Category: Child Poverty

MIL-OSI Africa: Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marinei Herselman, Lecturer, University of Fort Hare

The unintended consequences of measures introduced to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus from 2020 to 2022 have been studied extensively. Research in South Africa shows that some of these measures added to social ills, such as unemployment and poverty.

Another impact of “lockdown” was on gender-based violence. The government’s Gender-Based Violence Command Centre reported over 120,000 cases within the first three weeks of lockdown.

In the year 2019-20, 53,293 sexual offences were reported, an average of 146 per day. This was up from 52,420 in 2018-19. Most of these were cases of rape. The police recorded 42,289 rapes in 2019-20, up from 41,583 in 2018-19, an average of 116 rapes each day. Further, a total of 2,695 women were murdered in South Africa in 2019-20. This means a woman is murdered every three hours.

The lockdown measures required people to remain indoors. Schools and non-essential establishments like restaurants were closed. Travelling internationally and between provinces was prohibited.

Research showed that the lockdown measures trapped many women and children in abusive environments. The gender-based violence incidents highlighted gaps in support services and underscored the critical role of social workers in crisis situations.

In a recent paper, we described our study of the impact the lockdown measures had on gender-based violence in Matatiele, a small town in South Africa’s Eastern Cape, one of the poorest regions in the country.

The study highlighted the need to integrate gender-based violence support services into emergency plans to ensure continuity of care in times of crisis. In addition, the challenges faced by social workers during the pandemic showed systemic weaknesses in the support infrastructure.

Read more: South African women face exclusion from society due to gender-based violence – how they’re fighting back

We recommend prioritising gender-based violence services, expanding the social work workforce, and ensuring accessible, effective support mechanisms to safeguard survivors. By engaging local and provincial partners through cross-sector collaboration, South Africa can build a more equitable society and empower survivors during future emergencies.

Interviewing survivors of violence

Our findings were based on interviews with 30 survivors of gender-based violence and five social workers at the Thuthuzela Care Centre in Matatiele, which provides support for rape survivors. Twenty-four of the survivors (80%) were women and six (20%) were males. The participants were aged 18-35.

We found that 63.3% of survivors experienced gender-based violence differently during the pandemic, primarily because access to support services was reduced. Key findings were that:
- survivors found it difficult to reach police stations, hospitals and support centres
- a lack of transport and staffing made access to services even more difficult than usual
- survivors were often imprisoned with their abusers, making it nearly impossible to escape the abusive environment
- the closure of schools and community centres destroyed additional refuges and support networks
- social workers reported that remote counselling methods, such as telephone calls, were less effective
- poor internet connection and the inability to meet in person limited the quality of psychosocial support provided
- many perpetrators faced job losses and economic hardships; this led to increased stress and violence.
Our findings highlight how public health crises can worsen existing social vulnerabilities. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated the vulnerability of survivors during crises and the role of social workers in providing support.

Read more: Spoken word poetry challenges gender-based violence in Namibia

Women’s experiences

As shown in the table, some participants said their experiences of abuse were the same before and during COVID-19. This might be because a participant was abused during the pandemic and had not been a victim before.

Supplied by author.

Most of the research participants said their experience of gender-based violence was different from how it had been before COVID-19. Asked to explain, most of them responded in similar ways.

One of the women said:

I have difficulty escaping my abuser.

Another said:

I struggled to sleep, and I was anxious for a long time. I accepted the situation and told myself that I will be fine. I was abused by a stranger, which made it difficult for me to get justice but I told myself that abuse is something that you cannot run away from.

Lack of sleep is a common challenge for many survivors of gender-based violence.

One of the male survivors in the study, a married man, spoke of the difficulty of dealing with societal norms which are rooted in patriarchy. There’s a local saying which captures the typical attitude: indoda yokwenyani ayikhali (“a real man does not cry”).

There appeared to be a general sense that gender-based violence would not change, so women and men just accepted and normalised it.

Read more: Men abused by women don’t all fight back. Some believe a strong man is non-violent – South African study

Next steps

An effective response to gender-based violence requires sufficient staffing of response facilities. There is also a need for robust communication tools and training to handle remote support scenarios as happened during COVID.

Gender-based violence is a serious problem that needs a multi-faceted response. Governments, and non-profit, non-governmental and civil society organisations must work together. This will help in achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality. Gender equality is a fundamental human right. It is a foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. While some progress has been made in recent decades, the world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030.

To lessen the impact of future crises on survivors of gender-based violence, several steps are essential:
- the government must recognise support services as critical in emergencies; social workers must be classified as essential personnel so that they can continue their work without restrictions
- essential services such as safe shelters, mental health support and legal aid must be in place, and healthcare services must be fully available, well-equipped and well-staffed
- the government must expand and train the social worker workforce, and provide specialised training for any crisis situation in the future
- there is need to develop support channels, including online platforms, helplines and mobile outreach programmes
- investing in reliable communication technologies and transportation can help people reach support services
- long-term strategies should focus on reducing gender inequalities and challenging patriarchal norms.
Bongeka Zawani, a master’s student at the University of Fort Hare, carried out the study this article is based on.

– Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps
– https://theconversation.com/women-trapped-with-abusers-south-africas-covid-lockdowns-exposed-serious-protection-gaps-243198

MIL OSI Africa –
June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Analysis: Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Wunpini Fatimata Mohammed, Assistant Professor of Communication, Cornell University

Netflix began its Africa operations in South Africa in 2016. When the US streaming giant announced it was setting up shop in Nigeria in 2020, many west African film-makers, writers, artists and media audiences were jubilant.

Finally, west Africa’s creativity and brilliance would be formally recognised on the world stage. Netflix Naija’s purpose was to produce local content for Netflix just like Netflix South Africa and later Netflix Kenya.

Read more:
Netflix Naija: creative freedom in Nigeria’s emerging digital space?

Some film-makers have been wary of US cultural imperialism happening through the market dominance of Netflix and other US streamers. Others have rushed to the streamer to sign deals that will gain their films and TV shows a global audience.

Netflix’s interest in African stories comes with a colonial power dynamic that research and scholarship has not fully explored. As a scholar of media and communication, I recently examined the effect US streamers are having on the stories being told in films in Nigeria and Ghana.

In my study, I argue that despite the growing global interest in African pop culture, African creative workers need to be careful about interest from global conglomerates. We can’t talk about African cinemas going global without paying attention to how Hollywood’s colonial relationship with Africa has shaped and influenced what African filmmakers believe will sell globally.

Read more:
Black Panther, Wakanda Forever and the problem with Hollywood – an African perspective

What price is being paid to appeal to global audiences? Film-makers might focus so much on the western gaze that they lose focus on telling African stories authentically and respectfully.

In my study, I analyse various films including the Ghanaian film Azali and the Nigerian movie Lionheart to argue that that’s exactly what’s happening.

Dancing to the tune of the west

Despite the existence of thriving African film and TV industries before the advent of streaming technologies, we are seeing a replication of what I call the everydayness of colonialism in the area of media representations of the continent.

Here, African filmmakers and producers find themselves jumping through hoops to tell stories that are “fit” to be streamed to Netflix’s millions of American, European and global subscribers. Global cosmopolitan audiences are prioritised over African audiences.

Read more:
Woman King is set in Benin but filmed in South Africa – in the process it erases real people’s struggles

African audiences at home and in the diaspora are the reason we have vibrant film industries such as Nollywood to begin with.

This displacement of African audiences happens both in representation and in access.

Most African movie audiences do not have access to Netflix and other streaming platforms due to the digital divide and the cost of subscribing. So the target audience shifts to the elite, both African and global, who can afford to stream.

Azali and Lionheart

Ghana and Nigeria’s film industries were developed by artists who wanted to reflect their societies to their communities. I found that with Netflix’s arrival, there is a danger of disrupting and undoing this important work.

The intervention of US streamers has led to the development of glossier versions of Africa. They are universal enough to be consumed by anyone, anywhere in the world, even if it means sacrificing the integrity of stories to achieve this global appeal.

In Azali, for example, I found that the film sacrificed authentic language and geographical accuracy to tell a story for a western audience.

Azali explores the themes of child marriage, child-trafficking and rural-urban migration in Ghana. Here, a film about the Dagbamba was set in the town of Zebilla, where Dagbanli is not the dominant language. The film cast non-Dagbanli speakers in major roles to speak a language they neither understood nor had any proficiency in. If Dagbamba had been centred as the primary audience of the movie, this cultural indignity might not have happened.

Lionheart, though star-studded, departed from traditional Nollywood narrative conventions. The film tells the story of a wealthy Nigerian family and the quest of a young woman to take control of the family business. The movie had high production values and told a story that would be considered universally relatable. However, it was disqualified in its bid for an Oscar nomination in the Best International Feature Film category because of its majority English dialogue. Despite appealing to Netflix in the area of production quality and storyline, African film-makers were still punished by the Academy.

Nigeria and Ghana’s film industries have traditionally told a wide variety of African stories. Netflix’s arrival is reducing African stories to stories about the elite and for the global cosmopolitan elite.

Stories about the majority of Africans are being erased. Africa becomes a backdrop to tell stories about the elite class.

In my study, I argue that narrative construction is an important part of identity and that when external factors begin to determine how African stories are told, it distorts the image of Africa for Africans and raises questions of cultural sovereignty.

Moving forward

It is refreshing to see African cultures appreciated on a global scale. But this shouldn’t erase narratives about the African masses and working communities.

There are film-makers that are resisting the Netflix canon. Nigerian actress and producer Funke Akindele shows that this is possible in A Tribe Called Judah. Her film set a new box office record in Nigeria by avoiding direct to Netflix/streamer distribution and staying true to African audiences. The film tells the story of how a single mother and her five sons navigate poverty in Lagos. It was later licensed to stream on Amazon Prime Video after it made history at the box office in Nigeria.

Other film-makers like Omoni Oboli, whose approach centres the Nigerian masses, has turned to YouTube. She tells Nigerian stories while resisting the exploitation that can often come with signing a Netflix deal.

Read more:
The unique strategy Netflix deployed to reach 90 million worldwide subscribers

These projects offer an alternative. As Netflix expands, African creative workers and cultural policymakers must protect the narrative integrity of African stories and resist the economic exploitation of African film-makers. Productions can capture the nuances of African stories while representing African languages and cultures with respect and dignity – without selling out to western values.

Wunpini Fatimata Mohammed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high – https://theconversation.com/netflix-gives-african-film-a-platform-but-the-cultural-price-is-high-259252

MIL OSI Analysis –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Analysis: Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Wunpini Fatimata Mohammed, Assistant Professor of Communication, Cornell University

Netflix began its Africa operations in South Africa in 2016. When the US streaming giant announced it was setting up shop in Nigeria in 2020, many west African film-makers, writers, artists and media audiences were jubilant.

Finally, west Africa’s creativity and brilliance would be formally recognised on the world stage. Netflix Naija’s purpose was to produce local content for Netflix just like Netflix South Africa and later Netflix Kenya.

Read more:
Netflix Naija: creative freedom in Nigeria’s emerging digital space?

Some film-makers have been wary of US cultural imperialism happening through the market dominance of Netflix and other US streamers. Others have rushed to the streamer to sign deals that will gain their films and TV shows a global audience.

Netflix’s interest in African stories comes with a colonial power dynamic that research and scholarship has not fully explored. As a scholar of media and communication, I recently examined the effect US streamers are having on the stories being told in films in Nigeria and Ghana.

In my study, I argue that despite the growing global interest in African pop culture, African creative workers need to be careful about interest from global conglomerates. We can’t talk about African cinemas going global without paying attention to how Hollywood’s colonial relationship with Africa has shaped and influenced what African filmmakers believe will sell globally.

Read more:
Black Panther, Wakanda Forever and the problem with Hollywood – an African perspective

What price is being paid to appeal to global audiences? Film-makers might focus so much on the western gaze that they lose focus on telling African stories authentically and respectfully.

In my study, I analyse various films including the Ghanaian film Azali and the Nigerian movie Lionheart to argue that that’s exactly what’s happening.

Dancing to the tune of the west

Despite the existence of thriving African film and TV industries before the advent of streaming technologies, we are seeing a replication of what I call the everydayness of colonialism in the area of media representations of the continent.

Here, African filmmakers and producers find themselves jumping through hoops to tell stories that are “fit” to be streamed to Netflix’s millions of American, European and global subscribers. Global cosmopolitan audiences are prioritised over African audiences.

Read more:
Woman King is set in Benin but filmed in South Africa – in the process it erases real people’s struggles

African audiences at home and in the diaspora are the reason we have vibrant film industries such as Nollywood to begin with.

This displacement of African audiences happens both in representation and in access.

Most African movie audiences do not have access to Netflix and other streaming platforms due to the digital divide and the cost of subscribing. So the target audience shifts to the elite, both African and global, who can afford to stream.

Azali and Lionheart

Ghana and Nigeria’s film industries were developed by artists who wanted to reflect their societies to their communities. I found that with Netflix’s arrival, there is a danger of disrupting and undoing this important work.

