP, communicated by the Ministry of Finance?  Are they reliable?  Thank you very much. 

    QUESTIONER: Are there any other questions on Senegal?  Okay, so let me step back and remind where we are on Senegal. 

    So our team remains closely engaged with the Senegalese authorities.  As you know, a Staff Mission visited Dakar in March and April, just a few months ago, to advance resolution of the misreporting case, which was confirmed by the Court of Auditors and which, as you know, revealed underreporting of fiscal deficits and public debt over a number of years.  And we’re working closely with the authorities on the design of corrective measures and actions to address the root causes of the misreporting that took place.  And we’re also working closely with the authorities to strengthen capacity development. 

    What I can say with respect to the question on the debt numbers is we strongly welcome the new government’s commitment to transparency in revealing the discrepancies in the reported debt and the fiscal deficits.  The authorities are conducting their own audit and that audit is ongoing. We understand that the audit is close to being finalized.  And we’re waiting for its completion to better understand the challenges and how we can move forward.  And so ultimately, as we wait for that report, we are going to refrain from commenting on any numbers.  We’re waiting for the report, and we will remain very closely engaged. 

    And on your other question on President Ouattara, I don’t have any information for you at this time, but of course, we’ll keep you updated if we have anything to report on that. 

    QUESTIONER: Question about Russia.  So, the Bank of Russia has recently indicated that it can cut key interest rates for another one percentage point if the inflationary pressure remains to ease in Russia.  So, from the IMF standpoint, how – well-timed and appropriate will this step be, taking into account your view on the current economic situation in Russia?  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Russia? Okay, so let me start a little bit with our assessment of the economy, and then I’ll speak to your question on monetary policy. 

    So, in terms of how we see the Russian economy following last year’s overheating, what we see is that the Russian economy is now slowing sharply.  Inflation is easing, but is still high.  And Russia, like many countries, is affected by high risks and uncertainty.  In our April WEO, we projected growth to slow to 1.5 percent in 2025.  Recent developments since April suggest that growth may even be lower.  And we will, like for many countries, we will be updating our forecast for Russia in the July WEO update, which will come in a few weeks. 

    With respect to monetary policy, as I said, inflation remains high.  Annual inflation is above the Central Bank of Russia’s target.  But based on our April forecast, we do expect inflation to come down and to decline over time.  In April, we had expected inflation to return to target in the second half of 2027.  And so, we see that for the Central Bank policymaking is going to need to balance the fact that inflation is still high, and that unemployment is still very low in Russia, with the fact that the economy is rapidly slowing and that risks are rising.  So that will be the challenge for the Central Bank that we see in its making of monetary policy in the near future. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, can I just follow up on that Russia question? So you said that because of the current conditions, can you just explain why your forecast is going to be revised downward for Russia’s growth? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I want to be clear, we will provide the revised forecast in July as part of the WEO. What the team has been seeing is that some recent data suggests that growth may be lower than we had forecast.  But I don’t want to preempt their actual forecast.  What we see is that the slowdown that we see in Russia reflects a few things.  First, tight policies.  The other factors are cyclical factors.  So, coming off of a period of overheating, you often see a cyclical slowdown.  And that’s what we’re seeing in Russia.  And also, the fact that oil prices are lower, which is also affecting Russia as well.  And we also do see some impact on the economy from tightening sanctions. 

    QUESTIONER: A couple of questions on the U.S. Congress, as you know, is about to pass the, what they call the One Big Beautiful Bill, the sweeping budget tax spending policy bill, which is going to, by all accounts, increase the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over 10 years.  It contains major cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, which is going to be very hard on the poorest Americans.  Just wondering if you can provide any perspective from the IMF on this bill.  It kind of goes against everything that the IMF recommends that the U.S. do on the fiscal front, which is to bring deficits under control and tocreate more equality in the economy.  So just wondering if you can shed some light on sort of how the IMF is going to view this, including your perspective on what it might do for financial markets with extra U.S. debt, perhaps increasing U.S. interest rates in real terms and forcing other countries to pay higher interest rates.  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there any other questions on the U.S.? You have another question?

    QUESTIONER: It’s a trade question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, well, if it’s on the U.S., go for it.

    QUESTIONER: So next week is the July 9th deadline for the U.S. to potentially raise tariff rates on many, many countries.  As you know, the president had lowered those tariff rates temporarily. It’s likely that a lot of countries are going to see much higher interest rates.  And I’m just wondering if you can comment on that and how it will affect whether that’s being factored into your WEO update, and the impact that  will have on the global economy.  Thanks.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, a follow-up?

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up to that question with regard to the U.S. and trade.  Now, one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners is the U.S.  Now, President Trump has already signaled deals with countries like Vietnam and India.  But, for small economies like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, there is still uncertainty around it.  So, given the uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking at changes in certain targets with these countries that are already in programs, or will there be any revisit to the financing already given to these countries?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start by saying, I think, to your first question, so at this stage, and as you noted, it’s fair to say there’s a consensus that the recent bill that was approved in the Senate and is now under discussion in the House would add to the fiscal deficit and it appears to run counter to reducing federal debt over the medium term. From the IMF side, we have been consistent in saying that the U.S. will need to reduce its fiscal deficit over time to put public debt-to-GDP on a decisive downward path.  And since a fiscal consolidation will ultimately be needed to achieve or to put debt on a downward path, of course, the sooner that process starts to reduce the deficit, the more gradual the deficit reduction can be over time. 

    And of course, there are many different policy options that the U.S. has to reduce its deficit and debt.  And it is, of course, important to build consensus within the United States about how it will address these chronic fiscal deficits.  We’re currently examining the details of the legislation and the likely impact on the U.S. economy.  We will be providing a broader update of our views in terms of the outlook for the U.S. and also, of course, for the global economy in the July WEO update, which, as I noted, will be coming in the next few weeks.  And of course, we will take into account in the update all updated developments, including potential new policies or legislation. 

    And that goes a little bit to your other question on July 9th and the tariff deadline, to the extent possible and feasible, we will take into account as many of the trade deals or announcements that are made, and we will take those into account in our July WEO update.  And we’re paying, of course, close attention to the situation globally. 

    As we’ve been saying, this is a moment for the global economy marked by high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is something that is still with us.  And we’re also taking the fact that we’re at a moment of high uncertainty into account in thinking about our forecasts for the global economy. 

    QUESTIONER: When will the Board will address the first revision of the agreement with Argentina?  It’s a simple question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay. Other questions on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Is there a concern in the IMF that the external deficit exceed $5 billion in the first quarter of this year?  

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie.  Wanted to ask what the IMF is expecting in terms of Argentina’s ability to meet its reserves target, or whether the IMF will be considering a waiver to ask about the timing for the next $2 billion disbursement.  And finally, how the YPF court order this week influences the outlook for Argentina and the need to build foreign reserves.  

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie.  Good morning.   I would like to address the question of my colleague.  Do you think the court ruling of YPF will have significant implications for both, I mean, the company and Argentina’s economic stability?  

    QUESTIONER: Also, on the YPF issue, if that challenges in any way Argentina’s goal to return to international financial markets by the end of the year.  And if you could comment on the mission that was in Buenos Aires’ findings last week.  

    QUESTIONER: A recent JP Morgan report recommended that selling LECAP bonds due to their increased risk because of the lack of reserve accumulation. Also, Argentina failed to rise to MSCI Emerging Market status. Is this a cause for concern for the IMF? Could it obstruct Argentina’s return to international markets in 2026 as the Staff Report indicates? Thank you.

    MS. KOZACK: All right, anyone else on Argentina? Okay, so maybe just stepping back for a moment.  As you know, a recent IMF Staff Technical Mission visited Buenos Aires recently.  The mission concluded on June 27th.  And this mission was part of the First Review under the program under the new $20 billion EFF program.  Discussions for the First Review continue, and they remain very productive. 

    What I can also add is that the program, as we’ve said before, it continues to deliver positive results.  The transition to a more robust FX regime has been smooth.  The disinflation process has resumed.  The economy continues to expand.  High-frequency indicators suggest that poverty is on a downward trend in Argentina.  Argentina has also reaccessed international capital markets for the first time in seven years.  And all of this progress, of course, under the program, is being underpinned by appropriately tight fiscal and monetary policies.

    Discussions now are focused on policies to sustain the stabilization gains, including by continuing to rebuild buffers to address risks from a more complex external backdrop.  Both the IMF Staff and the Argentine authorities are closely engaged on these issues, and it reflects the ongoing collaboration that we have with the authorities as well as a shared commitment to the success of the program. 

