Category: Child Poverty

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 24 April 2025 News release WHO calls for revitalized efforts to end malaria

    Source: World Health Organisation

    On World Malaria Day, the World Health Organization (WHO) is calling for revitalized efforts at all levels, from global policy to community action, to accelerate progress towards malaria elimination.

    In the late 1990s, world leaders laid the foundation for remarkable progress in global malaria control, including preventing more than 2 billion cases of malaria and nearly 13 million deaths since 2000.

    To date, WHO has certified 45 countries and 1 territory as malaria-free, and many countries with a low burden of malaria continue to move steadily towards the goal of elimination. Of the remaining 83 malaria-endemic countries, 25 reported fewer than 10 cases of the disease in 2023.

    However, as history has shown, these gains are fragile.

    “The history of malaria teaches us a harsh lesson: when we divert our attention, the disease resurges, taking its greatest toll on the most vulnerable,” said WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. “But the same history also shows us what’s possible: with strong political commitment, sustained investment, multisectoral action and community engagement, malaria can be defeated.”

    Investments in new interventions drive progress

    Years of investment in the development and deployment of new malaria vaccines and next-generation tools to prevent and control malaria are paying off.

    On World Malaria Day, Mali will join 19 other African countries in introducing malaria vaccines—a vital step towards protecting young children from one of the continent’s most deadly diseases. The large-scale rollout of malaria vaccines in Africa is expected to save tens of thousands of young lives every year.

    Meanwhile, the expanded use of a new generation of insecticide-treated nets is poised to lower the disease burden. According to the latest World malaria report, these new nets—which have greater impact against malaria than the standard pyrethroid-only nets—accounted for nearly 80% of all nets delivered in sub-Saharan Africa in 2023, up from 59% the previous year.

    Progress against malaria under threat

    Despite significant gains, malaria remains a major public health challenge, with nearly 600 000 lives lost to the disease in 2023 alone. The African Region is hardest hit, shouldering an estimated 95% of the malaria burden each year.

    In many areas, progress has been hampered by fragile health systems and rising threats such as drug and insecticide resistance. Many at-risk groups continue to miss out on the services they need to prevent, detect and treat malaria. Climate change, conflict, poverty and population displacement are compounding these challenges.

    WHO recently warned that the 2025 funding cuts could further derail progress in many endemic countries, putting millions of additional lives at risk. Of the 64 WHO Country Offices in malaria-endemic countries that took part in a recent WHO stock take assessment, more than half reported moderate or severe disruptions to malaria services.

    Renewed call to protect hard-won gains

    World Malaria Day 2025 – under the theme, “Malaria ends with us: reinvest, reimagine, reignite” – is calling for stepped up political and financial commitment to protect the hard-won gains against malaria.

    To reinvest, WHO joins partners and civil society in calling on malaria-endemic countries to boost domestic spending, particularly in primary health care, so that all at-risk populations can access the services they need to prevent, detect and treat malaria. The successful replenishments of the Global Fund and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, are also critical to financing malaria programmes and interventions, and accelerating progress towards the targets set in the WHO Global technical strategy for malaria 2016-2030.

    Addressing current challenges in global malaria control will also require a reimagined response through innovative tools, strategies and partnerships. New and more effective antimalarial drugs are needed, as all well as advancements in service delivery, diagnostics, insecticides, vaccines and vector control methods.

    More countries are making malaria control and elimination a national priority, including through the Yaoundé Declaration, signed in March 2024 by African Ministers of Health from 11 high burden countries.

    “Ministers committed to strengthening their health systems, stepping up domestic resources, enhancing multisectoral action and ensuring a robust accountability mechanism,” notes Dr Daniel Ngamije, Director of the WHO Global Malaria Programme. “This is the kind of leadership the world must rally behind.”

    Reigniting commitment at all levels – from communities and frontline health workers to governments, researchers, the private sector innovators and donors – will be critical to curbing and, ultimately, ending malaria.

    Notes to the editor:

    For more information on the WHO World Malaria Day campaign, visit: https://www.who.int/campaigns/world-malaria-day/2025

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI China: Peng Liyuan chats over tea with wife of Kenyan president

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, April 24 — Peng Liyuan, wife of Chinese President Xi Jinping, chatted over tea with Rachel Ruto, wife of Kenyan President William Ruto, in Beijing on Thursday.

    Hailing the longstanding friendship between China and Kenya, Peng said the two countries have had good cooperation in education, sports, agriculture and other fields, expressing her expectations for closer exchanges and stronger friendship between the two peoples.

    Peng introduced China’s achievements in targeted poverty alleviation, and expressed appreciation for Rachel’s long-term dedication to social welfare and consistent focus on women’s education and empowerment.

    Peng said she hopes that the two sides will share their experience to jointly promote poverty alleviation and the cause of women and children in both countries.

    Rachel, who is accompanying President Ruto on a state visit to China, introduced the work she has done over the years in empowering women and supporting women’s entrepreneurship.

    She praised Peng’s long-term contribution to promoting the development of the cause of women and children in African countries including Kenya.

    She said she will continue to contribute to strengthening cultural and people-to-people exchanges and deepening traditional friendship between the two countries.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Reusable period products given out at Leeds leisure centres

    Source: City of Leeds

    Leeds City Council’s leisure centres are supporting visitors and staff to make the switch to reusable period products and removing the barrier of periods when being active.

    Together with period poverty charity Freedom 4 Girls, Active Leeds are giving out free sustainable products at their leisure centres across Leeds over the next few months.

    1 in 10 girls in the UK can’t afford period products, and a lack of access can mean missing school, work and physical activity.

    Members of staff at Leeds leisure centres have shared their experiences of how periods have impacted them at work, whether it is the fear of leaking, getting caught short and not having products with them at work, navigating perimenopause and irregular periods or struggling with feeling confident to do their job whilst on their period.

    Over the next few months, Active Leeds and Freedom 4 Girls are providing the opportunity for staff and visitors to explore and take home sustainable period products, removing both financial and cultural barriers to physical activity. They are also asking for help to stock the leisure centres’ period stations through donations of disposable or sustainable menstrual products.

    At the two pilot events that have already taken place, teams handed out 208 free sustainable products including 121 period pants, 57 period swimwear and 30 reusable pads. In exchange for the free products, they collected over 100 packets and boxes of disposable products, to be able to offer free period products for all visitors at the Active Leeds sites.

    Councillor Salma Arif, Leeds City Council’s executive member for adult social care, active lifestyles and culture, said: “This initiative is about more than just access to reusable and sustainable period products, it’s about normalising conversations, building confidence, and ensuring that no one is left behind because of their period.

    “Following the success of the pilot events, we’re looking forward to rolling this out across more leisure centres over the next few months.”

    Events will take place at the following leisure centres:

    Kirkstall Leisure Centre – 21 May

    Armley Leisure Centre – 22 May

    Garforth Leisure Centre – 11 June

    Rothwell Leisure Centre – 12 June

    Middleton Leisure Centre – 25 June

    Pudsey Leisure Centre – 26 June

    Scott Hall Leisure Centre – 9 July

    Fearnville Leisure Centre – 10 July

    John Smeaton Leisure Centre – 16 July

    Morley Leisure Centre – 17 July

    Find out more about Active Leeds at https://active.leeds.gov.uk/.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Taneshka Kruger, UP ISMC: Project Manager and Coordinator, University of Pretoria

    Healthcare in Africa faces a perfect storm: high rates of infectious diseases like malaria and HIV, a rise in non-communicable diseases, and dwindling foreign aid.

    In 2021, nearly half of the sub-Saharan African countries relied on external financing for more than a third of their health expenditure. But donor fatigue and competing global priorities, such as climate change and geopolitical instability, have placed malaria control programmes under immense pressure. These funding gaps now threaten hard-won progress and ultimately malaria eradication.

    The continent’s healthcare funding crisis isn’t new. But its consequences are becoming more severe. As financial contributions shrink, Africa’s ability to respond to deadly diseases like malaria is being tested like never before.

    Malaria remains one of the world’s most pressing public health threats. According to the World Health Organization there were an estimated 263 million malaria cases and 597,000 deaths globally in 2023 – an increase of 11 million cases from the previous year.

    The WHO African region bore the brunt, with 94% of cases and 95% of deaths. It is now estimated that a child under the age of five dies roughly every 90 seconds due to malaria.

    Yet, malaria control efforts since 2000 have averted over 2 billion cases and saved nearly 13 million lives globally. Breakthroughs in diagnostics, treatment and prevention have been critical to this progress. They include insecticide-treated nets, rapid diagnostic tests, artemisinin-based combination therapies (drug combinations to prevent resistance) and malaria vaccines.

    Since 2017, the progress has been flat. If the funding gap widens, the risk is not just stagnation; it’s backsliding. Several emerging threats such as climate change and funding shortfalls could undo the gains of the early 2000s to mid-2010s.

    New challenges

    Resistance to drugs and insecticides, and strains of the malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum that standard diagnostics can’t detect, have emerged as challenges. There have also been changes in mosquito behaviour, with vectors increasingly biting outdoors, making bed nets less effective.

    Climate change is shifting malaria transmission patterns. And the invasive Asian mosquito species Anopheles stephensi is spreading across Africa, particularly in urban areas.

    Add to this the persistent issue of cross-border transmission, and growing funding shortfalls and aid cuts, and it’s clear that the fight against malaria is at a critical point.

    As the world observes World Malaria Day 2025 under the theme “Malaria ends with us: reinvest, reimagine, reignite”, the call to action is urgent. Africa must lead the charge against malaria through renewed investment, bold innovation, and revitalised political will.

    Reinvest: Prevention is the most cost-effective intervention

    We – researchers, policymakers, health workers and communities – need to think smarter about funding. The economic logic of prevention is simple. It’s far cheaper to prevent malaria than to treat it. The total cost of procuring and delivering long-lasting insecticidal nets typically ranges between US$4 and US$7 each and the nets protect families for years. In contrast, treating a single case of severe malaria may cost hundreds of dollars and involve hospitalisation.

    In high-burden countries, malaria can consume up to 40% of public health spending.

    In Tanzania, for instance, malaria contributes to 30% of the country’s total disease burden. The broader economic toll – lost productivity, work and school absenteeism, and healthcare costs – is staggering. Prevention through long-lasting insecticidal nets, chemoprevention and health education isn’t only humane; it’s fiscally responsible.

    Reimagine: New tools, local solutions

    We cannot fight tomorrow’s malaria with yesterday’s tools. Resistance, climate-driven shifts in transmission, and urbanisation are changing malaria’s patterns.

    This is why re-imagining our approach is urgent.

    African countries must scale up innovations like the RTS,S/AS01 vaccine and next-generation mosquito nets. But more importantly, they must build their own capacity to develop, test and produce these tools.

    This requires investing in research and development, regional regulatory harmonisation, and local manufacturing.

    There is also a need to build leadership capacity within malaria control programmes to manage this adaptive disease with agility and evidence-based decision-making.

    Reignite: Community and collaboration matters

    Reigniting the malaria fight means shifting power to those on the frontlines. Community health workers remain one of Africa’s greatest untapped resources. Already delivering malaria testing, treatment and health education in remote areas, they can also be trained to manage other health challenges.

    Integrating malaria prevention into broader community health services makes sense. It builds resilience, reduces duplication, and ensures continuity even when external funding fluctuates.

    Every malaria intervention delivered by a trusted, local health worker is a step towards community ownership of health.

    Strengthened collaboration between partners, governments, cross-border nations, and local communities is also needed.

    The cost of inaction is unaffordable

    Africa’s malaria challenge is part of a deeper health systems crisis. By 2030, the continent will require an additional US$371 billion annually to deliver basic primary healthcare – about US$58 per person.

    For malaria in 2023 alone, US$8.3 billion was required to meet global control and elimination targets, yet only US$4 billion was mobilised. This gap has grown consistently, increasing from US$2.6 billion in 2019 to US$4.3 billion in 2023.

    The shortfall has led to major gaps in the coverage of essential malaria interventions.

    The solution does not lie in simply spending more, but in spending smarter by focusing on prevention, building local innovation, and strengthening primary healthcare systems.

    The responsibility is collective. African governments must invest boldly and reform policies to prioritise prevention.

    Global partners must support without dominating. And communities must be empowered to take ownership of their health.

    – Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats
    – https://theconversation.com/beating-malaria-what-can-be-done-with-shrinking-funds-and-rising-threats-255126

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Taneshka Kruger, UP ISMC: Project Manager and Coordinator, University of Pretoria

    Healthcare in Africa faces a perfect storm: high rates of infectious diseases like malaria and HIV, a rise in non-communicable diseases, and dwindling foreign aid.

    In 2021, nearly half of the sub-Saharan African countries relied on external financing for more than a third of their health expenditure. But donor fatigue and competing global priorities, such as climate change and geopolitical instability, have placed malaria control programmes under immense pressure. These funding gaps now threaten hard-won progress and ultimately malaria eradication.

    The continent’s healthcare funding crisis isn’t new. But its consequences are becoming more severe. As financial contributions shrink, Africa’s ability to respond to deadly diseases like malaria is being tested like never before.

    Malaria remains one of the world’s most pressing public health threats. According to the World Health Organization there were an estimated 263 million malaria cases and 597,000 deaths globally in 2023 – an increase of 11 million cases from the previous year.

    The WHO African region bore the brunt, with 94% of cases and 95% of deaths. It is now estimated that a child under the age of five dies roughly every 90 seconds due to malaria.

    Yet, malaria control efforts since 2000 have averted over 2 billion cases and saved nearly 13 million lives globally. Breakthroughs in diagnostics, treatment and prevention have been critical to this progress. They include insecticide-treated nets, rapid diagnostic tests, artemisinin-based combination therapies (drug combinations to prevent resistance) and malaria vaccines.

    Since 2017, the progress has been flat. If the funding gap widens, the risk is not just stagnation; it’s backsliding. Several emerging threats such as climate change and funding shortfalls could undo the gains of the early 2000s to mid-2010s.

    New challenges

    Resistance to drugs and insecticides, and strains of the malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum that standard
    diagnostics can’t detect, have emerged as challenges. There have also been changes in mosquito behaviour, with vectors increasingly biting outdoors, making bed nets less effective.

    Climate change is shifting malaria transmission patterns. And the invasive Asian mosquito species Anopheles stephensi is spreading across Africa, particularly in urban areas.

    Add to this the persistent issue of cross-border transmission, and growing funding shortfalls and aid cuts, and it’s clear that the fight against malaria is at a critical point.

    As the world observes World Malaria Day 2025 under the theme “Malaria ends with us: reinvest, reimagine, reignite”, the call to action is urgent. Africa must lead the charge against malaria through renewed investment, bold innovation, and revitalised political will.

    Reinvest: Prevention is the most cost-effective intervention

    We – researchers, policymakers, health workers and communities – need to think smarter about funding. The economic logic of prevention is simple. It’s far cheaper to prevent malaria than to treat it. The total cost of procuring and delivering long-lasting insecticidal nets typically ranges between US$4 and US$7 each and the nets protect families for years. In contrast, treating a single case of severe malaria may cost hundreds of dollars and involve hospitalisation.

    In high-burden countries, malaria can consume up to 40% of public health spending.

    In Tanzania, for instance, malaria contributes to 30% of the country’s total disease burden. The broader economic toll – lost productivity, work and school absenteeism, and healthcare costs – is staggering. Prevention through long-lasting insecticidal nets, chemoprevention and health education isn’t only humane; it’s fiscally responsible.

    Reimagine: New tools, local solutions

    We cannot fight tomorrow’s malaria with yesterday’s tools. Resistance, climate-driven shifts in transmission, and urbanisation are changing malaria’s patterns.

    This is why re-imagining our approach is urgent.

    African countries must scale up innovations like the RTS,S/AS01 vaccine and next-generation mosquito nets. But more importantly, they must build their own capacity to develop, test and produce these tools.

    This requires investing in research and development, regional regulatory harmonisation, and local manufacturing.

    There is also a need to build leadership capacity within malaria control programmes to manage this adaptive disease with agility and evidence-based decision-making.

    Reignite: Community and collaboration matters

    Reigniting the malaria fight means shifting power to those on the frontlines. Community health workers remain one of Africa’s greatest untapped resources. Already delivering malaria testing, treatment and health education in remote areas, they can also be trained to manage other health challenges.

    Integrating malaria prevention into broader community health services makes sense. It builds resilience, reduces duplication, and ensures continuity even when external funding fluctuates.

    Every malaria intervention delivered by a trusted, local health worker is a step towards community ownership of health.

    Strengthened collaboration between partners, governments, cross-border nations, and local communities is also needed.

    The cost of inaction is unaffordable

    Africa’s malaria challenge is part of a deeper health systems crisis. By 2030, the continent will require an additional US$371 billion annually to deliver basic primary healthcare – about US$58 per person.

    For malaria in 2023 alone, US$8.3 billion was required to meet global control and elimination targets, yet only US$4 billion was mobilised. This gap has grown consistently, increasing from US$2.6 billion in 2019 to US$4.3 billion in 2023.

    The shortfall has led to major gaps in the coverage of essential malaria interventions.

    The solution does not lie in simply spending more, but in spending smarter by focusing on prevention, building local innovation, and strengthening primary healthcare systems.

    The responsibility is collective. African governments must invest boldly and reform policies to prioritise prevention.