The intervention of US streamers has led to the development of glossier versions of Africa. They are universal enough to be consumed by anyone, anywhere in the world, even if it means sacrificing the integrity of stories to achieve this global appeal.

In Azali, for example, I found that the film sacrificed authentic language and geographical accuracy to tell a story for a western audience.

Azali explores the themes of child marriage, child-trafficking and rural-urban migration in Ghana. Here, a film about the Dagbamba was set in the town of Zebilla, where Dagbanli is not the dominant language. The film cast non-Dagbanli speakers in major roles to speak a language they neither understood nor had any proficiency in. If Dagbamba had been centred as the primary audience of the movie, this cultural indignity might not have happened.

Lionheart, though star-studded, departed from traditional Nollywood narrative conventions. The film tells the story of a wealthy Nigerian family and the quest of a young woman to take control of the family business. The movie had high production values and told a story that would be considered universally relatable. However, it was disqualified in its bid for an Oscar nomination in the Best International Feature Film category because of its majority English dialogue. Despite appealing to Netflix in the area of production quality and storyline, African film-makers were still punished by the Academy.

Nigeria and Ghana’s film industries have traditionally told a wide variety of African stories. Netflix’s arrival is reducing African stories to stories about the elite and for the global cosmopolitan elite.

Stories about the majority of Africans are being erased. Africa becomes a backdrop to tell stories about the elite class.

In my study, I argue that narrative construction is an important part of identity and that when external factors begin to determine how African stories are told, it distorts the image of Africa for Africans and raises questions of cultural sovereignty.

Moving forward

It is refreshing to see African cultures appreciated on a global scale. But this shouldn’t erase narratives about the African masses and working communities.

There are film-makers that are resisting the Netflix canon. Nigerian actress and producer Funke Akindele shows that this is possible in A Tribe Called Judah. Her film set a new box office record in Nigeria by avoiding direct to Netflix/streamer distribution and staying true to African audiences. The film tells the story of how a single mother and her five sons navigate poverty in Lagos. It was later licensed to stream on Amazon Prime Video after it made history at the box office in Nigeria.

Other film-makers like Omoni Oboli, whose approach centres the Nigerian masses, has turned to YouTube. She tells Nigerian stories while resisting the exploitation that can often come with signing a Netflix deal.

Read more:
The unique strategy Netflix deployed to reach 90 million worldwide subscribers

These projects offer an alternative. As Netflix expands, African creative workers and cultural policymakers must protect the narrative integrity of African stories and resist the economic exploitation of African film-makers. Productions can capture the nuances of African stories while representing African languages and cultures with respect and dignity – without selling out to western values.

Wunpini Fatimata Mohammed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high – https://theconversation.com/netflix-gives-african-film-a-platform-but-the-cultural-price-is-high-259252

MIL OSI Analysis –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Analysis: Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marinei Herselman, Lecturer, University of Fort Hare

The unintended consequences of measures introduced to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus from 2020 to 2022 have been studied extensively. Research in South Africa shows that some of these measures added to social ills, such as unemployment and poverty.

Another impact of “lockdown” was on gender-based violence. The government’s Gender-Based Violence Command Centre reported over 120,000 cases within the first three weeks of lockdown.

In the year 2019-20, 53,293 sexual offences were reported, an average of 146 per day. This was up from 52,420 in 2018-19. Most of these were cases of rape. The police recorded 42,289 rapes in 2019-20, up from 41,583 in 2018-19, an average of 116 rapes each day. Further, a total of 2,695 women were murdered in South Africa in 2019-20. This means a woman is murdered every three hours.

The lockdown measures required people to remain indoors. Schools and non-essential establishments like restaurants were closed. Travelling internationally and between provinces was prohibited.

Research showed that the lockdown measures trapped many women and children in abusive environments. The gender-based violence incidents highlighted gaps in support services and underscored the critical role of social workers in crisis situations.

In a recent paper, we described our study of the impact the lockdown measures had on gender-based violence in Matatiele, a small town in South Africa’s Eastern Cape, one of the poorest regions in the country.

The study highlighted the need to integrate gender-based violence support services into emergency plans to ensure continuity of care in times of crisis. In addition, the challenges faced by social workers during the pandemic showed systemic weaknesses in the support infrastructure.

Read more:
South African women face exclusion from society due to gender-based violence – how they’re fighting back

We recommend prioritising gender-based violence services, expanding the social work workforce, and ensuring accessible, effective support mechanisms to safeguard survivors. By engaging local and provincial partners through cross-sector collaboration, South Africa can build a more equitable society and empower survivors during future emergencies.

Interviewing survivors of violence

Our findings were based on interviews with 30 survivors of gender-based violence and five social workers at the Thuthuzela Care Centre in Matatiele, which provides support for rape survivors. Twenty-four of the survivors (80%) were women and six (20%) were males. The participants were aged 18-35.

We found that 63.3% of survivors experienced gender-based violence differently during the pandemic, primarily because access to support services was reduced. Key findings were that:
- survivors found it difficult to reach police stations, hospitals and support centres
- a lack of transport and staffing made access to services even more difficult than usual
- survivors were often imprisoned with their abusers, making it nearly impossible to escape the abusive environment
- the closure of schools and community centres destroyed additional refuges and support networks
- social workers reported that remote counselling methods, such as telephone calls, were less effective
- poor internet connection and the inability to meet in person limited the quality of psychosocial support provided
- many perpetrators faced job losses and economic hardships; this led to increased stress and violence.
Our findings highlight how public health crises can worsen existing social vulnerabilities. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated the vulnerability of survivors during crises and the role of social workers in providing support.

Read more:
Spoken word poetry challenges gender-based violence in Namibia

Women’s experiences

As shown in the table, some participants said their experiences of abuse were the same before and during COVID-19. This might be because a participant was abused during the pandemic and had not been a victim before.

Most of the research participants said their experience of gender-based violence was different from how it had been before COVID-19. Asked to explain, most of them responded in similar ways.

One of the women said:

I have difficulty escaping my abuser.

Another said:

I struggled to sleep, and I was anxious for a long time. I accepted the situation and told myself that I will be fine. I was abused by a stranger, which made it difficult for me to get justice but I told myself that abuse is something that you cannot run away from.

Lack of sleep is a common challenge for many survivors of gender-based violence.

One of the male survivors in the study, a married man, spoke of the difficulty of dealing with societal norms which are rooted in patriarchy. There’s a local saying which captures the typical attitude: indoda yokwenyani ayikhali (“a real man does not cry”).

There appeared to be a general sense that gender-based violence would not change, so women and men just accepted and normalised it.

Read more:
Men abused by women don’t all fight back. Some believe a strong man is non-violent – South African study

Next steps

An effective response to gender-based violence requires sufficient staffing of response facilities. There is also a need for robust communication tools and training to handle remote support scenarios as happened during COVID.

Gender-based violence is a serious problem that needs a multi-faceted response. Governments, and non-profit, non-governmental and
civil society organisations must work together. This will help in achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality. Gender equality is a fundamental human right. It is a foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. While some progress has been made in recent decades, the world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030.

To lessen the impact of future crises on survivors of gender-based violence, several steps are essential:
- the government must recognise support services as critical in emergencies; social workers must be classified as essential personnel so that they can continue their work without restrictions
- essential services such as safe shelters, mental health support and legal aid must be in place, and healthcare services must be fully available, well-equipped and well-staffed
- the government must expand and train the social worker workforce, and provide specialised training for any crisis situation in the future
- there is need to develop support channels, including online platforms, helplines and mobile outreach programmes
- investing in reliable communication technologies and transportation can help people reach support services
- long-term strategies should focus on reducing gender inequalities and challenging patriarchal norms.
Bongeka Zawani, a master’s student at the University of Fort Hare, carried out the study this article is based on.

Marinei Herselman and Bongeka Zwani received funding from the University of Fort Hare GMRDC for this study.

– ref. Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps – https://theconversation.com/women-trapped-with-abusers-south-africas-covid-lockdowns-exposed-serious-protection-gaps-243198
MIL OSI Analysis –
June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Analysis: Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has raged since April 2023. It’s turned Sudan into the site of one of the world’s most catastrophic humanitarian and displacement crises.

At least 150,000 people have been killed. More than 14 million have been displaced, with over 3 million fleeing to neighbouring countries like Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Once a vibrant capital city, Khartoum is now a “burnt-out shell”.

This devastating war, rooted in long-standing ethnic, political and economic tensions, has been compounded by what international and regional actors have done and failed to do. As Amnesty International notes, the international response remains “woefully inadequate”.

The problem lies in the fact that external involvement has not been neutral. Instead of halting the conflict, many external players have complicated it. In some cases, international interventions have escalated it.

More than 10 countries across Africa, the Middle East and Asia have been drawn into Sudan’s war. This has turned it into a proxy conflict that reflects the interests of external actors, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Several actors have taken sides.

Saudi Arabia, for instance, backs the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is alleged to support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Egypt, citing historical ties, backs the army. For their part, Ethiopia and Eritrea reportedly support the paramilitary group. Chad has been accused of facilitating arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces via its eastern airports. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have also been linked to diplomatic and military support to Sudan’s army.

These geopolitical entanglements have made peace nearly impossible, deepening the conflict instead of resolving it.

I have studied Africa’s governance failures for more than 30 years, from military elites and coups to state capture and political instability. Based on this, my view is that Sudan’s conflict cannot be resolved without serious international commitment to neutrality and peace.

Read more:
Sudan’s peace mediation should be led by the African Union: 3 reasons why

The involvement of foreign actors on opposing sides must be reversed. International involvement must be premised on helping the Sudanese people develop the capacity to resolve governance problems themselves.

For this to happen, regional diplomacy must be stepped up. The African Union must assert its legitimacy and take the lead in addressing this challenging crisis. It can do this by putting pressure on member states to ensure that any ceasefire agreements are enforced.

The East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development can provide assistance in securing a peace agreement and ensuring it’s enforced. Members of these continental organisations can encourage external actors to limit their intervention in Sudan to activities that promote democratic governance and sustainable development.

The African Union

The African Union should play a central role in bringing peace to Sudan. But its absence has been conspicuous.

Despite adopting the “African solutions to African problems” mantra, the African Union has neither held Sudan’s warlords accountable nor put in place adequate civilian protection measures.

First, it could have worked closely with the UN to deploy a mission to Sudan with a mandate to protect civilians, monitor human rights (especially the rights of women and girls), assist in the return of all displaced persons and prevent any further attacks on civilians.

Second, the African Union could have sent an expert group to investigate human rights violations, especially sexual violence. The results could have been submitted to the union’s Peace and Security Council for further action.

Third, the African Union could have worked closely with regional and international actors, including the Arab League. This would ensure a unified approach to the conflict, based on the interests of Sudanese people for peace and development.

Finally, the AU could have addressed the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts, which include extreme poverty, inequality, political exclusion and economic marginalisation.

The African Union could also make use of the insights and knowledge gleaned by African leaders like Kenya’s William Ruto and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who have attempted to mediate, but have failed. The AU should also use the political expertise of elder statesmen, such as Thabo Mbeki, Moussa Faki and Olusegun Obasanjo, to help address the conflict and humanitarian crisis.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is alleged to back the paramilitary troops in the war. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly involved in African conflicts. It has supported various factions to conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and Libya.

Its increased involvement in Africa is driven by several strategic interests. These include fighting terrorism, securing maritime routes, and expanding its trade and influence.

Read more:
Sudan is burning and foreign powers are benefiting – what’s in it for the UAE

In 2009, the UAE helped Sudan mediate its border conflict with Chad. The UAE supported the ouster of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, as well as Sudan’s transitional military council.

In 2021, the UAE signed a strategic partnership with Sudan to modernise its political institutions and return the country to the international community. The UAE has stated that it has taken a neutral position in the present conflict. However, on 6 March 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE to the International Court of Justice. It accused the UAE of complicity in genocide, alleging that the UAE “has been arming the RSF with the aim of wiping out the non-Arab Massalit population of West Darfur.”

The United States

During his first term, US president Donald Trump spearheaded the Abraham Accords. These agreements were aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including Sudan. Subsequently, Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The accords appeared to have brought Khartoum closer to Washington. They provided avenues for the type of engagement that could have placed it in good stead when Trump returned to the White House in 2025.

However, Sudan’s internal political and economic instability, including the present civil war, has complicated the situation.

The Abraham Accords were a significant foreign policy achievement for Trump. A peaceful, democratically governed, and economically stable and prosperous Sudan could serve as the foundation for Trump’s “circle of peace” in the Middle East.

But Trump and his administration are preoccupied with other domestic and foreign policy priorities. During his May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump did not officially address the conflict in Sudan. Instead, he placed emphasis on securing business deals and investments.

The European Union

The European Union has strongly condemned the violence and the atrocities committed during the war in Sudan, especially against children and women. The organisation has appealed for an immediate and lasting ceasefire while noting that Sudan faces the “most catastrophic humanitarian crisis of the 21st century”.

Unfortunately, member countries will remain preoccupied with helping Ukraine, especially given the growing uncertainty in Washington’s relationship with the authorities in Kyiv.

The preoccupation and focus of the EU and the US on Gaza, Ukraine and Iran may, however, be underestimating the geopolitical risks Sudan’s war is generating.