    On some of the more specific questions with respect to targets under the program and the potential for waivers, at this stage, given that the discussions are ongoing, I’m not going to speculate on the potential for waivers or the outcome of those discussions.  But we will, of course, keep you updated in due course.

    On the broader question of reserve accumulation, what I can add is that, as I mentioned, Staff and the authorities do have a shared commitment to the success of the program, which I noted.  But I can add that this, of course, includes a shared recognition of the need to continue to build buffers against external risks.  We’re closely engaged with the authorities on the issue. 

    On the question of YPF, we’re obviously paying close attention, monitoring this situation.  However, as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on legal matters involving our member countries, and that includes this IMF case. 

    I need to apologize because a question was asked in the last round which I did not answer.  So, I’m going to repeat the question, and then I’m going to answer it.  The question is the U.S. is one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners and countries are racing to strike deals.  President Trump already signaled a deal with India.  Given this uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking to change targets or revisit financing?  So here I think, they were asking really about program countries, and they mentioned Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and one other country. 

    So, what I can say on this one is that in all program countries, in all program contexts, the reason why we have reviews during the program is there’s a backward-looking part to the review, which is to assess whether the country has complied with the targets and the commitments that they have made.  But the other part is what we call a forward-looking part.  And that part really looks at what has happened to the economy, globally, what are the trends, and how should those be taken into account going forward.  So to the extent that uncertainty or changes in trading relations or in the trading environment has an effect on the economy, which is significant enough to affect the program, of course, those will be taken into account.  But it will be done on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific circumstances of every program country that we have. 

    Let’s continue then.   

    QUESTIONER: Do you know when the Board will meet? 

    MS. KOZACK: Ah, I apologize. So, with respect to the First Review, just in terms of the process, first, the discussions between the team and the authorities will need to come to a conclusion, and a Staff-Level Agreement would need to be reached.  And once that happens, we will submit the documentation to our Board for review.  So, I don’t yet have a timing for the Board meeting, but we will, of course, keep you informed as the discussions continue.

    MS. KOZACK: I’m not going to speculate at all. I want to give time, of course, for the authorities and the team to complete the discussions, and we will abide by our process, the first step of which is a Staff-Level Agreement, and then we will submit the documents for consideration by the Executive Board. 

    QUESTIONER: Can I have a short follow-up? Do you expect Minister Caputo in the upcoming days in Washington D.C.?

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say is that the discussions are continuing. There is a technical team here in Washington to have those discussions. But it’s a technical team. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go online.

    QUESTIONER: I have a couple of questions on Egypt specifically. The first is we all in Egypt were expecting the Fifth Review to be completed before the end of fiscal year, which ends by end of June.  So, could you please update us on the ongoing negotiations regarding the Fifth Review?  My second one is on the RSF financing.  We want to also know an update on that. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there other questions on Egypt.

    QUESTIONER:  I have another question on Egypt.  So, what are the current points of contention that delayed this disbursement of the fifth tranche?  And do you think there is any room to extend the loan repayment due to the current challenges, especially that there were more effects that have affected Egypt recently, because of the war that happened during June?  And I have another question on Syria.  I don’t know if I could put it in now.  Maybe you can answer that later on.  How will lifting the sanctions change or expedite any program with the IMF regarding Syria? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let’s first see if there’s other questions on Egypt and I’ll answer on Egypt and then I’ll turn to Syria.

    QUESTIONER: I just want to add to what my colleagues said before whether you’re able to confirm or say any more about reports recently that the Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be combined into one review that would then take place in September. 

    MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?   

    So, on Egypt, an IMF team, as you know, visited Cairo in May, from May 6th to 18th, for discussions with the Egyptian authorities.  The discussions were productive.  Egypt continues to make progress under its macroeconomic reform program.  And we can say that there’s been notable improvements in inflation and in the level of foreign exchange reserves, which have increased.

    To move further and to really safeguard macroeconomic stability in Egypt and to bolster the country’s resilience to shocks, it is essential to deepen reforms, and this is particularly important to reduce the state footprint in the economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Some of the key policies that are under discussion and key priorities are advancing the state ownership policy and asset diversification program in sectors where the state has committed to withdraw.  These steps are critical to really enabling the private sector to drive stronger and more sustainable growth in Egypt.  And our commitment, of course, is strong to Egypt.  We’re committed to supporting Egypt in building this resilience and in fostering growth. 

    With respect to the reviews, the discussions suggest that more time is needed to finalize the key policy measures, particularly related to the state’s role in the economy and to ensure that the critical objectives of the program, the authority’s economic reform program, can be met.  Our Staff team is continuing to work with the authorities on this goal.  And for that reason, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF will be combined.  And the idea is for them to be combined into a discussion or a combined review for the fall.  So that’s the rationale for combining the reviews.  More time [is] needed. 

    And I think there was also a question on Egypt’s RSF and what I can say on thisis that as the RSF was approved recently for Egypt and as per the schedule approved by the board, the First Review of the RSF is aligned with the Sixth Review under the EFF. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, would you allow me to follow up on something they’ve just said? 

    So, you said that the Fifth and the Sixth Review will be combined for the fall.  Does this mean that the Fifth and the Sixth disbursements will be together?  Could this be possible? Is this on the table? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, given that the discussions are still underway, a part of the discussions that will, of course, take place around combining the reviews will be to look at what are Egypt’s financing needs and around that, what should be the size of the disbursement around the combined Fifth and Sixth Review. So that’s all part of the discussions, the ongoing discussions that are taking place.  So, it would be premature for me to speculate at this stage. 

    Okay, you had a question on Syria.  So, let me see if anyone else has a question on Syria.  I don’t see anyone else on Syria. 

    So, turning to Syria. So, as I think you know, an IMF team visited Syria from June 1st to 5th.  And this was the first visit of an IMF team to Syria since 2009.  The team was in Syria to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity-building priorities.  And all of this, of course, is to support the recovery of the Syrian economy. 

    As we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused, you know, immense human suffering.  And the conflict has reduced the economy to a fraction of its former size.  The lifting of sanctions can help facilitate Syria’s rehabilitation by supporting its reintegration into the global economy.  And as part of our ongoing engagement with the Syrian authorities, we will, as needed, of course, you know, assess the implications of the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian economy. 

    So, again, that’s going to be part of the work of the team as they are putting together a picture of the Syrian economy, but also of the very important and deep capacity development needs that the Syrian authorities will have. 

    QUESTIONER: I just wanted to follow up on a colleague’s follow-up.  The comments that you made a few minutes ago regarding Argentina having a technical team in Washington for discussions with the IMF.  I just wanted to confirm my understanding.  Were you saying that they have a — that there is currently a technical team in Washington, and can you tell us anything more about the dates of the meetings or anything beyond that technical team being currently in Washington, if I understood you correctly? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I think all I can add to that is that I can confirm that there is a technical delegation in Washington, you know, from Argentina in Washington, visiting headquarters this week. And the goal is to advance discussions on the First Review under the program.  I hope that clarifies. 

    QUESTIONER: Yes, I wanted to ask you on Mozambique — sorry, just pulling up my note here — which was that –excuse me.  Regarding Mozambique, is it feasible to agree to a new program with Mozambique by year-end, as the president of that country is hoping, or do you have anything on any of the hurdles and the process there?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: I’m sort of looking. I don’t have anything off-hand in terms of an update on Mozambique. So, we’ll come back to you separately on Mozambique.  I’m sorry about that. 

    All right, let’s go online.  You had a question?

    QUESTIONER: I have a quick follow-up on Ukraine and then another one.  On Ukraine, when you are talking about combining the Ninth and Tenth Reviews, what would that mean also in terms of the disbursement?  But you know, in the case of Egypt, you’re giving the authorities more time to execute reviews.  What is the reason for combining them in the case of Ukraine? 

    And then, how many more reviews, I just don’t remember, how many more reviews were planned to get to the $15.5 billion?  So, we’ve got $10.6 billion dispersed already.  Like, how much is left to go, and how much of that notionally would come in the Ninth and Tenth Reviews?

    And then separately, I just want to come back to the trade question and perhaps broaden it out a little bit.  So, as the United States under the administration of Donald Trump is imposing quite significant tariffs on many, if not all, of its trading partners, that raises costs, obvious for everyone.  At the same time, the government has also been reducing, significantly slashing its foreign aid for development systems.  And you know, obviously, there’s a lot of concern about that.  We’ve seen some reports recently from the Lancet that millions of people could die as a result of this money not being in — in those countries.  That has follow-on consequences for all the countries whose, you know, economies you’re guiding and accompanying.  And I just want to know if you — if you’ve done a sort of broader analysis about this trade environment.  For many years, you have been warning about trade restrictions, and we are now fully into a period where trade restrictions seem to be increasing.  So, just asking a broad question.