    Global partners must support without dominating. And communities must be empowered to take ownership of their health.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Beating malaria: what can be done with shrinking funds and rising threats – https://theconversation.com/beating-malaria-what-can-be-done-with-shrinking-funds-and-rising-threats-255126

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi addresses Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition, urging jointly advancing global climate governance

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Xi addresses Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition, urging jointly advancing global climate governance

    Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a speech via video link at the Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition, April 23, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, April 23 — Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech via video link at the Leaders Meeting on Climate and the Just Transition on Wednesday.

    Noting that this year marks the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement and the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN), Xi said as unprecedented global changes unfold at a faster pace, humanity has come to a new crossroads.

    Although some major country’s persistent pursuit of unilateralism and protectionism has seriously impacted international rules and the international order, history will, as always, move forward through twists and turns, Xi said.

    “As long as we enhance confidence, solidarity and cooperation, we will overcome the headwinds and steadily move forward global climate governance and all progressive endeavors of the world,” he said.

    Xi shared four points in this regard.

    “First, we must adhere to multilateralism,” he said, adding that all countries should firmly safeguard the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, and firmly safeguard international fairness and justice.

    “It is important for all countries to champion the rule of law, honor commitments, prioritize green and low-carbon development, and jointly respond to the climate crisis through multilateral governance,” said Xi.

    Second, the international cooperation must be deepened, he said. “We should rise above estrangement and conflict with openness and inclusiveness, boost technological innovation and industrial transformation through cooperation, and facilitate the free flow of quality green technologies and products, so that they can be accessible, affordable and beneficial for all countries, especially the developing ones.”

    China will vigorously deepen South-South cooperation and continue to provide help for fellow developing countries to the best of its capability, added Xi.

    “Third, we must accelerate the just transition,” Xi said, adding that green transformation must be people-centered and pursued in a way that advances the well-being of people and climate governance in tandem, and strike a balance between multiple goals including environmental protection, economic growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation.

    “Developed countries are obliged to extend assistance and support to developing countries, help drive the global shift toward green and low-carbon development, and contribute to the common and long-term well-being of people of all countries,” said Xi.

    Fourth, results-oriented actions must be strengthened, according to Xi.

    “All parties should do their utmost to formulate and implement their program of action for nationally determined contributions (NDCs) while coordinating economic development and energy transition,” he said.

    China will announce its 2035 NDCs covering all economic sectors and all greenhouse gases before the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Belem, Brazil, added Xi.

    Xi highlighted that harmony between man and nature is a defining feature of Chinese modernization, and China is a steadfast actor and major contributor in promoting global green development.

    “Since I announced China’s goals for carbon peaking and carbon neutrality five years ago, we have built the world’s largest and fastest-growing renewable energy system as well as the largest and most complete new energy industrial chain,” he said, adding that China also leads the world in the speed and scale of “greening,” contributing a quarter of the world’s newly-added area of afforestation.

    “However the world may change, China will not slow down its climate actions, will not reduce its support for international cooperation, and will not cease its efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind,” said Xi.

    China is willing to work with all parties to earnestly honor the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, do the utmost respectively and collectively, and build a clean, beautiful, and sustainable world together, he added.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: VANUATU: Families find climate-smart ways to grow crops 18 months on from cyclone devastation

    Source: Save the Children

    Families in Vanuatu are adopting climate-smart agricultural techniques to improve food security, such as growing climate resistant crops, to prepare for future climate-driven disasters in the wake of devastating Tropical Cyclone Lola 18 months ago.
    Tropical Cyclone Lola was one of the most powerful off-season storms to strike the Pacific when it made landfall in October 2023 with wind speeds of up to 215 km/h, destroying homes, schools and plantations, claiming the lives of at least four people [2] and affecting about 91,000 people [1]. 
    Recovery efforts were made significantly more challenging when Vanuatu’s capital Port Vila was then hit by a 7.3 magnitude earthquake in December last year, claiming 14 lives and destroying critical infrastructure.
    Madleen, 11, said when the cyclone hit, her family’s crops were destroyed, leaving them short of food. 
    “It destroyed the food crops. When we came outside, we saw the crops were destroyed. The banana tree was just bearing fruit and it was destroyed. And we didn’t have enough food. We were eating rice, but we were almost running short. We were not eating well, we ate just enough. I felt bad.”  
    After the cyclone, a shortage of nutritious food put children at risk of hunger as well as diseases like diarrhea, with typically an increase in the number of children hospitalised for diarrhea following cyclones, Save the Children said. 
    Vanuatu is already one of the most climate disaster-prone countries in the world, and scientists say tropical cyclones will become more extreme as the climate crisis worsens. This will disproportionately impact children due to food shortages, disruption to education and psychosocial trauma associated with experiencing disasters. 
    Save the Children, alongside Vanuatu’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, Fisheries, and Biosecurity (MALFFB) and local partners, is supporting Madleen and her family through the Tropical Cyclone Lola Recovery Programme, which is helping improve food security and resilience in communities impacted by the cyclone. 
    As a part of the Recovery Programme, over 1,100 households have received climate-resistant [3] seeds from a seedbank. These seeds, for growing watermelon, papaya, Chinese cabbage, tomato, capsicum and cucumber, are proven to perform in Vanuatu’s changing climate, with tolerance to high rainfall, drought, pests and disease. Farmers are encouraged to preserve the seeds from crops and sell them back to the seed bank. 
    The programme is also training communities in other climate-smart agricultural techniques such as growing smaller fruit trees that are robust enough to withstand strong cyclone winds.
    Save the Children has also built a collapsible nursery for plants in Madleen’s community that can be taken down when a cyclone is predicted, so saplings and trees can be stored, protected and replanted after it passes.
    Save the Children Vanuatu Country Director, Polly Banks, said:
    “In just 18 months, people in Vanuatu have been deeply shaken by a devastating cyclone and a powerful earthquake.
    “Children have borne the brunt of this, with food taken off their plates, crops destroyed, homes and schools damaged and diseases on the rise. As the climate crisis accelerates, we must work with communities to strengthen their resilience, so children and their families are better equipped to face whatever comes next.
    “We’re working in partnership with the Government of Vanuatu and local partners to help communities build the skills and resources they need to support themselves when future cyclones and disasters strike.”
    Save the Children has been working in in Vanuatu for more than 40 years to make sure children are learning, protected from harm, and grow up healthy and strong.
    Notes:
    This project was also supported by the New Zealand Government’s Disaster Response Partnership programme.
    [3] Open-pollinated seeds (OP seeds) produce plants that can reproduce true to type, meaning farmers can save seeds from their harvest and plant them in the next season with similar results. OP varieties used and recommended by the Vanuatu Agriculture Research and Technical Centre are often locally adapted, meaning they’ve been trialed and selected for their performance in Vanuatu’s climate – including tolerance to high rainfall, drought, pests and diseases. These seeds have genetic diversity, allowing plants to better adapt to changing weather patterns.
    About Save the Children NZ:
    Save the Children works in 120 countries across the world. The organisation responds to emergencies and works with children and their communities to ensure they survive, learn and are protected.
    Save the Children NZ currently supports international programmes in Fiji, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Laos, Nepal, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Areas of work include child protection, education and literacy, disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, and alleviating child poverty.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Evans, Larson, DeLauro, Frankel to Introduce ‘Claws Off Social Security’ Act

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Dwight Evans (2nd District of Pennsylvania)

    Democrats push to protect struggling seniors from Trump’s drastic ‘clawbacks’

    WASHINGTON (April 15, 2025) – U.S. Reps. Dwight Evans (D-PA), John Larson (D-CT), Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and Lois Frankel (D-FL) announced they will introduce the “Claws Off Social Security” Act, aimed at protecting struggling seniors from drastic “clawback” payments ordered by the Trump administration.

    “Under a new Trump administration policy, seniors who received an overpayment because of someone else’s mistake are seeing up to their entire checks withheld, forcing some to choose between basics like food, rent and medicine. Our bill would cap these ‘clawbacks’ at a reasonable 10 percent of monthly benefits, restoring a policy the Biden administration put in place last year,” said Evans, who serves on the House Ways and Means Committee, which oversees Social Security.

    “I’m proud to have three Social Security champions — Representatives John Larson, Rosa DeLauro and Lois Frankel – as co-lead sponsors on this bill. We are telling the Trump administration ‘Claws Off’ people’s earned benefits!

    The two-page bill would:

    • cap the Social Security Administration’s overpayment withholding rate at 10 percent of a Social Security benefit on a monthly basis;
    • allow beneficiaries the option to repay overpayment in larger amounts if they choose; and
    • allow for an exception in cases of fraud.

    “Elon Musk and Donald Trump will not lose a minute of sleep over their new policy that will mean seniors may lose their entire Social Security check through no fault of their own,” said Larson, ranking member of the Ways and Means Social Security Subcommittee. “Social Security is an earned benefit that our seniors rely on to put food on the table, afford their medications, and keep a roof over their heads. Make no mistake about it – these ‘claw backs’ are about ripping checks out of seniors’ hands to pay for tax cuts for billionaires. Our Claws Off Social Security Act is a common-sense bill to restore the Social Security Administration’s policy protecting beneficiaries from being excessively penalized for accidental overpayments. Congress must act to defend our seniors’ hard-earned benefits from this cruel policy.”

    “If the government makes a mistake & overpays your monthly Social Security, the government can freeze your benefits,” said DeLauro, ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee. “I led the charge to fix overpayment errors without complete clawbacks, but now, President Trump is moving policies that will rollback that progress while driving up costs for seniors. Americans rely on these benefits—they shouldn’t be punished for government errors.”

    “For so many seniors, their Social Security check isn’t extra – it’s everything,” said Frankel, who serves on the Appropriations subcommittee that oversees funding for the Social Security Administration. “It puts food on the table, keeps the lights on, and pays for the medicine they need. But under Donald Trump’s cruel new rule, seniors who’ve done nothing wrong could suddenly lose all of their income overnight – forcing them to go months or even years without a dime to live on. That’s just wrong. Our bill will restore fairness and common sense by capping repayments at 10 percent, just like it was under President Biden – because no senior should be punished into poverty for a government mistake.”

    Also co-sponsoring the bill are Reps. Nanette Barragán (D-CA), Sanford Bishop (D-GA), Brendan Boyle (D-PA), Danny Davis (D-IL), Maxine Dexter (D-OR), Lloyd Doggett and Sylvia Garcia (both D-TX), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC), Gwen Moore (D-WI), Chellie Pingree (D-ME), Delia Ramirez (D-IL), Linda Sánchez (D-CA), Terri Sewell (D-AL), Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA), Tom Suozzi (D-NY), Rashida Tlaib and Shri Thanedar (both D-MI), and Paul Tonko (D-NY).

    Organizations endorsing the bill include the Philadelphia Corporation for Aging, Justice in Aging, National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, and Social Security Works. 

    The bill is expected to be referred to the Ways and Means Committee, on which Evans, Larson, Boyle, Davis, Doggett, Moore, Sánchez, Sewell and Suozzi serve.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Meeting in Geneva Concludes with Key Recommendations on AI Governance and Launches HUMAN-AI-T: A Global Initiative to Integrate Humanity into Artificial Intelligence

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Meeting in Geneva Concludes with Key Recommendations on AI Governance and Launches HUMAN-AI-T: A Global Initiative to Integrate Humanity into Artificial Intelligence
    UNAOC AI for #OneHumanity: Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence

    Geneva, Switzerland – April 23, 2025 –WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”) (SIX: WIHN, NASDAQ: WKEY), a leading global cybersecurity, blockchain, and IoT company, today announces that United Nations Alliance of Civilizations meeting in Geneva concludes with key recommendations on AI Governance and launches HUMAN-AI-T.

    Staying true to its founding motto “Many cultures, one humanity,” the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), established in 2005 by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, continues to promote cultural diversity, interfaith dialogue, and mutual respect. Today, these foundational principles are essential to shaping the future of artificial intelligence.

    At a high-level meeting held at the United Nations Office in Geneva, UNAOC and its public and private sector partners launched HUMAN-AI-T, a transformative global initiative designed to align the evolution of artificial intelligence with universal ethical values, cultural heritage, and human dignity.

    Building on the momentum of its two previous editions, the third “AI for #OneHumanity” summit gathered a diverse group of global actors—governments, international organizations, business leaders, innovators, academics, media, and civil society—to explore pathways toward inclusive and responsible AI development in the service of the common good.

    Organized by UNAOC in collaboration with the Onuart Foundation, the two-day forum featured thematic sessions on the role of AI in intercultural dialogue, sustainable development, and collective human progress, while addressing critical issues such as cultural bias, AI governance, and equitable access.

    Notable participants from Spain included:

    • José Manuel Albares, Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of Spain;
    • Miguel Ángel Moratinos, former Foreign Minister and current High Representative of UNAOC;
    • José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, former Prime Minister of Spain and President of the Advisory Board of the Onuart Foundation.

    Key Points:

    1. Ethical AI Governance:
      Minister Albares emphasized the urgent need for ethical AI development rooted in human rights. He announced Spain’s intention to propose a national Artificial Intelligence Governance Law, aimed at ensuring AI applications respect fundamental rights and prioritize dignity, inclusion, and human-centered innovation through multilateral frameworks.
    2. Global Cooperation and Risks:
      Albares warned of the growing dangers of misinformation and the irresponsible use of autonomous military technologies. He called for greater UN involvement to ensure no one is left behind and to maintain a fair and balanced multilateral system in AI development and regulation.
    3. Moratinos’ Concerns:
      Miguel Ángel Moratinos highlighted the risk of AI deepening global inequality or undermining shared values. He stressed that AI is no longer a future issue—it is already at the heart of our communications, economies, and daily lives, and urgently requires global oversight guided by human dignity.
    4. Zapatero’s Message:
      In a video message, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero expressed optimism about AI’s potential to address humanity’s most urgent needs: peace, democracy, and the eradication of poverty. “We are at a turning point,” he said. “Artificial intelligence must be a tool for peace and social justice. It must help us end hunger, combat inequality, and strengthen democratic values. Let’s ensure that AI, like every great human creation, serves to elevate the human spirit.”

    The opening session, titled “Towards One Humanity: Human-Centered Development Supported by AI,” featured remarks by Moratinos, Dr. José Luis Bonet Ferrer (President of the Onuart Foundation), and Rima Al-Chikh (UNOG), followed by opening addresses from Minister Albares, H.E. Burak Akçapar, Permanent Representative of Türkiye, and former President Zapatero.

    A main session on ethical and equitable AI included insights from David Carmona (VP & CTO of Microsoft), Carlos Moreira (CEO of WISeKey), Francisco Hortigüela (President of Ametic), Moulaye Bouamatou (President of Banque de Mauritanie), and Julian Isla (President of Fundación29), moderated by Fernando Zallo from the Onuart Foundation.

    Other panels focused on the inclusive future of AI, with contributions from Bilel Jamoussi (ITU), Jon Hernández, Enrique Arribas, Alberto Díez, Loida Peral, Matthew Griffin, Danilo McGarry, and Yujun Pian, moderated by Julie Ladanan of UNAOC.

    The session “Artificial Intelligence: Transforming Human Identity and Behavior in the Digital Age” featured video contributions from Dr. Rafael Yuste, Director of Columbia University’s NeuroTechnology Center and President of the NeuroRights Foundation, and Jared Genser, General Counsel of the same foundation. The session was moderated by Juan Carlos Gutiérrez of the Onuart Foundation.

    A complementary session on “AI and Media in the Information Age” addressed challenges such as disinformation and hate speech, with contributions from Catherine Bokonga-Fiankan (President of the Association of UN Correspondents in Geneva), Yfat Barak-Cheney (World Jewish Congress), Eduardo Solana (University of Geneva), Axel Hörger (former CEO of UBS Germany), Lluis Vilella (CEO of K-BOX), Sixtine Crutchfield (Art Director at WiseArt), filmmaker Devy Man, and music writer Soren Sorensen (aka Dorian Gray), moderated by Nihal Saad, Director of UNAOC.

    The HUMAN-AI-T initiative was presented as a secure and globally accessible digital platform to preserve humanity’s ethical, philosophical, and cultural legacy. Inspired by the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, it will function as an ethical digital vault, housing verified content—from religious texts and philosophical works to legal codes, international treaties, and indigenous knowledge—digitally signed and protected by post-quantum cryptographic technologies to ensure long-term trust, traceability, and integrity.

    As general artificial intelligence (AGI) and quantum computing advance, HUMAN-AI-T responds to the increasing ethical risks posed by superintelligent systems by anchoring AI development in shared human values and global moral frameworks. The initiative aligns with the UN General Assembly resolution on safe and trustworthy AI, aiming to make AI a platform for inclusion, cooperation, and ethical progress.

    “At the heart of AI must be the heart of humanity,” emphasized Miguel Ángel Moratinos. “This is not just a technological issue—it is a civilizational imperative. We must develop AI to serve people, not the other way around. That requires an inclusive model centered on dignity.”

    Dr. Bonet Ferrer added: “For AI to truly contribute to human progress, we must incorporate the spirit of One Humanity into its design and governance. Technology must unite us, honor our diversity, and strengthen our shared destiny.”

    Jared Genser also highlighted: “As neurotechnologies and AI converge, we must update human rights frameworks to protect mental sovereignty. HUMAN-AI-T is an urgent ethical safeguard anchoring these tools in principles from the outset.”