A peaceful and democratically governed Sudan can contribute to peace not just in the region, but also in many other parts of the world.

What now?

To end Sudan’s war and prevent future ones, international and African actors must do more than issue statements. They must act coherently, collectively and with genuine commitment to the Sudanese people’s right to peace, democratic governance and sustainable development.

Democracy and the rule of law are key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in Sudan. However, establishing and sustaining institutions that enhance and support democracy is the job of the Sudanese people. The external community can provide the financial support that Sudan is likely to need. It can also support the strengthening of electoral systems, civic education and citizen trust in public institutions.

John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them – https://theconversation.com/sudan-foreign-interests-are-deepening-a-devastating-war-only-regional-diplomacy-can-stop-them-259824

MIL OSI Analysis –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Analysis: Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has raged since April 2023. It’s turned Sudan into the site of one of the world’s most catastrophic humanitarian and displacement crises.

At least 150,000 people have been killed. More than 14 million have been displaced, with over 3 million fleeing to neighbouring countries like Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Once a vibrant capital city, Khartoum is now a “burnt-out shell”.

This devastating war, rooted in long-standing ethnic, political and economic tensions, has been compounded by what international and regional actors have done and failed to do. As Amnesty International notes, the international response remains “woefully inadequate”.

The problem lies in the fact that external involvement has not been neutral. Instead of halting the conflict, many external players have complicated it. In some cases, international interventions have escalated it.

More than 10 countries across Africa, the Middle East and Asia have been drawn into Sudan’s war. This has turned it into a proxy conflict that reflects the interests of external actors, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Several actors have taken sides.

Saudi Arabia, for instance, backs the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is alleged to support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Egypt, citing historical ties, backs the army. For their part, Ethiopia and Eritrea reportedly support the paramilitary group. Chad has been accused of facilitating arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces via its eastern airports. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have also been linked to diplomatic and military support to Sudan’s army.

These geopolitical entanglements have made peace nearly impossible, deepening the conflict instead of resolving it.

I have studied Africa’s governance failures for more than 30 years, from military elites and coups to state capture and political instability. Based on this, my view is that Sudan’s conflict cannot be resolved without serious international commitment to neutrality and peace.

Read more:
Sudan’s peace mediation should be led by the African Union: 3 reasons why

The involvement of foreign actors on opposing sides must be reversed. International involvement must be premised on helping the Sudanese people develop the capacity to resolve governance problems themselves.

For this to happen, regional diplomacy must be stepped up. The African Union must assert its legitimacy and take the lead in addressing this challenging crisis. It can do this by putting pressure on member states to ensure that any ceasefire agreements are enforced.

The East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development can provide assistance in securing a peace agreement and ensuring it’s enforced. Members of these continental organisations can encourage external actors to limit their intervention in Sudan to activities that promote democratic governance and sustainable development.

The African Union

The African Union should play a central role in bringing peace to Sudan. But its absence has been conspicuous.

Despite adopting the “African solutions to African problems” mantra, the African Union has neither held Sudan’s warlords accountable nor put in place adequate civilian protection measures.

First, it could have worked closely with the UN to deploy a mission to Sudan with a mandate to protect civilians, monitor human rights (especially the rights of women and girls), assist in the return of all displaced persons and prevent any further attacks on civilians.

Second, the African Union could have sent an expert group to investigate human rights violations, especially sexual violence. The results could have been submitted to the union’s Peace and Security Council for further action.

Third, the African Union could have worked closely with regional and international actors, including the Arab League. This would ensure a unified approach to the conflict, based on the interests of Sudanese people for peace and development.

Finally, the AU could have addressed the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts, which include extreme poverty, inequality, political exclusion and economic marginalisation.

The African Union could also make use of the insights and knowledge gleaned by African leaders like Kenya’s William Ruto and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who have attempted to mediate, but have failed. The AU should also use the political expertise of elder statesmen, such as Thabo Mbeki, Moussa Faki and Olusegun Obasanjo, to help address the conflict and humanitarian crisis.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is alleged to back the paramilitary troops in the war. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly involved in African conflicts. It has supported various factions to conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and Libya.

Its increased involvement in Africa is driven by several strategic interests. These include fighting terrorism, securing maritime routes, and expanding its trade and influence.

Read more:
Sudan is burning and foreign powers are benefiting – what’s in it for the UAE

In 2009, the UAE helped Sudan mediate its border conflict with Chad. The UAE supported the ouster of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, as well as Sudan’s transitional military council.

In 2021, the UAE signed a strategic partnership with Sudan to modernise its political institutions and return the country to the international community. The UAE has stated that it has taken a neutral position in the present conflict. However, on 6 March 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE to the International Court of Justice. It accused the UAE of complicity in genocide, alleging that the UAE “has been arming the RSF with the aim of wiping out the non-Arab Massalit population of West Darfur.”

The United States

During his first term, US president Donald Trump spearheaded the Abraham Accords. These agreements were aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including Sudan. Subsequently, Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The accords appeared to have brought Khartoum closer to Washington. They provided avenues for the type of engagement that could have placed it in good stead when Trump returned to the White House in 2025.

However, Sudan’s internal political and economic instability, including the present civil war, has complicated the situation.

The Abraham Accords were a significant foreign policy achievement for Trump. A peaceful, democratically governed, and economically stable and prosperous Sudan could serve as the foundation for Trump’s “circle of peace” in the Middle East.

But Trump and his administration are preoccupied with other domestic and foreign policy priorities. During his May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump did not officially address the conflict in Sudan. Instead, he placed emphasis on securing business deals and investments.

The European Union

The European Union has strongly condemned the violence and the atrocities committed during the war in Sudan, especially against children and women. The organisation has appealed for an immediate and lasting ceasefire while noting that Sudan faces the “most catastrophic humanitarian crisis of the 21st century”.

Unfortunately, member countries will remain preoccupied with helping Ukraine, especially given the growing uncertainty in Washington’s relationship with the authorities in Kyiv.

The preoccupation and focus of the EU and the US on Gaza, Ukraine and Iran may, however, be underestimating the geopolitical risks Sudan’s war is generating.

A peaceful and democratically governed Sudan can contribute to peace not just in the region, but also in many other parts of the world.

What now?

To end Sudan’s war and prevent future ones, international and African actors must do more than issue statements. They must act coherently, collectively and with genuine commitment to the Sudanese people’s right to peace, democratic governance and sustainable development.

Democracy and the rule of law are key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in Sudan. However, establishing and sustaining institutions that enhance and support democracy is the job of the Sudanese people. The external community can provide the financial support that Sudan is likely to need. It can also support the strengthening of electoral systems, civic education and citizen trust in public institutions.

John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them – https://theconversation.com/sudan-foreign-interests-are-deepening-a-devastating-war-only-regional-diplomacy-can-stop-them-259824

MIL OSI Analysis –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: European rural areas face higher levels of energy poverty

Source: European Union 2

Around 48 million Europeans are unable to keep their homes warm, according to a new report. Rural areas in the EU experience higher levels of energy poverty, especially in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. However, rural areas are ahead of cities in carrying out energy efficiency improvements.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: European rural areas face higher levels of energy poverty

Source: European Union 2

Around 48 million Europeans are unable to keep their homes warm, according to a new report. Rural areas in the EU experience higher levels of energy poverty, especially in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. However, rural areas are ahead of cities in carrying out energy efficiency improvements.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Banking: Samsung in Partnership with CUT Host Graduation Ceremony for 2nd Cohort

Source: Samsung

Samsung in mphopartnership with the Central University of Technology (CUT) recently hosted a graduation ceremony where certificates were awarded to 21 students from the 2nd cohort that have successfully completed studies in AI in the prestigious Samsung Innovation Campus (SIC) programme.
At this year’s graduation, the SIC partnership with CUT is also celebrating the fact that 16 out of the 21 students have already secured employment, while five (5) of these graduates have opted to further their studies. This is a key milestone in this partnership and a confirmation of how this SIC programme has successfully managed to fulfil its main objectives of addressing South Africa’s youth unemployment and the critical skills gap in technology and innovation.
Since November 2022, when the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed by Samsung and CUT – this SIC programme has been able to equip an overall group of 71 enthusiastic, young participants with in-demand skills in 4IR including Artificial Intelligence (AI), as well as Coding and Programming (C&P). This second cohort of CUT students that is now graduating with skills in AI; were also part of the cohort that completed Coding and Programming in Python. The programme has been structured in such a way that it includes theoretical learning, practical sessions and capstone projects.
These essential skills that these CUT students have acquired have not only prepared them for the demands of the modern tech industry but have also turned them into a group of eligible young professionals – able to secure permanent employment in the local market. This global SIC programme is in line with the country’s transformation goals outlined in the National Development Plan, the long-term strategic plan for South Africa’s future which aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030.
Professor Wendy Setlalentoa, CUT acting Deputy Vice Chancellor: Research, Innovation and Engagement said: “We are grateful to Samsung for choosing to partner with our institution and for helping us to make a lasting difference in the lives of young people in South Africa. This partnership is a perfect example of a well-functioning and mutually beneficial Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with tangible examples of how to address youth unemployment and skills development.

“In the last few years, our institution has had the opportunity to play a crucial role in providing the curriculum and training for students in 4IR skills and focus on developing practical skills that have helped prepare our graduates for future careers in innovation and technology space,” added Prof. Setlalentoa.
CUT’s Centre for Innovation in Learning and Teaching (CILT) has also supported the SIC programme by creating an enabling education environment and improving the quality of teaching and learning. Also, CUT students that participated in the SIC programme have now developed stronger problem-solving skills, which are crucial for both career advancement and entrepreneurial pursuits.
And furthermore, the institution’s broader emphasis on work-integrated learning and industry exposure has allowed CUT to play an instrumental role in securing jobs for students participating in the SIC programme, primarily through its Careers Office and other key industry partners. Some of the partners who are employers to these employed graduates and their primary activities include: Capacity – Full stack developer in Python; BoxFusion – Junior Data Analyst and Junior Software Engineer respectively; Vodacom – Software Architect; BitCube – Junior Software Developer Associate and Standard Bank – Junior Software Engineer.
One of the top performing students in the graduating cohort, Mpho Macdonald Ramaisa said: “I am overjoyed and exceptionally grateful to have been part of the SIC programme. The programme has equipped me with critical skills, particularly in the tech field and these, have now boosted my confidence in my abilities, given me a clearer career direction and enhanced my innovative thinking skills.

“The majority of us have already secured jobs and this alone, has given us a sense of purpose and accomplishment. For us, access to these in-demand tech skills needed by our local economy and the employment opportunities that we have secured – means that we will be able to create better opportunities for ourselves and our families,” Ramaisa.
The partnership between Samsung and CUT has also seen success in the increase of female representation in the SIC programme as well as in ensuring that graduates have better opportunities in the job market or entrepreneurship space. The gender split in this graduating cohort is as follows: 52% female representation.
Lefa Makgato, Corporate Social Responsibility Manager for Samsung Electronics in Southern Africa said: “We are very proud of what this partnership has achieved since inception; and how well its accomplishments align with the country’s vision 2030 goals.

Importantly, this collaboration with CUT has also ensured that these students are now equipped with skills to contribute to the digital economy. But most importantly, in conjunction with CUT – we have now been able to accomplish Samsung’s education vision which centres around fostering future technological leaders and ICT entrepreneurs by providing accessible and engaging learning experiences that integrate technology and real-world application.”

MIL OSI Global Banks –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Chinese state councilor stresses bolstering employment, boosting consumption

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

CHANGSHA, June 26 — Chinese State Councilor Shen Yiqin has called for efforts to stabilize the employment of key groups such as college graduates and further boost culture, tourism and sports-related consumption.

Shen made the remarks during an inspection tour in central China’s Hunan Province from Monday to Thursday.

Shen urged placing greater importance on employment, and called for supportive measures to strengthen the job opportunities for key groups including college graduates, migrant workers and those who have shaken off poverty.

Enterprises should receive more support to aid in the creation of more job opportunities, said Shen, who called for the launch of large-scale vocational training programs in key sectors to improve labor force skills.

Shen also called for efforts to continue increasing the supply of high-quality products and services, and to accelerate the integration of culture, tourism and sports with science and technology, to better meet people’s growing demand.

MIL OSI China News –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Welfare vote a test of ‘moral backbone’ for Scottish Labour

Source: Scottish Greens

26 Jun 2025 Equality

Scottish Greens call on Labour MPs to vote against Starmer’s Welfare Bill

More in Equality

An upcoming vote on social security cuts at Westminster will be a test of Scottish Labour’s moral backbone, says Scottish Green’s social justice spokesperson Maggie Chapman.

Next Tuesday, Westminster is due to vote on the controversial changes to social security, which would see financial support for disabled people slashed in an effort to save £5 billion from the UK Government’s welfare bill.

A number of Labour MPs have now supported an amendment to reject the Bill outright, warning that the proposals lack consultation, ignore any real impact assessment, and will deepen inequality. However, the vast majority of Scottish MPs have not signed up.