    And then finally, we do have the G20 meeting coming up. The United States has not participated in the initial G20 meetings this year.  What would it mean to the organization if the United States also chose to skip this July meeting?  What is the importance of that as in that body?

    QUESTIONER: So, on Ukraine, what I can say is the Ninth Review, as I said, we expect it to take place by the end of the year and it is going to combine the previously envisaged Ninth Review, which was scheduled for the fall, and the Tenth Review, which we expected to take place in the fourth quarter.  And the team is going to remain closely engaged with Ukraine over this period.  I don’t have more details on the reason that the reviews are being combined, but I believe the Staff Report has been published for Ukraine.  And so, I would refer you to that document, which should have the relevant details.

    On your broader question about the trade environment and the aid environment.  I think if you think about it, or if we look back at it, you know, what has the IMF been saying?  If we look back to the Spring Meetings, one of the main messages from the Managing Director’s Curtain Raiser and her global policy agenda, as well as our broader messages, was that it is very important for countries to, we were saying, kind of, or the Managing Director was saying to get their own house in order.  So, there’s — and the message really behind that was that yes, the trade environment is shifting, and we see very significant shifts in the trade environment. 

    But there is a lot that countries can and need to do domestically related to their own reforms to build their own resilience.  There’s a lot that countries can do in terms of policy, and that really relates in many countries to fiscal policy, which is about, because we’ve been talking about a low-growth, high-debt environment for some time.  High uncertainty and weaker trade affects that environment.  But the fact still remains that we have a low-growth and high-debt environment globally.  So, for countries, that means taking measures to reduce the high debt problem. 

    That’s on the fiscal side.  And that is a general piece of policy advice that we’ve given to many, many countries.  And on the growth side, we are strongly encouraging countries to take measures to boost productivity and medium-term growth.  So, this is really at the crux of our policy advice to countries. 

    And on the aid side, what we’ve been warning about for quite some time is that official development assistance, in general, has been on a declining downward trend for many, many years.  And we see the impact of the decline in official development assistance in low-income countries.  So, this is a broad trend that we observe globally across many countries, affecting low-income countries.  But what it means for those countries is that they are going to have to both work with the IMF, other MDBs [multinational development banks], [and] donors who are still providing financing.  But most importantly, those countries are going to need to look for ways to mobilize domestic resources so that they can fund many of their own development needs. 

    And so this is also part of, we call it a three-pillar approach where we look at the need for domestic reforms in countries, the need for assistance and stepped-up  assistance from multilateral organizations to provide needed financing for countries, and of course ways to ultimately reduce the cost of financing and also looking to mobilize private financing for countries.  So, there is a very rich and large agenda on this broad topic that we have been discussing for quite some time.

    And on the G20, this is really a matter, I think, for the G20 presidency and for the — for the United States. 

    Let me look online. 

    QUESTIONER: So, I have like two questions regarding the finalizing the four-year Extended Credit Facility that is linked between the International Monetary Fund and the government of Ethiopia.  So again, the IMF Staff has been paying a review visit to Ethiopia many times to review Ethiopia’s section and disperse the money.  In this point, I have two questions.  The first one is how does the IMF evaluate Ethiopia’s move and current achievement towards liberalizing its economy?  And the second one is what are the parameters to indicate whether the mission is going on the right track, as the people of the country are facing heavy life burden?

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Other questions on Ethiopia? 

    QUESTIONER: I noted [that] in the Third Review that came out late last night that most of the macroeconomic forecasts are looking up compared to the second.  Apart from public debt-to-GDP, I can’t really figure out why.  So, could you maybe walk me through that?  And I have a separate question on Lebanon.  Maybe we’ll take that later.

    MS. KOZACK: Anything else on Ethiopia? All right. So, with respect to Ethiopia, the IMF Executive Board approved the 2025 Article IV consultation and the Third Review under the ECF on July 2nd, and that enabled Ethiopia to access about U.S. $260 million. 

    What I can add is that the completion of the review reflects both the assessment of the Staff and our Executive Board that Ethiopia’s strong adherence to the program and the program goals, and it also reflects continued confidence in the government’s reform agenda.  The Ethiopian authorities have made significant progress in implementing some really important and fundamental reforms under the ECF.  Key economic indicators such as inflation, fiscal balance, and external balance are all showing signs of stabilization.  And that suggests that the country and the economy are kind of progressing on the right track. 

    With respect to your more detailed question, we will have to come back to you bilaterally.  I’m not sure exactly why.  I don’t know off the top of my head the answer to that, but we will come back to you on that one. 

    I know there’s a few more questions online, so let’s try to get to them. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Sorry.  So, I wanted to — my question is regarding what is going on in Kenya.  President Ruto announced that he planned to privatize some of the public assets.  And I was wondering if you could provide any views from the IMF?  I also wanted to ask you, next week, President Donald Trump will be meeting with several African leaders.  Some of those countries have critical minerals.  So perhaps the meeting we resolve around critical minerals.  As you know, a lot of countries, the U.S., China, as well as European nations, are very interested in African critical minerals.  So, I was wondering if you could share your view, giving what has happened in the past and the corruption around critical minerals and the mismanagement of the Fund received from the minerals.  What is the IMF’s recommendation to nations across the African continent right now, on how to —

    MS. KOZACK: I think we lost you.

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so, we lost you for a bit in the middle, but I think I got the gist of your question. So, let me now ask, does anyone else have a question on Kenya? 

    QUESTIONER: Yeah, I do.  Hello? 

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about that Diagnostic Mission.  I know I’d asked you about it before, but now it’s completed, and does the IMF want that report to be made public, or does it expect it to be made public?  I have a question on Barbados, too, but I’ll wait on that one. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start with Kenya. So, on Kenya, maybe just to remind everyone where we are on Kenya. Our Staff team is actively engaged with the authorities on recent developments.  As you know, we’ve been discussing with them the timing of the next Article IV Mission and also their request for a new program. 

    And I will come to your question on the Government Diagnostics Mission in just a minute. 

    So, a big part of our work with Kenya now is this Government Diagnostics Mission.  The Technical Mission just concluded on June 30th, and they released a short press release, which was just issued.  This was kind of the first step of a process that we expect to take until the end of the year.  So, collaboration on government diagnostics.  It will continue over the next several months.  A draft diagnostic assessment report is expected to be shared with the Kenyan authorities before the end of the year.  So that first report will go to the authorities, and then the report will be published once consent is received from the authorities.  So that is the process that we’ll have.  But it will take quite some time to get that report prepared and ready.  So, kind of hold this space.  We’ll continue to work on it. 

    And then on your question on Kenya, what I can say is that we look forward to learning more details about the President’s statement that was made yesterday.  What I can say more broadly is that our engagement with the Kenyan authorities on privatization has been focused on establishing a solid framework to ensure that transparency and good governance, with the aim to unlock potential benefits. 

    So again, our discussions have very much focused on having a framework, and if done well, we see potential benefits that could include, for example, increased efficiency of improved private investment, reducing the fiscal burden, and improving service delivery. 

    On your second question, I think the way I will approach it is to say that, and Kenya is an example of this in some ways, with this governance Diagnostic Mission that, of course, at the IMF, we are concerned about not only in Africa, but in all countries where it’s a — where corruption affects economic activity, we are concerned about governance.  We have a strong governance program, and it includes a Government Diagnostic Mission.  Government diagnostic assessments allow our experts to go and do a deep assessment of governance in a country, look at where governance weaknesses exist, and to recommend a path forward to improve governance and reduce corruption over time. 

    We recognize that in many of our member countries, governance and corruption issues do have a significant impact on economic activity, and we are very committed to working with our member countries to improve governance as an important part of enabling countries to achieve stronger growth and better livelihoods for their people. 

    And let me go — I have Jermine.  You haven’t had a question yet, and I think we are over time.  So,  I am going to wrap up with you as the last question. 

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions pertaining to the Caribbean region, more specifically to the Citizenship by Investment programs.  What’s IMF’s position regarding the decisions made by St. Kitts and Nevis and other territories to establish a regulatory body to oversee these programs? 

