Category: Child Poverty

MIL-OSI United Nations: Deputy Secretary-General’s remarks at the G20 Tax Side Event – Domestic Resource Mobilisation: Bridging the Tax Gap [as prepared for delivery]

Source: United Nations secretary general

H.E. Mr. Enoch Godongwana, Minister of Finance of South Africa,
Excellencies,
It is a pleasure to join you for this important discussion on domestic resource mobilization and bridging the tax gap.
This challenge stands at the heart of financing sustainable development, and demands our urgent attention.
We are not on track to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
We have an estimated $4 trillion sustainable development financing gap annually.
Domestic public finance is essential for financing the Sustainable Development Goals, increasing equity and strengthening macroeconomic stability.
Robust fiscal systems, including both tax and expenditure, drive economic growth, industrial transformation and environmental sustainability – contributing to alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities.
Beyond raising revenue, taxation remains fundamental to fairness, trust, and sovereignty.
Yet, after significant increases in taxation in developing countries in the decade before 2009, average tax-to-GDP ratios for all developing country groups are below 2010 levels, remaining far below those of developed countries.
Successive shocks over the last two decades have severely impacted the mobilization of domestic resources for development.
As global crises intensify, it becomes more critical than ever to increase countries’ taxation capabilities.
The good news is that there is a large unmet tax potential in many developing countries.
Many governments have invested in tax reforms, demonstrating how nations can unlock unmet potential.
Strengthening tax systems requires sustained investment in capacity development based on country needs and priorities.
As economies evolve, so must tax systems.
The increasingly digitalized economy presents new opportunities, but also poses new challenges to an international tax system that has been designed for traditional business models.
We must develop future-ready tax policies that ensure global fair taxation without imposing excessive burdens – both on taxpayers and tax authorities.
Many organizations – including the UN, IMF, OECD, World Bank, and regional and national tax bodies – are supporting countries in this effort.
Initiatives like Tax Inspectors Without Borders help countries enhance domestic revenue mobilization. The Addis Tax Initiative and broader multilateral and regional efforts provide platforms for collaboration, knowledge-sharing, and technical assistance.
However, political will remains insufficient – with countries not investing enough in tax system reform and administration capacity, and donors not delivering promised assistance for supporting revenue mobilization.
The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, in Sevilla in June, offers a pivotal moment to turn commitments for domestic tax reforms into actions, and make tax systems more fair, transparent, efficient and effective.
In our interconnected world, strengthening countries’ fiscal frameworks must go hand-in-hand with international tax cooperation.
Every year, billions of dollars that should fund education, healthcare, and infrastructure are lost to tax avoidance and evasion, illicit financial flows, and financial crime.
Africa alone loses approximately $88.6 billion annually to illicit financial flows – around 3.7% of the continent’s GDP – draining resources vital for economic development.
The G20 has played an important role in advancing tax transparency and tackling tax avoidance. Expanding the automatic exchange of information and enhancing transparency in beneficial ownership remain paramount.
But more must be done to ensure that all countries – particularly those with limited administrative capacity – can fully participate in shaping global tax norms.
The ongoing negotiations on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, present a historic opportunity for progress toward a fair, inclusive, and effective international tax system.
Through the Pact for the Future, Member States have committed to improving the inclusiveness and effectiveness of tax cooperation under the UN.
Ensuring that international tax rules reflect the diverse needs, priorities, and capacities of all countries is central to this effort.
The two early protocols in the UN Convention – on taxation of income from cross-border services in a digitalized and globalized economy and on preventing and resolving tax disputes – can demonstrate an inclusive and impactful approach.
The UN process can strengthen global cooperation, enhance legitimacy, certainty, resilience, and fairness of international tax rules, while addressing challenges in domestic resource mobilization and ensuring that all countries have a seat at the table.
Today’s discussion is an opportunity to drive forward these critical issues.
The United Nations remains fully committed to these efforts.
Together, we can build a fairer, more transparent, and more effective international tax system – one that provides every country with the means to invest in its future and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
Thank you.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – A10-0012/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024

(2024/2081(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

– having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

– having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

– having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

– having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

– having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

– having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

– having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

– having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

– having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

– having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

– having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006 [1],

– having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

– having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses [2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe [3],

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

– having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

– having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

– having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

– having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

– having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

– having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

– having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

– having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

– having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

– having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859 [4],

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

– having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

– having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

– having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

– having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU [5],

– having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy [6],

– having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy [7],

– having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)[8],

– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023 [9], and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

B. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

C. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

D. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

E. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

F. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

G. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

H. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

I. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

J. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

K. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

L. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

M. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

N. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

O. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

P. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to RSF, 47 journalists and media workers have been killed, most of them in conflict zones, and 573 have been imprisoned since 1 January 2024;

Q. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

R. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

S. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

Global challenges to democracy and human rights

1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil;

5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative [10] as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

EU action plan on human rights and democracy

8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

EU trade and international agreements

12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

EU human rights dialogues

13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

Democracy support activities

15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS;

EU support for human rights defenders

16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

17. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

18. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

19. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation;

20. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk, for instance streamlining visa procedures and promoting harmonisation in the EU’s visa application process;

Combating impunity and corruption

21. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012); supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

22. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

EU actions at multilateral level

23. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

24. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

25. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

26. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

27. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

Upholding international humanitarian law

29. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

30. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

31. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

Team Europe approach

32. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to urge countries to release political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

33. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

34. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

35. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

Right to food, water and sanitation

36. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

37. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

Climate change and the environment

38. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

39. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

Rights of the child

40. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

41. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

42. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

Rights of women and gender equality

43. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

44. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

45. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU [11], including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

46. Reaffirms that no agreement with a non-EU country designated as a transit country should be concluded without Parliament’s scrutiny, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to include robust human rights clauses, monitoring mechanisms and impact assessments therein; reiterates its call on the Commission to integrate ex ante human rights impact assessments into such agreements;

Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

47. Deplores the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

Rights of persons with disabilities

48. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

Rights of elderly people

49. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

Right to equality and non-discrimination

50. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

51. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

52. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

53. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

54. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; notes the number of journalists killed in conflict situations in 2023, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, has increased alarmingly – by 85 % – since 2022;

55. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

56. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; urges the EU to help make reliable news sources available to more people living in countries that restrict press freedom;

57. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

58. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

59. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

Rights of indigenous peoples

60. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

Right to public participation

61. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by articifical intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

Human rights, business and trade

62. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market [12] and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

63. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

Human rights and digital technologies

64. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry [13]; condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

65. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

66. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

67. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

° °

68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Each year, the European Parliament adopts three annual reports on the EU’s foreign, security and defence, and human rights policies.

The three reports are on:

• the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the AFET Committee,

• Human Rights and Democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (based on the EU Annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World) – competence of the DROI Subcommittee, and

• the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the SEDE Subcommittee.

These reports monitor and assess the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the EU policy on Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy. They are a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU foreign policy making, most notably in regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is essential that the European Parliament responds to the annual reports issued by other institutions as soon as they are published.

ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

European Partnership for Democracy/International Dalit Solidarity Network

Clean Clothes Campaign

Protection International

Race & Equality

FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights

International Partnership for Human Rights

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

Front Line Defenders

Save the Children

Avocats Sans Frontières

Center for Reproductive Rights

Reporters without Borders

End FGM European Network

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do ), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

COUNTRY

Individual

BACKGROUND

ACTION TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

AFGHANISTAN

Manizha Seddiqi Ahmad Fahim Azimi

Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee Ezatullah Zwab

Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab are human rights defenders who have been detained in Afghanistan.

In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

– Condemns the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, including Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab;

– Calls for victims of violence against women and girls to be released from prison, where they are being held in inhumane conditions to the detriment of their mental and physical health.

ALGERIA

Boualem Sansal

French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal was detained on 16 November 2024 by the Algerian authorities, his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel; he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, and he is awaiting trial.

In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

– Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

– Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

– Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard.

AZERBAIJAN

Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu

Ilhamiz Guliyev

Ulvi Hasanli Sevinj Vagifgizi

Nargiz Absalamova

Hafiz Babali,

Elnara Gasimova Aziz Orujov

Rufat Muradli

Avaz Zeynalli

Elnur Shukurov

Alasgar Mammadli

Farid Ismayilov

Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life.

Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; he is facing up to 12 years in prison.

Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev are political prisoners, and Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov are human rights defenders and journalists.

In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

– Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

– Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals.

AZERBAIJAN

Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

Political prisoner and 2024 Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest; the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his health condition is critical, requiring hospitalisation and urgent heart surgery.

Civil society leader Anar Mammadli has been in pre-trial detention since April 2024 on bogus charges, with his health deteriorating due to denied healthcare.

In early December 2024, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested MeydanTV journalists Aynur Ganbarova, Aytaj Ahmadova, Khayala Agayeva, Natig Javadli and Aysel Umudova, and journalists Ramin Jabrayilzade and Ahmad Mukhtar; they also arrested Baku Journalism School deputy director Ulvi Tahirov, political leader Azer Gasimli and human rights defender Rufat Safarov; all face unfounded, politically motivated charges.

In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

– Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately end the crackdown on all dissident groups and unconditionally release and drop all charges against human rights defenders, journalists and political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated, politically motivated charges;

– Demands that the authorities immediately lift the travel ban on Ibadoghlu, unconditionally drop all charges against him and allow him to receive urgent treatment abroad; deplores the fact that Ibadoghlu was not allowed to attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony or connect remotely;

– Calls on Azerbaijan to lift undue restrictions on independent media by aligning its laws on the registration and funding of non-governmental groups and media with Venice Commission recommendations; demands that the authorities end the repression of MeydanTV, ToplumTV, Abaz Media and Kanal13;

– Calls for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including Fuad Alasgarov, Vilayat Eyvazov and Ali Naghiyev.

BELARUS

Marina Adamovich, Mikalai Statkevich Tatsiana Seviarynets, Pavel Seviarynets Daria Losik

Ihar Losik

Mikalai Kazlou

Ryhor Kastusiou Mikalai Statkevich Pavel Seviarynets

Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich (political prisoner), Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets (political prisoner), and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik (political prisoner), have suffered interrogations and detentions by the KGB.

Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, all political prisoners, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour.

In its resolution of 14 December 2023, the European Parliament:

– Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;

– Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1 400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights.

BELARUS

Mikola Statkevich

Ales Bialiatski

Maria Kalesnikava Siarhei Tsikhanouski Viktar Babaryka Maksim Znak

Pavel Sevyarynets Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk

Andrzej Poczobut Ihar Losik

Former presidential candidate and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikola Statkevich has been imprisoned on politically motivated charges for 14 years; he is kept in solitary confinement under maximum security; his health is deteriorating and his lawyers and family have been denied information and contact for over 300 days.

Prominent Belarusian political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Pavel Sevyarynets, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik, have been subjected to similar isolation.

In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

– Demands the immediate, unconditional release of Mikola Statkevich and all 1 500 political prisoners; calls for the withdrawal of all charges against them, their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damage suffered as a result of being deprived of liberty;

– Insists that the prisoners must receive proper medical assistance and access to lawyers, family, diplomats and international organisations, which can assess their condition and provide aid; regrets the inaction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Belarus;

– Strongly condemns the unjustified, politically motivated sentences and continued repression of Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, clergy, political activists and their family members.

CHINA

Ding Yuande

Ma Ruimei

On 12 May 2023 Falun Gong practitioners Mr Ding Yuande and his wife Ms Ma Ruimei were arrested without a warrant; Ms Ma was released on bail, but was then intimidated by police because of a rescue campaign launched by their son abroad.

Mr Ding was detained with no family visits for eight months; on 15 December 2023 he was sentenced to three years in prison with a CNY 15 000 fine.

In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

– Strongly urges the PRC to immediately end the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Mr Ding and all Falun Gong practitioners in China;

– Calls for the PRC to end domestic and transnational surveillance and control and the suppression of religious freedom; urges the PRC to abide by its obligations under international law and its own constitution to respect and protect human rights.

CHINA

Ilham Tohti

Gulshan Abbas

In 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize. Gulshan Abbas has been serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC.

Gulshan Abbas, is a Uyghur retired doctor, who was forcibly disappeared in retaliation of her sisters public criticism of the treatment of Uyghurs. She has received a 20-year sentence in 2020, for participating in a terrorist organisation.

In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

– Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;

– Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;

– Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;

– Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

– Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations.

CUBA

José Daniel Ferrer Garcia

Human rights defender and opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer García was detained on 11 July 2021 in the context of widespread protests in Cuba, and has been held in isolation since 14 August 2021; the Cuban regime has imprisoned, harassed and intimidated him for over a decade for his peaceful political activism; since March 2023, he has been held incommunicado and his family have received no information about his health and have been denied the right to visit him.

In its resolution of 19 September 2024, the European Parliament:

– The Cuban regime holds political prisoners in the most appalling conditions; whereas reports indicate that José Daniel Ferrer is in a critical condition and has been held without access to medical treatment, with inadequate food and in unsanitary conditions, which constitute forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment;

– The human rights situation in Cuba is alarming, particularly for dissidents, who are subjected to worrying levels of surveillance and arbitrary detention; whereas the number of political prisoners is unknown but reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand prisoners, including minors; whereas among the many political prisoners are Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Lizandra Gongora, whose health condition is critical;

– Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release José Daniel Ferrer and all persons politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

– Condemns the torture and inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban authorities against José Daniel Ferrer and the other political prisoners; calls for the families of victims of the regime’s persecution to be granted immediate access to them, pending their release, and for the victims to be given medical care.

CRIMEA

Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

Crimean journalist and human rights defender Iryna Danylovych was abducted in 2022, accused of possessing explosives and sentenced to 6 years and 11 months of imprisonment; NGO activist Tofik Abdulhaziiev was arrested in 2019 and sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security prison on trumped-up charges, and since 2023 is being held in a prison some 2 700 km away from Crimea; citizen journalist Amet Suleymanov was sentenced to 12 years of prison in 2021.

In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

– Condemns Russia’s continuous targeting of ethnic Ukrainians and systematic persecution of indigenous Crimean Tatars, which aims to erase their identity, heritage and culture, echoing, for the Crimean Tatars, the genocidal deportations of 1944; considers that Crimea’s future is tied to its recognition as the Crimean Tatars’ historic homeland;

– Condemns the persecution of journalists, civil society activists and human rights defenders and the deportation of civilians including political prisoners from Crimea to penitentiary institutions across Russia, contrary to international law;

– Demands the immediate and unconditional release of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov and other political prisoners; calls for immediate medical care to be provided; denounces the upholding of verdicts against seriously ill individuals, which constitutes a blatant violation of international human rights standards; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN to establish the whereabouts of civilian detainees from Crimea.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Jean-Jacques Wondo

Jean-Jacques Wondo, a Belgian-Congolese security, military and political expert, was arrested following a failed coup on 19 May 2024, for which he was accused of being the ‘intellectual perpetrator’, on 13 September 2024, Wondo and 36 others were sentenced to death by a military court.

In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

– Strongly condemns the sentencing to death of Wondo and others and the grave violations of their right to a fair trial;

– Urges the DRC Government to immediately overturn the death sentences, reinstate a moratorium on executions and take steps towards the full abolition of the death penalty;

– Expresses deep concern about Wondo’s deteriorating health, calls for him to be given immediate access to medical treatment and insists on his immediate release;

– Calls for systemic reforms to be implemented in the DRC to rebuild the judiciary into an independent, fair and efficient institution that guarantees due process and the protection of fundamental rights.