The Government’s own impact assessment stated that these proposals could push up to 250,000 people, including 50,000 children, into poverty. Recent research from the Trussell Trust states that 300,000 Scots could lose £500 a year in crucial disability support payments if the cuts are voted through.

The Scottish Greens are urging all Scottish Labour MPs and MSPs to clearly oppose the dangerous cuts to social security, and oppose this new wave of austerity inflicted on Scotland.

Commenting, Maggie said:

“It’s clear to anyone who’s looking that the brutal welfare cuts put forward by Labour at Westminster will push disabled folk across the UK into poverty. The Government’s own assessment of the proposals tells us that.

“Supporting these turbo-charged austerity measures – while the evidence of the harms they will cause is so painfully obvious – is completely inexcusable. This is not leadership, it is cowardice and cruelty dressed up as pragmatism.

“Next week’s vote will be a crucial moral test for all Scottish Labour politicians. Will they choose to back a Prime Minister who is once again ploughing ahead with deeply unpopular and harmful cuts to our communities, or will they do the right thing and stand up for their constituents in Scotland?

“There is no excuse for silence here in Holyrood or Westminster. Now is the time to show solidarity and moral leadership – not to hide behind party lines.

“The public deserves better than a Labour Party that promises change but delivers cuts.”

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Audience of the Holy Father with Redemptorist and Scalabrinian Bishops

Source: The Holy See

Audience of the Holy Father with Redemptorist and Scalabrinian Bishops, 26.06.2025
This morning, in the Consistory Hall of the Apostolic Palace, the Holy Father Leo XIV received in audience the Redemptorist and Scalabrinian bishops, to whom he delivered the following address:

Address of the Holy Father
In the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.
Peace be with you!
Your Eminences, Your Excellencies,
Reverend Superiors,
I am happy about this meeting, and find the occasion that generates it beautiful: the choice of two Religious Congregations to meet and dialogue with those brethren whose episcopal ministry they have given to the Church. This is an exchange that certainly enriches the Bishops present, your Communities and the entire People of God, as the Second Vatican Council teaches (cf. Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium, 7; Congregation for Religious and Secular Institutes – Congregation for Bishops, Directives for the Mutual Relations Between Bishops and Religious in the Church, 2).
The Church is grateful to your Institutes, of whom it has asked, with the appointment of bishops among its members, a not inconsiderable sacrifice in times of a shortage of religious brothers, when depriving you of confrères engaged in the service of various works entails not a few problems. Perhaps the General will say something to me, but… [laughter]. At the same time, though, it has given a great gift to your Congregations, because service to the universal Church is the most beautiful grace and joy for any religious family, as your Founders would certainly confirm.
You in particular, Scalabrinian and Redemptorist religious, chosen and consecrated for service to the Episcopate and also to the Cardinals, bring into your ministry the legacy of two important charisms, especially in our days: service to migrants and the evangelization of the poor and the distant.
Saint Alphonsus Maria de’ Liguori, entering into contact with the poverty of the most neglected neighbourhoods of Naples in the eighteenth century, renounced a wealthy life and a lucrative career, embracing the mission of bringing the Gospel to the last.
Saint John Baptist Scalabrini, a century later, was able to feel and understand the hopes and sufferings of the many people who left, leaving everything behind, in search of a better future for themselves and their families in faraway lands.
Both of them were Founders, became bishops, and knew how to respond to the challenges of social and economic systems which on the one hand opened new frontiers at various levels, but on the other left behind a great deal of unheeded misery and many problems, creating pockets of degradation that no one seemed to want to deal with.
At a historic moment that also presents great opportunities and at the same time no shortage of difficulties and contradictions, by celebrating the Jubilee of hope we want to recall that, today as yesterday, the voice to listen to in order to understand what to do is that of “the love of God … poured out into our hearts through the holy Spirit that has been given to us” (Rm 5:5).
Even in our world, the Lord’s work always goes before us: we are required to conform our minds and hearts to it through wise discernment, and I am convinced that the discussion you have promoted will be very useful to this end. I encourage you, therefore, to maintain and to nurture, also for the future, these relations of fraternal help, with generosity and selflessness, for the good of all Christ’s flock. I thank you for the great work you do, and I bless you heartily, together with all your communities. Thank you!
[Prayer: Pater Noster]
[Blessing]

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Tax Justice Aotearoa welcomes IRD discussion document on tax reform

Source: Tax Justice Aotearoa

Tax Justice Aotearoa has welcomed the release of Inland Revenue’s draft Long Term Insight Briefing, which looks at the possible future directions for New Zealand’s tax system.

The discussion document suggests a stable core structure of main bases that “comprehensively taxes the factors that are sought to be taxed”, coupled with the ability to “change rates on main bases to change the level of revenue.”

“We welcome the release of the draft LTIB as a useful contribution to the debate about what kind of tax system we want for the future,” says Glenn Barclay, Chair of Tax Justice Aotearoa.

“Tax has become a hot topic and this document demonstrates some of the challenges we face.”

“We look forward to hearing more from the IR officials and giving the public the opportunity to question their thinking at our upcoming briefing event*,” says Glenn Barclay. “This is part of the consultation process so everyone who would like to make a submission on the LTIB should come along.”

The LTIB notes the fiscal challenge we face as a country as expenditure increases, largely as a result of an ageing population.

“Tax Justice Aotearoa agrees with this observation but an ageing population is just one of the many problems we have stored up for ourselves by failing to invest in both social and physical infrastructure – the challenges of poverty and inequality, as well as climate change adaptation and mitigation also come to mind”, says Glenn Barclay.

The LTIB also demonstrates that New Zealand is an outlier in the extent to which it relies on tax revenue from labour income and GST and that we under tax capital income.

“These are the taxes that impact most on working people and the poor,” says Glenn Barclay.

“We need to address this imbalance by ensuring those who can afford to pay more are required to do so, and also that the regressive nature of GST can be addressed. The permanent GST-offset credit suggested by the LTIB, is a proposal worth considering.”

“There are limitations to the document, for example it does not address the interface between the tax system and the Working For Families tax credit, which is a fraught issue for those who are dependent upon WFF, but we look forward to the debate that the document will provoke,” says Glenn Barclay.

* Tax Justice Aotearoa will be hosting speakers from Inland Revenue at one of its ‘Tax on Tuesdays’ events on Tuesday 1 July at 12.30pm* – members of the public are welcome to attend.

It will be a hybrid event with an in person session at Rutherford House in Wellington, which will be live-streamed.

Where: Rutherford House Lecture Theatre 2 (RHLT2), 33 Bunny Street, Wellington.

When: 12.30-1.30 pm Tuesday, 1 July 2025

To register in person or Zoom: https://www.tjanz.org/ir-insights-briefing

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Health and Social Care Secretary speech on health inequalities
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

Health and Social Care Secretary speech on health inequalities

Wes Streeting spoke at Blackpool Football club on reducing health inequalities.
Thank you very much, Simon. And thanks to all of you for coming to join us this morning here at Bloomfield Road.

I just want to echo, first of all, what Simon said about the club and about the impact it has through the trust of people in the community, particularly in terms of the work it does with young people, giving people opportunities or better life chances.

It’s a reminder that it’s something that government has to do, and I believe very strongly we can’t do without a good and active government.

But it’s also a reminder that whether we’re talking about creating health or education and life chances, the government can’t do it on our own.

And if we try to, we won’t have as much impact as if we work with partners.

So I just want to say a massive thank you to everyone here at the club for the work that you do as a proper community-rooted club.

This is a town that occupies a special place in my heart through a lot of happy memories from visits to Pleasure Beach as a kid.

I’ve got family up the road in Preston, too. And National Union of Students conferences in Winter Gardens during my student years, some of which I can still remember.

But as Health and Social Care Secretary, Blackpool is on my mind for less happy reasons: its health outcomes, which are not only poor, but unjust.

England is not an especially large nation. Yet the inequalities between us are huge.

Travel 30 miles down the road to Ribble Valley and men live for 8 years longer.

A baby girl born here in Blackpool will live 7 years less than one born in Wokingham.

She will fall into ill health 18 years earlier in life.

As the report by the Chief Medical Officer on health in coastal communities puts it, in many working-class towns like this one, people are growing old before their time.

[Political content removed]

And the gap between the health of the poorest and wealthiest parts of our country have widened.

These stark health inequalities are not just down to the health service alone.

They are also caused by poverty, a lack of good work, damp housing, dirty air, and the sporting, travel and cultural opportunities which are afforded to the privileged few being denied to the many.

It is why I have been driving the NHS so hard to reform, improve productivity and cut waste.

Because every pound spent on diagnosing and treating illness is a pound that can’t be spent on tackling the causes of ill health.

In the coming days, we will be publishing our 10 year plan, which will set out how this mission-driven government will tackle illness, keep disease at bay, and reduce the health inequalities that shame our society.

Our 10 year plan will not just be a plan for the NHS, but a plan for health.

It will tackle illness at source through a whole-society approach, with a shift in focus from treating sickness to preventing it in the first place.

Already this government is taking action. The Education Secretary, Bridget Phillipson, is rolling out primary school breakfast clubs and free school lunches to millions of children, so they walk into the classroom with hungry minds not hungry bellies.

Angela Rayner, Deputy Prime Minister, is building a new generation of homes, and along with our Business Secretary, Jonny Reynolds, introducing sick pay from day one in the job.

The Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, has given workers on the minimum wage a £1,400 pay rise this year.

The Work and Pensions Secretary, Liz Kendall, is giving disabled people the right to work, so they can take up a job opportunity, knowing if things go wrong they can go back to the support they had before without the jeopardy or fear of missing out or being back to square one.

Our Energy Secretary, Ed Miliband, is extending the Warm Home Discount, helping keep millions more households warm this winter.

And our Environment Secretary, Steve Reed, is cleaning up our rivers and seas from sewage.

So, you can see that just those steps we’ve already taken less than a year in office that Keir Starmer’s government is determined to lift people out of poverty, tackle inequality and improve the health of our society.

[political content removed]

Today, I want to set out how our reforms to the NHS will fundamentally improve the health of working-class communities.

NHS founded on principle of equity

The National Health Service was founded to end grotesque inequality in access to healthcare.

Before 1948, working people avoided the doctor unless they absolutely needed to see one, because of the costs being so prohibitive.

Diseases such as rickets, scurvy and diphtheria were common amongst children.

The solution was revolutionary – universal healthcare, publicly funded, free at the point of need.

And as the NHS’s founder, my predecessor, Nye Bevan, promised, the NHS lifted the shadow from millions of homes and eradicated the fear of illness from people’s hearts.

It has been one of the great levellers of our society. The greatest institution this country has ever built.

But as the NHS was neglected and left to decline after 2010, it contributed toward the widening gap between rich and poor.

Two-tier healthcare

Waiting times soared, and a 2-tier healthcare system emerged, where those who can afford it pay to go private, and everyone else was being left behind.

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The NHS was never intended to just be a safety net for those who cannot afford to pay.

Such a system would be doomed to ever-declining quality care.

Taxpayers would question why they continue to pay for a service they don’t use.

Inevitably, the NHS would become a poor service for poor people.

Since its foundation, we have always aspired to an NHS that is universal in provision so that everyone receives high-quality care.

[Political content removed]

With our Plan for Change, the NHS is on the road to recovery. Since the general election, we have:

recruited an extra 1,700 GPs to the frontline

delivered an extra 3.6 million appointments for planned care and delivered on our promised 2 million in our first year

diagnosed an extra 187,000 suspected cancer patients on time

cut waiting lists in the month of April for the first time in 17 years

cut waiting lists to their lowest level in 2 years

cut waiting lists by almost a quarter of a million patients

Each one of those patients we have taken off the waiting list is free from pain and in some cases disability, because of the decisions this government has taken.

I’m not here to do victory laps. I know that for the almost a quarter of a million people who have received faster treatment, there are more than 7 million cases still waiting.

We’ve done a lot but there’s so much more to do. Especially for towns like Blackpool.

Tackling inequalities

While there are so many social determinants of ill-health that need to be addressed, the fact is that the NHS doesn’t do enough to address the unjust, unequal way in which illness presents itself in our country.

In fact, it sometimes entrenches it.

General practice was neglected and declined across the board for more than a decade [political content removed].

But that doesn’t explain why there are 300 more patients per GP in the poorest communities, compared with the richest.

As I spoke about on Monday, far too many parents and their babies have been failed by maternity services.

But failing services don’t explain why Black women are almost 3 times more likely to die from childbirth than White women.

Black men are twice as likely to get prostate cancer than White men.

But given we know the risk is greater, and given we know how to catch cancer early, that doesn’t explain these sorts of inequalities given the evidence is there.

For those in greatest need often receive the worst-quality healthcare.

This fact flies in the face of the values upon which the NHS was founded.

A core ambition of our 10 year plan is to restore the promise of the NHS, to provide first class healthcare for everyone in our country.

Whoever you are, whatever your background, wherever you live.

NHS solutions

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It has fallen to this government to rebuild the NHS for all of us.

We are starting where the need is greatest.