    MS. KOZACK: Go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Regarding the looming threat of visa waivers by the Schengen region, the European Union, regarding these particular passport holders, knowing that the CBI programs are the pillars of the economies of the region. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say on the CBI, the citizenship by investment programs, is that our position has been that we generally advocate for common CBI program standards across the region, including in the area of transparency. And this was noted in our 2024 Regional Consultation Report on the ECCU. 

    And with respect to specific countries such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, for those specific countries, we have provided country-specific information, and the information on those can be found in the respective Article IV reports for those countries. 

    With respect to the question on the Schengen region, this is really a matter between the individual countries in the Caribbean and the countries in the Schengen region.  It’s not really a matter for the IMF. 

    So, with that, given that we’ve taken more time than we normally allocate, I want to thank everyone very much for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made later — available later on IMF.org.  And of course, in case of any clarifications, additional queries, if you didn’t get a chance to ask your questions today, please do be in contact with my colleagues at media@imf.org, and we will be sure to give you a response.  I wish you all a wonderful day and a wonderful long weekend, and I look forward to seeing you all next time.  Thanks very much.  

    *  *  *  *  *

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    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/03/tr-070325-com-regular-press-briefing-july-3-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Islamic Republic of Mauritania: IMF Executive Board Completes Fourth Reviews of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and Third Review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    July 3, 2025

    • The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Fourth Reviews of Mauritania’s Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility arrangements, and the Third Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement. The decisions allow for an immediate disbursement of SDR 36.16 million (about US$ [49.2] million).
    • Rule-based fiscal consolidation, supported by robust tax collection, and flexibilization of the exchange rate —alongside ongoing reforms to monetary operations and banking supervision—have strengthened the Mauritanian economy resilience, amid heightened global uncertainties and regional security risks.
    • A strong reform agenda, including the recent adoption by the parliament of key anti-corruption laws, should bolster governance and help promote private sector investments.

    Washington, DC: The IMF Executive Board completed today the Fourth Reviews under the 42‑month blended Extended Credit Facility arrangement (ECF) and the Extended Fund Facility arrangement (EFF), and the Third Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility arrangement (RSF). The ECF/EFF were approved by the IMF Executive Board in January 2023 (see PR 23/15) and the RSF was approved in December 2023 (see PR23/465). The completion of the reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 36.16 million (about US$ 49.8 million) of which SDR 6.44 million (about US$ 8.9 million) under the ECF/EFF and SDR 29.72 million (about US$ 40.9 million) under the RSF, bringing the cumulative disbursements to SDR 125.9 million (about US$ 166.5 million).

    The Mauritanian economy has proven resilient, notwithstanding heightened global uncertainty and increasing regional security risks, with economic activity estimated to have decelerated slightly to 5.2 percent in 2024. Following a further deceleration to 4.0 percent in 2025, growth is expected to remain favorable in the medium term, supported by the government infrastructure drive and by private investment. Inflation is expected to remain contained within the Central Bank’s target. The reforms in the areas of governance, monetary and financial sector, investment policies, and vocational training are expected to support efforts to diversify the economy away from the extractive industries.

    Program performance has been strong, with all end-December 2024 quantitative targets met, and most of the structural benchmarks under the ECF/EFF implemented. Reforms under the RSF are also progressing.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Chair stated:

    “Program performance under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangements has been strong. Supported by the authorities’ prudent and well-calibrated policies, Mauritania’s economy continued to grow in 2024, albeit at a slower pace than in 2023, while inflation decreased. The fiscal performance, including the implementation of a fiscal anchor, is supporting the authorities’ medium-term goal of stabilizing debt. The current account widened in 2024, but international reserves remained at comfortable levels.”

    “The authorities’ prudent fiscal stance, underpinned by the fiscal anchor, helps insulate public spending from commodity price volatility and contributes to stabilizing debt. Continuing with this prudent fiscal policy, and complementing it with reforms in tax policy and administration, would create fiscal space for social spending and public investment while safeguarding the credibility of the medium-term budget framework.”

    “With inflation easing, the Central Bank of Mauritania has begun lowering interest rates. Effective liquidity management, supported by continued development of monetary policy instruments, helps anchor inflation expectations while fostering the development of domestic debt markets. Continued reforms to deepen the foreign exchange market would enhance exchange rate flexibility and resilience to external shocks. Strengthening the banking sector’s resilience requires close monitoring of financial sector trends and consistent enforcement of prudential regulations.”

    “Decisive implementation of structural reforms is essential to support higher, more inclusive and diversified, private-sector-led growth. Priorities include operationalizing recent governance reforms, strengthening accountability and transparency, developing human capital, promoting financial inclusion, and enhancing the business climate.”

    “Effective implementation of the ECF and EFF arrangements, along with intensified reform efforts under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, will help Mauritania address its medium- and long-term challenges and secure additional financing. These programs aim to maintain adequate international reserves, strengthen macroeconomic policy frameworks, and promote sustainable growth, thereby supporting the country’s climate agenda, human capital development, and poverty reduction.”

    Mauritania: Selected Economic Indicators, 2020–25

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    3rd Review

    Est.

    Projections

    National accounts and prices

    (Annual change in percent)

    Real GDP 

    -0.4

    0.7

    6.8

    6.5

    4.6

    5.2

    4.0

    Real extractive GDP

    7.1

    -19.2

    18.3

    9.4

    -0.5

    3.2

    -1.0

    Real non-extractive GDP

    -1.7

    6.0

    3.8

    5.9

    5.7

    5.6

    5.1

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    1.8

    5.7

    11.0

    1.6

    3.0

    1.5

    3.5

    Central government operations

    (in percent of nonextractive GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    Revenues and grants

    20.8

    22.7

    25.0

    22.5

    24.1

    22.5

    25.6

    Nonextractive

    16.6

    16.2

    18.2

    17.0

    18.9

    18.1

    19.9

    Taxes

    10.9

    11.7

    13.4

    12.6

    14.3

    14.1

    15.5

    Extractive

    2.1

    4.2

    5.1

    3.7

    3.4

    3.2

    3.8

    Expenditure and net lending

    18.5

    20.8

    28.7

    25.0

    25.4

    23.9

    26.1

       Of which: Current

    12.0

    13.0

    17.2

    16.4

    15.5

    15.1

    14.4

       Capital

    6.6

    7.8

    11.5

    8.7

    9.8

    8.8

    11.7

    Primary balance (excl. grants)

    1.2

    0.5

    -4.5

    -3.3

    -2.1

    -1.6

    -1.5

    Overall balance (in percent of GDP)

    2.2

    1.9

    -3.7

    -2.5

    -1.2

    -1.4

    -0.5

    Public sector debt (in percent of GDP)

    56.5

    52.4

    48.5

    46.4

    44.3

    42.1

    41.2

    External sector

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Current account balance (in percent of GDP)

    -6.8

    -8.6

    -14.9

    -8.8

    -7.7

    -9.5

    -6.2

    Excl. externally financed extractive capital goods imports

    2.2

    1.0

    -0.8

    -0.3

    -1.4

    -1.4

    -0.2

    Gross official reserves (in millions of US$, eop)

    1,542

    2,347

    1,877

    2,032

    2,039

    1,921

    1846

    In months of prospective non-extractive imports

    6.7

    8.2

    6.2

    6.4

    6.5

    6.4

    5.9

    External public debt (in millions of US$)

    4,113

    4,204

    3,970

    3,959

    3921

    3,980

    4050

    In percent of GDP

    49.1

    45.8

    42.3

    40.0

    36.3

    36.3

    34.5
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Mayada Ghazala

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/03/pr25240-mauritania-imf-comp-4th-rev-of-ext-arr-under-ecf-and-eff-arr-and-3rd-rev-of-rsf-arr

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tonko: Republicans Have Abdicated Their Duty & Betrayed the American People

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Paul Tonko (Capital Region New York)

    WASHINGTON, DC — Congressman Paul D. Tonko released the following statement on the House passage of President Trump’s budget, the so-called “Big, Beautiful Bill” that exacts the largest cut to health care and food assistance in American history, all to bring massive tax breaks to the wealthiest 0.1 percent.

    “This bill will go down as one of the most egregious betrayals of the American public in history. At a time when we should be celebrating the birth of our nation and a celebration of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” the President and rubber-stamp Republicans have condemned millions to a harder, less free, less joyous life.

    “Republicans spent these past few weeks hemming and hawing about this legislation: from the devastating cuts to Medicaid and SNAP, to the eradication of countless manufacturing and clean energy jobs, to the massive increase in our debt. But after that whining, they went ahead and voted to pass all those disastrous provisions anyway.