GREECE

George Karaivaz

George Karaivaz was a journalist who have been murdered on 9 April 2021.

In its resolution of 7 February 2024, the European Parliament:

– Is deeply concerned by the failure of law enforcement and the judicial authorities in Greece to make progress in the investigation into the murder of the Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021; notes that two suspects were arrested in April 2023, but otherwise there has not been any discernible activity in the police investigation; strongly urges the authorities to take all the necessary steps towards conducting a thorough and effective investigation, and to bring those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; urges the authorities to request assistance from Europol.

HONG KONG

Andy Li

Joseph John

Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities.

Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment.

In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

– Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

– Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists.

HONG KONG/ CHINA

Jimmy Lai

Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; his trial started in 2023 after various delays; he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him. Jimmy Lai a British national since 1996, is a Hong Kong media tycoon, and a known pro- democracy supporter. Political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison.

45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

In its resolution of 28 November 2024, the European Parliament:

– Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

– Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

– Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau.

IRAN

Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi

Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’.

In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

– Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

– Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

– Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

– Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

– Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

– Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates.

KYRGYZSTAN

Temirlan Sultanbekov

Temirlan Sultanbekov is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party (SDK), he and other party officials have been arrested for vote-buying allegations, with an audiotape of unknown origin serving as the primary evidence, for which the judicial authorisation is unclear and its connection with the detainees unknown.

In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

– Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to immediately release Mr Sultanbekov and other party officials and adopt alternative measures to detention, while respecting their right to due process in line with the civil and political rights guaranteed under the Kyrgyz constitution and international obligations; calls on the authorities to ensure his safety and well-being;

– Urges the Kyrgyz government to halt its campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, independent media outlets and journalists; is concerned by the adoption of the Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to drop all charges against human rights defenders, including Makhabat Tazhibek Kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov and Ayke Beishekeeva, journalists from the Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese channels.

RUSSIA

Alexei Navalny

Vladimir Kara-Murza

Yuri Dmitriev

Ilya Yashin

Alexei Gorinov

Lilia Chanysheva Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin

Daniel Kholodny Vadim Kobzev

Igor Sergunin

Alexei Liptser Viktoria Petrova Maria Ponomarenko Alexandra Skochilenko

Svetlana Petriychuk Evgenia Berkovich Dmitry Ivanov

Ioann Kurmoyarov Igor Baryshnikov Dmitry Talantov Alexei Moskalev

Oleg Orlov

Boris Kagarlitsky

Ivan Safronov

Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence. He had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns.

Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Liptser, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov are political prisoners.

In its resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament:

– Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

– Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons.

TAJIKISTAN

Abdullo Ghurbati Daler Imomali Zavqibek Saidamini Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva Khushruz Jumayev Khurshed Fozilov

Manuchehr Kholiknazarov Buzurgmehr Yorov

Abdullo Ghurbati, Daler Imomali, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khushruz Jumayev and Khurshed Fozilov are journalists who have been sentenced to between seven and over 20 years in prison in retaliation for their coverage of social issues and human rights abuses, including in GBAO.

Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov are human rights lawyers who have been detained.

In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

– Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites, including the online media outlets Pamir Daily News, New Tajikistan 2 and Akhbor.com;

– Condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them, stop the persecution of lawyers defending government critics and release human rights lawyers Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov;

– Urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.

TÜRKIYE

Bülent Mumay

Bülent Mumay is a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed.

In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

– Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists, as well as political opponents, human rights defenders, civil servants and academics;

– Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism.

VENEZUELA

Rocío San Miguel

General Hernández Da Costa

Ronald Ojeda

María Corina Machado

Juan Freites

Luis Camacaro Guillermo Lopez Emil Brandt

Rocío San Miguel is a lawyer and human rights activist with Spanish nationality, who got kidnapped by the Venezuelan regime on 9 February 2024, and sentenced on politically motivated grounds of suspected conspiracy against Nicolás Maduro and his regime; she is currently being detained in El Helicoide prison, which is known for human rights abuses, including torture.

Hernández Da Costa has been a political prisoner since August 2018; on 19 February 2024, he was forcibly transferred to El Rodeo 1 prison, designed to detain political prisoners; an unknown number of prisoners, including some EU citizens, were also transferred; the general suffers from medical ailments that require constant treatment, which he is being denied.

Ronald Ojeda was a former political prisoner who escaped the Maduro regime, and got murdered in Chile.

Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro, Guillermo Lopez and Emil Brandt are four campaign coordinators working for the opposition to the regime’s presidential candidate, and have been detained on political grounds.

In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

– Demands the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, and the full restoration of their rights; exhorts the regime to cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

– Strongly condemns the Maduro regime for imprisoning hundreds of political prisoners;

– Calls on the international community to support a return to democracy in Venezuela, particularly in the light of the upcoming elections, in which the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, must be allowed to fully participate.

VENEZUELA

Maria Corina Machado

Juan Freites

Luis Camacaro Guillermo López

Maria Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35 % of the votes in the primary elections. She got a disqualification of 15 years.

For several months, members of María Corina Machado’s campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing.

In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

– Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;

– Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office;

– Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians.

ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

Year of Sakharov Prize award	Name and surname	Laureate / Finalist	Country	Situation (Detention / house arrest / temporarily released)	Length of prison sentence	Start date of detention
2024	Gubad Ibadoghlu	Finalist	Azerbaijan	Under travel ban		A court rejected Ibadoglu’s appeal against the travel ban on 3/12/2024
2021	Alexei Navalny	Laureate	Russia	Deceased in prison on 16/2/2024	3,5 + 9 + 19 years	Last detained 17/2/21, last sentenced 4/8/23
2020	Siarhei Tsikhanouski Maryia Kalesnikava Mikola Statkevich Ales Bialiatski	Laureate Laureate Laureate Laureate	Belarus	Detention Detention Detention Detention	18 years 11 years 14 years 10 years	Detained 29/5/20, sentenced 14/12/21 Detained 07/9/20, sentenced 06/9/21 Last detained 31/5/20, last sentenced 14/12/21 Last detained 15/7/21, last sentenced 03/03/23
2020	Porfirio Sorto Cedillo, José Avelino Cedillo, Orbin Naún Hernández, Kevin Alejandro Romero, Arnold Javier Aleman, Ever Alexander Cedillo, Daniel Marquez and Jeremías Martínez Díaz	Finalists	Honduras	Detention	Unknown	1/9/2019, released on 24/2/2022, after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Honduras
2019	Ilham Tohti	Laureate	China	Detention	Unknown	23/9/2014
2018	Nasser Zefzafi	Finalist	Morocco	Detention	20 years	5/4/2019
2017	Dawit Isaak	Finalist	Eritrea	Incommunicado detention	Unknown	23/9/2001
2015	Raif Badawi	Laureate	Saudi Arabia	Released on 11/3/2022, since then under a 10-year travel ban	10 years	First sentenced on 17/12/2012, but announced on 30/3/2013
2012	Nasrin Sotoudeh Jafar Panahi	Laureate Laureate	Iran Iran	Detention, on temporary medical furlough since July 2021, arrested again 29/10/2023 and released 15/11/2023 Detained in 2022, released on 3/2/2023 after hunger strike	38 years 6 years	6/3/2019 (most recent) compelled in July 2022 to serve a 10-years old prison sentence
2011	Razan Zaitouneh	Laureate	Syria	Kidnapped in 2013. Presumptions of detention and death.		9/12/2013
2009	Memorial – Oleg Orlov	Laureate	Russia	Released on 1/8/2024 as part of a prisoner exchange with the US and Germany	2.5 years	Latest sentence in February 2024. Memorial as legal entity liquidated in January 2022.

ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

List of resolutions adopted by the European Parliament from December 2023 to January 2025 and related directly or indirectly to human rights violations in the world

Country/Region	Date of adoption in plenary	Title
Africa
Algeria	23.01.2025	The case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria
Democratic Republic of the Congo	23.01.2025	The case of Jean-Jacques Wondo
Gambia	25.04.2024	On the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia
Nigeria	08.02.2024	On the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria
Sudan	18.01.2024	On the threat of famine following the spread of the conflict in Sudan
Tanzania	14.12.2023	On the Maasai Communities in Tanzania
Americas
Cuba	29.02.2024	On the critical situation in Cuba
Cuba	19.09.2024	The case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba
Guatemala	14.12.2023	On the attempt at a coup d’état in Guatemala
Venezuela	08.02.2024	On further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado
Venezuela	14.03.2024	On the case of Rocío San Miguel and General Hernández Da Costa, among other political prisoners in Venezuela
Venezuela	19.09.2024	Situation on Venezuela
Venezuela	23.01.2025	Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025
Asia
Afghanistan	14.03.2024	On the repressive environment in Afghanistan, including public executions and violence against women
Afghanistan	19.09.2024	The deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan due to the recent adoption of the law on the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”
Azerbaijan	25.04.2024	On Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev
Azerbaijan	19.12.2024	Continued repression of civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV
Cambodia	28.11.2024	The shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL
China	18.01.2024	On the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong in China, notably the case of Mr Ding Yuande
China	10.10.2024	The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas
China/ Taiwan	24.10.2024	Misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan
Hong Kong	25.04.2024	On the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John
Hong Kong/ China	28.11.2024	Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law
Kyrgyzstan	19.12.2024	Human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov
Tajikistan	18.01.2024	On Tajikistan: state repression against the independent media
Tibet	14.12.2023	On the abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet
Middle East
Iran/Israel	25.04.2024	On Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response
Iran	08.02.2024	On the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou
Iran	28.11.2024	The increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran
Iran	23.01.2025	Systematic repression of human rights in Iran
Iraq	10.10.2024	Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law
Palestine	18.01.2024	On the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation
Palestine	14.03.2024	On the immediate risk of mass starvation in Gaza and the attacks on humanitarian aid deliveries
Europe and Eastern Partnership countries
Azerbaijan/Armenia	13.03.2024	On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia
Azerbaijan/ Armenia	24.10.2024	Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia
Belarus	14.12.2023	On the unknown status of Mikola Statkevich and the recent attacks on Belarusian politicians’ and activists’ family members
Belarus	08.02.2024	on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members
Belarus	19.09.2024	The severe situation of political prisoners in Belarus
Belarus	22.01.2025	Actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus
Crimea	19.12.2024	11th year of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the deteriorating human rights situation in occupied Crimea, notably the cases of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov
Georgia	25.04.2024	On attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society
Georgia	09.10.2024	The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia
Georgia	28.11.2024	Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud
Greece	07.02.2024	On the rule of law and media freedom in Greece
Hungary	24.04.2024	On ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications
Hungary	18.01.2024	On the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds
Moldova	09.10.2024	Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration
Russia	29.02.2024	On the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia
Russia	08.02.2024	On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union
Russia	25.04.2024	On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union
Russia	25.04.2024	On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories
Russia	14.11.2024	EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia
Russia	23.01.2025	Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine
Russia/ North Korea	28.11.2024	Reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia
Serbia	08.02.2024	On the situation in Serbia following the elections
Slovakia	17.01.2024	On the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications for the rule of law
Türkiye	10.10.2024	European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye
Cross-cutting issues
Children liberty	13.12.2023	On the situation of children deprived of liberty in the world
LGBTIQ rights	08.02.2024	On the implementation of the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025
Protection of journalists	27.02.2024	On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings
Human rights and democracy	28.02.2024	Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023
Foreign and security policy	28.02.2024	Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023
Media freedom	13.03.2024	On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market
Forced labour	23.04.2024	On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market
Right of abortion	11.04.2024	On including the right to abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter
Due diligence	24.04.2024	On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive
Fundamental rights	18.01.2024	On the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023
Hate speech	18.01.2024	On extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime
Business and human rights	18.01.2024	On shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims
Freedom of scientific research	17.01.2024	On promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU
Citizens, equality, rights and values	16.01.2024	On the implementation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 2021-2027
Violence against women	24.04.2024	On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence
Human beings traffic	23.04.2024	On preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI United Nations: Somalia faces escalating crisis amid drought, conflict and price hikes

Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

By Vibhu Mishra

26 February 2025 Humanitarian Aid

The humanitarian situation in Somalia is worsening as drought, conflict and soaring food prices push millions toward extreme hunger, UN agencies warned on Wednesday.

New food security assessments indicate that 4.4 million people – nearly a quarter of the population – could face “crisis” levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher) between April and June 2025, marking a sharp increase from 3.4 million people currently experiencing acute hunger.

“Worsening drought, erratic rainfall and ongoing conflict are eroding livelihoods, pushing families deeper into crisis,” said Etienne Peterschmitt, head of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Somalia.

The hunger crisis is expected to be most severe among internally displaced persons (IDPs), pastoralists with limited livestock and farming households that have exhausted their food supplies.

Consecutive climate shocks

Somalia has suffered consecutive climate shocks, with below-average rainfall in late 2024 severely reducing crop yields, depleting water sources and leading to livestock losses. The effects of erratic rainfall and riverine flooding in key agricultural areas – such as Hiraan, Middle Shabelle and Middle Juba –further devastated crops.

As a result, food prices remain high, worsening food insecurity for millions of Somalis already struggling with poverty and conflict-driven displacement.

According to the latest report by the global food security tracker, IPC, 1.7 million children under five are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2025, including 466,000 with severe acute malnutrition – an increase of 9 per cent compared to last year.

Nearly two-thirds of these cases are concentrated in southern Somalia, where food insecurity is most extreme.

Children most at risk

“Past climate events demonstrate that children are the most affected, facing severe malnourishment and diseases that increase their risk of death and long-term developmental issues,” said Nisar Syed, Officer-in-Charge for the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Somalia.

He underscored the need to urgently implement better prevention measures, emphasising a multi-sector approach.

This must combine immediate humanitarian response with long-term investments in resilience and health systems, he added.

Multiple pressures

Somalia’s food crisis is driven by multiple, overlapping factors: the 2024 Deyr rainy season (October–December) brought below-average rainfall, impacting both agropastoral communities and urban dwellers reliant on local food markets.

The upcoming Gu season (April–June) is also forecast to be drier than normal, raising fears of further crop failures.

At the same time, conflict and insecurity continue to displace families and disrupt livelihoods. Fighting in central and southern Somalia has hindered access to markets and aid, making it harder for affected communities to access food and basic services.

“Recurrent climate shocks, protracted conflict, disease outbreaks and widespread poverty, among other factors, have aggravated the humanitarian crisis in Somalia,” said Crispen Rukasha, Head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Somalia.

“Aid agencies are doing their best to save lives, but they urgently need adequate funding to meet the most critical needs at this juncture in Somalia,” he stressed.

© UNDP Somalia

Droughts are a constant threat in Somalia, in the horn of Africa.

Action stations

The agencies warned that without swift intervention, the situation could deteriorate to catastrophic levels.

Though they are working to scale up food assistance, nutrition and livelihood support, programmes could be forced to scale down or stop altogether amid “critically low” funding.

The 2025 Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which requires $1.42 billion, is currently only 12.4 per cent funded.

“Famine was narrowly avoided in 2022 due to large-scale humanitarian support, which is needed again to provide immediate assistance while implementing longer-term solutions,” said El-Khidir Daloum, UN World Food Programme (WFP) Country Director in Somalia.