[Political content removed]

We’ve sent crack teams of top clinicians to hospitals around the country, where the highest numbers of people are off work, off sick, to help them cut waiting lists faster. Therefore, getting people not just back to health but back to work.

We are delivering on our manifesto commitment to fill in dental deserts, by paying dentists extra to come to work in underserved areas.

And today I can announce that we will go further.

In recent years, billions of pounds have been put aside for NHS trusts who let their spending get out of control and run up deficits.

It’s essentially a bailout fund for poor financial management.

I am working with Jim Mackey, Chief Executive of the NHS, to end that culture of rewards for failure.

Thanks to the reforms we’ve made to bear down on wasteful spending, the fund will not go to trusts which run deficits this year.

We can reinvest that money in the frontline, so it isn’t spent on rewarding poor performance but to improving poor health.

The £2.2 billion will fund more effective care – such as innovative medicines, modern technology and services that keep people out of hospital – all going to the places where they are most needed.

GP practices serving more deprived areas receive 10% less funding per needs-adjusted patient than poorer parts of our country and have 300 more patients per GP as a result.

So, working with the British Medical Association, we will review how health need is reflected in funding for general practice (known to the wonks in the room as the Carr-Hill formula), with a sharp focus on money following need.

Where health needs are greatest and GPs fewest, we will prioritise investment to rebuild your NHS and rebuild the health of your community.

NHS as anchor institution

I said in my first week in this job, the NHS has a part to play in dragging our country out of the sluggish growth and low productivity the government inherited.

It is the biggest employer in many towns in England.

In coastal towns like Blackpool, where far more people are off work due to long-term sickness, the NHS has a dual role to play.

Not just getting patients off waiting lists and back to work, although we are doing that.

The health service should also act as an engine of local economic growth, giving opportunities in training and work to local people.

Working in the NHS is rightly seen as a high status, secure job.

But many people see it as unachievable and out of their reach.

On a visit to King George Hospital in my own neck of the woods, I saw first-hand a brilliant programme, Project SEARCH, that supports 17 to 19 year olds who are learning disabled and/or autistic, with internships that give them experience of a wide range of paying jobs, as well as coaching on things like preparing a CV and interview skills.

One of them, Muhammed Patel, shared with me how much he had loved the experience and hoped for a career in the NHS.

Months later, he messaged me on Instagram to tell me he’s got a job.

He’s not the only one.

Project SEARCH aims to get every young person on their programme a job in the NHS or with another employer and is succeeding.

So today we are launching a new pilot, backed by £5 million, to help recruit an additional 1,000 people to the NHS from areas worst hit by unemployment.

The programme will offer a ladder into the world of work for people who find it hardest to break out of unemployment, including over 50s, unpaid carers and disabled people.

They will gain the skills needed in health and care, alongside support with job applications and work placements, kickstarting what will hopefully be a long-term and rewarding career in our health and care sectors, where they will more than repay the investment we’re making in them today.

Patient power revolution

Finally, our 10 year plan will address one of the starkest health inequalities, which is often written out of this conversation.

It is the unequal access in our society to information, choice and control over our own healthcare.

When I was diagnosed with kidney cancer, colleagues in Parliament asked where I was being treated and who my surgeon was.

They just wanted to make sure I was receiving the best possible care.

Luckily, the NHS had already assigned me a world-class surgeon who saved my life.

But those are questions that my mum, a cleaner here in Lancashire, would never think to ask and would certainly never ask.

When the wealthy receive a diagnosis, they already know the best surgeons and can push to get the best care.

But working-class people can’t. 

If the wealthy are told to wait months for treatment, they can shop around. But working-class people can’t. 

And if the wealthy want instant information about their own health, they can pay for an app that allows them to speak to a doctor over the phone, 24/7.

But working-class people can’t.

This is not just grossly unfair. It presents an existential risk to the health service.

More than any other age group, this generation of young people are prepared to opt-out of the NHS.

Last year the biggest increase in private hospital admissions was for people under the age of 40.

Almost half of young people say they would consider going private if they needed care.

The NHS feels increasingly slow and outdated to the generation that organises their lives at the touch of a button.

If you get annoyed at Deliveroo not getting your dinner to you in less than an hour, how will you feel being told to wait a year for a knee operation?

A failure to modernise risks this generation walking away from the NHS, first for their healthcare and then with their taxes.

People won’t accept paying higher and higher taxes to fund a health service that no longer meets their needs.

And the lack of control people feel over their own lives is made worse by an analogue, ‘computer says no’, NHS.

We can only close this inequality and shut down this risk to the NHS’s future through a revolution in patient power.

The ambition of our 10 year plan is nothing less than to provide NHS patients with the same ease, convenience, power, choice and control that’s afforded to private patients.

The good news is that technology gives us the opportunity to democratise healthcare in a way never before possible.

It can empower patients with choice and control and make managing our healthcare as convenient as doing our shopping or banking online.

Technology can be the great leveller.

Look at what Martin Lewis, the Money Saving Expert, has done for personal finances.

For ordinary people who sign up to his newsletter – and I’m one of them – who could never afford their own financial adviser, it is simple and easy to make your hard-earned money go further – if you’ve got access to the right advice.

Our 10 year plan for health will do the same for NHS patients, giving them easy access to information to help them improve their health.

We will introduce a tool on the NHS App called My Companion.

It will provide all patients with information about their health condition, if they have one, or their procedure, if they need one.

It will get patients answers to questions they forgot or felt too embarrassed to ask in a face-to-face appointment.

So, the next time you’re at an appointment and you’re told something that doesn’t sound right, you will have at your fingertips the information you need to speak up confidently.

And we will give every patient meaningful choice, through a new tool called My Choices.

It will show patients everything from their nearest pharmacy to the best hospital for heart surgery across the country, with patients able to choose based on their preference.

If NHS providers know that their waiting times, health outcomes of their patients, and patient satisfaction ratings will all be publicly available, they will be inspired to respond to patient choice, raise their game and deliver services that patients value.

Not everyone will want a choice.

Many just want their local hospital.

That’s fine and will always be a default option.

But we know that at the root of many inequalities in health outcomes is a failure to listen to patients.

A ‘one size fits all’ approach often misses the distinct needs of women, people from ethnic minority backgrounds or people living in rural communities.

And we will only deal with the grotesque health inequalities in our society by empowering all patients.

Conclusion

In the months leading up to the founding of the NHS, Nye Bevan said:

For a while it may appear that everything is going wrong. 

As a matter of fact, everything will be going right because people will be able to complain.

They complain now, but no one hears about it.

He promised that a National Health Service would put a “megaphone to the mouth of every complainant, so that it can be heard all over the country.”

[political content removed]

We have always believed that public services exist to serve the interests of the pupil, the passenger, the patient above all else.   

And the driving force behind the work this government does every day is the principle that whatever class you come from, everyone deserves world-class services.

We expect nothing less from what we expect for ourselves, and that is why we’re determined to get our NHS back on its feet, to make sure it’s fit for the future and put power in the hands of every patient. Thank you.

Updates to this page

Published 26 June 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: York has the least pregnant smokers in Yorkshire

Source: City of York

York has the lowest rate of pregnant women smoking in Yorkshire and the Humber at the time of delivery, new figures have revealed.

According to new data published by NHS England Statistics on Women’s Smoking Status at Time of Delivery: Data tables – NHS England Digital only 4.6 per cent (65 women) smoked in York, at the time of their delivery. This shows a significant drop, when compared to figures in 2020, which were 10.4 per cent (167 women).

Many women have been supported to help quit for good through help from the Health Trainers.

Cllr Lucy Steels- Walshaw, Executive Member for Health, Wellbeing and Adult Social Care at City of York Council, said “Stopping smoking during pregnancy is a positive step you can take for the health of you and your baby.

“Stopping smoking can be challenging, but you do not have to face this alone. The council’s health trainers can offer support tailored to your needs and look at techniques and strategies to keep you motivated on your journey to becoming smoke free”.

The Health Trainers offer an incentive scheme of £170 in shopping vouchers which are offered, if they continue to quit during their pregnancy and quit for good.

Lucy Evans, from Acomb, gave birth at full term to a 7lb 14oz healthy baby girl, Violet, 12 weeks ago. She stopped smoking a week after her first health trainer appointment early in her pregnancy, and received free nicotine gum and patches as well as one-to-one support sessions.

She has just received her final voucher this week, which she plans to spend on clothes for Violet and a treat for herself.

She said: “I wanted to quit to make sure my baby was healthy and would definitely recommend this scheme, you get so much support and help and it makes you want to quit even more.

“I feel a lot healthier, I’m not coughing as much and am breathing better, and I feel like I can handle stress a lot better as I’m not relying on smoking.”

The service offers personalised, individual support and advice, and signing up is really simple.

Visit York Health Trainers and complete the online referral form, call 01904 553377 or email cychealthtrainers@york.gov.uk

Across the region, the Smoking at Time of Delivery (SATOD) data shows that 7.5 per cent (3,901) of pregnant women across Yorkshire and the Humber were recorded as smoking in 2024/25.

This is 1.8 per cent lower than the previous year, when maternal smoking rates were 9.3 per cent across the region. This equates to 642 fewer women smoking compared to last year.

This is the lowest rate of smoking during pregnancy recorded in Yorkshire and the Humber since data began to be collected. This also reflects improvement across England as a whole, where SATOD rates fell to 6.1 per cent from 7.4 per cent last year.

Smoking during pregnancy significantly increases the risk of harm to both mother and baby. It increases the risk of stillbirth, miscarriage, and sudden infant death. Children born to parents who smoke are also more likely to experience respiratory illness, learning difficulties, and diabetes, and are more likely to grow up to be smokers when compared to children born into smoke-free households.

As well as the health harms caused by smoking during pregnancy, it also adds to the cost of living and pushes families further into poverty. The average smoker spends £3,000 per year on tobacco, with younger women from the most deprived areas being the most likely to smoke and be exposed to second-hand smoke during pregnancy.

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: President Museveni Welcomes Former Opposition Youth To National Resistance Movement (NRM), Commends Them For The Wise Decision

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The converts from the districts of Mubende, Kassanda and Mityana have been undergoing a two-week ideological training at the National Leadership Institute (NALI) in Kyankwanzi.

The 2025/2026 cohort of youth converts comprised 145 males and 46 females. They were introduced to the principles of the NRM, its ideology, and other patriotic values.

During a meeting held at State House Entebbe, the President commended the youth for making what he called a wise and courageous decision.

President Museveni also pledged Shs 100m to support their SACCO as a token of encouragement and empowerment.

He also lauded the converts for abandoning political factions that, according to him, have long misled the youth and discouraged them from engaging in government programs meant to fight poverty and foster economic transformation.

“Those opposition groups are merciless. They use you for foreign-funded agendas and then tell you to shun government programs,” the President remarked.

“When we were giving out coffee seedlings under Operation Wealth Creation, they said the seedlings wouldn’t help them, but you have made the right choice, and I congratulate and welcome you.”

President Museveni further drew on his own political journey, sharing that he too was once an opposition supporter.

“I was in the Democratic Party from 1960 to 1970. Even though UPC rigged the elections in 1962, I told my fellow DP supporters, Obote may have stolen votes, but he didn’t steal your food. We had to be smart and take full advantage of the government’s programs,” he said.

He commended the youth instructors for equipping the converts with a strong understanding of NRM’s core principles particularly the third mission: socio-economic transformation.

“I am happy that your instructors taught you the mission of socio-economic transformation. As Africans, we must move from subsistence living to the money economy,” he said.

Modernizing African Livelihoods:

The President illustrated how daily life for most Africans still relies on outdated practices that need urgent modernization.

“In developed countries, machines fetch water. Here, our girls still carry jerry cans on their heads. We cook with firewood while others use gas or electricity. That’s what the NRM seeks to change,” he said.

The President also emphasized education as a key driver of transformation, highlighting the role of the government’s Universal Primary and Secondary Education (UPE and USE) programs as well as the Presidential Skilling Hubs.

“The skilling hub in Kassanda is proof that youth can access quality training for free. If we fully embrace free education, it will play a major role in changing lives.”

President Museveni further revisited his Four-Acre Model, a strategy he first introduced in the 1996 NRM Manifesto to guide smallholder farmers towards profitable and calculated farming.

“If you have only two acres and grow cotton or tobacco, you’ll remain poor. But if you plan well, with ekibalo (calculation) you can generate serious income,” he explained.

For those with four acres, the President advised; One acre for coffee (earning up to Shs15 million per year), one for fruits, one for pasture to support up to eight cows, and one for food crops.

He added that backyard farming activities like poultry, piggery (for non-Muslims), and fish farming could generate even more income.

“Fish farming, for instance, can bring in up to Shs 80 million a year from one acre of ponds,” President Museveni revealed.

Industrialization and ICT as Game Changers:

He also pointed to Uganda’s manufacturing sector, which now employs over 1.2 million people, more than double the public service sector’s 480,000.

“From small dairy coolers to big factories, manufacturing has become a major source of jobs and wealth,” he said.

The President also praised growth in the services sector particularly tourism, transport, professional services, and religious work which employs about four million Ugandans.

Finally, he underscored the transformative potential of ICT, especially in business Process Outsourcing (BPO).