    Carlos Moreira, founder and CEO of WISeKey, concluded: “We are approaching a threshold where machines may surpass human intelligence. If we do not act now, we risk losing control over the values embedded in these systems. HUMAN-AI-T is our response: to ensure that the intelligence we build remains deeply human—now and for future generations.”

    Finally, Che Fu, founder and president of the World Public Economic Organization (WPEO) and president of the East-West Cultural Exchange Promotion Agency of Sichuan, remarked: “Artificial intelligence has a unique power to build bridges between civilizations. It is a new language of humanity—one that must be shaped with ethics and cultural understanding. We must come together, East and West, to ensure this technology connects us. I warmly invite the UN Alliance of Civilizations to hold the 4th AI for #OneHumanity Conference in China on January 20, 2026, where we can continue this global dialogue and strengthen our shared commitment to a human-centered digital future.”

    The event concluded with closing reflections from H.E. Mr. Moratinos and Dr. Bonet Ferrer, marking the beginning of a new chapter in the evolution of AI—one guided not only by algorithms and code, but by consciousness, cooperation, and compassion.

    #HUMANAIT #QuantumRisks #AGI #AIForGood #OneHumanity #TrustworthyAI #EthicalAI #China2026

    About WISeKey

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”, SIX: WIHN; Nasdaq: WKEY) is a global leader in cybersecurity, digital identity, and IoT solutions platform. It operates as a Swiss-based holding company through several operational subsidiaries, each dedicated to specific aspects of its technology portfolio. The subsidiaries include (i) SEALSQ Corp (Nasdaq: LAES), which focuses on semiconductors, PKI, and post-quantum technology products, (ii) WISeKey SA which specializes in RoT and PKI solutions for secure authentication and identification in IoT, Blockchain, and AI, (iii) WISeSat AG which focuses on space technology for secure satellite communication, specifically for IoT applications, (iv) WISe.ART Corp which focuses on trusted blockchain NFTs and operates the WISe.ART marketplace for secure NFT transactions, and (v) SEALCOIN AG which focuses on decentralized physical internet with DePIN technology and house the development of the SEALCOIN platform.

    Each subsidiary contributes to WISeKey’s mission of securing the internet while focusing on their respective areas of research and expertise. Their technologies seamlessly integrate into the comprehensive WISeKey platform. WISeKey secures digital identity ecosystems for individuals and objects using Blockchain, AI, and IoT technologies. With over 1.6 billion microchips deployed across various IoT sectors, WISeKey plays a vital role in securing the Internet of Everything. The company’s semiconductors generate valuable Big Data that, when analyzed with AI, enable predictive equipment failure prevention. Trusted by the OISTE/WISeKey cryptographic Root of Trust, WISeKey provides secure authentication and identification for IoT, Blockchain, and AI applications. The WISeKey Root of Trust ensures the integrity of online transactions between objects and people. For more information on WISeKey’s strategic direction and its subsidiary companies, please visit www.wisekey.com.

    Disclaimer
    This communication expressly or implicitly contains certain forward-looking statements concerning WISeKey International Holding Ltd and its business. Such statements involve certain known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which could cause the actual results, financial condition, performance or achievements of WISeKey International Holding Ltd to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. WISeKey International Holding Ltd is providing this communication as of this date and does not undertake to update any forward-looking statements contained herein as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities, and it does not constitute an offering prospectus within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (“FinSA”), the FinSa’s predecessor legislation or advertising within the meaning of the FinSA. Investors must rely on their own evaluation of WISeKey and its securities, including the merits and risks involved. Nothing contained herein is, or shall be relied on as, a promise or representation as to the future performance of WISeKey.

    Press and Investor Contacts

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd
    Company Contact: Carlos Moreira
    Chairman & CEO
    Tel: +41 22 594 3000
    info@wisekey.com 
    WISeKey Investor Relations (US) 
    The Equity Group Inc.
    Lena Cati
    Tel: +1 212 836-9611
    lcati@equityny.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 – A10-0068/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023

    (2024/2052(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Investment Bank Group (‘EIB Group’) 2023 activity report of 1 February 2024 entitled ‘A Blueprint for Sustainable Living’, and to the EIB Group document of 2 February 2023 entitled ‘EIB Group Operational Plan 2023-2025’,–  having regard to the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’, ‘the Bank’) Investment Report 2023/2024 entitled ‘Transforming for competitiveness’, published on 7 February 2024,

     having regard to the EIB document of 8 May 2023 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the EIB Energy Lending Policy’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2023, published on 1 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 27 November 2023 entitled ‘The EIB Group PATH Framework – Version 1.2 of November 2023 – Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement’,

     having regard to the EIB Group and EIB documents of 21 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap’ and of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘EIB Global Strategic Roadmap’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2023, published on 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB information note of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘The European Investment Bank’s approach to human rights’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Report 2023, published on 10 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 14 October 2024 entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’,

     having regard to the EIB publication of 23 September 2024 entitled ‘EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2023’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 15 July 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions 2023’,–  having regard to the EIB report of 19 October 2023 entitled ‘EIB Investment Survey 2023 – European Union overview’,

      having regard to the EIB Group report of 26 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group support for EU businesses: Evidence of impact in addressing market failures’,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

     having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 22/2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 29 December 2023 entitled ‘European Investment Bank Group Risk Management Disclosure Report – June 2023’,

     having regard to the joint communication of 19 March 2025 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0068/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB stands as the world’s largest multilateral development bank; whereas the EIB is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration; whereas the EIB’s key priorities include providing funding for projects to foster European integration and social cohesion; whereas the EIF acts as a dedicated body for supporting the European Union’s policy objectives in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion;

    B. whereas, as a bank owned by the EU Member States, the EIB is governed by a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and a Management Committee, and it maintains robust internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (60 %), the EU (30 %) and financial institutions (10 %) from the Member States, the UK and Türkiye, and is managed by the General Meeting of EIF shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive, with independent internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit, some of which are shared at the Group level;

    C. whereas both the EIB and the EIF operate within a competitive market but are held to high standards of transparency and stakeholder engagement as EU bodies;

    D. whereas the EIB Group promotes EU policies both within and outside the EU and collaborates closely with other EU and national institutions, aligning its financing with the EU’s political priorities; whereas the EIB Group outlined eight strategic priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027: climate action, digital transformation, defence, cohesion, agriculture, social infrastructure, external financing and promoting the Capital Markets Union;

    E. whereas the EIB is also tasked with securing resources through borrowing activities, which are crucial for implementing the EU’s policies;

    F. whereas the European Council’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029 envisages an enhanced role for the EIB Group as a driver of EU defence and security, and emphasises the need to boost EU competitiveness and improve citizens’ economic and social well-being through significant collective investment efforts, leveraging both public and private funding;

    G. whereas the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness[1] proposed numerous ways to expand the EIB’s role in financing EU policies and to enable the EIB to assume more risk;

    H. whereas the EIB Group’s core mission is to bolster Europe’s potential for job creation and economic growth; whereas its investments should tackle inequalities by improving access to jobs, training opportunities, housing and education in order to address poverty and unemployment; whereas it is crucial to overcome barriers to financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps; whereas public lending and guarantee schemes serve as vital countercyclical policy tools, especially during economic downturns, and help mitigate structural market failures;

    I. whereas the EIB is a cornerstone of the European financial architecture for development and the largest multilateral lender in the EU’s neighbouring regions, including the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa; whereas the EIB is expected to help close the gap in productive investment between Europe and its main competitors by increasing investment in innovation, communication technology and intellectual property;

    J. whereas the success of the EU’s policy objectives and their effective implementation increasingly depend on the EIB Group; whereas the depth and quality of Parliament’s oversight of the EIB’s financial operations should therefore be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;

    K. whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency, and robust measures must be implemented and regularly updated to combat financial fraud, corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and both tax evasion and avoidance; whereas the EIB Group has a control framework aimed at preventing and mitigating sanctions risks;

    L. whereas the EIB Group adheres to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s definition of compliance risk, with the aim of preventing the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or damage to reputation; whereas the Bank takes appropriate measures to mitigate such risks by ensuring strict compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks, both at EU and international level;

    Financial operations and performance

    1. Acknowledges that the EIB has operated effectively and efficiently in a landscape marked by significant global challenges, including geopolitical tensions, climate change impacts and other factors influencing the global economy; suggests exploring both the EIB’s effectiveness and efficiency through thoughtful analysis, particularly focusing on the impact on competitiveness and growth;

    2. Recognises that EIB financing is becoming increasingly crucial in the context of high interest rates and constrained public finances; expects the EIB, in the context of a challenging economic outlook and increased global competition, to address constraints to EU competitiveness, such as volatile energy prices, skills shortages in key sectors and insufficient investments in innovation and new technologies;

    3. Notes that the EIB Group achieved strong consolidated results amounting to EUR 2.272 billion in 2023 under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), compared to EUR 2.327 billion in 2022, reflecting a year-on-year decrease of 2.4 %; calls for a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to this decrease, especially since the period was marked by steady economic growth; observes that EIB reserves reached over EUR 56 billion in 2023, up from EUR 53.9 billion in 2022 and EUR 36 billion in 2014;

    4. Notes that the EIB’s total liquidity ratio remained well within internal limits to the end of 2023 and that the EIB’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stood at 33.1 % in 2023, significantly higher than the average ratio of significant institutions supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) at that time; emphasises that maintaining the EIB’s AAA rating with a ‘stable’ outlook is crucial for securing favourable market financing at preferential rates and should be preserved; underlines that the EIB’s high credit standing is key to its successful business model;

    5. Calls on the EIB to maintain its strong capital position and consistently high profits, but notes that the Bank has potential to absorb potential fluctuations in returns without compromising shareholder capital or its credit rating, has the capacity to take on more risk in strategic investments and is well-equipped to invest more in higher-risk innovative projects where private capital remains hesitant;

    6. Highlights that the EIB’s total disbursements reached EUR 54.4 billion in 2023, with EUR 53.4 billion from its own resources, compared to EUR 54.3 billion (EUR 53.3 billion from its own resources) in 2022; observes that the EIF’s disbursements on private equity investments amounted to EUR 139.7 million in 2023, compared to EUR 113.7 million in 2022; notes that, according to an economic model developed jointly by the EIB’s Economics Department and the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the EIB Group’s overall investment within the EU in 2023 is expected to create around 1 460 000 new jobs in the EU-27 by 2027 and boost the EU’s GDP by 1.03 percentage points; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments to maximise their impact across all EU regions, promoting cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the Union, with particular attention to under-represented and less developed areas;

    7. Recalls that the EIB’s Statute mandates geographical balance among its staff and that the selection of staff members must be based on merit, while also considering fair representation of nationals from all Member States; encourages the Bank to continuously monitor geographical balance among its staff and to adjust the recruitment process accordingly, if needed;

    8. Welcomes the fact that the EIB Group upholds a rigorous policy against tax fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorism financing;

    InvestEU, the simplification of the multiannual financial framework, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    9. Welcomes the adoption, on 13 December 2023, of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026, which outlines the priorities and activities for implementing the EIB Group’s strategy over the next three years; calls for adjustments to new market conditions, including simplification and a reduction of bureaucracy to remove barriers to financing for SMEs, which must be significantly increased; acknowledges that increasing higher-risk activities and mandates is crucial for providing effective support to high value-added and innovative sectors;

    10. Recalls that the EIB Group has been allocated 75 % (EUR 19.6 billion) of the EU budgetary guarantee under the InvestEU Regulation[2]; highlights that, in 2023 alone, the EIB approved 30 operations under InvestEU totalling EUR 9.1 billion; believes that in order to stay competitive, significant investments are needed, primarily from the private sector; believes that focusing on innovative projects, start-ups and scale-ups would enhance European competitiveness and growth; notes that this requires mobilising private investments; calls, therefore, on the EIB to play a more significant role in strategic de-risking through guarantees, thereby encouraging private capital investment;

    11. Stresses that, within the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the EIB manages 87 mandates from the Commission, increasing to about 130 if those relating to shared management and assigned by local governments and the Member States are included, and notes that the EIB produces no fewer than 457 reports a year for these; points out that de-bureaucratisation and simplification are deemed necessary to enable better use of resources;

    12. Emphasises that the EIB is managing six Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) mandates in four Member States, signed in 2021 (Greece and Italy), 2022 (Romania) and 2024 (Spain), totalling EUR 8.7 billion; acknowledges that the adoption of ‘financing not linked to costs’ instruments, which have significantly expanded with the RRF, inherently raises the risk of errors and double funding; expresses its concern about the transparency, auditing and monitoring of the implementation of the RRF; calls on the EIB to cooperate with Member States to address government capacity constraints and the lack of technical skills so as to ensure that RRF resources are managed as effectively as possible, in alignment with national structures and complying with all RRF reporting requirements, especially in the implementation of investment projects and reforms; urges the Commission and the EIB, in its advisory role, to refrain from proposing new financing mechanisms based on the RRF model without taking corrective measures, including in the upcoming post-2027 multiannual financial framework; stresses that, while the EIB seeks simplification, it must not compromise the soundness of EU resource management or the ability to maintain oversight and accountability, as mandated by the Treaties;

    Energy security

    13. Notes the EIB’s continued support for security of supply, which mainly takes the form of reinforcing electricity grids and cross-border infrastructure, of reducing energy demand through energy efficiency projects and of fostering low-carbon power generation; commends the fact that the EIB has supported new dimensions of energy security, such as demand response and energy storage, and has promoted the development of a sustainable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) needed for the energy transition; calls for an urgent analysis of the real impact of these projects implemented to date, especially of their impact on the availability and cost of energy and thus on the general competitiveness of European companies;

    14. Reiterates the need to address energy poverty and emphasises the need for a fair and inclusive energy transition; recalls that the energy crisis is exacerbating inflation, increasing food insecurity and straining household budgets; encourages the EIB to leverage the Just Transition Mechanism and the Modernisation Fund to support regions and populations most affected by the energy transition; stresses the importance of using the Just Transition Mechanism to support workers and regions affected by the phase out of fossil fuels, ensuring access to retraining and quality jobs; recognises that numerous sectors are grappling with challenges stemming from the combined effects of adaption to European Green Deal objectives and the repercussions of the energy crisis and inflation; stresses that accelerating the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies requires bringing their costs to a level that is competitive with fossil fuels and adjusting to the ongoing reform of the green policies;

    15. Acknowledges that the REPowerEU plan is a crucial new element in the EU policy response to the energy crisis; notes that, in July 2023, the EIB Group increased the financing targets of the October 2022 commitment from EUR 30.0 billion until 2027 to EUR 45.0 billion (REPowerEU+), in order to scale up its efforts to support the EU’s energy security; calls for a clear overview of potential double funding of energy projects;

    16. Underlines that in 2023, the EIB provided approximately EUR 21.4 billion in financing for energy-related projects, of which around EUR 19.8 billion in the EU and EUR 1.6 billion outside the EU; considers it necessary to increase not only the volume of financing for energy-related projects, but also the efficiency of the investments; underlines, in this regard, the importance of the EIB’s combined offer of competent technical assistance and innovative financial support, and encourages the Bank to expand the range of innovative financing products offered to economic operators, going beyond the standard market offer;

    17. Believes that hydrogen and its derivatives, particularly when sourced from renewable energy, can significantly contribute to the EU’s decarbonisation goals and reduce dependence on fossil fuels; urges the EIB to take a leading role in mobilising private investments, which are essential for scaling up hydrogen production across the EU, while ensuring technological neutrality and supporting a diverse range of innovative solutions for decarbonisation, including further scientific research aimed at enhancing and stabilising the efficiency of hydrogen technology; encourages the Bank to consider the cost-effectiveness of such projects from the perspective of their total life cycle;

    Defence and security policy

    18. Welcomes the significant role that the EIB Group plays in supporting the EU’s defence and security policy by providing funding and leveraging private investment to enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses the importance of the EIB’s investment capabilities, supporting initiatives that contribute to strengthening the EU’s defence industry, advancing cybersecurity infrastructure and promoting innovation in critical defence technologies;

    19. Appreciates that security and defence is set as one of the Bank’s core priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027; highlights that in May 2024, the EIB’s Board of Directors approved the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan, which follows the EIB Group 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology, in order to enhance support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes, with satisfaction, that EIB Group support is provided to SMEs and innovative start-ups within the security and defence sector under the ‘dual-use’ principle, upholding the ‘credible civil use’ criterion, but waiving the revenue test; welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors of 21 March 2025 to expand the Bank’s eligibilities for financing Europe’s security and defence industry and infrastructure, by ensuring that excluded activities are as limited as possible in scope;

    20. Welcomes the EIB’s targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure and emphasises the need for strategic investment in technologies that serve both civilian and defence purposes, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; calls on the EIB Group to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy;

    21. Stresses the importance of SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps in the security and defence industry and in developing a common European market for defence; believes that smaller actors play a crucial role in strengthening the Union’s capacity and autonomy to develop innovative defence products; encourages the EIB to further support cross-border research and development (R&D) cooperation, particularly by paving the way for smaller actors to take part in the defence supply chains; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage investment by commercial banks in the same area and considers it necessary to increase the flexibility of lending to SMEs in this regard;