“However, funding shortfalls are forcing us to prioritize and reduce assistance at the worst possible time,” he added, urging greater international support.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ambitious budget set to empower communities and support the most vulnerable
Source: Scotland – City of Perth

Despite the costs of providing essential services continuing to rise, flexibility from a three-year Council Tax strategy and additional funding from the Scottish Government meant that Councillors were able to agree a budget for each of the next three years which prioritises services for the most vulnerable, avoids further public sector job cuts, and invests in community empowerment and business growth. All with a lower Council Tax increase than originally proposed.

The agreed Council Tax increase for 2025/26 is 9.5%. This follows a freeze in the current year. For people living in a Band D property, this represents a £2.56 weekly increase, or £11.11 more a month. Provisional increases have also been agreed of 9.5% for 2026/27 and 6% for 2027/28.

Key investments agreed:
- Protecting vital services for residents in the greatest need – the budget prioritises vulnerable residents, with almost £7 million to maintain health and social care services, plus £1 million over two years to support innovation and provide new models of delivering care in our communities.
- Protecting frontline jobs – no further job cuts are required as part of the budget decisions made today, with over £2 million being put back into Education and Learning to reverse proposed reductions in teacher numbers and £400,000 to prevent further cuts to teams supporting vulnerable children and families. Council officers are continuing to deliver on phase 2 of the leadership savings agreed last year.
- Empowering communities – the budget includes £1 million to support community resilience, £1 million for Culture Perth and Kinross services, and almost £150,000 in community sports.
Council Leader, Councillor Grant Laing, said: “Community groups are an essential part of delivering on local ambitions, and I’m proud that this budget creates more opportunities than ever before to put them at the heart of local decision-making. From additional funding for Bloom groups and Community Councils, to investing in community resilience and community sports, there’s lots we have been able to do.

“We’ve also listened to the community members who have campaigned in support of their rural libraries, and allocated money over two years to allow Culture Perth and Kinross to maintain current premises and opening hours. But, this funding is contingent upon the energy and commitment shown by those supporters now being directed towards working with CPK to plan and implement sustainable futures for those libraries.”

Additional key investments include:
- Economic growth – £9 million over four years in the Commercial Property Investment Programme to make more units available for new and growing businesses, particularly in rural Perth and Kinross.
- Environmental initiatives – £200,000 to provide practical support to Bloom and biodiversity groups to accelerate the delivery of the biodiversity aims of our Grow Wild approach to greenspaces. And, another £200,000 to deliver a new round of the Green Living Fund for community projects.
- Public transport – almost £170,000 to extend the offer for free bus travel on the first Saturday of every month for another year, adding extra free travel for Clean Air Day in June and for an additional free Saturday in December in the peak Christmas shopping season. Plus, almost £70,000 for rural bus services and community transport initiatives.
- Tackling poverty – adding £2 million to target anti-poverty initiatives, including continuing school holiday food and fun activities, and investing in efforts to tackle poverty in rural areas.
Councillor Laing added: “One of our key priorities is to tackle poverty head-on. We are investing in job creation and growth schemes, such as apprenticeships and rural employability programs, to provide more opportunities for our residents. Additionally, we are adding £2 million to our anti-poverty funding and allocating £600,000 to the Financial Insecurity Fund and Scottish Welfare Fund. This will ensure that we can support those facing financial challenges and help them access the discounts and benefits they are entitled to.

“Our Welfare Rights Team does a fantastic job in helping maximise income for households in financial need. By investing further in this team, we can support even more households and ensure that everyone in our community has the resources they need to thrive.
“With this ambitious budget, we are not only addressing immediate needs but also laying the foundations for a resilient and thriving community. Together, we are building a brighter future for Perth and Kinross.”
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Last Chance’ to Achieve Two-State Solution, UN Mediator Tells Security Council, as Speakers Highlight Need to Sustain Gaza Ceasefire

Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

This may be “the last chance” to achieve a two-State solution — the creation of independent Israel and Palestine coexisting peacefully side by side — a United Nations mediator told the Security Council today, as it considered the fragile ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the first phase of which is set to expire on 1 March.

While welcoming the implementation of this initial phase, including the release of 34 hostages, Sigrid Kaag, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process ad interim, added: “None of us will forget the harrowing pictures of the coffins of the Bibas children taken hostage with their mother and killed while in captivity.” Condemning Hamas’ public parading of hostages, she also noted the release of 1,135 Palestinian prisoners and detainees, and reports of the ill treatment and humiliation they experienced.

In Gaza, far more remains to be done to address over 15 months of deprivation of basic human necessities and “above all, a loss of human dignity”, she said, while noting some improvements in humanitarian aid access. “Palestinians must be able to resume their lives, to rebuild and to construct their future in Gaza,” she stressed, adding that there can be no question of forced displacement. Gaza must remain an integral part of a future Palestinian State, and the Strip must be unified with the West Bank including East Jerusalem, “politically, economically and administratively”, she said, calling on the Council to ensure continued support for the full realization of the ceasefire deal, urgent de-escalation in West Bank and support for Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction — which would cost $53 billion.

Also briefing the Council today was Daniel Levy, President of the US/Middle East Project, who stressed that Israelis and Palestinians both deserve security, while acknowledging the “power asymmetry” between a colonizing State and a colonized people. Recalling the Israeli ambassador’s “gimmick” of shredding the UN Charter at the General Assembly podium, he said: “When a State like Israel conducts itself in ways that render the Charter meaningless and which assault [international] conventions, including on genocide […] then that is a challenge that cannot be allowed to pass.”

Calling for a full ceasefire, the release of all Israeli hostages and a surge in humanitarian assistance, he cautioned: “There is good reason to fear that this could collapse.” In that vein, he warned against the attempt to permanently depopulate the north of Gaza, adding: “Hamas non-governance in Gaza is achievable, the movement itself has said so.” But, there will be resistance if the structural violence of occupation and apartheid continue. He also cautioned against zero-sum thinking, also stressing that the unlawful forced displacement of Palestinians must not be endorsed or encouraged by any State, let alone, one of the permanent five.

Testimony from Ex-Hostage

“I was kidnapped by Hamas terrorists on 7 October 2023 from the Nova music festival with my partner,” recalled Noa Argamani, who also addressed the Council today. She added that she was taken by force into Gaza and “held in total fear, living in a nightmare”. Noting that she was rescued by Israeli soldiers after eight months in captivity, she said: “Being here today is a miracle, but I’m here today to tell you we have no time.” There are still 63 hostages in captivity — 24 believed to still be alive — “the [ceasefire] deal must go on, in full”, she urged.

Recalling that her captors murdered her friend, she underscored: “Every second in captivity is dangerous.” The Council must “not let the darkness take over”, she warned, stating that she came to the Council so that the international community understands that “the hostages are in hell” and deserve to return home immediately.

Determined to Eradicate Hamas

“This is the story of every hostage and every family shattered by Hamas’ terror,” said Israel’s delegate, urging the Council to adopt a resolution condemning the group — a move he argued the 15-member organ could have taken 16 months ago. Stressing that the tragedy will not end “until each one of them is back home”, he continued: “The question now is whether this Council will help write that ending, or continue to look away.”

“No matter what happens, our commitment to freeing all the hostages and completely eradicating Hamas is unshakeable,” he underscored. Turning to the humanitarian situation, he pointed to thousands of trucks entering Gaza every week to deliver aid and stressed: “The only starved people in Gaza are the hostages.” He added that “it is time to think beyond the frameworks of the past and build a new reality — one where terrorists do not hold entire communities hostage and where life is sacred once more”.

Recordings of Gunfire at Family

Riyad H. Mansour, Permanent Observer for the State of Palestine, said while “nothing justifies” what happened to the Bibas family, Palestinian children are “not any less deserving of your outrage for their killing”. He went on to play recordings of the calls made to emergency services by 15-year-old Layan Hamadeh and her 6-year-old cousin Hind Rajab — both found dead later — after their family members were shot dead while evacuating Gaza City by car. He also remembered the Palestinian parents who had to collect “what remained of their children’s bodies in plastic bags”.

“Did you see the images of our released prisoners, often starved, with marks and scars on their bodies?”, he asked, noting that Israel subjects them to beatings and humiliating treatments. “How many hostages were released by military actions and how many hundreds of Palestinians have perished in these military attacks that were supposed to rescue the hostages but led to the death of many of them?”, he asked, adding: “Ceasefire works.” The next few days is a test of Israel’s true priorities, he said.

Support for Ceasefire’s Second Phase

Council members stressed the need to uphold the ceasefire and reach an agreement on the second phase, which aims to establish a permanent truce. Under this phase, Israel would fully withdraw from Gaza, while Hamas would release all remaining hostages in exchange for additional detainees.

The representative of Sierra Leone, voiced a “renewed sense of relief and optimism” despite “the uncertainty that still looms”. The representative of the Republic of Korea noted that the agreement shows “what firm political will can bring to the region” as Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners reunite with their families. The ceasefire is also saving lives, Denmark’s delegate said, adding that it is vital that it moves to its second phase. Georgios Gerapetritis, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, added that the ceasefire will “allow planning for a more prosperous and secure ‘day after’ for the whole region”.

The representative of France said that his country has deployed specialized personnel within the framework of the European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point to support the ceasefire. He also noted that his country and Saudi Arabia will co-chair an international conference for the implementation of a two-State solution in June.

The Russian Federation’s delegate expressed concern about the “opaque monitoring mechanism”, highlighting accusations from both sides about the other side’s bad faith in the implementation of individual steps. Somalia’s delegate said that the continued attacks, illegal arrests, settlement-expansion and excessive use of force “undermine the spirit of the ceasefire deal” and that “mediation efforts will not succeed if the aggression continues unchecked”. If the ceasefire fails, Panama’s delegate warned, “then the human toll will be incalculable and prospects for regional peace and stability will fade further”.

The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed improved aid supplies since the ceasefire agreement as having “demonstrated the central role of the UN and humanitarian actors, including UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East]”. She also expressed concern over tightening humanitarian space, as well as the expansion of Israel’s operations killing and displacing civilians in the West Bank.

Gaza’s Future without Hamas

The representative of the United States expressed support for Israel’s “sovereign decision” to close UNRWA offices in Jerusalem, adding: “UNRWA is not and never has been the only option for providing humanitarian assistance in Gaza”. Her country stands with all hostages, she said, adding that the desecration of the remains of Shiri Bibas shows “the depth of Hamas’s cruelty”. President Donald J. Trump has made clear that the future of Gaza must look different, she said, adding that Hamas must be fully removed from power and held accountable for its 7 October 2023 terrorist massacre.

Save West Bank from Becoming Next Gaza

Other speakers, however, highlighted the impact of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, and the escalation of settlements and violence in the West Bank. “Israel is not trying to return to calm,” said Kuwait’s delegate, speaking for the Arab Group. Asking the Council if it is waiting for a repeat of the Gaza tragedy, he called on the international community to help end the occupying Power’s aggression in the West Bank and its attacks on Christian and Muslim holy sites in the Aqsa Mosque compound.

Algeria’s delegate drew attention to the Israeli Finance Minister’s declaration that the “goal for 2025 is to demolish more than what Palestinian are building in the West Bank”. Stressing the need to support UNRWA and empower the Palestinian Authority, he added that weakening the Authority is a deliberate strategy by the Israeli occupying Power which dreams “of a land free of Palestinians”, from the river to the sea. Five newborn babies froze to death yesterday in a hospital in Gaza City, he noted, adding “we have no more time to waste”. The ceasefire agreement should serve as a foundation for a durable peace plan.

Slovenia’s delegate stressed: “Gaza belongs to Gazans and it is an integral part of the Palestinian State.” Pointing to the “many more steps” needed for lasting peace to persist in the Middle East, he observed: “While peace seems to be a big word, it essentially boils down to everyday decisions to work for it.”

“The cumulative effect of Israel’s violent occupation of Palestinian territories has entrapped the Palestinian people in a cycle of violence and poverty,” Guyana’s delegate noted. Pakistan’s representative pointed to the forcible displacement, military raids, settler violence and illegal land annexations Israel is conducting, describing these as “ethnic cleansing in real time”.

The representative of China, Council President for February, speaking in his national capacity, urged the international community to support the parties in moving ahead with negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire and called on Israel to cease its military and settler activity in the West Bank, underscoring: “The West Bank must not become the next Gaza.”

MIL OSI United Nations News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Council takes fresh vision for growth and prosperity to the heart of Government
Source: City of Stoke-on-Trent

At the start of our centenary year, Stoke-on-Trent is today taking a fresh vision for the city’s growth and prosperity to the heart of Government.

The prospectus document – called Future 100 – is based around five missions and sets out a bold set of actions that, together, aim to transform the city’s economy and unlock prosperity and opportunity for decades to come.

A delegation – made up of the city’s MPs, the council leader, and representatives from the business and voluntary sectors – will deliver the document to 10 Downing Street today.

The prospectus, which has the subtitle “Shaping Our City: Growth for All”, has been drawn up by a city coalition including prominent politicians, business leaders, academics, and figures from the health and voluntary sectors. It is supported by Stoke-on-Trent’s three MPs as well as the city council.

It celebrates Stoke-on-Trent’s history as a hive of innovation and industry, its enviable position at the heart of the UK’s transport network, and its strengths in key growth sectors – including createch and advanced manufacturing.

But it also acknowledges the barriers to growth caused by historic Government underinvestment, national industrial decline in the 1980s and 1990s, and more than a decade of austerity cuts.

This creates a Stoke-on-Trent “paradox”: the fact the city’s economic growth has outstripped the national average over recent years, but deeply-rooted economic and social problems mean too many communities lack opportunity and are not able to reap the expected benefits of this headline growth.

The City Prospectus offers radical solutions – aligning itself with national Government priorities and offering the city as a test bed and pioneer for new ways of delivering local services.

Its five missions come with a series of bold actions that will be taken locally, as well as specific targets by which progress will be measured.

The prospectus is pitched as a partnership offer with Government – making clear that targeted interventions and investment will be needed to fully realise Stoke-on-Trent’s potential.

A foreword to the document – co-signed by Councillor Ashworth and the city’s MPs – says: “Stoke-on-Trent already has a dynamic, diverse and highly-integrated economy; a rich cultural heritage; and an indomitable sense of community spirit.

“The city is a strategic hub, connecting labour, goods and services across the region and the UK. With Government support and investment, we can overcome current challenges to create a city that is prosperous, inclusive and sustainable, delivering economic and social benefits locally and nationally for decades to come.

“We invite the Government to partner with us to unlock this city region’s full potential, transform our citizens’ lives and unleash a new era of creativity and innovation.”

The five missions listed in the City Prospectus are:
- Securing economic growth
- Delivering clean energy, sustainable transport and an improved local environment
- Regenerating the city
- Removing barriers to opportunity
- Improving the health and wellbeing of the population
The economic targets include achieving a local economy worth £9 billion a year by 2030, with 5,000 more people in employment and a 10 per cent increase in the value of locally-contracted supplies.

Environmental targets include tripling the amount of locally-generated renewable energy and increasing bus passenger journeys by a third in the next five years.

The city aims to have completed or be building 5,000 new homes, redeveloped 150 hectares of brownfield land and seen five heritage buildings removed from the “at risk” register.

The attainment gap will have been closed with the national average, with a 2.5 percentage point increase in the number of working-age residents with Level 3 or higher qualifications.

The city is also targeting a five percentage point drop in the proportion of children living in poverty, and a two-year boost to healthy life expectancy.