“With our strong internet and telecom infrastructure, Ugandans can now work for international companies and earn globally competitive salaries right from here,” President Museveni noted.

Ms. Hellen Seku, the Commissioner of the National Secretariat for Patriotism Corps (NSPC), expressed gratitude to President Museveni for hosting the youth converts from parishes, villages, and sub-counties in the three districts.

“We thank Your Excellency for welcoming these young people, many of whom were once leaders in the opposition. This meeting marks a turning point in their journey of transformation,” Ms. Seku said.

“These youth have been receiving ideological training focused on civic duty, patriotism, and the core principles of the NRM. The goal has been to equip them to become responsible, value-driven citizens who contribute meaningfully to their communities,” she explained.

Ms. Seku also emphasized that the training covered key themes such as teamwork, peacebuilding, national unity, embracing government programs, and serving the country with loyalty and discipline.

“We have taught them the pillars of society, how to protect the peace we have, and the importance of working together as one. These young people are now prepared to return home and help drive progress in their areas,” she added.

She further urged the youth to be responsible citizens and take care of both the environment and their personal health.

“Go back and plant trees in your communities. Let us care for our environment. Above all, maintain discipline in your health. HIV/AIDS has become rampant in our societies. Guard yourselves. It is spreading like wildfire, and we must stop it,” she advised.

On his part, Col. Okei Rukogota, the Director of NALI expressed his appreciation to President Museveni for his unwavering efforts in empowering young people through anti-poverty programs.

“Your Excellency, I thank you for your tireless fight against poverty among the youth. Your leadership continues to create opportunities for transformation,” Col. Rukogota said.

He also commended the NALI team for their dedication and commitment in organizing and facilitating the ideological training for the youth.

“To the entire NALI team, thank you. Without your hard work and support, this success would not have been possible,” he added.

Col. Rukogota further applauded the converts for their commitment to learning and embracing the values and principles taught during the retreat.

“I also thank the youth converts. Your willingness to learn and change is a sign of true patriotism. Uganda needs you,” he said.

Speaking on behalf of the group, Mr. Mutumba Byakatonda, a youth representative and councilor from Mubende Municipal Council, said the converts were once affiliated with opposition political parties but have now decided to cross to the NRM.

“Your Excellency, I personally crossed to the opposition after you commissioned the Mubende Central Market. However, today, I stand before you as a proud convert back to the NRM,” he said.

“Your Excellency, for a while, many of us were misled by opposition narratives. We were persuaded into ideologies that alienated us from government programs aimed at creating wealth and improving livelihoods,” Mr. Byakatonda explained.

“We sincerely thank the Director and entire staff at NALI for the training, mentorship, and welfare support. Through lessons on the principles and ideology of the NRM, we have experienced a complete mindset change.”

He thanked the President for his continued facilitation, time, and attention, saying: “We are deeply grateful for your support and for sparing time out of your busy schedule to meet us today. We do not take it for granted.”

As part of their next steps, the group expressed interest in registering a Youth Converts SACCO across their districts.

“We plan to form a SACCO where we can access funds at low interest rates and start small businesses. Your Excellency, we also humbly request coffee seedlings under Operation Wealth Creation to help us kick-start our income-generating activities and contribute to the national development agenda,” Mr. Byakatonda said.

He concluded by reaffirming their loyalty to the NRM government.

“We are ready to enroll fully into the NRM and support you in building a transformed and prosperous Uganda,” he added.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of State House Uganda.

MIL OSI Africa –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Disabilities and Poverty – New research shows poverty hitting intellectually disabled New Zealanders the hardest – IHC

Source: IHC

A new IHC report reveals that New Zealanders with an intellectual disability are twice as likely to live in hardship or severe hardship compared to the rest of the population.

IHC Advocate Shara Turner says the report, The Cost of Exclusion: Hardship and People with Intellectual Disability in New Zealand, shows this is a deep, systemic issue.

“The cost of disability is real and it’s falling entirely on individuals and families who are often excluded from work, transport and even food.

“It is not acceptable that people with intellectual disabilities can’t afford a healthy diet.

“It’s also unacceptable that this is not part of national conversations on poverty.

“We need to include intellectual disability in all poverty tracking and public reporting. We need to adjust income support to reflect the true cost of disability and to build joined-up systems that recognise the long-term, cross-sector disadvantage disabled people experience.”

The report shows that people with intellectual disability face significantly higher rates of hardship at every stage of life:

Hardship is twice as likely for people with an intellectual disability under 40 and almost three times as likely for those aged 40-64 compared to others
Severe hardship rates triple in middle age, even as they decline for the rest of the population
Nearly 50% of people with intellectual disability cannot pay an unavoidable bill within a month without borrowing (vs. 18% of others)
They are over four times more likely to go without a meal with meat (or vegetarian protein equivalent) every second day
They are almost three times more likely to cut back on fresh fruit and vegetables due to cost
Nearly 30% of children with intellectual disability can’t have fri

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES NAMES 50 GLOBAL FINALISTS IN 2025 MAYORS CHALLENGE Including Lower Hutt
Source: Bloomberg Philanthropies

Finalists from 33 countries will receive $50,000 and support to test breakthrough ideas for improving life in cities – In January 2026, 25 winning cities will receive $1 million each to bring their idea to life.

New York, NY – (June 25, 2025) – Bloomberg Philanthropies today announced the 50 finalists of its latest Mayors Challenge, a competition to spur local government innovation that improves lives in cities around the world. The sixth Challenge elevates municipalities that have proposed the boldest ideas to bolster essential municipal services.

From Boise to Belfast, Ansan to Addis Ababa, Toronto to Taipei, the 50 finalists, selected from more than 630 applications, hail from 33 countries and represent over 80 million residents. Their ideas aim to increase public transit ridership, lower household energy costs, expand urban green space, speed service response, strengthen sanitation, improve youth safety, safeguard water supply, and more.

Each finalist city will receive $50,000 to prototype their idea. They will also participate in Bloomberg Philanthropies’ Ideas Camp in July to hone and test their concepts with feedback from experts and fellow peers. In January 2026, the 25 city halls with the most promising ideas will each be awarded $1 million and operational assistance to bring their proposals to life.

“Local government is where people meet policy—and where government improves lives and builds trust,” said James Anderson, who leads the Government Innovation program at Bloomberg Philanthropies. “That’s why municipal innovation isn’t about grand gestures—it’s about solving hard problems under pressure, often with imperfect tools and finite resources. These Mayors Challenge finalists stand out because they’re not just thinking creatively—they’re designing solutions that reckon with the complexity of implementation and the urgency of their residents’ needs. Their proposals reflect a new standard for public sector achievement: ambitious, yes, but also grounded, disciplined, and ripe for real impact.”

The 630 ideas submitted to the Mayors Challenge reflect some of the greatest public service challenges facing cities today—as well as the creativity that animates local governments across the globe. A third of U.S. and Canada applicants, for example, devised solutions addressing housing and shelter. Nearly half of the applicants from Africa proposed upgrades to waste collection and management. One out of five applicants from the Asia-Pacific region focused on cleaner water, air, and infrastructure, and 22 percent of European applicants sought ways to reduce poverty or enhance social inclusion.

The 50 finalist ideas were selected for their originality, potential for impact, and credible vision for delivery. Artificial intelligence was featured in the plans of a number of finalists, including South Bend, Indiana, which envisioned a cutting-edge 311 system that anticipates complaints for non-emergency issues, such as potholes, allowing officials to address problems before a resident report. More analog innovations also rose to the top: In Yonkers, New York, city officials proposed a powerful new hyper-local civic brigade to help older neighbors age happily and healthfully in place.

The 50 finalist cities are:

Abha, Saudi Arabia

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Ansan, South Korea

As-Salt, Jordan

Barcelona, Spain

Beaverton, U.S

Beira, Mozambique

Belfast, United Kingdom

Benin City, Nigeria

Boise, U.S.

Boston, U.S.

Budapest, Hungary

Cap-Haïtien, Haiti

Cape Town, South Africa

Cartagena, Colombia

Cauayan, Philippines

Choma, Zambia

Cuenca, Ecuador

Detroit, U.S.

Fez, Morocco

Fukuoka, Japan

Ghaziabad, India

Ghent, Belgium

Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, India

Helsinki, Finland

Honolulu, U.S.

Kanifing, Gambia

Kyiv, Ukraine

Lafayette, U.S.

Lower Hutt, New Zealand

Maceió, Brazil

Marseille, France

Medellín, Colombia

Mexico City, Mexico

Naga, Philippines

Ndola, Zambia

Netanya, Israel

Nouakchott, Mauritania

Pasig, Philippines

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

San Francisco, U.S.

Seattle, U.S.

Seoul, South Korea

Sialkot, Pakistan

South Bend, U.S.

Surabaya, Indonesia

Taipei, Taiwan

Toronto, Canada

Turku, Finland

Yonkers, U.S.

In this round of the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge, more funding will be distributed and more cities will be assisted than in the previous five Challenges which each selected between five to 15 winners.

“Local government and mayors’ offices are the beating heart of innovation and change in our urban environments,” said Professor Lesley Lokko OBE, Founder and Chair of the African Futures Institute and 2025 Mayors Challenge advisory committee member. “It has been an honour to join Bloomberg Philanthropies’ advisory committee for the organization’s sixth Mayors Challenge, an initiative dedicated to empowering and supporting city makers around the world. I look forward to working with these 50 finalists as they advance in this extraordinary competition—strengthening their ideas which each represent the inventiveness citizens everywhere should expect from their governments—and the future of what municipal delivery has the power and potential to be.”

“For more than a decade, Bloomberg Philanthropies has provided unprecedented support to drive local government innovation in cities across the country and around the world,” said Admiral Michael G. Mullen, President & CEO of MGM Consulting and 2025 Mayors Challenge advisory committee member. “The organization’s sixth Mayors Challenge will invest in the future of urban delivery from the ground floor of communities—and I am thrilled to join its advisory committee and work with these finalist cities on accelerating their ideas – from safeguarding water supply to carving out community spaces to integrating AI to improve student routes, and more.”

The new Mayors Challenge builds on more than 10 years of work led by Bloomberg Philanthropies to discover, nurture, and drive innovation in cities. The awards to date across five previous rounds of competition have provided 38 winning cities with funding and technical assistance to realize their ideas for addressing civic issues. By supporting the replication of the most successful winning ideas, Bloomberg Philanthropies has expanded the impact of the Mayors Challenge to 337 other cities globally, reaching over 100 million residents around the world.

“Bloomberg Philanthropies has provided invaluable support for cities to develop and implement innovative solutions that improve the lives of residents in ways they can feel,” said Mayor Mike Duggan of Detroit, Michigan. “Detroit is honored to be among the 50 municipalities selected from over 630 applications for the organization’s Mayors Challenge. As a finalist, we will work with renowned experts and peers to advance our proposal to create a powerful, single entry that connects currently scattered information – such as inspection dates, taxes, and utilities – on all 400,000 Detroit properties to revolutionize how owners can access this vital information, as well as how our city plans and provides its most essential services.”

“Seoul is honored to be selected as one of the 50 finalists for the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge competition,” said Mayor Oh Se-hoon of Seoul, South Korea. “As a finalist, we will further our proposal to launch powerful educational campaigns and new support systems that will protect youth safety and prevent online child exploitation through the development of an AI-based mobile app that detects risks and alerts parents – while working alongside other cities to set a new standard for the future of urban policy.”

“City halls deliver the most fundamental public services—from reliable public transport to affordable housing, clean water, sustainable environments, emergency response, and more,” said Mayor Gergely Karácsony of Budapest, Hungary. “Recognizing their potential and reach, the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge rewards and equips those with the most inventive ideas to lead transformations of the essential programs their communities rely on. We are honored that Budapest is one of the 50 finalists selected to further our idea to build a city-run food processing plant that can turn surplus fruits and vegetables from local markets into nutritious meals for schools and senior homes.”

“It is an honor to be selected as a finalist for the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayors Challenge,” said Mayor Sunita Dayal of Ghaziabad, India. “As we pursue our idea to improve our environment alongside bolstering our workforce – converting organic waste into white rooftop paint and compost to cool homes, green parks, and lower emissions while providing new job opportunities – we have a unique opportunity to incubate innovation that will move our communities forward.”

“Thank you to Bloomberg Philanthropies for seeing our vision to improve the quality of life for seniors across our city,” said Mayor Mike Spano of Yonkers, New York. “We are honored to be among 50 finalists selected for the prestigious global Mayors Challenge competition. As a finalist, we will look to create a fully sustainable model for community engagement – marshaling public and private partners as well as residents and students – coupled with innovative technology and tools to enable many more to age safely and gracefully in place.”

With the expansion of the Bloomberg Cities Idea Exchange, future Mayors Challenge-winning ideas and other locally led solutions supported by Bloomberg Philanthropies will have new potential to scale—serving as models and catalysts for how governments solve problems across the globe.