    “Republicans had one job: to vote no on a bill that their constituents don’t like, that hospitals don’t like, that businesses don’t like, that unions don’t like, that they themselves don’t like. Instead, they voted yes all to appease one man.

    “It’s clear that Republicans would rather lie about the contents and consequences of this bill and bow down to wannabe king Donald Trump than protect the lives and livelihoods of their constituents. Regardless of what they believe, they are still beholden to their constituents and the American people. When they go home to their districts, they’ll have to explain why they voted to make more people slide into poverty, more kids go to bed hungry, and more patients die without the care they need.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tonko: Republicans Have Abdicated Their Duty & Betrayed the American People

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Paul Tonko (Capital Region New York)

    WASHINGTON, DC — Congressman Paul D. Tonko released the following statement on the House passage of President Trump’s budget, the so-called “Big, Beautiful Bill” that exacts the largest cut to health care and food assistance in American history, all to bring massive tax breaks to the wealthiest 0.1 percent.

    “This bill will go down as one of the most egregious betrayals of the American public in history. At a time when we should be celebrating the birth of our nation and a celebration of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” the President and rubber-stamp Republicans have condemned millions to a harder, less free, less joyous life.

    “Republicans spent these past few weeks hemming and hawing about this legislation: from the devastating cuts to Medicaid and SNAP, to the eradication of countless manufacturing and clean energy jobs, to the massive increase in our debt. But after that whining, they went ahead and voted to pass all those disastrous provisions anyway.

    “Republicans had one job: to vote no on a bill that their constituents don’t like, that hospitals don’t like, that businesses don’t like, that unions don’t like, that they themselves don’t like. Instead, they voted yes all to appease one man.

    “It’s clear that Republicans would rather lie about the contents and consequences of this bill and bow down to wannabe king Donald Trump than protect the lives and livelihoods of their constituents. Regardless of what they believe, they are still beholden to their constituents and the American people. When they go home to their districts, they’ll have to explain why they voted to make more people slide into poverty, more kids go to bed hungry, and more patients die without the care they need.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Spain, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend Measures Making Abortion More Accessible, Ask about Accountability for Past Rights Violations and Overcrowding in Migrant Reception Centres

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Spain on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Committee Experts commended revisions to the State’s abortion law promoting increased access, while raising issues concerning its efforts to address accountability for past human rights violations and overcrowding in offshore migrant reception centres.

    A Committee Expert said there had been positive changes in legislation on sexual and reproductive health and voluntary termination of pregnancy, with the removal of requirements for parental consent and the mandatory three-day reflection period.

    Another Committee Expert said serious human rights violations were committed during the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship.  Did the 2022 law on democratic memory overturn the 1977 law on amnesty?  How many high-ranking officials had been tried and sentenced for crimes committed during the dictatorship?

    A Committee Expert said that in Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands, migrants had been forced to sleep on the streets due to the lack of capacity in reception centres.  The Committee had also received disturbing reports about overcrowding and abuse of unaccompanied children in detention, particularly in the Canary Islands.  What progress had been made in redistributing migrants held in the Canary Islands to other areas of Spain?

    Marcos Gómez Martínez, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, presenting the report, said Spain remained firmly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights. Since the presentation of the previous report in 2015, Spain had adopted important legislative, institutional and political measures to strengthen the protection of human rights in the country, in particular civil and political rights.

    Mr. Gómez Martínez said Law 20/2022 on Democratic Memory consolidated the right to truth, justice and reparation for the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship.  A national census of victims, a map of graves and a State plan for exhumations had been created, with the participation of the autonomous communities and civil society.

    The delegation added that work was underway to create a DNA database of disappeared individuals.  There was a unit in the Prosecutor’s Office that specialised in identifying the whereabouts of disappeared persons, and an information service for persons affected by the kidnapping of babies, which facilitated access to birth certificates and genetic records.

    In response to the influx of arrivals to the Spanish islands, particularly in the Canary Islands, the Government was working to strengthen resources and support access to the asylum procedure, the delegation said.  It had opened four large reception centres on the Canary Islands, and had moved some asylum seekers from the Canary Islands to Madrid to allow them to submit asylum applications.  Detainment in migrant holding centres was a last resort.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Gómez Martínez thanked the Committee for the dialogue and the quality of its questions.  The full guarantee of civil and political rights was an ongoing process.  The Committee helped the State party to guarantee these rights domestically.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, said the dialogue had addressed key topics related to implementation of the Covenant. The Committee urged the State party to implement its recommendations to strengthen implementation of the Covenant.

    The delegation of Spain was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation; Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Courts; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Equality; Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration; Ministry of Youth and Children; and the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Thursday 3 July to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Spain (CCPR/C/ESP/7).

    Presentation of the Report

    MARCOS GÓMEZ MARTÍNEZ, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, said Spain remained firmly committed to the promotion and protection of human rights.  Since the presentation of the previous report in 2015, Spain had adopted important legislative, institutional and political measures to strengthen the protection of human rights in the country, in particular civil and political rights.

    In June 2023, the second national human rights plan (2023-2027) was approved, which expanded the protection of political and civil rights; incorporated the equality of women and men, as well as non-discrimination; and advanced measures to guarantee the universality of human rights for all people. There was a structure responsible for monitoring and supervising implementation of the plan, which followed up on the opinions and recommendations of the human rights treaty bodies.  The plan recognised the importance of the national human rights institution, the Ombudsman, as an independent institution, with its own resources and competences in the field of human rights monitoring.

    Spain had made significant progress in the fight against discrimination.  In 2023, a law was approved that guaranteed of the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people, eliminating the requirement of medical intervention for changing information on sex in the civic registry, as well as the age requirement.  Conversion therapies and unnecessary surgical interventions on intersex people under 12 years of age were also prohibited.

    Law 15/2022 facilitated the creation of the Independent Authority for Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination.  The criminal framework against hate crimes had also been strengthened, expanding the recognised causes of discrimination, including age, social exclusion and ethnicity.  The Attorney General’s Office had consolidated a network of prosecutors specialising in hate crimes and discrimination, and specific police units were created for prevention and investigation.

    The Strategy for Equality, Inclusion and Participation of the Gitanos [Spanish Romani] (2021-2030) had been renewed, with specific measures addressing education, employment, health, housing, essential services, poverty, and gender equality.  In addition, studies and awareness-raising campaigns on racism and xenophobia had been promoted, and the Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia had been strengthened, as had the Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination.  Judicial mechanisms for dealing with victims of hate crimes had been strengthened, as well as the detection and reporting of hate speech on social networks, including a specific protocol to combat it online.

    In 2024, Spain took a decisive step towards the effective recognition of the rights of persons with disabilities through the reform of article 49 of the Constitution.  The new wording guaranteed that all persons with disabilities could exercise their rights in conditions of freedom and equality.  In addition, in Spain the right to vote was fully guaranteed to all persons with disabilities.

    Organic Law 10/2022 on the Comprehensive Guarantee of Sexual Freedom expanded prevention, care and reparation measures.  Within the Ministry of the Interior, the National Office against Sexual Violence was created in 2023.  Organic Law 1/2023 guaranteed access to voluntary termination of pregnancy free of charge, including for minors and women with disabilities.  Organic Law 8/2021 on the comprehensive protection of children and adolescents against violence strengthened the framework for the protection of minors. 

    In July 2023, Spain approved the new protocol for the forensic medical examination of detainees.  In 2022, the Ministry of the Interior created the National Office for Human Rights Guarantees, a body responsible for ensuring compliance with national and international standards against torture by the State security forces.

    Spain’s prison population had decreased in recent years and detention conditions had improved, including through increased access to health and care for people with disabilities and a reduction of the use of mechanical restraints. Incommunicado detention was applied on an exceptional basis and could not be applied to minors under 16 years of age.  In Temporary Stay Centres for Immigrants, specific modules had been set up for women and families, eliminating situations of overcrowding.

    A contingency plan implemented since 2022 called on child protection services in all the country’s territories to take in unaccompanied minors.  Royal Decree Law 2/2025 implemented urgent measures to guarantee the rights and best interests of migrant children and adolescents. The Government was preparing a Royal Decree that set minimum quality standards in terms of reception centres’ size, resources and accessibility.  

    Law 2/2023 regulated the protection of people who reported regulatory breaches and created the Independent Authority for the Protection of Whistleblowers.  This was one of the actions included in the Action Plan for Democracy of 2024, which aimed to expand and improve the quality of Government information, and strengthen the transparency and accountability of the media, the legislative branch and the electoral system.  