The Prospectus invites the Government to support the city’s work through specific, targeted interventions linked to the local missions and targets. That includes investment in critical growth enablers like transport infrastructure, heritage restoration and the city’s highly-successful Family Matters programme, which has driven down the number of children in care.

It suggests the Government could make Stoke-on-Trent a national incubator for public service reform based on higher educational attainment, and a national test best for a new model of educational inclusion aimed at enabling more children to learn in mainstream schools.

And it calls for innovations to unlock development, such as a revolving land fund to reclaim brownfield sites and help to kickstart council-house building.

Jane Ashworth, leader of Stoke-on-Trent City Council, said: “Stoke-on-Trent is already a nationally important engine of innovation and growth.

“But well-known obstacles have held back this growth. Austerity and chronic underinvestment in vital infrastructure have constrained our economy and mean opportunity has been unevenly spread.

“For too many of the people who live here, the headline growth in the city’s economy has felt like little more than a number of a spreadsheet.

“This is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to create something better.

“The City Prospectus is a radical yet achievable plan to tackle our economic, social and environmental challenges at the same time; to transform the way we deliver services; and to make Stoke-on-Trent not just an engine of growth, but one which provides high quality homes, jobs, skills and opportunities for people across North Staffordshire and beyond.”

Gareth Snell, MP for Stoke-on-Trent Central, said: ‘To deliver for our city and our country, we need a clear plan from Government and we need to be able to turn that into local actions.

“Labour’s missions focus on economic growth, city regeneration, removing barriers to opportunity and improving health and well-being. These are exactly the same priorities I want to see delivered in Stoke-on-Trent, so forging a new partnership with Government is the best way to ensure we all succeed.

“The Future 100 prospectus sets a series of ambitious targets and outlines what Stoke-on-Trent can contribute. But it also sets out the additional help and resources that the city will need to achieve those goals.”

Allison Gardner, MP for Stoke-on-Trent South, said: “Our city, shaped by its rich industrial history, has always been a place of hard work and innovation.

“The same spirit that built our city can lead it into a new chapter, driving the country forward once again.

“Stoke-on-Trent stands strong and proud, despite having been let down previously by the central Government. With the support of this Labour Government, our potential is limitless.”

David Williams, MP for Stoke-on-Trent North, said: “The Future 100 prospectus represents a bold and ambitious vision for Stoke-on-Trent’s next century, rooted in our city’s rich history of creativity, resilience, and innovation.

“For too long our city has not received the investment we deserve. We were hit hard by austerity and post-industrial decline stifled economic growth.

“The Future 100 prospectus represents a turning point, ensuring real investment in our transport infrastructure, beloved community assets, business growth and in improving opportunity for all.

“This is a moment for real transformation for our city, one where we seize the opportunity to build a thriving, sustainable, and inclusive future for all. With targeted investment and strategic action, we can unlock Stoke-on-Trent’s full potential, creating lasting economic and social benefits that will shape generations to come.

“I am grateful for the council’s leadership on creating this bold vision for our city, and I look forward to working with the Government, the council and other partners to turn the vision into a reality.”
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Why people rebuild in Appalachia’s flood-ravaged areas despite the risks

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kristina P. Brant, Assistant Professor of Rural Sociology, Penn State

Parts of the North Fork of the Kentucky River flooded in July 2022, and again in February 2025. Arden S. Barnes/For The Washington Post via Getty Images

On Valentine’s Day 2025, heavy rains started to fall in parts of rural Appalachia. Over the course of a few days, residents in eastern Kentucky watched as river levels rose and surpassed flood levels. Emergency teams conducted over 1,000 water rescues. Hundreds, if not thousands of people were displaced from homes, and entire business districts filled with mud.

For some, it was the third time in just four years that their homes had flooded, and the process of disposing of destroyed furniture, cleaning out the muck and starting anew is beginning again.

Historic floods wiped out businesses and homes in eastern Kentucky in February 2021, July 2022 and now February 2025. An even greater scale of destruction hit eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina in September 2024, when Hurricane Helene’s rainfall and flooding decimated towns and washed out parts of major highways.

Scenes of flooding from several locations across Appalachia in February 2025.

Each of these events was considered to be a “thousand-year flood,” with a 1-in-1,000 chance of happening in a given year. Yet they’re happening more often.

The floods have highlighted the resilience of local people to work together for collective survival in rural Appalachia. But they have also exposed the deep vulnerability of communities, many of which are located along creeks at the base of hills and mountains with poor emergency warning systems. As short-term cleanup leads to long-term recovery efforts, residents can face daunting barriers that leave many facing the same flood risks over and over again.

Exposing a housing crisis

For the past nine years, I have been conducting research on rural health and poverty in Appalachia. It’s a complex region often painted in broad brushstrokes that miss the geographic, socioeconomic and ideological diversity it holds.

Appalachia is home to a vibrant culture, a fierce sense of pride and a strong sense of love. But it is also marked by the omnipresent backdrop of a declining coal industry.

There is considerable local inequality that is often overlooked in a region portrayed as one-dimensional. Poverty levels are indeed high. In Perry County, Kentucky, where one of eastern Kentucky’s larger cities, Hazard, is located, nearly 30% of the population lives under the federal poverty line. But the average income of the top 1% of workers in Perry County is nearly US$470,000 – 17 times more than the average income of the remaining 99%.

This income and wealth inequality translates to unequal land ownership – much of eastern Kentucky’s most desirable land remains in the hands of corporations and families with great generational wealth.

When I first moved to eastern Kentucky in 2016, I was struck by the grave lack of affordable, quality housing. I met families paying $200-$300 a month for a small plot to put a mobile home. Others lived in “found housing” – often-distressed properties owned by family members. They had no lease, no equity and no insurance. They had a place to lay one’s head but lacked long-term stability in the event of disagreement or disaster. This reality was rarely acknowledged by local and state governments.

Eastern Kentucky’s 2021 and 2022 floods turned this into a full-blown housing crisis, with 9,000 homes damaged or destroyed in the 2022 flood alone.

“There was no empty housing or empty places for housing,” one resident involved in local flood recovery efforts told me. “It just was complete disaster because people just didn’t have a place to go.”

Most homeowners did not have flood insurance to assist with rebuilding costs. While many applied to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for assistance, the amounts they received often did not go far. The maximum aid for temporary housing assistance and repairs is $42,500, plus up to an additional $42,500 for other needs related to the disaster.

The federal government often provides more aid for rebuilding through block grants directed to local and state governments, but that money requires congressional approval and can take months to years to arrive. Local community coalitions and organizations stepped in to fill these gaps, but they did not necessarily have sufficient donations or resources to help such large numbers of displaced people.

Affordable rental housing is hard to find in much of Appalachia. When flooding wipes out homes, as Jackson, Ky., saw in July 2022 and again in February 2025, it becomes even more rare.
Michael Swensen/Getty Images

With a dearth of affordable rentals pre-flood, renters who lost their homes had no place to go. And those living in “found housing” that was destroyed were not eligible for federal support for rebuilding.

The sheer level of devastation also posed challenges. One health care professional told me: “In Appalachia, the way it usually works is if you lose your house or something happens, then you go stay with your brother or your mom or your cousin. … But everybody’s mom and brother and cousin also lost their house. There was nowhere to stay.” From her point of view, “our homelessness just skyrocketed.”

The cost of land – social and economic

After the 2022 flood, the Kentucky Department for Local Government earmarked almost $300 million of federal funding to build new, flood-resilient homes in eastern Kentucky. Yet the question of where to build remained. As another resident involved in local flood recovery efforts told me, “You can give us all the money you want; we don’t have any place to build the house.”

It has always been costly and time-intensive to develop land in Appalachia. Available higher ground tends to be located on former strip mines, and these reclaimed lands require careful geotechnical surveying and sometimes structural reinforcements.

If these areas are remote, the costs of running electric, water and other infrastructure services can also be prohibitive. For this reason, for-profit developers have largely avoided many counties in the region. The head of a nonprofit agency explained to me that, because of this, “The markets have broken. … We have no [housing] market.”

Eastern Kentucky’s mountains are beautiful, but there are few locations for building homes that aren’t near creeks or rivers. Strip-mined land, where mountaintops were flattened, often aren’t easily accessible and come with their own challenges.
Posnov/Moment via Getty Images

There is also some risk involved in attempting to build homes on new land that has not previously been developed. A local government could pay for undeveloped land to be surveyed and prepared for development, with the prospect of reimbursement by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development if housing is successfully built. But if, after the work to prepare the land, it is still too cost-prohibitive to build a profitable house there, the local government would not receive any reimbursement.

Some counties have found success clearing land for large developments on former strip mine sites. But these former coal mining areas can be considerable distances from towns. Without robust public transportation systems, these distances are especially prohibitive for residents who lack reliable personal transportation.

Another barrier is the high prices that both individual and corporate landowners are asking for properties on higher ground.

The scarcity of desirable land available for sale, combined with increasingly urgent demand, has led to prices unaffordable for most. Another resident involved in local flood recovery efforts explained: “If you paid $5,000 for 30 acres 40 years ago, why won’t you sell that for $100,000? Nope, [they want] $1 million.” That makes it increasingly difficult for both individuals and housing developers to purchase land and build.

One reason for this scarcity is the amount of land that is still owned by outside corporate interests. For example, Kentucky River Properties, formerly Kentucky River Coal Corporation, owns over 270,000 acres across seven counties in the region. While this landholding company leases land to coal, timber and gas companies, it and others like it rarely permit residential development.

But not all unused land is owned by corporations. Some of this land is owned by families with deep roots in the region. People’s attachment to a place often makes them want to stay in their communities, even after disasters. But it can also limit the amount of land available for rebuilding. People are often hesitant to sell land that holds deep significance for their families, even if they are not living there themselves.

Rural communities are often tight-knit. Many residents want to stay despite the risks.
AP Photo/Timothy D. Easley

One health care professional expressed feeling torn between selling or keeping their own family property after the 2022 flood: “We have a significant amount of property on top of a mountain. I wouldn’t want to sell it because my papa came from nothing. … His generation thought owning land was the greatest thing. … And for him to provide his children and his grandchildren and their great-grandchildren a plot of land that he worked and sweat and ultimately died to give us – people want to hold onto that.”

She recognized that land was in great demand but couldn’t bring herself to sell what she owned. In cases like hers, higher grounds are owned locally but still remain unused.

Moving toward higher ground, slowly

Two years after the 2022 flood, major government funding for rebuilding still has not resulted in a significant number of homes. The state has planned seven communities on higher ground in eastern Kentucky that aim to house 665 new homes. As of early 2025, 14 houses had been completed.

Progress on providing housing on higher ground is slow, and the need is great.

In the meantime, when I conducted interviews during the summer and fall of 2024, many of the mobile home communities that were decimated in the 2022 flood had begun to fill back up. These were flood-risk areas, but there was simply no other place to go.

Last week, I watched on Facebook a friend’s live video footage showing the waters creeping up the sides of the mobile homes in one of those very communities that had flooded in 2022. Another of my friends mused: “I don’t know who constructed all this, but they did an unjustly favor by not thinking how close these towns was to the river. Can’t anyone in Frankfort help us, or has it gone too far?”

With hundreds more people now displaced by the most recent flood, the need for homes on higher grounds has only expanded, and the wait continues.

Kristina Brant has received funding from the National Science Foundation and United States Department of Agriculture to support her past and ongoing research in rural Appalachia.

– ref. Why people rebuild in Appalachia’s flood-ravaged areas despite the risks – https://theconversation.com/why-people-rebuild-in-appalachias-flood-ravaged-areas-despite-the-risks-240429

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: States that impose severe prison sentences accomplish the opposite of what they say they want

Source: The Conversation – USA – By John Leverso, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Cincinnati

Prison doors close, but for most people convicted of crimes, they eventually open again. Hans Neleman/Stone via Getty Images

Across the U.S., tough-on-crime policies are surging again, despite research showing they do little to reduce crime, particularly violent offenses.

Before the early 1990s, people who were sentenced to 10 years in prison might be released after serving roughly half that long. That’s because of policies that allowed incarcerated individuals to earn credit for good behavior or, in some states, to avoid losing credits they already held toward an early release. These so-called “good time” policies were created by states to encourage good behavior and rehabilitation and to reduce prison overcrowding.

But in the 1990s, when national politics was focused on crime rates, Congress encouraged states to adopt so-called “truth-in-sentencing” laws, which required people to serve at least 85% of their prison sentence.

As research highlighted the inefficacy and unintended consequences of these laws, states rolled them back or modified them, mostly by partially repealing them or reducing the severity of mandatory sentences.

Some efforts to roll back harsh sentencing rules continue: In Illinois, traditionally a leader in criminal justice reform, one bill that would soften truth-in-sentencing requirements has stalled, though another was introduced in January 2025.

But in many other states, truth-in-sentencing laws and other similar laws that impose longer sentences are making a comeback, particularly for violent crimes.

Since 2023, Louisiana, Arkansas, South Dakota and Tennessee have passed truth-in-sentencing laws. North Dakota is now considering similar legislation. In November 2024, Colorado voters required people convicted of violent crimes to serve higher percentages of their sentences, which is a similar move, though it didn’t bear the “truth-in-sentencing” label.

A personal lens on the topic

These laws have real effects on real people.

In 1998, I was sentenced to 22 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections for a gang-related violent crime I committed as a juvenile. I served just 11 of those years under a long-standing policy that allowed individuals to serve half their sentence with good behavior.

But if I had been arrested just 100 days later, a truth-in-sentencing law would have taken effect, and I would have had to serve the full 22 years.

Eleven years is a long time. Since my release in 2012, I’ve earned a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree and a Ph.D. I’m now a college professor, author, husband and father.

If I had been required to serve my full sentence, I would have been released in 2023, older and with fewer opportunities for education, rehabilitation and rebuilding my life.

Instead of being able to start my education at the age of 30, I would have entered the world in my forties, making it much harder to pursue a decade of schooling to become a professor. The delay would have also made it harder to start a family, forcing me to balance career-building with the difficulties of having children later in life.

Incarcerated graduates, who finished various educational and vocational programs in prison, wait for the start of their graduation ceremony in May 2023.
AP Photo/Jae C. Hong

Not deterring crime

Supporters of truth-in-sentencing laws say they are intended to increase accountability for wrongdoing and deter crime. The logic can seem reasonably intuitive: If people know they will receive a harsher punishment, they will be less likely to commit particular crimes.

But research finds that those are not the results. There is no compelling evidence that punitive sentencing policies discourage individuals from engaging in criminal activity.

And states without truth-in-sentencing laws have seen their crime rates fall to roughly the same degree as states that have the laws.

Harming society at large

Research also finds that truth-in-sentencing laws cause far-reaching harms to people convicted of crimes and to society at large, undermining both rehabilitation and public safety.

Because truth-in-sentencing laws focus on deterrence, they do not address the causes of criminal behavior, such as poverty and childhood trauma.

These laws also make prisons less safe: They remove incentives for people in prison to follow the rules, get an education, participate in psychotherapy or otherwise engage in positive activities while behind bars.

The vast majority of incarcerated people – six out of every seven inmates – are released into society again. Under truth-in-sentencing laws, they emerge from prison less prepared to follow the laws than they would have been if they had access to educational programs, therapy and an incentive structure that encouraged rehabilitation while incarcerated.

A study in Georgia, for instance, found that after stricter sentencing requirements were enacted, inmates subject to the new rules committed more disciplinary infractions and participated in fewer rehabilitation programs in prison. And once released, they were more likely to commit new crimes than released inmates who had not been subject to the stricter sentences.