To learn more about the 50 finalist proposals, visit mayorschallenge.bloomberg.org

About Bloomberg Philanthropies:
Bloomberg Philanthropies invests in 700 cities and 150 countries around the world to ensure better, longer lives for the greatest number of people. The organization focuses on creating lasting change in five key areas: the Arts, Education, Environment, Government Innovation, and Public Health. Bloomberg Philanthropies encompasses all of Michael R. Bloomberg’s giving, including his foundation, corporate, and personal philanthropy as well as Bloomberg Associates, a philanthropic consultancy that advises cities around the world. In 2024, Bloomberg Philanthropies distributed $3.7 billion. For more information, please visit bloomberg.org,
MIL OSI New Zealand News –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Press Release: Agencies Release List of Distressed or Underserved Nonmetropolitan Middle-Income Geographies

Source: US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FDIC

WASHINGTON – Federal bank regulatory agencies today released the 2025 list of distressed or underserved nonmetropolitan middle-income geographies where certain bank activities are eligible for Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit.

Under the CRA, the agencies assess a bank’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound operations. The list released by the agencies includes distressed or underserved nonmetropolitan middle-income geographies where revitalization or stabilization activities are eligible to receive CRA consideration. The designations reflect local economic conditions, including unemployment, poverty, and population changes. Previous years’ lists and criteria for designating these areas are available here.

Revitalization or stabilization activities in these geographies are eligible to receive CRA consideration under the community development definition for 12 months after publication of the current list. As with past lists, the agencies apply a one-year lag period for geographies that were included in 2024 but are no longer designated as distressed or underserved in the current list.

The agencies leveraged an updated methodology to designate underserved middle-income census tracts for this list, based upon revised source information from various agencies. As a result, the amended urban influence codes use similar criteria and methods as previous delineations but have been consolidated from 12 to 9 categories. Additional information is available in the Source Information and Methodology.

# # #

Attachments:

MEDIA CONTACT:

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
LaJuan Williams-Young
(202) 898-3876

Federal Reserve Board
Chelsea Grate
(202) 452-2955

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Anne Edgecomb
(202) 649-6870

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon contributes $10K in response to devastating flooding in West Virginia

Source: Verizon

Headline: Verizon contributes $10K in response to devastating flooding in West Virginia

WHEELING, W.V. – On June 15, devastating heavy rains and flash flooding severely impacted Ohio and Marion counties in West Virginia. This rare event saw up to 3 to 4 inches of rainfall in less than an hour in localized areas. Multiple fatalities and extensive damage to roads, bridges, buildings and homes have been reported. Thousands were left without power and the National Guard has been mobilized to support local emergency operations.

In response to this disaster, Verizon is showing up for our customers and our neighbors in West Virginia by investing $10,000 in Appalachian Outreach, Inc. (AOI). AOI is a nonprofit that assists people experiencing poverty and disaster in Ohio, Marshall, and Wetzel counties. AOI is offering a variety of support for individuals and families impacted by the recent flooding including access to supplies, a charging station, and a comfortable place to rest and recharge. Additionally, AOI is collaborating with the Red Cross and the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, to increase the number of community members they can reach directly.

“When natural disasters unfold our priority is to swiftly mobilize resources and provide support where it’s needed most,” said Anthony Lewis, Region Vice President of State Public Policy and Government Affairs for Verizon. “As always, our team worked to keep our network stable so that West Virginians can continue to connect with each other during these difficult times. Our partnership with Appalachian Outreach, Inc., further enables the delivery of immediate relief and ongoing support residents deserve as they work to recover and rebuild.”

“We are beyond grateful to Verizon for their compassion and commitment to West Virginia families,” said Heather Ray, Executive Director of Appalachian Outreach, Inc. “Their generous $10,000 donation comes at a time when so many in our community are hurting in the wake of devastating flash floods. This support allows us to meet urgent needs—like hygiene items, clothing, food, and cleaning supplies—while also standing beside families as they begin the long journey toward recovery. We simply couldn’t do this work without partners like Verizon who step up when it matters most.”

This investment is part of Verizon’s larger commitment to responding to disasters across the country. Verizon is committed to helping communities prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters with greater confidence.

MIL OSI Economics –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

(2024/2053(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

– having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

– having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

– having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

– having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

– having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

– having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

– having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank [1],

– having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

– having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

– having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

– having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

– having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

– having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

– having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

– having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

– having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

– having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

– having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

– having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

– having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

– having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

– having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

– having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

– having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

– having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

– having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 [5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund [6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform [8],

– having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence [9],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed [10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade [11];

L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

General remarks

1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria [13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation [15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

Financing peace, security and defence

28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for 2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation [16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative [17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

Governance: accountability and transparency

61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

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69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

(2025/2024(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [1],

– having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

– having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4. Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

Alignment on foreign policy matters

24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

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32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

(2025/2018(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part [1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

– having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

– having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina [4],

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina [5],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

– having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

– having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

– having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

– having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

– having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

– having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

– having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

– having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement [6],

– having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

Democracy and the rule of law

20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

Fundamental freedoms and human rights

35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act [8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act [9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

Socio-economic reforms

58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive [10], the Birds Directive [11] and the Water Framework Directive [12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

73. Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

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75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

(2025/2017(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part [1],

– having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

– having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

– having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

– having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

– having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

– having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

– having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

– having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

– having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region;

7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

Democratic institutions, media and civil society

8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act [4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

Fundamental rights

20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens;

24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

Rule of law

29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority; urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

Socio-economic reforms

38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive [5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment [6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment [7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

Regional cooperation and foreign policy

55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

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61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Plaid’s direct child payment best way to tackle child poverty – experts

Source: Party of Wales

A direct child payment is the most powerful and effective intervention to reduce poverty a leading report has found.

A recent report by Policy in Practice has identified that the most powerful and effective intervention designed to reduce poverty is a direct child payment.

Today (Tuesday, June 24^th), Rhun ap Iorwerth, Plaid Cymru leader, challenged the Labour First Minister, Eluned Morgan, on her refusal to implement such a policy.

Plaid Cymru has called on the Labour Government in Wales to implement a Child Payment immediately to “reach nearly one-third of households that are in poverty”, and “reduce child poverty by nearly a quarter”.

Plaid Cymru announced their intention to create a direct child payment, Cynnal, in their Spring Conference in March of 2025. The policy took inspiration from the Scottish Child Payment, which has aided Scotland in becoming the only nation where child poverty is projected to fall.

By 2029, child poverty is set to rise to 34.4% in Wales, which would be the highest rate of all UK nations.

The Plaid Cymru leader judged the Labour First Minister for her inaction on this ‘national stain’, accusing her of ‘continued objection’ towards the policy, which has been backed by experts in the sector.

The Plaid Cymru leader also challenged the First Minister over the Labour UK Government’s proposed changes to welfare, changes which see the Government in Westminster facing a rebellion from the Labour backbenchers. Mr ap Iorwerth asked the Welsh Labour leader she would urge her Welsh Labour MP colleagues to vote on the changes, with only 3/27 Welsh Labour MPs having declared their objection.

Rhun ap Iorwerth MS went on to state that only a Plaid Cymru Government has ‘real ambition’ to tackle child poverty, that will provide a ‘brighter future’ for future generations.

Plaid Cymru leader, Rhun ap Iorwerth MS, said:

“The introduction of a Welsh Child Payment has emerged as the most powerful and effective of all interventions designed to reduce child poverty. Such a payment would reach nearly one-third of households that are in poverty, particularly benefiting larger families and households with young children.

“The policy has proved transformational in Scotland with it set to be the only nation, based on current trends, that will succeed in reducing child poverty by 2029. In stark contrast, child poverty in Wales is set to rise to a scandalous 34.4% in the same timeframe – the highest in the UK. So, with such unequivocal evidence, what is the First Minister waiting for?

“The answer to that question is clear – tackling poverty is not a priority for Labour. While Labour keep the cruel two child cap, and push more people into poverty through cuts to disability benefits, Plaid Cymru are pledging to take positive action on reducing poverty – showing that we are the only Party willing to tackle this national stain.

“This is made even clearer by the list of Labour MPs ready to vote against Labour’s cruel cuts to disability welfare, because despite Wales being hit disproportionately by the cuts, it appears that only a handful of Labour MPs from Wales are on the list of rebelling Labour MPs.

“Plaid Cymru know that this is not as good as it gets for Wales, we know that 1/3 of our children should not be living in poverty, that poverty is not inevitable in our communities. That is why we are the only party willing to tackle this issue head on.

“A vote for Plaid Cymru in 2026 is a vote for a party with real ambition and credible plans to tackle child poverty, backed by the experts, for a brighter future for our future generations.”

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Government Technology recognizes 2024 Oregon Summer EBT for best practices

Source: US State of Oregon

he Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) was recognized in a national Government Technology Case Study for its excellence in the use of smart technology in rolling out the Summer EBT program. As a result, more than 362,000 children were able to get more food during summer 2024.

About Summer EBT

Thousands of children in Oregon rely on free or reduced-price school meals. But what happens in the summer months when these meals are gone? This is called the summer hunger gap. To address this gap, the federal government last year rolled out a new program to provide food to school-aged children during the summer months.

Oregon was one of 35 states to pick up on the federal Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) program, which provided a total of $120 in nutrition benefits for each eligible child when school is out.

Summer EBT qualification is based on income. For families to qualify, the household income needs to be under 185 percent of the federal poverty level.

“The majority of the people we served are working. It could be part time or they’re just starting off – they are bringing in income but it’s just not enough. The Summer EBT helps supplement their food budget for their children,” Singer said.

A tight timeline

It was go-time for ODHS in early 2024. There was only 16 weeks to set up a new program, bring in community partners, identify and reach out to eligible families, create communication plans and products, and establish the innovative technology needed to accomplish this task. ODHS is the lead agency and administers this program in partnership with the Oregon Department of Education (ODE).

“It was a very short amount of time to build an entire system. The challenge was to quickly build a system to deliver quality services not only for this year but next year also,” Nate Singer, ODHS Oregon Eligibility Partnership (OEP) Director, said. OEP is responsible for determining eligibility for people applying for benefits and processing applications to deliver those benefits.

Goal setting

Initial estimates in 2024 projected that Oregon would provide Summer EBT to at least 294,000 children.

“The one thing I wanted for the project was to exceed that expectation because that would mean we would be providing more services for families and we could increase our outreach for all the of the services ODHS offers,” said Christine Doody, Self-Sufficiency Programs Policy Business Manager and Program Manager for Summer EBT.

The expectation was exceeded about 68,000, meaning more than 362,000 children were able to get food benefits last summer.

Innovation in action

To identify eligible children, OEP used data from ODHS and ODE. Most children who received the benefit were “automatically eligible” because they receive other benefits. These families didn’t need to apply, and the benefit was automatically added to their Oregon EBT card.

Other families needed to apply. ODHS brought in contractors Amazon Web Services and Deloitte Consulting to help with the technology and planning to make applying easy.

“We tried to make it simple as possible. People could apply with a paper application or online. The online application could be done on a mobile phone. If someone had questions about whether they needed to apply or needed help to apply, they could call the Summer EBT Call Center to talk to someone. The call wait time was below five minutes. People could hear right then, on the phone, they would get their benefits if they applied. It took minutes,” Singer said.

The Oregon Summer EBT Call Center included an Interactive Voice Response system offering self-service options for supported languages: English, Spanish, Russian, Vietnamese, Somali, Mandarin, Cantonese, Arabic, Ukrainian, and Chuukese. For other languages, or for other assistance, the calls could be routed to help.

“This gave families the ability to take control of their case. They could use voice activation to say, ‘I want text messages’ from us, or they could change their demographic information or ask for a new card. The family could do that on their own,” Doody said.

This population of customers – families with children in school – are used to getting texts and email from their schools, so they were already familiar with getting information this way. In fact, 99 percent of families that needed to apply chose to use the online application rather than a paper application. Those that used the online caption reported a 96 percent satisfaction rating.

Communications and community engagement

There was also communications and community engagement support, as well as an effective feedback loop. A workgroup with community representatives, such as the Oregon Food Bank and Partners for a Hunger Free Oregon, was in place. The community partners advised on all communication products such as news releases, the application design and social media kits.

“We worked together to get the information as far out to communities as we could. We were also able to get good data from the Call Center to let us know how we were doing. We had a strong feedback loop that we responded to quickly,” Christy Sinatra, ODHS Senior Communications Advisor, said.

For example, people asked if children in charter, private schools, or home schools could be included in Summer EBT. The answer was, yes, if they are found to be eligible. It was also important to communicate to people that the Summer EBT benefits expired after 122 days – so it was important to use them before then.

“We are trying to increase equity and access. There’s not just one approach. We pushed many communications and engagement levers – technology, in-person outreach, digital communications, community partnerships, media exposure. All those things working together to make the program successful and making sure every eligible kid gets this,” Sinatra said.

“The Oregon Summer EBT program demonstrated the strength of cross-agency collaboration and intentional program design. Staff were equipped with thoughtful tools and invited to shape how the program would operate, ensuring that those on the ground had a voice in critical decisions. That partnership—from planning to implementation—meant that families and children not only received meaningful support but also felt seen, heard, and cared for. The feedback from the community speaks volumes about the impact of that collective effort,” Singer said.