    Law 20/2022 on Democratic Memory consolidated the right to truth, justice and reparation for the victims of the Civil War and the dictatorship.  A national census of victims, a map of graves and a State plan for exhumations had been created, with the participation of the autonomous communities and civil society.

    Spain reiterated its commitment to the international human rights system and to the effective implementation of the Covenant.  

    Questions by Committee Experts

     

    A Committee Expert said reports revealed positive steps had been taken by the State party, however challenges remained in implementing the Convention.  Was there an oversight mechanism assessing implementation of the Committee’s recommendations and Views?  What was the jurisprudence of the State’s courts regarding the Committee’s Views? The Supreme Court had issued a decision asserting the binding nature of human rights treaty bodies’ Views.  Was this decision being applied?  Could the delegation give some examples of court cases that had referenced the Covenant?

    The 2022 law on equality, which recognised the right of all persons to non-discrimination, had no bearing on the legislation on immigration, which inhibited access to public services for migrants.  Would the State party address this issue?  There had been major delays in the establishment of the proposed Authority for Equal Treatment; when would this be completed?  What was the status of the proposed Organic Act against Racism?

    The Criminal Code did not address hate crimes based on language, political opinion or economic status. How did the State party tackle such hate crimes?  There had been a disturbing rise in hate crimes recently; how was the State party working to prosecute and prevent these crimes?

    What remedies had the State party provided for newborns and intersex children subjected to unnecessary medical treatments?  The State party had made steps forward in promoting self-determination of gender with the adoption of the recent law on the topic, however this did not recognise the rights of non-binary persons.  Did the State party plan to amend the law to recognise non-binary persons? Had it considered expanding the options for declaring sex in the civil registry beyond simply “male” and “female”?

    Another Committee Expert said that Spain had concluded its first national action plan on human rights.  How did the consultative commission work with the Ombudsperson’s Office to assess implementation of the plan?  The Ombudsperson’s Office had “A” status under the Paris Principles.  What efforts had been made by the State to implement the recommendations of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions to strengthen the role of                               Ombudsperson?  Was the Ombudsperson mandated to investigate complaints of torture and ill-treatment by security forces?

    There had been positive changes in legislation on sexual and reproductive health and voluntary termination of pregnancy, with the removal of requirements for parental consent and the mandatory three-day reflection period.  How did the State party promote access to abortions for women with disabilities and minority women?  What measures would the State party take to address conscientious objections by doctors to abortions?  How did the State party fight against obstetric violence?

    Serious human rights violations were committed during the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship.  Positive progress had been made with the 2022 law on democratic memory, but the right to truth, justice and reparation of the family members of victims had not been guaranteed and the Law of Amnesty of 1977 had not been overturned.  Did the 2022 law overturn the 1977 law on amnesty?  Were there efforts to overturn the law on State secrets related to the Franco dictatorship?  There had been a proposal to create a DNA database of babies stolen during the dictatorship.  How many high-ranking officials had been tried and sentenced for crimes committed during the dictatorship?  What would the makeup of the proposed Truth Commission be, and how would it promote access to truth, justice and reparation for victims of historical human rights violations?

    One Committee Expert welcomed the strategy for equality and inclusion for the Gitanos, and institutions set up to tackle discrimination and racism.  The quality of education provided to Gitano people was lower than that of the rest of the population, and the community had lower employment levels. What measures were in place to address these issues?  The Council for the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination had recommended increasing persons from diverse backgrounds in public institutions and measures to redress discrimination.  Had the State party implemented these recommendations?  What measures were in place to prevent discrimination against people of African descent?

    Law enforcement officials reportedly continued to engage in discriminatory identity checks.  Did the State party plan to adopt a law explicitly prohibiting racial and ethnic profiling?  Challenges to proving discrimination resulted in underreporting of racial and ethnic profiling.  Who investigated such reports and how were perpetrators held accountable?  Internal accountability mechanisms lacked transparency and data was not publicly available.  How were people disciplined for infractions?

    The Committee was concerned by the reported increase in hate speech in Spain, particularly neo-fascist hate speech, and a reduction in the budgets of Government mechanisms to combat this phenomenon.  How would the State party tackle this issue?  The Committee was also concerned by the rise in hate crimes against minorities. The State party had launched several initiatives to tackle hate crimes, but their effects appeared to be limited. How was the State party collecting data on and working to ensure the implementation of measures to tackle hate crimes?

    A Committee Expert welcomed Organic Law 10/2022 and other measures to tackle gender-based violence.  There had been an increase in femicides, and women faced barriers in reporting violence.  What measures were in place to ensure implementation of Law 10/2022?  What resources had been allocated to services for victims of violence and programmes tackling gender-based violence?  Were there oversight mechanisms that monitored the treatment of women in courts?  How was the State party tackling online discrimination against women and gender biases in artificial intelligence tools?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed recent amendments to the Criminal Code removing an article that justified forced sterilisation in certain circumstances.  Had past cases of forced sterilisation been exempt from prosecution by this article?  What measures had the State party taken to ensure specialised training for health workers related to the prohibition of forced sterilisation?

    Acts of torture in Spain were subject to a statute of limitations if they did not qualify as crimes against humanity.  Were there plans to amend the definition of torture to bring it in line with international standards and remove the statute of limitations?  Time bars prevented many victims of past political violence in Basque accessing remedies and justice.  How was this issue being addressed?  What steps had been taken to identify and prosecute historic allegations of torture?  The State party did not make video recordings of interrogations; would it consider making such recordings?

     

    Responses by the Delegation

     

    The delegation said Spain had implemented the recommendations in the Views issued by the Committee and all treaty bodies.  The Views being implemented were referred to in the preambles of the relevant laws.  The Supreme Court and lower courts applied the provisions of these Views in their interpretations of Spanish law.  A July 2024 Royal Decree established a monitoring committee tasked with drafting follow-up reports on the implementation of the Views of treaty bodies.

    The Ombudsperson had the mandate to submit recommendations to the Government related to complaints it received, including complaints from the Spanish autonomous communities.

    There were no limitations on foreigners’ access to the police to report human rights violations.  The immigration law suspended deportation procedures involving victims of trafficking and minors.  Foreigners were assisted in criminal proceedings, and all victims were treated equally before the law, regardless of their migration status. New immigration regulations implemented this year protected foreign victims of crimes, who were permitted to live and work in Spain.  There were specific norms for victims of sexual and gender-based violence and trafficking in persons.

    Implementation of the law on racism and intolerance continued to be a priority.  There had been delays in implementation of the draft law on equal treatment.  The chair of the independent authority on equal treatment had been appointed and the body was fully operational.

    A Royal Decree of 2024 promoted equality and non-discrimination of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals, and the Government planned to adopt State strategies for the inclusion of this group.  A mechanism had been set up for reporting hate crimes against this community. Spanish laws prohibited conversion therapy.  The State party had made progress in conducting a study on non-binary people.

    Organic Law 1/2023 strengthened inclusion for women with disabilities.  All women could access voluntary interruption of pregnancy from 16 years of age, including women with disabilities.  The State party was promoting access to abortion services in autonomous communities.  Each autonomous community needed to ensure that they had sufficient personnel to promote access to abortions.  The Organic Law set out concrete measures to eradicate obstetric violence.  Autonomous communities ensured that health care centres could report malpractice.  Legal exceptions which allowed for sterilisation of persons with disabilities without their consent had been removed in 2020.  Specialised training on legislation related to abortion and sterilisation was being provided to medical staff.

    Spain had a decentralised governance structure, and the Central Government did not have the authority to address some issues that were the purview of autonomous community governments. 

    The law on democratic memory sought to ensure victims’ right to truth.  It would be implemented in line with international law.  The law on investigations into human rights violations occurring during the Civil War and dictatorship had established a Centre of Memory. Court cases involving crimes occurring during the Civil War had failed due to the statute of limitations.  The Prosecutor’s Office had worked to create a DNA database of victims of these human rights violations.  Autonomous communities’ laws on historical violations were being challenged by the State in the Constitutional Court.  Spain had a law on transparency and a working group was seeking to expand transparency in access to information involving historic rights violations.  Parliament was addressing cases of children stolen during the dictatorship, and the law on democratic memory recognised these rights of these children.

    The State party had a national strategy on the Gitanos, which promoted social inclusion, equal opportunities and empowerment of this group, as well as their access to education, housing and healthcare services.