Costing taxpayers dearly

Additionally, the financial burden of these laws is significant.

For example, Arkansas’ truth-in-sentencing law, passed in 2023, is projected to cost the state’s taxpayers at least US$160 million over the next decade to pay for increased prison capacity and staffing.

Instead of deterring crime, truth-in-sentencing laws lock more people up for longer periods of time without addressing the underlying factors, which strains already overburdened correctional systems.

These laws also disproportionately affect people of color, exacerbating systemic inequities in the criminal justice system.

These people incarcerated in a California prison are learning computer programming.
AP Photo/Eric Risberg

A different path

For me, the possibility of earning good-time credit was a powerful motivator to engage in rehabilitative activities and regain lost time after disciplinary infractions.

When I began my sentence, Illinois law allowed people to receive a 50% reduction in their sentence through good-time credit: I might need to serve only half of my original 22-year sentence, and be released after 11 years, if I maintained good behavior.

Breaking the rules would cost credit, extending my time in prison beyond that 50% mark. Early in my sentence, I broke the rules and was placed in isolation – also called segregation or restrictive housing, in a cell for 24 hours a day, except for six hours of exercise a week – for a total of 18 months, resulting in a significant loss of my good-time credit. As a result, instead of serving 11 years, my expected time in prison increased to approximately 12.5 years.

This setback was a turning point. I knew that my actions had directly affected the length of time I would have to spend in prison. I became determined to earn back my lost time. I focused on staying out of trouble, earning my GED, completing my associate degree and enrolling in available programs. I was able to regain my time credit and had to serve only 11 years.

Under today’s truth-in-sentencing laws, none of this would have been possible. I would have been required to serve my full sentence, regardless of whether I chose to change, rehabilitate or prepare for life after prison. The ability to reduce my sentence through good behavior and educational achievement gave me a tangible incentive to turn my life around, an opportunity that truth-in-sentencing laws eliminate.

A way forward

By contrast, investing in rehabilitation not only improves outcomes for those incarcerated but also makes communities safer by reducing the cycle of crime.

Research shows that in-prison rehabilitation programs – particularly those centered on education and vocational training programs and social-support services such as housing help, mental health care and job placement assistance – reduce recidivism rates. While in prison, people are held accountable while also having opportunities to grow and learn, preparing for successful reintegration into society after their release.

I believe that in the overwhelming majority of people in prison, there is potential for redemption – but that potential is most likely to emerge when they have opportunities to learn and grow and receive benefits for making changes in their lives.

Unfortunately, many states are choosing to spend millions locking up more people for longer periods – while giving them less opportunity to improve themselves and their lives, reducing their potential for change and safe, productive reintegration into society upon release.

John Leverso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. States that impose severe prison sentences accomplish the opposite of what they say they want – https://theconversation.com/states-that-impose-severe-prison-sentences-accomplish-the-opposite-of-what-they-say-they-want-247550

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Transforming banking and advancing sustainability

Source: Bank for International Settlements

Since its inception 58 years ago, ASEAN has evolved to become a significant force in global trade, investment and diplomacy. ASEAN now stands as the world’s fourth-largest economic bloc, with an estimated GDP of USD4.13 trillion.¹ Looking ahead to 2025, ASEAN is poised for another strong year. GDP is expected to grow by 4.7%,² significantly outperforming the global average. Much has been said about ASEAN’s pivotal role in global supply chains, our geopolitical neutrality and our strategic location for global trade. However, ASEAN’s driver for sustainable economic growth also comes from within: robust domestic consumption from a youthful demographic, strong growth of individual member states and increasing regional integration. In 2023, for example, intra-ASEAN trade accounted for 21.5% of the region’s total trade in goods.

Let me touch briefly on Malaysia’s growth outlook. After a strong performance last year, Malaysia is expected to record steady growth going into 2025 despite the challenging global environment. The diversified export structure will help cushion against external demand shocks. But, more importantly, key factors within the economy, particularly the robust expansion in investment activity and resilient household spending, will be important to drive growth this year. Exports are also expected to continue expanding with support from tech upcycle and forthcoming tourist arrivals. We acknowledge that the growth outlook is highly subject to risks from trade and investment restrictions. However, growth could potentially be higher from greater spillovers from the tech upcycle, more robust tourism activities and faster implementation of investment projects in the country.

The financial sector lies at the core of ASEAN’s progress over the years. The sector acts as the central engine to our economy, facilitating financial flows within ASEAN. Indeed, over the last few decades, we have made progress in facilitating regional capital flows, connecting our payment infrastructure and introducing a framework to support the integration of our banking system through the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF). However, the potential for intra-ASEAN investments remains untapped, and there is still much to be done to achieve regional regulatory coherence. My vision is for the financial sector to become the critical enabler for the next phase of economic integration under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2045. This would require the sector to strategically harness the three driving forces: funding, technology and talent.

Mobilising funds to unlock new growth sectors, bridge financing gap and drive sustainable growth for ASEAN

Let’s start with funding, which is a crucial driver of ASEAN economic growth. ASEAN is facing significant funding gaps that demand our urgent attention. Let me share a few examples. The Asian Development Bank reports that ASEAN economies will need infrastructure investments of at least USD2.8 trillion from 2023 to 2030 to sustain economic growth, reduce poverty and respond to climate change. Key projects in the region that require large financing include the ASEAN Power Grid, which is pivotal to advancing the region’s climate and energy security agenda, and various ASEAN highway and railway projects, such as the Asian Highway Network, which are cornerstones of regional economic development and integration. Our micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) also face a daunting financing gap, exceeding USD300 billion annually.³

These figures underscore the urgent need for strategic investments and collaborative efforts to secure a resilient and sustainable future for ASEAN. This need is even more pressing in a region where over 90% of all social infrastructure development has traditionally relied on public resources,⁴ and public funding faces increasing constraints. How, then, can the financial sector step in as a catalyst to crowd in diverse sources of funding and facilitate long-term investments to ensure sustainable economic expansion and build more resilient supply chains and communities?

This is where blended finance, the strategic use of public, private, and philanthropic finance sources and development finance, can be a critical tool to mobilise additional private capital flows toward sustainable development in ASEAN. The financial sector is pivotal in advancing blended finance to meet funding gaps in ASEAN, by enabling acceptable risk-taking levels based on various funding sources. This approach leverages the willingness of development finance and philanthropic funders, including sovereign funds within ASEAN to assume greater risk exposure, utilising tools like partial credit guarantees to attract additional investors. Multilateral development banks and development finance institutions play a critical role by offering concessional financing and technical assistance, which supports local companies in accessing capital markets and structuring deals, thereby encouraging participation by private financial institutions through co-funding arrangements.

I also believe that this is an opportunity for Islamic finance to demonstrate its unique role and impact. In recent years, Islamic finance has gained momentum within the ASEAN region. It offers alternative solutions to conventional financial structures through the use of risk sharing and social finance instruments that can be mobilised towards the development of productive economic sectors such as healthcare, transportation and green sectors. Notably, the deployment of blended capital using instruments such as waqf and zakat in Malaysia and a few neighbouring countries such as Indonesia and Brunei have significantly contributed to financial inclusion for the underserved and strengthened support for the MSMEs. An example of this is Malaysia’s iTEKAD initiative, a social blended finance programme for low-income microentrepreneurs that provides social and commercial funding, which comes together with training and mentorship to empower them in generating sustainable income. In the capital market structure, Islamic finance has also been mobilised for infrastructure, climate and green projects. In Malaysia, for example, a total of USD56 billion of sukuk was issued in 2023 to fund real economic sectors with a high concentration in renewable energy and green real estate.

Embracing innovative financing structures will involve navigating various complexities that demand careful consideration, collaboration and adaptation. Hence, advancing capacity building within the financial sector is very crucial. In Malaysia, the Joint Committee on Climate Change (JC3) continues to serve as a key focal point in supporting the financial preparedness for climate change. As part of Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2025, Bank Negara Malaysia is committed to supporting the region’s transition efforts. During the ASEAN Finance Ministers and Governors Meeting week from 7 to 10 April this year in Kuala Lumpur, we will host several side events to advance these discussions. These events include a closed-door investor roundtable focused on innovative financing solutions for sizeable ASEAN green and transition projects, as well as pitching sessions on sustainable ASEAN Projects. We invite the financial industry to contribute and participate in these events.

Responsible deployment of technology in financial services is key to maximise its potential while minimising risk

Ladies and gentlemen,

There is an immense potential for ASEAN to also leverage technology. This is the second point. With a median age of about 30 and a substantial portion under 35,⁵ ASEAN’s population is digitally proficient. Indeed, the adoption of digital financial services can be a game-changer in addressing challenges within the region, which include to better serve the needs of large unbanked and underbanked populations in our region.

The outlook for digital financial services in ASEAN is very bright. Through innovations such as mobile wallets, digital payments and micro-lending, digital finance is expanding access to financial services for individuals who previously had limited options. These services are not just filling gaps – they are creating new pathways to financial inclusion, thereby allowing individuals to save, invest and access credit with unprecedented ease.

While digital financial services hold tremendous promise, it comes with its own set of risks. Today’s technological advances are progressing at an unprecedented pace, making our response to these developments very crucial. For financial institutions, deployment of technology must be done thoughtfully and responsibly with holistic consideration of the impacts and value to the broader environment and community. This unwavering commitment to enhance financial services and preserve consumer confidence includes addressing cybersecurity risks, strengthening climate resilience, promoting financial literacy and ensuring that digital financial services are secure and accessible to all segments of society.

As regulators, our commitment is for our policies to strike a balance between embracing technological innovation and, at the same time, preserving financial stability. Our Regulatory Sandbox allows for experimentation and contributes to the recalibration of regulatory policies such as eKYC. We also adapt our regulations to welcome new players into the market, those that have strong value propositions on inclusion, as demonstrated by the issuance of our licensing and regulatory framework for digital banks and digital insurers and takaful operators.

Investing in talent strategies that not only creates a more agile and adaptive workforce, but also paves the way for regional talent mobility

Let me move on to the third point. At the heart of economic growth and development lies talent. ASEAN is blessed with a vibrant, young and dynamic workforce. To capitalise on this potential, the financial sector will need to create an environment that nurtures the next generation of leaders and innovators in finance who carry a unique ASEAN identity – one that is not only tech-savvy, but also adept at navigating the complexities of regional regulations and global economic shifts while championing social equity and environmental sustainability.

I would like to also take this opportunity to share Malaysia’s efforts in developing talent in our financial sector. In July last year, the industry launched the Financial Sector Future Skills Framework, and this is to empower individuals to take charge of their professional development, while creating new talent pipelines and succession pools. I reiterate the call I made during the launch of the framework for the industry to work closely with training institutes, professional bodies and industry associations to ensure that training programmes meet the established quality assurance standards and set high standards in new skill areas.

Complementing this is a dynamic talent development hub, offering tailored learning programmes and certifications. For example, the Financial Sector Talent Enrichment Programme (FSTEP) targets fresh graduates interested in launching their career in financial services, while globally recognised financial certifications are available for seasoned professionals.

Malaysia is also home to regional research and learning hubs such as the SEACEN Centre and is recognised globally as a leader in Islamic finance. With a multitude of well-established talent development institutions and capacity-building providers in Islamic finance, we offer a fertile ground for nurturing specialised skills and thought leadership in this field.

To truly capitalise on the large working-age population in ASEAN, we need to go beyond domestic efforts. Financial institutions across the region should pursue collaborative initiatives that enhance talent mobility, such as through mutual recognition of qualifications and expertise sharing. ABIF can also be leveraged to intensify efforts to promote greater regulatory coherence through capacity-building initiatives. By doing so, we can improve connectivity across ASEAN markets, paving the way for a more integrated and resilient future for the region.

In closing, today’s discourse reaffirms the financial sector’s commitment to turning AEC 2045 into a reality. The challenge lies in ensuring that the ASEAN financial sector has the capacity to do so by mobilising funds, leveraging technology, and developing regional talent.

As I conclude my speech, I leave you with a thought from Peter Drucker: ‘The best way to predict the future is to create it.’ Together, let’s create a future where the financial sector empowers ASEAN’s growth and integration. On that note, I wish you all productive discussions during the rest of the Summit.

MIL OSI Economics –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Starmer announces aid cuts to fund defence – but Britain’s days as an aid superpower are already long over

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Balazs Szent-Ivanyi, Reader in Politics and International Relations and Deputy Director Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University

Keir Starmer’s announcement that the UK will cut foreign aid in order to fund more defence spending seems like smart politics. With the US’s commitment to European security in question, it is clear that European countries, including the UK, need to spend more on defence.

The US president, Donald Trump, with whom the prime minister is meeting on Thursday, has long called out Europeans for free-riding on America’s security guarantee. Credible promises of more British defence spending (including on American kit) may also deter Trump from introducing tariffs on UK imports.

Building up the UK’s and Europe’s defence capabilities comes with a hefty price tag, and finding the money is tricky. The UK economy has weak growth prospects, and Labour has made a pledge not to increase taxes “on working people”. This leaves budget cuts in other areas as the only approach. The government seems to have decided that cutting foreign aid may be the least painful option for voters.

Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

Foreign aid has generally been seen as an area of government spending which has relatively weak groups of domestic supporters. Charities and companies that directly benefit from aid spending through government contracts are a smallish group, and many receive funding from several sources.

Hostility to aid among the general public is relatively high. According to a 2024 survey by the British Foreign Policy Group, 46% of Britons surveyed thought that UK aid should not return to its previous high of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI), or should be cut even further below the 0.5% at the time of that survey.

A frequent argument made by successive British governments is that aid, by targeting poverty and conflict, can address the root causes of migration. The public, however, is sceptical about aid’s ability to reduce irregular migration or make the UK safer.

Read more:
Why many policies to lower migration actually increase it

Although Labour voters are more positive about aid’s benefits, it is unlikely that the government would see any major electoral harm from reductions to the aid budget.

Where aid is really used

While cutting aid may be a smart move politically, it will have longer-term consequences for the UK’s global influence and its ability to achieve positive change in the world. Many charities were quick to point this out, arguing that it will hurt the lives of the poorest across the world.

Aid is now set to shrink from 0.5% of GNI to 0.3%, which implies the UK will still have a substantial aid programme. On average, rich countries spent 0.37% of their GNI on aid in 2023 – not much more than what the UK will spend now.

In practice, however, 23% of the British aid budget in 2023 was made up by Home Office spending on housing refugees in the UK. This is unlikely to decline quickly, even though the government has said it aims to reduce it. A further 34% consisted of contributions to multilateral organisations like the United Nations and World Bank. While there is scope to cut some of this, large savings are difficult without the UK leaving some organisations.

Given these two fixed items, very little will remain for “genuine” development programmes in partner countries – the kind of funding that is actually visible as UK aid.

Read more:
The UK spent a third of its international aid budget on refugees in the UK – what it’s paying for, and why it’s a problem

Such a small genuine aid programme will undoubtedly mean lower development impact and lower British influence. But the UK’s standing and soft power, particularly in poorer countries, was already in tatters well before Starmer’s announcement.

The merger between the Foreign Office and Department for International Development in 2020, followed by budget cuts and the re-allocation of aid to the Home Office, has destroyed the UK’s reputation as an “aid superpower” and champion of the global poor.