    22. Notes that the resources allocated to support the defence and security sector mainly come from the European Defence Fund (EDF) (EUR 8 billion), the EIB Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) (EUR 8 billion) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) (EUR 1.5 billion); calls for a dedicated capital allocation on defence and the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments in order to meet the ambitious role of contributing to Europe’s peace and security set by the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 for the EIB Group; welcomes the integration of the EIB’s existing EUR 8 billion SESI into a cross-cutting and permanent public policy goal and the removal of a predefined ceiling for financing in this area; believes that these measures will allow the Bank to respond to the investment needs in security and defence, while safeguarding its operations and strong financial position; believes that the decision by the Board of Governors in June 2024 to increase the gearing ratio of the Bank will enable increased investments in areas of strategic importance, including in security and defence;

    23. Underlines the added value of the innovative measures that the EIB has adopted to accelerate investments in security and defence, and of the ‘one-stop shop’ that acts as the single point of entry for clients and external stakeholders, to whom it offers expert assistance to streamline access and speed up deployment of financing available under the SESI; encourages the EIB to continue developing and implementing agreed upon measures that simplify client procedures and further accelerate investment processes, while ensuring that the AAA rating is preserved;

    24. Notes, with appreciation, that in June 2023, the EIB approved an increase in SESI for security investments in the EU from EUR 6.0 billion to EUR 8.0 billion for the period from 2022 to 2027, also including the space and cybersecurity sectors; encourages the EIB to strengthen institutional partnerships with the EU Agency for the Space Programme and other potentially relevant partners, in accordance with EU competition rules;

    25. Commends the EIB’s cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including Member State governments, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Innovation Fund; appreciates, in particular, the EIB Group’s cooperation with the EDA and welcomes the signing of an update to the memorandum of understanding between the two bodies on 3 October 2024, which will allow them to strengthen strategic partnerships and jointly identify financing needs to better support research, development and innovation (RDI) in the area of security and defence in the Union;

    26. Invites the EIB to further strengthen such collaboration with key stakeholders with a view to increasing impact, synergies and complementarity with EU defence programmes, ensuring that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities; asks the EIB to enhance regional security and resilience, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean through the creation of infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States on defence matters; stresses, furthermore, the importance of exploring cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund in order to improve access to financing for technology start-ups, in parallel to the deployment of the EIF Defence Equity Facility;

    Social infrastructure and housing

    27. Asks the EIB to increase risk-taking for projects providing essential services with long-term clear and measurable benefits; welcomes, in this vein, the EIB Group’s actions and measures in the area of housing and social infrastructure that contribute to affordable housing, social inclusion and regional development, while also supporting sustainability and innovation; calls on the EIB to prioritise its investments towards these goals in order to achieve better economic growth, social inclusion and regional cohesion, while also supporting the EU’s sustainability objectives; invites the Bank to focus on sustainable urban development and inclusive growth by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, more cohesive and prosperous Europe;

    28. Emphasises that housing purchase and rental costs have surged significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and limiting access to housing; stresses that the EIB must play a stronger role in addressing the housing crisis; welcomes the inclusion of support for social infrastructure in the EIB Group’s eight strategic priorities for 2024-2027 and agrees that investments in energy-efficient, sustainable and accessible housing, and education within easy reach are crucial for boosting productivity and fostering strong and resilient societies; encourages the EIB to prioritise investments in housing cooperatives, energy-efficient social housing and renovation projects targeting low-income households; believes that addressing the EU’s major housing investment gaps requires overcoming both financial and non-financial investment barriers and the large-scale mobilisation of resources and capacities;

    29. Welcomes that the EIB, in collaboration with the Commission, has initiated a pan-European investment platform aimed at promoting affordable and sustainable housing, combining advisory services and financing, and encourages the participants to continue this initiative;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to easing the pressure on housing markets in Europe; stresses that housing purchase and rental prices have increased significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and compromising access to these; emphasises that EIB analysis shows that the EU needs about 1.5 million new housing units per year to cope with demand, and that about 75 % of the EU’s building stock needs to be renovated, representing an additional 5 million units per year; welcomes the fact that the EIB supports the reconstruction of existing housing and the construction of new social and affordable accommodation; encourages the EIB to mobilise more funding for affordable housing projects among the Member States;

    31. Calls for the strengthening of technical assistance and financial expertise in support of local and regional authorities, especially in areas with low investment capacity, in order to improve access to EIB funding; believes that cooperation with local authorities, local governments and civil society representatives should foster the development of social housing suitable for all, and especially for the most vulnerable citizens of the concerned Member State; is aware that the effectiveness of the EIB’s action in the housing and social infrastructure sector also depends on the removal of policy and regulatory hurdles;

    32. Notes that, in 2023, the EIB signed EUR 8.3 billion in financial support for energy efficiency operations, of which 65 % was for energy efficiency in buildings; invites the EIB to prioritise long-term affordable and accessible solutions, and sustainable investments, such as energy-efficient renovations and the reuse of vacant buildings;

    33. Believes that the related investments should ensure sufficient durability before any change of destination or use is authorised;

    34. Invites the EIB to build on its long-standing experience as an accelerator of European investments and to also deploy its potential in the education and training and healthcare sectors, including through advisory services; calls on the Bank to strengthen support for healthcare capacities, both within and outside the EU, thus  ensuring a stronger role for Europe in the world;

    Support for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups, scale-ups and businesses in rural and remote areas, the Capital Markets Union and the role of the EIF

    35. Highlights that SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups are vital for the EU’s economy; notes that these businesses encounter significant hurdles in accessing financing, markets and talent, which constrains their growth; asserts that business growth, dynamism and public investment are essential for fostering innovation, competitiveness and productivity; encourages the EIB Group to continue addressing these challenges, notably in the current geopolitical context, through customised financial programmes, risk-sharing mechanisms and targeted financial instruments, while ensuring the additionality of public resources for these purposes and avoiding the crowding out of private capital; notes that different instruments to support lending to businesses can be combined depending on the context, and that different EIB Group instruments target different market failures and firm types; stresses the need to provide technical assistance to SMEs before project approval, in order to improve access to EIB funding;

    36. Notes that the development of a well-functioning securitisation market can be a key first step towards establishing a strong Capital Markets Union (CMU); believes that the CMU will benefit consumers and SMEs by offering high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy and will eventually boost the venture capital market by improving access to diversified funding sources; believes that financing European scale-ups with European capital should be a priority, as exemplified by the European Tech Champions Initiative, which was launched in February 2023 to finance promising European tech companies and prevent the sale of businesses to foreign investors because of the lack of European investment; encourages the EIF to explore establishing the second generation of this initiative; observes that the European Tech Champions Initiative is complemented by the European Scale-up Initiative, which aims to provide crucial financing for Europe’s high-tech companies in their late-stage development; notes that these investments should be in line with policy actions at EU and national level; is aware of the comparative weaknesses of the European venture capital market in respect of other competitors’ markets, and that European start-ups and scale-ups are often obliged to relocate or search for foreign buyers or rely on sources of financing other than venture capital, hence less suited to high-growth;

    37. Acknowledges the mission of the EIF to support access to financing for European micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; believes that the EIF should significantly step up its activities for the development of the European venture capital ecosystem, while maintaining a geographical balance; calls for the EIF’s activities to be strengthened, enabling increased investment in high-growth sectors, enhancing risk-sharing between public and private investors, and promoting innovation throughout Europe; considers it necessary to monitor the rate of increase in support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

    38. Encourages the EIF to further develop its monitoring tools to better track the long-term performance of venture capital funds and SME financing operations, especially in terms of job creation, innovation diffusion and regional impact; stresses also the critical role of large European companies in Europe’s economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe’s global competitiveness;

    39. Praises the support provided by the EIB Group to about 400 000 SMEs and mid-caps in 2023 alone, with EUR 31.1 billion in financing, including loans and guarantees for businesses (of which EUR 14.9 billion was deployed by the EIF), resulting in the mobilisation of over EUR 134 billion, and notes that it teamed up with almost 300 partner institutions across Europe to this end; encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to financing for SMEs, which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage;

    40. Recalls that the deployment of the European Guarantee Fund ended in 2023 and that its disbursements to help SMEs to recover from the adverse impact of the pandemic reached approximately 200 000 SMEs across the EU; recalls the concerns expressed in previous resolutions about the transparency of the decision-making processes and information about final recipients;

    41. Welcomes that EIF measures on anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and tax avoidance encompass risk assessments for products and transactions, thorough due diligence on counterparties and screening the ownership structures and key individuals against sanctions and adverse media; welcomes the introduction of mandatory staff training and the conclusion of an agreement with the Financial Intelligence Unit of Luxembourg on the reporting of and follow-up on any suspicious transactions detected;

    Key policy areas of cohesion, climate action and environmental sustainability, and digitalisation

    42. Appreciates that in its 2021-2027 Cohesion Orientation, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions; notes that, in 2023, such financing amounted to EUR 29.8 billion, equivalent to 45 % of the Bank’s total signatures in the EU; underlines that the share of EIB financing allocated to less developed regions increased from 24 % in 2022 to 26 % in 2023, totalling EUR 17.2 billion, well above the 21 % target set in the EIB Cohesion Orientation for 2023; reiterates the call for the EIB to continue monitoring, analysing and addressing the shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from fully benefiting from the EIB’s financial support and assistance;

    43. Acknowledges the role played by the EIF in contributing to economic and social cohesion in the Union through a wide range of financial instruments; notes that EIF commitments to credit guarantees, venture capital and private equity investments for cohesion regions in 2023 stood at EUR 6.8 billion, representing 48 % of total EIF commitments in the EU; notes that in 2023, the EIF was especially active in Central and Eastern Europe;

    44. Notes that the EIB Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework includes revised environmental and social policy and standards promoting an integrated approach to impact and risk assessment and management;

    45. Acknowledges that over the past 15 years, EIB Advisory has supported over 1 000 projects in cohesion regions; calls on the Bank to actively promote financing opportunities in less developed and transition regions, including by boosting the presence of advisory services in EIB local offices; considers it necessary to also take into account the geographical distribution of EIB support for increasing social cohesion;

    46. Highlights the EIB’s initiatives in cohesion regions to support the healthcare sector, including the HERA Invest programme, a EUR 100 million guarantee established with the Commission to support research and development in addressing pressing cross-border health threats; encourages the EIB to promote targeted investments in key systemic enablers such as healthcare, education, social housing, digital connectivity and local financing for cities and regions, ensuring a better geographical balance, either through direct lending or financial instruments, and to leverage synergies between EU grants and EIB loans to enhance cross-border rail connectivity, which is crucial for better integration within the EU single market;

    47. Acknowledges the EIB’s strategic orientation since 2019 to be the EU Climate Bank; emphasises that in 2023 alone, the EIB signed EUR 41.8 billion in financing for climate action and EUR 25.1 billion for environmental sustainability (EUR 35.1 billion and EUR 15.9 billion respectively in 2022); notes that EIB financing for climate change adaptation totalled EUR 2.7 billion in 2023, corresponding to 6.4 % of its total climate action (compared to EUR 1.9 billion, or 5.4 %, in 2022); welcomes that climate action and environmental sustainability financing, as a whole, accounted for 60 % of EIB financing in 2023; calls for maintaining technological neutrality in its investment strategy in climate and sustainable financing;

    48. Recalls that the EIB Energy Lending Policy (ELP), adopted in 2019, established a ‘phase out support to energy projects reliant on unabated fossil fuels’ and introduced a transition period during which the Bank could continue to approve projects already under appraisal, but the Board of Directors did not approve any such project after the end of 2021; remarks that, in 2022, the EIB Group introduced a temporary and exceptional extension of the exemptions to the Paris Alignment for Counterparties Framework (so-called PATH) in support of REPowerEU, to cover projects with high innovative content and renewable energy projects and electric vehicle charging infrastructure in the EU; observes that, in 2023, the EIB Group decided to apply the same temporary and exceptional extension also for projects in the spirit of REPowerEU outside the EU; notes that such temporary and exceptional extensions are expected to run until 2027, subject to a Climate Bank roadmap review expected in 2025; recalls its previous resolution[3] and maintains that PATH offers the appropriate framework for supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement objectives; emphasises that the EIB is expected to intensify its engagement with all of its clients to foster the development of their decarbonisation plans;

    49. Notes the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap mid-term review, approved in 2023, which includes a simplified Paris Alignment framework for microenterprises, the revision of the PATH framework’s disclosure requirements for financial intermediaries and a temporary extension of the list of countries in which the EIB can act as a sole financier of climate adaptation projects due to their particular vulnerability to climate change;

    50. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities, but notes that agriculture, fisheries and forestry received only 1.1 % of the EIB’s lending stock in 2023; considers it important for the EIB to programme significant amounts for financing the agricultural sector and through simplified procedures;

    51. Underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas; acknowledges the increasing challenges faced by the agricultural sector and the need for EU farmers to adapt to the European Green Deal objectives, cope with the energy crisis and manage rising inflation; calls on the EIB Group to enhance support and foster innovation for this vital sector, which plays a significant role in ensuring food security, leveraging the EU’s One Health approach by integrating human, animal, plant and environmental health to create sustainable, resilient and productive agri-food systems; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young and small operators, noting that farmers and the enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing;

    52. Stresses that EIB support should have a just transition approach in order to achieve sustainable agriculture that protects the environment, human health and animal welfare, while improving farmers’ livelihoods, in particular for small and medium-sized farms; maintains that supporting rural areas is essential for promoting balanced and inclusive development, generational renewal and equal access to financial opportunities for women and men; reiterates its call on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    53. Appreciates that the EIB Group is one of the key supporters of digitalisation in the EU, particularly in financing digital infrastructure and supporting innovative digital start-ups; encourages the EIB to enhance its support for digital networks strengthening the EU’s technological autonomy and innovation in key technologies;

    54. Believes that reducing digital inequality and preventing social exclusion requires significant public investment in telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in rural areas; encourages the EIB to support European citizens in acquiring adequate digital literacy to fully participate in society, with a special focus on the elderly and those with disabilities;

    55. Recognises the critical role of the cybersecurity sector in protecting businesses and governments from advanced digital threats and foreign influence; welcomes the increase in security investments from EUR 6 billion to EUR 8 billion, financed through the SESI to address security challenges, including those in the New Space industry;

    56. Welcomes the EIB’s focus on gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, resulting in a total of EUR 5.8 billion in investment in this field in 2023 (compared to EUR 5.1 billion in 2022); believes that the EIB could further increase microfinance loans to women-led businesses, which still face discrimination in access to financing;

    57. Highlights that the security of supply of critical raw materials is crucial for both the green and digital transitions, as well as for the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; calls on the EIB to increase investments in the CRM sector to help diversify the supply of both primary and secondary raw materials and to develop circular economy solutions, in particular R&D for alternative materials, such as bio-based materials; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption on 21 March 2025 of a new CRM strategic initiative, with an expected EUR 2 billion in financing for CRM investment in 2025, a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships;

    The EIB’s activities outside the EU

    58. Underlines that in EIB Global’s second year of existence, it provided financing amounting to EUR 8.4 billion (compared to EUR 9.1 billion in 2022); notes that, as EIB Global financing is limited to 50 % of the total cost of a project, investment co-financing with development finance institutions and multilateral development banks is recurring; calls on the EIB and the Commission to invest in internal audit and independent control functions to guarantee the integrity and soundness of all operations;

    59. Recalls that EIB Global is among the key implementing actors of the European Global Gateway and, as such, is expected to apply the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

    60. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap and its commitment to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the projects it supports;

    61. Highlights the importance of ensuring that the EIB Group’s interventions in Ukraine are guided by the priorities for the country’s reconstruction agreed with the EU, and are consistent with the methods and frameworks laid out in the Ukraine Plan and with the provisions of the EU Treaties; notes that the EIB is further enhancing its efforts to address fraud and corruption in relation to the EIB Group projects implemented in Ukraine; calls for the continued application of appropriate conditionality on the financial assistance provided to Ukraine, with a focus on ensuring effective oversight mechanisms, such as access to information and premises, and the monitoring of visits, and calls for conditionality to be extended to all non-EU countries for which it provides financing;

    62. Urges the strengthening of the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities responsible for implementing, monitoring, controlling and supervising funded actions, in particular for the prevention of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities; reiterates that the EIB should have clear and unrestricted oversight at all times;

    63. Believes that a greater role for the EIB will bring added value for both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the enlargement process and for prospective partnerships under the EU’s Global Gateway agenda and neighbourhood policy and in support of the Sustainable Development Goals; encourages the Commission to maximise cooperation with the EIB to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly on energy and raw materials;

    64. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB’s EU for Ukraine (EU4U) initiative and establishes a support mechanism based on EU budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs;

    65. Stresses that, in order to support Ukraine, the EIB has built up a loan portfolio of over EUR 7 billion since the beginning of the conflict with Russia in 2014; underlines that, as of 31 December 2023, the EIB’s exposure (disbursed and not yet disbursed) amounted to EUR 5.750 billion, predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the External Lending Mandate; notes that, in addition, the Bank also granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine, fully covered by EU Comprehensive Guarantees, for a signed amount of EUR 388.7 million at the end of 2023 (compared to EUR 478.8 million at the end of 2022);

    66. Notes the growing financial engagement of the EIB in Ukraine; calls on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;

    67. Underlines the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern EU regions bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly redirect public funds towards security, defence and preparedness, while dealing with severely reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes; calls on the EIB to take this into account in its financing decisions;