    The State party had conducted an analysis on racism and xenophobia to inform related policies.  It had established strategies promoting the inclusion of migrants.  The national action plan on preventing racism and xenophobia ran until 2026 and had already achieved tangible results.  The State party had been working with the European Commission to monitor and address online hate speech, and was drafting a strategy to address hate speech in sport.  Artificial intelligence was used in social networks to fight discrimination; it had led to increased detections of hate speech.  Data was collected on different forms of hate speech, including in sport. A working group was developing strategic plans promoting the inclusion of ethnic minorities.  Spain had been issuing subsidies to civil society organizations working to prevent hate speech and hate crimes.  The State party was promoting coordination between the police and other agencies to ensure the reporting of hate crimes.

    The Ministry of Interior had a zero-tolerance policy for hate speech and hate crimes.  There had been a rise in reports of these crimes, but this indicated that barriers to reporting had been addressed.  Police officers had been trained in combatting hate speech.  The State had implemented measures for protecting the Gitanos from hate speech.

    There was a robust legal framework governing police checks.  The police had committed to guaranteeing public security. There was an internal oversight body that investigated complaints related to racial profiling.

    Some 1.5 billion euros had been invested in the State Pact, and responsibilities for its implementation had been delineated.  Under the Pact, the State was working to combat all forms of violence against women.  The Constitutional Court had granted all victims of sexual aggression the right to appeal court cases.  There were 51 shelters for victims of violence, who also had access to compensation.  Budget had been allocated to improving care in rural areas.  Measures had been implemented to combat macho attitudes.  There was a comprehensive victim protection system that ensured appropriate protections for victims.  A campaign on psychological violence would be carried out by the State party this year.  Systems had been set up within the Ministry of the Interior to address sexual and gender-based violence.

    The definition of torture in the Criminal Code was not fully aligned with that of the Convention against Torture. However, the Code and other legislation sufficiently addressed the crime of torture, and did not need to be amended. The Code provided for the non-application of the statute of limitations for crimes of torture that were deemed to be crimes against humanity.  The statute of limitations was 15 years; this was sufficient time for the prosecution to act. Police practices needed to be aligned with international standards.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    One Committee Expert welcomed specific measures to address online hate speech and hate speech at sporting events.  What measures were in place to address other forms of hate speech?

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on the legal status of the Committee’s recommendations regarding compensation; national policies promoting sexual and reproductive health education; whether the 2022 law on memory brought an end to the amnesty imposed by the 1977 amnesty law; how the State party reconciled its obligations to guarantee access to justice and the concordia laws being adopted by the autonomous communities; measures to repeal amnesty laws to deal with enforced disappearance and to adopt a State plan for search and identification of the disappeared; and the legal framework on public access to archives on historic human rights violations.

    Experts also asked questions on whether the State party was considering adopting a law on racial profiling; the functions to be carried out by the body mandated to implement the recommendations of treaty bodies; whether all foreigners who were victims of serious crimes were provided with residency permits; whether the State’s efforts to prevent forced sterilisation were sufficient; the role of the Office of Human Rights Guarantees in implementing international standards on preventing torture; and investigations into numerous reports of torture and excessive use of force in a 2017 incident in Catalonia.

     

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said persons could go before the courts to claim financial compensation based on treaty bodies’ Views and recommendations.

    Spain had an educational curriculum on sexual and reproductive health, which promoted mutual respect and the prevention of violence.  The Ministry of Education and Health was also providing online training on sexual and reproductive health for teachers and families.

    The concordia laws drafted by three autonomous communities had been challenged in the Constitutional Court.

    Video recordings of interrogations could be used in certain kinds of investigations; however, they could not be used when they undermined investigations.

    There had been a clear drop in hate speech crimes, from over 2,000 cases in 2023 to 1,900 in 2024.  This had been influenced by training provided to public officials and civil society on hate speech.  The number of cases of hate speech against the Gitanos had also fallen over this period.  There were laws on police ethics; if police did not abide by these laws, they were sanctioned and could possibly be released from service.

    The right to truth, reparation and non-repetition was enshrined in the law on democratic memory.  A map of disappeared persons had been created, and work was underway to create a DNA database of disappeared individuals. There was a unit in the Prosecutor’s Office that specialised in identifying the whereabouts of disappeared persons.  In one cemetery, the remains of up to 120 victims of human rights violations from the Civil War had been found.  There was an information service for persons affected by the kidnapping of babies, which facilitated access to birth certificates and genetic records.

    The police oversight body within the Ministry of Justice took actions in response to reports of police misconduct and conducted preventative activities.  It complemented internal police oversight units.

    A 2024 Royal Decree regulated the second national human rights plan, which included a measure establishing a commission for following up on the recommendations of human rights treaty bodies. It addressed all of Spain, including the autonomous communities.

    Last year, the Constitutional Court decided that the 2022 law on democratic memory did not affect the 1977 amnesty law.  The 1977 law provided a broad amnesty to those persons who were arrested under the dictatorship, as part of the transition from the dictatorship to a democracy.  Court rulings extended the amnesty to victims of forced labour and military personnel. The prosecutor’s office was opening investigations into alleged cases of human rights violations which had taken place in the dictatorship-era.  The aim of the investigations was to provide redress to victims.  Thus far, around 7,000 human remains had been identified and more would be exhumed soon.

    The Commission for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was working with the private sector, unions and civil society to promote equality.  It held events related to racism, conducted studies and aided victims of racial discrimination.  Its funds had been increased in 2023, allowing it to expand its remit, which had led to an increase in reports of discrimination.

    Legal amendments had been made to make forced sterilisation a crime in all circumstances.  Since the amendments were enacted, there had been no reports of forced sterilisation.  The Government had held an event in which it offered an apology to victims.  The National Council for Disabilities was working to rectify this historic harm and support the sexual and reproductive health of women and girls with disabilities.

    Questions by Committee Experts

     

    A Committee Expert said the national preventive mechanism had identified material deficiencies in the oldest prisons, a dearth of psychiatric and healthcare professionals, and the use of mechanical subjugation.  How had authorities responded to these observations?  Electric shocks had been used against detainees as part of a study on aggressiveness.  Why was this allowed and how would the State party prevent repetition?

    Isolation was used in prisons, with prior authorisation for up to 14 days, with the possibility of extension. Why did the State party maintain this regime of incommunicado detention?  Had it seriously considered the possibility of its elimination? Legislation allowed for incommunicado detention of minors aged 16 to 18.  Would the State cease this practice?  There were no laws establishing maximum time limits for incommunicado detention; would limits be established?

    Were there alternatives to migratory detention?  To what extent were they applied?  What measures had the State party taken to respond to reports of ill-treatment of migrant children by officials in holding facilities?

    One Committee Expert said Spain was a country of destination and transit for migrants.  What was the nature and scope of the ongoing study on trafficking in persons?  What challenges remained in harmonising regional legislation on trafficking?  Was there a timeline for the adoption of the draft anti-trafficking law?  What did it cover?  Was the State party considering developing a more comprehensive national referral mechanism?

    Spain had no formal age determination procedure for migrants.  Would this be developed?  There were reports of abuse in migrant reception centres and of minors being held with adults.  How did the State party ensure that unaccompanied minors received legal assistance, protection and family reunification opportunities?

    To what extent was legislation on slander and libel compatible with international standards?  Was the State party considering decriminalising defamation? What was the rationale for maintaining the defamation law?  The transparency law did not cover judicial bodies and did not impose penalties on public officials for non-compliance.  Was the current legal system sufficient for securing transparency in public information? What measures were in place to promote increased application of the law?

    Between 2017 and 2020, at least 65 Catalan politicians, activists, and public figures had reportedly been targeted with Pegasus spyware, allegedly linked to the National Intelligence Centre, and there had been no investigations into these reports.  Did the State party intend to launch investigations into these allegations?  The 2024 amnesty law granted amnesty to individuals involved in recent pro-independence activities in Catalonia.  What progress had been made in applying the law?  What was the impact of the recent Constitutional Court ruling on the law?  Was the law compatible with international standards?

    A Committee Expert said migrant intake facilities could detain migrants for up to 60 days.  Did the State party provide consistent access to medical care and legal support for migrants in these centres?  In Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands, migrants had been forced to sleep on the streets due to the lack of capacity in reception centres.  The Committee had also received disturbing reports about overcrowding and abuse of unaccompanied children in detention, particularly in the Canary Islands.  What progress had been made in redistributing migrants held in the Canary Islands to other areas of Spain?