Across-the-board cuts have even devastated programmes which the UK has declared as priority areas, such as support for women and girls. Some would argue that after these cuts, the UK did not have much of a reputation left to lose.

But this story of UK aid is not unique. Indeed, the world has entered a new era of aid fatigue. The populist right portrays aid as wasteful and ineffective, as shown by the Trump administration’s dismantling of the US Agency for International Development.

Read more:
USAID’s freeze has thrust the entire global aid system into uncertainty

Many Africans see aid as a neocolonial enterprise aimed at spreading western ideologies, a sentiment often echoed by the progressive left. Western countries themselves are increasingly open about their selfish reasons for providing aid, such as boosting business, while many non-western donors have emerged as alternatives.

It is not a surprise that the west’s influence in the world has waned, as evidenced by its failure to build a global anti-Russia coalition following the invasion of Ukraine.

The UK will need to adapt to these realities. Designing a smarter and highly targeted aid programme, perhaps from the ground up, is now more important than ever to rebuild Britain’s reputation.

Balazs Szent-Ivanyi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Starmer announces aid cuts to fund defence – but Britain’s days as an aid superpower are already long over – https://theconversation.com/starmer-announces-aid-cuts-to-fund-defence-but-britains-days-as-an-aid-superpower-are-already-long-over-250873

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New Council Tax Reduction Scheme more equitable to support those in need

Source: City of Salford

Salford City Council’s Council proposals to make significant changes to its Council Tax Reduction (CTR) scheme are now approved and come into effect on 1 April 2025.

Council Tax Reduction (CTR) is the way that councils help households on low incomes to pay their council tax bill. Residents were consulted on the proposals for the new scheme which will play a vital role in alleviating financial pressures for vulnerable households.

The new, fairer and more flexible income-banded scheme in place for 2025/26 only assesses on income available to pay general bills. It uses Universal Credit notifications from the Department for Work and Pensions as the main way to determine household eligibility for CTR.

This change reduces the burden on the claimant, minimising the risk of them missing out on support and aligns with the move of most benefits to Universal Credit.

Lead Member for Finance, Support Services and Regeneration, Jack Youd, said: “We’re proud to have created a more equitable scheme which targets support to those in need, in line with our priority to tackle poverty and inequality.

“Our new scheme uses the Universal Credit breakdown to identify those with the lowest income available for general expenses and bills so the assessment of eligibility is fair across all claims and household types.

“Providing different income bands for different household make-ups recognises differences in expense levels as well as capacities and limitations for earning and accessing more income. This creates more stability in the amount of support a household will receive.

“By simplifying the eligibility and assessment criteria and enabling the claim to be driven by the Universal Credit claim, we can provide more certainty to recipients.

It also helps us get on the front foot with early intervention and prevention of debt in line with the council’s anti-poverty strategy.”

Visit www.salford.gov.uk/counciltaxreduction for more information about the new scheme.

Share this

Date published

Wednesday 26 February 2025

Press and media enquiries

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: New Report Reveals the Cost of War in Ukraine | United Nations

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Ukraine’s recovery will require $524 billion over the next decade, with war-related damage reaching $176 billion. A $9.96 billion funding gap for 2025 and rising poverty highlight the urgent need for investment and support.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pQzeNu2vEU

MIL OSI Video –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Burden on low-income earners resulting from rising CO2 prices – E-000025/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

A just transition is a key principle of the implementation of the European Green Deal. The new emissions trading system (ETS) for fuel combustion in buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2)[1] has been designed with important safeguards to start in an orderly, smooth and efficient manner.

ETS2 will complement policies and measures at national and EU level. Action at national level, which is set out in the National Energy and Climate Plans, will also be crucial in delivering the required emission reductions.

A part of the revenues raised by ETS2 will finance the Social Climate Fund[2], which is established to ensure a socially fair transition by addressing impacts on vulnerable groups, especially lower and lower-middle income households and those in energy or transport poverty. Member States are to define the vulnerable groups in their Social Climate Plans.

Together with a minimum 25% national contribution, the Fund will mobilise at least EUR 86.7 billion over 2026-2032. It will fund structural measures and investments in energy efficiency, renewable energy, decarbonisation of heating and cooling and sustainable mobility and transport, including social leasing, public transport, shared mobility and on-demand offers.

Pending the impact of these investments on reducing emissions and energy bills, there will be the option to provide temporary direct income support.

This will come alongside existing funding instruments supporting vulnerable groups, such as Recovery and Resilience Facility and Cohesion Policy Funds.

Member States must spend all remaining national auction revenues on select climate and energy purposes, prioritising social aspects. They could also further top up their contributions to their Social Climate Plans.
- [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87
- [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/955
MIL OSI Europe News –
February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Citizens at risk of poverty or social exclusion – E-000087/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
In line with the Treaties, the primary responsibility for social inclusion policies lies with the Member States. The Commission supports Member States in addressing poverty and social exclusion.

The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan proposed an ambitious and realistic EU target to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty or exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030. All Member States have defined national targets relating to this EU headline target.

A number of EU initiatives[1] that directly relate to poverty reduction and their implementation at national level will be key to achieve the EU target. EU funding, including the European Social Fund Plus[2] and the European Regional Development Fund[3], supports social inclusion.

The number of persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) has declined by around 1.6 million in the EU since the reference year of the EU target (from 2019 to 2023), with a rate of 21.4% of the population in 2023.

Trends in the Member States have been heterogenous with some increases in some Member States and declines in others. This also shows that the policies put in place by the Member States and the EU in recent years have been mitigating to a large extent the negative social impacts of the pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as well as by the high energy prices and increases in the costs of living.

Looking forward, the target remains within reach, but this will require further substantial efforts. T he Political Guidelines 2024-2029[4] announced a new action plan for implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights and the first-ever EU anti-poverty strategy, which will aim to help people to get access to the essential protections and services they need, along with addressing the root causes of poverty.

[1] European Child Guarantee, Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021H1004
Directive on adequate minimum wages, Directive (EU) 2022/2041 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022L2041
Council Recommendation on adequate minimum income ensuring active inclusion, Council Recommendation (EU) 2023/C 41/01 of 30 January 2023 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023H0203%2801%29
European Platform on Combating Homelessness, Lisbon Declaration on the European Platform on Combatting Homelessness of 21 June 2021
Council Recommendation on Access to social protection, Council Recommendation (2019/C 387/01) of 8 November 2019 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019H1115%2801%29
Commission Communication on the European care strategy COM/2022/440 final — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0440
Commission Communication on better assessing the distributional impact of Member States’ policies, COM(2022) 494 final — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0494

[2] European Social Fund Plus — Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1057

[3] Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1058

[4] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf
Last updated: 26 February 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Social Fund Plus post-2027 – A10-0014/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the European Social Fund Plus post-2027

(2024/2077(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 46(d), 149, 153(2)(a), 164, 175 and 349 thereof,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[1],

– having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2024/3236 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1057 and (EU) 2021/1058 as regards Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction (RESTORE)[2],

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which entered into force on 21 January 2011 in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [3],

– having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) proclaimed and signed by the Council, Parliament and the Commission on 17 November 2017,

– having regard to the La Hulpe Declaration on the Future of the European Pillar of Social Rights signed by Parliament, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council on 16 April 2024,

– having regard to the Liège Declaration of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘Affordable, decent and sustainable housing for all’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

– having regard to the Communication Commission of 20 March 2024 entitled ‘Labour and skills shortages in the EU: an action plan’,

– having regard to the Council recommendation of 12 March 2021 on Roma equality, inclusion and participation [4],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102) and its proposed 2030 headline targets on employment, training and reducing poverty,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 7 October 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation’ (COM(2020)0620),

– having regard to the annual reports of the European Court of Auditors on the performance of the EU budget for 2019 and 2021,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on job creation – the just transition and impact investments [5],

– having regard to its resolution of 21 November 2023 entitled ‘Children first – strengthening the Child guarantee, two years on from its adoption’[6],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2022 entitled ‘Towards equal rights for persons with disabilities’[7],

– having regard to its resolution of 29 April 2021 on the European Child Guarantee [8],

– having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on reducing inequalities with a special focus on in-work poverty [9],

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all [10],

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality [11],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2020 on tackling homelessness rates in the EU [12],

– having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 on the Youth Guarantee [13],

– having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2022 entitled ‘Towards a common European action on care’[14],

– having regard to its resolution of 18 June 2020 on the European Disability Strategy post-2020 [15],

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness,

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Regional Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0014/2025),

A. whereas the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) supports, complements and adds value to the policies of the Member States in order to ensure equal opportunities, equal access to the labour market, fair and high-quality working conditions, social protection and inclusion, in particular focussing on quality and inclusive education and training, lifelong learning, investment in children and young people and access to basic services;

B. whereas the ESF+ is the only EU fund primarily focused on social policies, and is therefore unique in itself and is strongly effective and necessary in achieving social inclusion, together with the cohesion policy; whereas the ESF+ must be used in the most efficient way in order to achieve systemic changes via structural reforms, focussing on its complementarity with Member States’ budgets in order to motivate the Member States to use the fund for these reforms, notwithstanding that it is crucial also to develop more holistic social policies at EU level to tackle inequalities and exclusion;

C. whereas cohesion policy, the European Structural and Investment Funds and, in particular, the ESF+, are strong tools for cohesion between Member States, regions and areas, including urban and rural areas;

D. whereas the situation and needs of each region in the EU are different; whereas local communities are the direct beneficiaries of the ESF+, and it is a precondition that regional and local stakeholders are directly involved in shaping this instrument; whereas community-led local development is a tool for involving citizens at local level in developing responses to the social, environmental and economic challenges faced today and thus it is an important tool to facilitate the implementation of the ESF+; whereas the implementation of the ESF+ at national level is often accompanied by unnecessary administrative burdens and complicated or ineffective rules;

E. whereas different people in vulnerable situations have different needs, such as children, single parent and large families, women in poverty, unemployed people and those in precarious jobs, migrants, labour migrants and victims of human trafficking, children, persons with disabilities, young and elderly people, homeless people and Roma people; whereas the digital and green transition is much needed and brings many opportunities but also challenges for everyone, such as the digital skills gap and the digital gender divide, and the need to reskill the workforce, and whereas to succeed in this endeavour, the EU must ensure a just transition that does not leave anyone behind; whereas there are people in vulnerable situations in the EU who are left on the margins of social policies and ESF+ funded programmes; whereas extraordinary efforts and structural changes are needed to reach all people in vulnerable situations and to prevent the number of people in these situations from increasing;

F. whereas around 100 million people in the EU have some form of disability; whereas only half of persons with disabilities are employed; whereas 28.8 % of persons with disabilities are at risk of poverty or social exclusion [16]; whereas persons with disabilities living in the EU continue to face multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination in all areas of their life, including the denial of decent accommodation; whereas persons with disabilities are entitled to enjoy their fundamental rights on an equal basis and are entitled to full and effective participation in all areas of life and society;

G. whereas 22.3 % of women live in poverty, compared to 20.3 % of men, and whereas women continue to be more affected by poverty and the risk of social exclusion than men [17]; whereas women in the EU earn 12.7 % less than men on average and this gender pay gap has over decades resulted in a 29.5 % gender pension gap, creating an unequal level of economic independence between elderly women and men; whereas almost half of single mothers live in poverty or are at risk of poverty or social exclusion;

H. whereas in 2023, 94.6 million people in the EU, some 21.4 % of the population, were living in households at risk of poverty or social exclusion, with an at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate of 24.8 % for the EU-27 [18]; whereas in 2020, approximately 14 % of households with children (7.8 million households) consisted of single parents; whereas almost half (48 %) of single mothers and a third (32 %) of single fathers are at risk of poverty or social exclusion [19]; whereas almost one in four children in the EU as a whole is therefore at risk of poverty or social exclusion; whereas the youth unemployment rate in the EU is nearly 15 %; whereas being unemployed, in particular at a young age, can lead to financial problems, as well as social isolation, mental health issues and less happiness;

I. whereas Europe’s overall increase in life expectancy and demographic ageing is generating a growing demand for care across all age groups; whereas 80 % of long-term care is provided by informal carers, predominantly women; whereas the care sector faces a growing shortage of workers in all Member States; whereas the European care strategy aims to ensure quality, affordable and accessible care services with better working conditions and work-life balance for carers across the EU; whereas programmes, projects and actions that promote active ageing and intergenerational ties are supported through the ESF+; whereas the ESF+ is the main EU funding instrument to support the Member States in the implementation of the EU-wide rules on the work-life balance for parents and carers;

J. whereas the availability and affordability of decent housing is decreasing because of reasons that may differ from one Member State to another, such as over-liberalisation of the market, real-estate speculation, unregulated short-term rentals, the drop in purchasing power of people in poverty and the lack of social and public housing, and is one of the major challenges Europeans are facing today; whereas we are far from reaching the target of ending homelessness by 2030; whereas the EU will have its first ever Commissioner for tackling the housing crises, and the first ever European affordable and sustainable housing plan is expected in 2025; whereas homeless children should be specifically targeted in this plan; whereas such proposals, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, need to go hand in hand with national measures in order to improve access to sustainable and affordable housing and the quality of everyday life, such as measures concerning short-stay rentals or other market interventions in highly stressed areas;

K. whereas one child in four is still at risk of poverty and social exclusion in the EU [20], and whereas the current trend will not meet the target of reducing the number of children in poverty by at least 5 million by 2030; whereas the European Child Guarantee aims to prevent and combat child poverty and the social exclusion of children in need, by guaranteeing effective and free access to high-quality early childhood education and care, education, school-based activities, at least one free healthy meal each school day, as well as healthcare, and effective access to healthy nutrition and adequate housing; whereas the Executive Vice-President of the Commission for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness is responsible for strengthening the Child Guarantee; whereas ESF+ resources alone are not sufficient for addressing the challenge of child poverty in the EU and, therefore, a significant increase in funding for the European Child Guarantee as well as synergies with other European and national funds are of the utmost importance;

L. whereas the social and economic integration of migrants, including labour migrants, refugees and victims of human trafficking, should be improved in order to ensure that they are included in our societies; whereas successful inclusion requires not only equal access to the labour market, but also complete participation in society; whereas special attention should be given to migrants coming from non-EU countries and undocumented migrants; whereas different EU funds, including ESF+ and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, play their own role in this regard;

M. whereas the population of the EU is decreasing; whereas depopulation is taking place in some regions and there is an increasing concentration of the population in certain urban areas; whereas efforts should be made to increase development and cohesion in these areas; whereas demographic changes will lead to a smaller workforce, requiring the upskilling, reskilling and expansion of the workforce;

N. whereas the report on the future of European competitiveness by Mario Draghi warns of the significant skills gap the EU is facing, with 77 % of EU companies reporting that even newly recruited employees do not have the required skills, and 42 % of Europeans lacking digital basic skills; whereas the report deplores the insufficient number of workers benefiting from training and the lack of progress in this area, with more than 50 million workers requiring training to meet the headline target of adults participating in training every year; whereas vocationally trained professionals and people with practical skills are crucial to European societies; whereas the further building of European competitiveness cannot be achieved without strengthening human capital; whereas timely investments in the reskilling and upskilling of workers that are at risk of losing their jobs or whose skills have become obsolete can among others help prevent them from becoming trapped in poverty;

O. whereas particular attention, including specific measures targeting the needs on the ground where relevant, should be paid to rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, the outermost regions and regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural, economic or demographic disadvantages, such as sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions;