    68. Welcomes the significant investments made in Moldova to support economic resilience, improving energy security, enhancing infrastructure and aiding the country’s progress towards EU integration; acknowledges that in the Western Balkans, EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in 2023, plus an additional EUR 700 million to enhance road safety and improve railway networks; welcomes the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in 2024 and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova approved by the European Parliament;

    69. Recognises the role played by the EIB in supporting the Western Balkans on their path to Union membership, in line with the EU’s enlargement policy; observes that EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in the Western Balkans in 2023, mobilising a total of over EUR 6 billion in investments; notes that the majority of the financing was allocated to sustainable connectivity, followed by credit lines for SMEs, infrastructure projects in the healthcare, education and skills sectors, and water supply and sanitation;

    70. Asks the EIB to collaborate with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring added value and long-term, positive impacts;

    EIB accountability architecture

    71. Recalls that internal oversight at the EIB is headed by the Inspectorate General (IG), which comprises three accountability-related divisions – operations evaluation, the complaints mechanism and fraud investigation – that hold complementary roles, contributing to the consistent handling of allegations and complaints;

    72. Observes that the EIB Complaints Mechanism (EIB-CM) handled a total of 104 cases in 2023 (97 in 2022); notes that 60 new complaints were received in 2023 (54 in 2022), of which 44 were considered admissible and 29 were related to EIB-financed projects, of which 27 were located outside Europe;

    73. Notes that the EIB Procurement Complaints Committee is the independent EIB committee handling complaints about project procurement procedures relating to EIB-financed projects outside the EU;

    74. Welcomes the efforts of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) to cooperate and coordinate efforts with the other components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which received 37 % of the referrals made for investigations in 2023 (27 cases out of 74); encourages the IG/IN to strengthen its cooperation with all components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture;

    75. Notes that the IG/IN carries out proactive fraud detection activities using the Fraud and Integrity Risk Scoring Tool and the Corruption Risk In Procurement robot and that, in 2023, 24 reviews identified targets for three full and in-depth proactive integrity reviews; invites the Bank to assess how these digital tools could be further enhanced to support transparency and financial accountability;

    76. Regrets the fact that, despite repeated calls by Parliament, the IG/IN annual report does not provide adequate information about the financial magnitude of the cases it handles, the funds or mandates affected, the kinds of projects concerned, the mitigating measures adopted, the role of the EIB services and of the intermediaries or partners in the cases, or even the Member States concerned; invites the representatives of the IG/IN to increase the level of engagement, interactions and transparency with Parliament, especially regarding the control of the financial activities; reiterates its call to the IG/IN to go beyond providing a mere narrative description of a few case studies, and to periodically report valuable insights into the extent to which financial interests are safeguarded; suggests that the IG/IN adopt a reporting model similar to those used by other investigative bodies, such as EPPO and OLAF, where a proper balance between transparency and duty of confidentiality or of professional secrecy is pursued;

    77. Is aware that the EIB Exclusion Policy provides for an autonomous exclusion process that is not fully equivalent to the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System; observes that in 2023, exclusion proceedings based on IG/IN findings excluded five companies from participating in any EIB-financed activity for a period of five years;

    78. Welcomes the approval, in 2023, of the EIB Group’s Internal Control Framework Policy; acknowledges the results of the group alignment process between the EIB and the EIF insofar as they reflect the different business models and governance structures of the two entities; refers, in particular, to the Audit Committee’s remarks that both internal audit and the internal control framework should evolve to become group functions;

    79. Notes that the EIB’s independent external auditor is the third line of defence; points out that the regular rotation of auditors and assignments allows fresh perspectives, and therefore observes that the EIB external auditor should be rotated periodically, yet its mandate was extended until 2027 and it has been the auditor of the EIB Group since 2009;

    80. Appreciates that the EIB Group Risk Management Framework and EIB Group’s semi-annual Risk Management Disclosure Reports are effective and are aligned with the requirements and technical standards of the European Banking Authority;

    81. Stresses that, in 2023, despite difficult market conditions, the EIB’s portfolio continued to exhibit very low levels of non-performing exposures (NPEs); takes the view that even if a significant portion of the Bank’s loan portfolio benefits from credit enhancements or from EU Member State guarantees, the high quality of the EIB’s portfolio results from the diligent implementation of very effective EIB lending policies;

    82. Highlights that the EIB does not fall within the scope of application of the EU’s legislation applicable to credit institutions, in particular the Capital Requirements Regulation[4] and Directive[5] (CRR, CRD), thus the Bank is entitled to determine its capital and liquidity requirements in a manner that is adequate and appropriate to its activities, its mission and the market conditions; points out that the EIB Group is committed to conform to the best banking and market practices and can determine their applicability in line with the proportionality principle; stresses that the implementation of these norms should not create unwarranted burden; welcomes the fact that the EIB Group voluntarily performed the Review and Evaluation Process; points out that this should be in line with the EIB’s governance structure and mission;

    83. Understands that, in line with the EU’s evolving needs, the EU institutions approved, in 2024, the change in statute proposed by the EIB Board of Governors by amending the statutory limit on its gearing ratio[6] and raising it from 250 % to 290 %, to enable the EIB to invest more without increasing its equity base;

    84. Notes that the amended gearing ratio paves the way for increased risk-taking; acknowledges that investments in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and innovative technologies are crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, but often carry greater risk because of the uncertainty of returns; points out that increased risk-taking may increase the volatility of the EIB’s returns, but observes that the EIB maintains capital buffers that would support expanded risk activities;

    85. Is alarmed by the situation of Northvolt AB, a battery manufacturer considered pivotal in the green transition; stresses that Northvolt has benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site; notes that Northvolt filed for bankruptcy in March 2025; calls on the EIB to provide details about the evaluation and decision-making process to fund Northvolt AB and the causes that led to the failure of the project;

    86. Stresses that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness and was consistent with the EU’s strategies in the sector;

    87. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;

    88. Maintains that the greatest added value of EU support lies in fostering higher-risk investments in innovative projects, scaling up EU strategic goals and enabling long-term transition projects that cannot get funding from the private sector; believes that to effectively pursue its targets in innovation and competitiveness, the InvestEU programme should focus on financing higher-risk and more scale-up investment and that the EIB Group should take on more and larger high-risk projects, which should involve primarily and preferentially European investors, combining a more risk-absorption-oriented deployment of InvestEU resources with an equivalent orientation in the use of the EIB Group’s own financial resources; urges the EIB to introduce stricter conditions to prevent EU public financing from being used to subsidise companies relocating production outside Europe, ensuring that all EIB-funded projects contribute to long-term European industrial resilience;

    89. Is aware that members of the EIB’s Management Committee are often civil servants in their countries of origin before beginning their terms at the EIB, which typically last for two to six years, and that they are therefore entitled to pursue professional development opportunities subject to certain conditions during the cooling-off period (which has been extended to a period of 24 months after the end of their term at the EIB); notes that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval as soon as possible for any negotiations regarding prospective employment;

    90. Strongly echoes Parliament’s repeated calls to strengthen the mechanism to prevent conflicts of interest within the EIB and to improve the handling of such cases, and to better define the terms under which EIB vice-presidents can participate in decisions about operations in their countries of origin, and insists that these matters be addressed in a future revision of the Management Committee code of conduct;

    91. Highlights that on 31 October 2023, the European Ombudsman ruled in Case 611/2022/KR that a former vice-president had participated in approving financing agreements between the EIB and a national promotional bank[7] in his country of origin just weeks before becoming the Chief Executive Officer of that national promotional bank, despite the EIB’s Chief Compliance Officer advising against such actions during the appointment process; understands that this case predates the entry into force of the current Management Committee code of conduct, which now includes specific provisions regarding the prospective employment of its members; notes that, in the future review of the rules applicable to its Ethics and Compliance Committee, the EIB has committed to consider the European Ombudsman recommendation to make public the Committee’s decisions;

    92. Observes that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, are the most common precautionary clauses to be used when handling a revolving-doors case and understands that such measures are implemented and are complied with by the members of the Management Committee, including those recently reported on in the media;

    93. Shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened when it comes to overseeing the intended new jobs of Management Committee members and that it should be able to impose and enforce risk-mitigating measures; understands that the role of the Ethics and Compliance Committee has become more prominent in recent years and that internal discussions are ongoing on how to enhance its efficiency;

    94. Invites the Bank to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the Bank to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility for European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    95. Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation, including at middle and senior management levels, and calls on it to publish an annual breakdown of the gender and nationality for middle and senior management positions;

    Scrutiny, transparency and oversight

    96.  Strongly regrets the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) still lacks full access to all data relating to EIB operations; acknowledges that not all the activities of the EIB are directly financed by the EU and, therefore, not all activities are automatically accessible to the ECA; insists that the ECA should have access to the necessary information to comprehensively and exhaustively assess all EIB operations involving EU funds, including those conducted through financial intermediaries, designed to implement EU policies; calls on the ECA to fully scrutinise, to the best of its abilities, all operations involving the EU budget to any degree;

    97. Observes that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee, which is a fully independent body; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

    98. Notes that the EIB’s Transparency Policy strikes a compromise between the principle of openness and the need to safeguard sensitive information; observes that the policy indicates what information should be published proactively and when – stipulating, for instance, that project summaries should be published at least three weeks before the project’s financing is considered for approval by the EIB Board of Directors – and sets out the relevant derogations; calls for these summaries to provide meaningful information to stakeholders;

    99. Notes that in 2023, 449 projects were approved by the EIB Board of Directors and that almost all (94 %) of the project summaries were published, in the majority (57 %) of cases before approval; observes that all EIB operations conducted through financial intermediaries are published on the EIB’s website and that the EIB provides details on request;

    100. Recalls that all EIB documents are accessible to the public in line with the presumption in favour of disclosure; emphasises that all applicants should be informed in advance about public access to documents, and any refusals should be based solely on specified exceptions; stresses that the EIB should consider publishing, in a timely manner, information regarding the rationale and context for projects and the explanation of their alignment with and contribution to EU policy goals; calls on the EIB to systematically publish audit results of its largest financial operations, ensuring independent scrutiny of its risk management and impact assessments; expects the EIB to limit non-disclosure to the applicable exceptions listed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001[8] and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006[9]; calls for the full implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations issued following its inquiries into EIB disclosure policy and related requests for access to documents;

    101. Recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that final recipients comply with the visibility criteria of the EU’s financial support;

    102. Highlights that the Bank is working to reduce the time needed to bring a product from conception to market availability (time to market) by fully digitising its project cycles; calls for the Bank to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    103 Reiterates its call on the EIB to strengthen and fully implement its policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance, including by refraining from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in such practices;

    104. Reiterates that more structured dialogue between Parliament and the EIB would be enhanced by the adoption of a memorandum of cooperation; praises, in this connection, the EIB’s unprecedented cooperation with Parliament for the preparation of this resolution, noting that it is a tangible expression of openness and transparency;

    Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

    105. Urges the EIB to continue reporting on the status of previous recommendations issued by Parliament, particularly regarding the outcomes achieved and the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, especially as regards:

    (a) impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

    (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

    (c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

    (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

    (e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye – A10-0067/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

    (2025/2023(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

     having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation[1] (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

     having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

     having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

     having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

     having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

     having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

     having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

     

     having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

     having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ (COM(2024)0593),

     having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

     having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

     having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

     having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

     having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

     having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

     having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

     having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye[2], of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey[3], and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks[4],

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide[6],

     having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey[7], of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye[8] and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye[9],

     having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10  billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    T. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation;

    2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, and Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    17. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    18. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    19. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    20. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    21. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; is extremely concerned by the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that theses last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, the slowdown on social media, the detention of journalists and the crackdown on peaceful protesters; considers that this is a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model;

    22. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    23. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

    24. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    25. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    26. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    27. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3.1 million refugees, including 2.9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3.2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    28. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; deeply regrets that Türkiye also continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli) at 12 nautical miles; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranen infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    29. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    30. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    31. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    32. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    33. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    34. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    35. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye  to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    36. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    37. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    38. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for  the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    39. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    40. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    41. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    42. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    43. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    44. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    45. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    46. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    47. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    48. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points to a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    50. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, welcomes various high-level dialogues (HLDs) held recently, including the HLD on trade, and the plans for an HLD on economy, as positive steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities for joint initiatives in fields such as security, climate change, research and innovation; stresses that trade between the EU and Türkiye hit a record high last year and that the EU remains Türkiye’s largest trade and investment partner; calls for the removal of all existing trade barriers and irritants;

    51. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    52. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member states to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    53. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    54. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement;

    55. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    56. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    57. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    58. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

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    ° °

    59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion – A10-0066/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion

    (2024/2107(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[1] (Common Provisions Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency[9],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)[10],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE[12],

     having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

     having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

     having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

     having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024[13], and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

     having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

     having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’[14],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report[15],

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

     having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

     having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

     having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024[16],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council of [INSERT DATE] on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU) [INSERT FOOTNOTE ONCE PUBLISHED IN OJ],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

     having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (XXX),

     having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[22],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States[23],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A. whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B. whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4.4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1.3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU[24];

    C. whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24.6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D. whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions[25], to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E. whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F. whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G. whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H. whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I. whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J. whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K. whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L. whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M. whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N. whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O. whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q. whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R. whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions[26], which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S. whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021[27], meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1. Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2. Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3. Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4. Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5. Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6. Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7. Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8. Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria[28] such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9. Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10. Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12. Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13. Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14. Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15. Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16. Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17. Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18. Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19. Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20. Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid[29], through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22. Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23. Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24. Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25. Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26. Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: How will a new pope be chosen? An expert explains the conclave

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Darius von Guttner Sporzynski, Historian, Australian Catholic University

    Following the death of Pope Francis, we’ll soon be seeing a new leader in the Vatican. The conclave – a strictly confidential gathering of Roman Catholic cardinals – is due to meet in a matter of weeks to elect a new earthly head.

    The word conclave is derived from the Latin con (together) and clāvis (key). It means “a locked room” or “chamber”, reflecting its historical use to describe the locked gathering of cardinals to elect a pope.

    Held in the Sistine Chapel, the meeting follows a centuries-old process designed to ensure secrecy and prayerful deliberation. A two-thirds majority vote will be needed to successfully elect the 267th pope.

    History of the conclave

    The formalised papal conclave dates back centuries. And various popes have shaped the process in response to the church’s needs.

    In the 13th century, for example, Pope Gregory X introduced strict regulations to prevent unduly long elections.

    Pope Gregory X brought in the rules to prevent a repeat of his own experience. The conclave that elected him in September 1271 (following the death of Pope Clement IV in 1268) lasted almost three years.

    Further adjustments were made to streamline the process and emphasise secrecy, culminating in Pope John Paul II’s 1996 constitution, Universi Dominici gregis (The Lord’s whole flock). This document set the modern framework for the conclave.

    In 2007 and 2013, Benedict XVI reiterated that a two-thirds majority of written votes would be required to elect a new pope. He also reaffirmed penalties for breaches of secrecy.

    The secrecy surrounding the conclave ensures the casting of ballots remains confidential, and without any external interference.

    The last known attempt at external interference in a papal conclave occurred in 1903 when Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria sought to prevent the election of Cardinal Mariano Rampolla. However, the assembled cardinals rejected this intervention, asserting the independence of the electoral process.

    How does voting work?

    The conclave formally begins between 15 and 20 days after the papal vacancy, but can start earlier if all cardinals eligible to vote have arrived. Logistical details, such as the funeral rites for the deceased pope, can also influence the overall timeline.

    Historically, the exact number of votes required to elect a new pope has fluctuated. Under current rules, a minimum two-thirds majority is needed. If multiple rounds of balloting fail to yield a result, the process can continue for days, or even weeks.

    After every few inconclusive rounds, cardinals pause for prayer and reflection. This process continues until one candidate receives the two-thirds majority required to win. The final candidates do not vote for themselves in the decisive round.

    The ballot paper formerly used in the conclave, with ‘I elect as Supreme Pontiff’ written in Latin.
    Wikimedia Commons

    How is voting kept secret?

    The papal conclave is entirely closed to the public. Voting is conducted by secret ballot within the Sistine Chapel in the Apostolic Palace, the pope’s official residence.

    During the conclave, the Sistine Chapel is sealed off from outside communication. No cameras are allowed, and there is no live broadcast.

    The cardinals involved swear an oath of absolute secrecy, and face the threat of excommunication if it is violated. This ensures all discussions and voting remain strictly confidential.

    The iconic white smoke, produced by burning ballots once a pope has been chosen, is the only public signal that the election has concluded.

    Who can be elected?

    Only cardinals who are under 80 years of age at the time of conclave’s commencement can vote. Older cardinals are free to attend preparatory meetings, but can not cast ballots.

    While the total number of electors is intended to not exceed 120, the fluctuating nature of cardinal appointments, as well as age restrictions, make it difficult to predict the exact number of eligible voters at any given conclave.

    Technically, any baptised Catholic man can be elected pope. In practice, however, the College of Cardinals traditionally chooses one of its own members. Electing an “outsider” is extremely rare, and has not occurred in modern times.

    What makes a good candidate?

    When faced with criticism from a member of the public about his weight, John XXIII (who was pope from 1958-1963) retorted the papal conclave was “not a exactly beauty contest”.

    Merit, theological understanding, administrative skill and global perspective matter greatly. But there is also a collegial element – something of a “popularity” factor. It is an election, after all.

    Cardinals discuss the church’s current priorities – be they evangelisation strategies, administrative reforms or pastoral concerns – before settling on the individual they believe is best suited to lead.