“The project was just overwhelmingly amazing. I just hope that people read this and apply for this summer,” Doody said.

2025 Summer EBT began May 22

The 2025 Summer EBT launched Thursday, May 22, 2025. Applications will be accepted through Wednesday, September 3, 2025.

ODHS will be running the whole program this summer – setting a goal of serving 375,000 children.

“We will be doing additional outreach, based on data and staff feedback, and providing new ways to engage with people such as going out to more schools and community events,” Doody said.

The program is set to: expand tactics to better reach people and communities that data showed were underserved; help schools connect families to Summer EBT; and increase strategic partnerships that serve priority audiences.

Resources:

Learn more about Summer EBT including how to apply for this benefit for your children: https://www.oregon.gov/odhs/food/pages/sebt.aspx.

Double Up Food Bucks Oregon: Visit https://doubleuporegon.org/ to learn how to double your SNAP and Summer EBT dollars at farmer’s markets, produce stands, community supported agriculture programs and grocery stores.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: England’s free school meals rollout risks losing sight of which children need help most

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Michaela James, Research Officer at Medical School, Swansea University

New Africa/Shutterstock

The UK government has announced an expansion of free school meals in England. Starting from September 2026, all children in households receiving universal credit will qualify, removing the previous income cap of £7,400 per year.

This change is expected to benefit more than 500,000 children and lift around 100,000 out of poverty, providing a broader safety net for families.

While this is a positive development, there are unintended consequences, particularly for researchers like us and policymakers who rely on free school meal eligibility as a measure of child poverty.

Under the new rules, eligibility will no longer distinguish between the most disadvantaged children, those in low-income households, or those who receive disability-related benefits. That makes it harder to identify which children are most vulnerable and to target support effectively.

Free school meal eligibility has long been a reliable indicator of poverty for schools and researchers. Without it, it becomes difficult to evaluate the effects of policies aimed at helping the most disadvantaged children.

Wales has already introduced universal free school meals for all primary school children since 2023. Our team is currently researching the effects of free school meals in Wales. We are expecting to publish these findings later this year.

shutterstock.
Monkey Business Images/Shutterstock

The dilemma

If there is no indicator of poverty, it is hard to evaluate which interventions or policies are working to help lift children out of it. This is particularly important when it comes to areas like nutrition.

For example, concerns about food quality, choices and portion sizes matter far more when a child is experiencing food insecurity at home. Without this information, it is difficult to assess the likelihood that a child will have access to a nutritious meal outside of school, and if free school meals help to alleviate hunger and improve nutrition for the most vulnerable.

The eligibility for free school meals was an indicator of a family living in poverty. This was available to people working in and studying education. It was possible to see how well interventions work to address educational needs, especially for those in low-income households.

The eligibility for universal credit is not available in school data, so it cannot be used to inform how well educational interventions are working to reduce inequality.

Without free school meal eligibility as a poverty marker, schools and researchers must rely on other sources. These are often less straightforward.

Read more:
More free school meals is a start – here’s what would really address child poverty

Finding other sources of information about poverty means that people working in education and child health need to work with data experts. This needs teams of people, more time, expertise, approvals and governance agreements to access and combine data to do research on education and child health. This makes the prospect far more complicated.

A local-area deprivation index can indicate if a child lives in a poorer neighbourhood but can’t confirm individual family poverty. Census data can be linked to educational records. But the census is only updated every ten years, which makes it less accurate for current needs.

Asking parents directly about income or hardship is possible, but risks stigma and can be resource intensive.

To improve health and education outcomes for children in poverty, free school meals remain vital. But as eligibility rules change, so must our data systems.

A new way of identifying poverty, one that can be integrated into school records, is needed. Without it, policymakers and researchers risk losing sight of who truly needs help and whether current efforts are working.

Michaela James receives funding from ADR Wales and UKRI.

Amy Locke receives funding from a Swansea University Studentship.

Sinead Brophy receives funding from UKRI, NIHR, European Union

– ref. England’s free school meals rollout risks losing sight of which children need help most – https://theconversation.com/englands-free-school-meals-rollout-risks-losing-sight-of-which-children-need-help-most-258614

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Comoros: Blue Economy Offers a Transformative Path to Sustainable Growth

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Comoros’ economy shows signs of recovery, surpassing pre-COVID-19 levels. Growth rose from 3 percent in 2023 to 3.4 percent in 2024, driven by household consumption supported by a 5.4 percent increase in remittances and strong services sector performance. Average annual inflation declined from 8.5 to 5.0 percent in 2024, reflecting the stabilization of global commodity prices and lower inflation in the Eurozone. Growth is projected to reach 4 percent by 2027, fueled by consumption and planned investments. However, poverty is projected to decline only slightly, due to modest GDP growth, high inequality, and weak social protection. Using the lower middle-income poverty line of $3.65 per day, the poverty rate is estimated at 38.1 percent in 2024 and expected to fall marginally to 37.2 percent in 2025.

“Persistent poverty and high inequality in Comoros reflect deep regional disparities and structural challenges. Low labor participation, underemployment, and limited access to quality education continue to hold back productivity and incomes. While remittances offer short-term relief, they cannot replace a dynamic, self-sustaining economy,” said Boubacar-Sid Barry, World Bank Resident Representative in Comoros. “Without bold reforms, poverty may deepen. The World Bank is committed to supporting Comoros on its path toward more inclusive and sustainable growth.”

The first edition of the Comoros Economic Update: An Ocean of Opportunities from the World Bank highlights that, without addressing structural barriers to investment and external competitiveness, growth will remain fragile. This will hamper job creation and income growth needed to reduce poverty and strengthen resilience to future shocks. The report also warns of significant downside risks. Comoros remains highly vulnerable to climate-related disasters, while rising fiscal pressures, contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises, and a fragile banking sector increase macroeconomic risks. The current account deficit is expected to widen in the medium-term due to structural trade imbalances and infrastructure-driven imports, emphasizing the need for export diversification, stronger external buffers, and sustainable financing strategies.

The blue economy offers a transformative opportunity for Comoros to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, according to the focus section of this report. With targeted reforms and strategic investments, it has the potential to elevate Comoros to upper-middle-income status by 2050, requiring sustained annual GDP growth of 6.1 percent. Fisheries have demonstrated strong performance, averaging 11.4 percent of GDP between 2018 and 2024. Modernizing the sector could increase its contribution to 16 percent by 2035. Marine tourism also holds significant promise, with the potential to quadruple visitor arrivals by 2030 and contribute over 6 percent of GDP by mid-century. Integrated development of eco-tourism, sustainable fisheries, and marine conservation can further promote inclusive growth while protecting natural ecosystems. However, achieving this vision will depend on restoring natural capital, expanding renewable energy, upgrading infrastructure, and strengthening environmental safeguards.

“Comoros stands at a turning point. The shift toward services and the blue economy has the potential to make Comoros a regional leader in sustainability. By 2040, services could contribute nearly two-thirds of GDP, with tourism and fisheries driving inclusive growth. Strong governance and sustained investment in these sectors can unlock lasting opportunities for people and protect the country’s natural wealth,” said Patrick John McCartney, Senior Economist at the World Bank in Comoros and author of the report.

A well-executed blue economy strategy can position Comoros as a regional leader in sustainable marine resource management while driving economic diversification, job creation, and resilience. Fully leveraging the synergies between fisheries, tourism, and conservation will be key to maximizing economic benefits while protecting vital natural assets. Strategic investments in governance, infrastructure, market access, and environmental sustainability can help transform the blue economy into a pillar of national development. This vision aligns with the objectives of the Plan Comoros Émergent 2030 (PCE 2030). By capitalizing on its rich marine resources, Comoros can pave the way for a more prosperous and sustainable future, achieving its ambition of reaching upper-middle-income status by 2050.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of The World Bank Group.

MIL OSI Africa –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Targeting funding at frontline services
Source: Scottish Government

Financial strategy and action plan published.

Savings rising to £2.6 billion in 2029-30 will ensure funding can be targeted at frontline services such as the NHS, social security, action to eradicate child poverty and other priorities.

Under the five-year Medium Term Financial Strategy and Fiscal Sustainability Delivery Plan the Scottish Government will:
- increase value for public money, with affordable and sustainable investment plans set out through a Scottish Spending Review in December
- improve efficiencies and productivity across the public sector by using more technology and automation while improving collaboration between public bodies
- reform public services, doing more with available resources and prioritising people with the greatest need
- reduce the public sector workforce by an average of 0.5% every year until 2030 while protecting frontline services
- invest in preventative measures to reduce demand on services such as health, social care and justice
The strategy and action plan also include measures to support sustainable, inclusive economic growth and ensure a strategic approach to tax policy that considers longer term impacts and competitiveness.

Finance Secretary Shona Robison said:

“With the world facing profound economic uncertainty this Medium Term Financial Strategy is being published in deeply challenging circumstances. Those challenges have been exacerbated by the actions of the UK Government, whose decisions continue to have serious consequences for the delivery of our public services.

“Managing the impact of Westminster austerity is all too familiar. In spite of this we continue to invest in the people of Scotland, supporting a better paid public sector, delivering high-quality public services and providing welfare support that is not available in other parts of the UK. And we have done this while delivering a balanced budget every single year.

“Fiscal sustainability is about more than balancing the books – it’s about delivering value, driving reform and making strategic choices that support long-term growth. By focusing on efficient public spending, modernising services, growing our economy and taking a strategic approach to tax, we can build a stronger, fairer Scotland.”

Background

Medium Term Financial Strategy 2025

Fiscal Sustainability Delivery Plan 2025

Medium-Term Financial Strategy: Ministerial statement – gov.scot

The Scottish Government’s seventh Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) provides the economic, funding and spending outlooks for the financial years 2025-26 to 2029-30. It also presents the Government’s fiscal strategy to deliver sustainable public finances within the current constitutional settlement.

A Fiscal Sustainability Delivery Plan (FSDP) is published alongside the MTFS this year, bringing together the actions across government to deliver fiscal sustainability.

The FSDP actions include:
- a Scottish Spending Review that will set a savings target of between £300 million and £700 million a year over the five years
- improving efficiency and productivity while reforming public services, with savings growing from £600 million to £1.5 billion a year over the five years
- reducing the public sector workforce by an average of 0.5 per cent every year until 2030, with savings growing from £100 million to £700 million a year
Exact savings figures will vary on an annual basis.

These figures incorporate the total £1 billion reduction in corporate functions over five years as set out in the Public Service Reform strategy.

A framework for the Scottish Spending Review forms part of the MTFS. The review will set out multi-year allocations on capital and resource funding, and will be published alongside the next Budget in December.
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Veterans should be exempt from disability assessments as part of UK Government welfare reforms – Plaid Cymru

Source: Party of Wales

MPs are set to vote on the UK Government’s welfare reforms next Tuesday

During PMQs today (Wednesday 25 June) Ben Lake MP urged the UK Government to commit to ensuring that veterans with service-related injuries to be automatically exempt from repeat disability assessments.

The Ceredigion Preseli MP explained the way in which veterans who have lost limbs and continue to live with the trauma of war are faced with repeat disability assessment just to prove their disabilities.

The UK Government announced its plan to tighten the eligibility criteria for PIP from November 2026, potentially resulting in reduced payments for many, including veterans living with service-related disabilities.

MPs are set to vote on the reforms next Tuesday (1 July), which are expected to save the Treasury £5bn a year in savings.

However, there is growing rebellion against Keir Starmer’s plans, with over 120 of his own MPs having already publicly opposed them.



Speaking in PMQs, Ben Lake MP said:

“I should like to join the Deputy Prime Minister in thanking members of the Armed Forces community for their service. I’ve had the privilege in recent months of meeting many veterans in my own constituency, some of whom still carry the trauma of war. Some, including amputees, have told me how repeat disability assessments are too often required of them in order to access financial support.

“So does the Deputy Prime Minister agree with me that veterans with life changing service-related injuries should be exempt from repeat disability assessments in future?”

Angela Rayner MP, the Deputy Prime Minister, who was standing in for the PM today, said:

“Mr. Speaker, again as part of the reforms we want to do is to ensure that those who can never work are properly supported and not put through this endless assessment, and I thank the Right Hon. Member for raising the case.

“We are committed to renewing the nation’s contract with those that have served, with a range of support in place for veterans, including dedicated medical and physical healthcare, pathways in the NHS and in employment and in housing. The new support system VALOUR backed by £50m of funding will provide a network of support centres to connect veterans with local and national services.”

Speaking after the session, Ben Lake MP said:

“It is unfair to force people to undergo reassessments for permanent conditions and disabilities to access financial support, and it is cruel to require amputees and others with life changing injuries to continually re-prove their disablement.

“The UK Government should look to address this injustice as a matter of urgency, but instead their proposed welfare reforms risk placing further barriers for those with disabilities to overcome. In Wales, where 32% of disabled people already live in poverty, the Government’s proposed changes will simply exacerbate this injustice.

“The UK Government must take this opportunity to address the injustices of the current welfare system instead of making it even harder for those with disabilities to access the support to which they are entitled.”

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 26, 2025