P. whereas the Commission has proposed minimum targets for 2030 to ensure progress towards Roma equality, inclusion and participation under the 10-year plan to support Roma in the EU; whereas these targets include, among others, reducing the gap in housing deprivation by at least one third, cutting the proportion of Roma children who attend segregated primary schools by at least half in Member States with a significant Roma population, and reducing the poverty gap between Roma and the general population by at least half; whereas the ESF+ will remain the main financial tool for reaching the 2030 Roma targets;

Principles of the ESF+ post-2027

1. Insists that the ESF+ must continue to be the key and primary instrument for supporting the Member States, regions, local communities and people in strengthening the social dimension of the Union and in pursuing socio-economic development that leaves no one behind;

2. Stresses that the ESF+ must address, contribute and adapt to tackling social challenges such as the consequences of climate change and digitalisation, while addressing social challenges such as the rising cost of living and wages that do not increase at the same speed, promoting social resilience, reducing inequalities and protecting the most vulnerable people; insists that the ESF+ should drive long-term investment and growth, focusing on social and territorial cohesion, while supporting structural transformation across the EU and enhancing convergence between the Member States;

3. Insists that the ESF+ must continue to enhance upward social convergence, especially for the most deprived people, and invest in human capital, employment, skills development and social inclusion, while boosting entrepreneurship and social innovation, investing in children, addressing the digital and green transition, demographic challenges and regions impacted by crises, among others Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

4. Insists that the ESF+ must continue to enhance employment opportunities, facilitate fair labour mobility, foster the creation of quality jobs, ensure decent working conditions and improve the employment participation rate, in particular of women, persons with disabilities and other people in vulnerable situations, to enhance social and economic resilience and thus help to adapt to industrial changes, also through training, reskilling and upskilling;

5. Underlines the need for the ESF+ to be based on a social investment strategy and life-long approach by supporting measures that can provide medium- to long-term solutions for people;

6. Insists that the objectives of the ESF+ should be to achieve social inclusion, high employment levels with high-quality and sustainable jobs, adequate wages, decent working conditions, including the wellbeing of workers, healthy working environments, fair social welfare systems in the Member States, as well as vocational education and training opportunities, and lifelong learning for all, taking into account specific needs of people in vulnerable situations, in order to develop a skilled, competitive and resilient workforce, ready for the twin transition and the future world of work, and to build fair social protections and inclusive and cohesive societies, with the aims of eradicating poverty, combating inequalities and delivering on the principles and the headline targets set out in the EPSR;

7. Calls for a strong, reinforced and separate ESF+ with significantly increased public support for instruments in the Member States with the aim of providing for people in vulnerable situations and those most in need in our societies, investing in people and skills, helping to lift people out of poverty and social exclusion, and boosting social investment and social entrepreneurship; insists, therefore, that achieving the ESF+ post-2027 objectives would require an important and substantiated increase in the ESF+ budget in the 2028-2034 ESF+ financial envelope;

8. Calls on the Commission to provide increased, dedicated and well-allocated funding for attaining the objectives of the ESF+ and those of the EPSR and its action plan and headline targets; expresses concerns, therefore, over attempts to split or merge the existing ESF+ with other funds, since that could create serious risks for the implementation of its objectives and those of the EPSR, its action plan and headline targets; warns that unifying, streamlining, centralising or merging funds may not improve their effectiveness; stresses, in this regard, that any possible remodelling of the fund must preserve the effectiveness and the purpose of the ESF+ by serving the objectives of promoting employment, social inclusion, education, training and skill development, and must be managed as close as possible to the beneficiaries;

9. Believes that the ESF+ should remain in a shared management governance model and that therefore it needs to be avoided that a different ESF+ governance leads to losing the priority given to social aspects, including employment, education, skills, training and social inclusion projects, a potential loss of focus, and to the funding not reaching the local level, people in vulnerable situations and those most in need, while increasing the risk of the funds being reallocated for other purposes;

10. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the participation, provision of information to and consultation of social partners, civil society organisations (CSOs), including not-for-profit social services, social enterprises, education and training providers, and representatives of the target groups in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages of the ESF+, to allocate adequate funding for this purpose and to prevent the exclusion of smaller actors; calls on the Commission to respect the partnership principle at EU level, as it is essential to the success of the ESF+ and must be maintained under the next multiannual financial framework (MFF); calls for the CSOs to be involved in the ESF+ Committee, as they are the main implementing partners of the fund;

11. Highlights the need for the ESF+ governance model to allow, while keeping a high level of transparency, for national, regional and local specificities and challenges to be well-reflected in operational programmes, not least by taking due account of the expertise of national and regional stakeholders, including civil society, and by ensuring that the funding goes to organisations and activities that target people in need;

12. Highlights that the availability of and universal access to quality public services such as early childhood education and care, education and health, as well as access to adequate, affordable and decent housing and essential services such as affordable energy, sanitation, water and healthy nutrition, are necessary conditions for ensuring equal opportunities and improving employment levels, improving living and working conditions and fighting poverty and social exclusion; underlines the role that the ESF+ can play in this regard; draws particular attention to the situation of older people who, due to rising living costs and the declining purchasing power provided by their pensions, are living in or are at risk of falling into severe poverty, which often leads to them being deprived of basic needs, such as food, housing and access to care facilities, resulting in the loss of social dignity;

13. Notes that the current ESF+ programme was adopted before the emergence of the crises that have led to high inflation and an increased cost of living, and therefore require higher public and social investment, such that the existing ESF+ cannot meet current needs; calls on the Commission, therefore, to ensure that a comprehensive, stable and large-scale needs-and-rights based budget, which takes into account inflation, the increased cost of living, poverty rates and the need for access to affordable housing, is guaranteed for the ESF+ in the next MFF;

14. Underlines that the post-2027 ESF+ should invest in tackling enduring social challenges and stay close to the general and specific objectives set out in the current ESF+, while being capable of responding and adapting to changing socio-economic circumstances; emphasises the importance of the fund’s principles of shared management, clear objectives and thematic concentrations, and that most of the fund should be spent as close as possible to those using the fund in close cooperation with local and regional authorities and organisations; highlights the need to share best practices on the most efficient and transparent implementation of the ESF+; highlights the need to continuously assess the impact and effectiveness of ESF initiatives;

15. Stresses that the post-2027 ESF+ should first and foremost address structural social and economic challenges; expresses its concern that the ESF+ has been repeatedly used as an emergency response tool and underlines that this approach poses a risk for the longer-term policy and investment objectives of cohesion policy and also poses the risk that the people for whom cohesion policy is intended cannot be sufficiently reached;

16. Calls on the Commission, therefore, to protect the budget allocation of the ESF+ so that it can be used for its main objectives and beneficiaries and to propose a financial reserve instrument that enables the EU to respond rapidly and in a flexible manner to social emergencies and crisis situations, complementing the ESF+ and other cohesion funds, either built on the success of the temporary EU instrument launched in 2020, entitled ‘Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE)’, or be it an EU unemployment reinsurance scheme, or based on the EU Solidarity Fund, designed to be mobilised to repair damage caused by natural disasters or public health emergencies; calls on the Commission, therefore, to ensure its sufficient funding with a view to the increased risks in these areas due to climate change;

Objectives, priorities and budget

17. Underlines that horizontal principles, such as gender equality, anti-discrimination based on sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion or belief, nationality, or racial or ethnic origin [21], and freedom of movement, should be integral to the ESF+; stresses the importance of an intersectional approach throughout the entire development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the fund;

18. Stresses the importance of the social inclusion of persons with disabilities and insists therefore that the ESF+ supports the employment of persons with disabilities through work and training placements, especially in facilitating transitions from sheltered workshops to the open labour market;

19. Stresses that more efforts are needed to ensure that persons with disabilities can access quality support and enjoy their rights as described in the UNCRPD; stresses that the upcoming ESF+ should keep prioritising independent living and the transition from institutional care to community-based care, and facilitate home support and personal assistance schemes; calls for the ESF+ to deliver on the European disability rights strategy 2021-2030, and in particular to facilitate the implementation of the upcoming EU Guidance on Independent Living and Inclusion in the Community, the upcoming Framework on Social Services of Excellence for Persons with Disabilities, and the Disability Employment Package;

20. Insists that the ESF+ should target disadvantaged people in our societies, in particular marginalised people and communities such as children in vulnerable situations and older people, ethnic minorities, Roma people, persons with disabilities or chronic diseases, homeless people, low-income groups, the long-term unemployed, as well as those living in rural areas, islands or remote regions who face unique socio-economic challenges; underlines that the ESF+ must be inclusive, with special attention given to all kinds of families, people and families in depopulated areas where access to services and opportunities can be more limited, and to children deprived of parental care; further stresses that the ESF+ should encourage the adoption of measures that prevent family separation for families in precarious situations, including parenting education programmes, family-focused therapy and employment training;

21. Stresses that the ESF+ should invest in projects targeting women’s employment and the social and economic inclusion of women, with special attention to single mothers and female-headed households; insists that the ESF+ supports women who are in vulnerable situations and need extra support to (re)integrate in societies and the labour market, including women who are victims of gender-based violence, including economic violence; calls for a cross-cutting gender approach [22] along the ESF+;

22. Calls on the Commission, in the light of current challenges, to include in the specific objectives of the ESF+ the promotion of the just transition, ending homelessness, the promotion of social enterprises in the social economy and the socio-economic integration of people in vulnerable situations, including migrants, young people, older people and those living in areas impacted by demographic decline and persons with disabilities or chronic diseases, as well as those coming back to the labour market after a longer absence;

23. Stresses that reaching the EPSR’s targets on poverty becomes challenging, unless specific support is dedicated to developing medium to long-term solutions to lift people out of poverty and to tackle the structural causes of inequalities, making them more resilient to upcoming challenges, addressing current gaps in national social protection systems and therefore reinforcing welfare systems, and mitigating the social impact of crises in a targeted manner; insists on dedicating support to ensure decent living conditions leaving no-one behind, with access to high-quality essential public services; calls for the EU anti-poverty strategy, outlined in Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s political guidelines for the 2024-2029 term to go beyond policy proposals and to allocate better funding in the upcoming MFF dedicated to social justice across funds, and to ease the delivery of the ESF+ on the ground; underlines the role of the ESF+ in implementing the strategy;

24. Stresses that addressing child poverty requires appropriately funded, comprehensive and integrated measures, together with the efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee at national level, and insists that it constitutes a central pillar of the EU anti-poverty strategy; repeats its previous demands for the ESF+ post-2027 financial envelope to include a dedicated budget of at least EUR 20 billion for the European Child Guarantee; insists that all the Member States should allocate at least 5 % of their ESF+ resources to tackling child poverty and those Member States with a rate of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion above the EU average should allocate a higher amount to tackle the problem more effectively; insists on transparent and efficient use of the European Child Guarantee budget as close to the target groups as possible and in cooperation with whole spectrum of stakeholders and local organisations;

25. Urges the Commission, in line with the two general objectives of the fund and to reflect their importance on an equal footing, to raise the earmarking for social inclusion beyond the current 25 % and the earmarking for food aid and basic material assistance for the most deprived persons to 5 %, in response to rising living and food costs;

26. Welcomes the Commission president’s announcement the delivery of a European affordable housing plan and the launch of a pan-European investment platform on affordable and sustainable housing; shares the ambition to prioritise the tackling of the housing crisis, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, and emphasises that the post-2027 ESF+ should enhance timely and equal access to affordable, decent, accessible, inclusive, sustainable and high-quality services promoting access to housing, including measures such as social housing and affordable rental schemes; believes that all Member States must invest a sufficient amount of their ESF+ resources into tackling homelessness and asks the Commission to propose a significant earmarking for this;

27. Emphasises the need to ensure sufficient financing of the ESF+ post-2027 for high-quality, accessible public education and training for all, as well as the social right for workers to participate in skills development, upskilling, reskilling and lifelong learning, and for the addressing of skills shortages and brain drain, ensuring that individuals can successfully navigate labour market transitions without facing any type of discrimination, particularly workers impacted by the digital and green transition, and promoting specific actions for older workers to make the most of senior talent and experience; calls in this context for close cooperation between key actors, including educational institutions, employers, workers, governments and local authorities;

28. Underlines the potential of the ESF+ in fostering innovation and digital skills, while supporting workers affected by the digital and green transition by aligning educational and training programmes in a targeted way with the evolving needs of key sectors and ensuring access to lifelong learning opportunities, so that workers of all ages can continuously adapt their skills to meet the new employment needs of a rapidly changing economy; stresses the need for more subsidies and development of programmes that support workers in the digital and green transition, including retraining and reskilling of workers;

29. Insists that measures aiming to improve access to the labour market and promote skills acquisition should be designed in a way that promotes and recognises the autonomy of individuals, anticipates future skills needs and targets employees at risk of future job-loss; recalls in this context the wide range of skills-enhancing initiatives undertaken at the EU level that can provide useful guidance to the development of education and training programmes at the national and regional level;

30. Calls for the strengthening of efforts to support the implementation of the Youth Guarantee; urges the Commission to propose an increased earmarking beyond the current 12.5 % of their ESF+ resources for all Member States to support the targeted actions and structural reforms to support quality youth employment, vocational education and training, in particular traineeships and apprenticeships, and the transition from school to work, pathways to reintegrate into education or training and second chance education; repeats, in this context, its call on the Member States to ban exploitative practices, including unpaid traineeships; emphasises the need for monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure its long-term impact and effectiveness;

31. Underlines the importance of the ESF+ in focusing on different groups with different needs; stresses, therefore, the importance of allocating support to, among others, projects on the social inclusion of persons with disabilities, Roma people, the ageing population in society, women and children, and female-headed and large households and families, and the socio-economic integration of migrants, including labour migrants, with special attention to migrant women; emphasises further that the ESF+ should support projects for social and educational objectives and improving skills in regions experiencing significant depopulation; insists that the ESF+ post-2027 incorporates other aspects of social inclusion, such as housing, health and family circumstances and the support of public and community-based services; underlines that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution and that ways to address those needs may vary from region to region;

32. Stresses that the Employment and Social Innovation strand of the ESF+ supports initiatives addressing the precarious situation of mobile workers and secures funding for trade union-related counselling, underlining the importance of workers’ representatives in collective bargaining; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide stable funding for a European network of national and transnational trade union counselling services for such workers in order to enhance fair labour mobility;

33. Recalls that the ESF+ should also aim to provide a healthy and well-adapted working environment in order to respond to health risks related to changing forms of work, and the needs of the ageing workforce; stresses that the pandemic has accelerated new realities and the rise of new forms of work brought by digitalisation, including artificial intelligence (AI), that have affected workers’ occupational safety and health; calls, in this light, for support and sufficient funding for a directive on the right to disconnect and teleworking rules, a directive on AI in the workplace and a Directive on psychosocial risks and well-being at work, as well as increased funding to ensure effective work on the protection of workers against dangerous and harmful substances;

34. Calls for the ESF+ to boost the effective implementation of the European care strategy in all Member States by investing in quality community-based and home care services and infrastructure, long-term care and support for persons with disabilities and older persons with support needs, and quality early childhood education and care through community-based, child and person-centred, high-quality, affordable and accessible public care systems that promote the autonomy of persons in need of care as well as their dignity and that of carers; calls for further investment in support for carers, formal and informal, while at the same time ensuring decent working conditions for workers in the care sector, including adequate salaries, via a Care Deal; calls on the Member States to make full use of ESF+ funds to reinforce and finalise the deinstitutionalisation process so as to ensure that every person can live in a family or community environment;