    The cardinal electors seek someone who can unify the faithful, navigate modern challenges and maintain doctrinal continuity.

    Controversies and criticisms

    The conclave process has faced criticism for its strict secrecy, which can foster speculation about potential “politicking”.

    Critics argue a tightly controlled environment might not reflect the broader concerns of the global church.

    Some have also questioned whether age limits on voting cardinals limit the wisdom and experience found among older members.

    Nonetheless, defenders maintain that secrecy encourages free and sincere deliberation, minimising external pressure and allowing cardinals to choose the best leader without fear of reprisal, or of public opinion swaying the vote.

    Challenges facing the new pope

    The next pope will inherit a mixed situation: a church that has grown stronger in certain areas under Francis, yet which grapples with internal divisions and external challenges.

    Like other religions, the church faces secularisation, issues with financial transparency and a waning following in some parts of the globe.

    One of the earliest trials faced by the new pope will be unifying the global Catholic community around a shared vision – an obstacle almost every pope has faced. Striking the right balance between doctrine and pastoral sensitivity remains crucial.

    Addressing sexual abuse scandals and their aftermath will require decisive action, transparency and continued pastoral care for survivors.

    Practical concerns also loom large. The new pope will have to manage the Vatican bureaucracy and interfaith relations, while maintaining the church’s stance on global crises such as migration and poverty – two issues on which Francis insisted mercy could not be optional.

    The cardinal electors have a tough decision ahead of them. The Catholic community can only pray that, through their deliberations, they identify a shepherd who can guide the church through the complexities of the modern world.

    Darius von Guttner Sporzynski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How will a new pope be chosen? An expert explains the conclave – https://theconversation.com/how-will-a-new-pope-be-chosen-an-expert-explains-the-conclave-250506

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s Press Encounter on Climate

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Ladies and gentlemen of the media, may I first express to the Government and people of Türkiye my full solidarity in this difficult moment. 

    President Lula of Brazil and I just concluded a unique meeting with a cross-section of world leaders focused on climate action and a just transition.

    The gathering included 17 participants at level of heads of state and government representing some of the world’s largest economies — including China and the European Union — and some of the world’s most climate vulnerable countries.

    We also had leaders currently chairing important regional partnerships — the African Union, ASEAN, and the Alliance of Small Island States and CARICOM, along with many others.   

    It was among the most diverse meetings of heads of state focused exclusively on climate in some time.

    Yet I heard a unifying message.

    Yes, our world faces massive headwinds and a multitude of crises.

    But we cannot allow climate commitments to be blown off course.

    We must keep building momentum for action at COP30 in Brazil — and today was an important part of that effort. 

    We don’t have a moment to lose.

    No region is being spared from the ravages of accelerating climate catastrophes.   

    And the crisis is deepening poverty, displacing communities, and fuelling conflict and instability.

    At the same time, countries are waking up to a clear fact: 

    Renewables are the economic opportunity of the century.

    Dissenters and fossil fuel interests may try to stand in the way.  

    But as we heard today, the world is moving forward.  Full-speed ahead.

    No group or government can stop the clean energy revolution.  

    Science is on our side — and economics have shifted.

    Prices for renewables have plummeted and the sector is booming — creating jobs and boosting competitiveness and growth worldwide.

    The pathway out of climate hell is paved by renewables.

    They offer the surest route to energy sovereignty and security, and ending dependence on volatile and expensive fossil fuel imports.

    We also know collective climate action works. 

    Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the projected global warming-curve has been bent down — from over four degrees of temperature rise within this century, to 2.6 degrees if current national climate action plans are fully implemented.

    But that is catastrophic so we must go further and faster. 

    Today, I urged leaders to take action on two fronts.  

    First — to step up efforts to submit the strongest possible national climate plans well ahead of COP30.

    And leaders today committed to put forward ambitious and robust plans as soon as possible what was a strong message of hope.  

    These new climate plans offer a unique opportunity to lay out a bold vision for a just green transition over the next decade.

    They should align with 1.5 degrees and set emissions-reduction targets that cover all greenhouse gases and the whole economy as several today mentioned clearly.

    Most importantly, they should help speed-up a just transition away from fossil fuels to renewables… 

    Link national energy and development strategies with climate goals…

    And signal to policymakers and investors alike a total commitment to achieving global net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.

    Second — as leaders turbocharge their own transitions, I urged them to scale-up support for developing countries.

    Those least responsible for climate change are suffering from its worst effects.

    Africa and other parts of the developing world are experiencing faster warming —and the Pacific islands are seeing faster sea-level rise — even while the global average itself is accelerating. 

    Meanwhile, despite being home to 60 per cent of the world’s best solar resources, Africa has only around 1.5 per cent of installed solar capacity – and receives just two per cent of global investment into renewables.

    We need to change this — fast.

    At COP30, leaders must deliver a credible roadmap to mobilize $1.3 trillion a year for developing countries by 2035.

    Developed countries must honour their promise to double adaptation finance to at least $40 billion a year, by this year.

    And we need significantly increased contributions and innovative sources of finance to support the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage.

    Across all these fronts, we will keep up the push — including at a special event in September in the final weeks to COP30.

    As today’s meeting made clear, we cannot, must not, and will not let up on climate action.

    Thank you.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: KZN Premier encourages faith-based collaboration for social cohesion

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Wednesday, April 23, 2025

    KwaZulu-Natal Premier, Thamsanqa Ntuli, has underscored the critical role of faith-based collaboration in achieving social cohesion and healing fractured communities.

    “The fight against social ills requires more than just policy; it demands the moral authority and compassion that our faith communities provide,” Ntuli said, when he tabled a set of Parliamentary resolutions during an Interfaith Symposium.

    The meeting, held in Glencoe under Umzinyathi District Municipality, in the north-western part of KwaZulu-Natal, brought together a broad spectrum of religious leaders, including faith-based organisations, and community members, to confront pressing societal challenges through shared values and unified action.

    The symposium served as a platform for meaningful dialogue, focusing on how religious communities can play a proactive role in addressing issues such as poverty, inequality, crime, substance abuse, and moral decay within KwaZulu-Natal.

    In his address, Premier Ntuli highlighted the importance of faith-based collaboration in advancing the goals of the province’s moral regeneration agenda.

    Among the key resolutions tabled at the meeting included:
    • Joint community outreach programmes to support vulnerable populations.
    • Partnerships between government and religious institutions for youth empowerment.
    • Faith-driven initiatives to combat crime and substance abuse.
    • Promotion of interfaith tolerance and unity.

    The Premier said the resolutions are not symbolic, but “a call to action to strengthen the moral fabric of our society”.

    The event underscored the provincial government’s recognition of religious institutions as vital partners in building resilient, ethical, and inclusive communities.

    “As KwaZulu-Natal continues to navigate complex social dynamics, the Interfaith Symposium in Glencoe stands as a powerful reminder of the strength found in unity, compassion, and shared purpose across religious and cultural lines,” the Premier said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Deputy President calls for transparency, inclusivity in SA’s budget process

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Deputy President Paul Mashatile has emphasised the importance of collaborative action and transparency in shaping South Africa’s fiscal future. 

    “We have learnt that the current budgetary process is not transparent and inclusive enough, making it difficult for citizens to understand how government goes about the process of taking some of the most critical decisions in allocation of resources, albeit limited resources because of the competing needs,” Masahtile said. 

    Speaking during a virtual address at the 2025 Budget Roundtable, held at the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) offices in Cape Town, on Wednesday, the Deputy President emphasised the need to revisit the concept of a “people’s budget” advocated by anti-apartheid activists, the late Ben Turok and Joanamarrie Fubbs. 

    “What this means is that we need fiscal planning that is inclusive from the start, in terms of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and in line with government’s priorities,” he explained.

    “In this case, the budget process as part of fiscal planning must focus on how we address the issues of poverty, unemployment, and inequality specifically.” 

    The country’s second-in-command highlighted the necessity for the budget to reflect fairness and equity, ensuring that vulnerable sectors are not overlooked in the planning process.

    The Deputy President also stressed the critical role of the National Budget as the government’s primary tool for translating policy into action. 

    He noted the historic context of this year’s budget process, highlighting the unprecedented postponement of the Budget Speech, and the subsequent adoption of the 2025 Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals by the National Assembly this month. 

    The Deputy President told the attendees about the Cabinet Committee’s formation, which he chairs, tasked with addressing the contentious proposal from the Minister of Finance regarding a VAT increase. 

    The Deputy President acknowledged that, in contrast to other governments around the world that have collapsed due to fiscal disputes, South Africa successfully navigated the challenges and he believesthis underscores South Africa’s strong democracy that is functioning effectively. 

    “Government remains committed to expanding economic growth while improving the quality of life for all citizens.” 

    The Deputy President said equitable resource allocation was particularly timely as South Africa grapples with economic disparities. 

    “Public allocations should be fair, just, and available to all citizens,” he said, reinforcing the government’s commitment to serving all members of society.

    As the budgeting process continues with the looming deadlines for the Division of Revenue Bill and the Appropriation Bill in May and June, Mashatile reiterated the importance of thoughtful engagement and transparent decision-making. 

    He acknowledged the challenges of balancing competing needs, but maintained that, through diligence and collaborative effort, government can chart a path toward a more equitable socio-economic landscape.

    The Deputy President described the 2025 Budget Roundtable as a pivotal moment for shaping a more equitable future. 

    He also touched on another important task that requires fiscal planning and implementing financial strategies to achieve specific economic goals, which is often related to debt management, government spending, and tax policies. 

    This includes considering factors, such as interest rates, economic growth, and structural reforms to ensure a stable and transparent macroeconomic environment. 

    “The goal here is to create a sustainable fiscal position that supports economic growth and manages risks effectively.” – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Green taxation in Cyprus – E-001234/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001234/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Giorgos Georgiou (The Left)

    The Cypriot Minister of Finance said in a statement[1] that next May the Government is due to put into force green taxes on fuel, water and waste. The previous administration under Nicos Anastasiades had pledged to introduce these taxes under the Recovery and Resilience Plan.

    Given the very difficult circumstances (high prices, stratospheric cost of living and energy poverty) currently faced by the majority of households and small and medium-sized businesses in Cyprus and the fact that country is relatively behind with regard to its green transition, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Bearing in mind the lack of infrastructure and the high prices and energy poverty that exist in Cyprus, can the Recovery Fund be revised to avoid green taxes, with a view to minimising pressure on households and businesses in Cyprus?
    • 2.Given that there is no European directive or regulation imposing green taxes, is there a legal obligation to implement the measure?

    Submitted: 25.3.2025

    • [1] (https://www.sigmalive.com/news/oikonomia/1265209/ypik-perithwrio-mekhri-maio-ghia-prasini-forologhia-apomenoyn-telikes-pinelies)
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Budgets Committee sets out priorities for next long-term EU budget

    Source: European Parliament

    MEPs in the Budgets Committee have backed the first report outlining Parliament’s vision for the next long-term EU budget.

    In the report adopted on Wednesday by 23 votes in favour, 9 against and with 2 abstentions, MEPs emphasise the need for a significantly more ambitious long-term EU budget (multiannual financial framework – MFF) that can deliver on EU citizens’ rising expectations against a rapidly changing global backdrop. The current spending ceiling of 1% of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) is not enough to address the growing number of crises and challenges, the report argues. With the US retreating from its global role, spending will have to address Russia’s war of aggression, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop, a competitiveness gap and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis, according to the report.

    No to single national plans

    MEPs oppose the Commission’s idea of replicating the “one national plan per member state” model used in the Recovery and Resilience Facility for post-2027 spending in member states. Instead, they call for a structure that ensures transparency and parliamentary accountability, and involves regional and local authorities and all relevant actors. The report underlines the continued importance of cohesion policy to foster economic, social, and territorial integration, deepen the single market, reduce inequalities, and fight poverty and exclusion.

    Competitiveness and defence

    MEPs consider the Commission’s proposed Competitiveness Fund – which would merge several existing programmes – inadequate, calling instead for a new, targeted fund designed to leverage private and public investment through EU-backed de-risking mechanisms, building on the success of instruments like InvestEU and the Innovation Fund. The report also highlights the need for increased defence investment to support a comprehensive security approach, but stresses that this must not undermine social and environmental spending or long-standing policies.

    Simplification and accountability

    The next long-term budget must cut unnecessary red tape for those benefiting from EU funding, but must not give the Commission more leeway without the democratic scrutiny of Parliament. A simpler budget must be a more transparent budget, MEPs say. The report underlines that the budget’s design must safeguard Parliament’s role in holding the executive to account, putting in place strict accountability mechanisms and guaranteeing full transparency in relation to EU funds’ final recipients.

    Flexibility and rule of law

    Flexibility in spending is also key – crisis-response capabilities must be built into the long-term budget for each policy area, with humanitarian aid ring-fenced. The next budget should include two special instruments: for disaster relief and for other unforeseen challenges. The report insists that access to EU funds must be tied to respect for EU values and the rule of law, and advocates a smart conditionality mechanism so that beneficiaries are not penalised because of their government’s actions.

    Debt repayment and joint borrowing

    The repayment of NextGenerationEU borrowing costs must not endanger funding for key EU priorities, MEPs argue. The report calls for a clear separation between borrowing cost repayment and programme spending. The report urges the Council of member states to adopt new, genuine revenue resources for the sustainable financing of borrowing and of Europe’s higher spending needs. MEPs consider joint borrowing a viable option for tackling major EU-wide crises, such security and defence.

    Quotes

    “We want an EU budget that better reflects the Union’s new priorities like competitiveness and defence, while protecting long-standing ones such as agriculture and cohesion. That is why we call for a responsible and justified increase of the next MFF, moving beyond the self-imposed 1% of GNI cap. We also reject the Commission’s ‘one national plan per member state’ model, which we believe is unfit for managing spending in member states. Today’s vote shows Parliament’s Committee on Budgets is united and ready for the next EU budget proposal, with strong support from pro-European political groups for a more ambitious EU budget,” Siegfried Mureşan (EPP, RO), co-rapporteur, said.

    “We have worked hard to incorporate nearly 2,000 amendments into our report, reflecting the majority vision for the next long-term EU budget. We want people and regions at the centre of the next MFF. We need strong investments to boost strategic autonomy, economic resilience, and green goals while leaving no one behind. In addition, an ambitious budget must promote social and territorial cohesion, include new and modernised sources of revenue, and guarantee sufficient funding for security, defence and preparedness as a pillar to ensure just and thriving societies, while upholding the rule of law and the EU’s core values,” Carla Tavares (S&D, PT), co-rapporteur, said.

    Next steps

    Parliament’s plenary is expected to vote on the report during its first session in May, setting out Parliament’s priorities, and feeding into the Commission’s proposal on the next long-term EU budget. The Commission is expected to unveil its proposal in July.

    Background

    The EU’s long-term budget, the multiannual financial framework (MFF) is typically established for a period of seven years and lays down the maximum spending ceilings for different policy areas. After having secured Parliament’s consent, granted by a majority of its component members, the Council, consisting of EU governments, adopts the MFF regulation; this requires unanimity. The EU’s current long-term budget runs out on 31 December 2027. About 93% of the EU budget funds regional and local projects, and support for agriculture, research, education, and businesses.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Oxfam reaction to OECD preliminary data on aid spending in 2024

    Source: Oxfam –

    In response to the publication today of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) preliminary data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 2024, Oxfam International’s Aid Policy Lead Salvatore Nocerino said:

    “Today’s figures lay bare an ugly truth: even before this year’s devastating cuts to aid, rich countries had already begun to renege on their moral obligations to the world’s most vulnerable communities. Not only had they been reducing aid, but also spending a significant share of it within their own borders to cover refugee costs.

    “Only a handful of countries, including Luxembourg, New Zealand, Spain and South Korea, maintained or increased their aid budgets in 2024, and are expected to do the same this year.

    “If governments keep slashing aid, more children will go to bed hungry, more people will die from diseases we’ve long known how to prevent, and millions more will be pushed even deeper into poverty.

    “Governments must urgently reverse these cuts and start taxing the super-rich, whose wealth has grown unchecked. In a world as interconnected as ours, diseases and climate disasters know no borders. These cuts are reckless and short-sighted, and will drive us all towards greater harm.”
     

    The OECD’s preliminary data shows that ODA totalled $212 billion in 2024, a significant drop from $223 billion in 2023. Last year’s ODA fell $237 billion short of meeting the longstanding commitment of allocating 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) to aid for low- and middle-income countries. Oxfam has calculated that in the 54 years since this promise was made, rich countries have failed to deliver a total of $7.5 trillion in aid.

    In 2024, 13.1 percent was spent on domestic refugee reception.

    According to Forbes’ 39th Annual World’s Billionaire List published on 1 April, billionaires are worth a record $16.1 trillion, $2 trillion more than in 2024.
     

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Rent control consultation published

    Source: Scottish Government

    Views sought on exemptions from rent control and where rent could be increased above cap.

    A consultation has been published on potential for certain exemptions from rent controls or increases above the rent cap.

    Last year, the Scottish Government set out its plans for long-term rent controls in the Housing (Scotland) Bill, which will help create a fairer, better-regulated rented sector for tenants and landlords.

    Tenants, landlords and others in the rented sector are being asked to share their views on possible exemptions to the rent cap, for example in connection with mid-market and Build to Rent properties.

    The consultation also considers where landlords could be allowed to increase rents above the cap, for example where there have been improvements to their property or where rents have consistently been charged at a level below market rates.