    There were long wait times for the assessment of asylum applications; there were over 240,000 applications pending as of 2024.  How was this being addressed?  There were pushbacks at the border preventing migrants from entering the State, forcing them to swim or jump fences.  At least 15 migrants had died in an incident in a border area in 2014, and 23 had died in 2022.  What measures were in place to prevent deaths of migrants and promote effective and timely investigations of deaths?  When would the State party cease the practice of pushbacks?  A 2022 agreement with Morocco authorised Spain to send migrants back to Morocco.  How did the State party ensure that migrants who were sent back to Morocco had the right to apply for asylum?

    Another Committee Expert said the public security act of 2015 had a dissuasive impact on the activities of journalists and human rights defenders.  The Constitutional Court had issued a decision stating that the prohibition to film officials needed to be limited to cases where there was a threat to the official.  What measures were in place to amend the law in line with the Constitutional Court’s ruling? Did the State party still use the dangerous practice of undercover police agents?  The offence of glorification of terrorism had been used in 2024 against two Palestinian activists.  What was the status of proposed reforms to restrict the application of this offence?

    Limited progress had been made in combatting corruption in the judiciary.  In 2025, after five years of deadlock, an agreement was reached on establishing the General Council of the Judiciary.  Was fully operational?  How would the State party ensure that it functioned independently?  Judges and prosecutors had gone on strike this week to protest recent judicial reforms, fearing that it would harm their independence.  What was the purpose of these reforms?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there were shortages of medical professionals in prisons.  Healthcare was the mandate of the autonomous communities, but the Central Government continued to provide resources to support healthcare.  Remote doctors were always available, and the State coordinated with the police to facilitate transfers of inmates to hospitals in cases of medical emergencies. Rosters for nurses and other medical professionals in prisons had been 95 per cent completed.

    Experimentation on inmates was prohibited, but voluntary scientific studies could be conducted in prisons.  Mechanical subjugation, such as the use of handcuffs, straps and tranquilisers in extreme cases, was regulated in the law on penitentiaries.  All guarantees were in place to ensure legality and proportionality in the use of these devices.  These devices were used as a last resort.

    The European Council had not established infractions related to Spain’s use of incommunicado detention.  Persons in incommunicado detention needed to be visited twice daily by medical authorities and visits by consular authorities were not restricted.  Legislation on incommunicado detention was fully aligned with European standards.  The State’s isolation regime had received the support of the Council of Europe’s torture body.  Typically, isolation was used for short periods of a few minutes or hours to prevent conflicts.

    The Government had conducted a study on trafficking in persons in 2024; its results had been published online.  The study identified that there were around 9,000 women in prostitution at risk of being trafficked.  A draft bill had been developed that sought to prevent trafficking and ensure support for victims.  A public hearing on the bill had been concluded, and it would go through the legislature in September.  The bill would establish a national referral mechanism.  Several training courses for the security forces promoted identification of trafficking victims using objective, streamlined criteria.

    Detainment in migrant holding centres was a last resort, applied only in cases of irregular residency.  Migrants could be held for up to 72 hours in these centres.  The legal regime for these centres aligned with that of detention in police centres. Detainees had the right to food and drinks.  The average occupation rate in these centres did not exceed 30 per cent.

    Between November 2023 and January 2024, there had been a mass arrival of asylum seekers at Madrid Airport.  Holding rooms at the airport were expanded and a room for women and girls was established.  The Government had expedited the processing of asylum claims for these people. 

    There had been an influx of arrivals to the Spanish islands, particularly in the Canary Islands, during the last two years.  In response, the Government was working to strengthen resources and support access to the asylum procedure.  A specific plan to support minors had been developed.  The Government had opened four large reception centres on the Canary Islands.  One centre that opened in 2023 had housed more than 37,000 people to date.

    The Government was committed to defending child migrants’ rights; it had developed a protection framework for these children.  Royal Decree 2/2025 introduced measures to ensure the best interests of the child in cases of irregular migration, regulating when unaccompanied minors could be welcomed by autonomous communities.  The State party was trying to redistribute these minors across the territory to ensure that the capacities of communities were not exceeded.  A draft Royal Decree on minimum standards had been developed, which would ensure a basic level of care for migrant children, establish training for officials on migrant children’s rights and support migrants’ inclusion in communities.  There were minors who wished to be considered as adults so that they could work in the country.  Specialised prosecutors had established standard criteria for determining migrants’ age.  A draft bill would amend civil procedures to establish a formal age determination process, including the assumption that migrants were minors until proven otherwise.

    Spain worked in step with European instruments in regulating its border in national territories bordering Africa. Investigations into the cases of migrant deaths in 2022 were ongoing.

    In 2020, the criteria evaluated by judges when determining acts that glorified terrorism were revised.  In all prosecuted cases of acts of glorification of terrorism, limits on the freedom of expression had been exceeded. 

    The Organic Law on the protection of citizens’ safety was an administrative law that did not have a criminal aspect.  There had been an increase an administrative sanctions after the implementation of this law, which related to restrictions on the freedom of movement implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic.  The law was currently being revised by the parliament.

    There were women’s penitentiaries in Spain, and large prison facilities had wings that were exclusively for women.  The penitentiary administration had developed programmes that supported women after their release from prison.

    In June 2024, an agreement was reached on the appointment of magistrates to Spanish courts, which resulted in the filling of 120 vacancies. Strikes by prosecutors and judges were related to the appointment process.  Individuals could lodge complaints with oversight mechanisms regarding issues with transparency in the judiciary.  These mechanisms ensured that prosecutors and judges did not have links to political groups.  Specialised units had been established in the prosecutor’s office that were fighting public corruption, and draft laws on transparency in the public administration had been developed.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

     

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on reasons why police officers found guilty of human rights violations had not had their medals withdrawn; the treatment of people of African descent in Spain; efforts to investigate human rights violations involving migrants at the border more seriously; the number of autonomous communities involved in accommodating unaccompanied minors; efforts to standardise the process of determining minority across regions and increase the efficiency of the assessment process for minors’ asylum applications; how the State party had given effect to the national preventive mechanism’s recommendations regarding mechanical constraints; the law that determined the maximum duration of solitary confinement; the justification for the incommunicado detention regime; why the Constitutional Court had empty posts; and reforms that would be made by the forthcoming Organic Law on the judiciary.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said legal provisions were in place that allowed for the withdrawal of medals from officers who were found guilty of human rights violations.

    Tackling discrimination against people of African descent was a high priority for the State party.  It had developed policies and awareness raising campaigns that promoted the rights of this group.

    The Ministry of the Interior had moved some asylum seekers from the Canary Islands to Madrid to allow them to submit asylum applications.  Deportations to Morocco were processed in line with Spanish law.  Communities that shared a land border with Africa were saturated.  The budget for asylum processing had been significantly increased recently but was still not sufficient.  A draft bill had been developed to ensure that communities with the greatest demand were given greater priority in budgeting.  The State presumed that migrants subject to age determination procedures were minors until proven otherwise.

    Activities by undercover agents and “infiltrators” were regulated by State legislation.  They were mandated to gather information that contributed to public safety.

    There were around 300 cases in which had been necessary to use mechanical or chemical restraints between 2018 and 2025.  The use of such restraints was always filmed.

    Detainees who committed specific crimes, such as terrorist crimes or crimes related to organised crime, were subjected to the incommunicado detention regime.  Some 390 people, including 15 women, had been subjected to the regime.  There was a five-day maximum duration for such detention.

    Closing Statements

    MARCOS GÓMEZ MARTÍNEZ, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue and the quality of its questions.  The full guarantee of civil and political rights was an ongoing process.  The Committee helped the State party to guarantee these rights domestically.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said that, over the past two days, the dialogue had addressed key topics related to implementation of the Covenant. The Committee commended progress in several areas, but was concerned by issues in other areas.  It urged the State party to implement its recommendations to strengthen implementation of the Covenant.  Mr. Soh closed by thanking the delegation for its participation and all those who had contributed to the dialogue.

    ____________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CCPR25.014E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Vote on draft opinion on EU strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities – Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

    Source: European Parliament

    On 16 Jul 2025, the FEMM committee will vote on the draft opinion on EU strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities post-2024 (2025/2057(INI)) and on the question for oral answer, followed by a resolution, on Declaration of principles for a gender-equal society (2025/2780(RSP)). The Committee Members will also hold an exchange of views with Danish Minister for Gender Equality on the priorities of the Danish Presidency.

    Further, the Members will consider the draft opinion on Developing a new EU anti-poverty strategy (2025/2095(INI)).

    They will also consider draft opinion, amendments and budgetary amendments to the General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2026 – all sections.

    Finally, they will hear reporting back on the negotiations (Rule 75(3)) on Victims Rights Directive (2023/0250(COD)).

    MIL OSI Europe News –