    Views are also being sought on how Ministers’ regulation-making powers could be used to clarify how private sector joint tenancies are ended.

    Social Justice Secretary Shirley-Anne Somerville said:

    “The rent control proposals we have published as part of the Housing Bill are just some of the measures we are taking to improve lives and work towards achieving our goal of ending child poverty in Scotland.

    “Our rent control proposals will help provide certainty for tenants by keeping them in their homes and ensure rents remain affordable during a cost-of-living crisis.

    “Rental properties are a crucial element of our efforts to tackle the housing emergency and we want landlords to have the confidence to invest and continue to provide good quality, affordable homes.

    “We have published this consultation as part of our ongoing engagement with those who will be affected by rent control.  The responses will help us strike the right balance between supporting tenants, whilst ensuring the rights of landlords are protected and we continue to support investment in the rented homes we need.”

    Background

    Housing (Scotland) Bill – Scottish Government consultations – Citizen Space

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘Energy security’ is being used to justify more fossil fuels – but this will only make us less secure

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Freddie Daley, Research Associate, Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex

    corlaffra / shutterstock

    The UK government is about to host a summit with the International Energy Agency (IEA) on the future of energy security. It does so as the world grapples with war, geopolitical realignments and trade barriers, against a backdrop of accelerating climate upheavals. One of the expected outcomes of this summit is a new, agreed definition of what constitutes energy security in the 21st century.

    Common understandings of energy security have focused on making supplies reliable and affordable, with less attention paid to ensuring sources of energy are sustainable and less volatile over the medium- and long-term. This neglect compromises our collective security.

    The IEA’s 31 member countries and 13 associates include most of the world’s most powerful states. Its influence means that this new definition of energy security will be used to inform government policies and investment decisions around the world. Given the cost of energy infrastructure, and the lengthy time it takes to build these projects, this definition is set to shape our future, economically and climatically.

    But there is a very real risk that this definition will open the door to further investments into fossil fuel production under the guise of energy security.

    International Energy Agency (IEA) member and ‘association member’ countries.
    IEA, CC BY-SA

    After Russia invaded Ukraine, governments rushed to cut their reliance on Russian fossil fuels. This caused major disruptions as prices spiked and millions were pushed into energy poverty.

    Europe alone spent an extra €517–€831 billion (£444–£713 billion) on energy in 2021 and 2022, even though some imports from Russia continued through so-called “shadow fleets”. Some argued that high fossil fuel prices only embolden leaders like Putin and help fund their conflicts.

    Governments responded with “energy nativism”, as they sought to secure as much energy as possible for their citizens at whatever cost. This typically meant boosting renewables and bulk buying oil and gas. In the UK’s case, it also meant the previous government issuing hundreds of new licenses to drill for oil and gas to “increase energy security” – licenses the current government says it will honour).

    Shipments of liquified natural gas (LNG) were also redirected from poorer countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh towards the highest bidders in Europe and Asia. This raises the question of who exactly is becoming more energy secure and at what cost.

    Meanwhile, large fossil fuel exporters like Qatar, the US and Australia ramped up production. A US official even referred to its gas exports as “molecules of freedom”. Australia has exported so much natural gas it may have to buy its own gas back from Japan at market price.

    The sheer volume of investment in new oil and gas infrastructure like offshore rigs or LNG terminals, combined with long build times, has locked in higher fossil fuel production and pushed emissions to record levels. This poses significant risks for both exporters and importers, especially as future demand is uncertain and energy markets remain volatile.

    Fossil fuels remain dominant

    More fundamentally, continued reliance on fossil fuels is making humanity less secure. The vast majority of emissions still come from burning coal, oil or gas. Preventing climate catastrophe therefore requires us to phase out fossil fuels as fast as possible – with wealthy nations leading the charge. In their place, we’ll have to generate energy from renewable sources that do not replicate the volatility of globally traded fossil fuels.

    Yet despite some progressive policies, fossil fuels remain dominant across the global economy. Investment in oil and gas today is almost double the level it must fall below if the world is to reach net zero by 2050, according to the IEA’s own modelling.

    The pursuit of energy security has boosted renewables, but adding additional clean energy isn’t enough – it must ultimately displace fossil fuels entirely. This will require a whole-economy shift. That means cutting production of fossil fuels while also reducing demand, stabilising prices and building out clean energy fast enough to support the electrification of transport, industry and heating.

    But supply chains for batteries, solar panels and other key technologies are vulnerable. Delays and shortages could mean electricity prices spike, sparking social unrest. This is yet another risk of getting energy security wrong: if inflationary pressures drive the immiseration of the general public, governments and their energy plans will be short lived.

    The definition of energy security that comes out of the IEA summit should reflect the fact we’re now in a world of constant crises. True energy security means charting a path towards a world that is more socially, economically and environmentally secure. This means developing a well-managed global plan to phase out fossil fuels.

    Peter Newell receives research funding from UKRI for work on energy transitions.

    Freddie Daley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘Energy security’ is being used to justify more fossil fuels – but this will only make us less secure – https://theconversation.com/energy-security-is-being-used-to-justify-more-fossil-fuels-but-this-will-only-make-us-less-secure-254094

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 23 April 2025 Policy and education: ways to end child marriage and prevent adolescent pregnancy

    Source: World Health Organisation

    Every year, an estimated 21 million girls aged 15–19 years in low- and middle-income countries become pregnant. Adolescent pregnancy leads to higher risks of maternal and infant mortality, a greater chance of mental health problems, and constraints for educational and economic prospects, which contributes to cycles of poverty and inequality that can span across generations

    In many parts of the world, adolescents lack access to the information and resources necessary to make informed decisions about their sexual and reproductive health (SRH). This leaves them vulnerable to unintended pregnancies; child marriage further fuels the risk.

    The World Health Organization (WHO) recently released an updated guideline for preventing early pregnancy and poor reproductive outcomes among adolescents in low- and middle-income countries, providing evidence-based normative guidance in two key areas: preventing child marriage and improving adolescents’ access to contraception. The recommendations highlight the importance of enabling laws and policies and education to achieve these goals.  

    The power of policy

    Many countries around the world have recently stepped up to make child marriage illegal. Colombia is one of these, with members of congress abolishing  a law in November 2024 that allowed marriages from the age of 14. Importantly, the new bill they introduced also includes measures to restore the rights of children and adolescents affected by underage marriages and unions, with a special emphasis on supporting indigenous people and other vulnerable communities.

    A joint effort by authorities and society is required to eradicate this practice and guarantee the protection of girls’ rights.

    Tamara Ospina / Government of Colombia’s Vice Minister of Women

     “The effective implementation of this law shows a change in the social norms that perpetuate child marriage. A joint effort by authorities and society is required to eradicate this practice and guarantee the protection of girls’ rights,” said Tamara Ospina, the Government of Colombia’s Vice Minister of Women. “It is essential to advance a campaign for cultural change that allows for the dismantling of traditional family views and promotes the participation of girls in different sectors, especially in the educational sector, to foster greater opportunities.”

    The WHO guideline recommends the formulation and implementation of such laws and policies that prevent marriage before age 18, in line with human rights standards. However, the guideline acknowledges, in agreement with the Human Right Council Resolution, that simply making child marriage illegal is not enough. Without additional support programmes, this approach could marginalize and stigmatize girls and families, and lead to more informal or unregistered marriages, unintentionally increasing the practice.

    This is why a comprehensive approach, that includes efforts to address the root causes of child marriage, such as poverty, gender inequality and access to education, is so important. The guideline also suggests the approach should also mobilize youth and adolescents, as well as political and governmental leaders, alongside religious, traditional and other influential people in the community to promote girls’ rights.

     The importance of comprehensive sexuality education

    The WHO guideline reinforces the interagency technical guidelines on sexuality education, emphasizing that comprehensive sexuality education is key to preventing adolescent pregnancy and improving contraceptive uptake. In Colombia, implementation of the law is facilitated by work led by adolescent girls to ensure that girls have access to sexuality education.

    Ángela Rosa Cervantes Bravo is a teen activist from a rural indigenous village in Colombia where she is heavily involved in an NGO called Sinumar Foundation that focuses on girls and sexuality education with the aim to prevent adolescent pregnancy in her community. Every year, the foundation organizes an entire week of speakers on sexual education. “During this time, our mothers, children in the community, and we, as young women, are guided and filled with knowledge about our bodies, contraceptive methods, and more. We sit down with boys and girls in mixed circles, talking about sexual education, violence and any other issue that might be relevant to the community,” Cervantes Bravo said.

    Discussing topics, such as adolescent pregnancy or child marriage, comes with its challenges due to the social stigma and traditional beliefs around it. “Some parents still get upset when they hear us discussing these things, but they need to understand that we are at a stage where these conversations are necessary,” she said. The experiences of Cervantes Bravo reinforce the need to engage parents and other community members in supporting adolescents, which is highlighted as another recommendation in the updated guideline.  

    Support tools for policy makers and programme managers will be rolled out to guide decision making and ensure that interventions are contextually relevant, to support the work of countries like Colombia and of NGO’s like Sinumar Foundation.

    Avni Amin, Unit Head of Rights and Equality Across the Life Course at WHO and the UN Special Programme on Human Reproduction (HRP) concludes: “While these guidelines offer a solid foundation for countries to address adolescent pregnancy and prevent child marriage, the true measure of their success lies in their implementation. It is essential that these guidelines are not only read but acted upon, integrated into national policies, and adapted to fit local contexts. Our goal is to see tangible changes on the ground that will empower young girls and protect their rights.” 

    Other countries that have taken recent measures to act on child marriage include Sierra Leone and Belize. Sierra Leone’s Prohibition of Child Marriage Act eliminated all exceptions that previously allowed marriage under 18, ensuring a strict nationwide ban. Similarly, Belize amended its Marriage Act to raise the legal marriage age from 16 to 18, without any exceptions, reinforcing its commitment to ending child marriage. 

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 23 April 2025 News release WHO releases new guideline to prevent adolescent pregnancies and improve girls’ health

    Source: World Health Organisation

    In a bid to tackle the leading cause of death globally among 15–19-year-old girls, the World Health Organization (WHO) today released a new guideline aimed at preventing adolescent pregnancy and its significant related health complications.

    Among other strategies, the guideline urges rapid action to end child marriage, extend girls’ schooling, and improve access to sexual and reproductive health services and information – all critical factors for reducing early pregnancies among teenagers around the world.

    “Early pregnancies can have serious physical and psychological consequences for girls and young women, and often reflect fundamental inequalities that affect their ability to shape their relationships and their lives,” said Dr Pascale Allotey, Director of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Research at WHO and the United Nations’ Special Programme in Human Reproduction (HRP). “Tackling this issue therefore means creating conditions where girls and young women can thrive – by ensuring they can stay in school, be protected from violence and coercion, access sexual and reproductive health services that uphold their rights, and have real choices about their futures.”

    More than 21 million adolescent girls become pregnant each year in low and middle-income countries, around half of which are unintended. With impacts on girls’ education, social connection and future employment prospects, early pregnancy can create cycles of intergenerational poverty that become difficult to break. It also brings serious health risks, including relatively higher rates of infections and preterm births as well as complications from unsafe abortions – linked to particular challenges in accessing safe and respectful care.

    Reasons for early pregnancy are varied and interrelated, including gender inequities, poverty, lack of opportunity and inability to access sexual and reproductive health services. There is a strong correlation with child marriage: in low- and middle-income countries, 9 in 10 adolescent births take place among girls who were married before the age of 18.

    The guideline recommends holistic efforts to provide viable alternatives to early marriage by strengthening girls’ education, savings and employment prospects. If all girls finished their secondary schooling, it has been estimated that child marriages could be reduced by as much as two thirds. For girls at highest risk, the guideline recommends considering incentives to support secondary school completion, such as targeted financial stipends or scholarship programmes. The guideline also recommends laws to prohibit marriage below the age of 18, consistent with human rights standards, and community engagement to prevent the practice.

    “Early marriage denies girls their childhood and has severe consequences for their health,” said Dr Sheri Bastien, Scientist for Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health at WHO. “Education is critical to change the future for young girls, while empowering adolescents – both boys and girls – to understand consent, take charge of their health, and challenge the major gender inequalities that continue to drive high rates of child marriage and early pregnancy in many parts of the world.”

    The recommendations highlight the need to ensure adolescents can access high quality, adolescent-responsive sexual and reproductive health services including contraceptive options. In some countries, consent from an adult is required to access services, which is a significant barrier to their use. Young girls who get pregnant also need to be able to access high quality and respectful healthcare during and after pregnancy and birth, free from stigma and discrimination, as well as safe abortion care.

    Finally, comprehensive sexuality education is essential for both boys and girls to ensure they know where to access such services and how to use different types of contraception. It has been shown to reduce early pregnancies, delay the onset of sexual activity, and improve adolescents’ knowledge about their bodies and reproductive health. 

    This guideline updates an earlier edition of the guideline on adolescent pregnancy prevention from 2011 and focuses particularly on preventing child marriage and improving adolescents’ access to and use of contraception. It complements WHO’s related guidance around health services for adolescents, comprehensive sexuality education and gender-based violence.

    Globally, there has been progress in reducing adolescent pregnancies and births. In 2021, an estimated 1 in 25 girls gave birth before the age of 20, compared to 1 in 15 two decades prior. There remain significant disparities. In some countries, close to 1 in 10 adolescent girls (15–19 years) give birth each year.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Aid cuts threaten the lives of 110,000 children with severe malnutrition reliant on emergency treatment from Save the Children

    Source: Save the Children

    At least 110,000- severely acutely malnourished children supported by Save the Children in 10 countries could be left without access to life-saving ready-to-use emergency food and nutrition programmes as aid cuts hit supplies in coming months, according to a Save the Children analysis.
    Globally, one in five deaths among children aged under 5 are attributed to severe acute malnutrition, making it one of the top threats to child survival. Community-based programmes combining medical treatment and therapeutic foods, including a fortified peanut paste, have a 90% success rate.
    Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF) is an energy-dense, micronutrient paste typically made using peanuts, sugar, milk powder, oil, vitamins and minerals that is packaged in foil pouches with a long shelf life and no need of refrigeration. Over the past 30 years this emergency therapeutic food has saved the lives of millions of children facing acute malnutrition [1] [2].
    At a time when global hunger is skyrocketing [3], the current global supply of RUTF is already not even meeting 40% of global needs, Save the Children said, leaving millions of children without access to this life-saving intervention.
    In 2024 there were large-scale breaks in the supply of RUTF as rising malnutrition rates drove up demand and due to disruptions in global supply chains and insufficient funding. This situation is expected to worsen in 2025. An analysis by Save the Children of the 10 countries forecast to have the biggest gaps in supplies found 110,000 malnourished children could miss out on this vital treatment by the end of the year. RUTF supplies are expected to run out in many locations from next month due to a lack of funding.
    Globally at least 18.2 million children were born into hunger in 2024, or about 35 children a minute, with children in conflict zones from Gaza to Ukraine, to Haiti, Sudan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), struggling daily to get enough to eat. Famine has been declared in several parts of Sudan where people are resorting to eating grass to stay alive.
    Hannah Stephenson, Head of Hunger and Nutrition at Save the Children, said:
    “Right now, funding shortfalls mean essential nutrition packs are not reaching the children who desperately need them. We know we have the expertise and the track record to reach children around the world but what we urgently need now is the funding to ensure children can receive life-saving treatment. We are running out of time, and t his will cost children’s lives.
    “We also need to see long-term commitments to tackle the root causes of hunger and malnutrition, or else we will continue to see the reversal of progress made for children.”
    In Kenya, one of the countries where Save the Children treats acute malnutrition cases, 18-month-old Ereng has just recovered from malnutrition with treatment from Community Health Promoter Charles, who was trained in basic healthcare by Save the Children.
    Lomanat and Daniel, Ereng’s parents, walked for several kilometres to reach Charles’ clinic. The family are pastoralists, but recent droughts have killed their livestock, and the family now has no sustainable income and no reliable food source.
    They know how important treatment is for children like Ereng, who gained 2.4 kgs (5.3 pounds) in two months once she started receiving nutrition treatment using the fortified peanut paste which has about 500 calories in each portion. Lomanat said:
    “Our  child was in a very bad shape, and the doctor helped by giving her peanut paste. I am very happy, because she is cured.”
    In Somalia, where Save the Children also treats child with acute malnutrition, 7-month-Mukhtar- arrived at a health centre in Puntland after contracting flu which led to breathing difficulties and malnutrition.
    His mother Shamso, 40, who has eight other children, feared her son would not survive with the family struggling after drought killed all but six of their herd of 30 goats. But after receiving medical care and treatment for malnutrition with peanut paste, Mukhtar recovered and returned home.
    “His condition was serious when I brought him in and I didn’t expect him to reach the town alive ,” said Shamso. “My biggest worry is the children, whether my own, those of the relatives or those of my neighbours. When drought comes, it follows that hunger will strike.”
    Children are always the most vulnerable in food crises and, without enough to eat and the right nutritional balance, they are at high risk of becoming acutely malnourished.
    Malnutrition can cause stunting, impede mental and physical development, and increase the risk of contracting deadly diseases.
    About 1.12 billion children globally – or almost half of the world’s children – are unable to afford a balanced diet now, according to data from Save the Children released last month.
    In 2025, Save the Children aims to treat 260,000 children for severe acute malnutrition at outpatient sites in 10 countries that are now experiencing therapeutic food shortages.
    Save the Children is urgently trying to raise $7 million to provide 110,000 severely malnourished children with life-saving RUTF and the critical services needed to treat malnutrition 1 including skilled health workers, community follow-up, immunizations, safe spaces for treatment, safe water, hygiene and sanitation support.
    In the United States, actress and Save the Children ambassador Jennifer Garner launched her #67Strong4Kids campaign on her birthday last week. For #67Strong4Kids she is running a mile a day for 67 consecutive days to raise awareness about Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF). The amount $67 covers a six-week course of RUTF that treats a child suffering from severe acute malnutrition and potentially saves their life.
    NOTES:
    -Methodology: Save the Children used the target reach figures for all outpatient severe acute malnutrition treatment in 10 countries facing the largest disruption to the RUTF supply and compared with the current funding gaps for RUTF in those countries. Given the continued uncertainty in supply funding these figures are preliminary and up to date as of 26 March 2025. The 10 countries facing the largest disruptions are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen.
    REFERENCES
    About Save the Children NZ:
    Save the Children works in 120 countries across the world. The organisation responds to emergencies and works with children and their communities to ensure they survive, learn and are protected.
    Save the Children NZ currently supports international programmes in Fiji, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Laos, Nepal, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Areas of work include child protection, education and literacy, disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, and alleviating child poverty.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA:  Rep. García Stands with Community and Labor Leaders to Defend Social Security and Spanish-Language Services

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Jesús Chuy García (IL-04)

    CHICAGO, IL – Congressman Jesús “Chuy” García (IL-04) stood along with local elected officials, union leaders from the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), disability advocates from Access Living, and national partners at a bilingual press conference to denounce the Trump administration’s proposed cuts to thousands of Social Security Administration (SSA) employees. The administration’s plan would eliminate thousands of SSA jobs and drastically reduce Spanish-language services—posing a serious threat to millions of Americans, especially seniors, people with disabilities, and Spanish-speaking immigrants in Illinois’ 4th Congressional District.

    For pictures of the event, click here. 

    For a full livestream of the event, click here.

    “Social Security isn’t a gift — it’s something paid into and earned. But right now, the Trump administration is slashing jobs, shutting down services, and targeting immigrant communities. This is not about saving Americans money — it’s about making the rich even richer. We’re here to say clearly: Hands off Social Security. Eliminating services in Spanish is more than bad policy — it’s a civil rights crisis. We won’t let it be dismantled without a fight,” said Congressman García.

    “We’re facing an unprecedented staffing crisis—at a 50-year low while serving a record number of beneficiaries—with threats of layoffs and a reckless plan to cut 7,000 more workers. This understaffing is creating a public service crisis. Without adequate staff to run Social Security offices, we’re witnessing a backdoor cut to Americans’ earned benefits,” said Jessica LaPointe, AFGE Council 220 President, and Cheryl Bellamy-Bonner, AFGE Local 1395 representing Social Security field workers.

    “Social Security is a critical lifeline for people with disabilities, many of whom live in poverty because of their disability. There are more than 11 million disabled Americans under the age of 65 who rely on benefits from the Social Security Administration. When a local field office is closed, the number of people receiving disability benefits nearby drops by 16 percent. This cuts families from lifesaving financial support,” said Michelle Garcia, Manager of Organizing and Community Development at Access Living.

    “For our seniors, Social Security isn’t extra money. It’s how they pay the rent, buy food, cover prescriptions, and keep the lights on. A delayed check or a lost claim can throw their entire life into crisis. We have a responsibility to protect the dignity of our elders. We’re not going to wait for this crisis to get worse. We’re raising our voices now, because our seniors can’t afford to be ignored,” added Richard Juarez, Executive Director of Solutions for Care.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Brownley Holds Press Conference to Denounce Trump and Republican Attacks on Social Security

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Julia Brownley (D-CA)

  • MIL-OSI USA: Dingell Statement on the Passing of Pope Francis

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Debbie Dingell (12th District of Michigan)

    Congresswoman Debbie Dingell (MI-06) today released the following statement on the news of the death of Pope Francis.

    “The world has lost a leader who gave so many of us hope. Pope Francis was widely respected for his compassion, realness, and inspiration, which made him a global figure of belief, faith, optimism, and social justice. He had a remarkable ability to connect with people on a personal level and advocate for the marginalized, inspiring action on issues like poverty, inequality, and environmental protection. His genuine humility and open-mindedness resonated with a broad audience, making him a symbol of faith and social change. 

    Pope Francis consistently demonstrated a deep empathy for the suffering of others, particularly the poor and marginalized. He has called for the Church to be a home of mercy and to go out to meet the needs of those on the margins. He taught all of us how important forgiveness and understanding is. He had an authentic and relatable demeanor, where he often spoke directly to the needs and concerns of ordinary people. He avoided excessive formality and embraced a more down-to-earth approach, making him accessible to a wider audience. I loved him for this. 

    Pope Francis’s leadership has inspired people across the globe to embrace a more just and compassionate world. His message of hope and his commitment to social change have encouraged individuals and communities to take action and make a difference in their own lives. 

    Meeting him in 2015 when he spoke to Congress is a memory that I hold in my heart. His words and teachings reinforce the responsibility I have to the people I represent. May he rest in peace.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: How branding made Francis the ‘People’s Pope’

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Aidan Moir, Assistant Professor, Department of Communication, Media and Film, University of Windsor

    From papal selfies to the viral generative AI images featuring a stylish puffer jacket, Pope Francis became a prominent popular culture figure during his papacy.

    News media called him the “People’s Pope,” branding that also circulated online on social media to turn Pope Francis into an icon who symbolized the progressive ideals of 2010s popular culture.

    His 2013 election was significant for many reasons, including the fact that he became the first Jesuit and first pope from Latin America. His acension to the papacy represented an attempt by the Catholic Church to rebrand itself through Francis’s “progressive” public image.

    The Catholic Church as an institutional brand has been at the centre of numerous scandals and controversies after committing grave injustices for generations.




    Read more:
    ‘I am sorry’ — A reflection on Pope Francis’s apology on residential schools


    Pope Francis, on the other hand, became what branding expert Douglas Holt calls an “iconic brand.” These are entities that serve as powerful symbols that reflect cultural myths and ideals.

    Just like politicians or celebrities, popes also need branding to develop their public identities.

    Branding and the papacy

    Pontiffs have always been subject to branding, making them unique subjects for public fascination and popular culture. Decisions about what shoes to wear and what papal name to take are in fact acts of branding.

    Pope Francis chose his papal name to align himself with Saint Francis of Assisi. He also chose to wear a simple white cassock for his first public appearance on the balcony at St. Peter’s Basilica. These decisions were branding strategies.

    Francis’s use of social media brought the papacy into a new digital age. It provided him with a platform to build his brand in a manner similar to politicians.

    His embrace of technology made him appear “cool,” leading to a decade of viral social media posts and memes. The first papal selfie, taken in 2013 with teenage pilgrims visiting the Vatican, went viral on Twitter.

    Iconic brands cannot act alone to maintain their cultural status. As Holt explains, they depend on “co-authors” to create myths that connect brands with the public. Co-authors are media texts or cultural groups circulating stories that give meaning to iconic brands.

    From the outset, news media were an integral part of building the pope’s image. Francis was Time magazine’s 2013 Person of the Year, and graced the cover of Rolling Stone.

    He was largely unknown around the globe prior to becoming pope. Media coverage played an important role in presenting his brand to global audiences as news reports suggested Francis’s humility, compassion for the poor and radical approach to the papacy would transform the Catholic Church.

    Just days after his election, The Washington Post labelled Francis “the People’s Pope.” This title connected Francis to figures likes Princess Diana, a similar iconic figure known for challenging protocol and her progressive charity work who was dubbed “the People’s Princess.”




    Read more:
    Pope Francis has died, aged 88. These were his greatest reforms – and controversies


    A ‘progressive’ image

    After legacy media bolstered his iconic brand as “the People’s Pope,” Pope Francis reinforced this messaging through strategic, selective actions.

    Francis became pope during Barack Obama’s presidency in the United States. The two men shared some similarities, including representing different “firsts.”

    Francis was aware of his iconic brand as “the People’s Pope.” Like Princess Diana, this branding allowed him to appeal to a global audience, regardless of religious affiliation.

    His first official trip was to the Mediterranean island of Lampedusa, holding mass for asylum-seekers and migrants.

    His response of “who am I to judge?” to a media question about the Catholic Church’s position on 2SLGTBQ+ issues gained positive media coverage.

    In 2015, Francis published his first papal encyclical focused on the connection between climate change and global poverty.

    Pope Francis developed an iconic brand that connected with the public during a decade defined by progressive ideals as legacy and social media worked together as co-authors in building his identity.

    Iconic brands can transform the institutions they represent. Pope Francis’s image demonstrates how papal branding is no different than other forms of branding. It depends on different dynamics coming together at the right moment to form myths for public connection.

    Memes related to the movie Conclave are already going viral on social media. The new pontiff will enter a different cultural landscape than Pope Francis, but the strategies for creating an iconic brand remain the same.

    Aidan Moir previously received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    ref. How branding made Francis the ‘People’s Pope’ – https://theconversation.com/how-branding-made-francis-the-peoples-pope-254981

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Protecting Social Security: Gillibrand, Goldman, Seniors, Unions Rally To Demand No Cuts To Social Security Benefits

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Kirsten Gillibrand
    Today, Senator Gillibrand joined with Rep. Dan Goldman, unions, and seniors at a rally to protect Social Security from the Trump administration and to call on the administration to immediately halt its efforts to cut agency staff and the critical services Social Security provides. New York City is home to one of the largest senior populations living in poverty nationwide, and cuts to agency services or personnel will decimate the Social Security system and deny New Yorkers their hard-earned benefits. 
    “Social Security is a necessary lifeline that ensures Americans have access to benefits they rightfully deserve,” said Senator Gillibrand. “The Trump administration is trying to steamroll Social Security with its reckless efforts to undermine this vital program. Instead of tearing Social Security down, President Trump should be reaching across the aisle to strengthen it for future generations. Millions of New Yorkers will be harmed if President Trump gets his way, and I will fight to ensure Social Security benefits remain secure and accessible.”
    “Social Security is not a handout, it’s an earned benefit that New Yorkers have paid into their entire lives to retire with dignity,” said Congressman Dan Goldman. “Donald Trump and the Republican Party are hell-bent on tearing it down. They’re closing field offices, slashing staff, and forcing seniors to travel hours just to complete routine paperwork. Trump, Elon Musk, and their DOGE hatchet men are deliberately erecting roadblocks between seniors and the benefits they’ve been promised. While this president sabotages the programs our communities rely on, I’m calling on New York Republicans to stop cowering and stand up to this assault.”
    “Millions of Americans, including me, have been paying into Social Security our whole working lives. This is an earned benefit, not just something handed to us. Closing offices like the Hearing Office in White Plains will force seniors and people with disabilities to travel much longer distances to fight for their benefits. This amounts to a cut in benefits and we will do all we can to prevent it from happening,” said Congressman George Latimer.
    “Wait times are longer, social security recipients are anxious, and cuts to Social Security Administration staff and giving DOGE access to confidential personal data is wrong-headed,” said Congressman Tom Suozzi. “We must protect Social Security. Undermining Social Security weakens the fragile foundation of the American middle class.”
    “Many of our members dedicated their lives to public service with the promise that social security would be there when they reached retirement age, and now we are seeing that promise under attack by this administration,” said Henry Garrido, Executive Director of District Council 37 AFSCME, AFL-CIO. “The rising costs of housing, food and healthcare are already threatening to leave our retirees and seniors financially devastated, and these planned cuts to social security services must stop immediately.”
    The Social Security Administration (SSA) has already announced plans to cut 7,000 staff, despite the fact that SSA staffing is already at a 50-year low and there are historically long case backlogs. Seniors across the nation have been reporting hours-long wait times, SSA website crashes, and an inability to reach anyone at the Social Security office for help. The so-called “Department of Government Efficiency” is heightening fear among seniors that proposed cuts to SSA will amount to a cut in benefits. With continuous website crashes and some individuals not even being able to log in to their portal, DOGE has decided that now is the right time to terminate SSA employees who are in charge of IT for their website. DOGE is simultaneously planning to shutter Social Security Administration offices across the country, including two in New York. DOGE’s continued attempts to gut this agency at a time of heightened food and energy prices will cause anxiety and confusion amongst beneficiaries, some of whom rely completely on their Social Security benefits to make ends meet.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s Greenland plan glosses over a history of segregation and discrimination for Indigenous Alaskans

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

    Donald Trump has wanted America to annex Greenland for a long time. He now has a concrete plan to do it. As reported by the New York Times, the president’s National Security Council has instructed several government departments to get to work on acquiring the island.

    Trump has made it clear that the use of military force remains on the table. But, at least for now, it seems the plan will rely mostly on persuasion.

    The first component is a coordinated advertising and social media campaign aimed at convincing Greenlanders that their future lies under the stars and stripes. The administration plans to tell the island’s residents that they will be more prosperous and more secure as part of the US.

    Driving that message home will be an uphill struggle. A poll in January 2025 found that 85% of Greenlanders oppose the idea of being annexed by the US. A parliamentary election in March also showed little support for it. The best-performing party was the pro-business Demokraatit, which wants to slow walk changes to Greenland’s international status.

    To overcome this resistance, the Trump administration is reportedly planning to appeal to shared ethnic and cultural ties between Inuit Greenlanders, who make up about 88% of the island’s population, and Indigenous peoples in the US state of Alaska. Greenlanders are likely to question that approach for a number of reasons.

    These ties are not completely imaginary. Greenland Inuit are descended from the Thule people, who migrated from Alaska around 1,000 years ago. There are similarities between the languages of Alaskan and Greenland Inuit.

    But these people have been separated by 2,000 miles for centuries, and in the interim have been shaped by their divergent histories. Though their languages are similar, they are generally not mutually intelligible.

    One of the main factors separating Alaskan and Greenland Inuit is their separate colonial histories. Greenland was colonised by Denmark, and Alaska by the US. The details of this colonial history are likely to give Greenlanders pause.

    Alaska became a US state in 1959. Before then, it was a territory – a colonial holding similar to Puerto Rico or Guam today. During its time as a territory, the US government and white settlers treated Alaska’s Indigenous people with a mixture of disinterest and malice.

    Until discrimination was outlawed by a state law in 1945, Indigenous Alaskans lived in a system of segregation and limited rights similar to the “Jim Crow” policies of the southern US. Indigenous Alaskans, like African Americans in the southern states, were not guaranteed the right to vote, and “whites only” signs were commonplace in businesses.

    During the second world war, the US government feared a Japanese attack on the Aleutian islands, which form part of Alaska. As a result, it forcibly evacuated the Indigenous population, burning their villages to prevent invading Japanese troops from using them as housing. Evacuees were forced to live in unsanitary camps on the mainland for years, where more than one in ten died.

    The US government justified this as a geopolitical necessity. But given that great power politics is also behind its drive to control Greenland, the island’s residents should question whether their rights will be respected if they conflict with another perceived geopolitical necessity.

    Buying favour

    Another plank of the Trump administration’s plan is financial. The White House apparently wants to replace the subsidy that Greenland currently receives from Denmark with a payment of US$10,000 (£7,600) per resident. It’s not clear if this money is intended to go directly to the population, or to the island’s central government.

    This works out at just over US$568 million (£429 million) a year. If it’s a subsidy for the central government, then it’s slightly less than the island currently receives from Denmark. And if it’s a payment directly to the population, then it’s unclear how public services on the island would be funded.

    Here again, a look at the experience of Indigenous Alaskans is instructive. Indigenous Alaskans, who receive various US government services through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, have a much higher poverty rate than the general population, lower rates of health coverage and worse educational outcomes.

    They also generally don’t live as long. According to the most recent figures, the life expectancy for Indigenous Alaskans is 70.4 years – much lower than the statewide average of 74.5.

    Economic development – or, perhaps more accurately, exploiting Greenland’s natural resources – is also part of Trump’s plan. Trump is apparently interested in Greenland’s “rare earth minerals, copper, gold, uranium and oil”.

    Greenland does indeed have vast mineral wealth. But it is unclear if it can be safely accessed in the island’s current inhospitable environment.

    Such resource extraction could also easily lead to environmental damage, as it has done in Alaska. In 1989, for example, the Exxon Valdez oil supertanker spilled more than 10 million gallons of crude oil in Alaska’s Prince William Sound.

    Meanwhile, without strong regulation and taxation, the wealth generated could easily accrue to corporations rather than Greenlanders.

    There is a long history of colonising powers claiming that only they, rather than “the natives”, can deliver prosperity and progress to a country. Trump’s plan, which tries to turn the experience of Indigenous Alaskans into one that Greenlanders should want to emulate, fits squarely into this genre.

    But the history of US involvement in Alaska and its treatment of Indigenous Alaskans gives lie to that story. For Greenlanders to trade their sovereignty to the US in return for a guarantee of prosperity and security would be a risky gamble indeed.

    Andrew Gawthorpe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump’s Greenland plan glosses over a history of segregation and discrimination for Indigenous Alaskans – https://theconversation.com/trumps-greenland-plan-glosses-over-a-history-of-segregation-and-discrimination-for-indigenous-alaskans-254418

    MIL OSI – Global Reports