35. Recalls that public expenditure is needed to ensure upward social convergence; stresses that the implementation of the EPSR and the reforms under the relevant country-specific recommendations in the European Semester are also dependant on the strong support of the ESF+ for certain policy measures, especially those related to strengthening social welfare systems, ensuring inclusive, accessible and high-quality public education and training, care systems and healthcare services, including for mental health, reducing child poverty and eradicating homelessness and those relating to equal treatment and opportunities for women and men, which must be guaranteed and strengthened in all areas, including labour market participation, terms and conditions of employment and career advancement;

36. Recalls that EU policies can deliver the biggest impact when they are coordinated with funding instruments and other strategic frameworks, such as the European Semester and its country-specific recommendations; notes that the effectiveness of interventions funded by the ESF+ depends on the successful implementation of reforms;

37. Underlines that social dialogue and collective bargaining are pivotal for well-being at work and the reduction of in-work poverty, social exclusion and wage inequality; calls on the Commission to allocate consistent, adequate and sufficient financial resources to capacity-building, with the aim of empowering social partners to play a relevant role in areas of their competence, strengthening their capacity to engage in social dialogue both at EU and national level and of enhancing social partners’ actions with an appropriate minimum obligation in all Member States, and to include technical assistance for these three purposes; further insists that CSOs and non-for-profit organisations should, on an equal basis, be guaranteed minimum access to funding to contribute to and pursue ESF+ objectives in the Member States; underlines at the same time the need to develop institutional capacity through strong and professional administration and to foster innovation in public sector management;

38. Stresses the importance of employee-owned cooperatives, social enterprises and other alternative business models in reaching EU goals of inclusion; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that small social enterprises, not-for-profit social services and CSOs have access to all aspects of the ESF+; calls for a co-financing rate of at least 90 % for measures targeting the most deprived, and at least 70 % for all other actions implemented by small entities with limited capacity, such as CSOs, not-for-profit social services and social enterprises, in order for them to have access to funding while preserving a minimum number of different co-financing rates;

Functioning of the fund

39. Calls on the Member States to ensure coordination between regional and local authorities and organisations and their involvement in projects financed from national budgets and insists on the need to maintain the partnership approach of the current ESF+, which is key to strengthening the quality of the programmes financed under the ESF+; reiterates the need to adopt rules to manage the fund in cooperation with local actors that are closest to people’s needs and can develop place-based solutions that best suit their specific territories; highlights the need to involve regional and local actors in the implementation of the fund;

40. Insists that the rules governing the use and the implementation of the ESF+ must ensure and enhance compliance with the rule of law, the EU acquis, the highest EU social standards, social rights and democratic principles, and be aligned with the EPSR, the UN’s sustainable development goals and fundamental human rights and workers’ rights, as also included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU;

41. Calls for rules governing the ESF+ to allow public money to be allocated only to those employers that respect workers’ rights and the applicable rules on working conditions; calls, further, for more effective social conditionalities in rules on public procurement and concessions; encourages the Commission to create a comprehensive database, supplementing the Eurostat data, to allow for the timely and reliable monitoring of developments in employment, living conditions and industrial relations;

42. Notes with concerns that the national governments often hinder efficient implementation of the ESF+ by imposing unnecessary administrative burdens or preventing local actors from managing support under the fund or funding opportunities; calls for the reduction of the administrative burden and bureaucracy, notably by simplifying the application processes for accessing funds and the reporting procedures for organisations, in particular for civil society and social economy organisations, and those of a smaller size; emphasises that beneficiaries, including not-for-profit social service providers, should be consulted for the design of the simplification measures; urges that simplification uphold the fundamental principles of shared management, transparency, accountability and independent scrutiny, as well as the principles of partnership, ensuring the proper administration of public funds;

43. Recognises that excessive reliance on metrics such as the error rate may lead to a greater administrative burden; notes that different metrics, including measurements of inputs, outputs, performance or qualitative measures, may fit different objectives and interventions;

44. Calls on the Commission to provide consistent support and communication to the Member States in order to help them set up individual projects effectively and transparently, including transparent and predictable conditions, which provide legal clarity and predictability to applicants, as well as for the final beneficiaries of the funding;

45. Calls on the Commission to ensure more thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of individual interventions without imposing major new burdens on providers, for instance by simplifying the exchange of information between the Member States and the Commission and by creating evaluation desks at both EU and national levels;

46. Reiterates that digitalisation is one of the important tools to reduce administrative burden and streamline applications for funding opportunities, and that as such it should be promoted and people’s digital skills strengthened; warns, however, that not all people are prepared for digitalisation and that certain groups of people, especially the most vulnerable, such as older people and those living in depopulated areas where access to services and opportunities can be more limited, and the projects targeting them, as well as CSOs, not-for-profit social services and social enterprises, could miss out on funding opportunities as a result;

47. Sees that more work needs to be done for organisations and people to know about all the opportunities that the ESF+ can bring; insists that the Commission and the Member States raise awareness, inform and advise organisations about the opportunities presented by the ESF+ by carrying out information campaigns; sees that there is still a significant knowledge and skills gap, especially for social services, in accessing the current ESF+ and running EU-funded projects; considers, in particular, that the future ESF+ regulation should reserve a technical assistance budget to set up a network of national helpdesks or low-threshold information points offering services such as walk-in job counselling, coordinated at cross-European level in order to effectively deliver the training, guidance and support to organisations on the ground;

48. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen synergies at all levels between projects supported by the ESF+ and by other EU funds;

°

° °

49. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the European Committee of the Regions.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – 2024 annual report – A10-0010/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – 2024 annual report

(2024/2080(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 14, 16, 21, 24, 36 and 41 thereof,

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources [1],

– having regard to the report of 20 June 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, endorsed by the European Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024, 18 April 2024, 27 June 2024 and 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 March 2024, 22 April 2024, 24 May 2024, 24 June 2024, 22 July 2024, 14 October 2024, 18 November 2024 and 16 December 2024,

– having regard to the declaration of the Summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) adopted on 18 July 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 [2],

– having regard to the Political Guidelines of the Commission President for 2024-2029,

– having regard to the 2024 enlargement reports presented by the Commission on 30 October 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 on strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness,

– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in 2004, updated in 2008 and further supplemented in 2020 with a guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation,

– having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on European Economic Security Strategy (JOIN(2023)0020),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

– having in regard to the Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023)6689),

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States [4],

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation [5],

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2024 on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration [6],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan [7],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union [8],

– having regard to its resolutions of 24 October 2024 on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia [9] and of 5 October 2023 on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia [10],

– having regard to its resolutions on historical remembrance, including its resolutions of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism [11], of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe [12], of 15 December 2022 on 90 years after the Holodomor: recognising the mass killing through starvation as genocide [13] and of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness [14],

– having regard to the report of 9 May 2022 on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe,

– having regard to the EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in External Action 2021-2025 (GAP III),

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which entered into force in the EU on 1 October 2023,

– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York entitled ‘Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Agenda 2030), which established the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

– having regard to the UN resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1949 on assistance to Palestine refugees,

– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 on a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East situation,

– having regard to the UN Security Council resolution of 11 August 2006on the situation in the Middle East,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

– having regard to the agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union of 28 April 2006 on cooperation and assistance [15],

– having regard to the advisory opinion requested from the International Court of Justice by the UN General Assembly in its resolution of 30 December 2022 on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,

– having regard to the order of the International Court of Justice concerning South Africa’s request for the indication of provisional measures,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0010/2025),

A. whereas the world faces rapid geopolitical shifts, with autocratic powers, both individually and in coordinated efforts, actively challenging the international rules-based order and its multilateral institutions, international law, democratic institutions and societies, as well as our alliances; whereas all EU leverage should be assessed in order to dissuade countries from supporting Russia’s aggression;

B. whereas the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, from 22 to 24 October 2024 underscores how Putin leverages international platforms to counteract isolation and build alliances; whereas a unified and strategic EU response is required to uphold the principles of the rules-based international order;

C. whereas the EU and its Member States should review development assistance to governments of countries that openly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and monitor their votes on relevant UN resolutions;

D. whereas the geopolitical confrontation between democracies and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes is growing, conflicts are multiplying, and the use of force is increasingly treated as a standard tool for pursuing political aims; whereas force is wielded not only by states but also by an expanding array of non-state actors; whereas the EU needs to reinforce transatlantic relations and build constructive partnerships with like-minded partners in the Global South;

E. whereas the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating has accentuated the need for more ambitious, credible, decisive and unified EU action and a fully fledged European foreign policy on the world stage and has highlighted the necessity for Member States to demonstrate the required political will to rebuild their defence capabilities, while strengthening the EU’s transatlantic bonds and partnerships with like-minded countries; whereas the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) needs to become a fully fledged EU policy through which the EU can address the key geopolitical challenges; whereas the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement; whereas it is in the EU’s interest to stand up accordingly for universal values, norms and principles such as freedom and democratic standards, as well as human rights, the rule of law, international justice and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

F. whereas the EU is faced with the rapid rise of new threats at its borders and on its territory, which are destabilising the EU’s functioning, in particular targeted disinformation, cyber and hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of migratory flows, in addition to international terrorism and religious radicalism;

G. whereas strategic autonomy requires the EU to act independently on the global stage when needed, particularly in foreign and security policy; whereas the EU has recognised the need to reduce undue reliance on external actors for safeguarding its interests in an unpredictable and multipolar world;

H. whereas the EU needs to develop an independent and autonomous European diplomacy, including public and cultural, economic, climate, digital and cyber diplomacy, led by an EU diplomatic service which is driven by a common diplomatic culture;

I. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine violates the rules-based international order, fundamental principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter and key conventions and resolutions, the Helsinki Final Act and the European Convention on Human Rights;

J. whereas the Russian violations of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War comprise executions of prisoners and the denial of access to humanitarian organisations and medical treatment for prisoners;

K. whereas the ICC has issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin and the Russian High Commissioner for Children, Maria Lvova-Belova, for their involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children to Russia; whereas Russia, assisted by the Belarusian regime, is undertaking to re-educate Ukrainian hildren and erase their Ukrainian identity; whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus has to be held fully accountable for its complicity in the war of aggression against Ukraine and war crimes such as the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children;

L. whereas the ICC has additionally issued arrest warrants for Russian military leaders Sergei Shoigu, Valery Gerasimov, Viktor Sokolov and Sergei Kobylash, accused of directing attacks on civilian targets;

M whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF); whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have delivered military aid to Ukraine for more than 18 months;

N. whereas Russian shadow fleet tankers pose a considerable risk to maritime and environmental security by turning off or manipulating their automatic identification systems; whereas these tankers provide an estimated USD 12 billion to Russia’s war budget each month, thereby directly funding its aggressive military operations;

O. whereas Vladimir Putin’s regime has instrumentalised history in an attempt to secure the loyalty of the Russian population by creating nostalgia for the supposed greatness of the Soviet Empire, falsifying the history of Russia and Ukraine, rejecting Nikita Khrushchev’s policy to acknowledge and condemn Stalinist crimes, reneging on Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition and condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and declaring the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy of the previous century;

P. whereas Russia and other malign actors in its neighbouring countries promote anti-Western and divisive rhetoric and exploit ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans in order to inflame conflict and divide communities, including through the instrumentalisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church;

Q. whereas 2024 marked the 20th anniversary of the ‘big bang’ enlargement when 10 countries joined the EU; whereas enlargement is of the utmost strategic importance for the EU, as it represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, and in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires reforms in the EU and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity;

R. whereas the EU must maintain the momentum for the acceleration of its enlargement policy while accession countries continue to reform and achieve the required benchmarks related to the EU acquis; whereas consistent messages and a clear path towards integration for candidate countries are vital for keeping the pro-European perspective alive;

S. whereas the future of the Balkans and the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood lies in the EU;

T. whereas the Union is founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, which are part of the Copenhagen criteria, which are the key set of criteria for EU membership; whereas the accession process is a merit-based and reversible process;

U. whereas joining the EU requires foreign policy alignment, including on the votes on United Nations General Assembly resolutions, support for Ukraine and alignment with sanctions against Russia; whereas most of the countries of the Western Balkans have reached high levels of alignment with the CFSP, a notable exception being Serbia;

V. whereas North Macedonia concluded the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and cooperation with Bulgaria;

W. whereas the citizens of Georgia have demonstrated their commitment to democratic values and to their country making progress with EU integration; whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia needs to be reversed; whereas the Georgian authorities should heed the will of the Georgian people to join the EU and should ensure free and fair elections, stop democratic backsliding, abandon the laws that jeopardise Georgia’s European future and pursue pro-European democratic reforms; whereas Georgia should align with the EU’s CFSP, including the sanctions adopted unanimously against Russia;

X. whereas any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations and, in particular, on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia;

Y. whereas the Mediterranean is of great importance to the EU, both historically and geographically; whereas the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood play an important role in ensuring that irregular migration flows are managed on the basis of the principles of solidarity, balance, shared responsibility and in full compliance with applicable EU and international law and, in particular, human rights and humanitarian law;

Z. whereas strategic partnerships and agreements between the EU and countries of origin and transit, such those between EU and Mauritania, are proving to be a successful model for the prevention of irregular migration and the fight against migrant smugglers;

AA. whereas the supply of thousands of Shahed drones from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Russia has further cemented Iran’s role as a pariah state; whereas North Korea and China further demonstrate their unwavering disregard to international laws and norms;

AB. whereas on 28 May 2024, Norway, Ireland and Spain recognised the State of Palestine, followed on 4 June 2024 by a decision of Slovenia’s parliament to do the same;

AC. whereas China defines itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and endeavours to develop, in close partnership with Russia, a Polar Silk Road;

AD. whereas the Belt and Road Initiative, known in China as the One Belt One Road, is a threat to the EU’s interests and undermines the CFSP;

AE. whereas on 14 October 2024 the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the British Foreign Secretary agreed to launch strategic consultations on issues such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans and hybrid threats;

AF. whereas all UN agencies embody the rules-based international order as they uphold and implement both the letter and the spirit of the UN Charter, to which all UN Member States must abide;

AG. whereas the EU’s credibility and coherence is a paramount requirement for the correct implementation of its external action, as this reinforces trust in the EU among various actors and non-EU countries; whereas the efficiency of the EU’s actions worldwide is contingent on ensuring the highest level of coordination and coherence in the EU’s external action; whereas coordination between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should be strengthened, particularly due to the insufficient operational budget of the EEAS;

AH. whereas the implementation of gender equality and the WPS agenda requires initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights and combat sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings; whereas the funding of these initiatives is essential for supporting local civil society organisations and providing survivor-centred support;

AI. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) are the EU’s main allies in defending and promoting human rights abroad; whereas HRDs are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors; whereas Parliament has consistently called for the proper and coordinated implementation of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (2008); whereas the Member States, alongside the EU institutions, should implement these Guidelines, which include a range of specific commitments, such as regular reporting, coordination and action in support of HRDs;

AJ. whereas the consequences of climate change will have an ever-increasing effect on various spheres of human life, including geopolitical order and global stability; whereas it is of crucial importance that fighting climate change, necessitating climate action, and aiding those who are hardest hit by its repercussions, becomes a cornerstone of the CFSP; underlines the fundamental role which the Commission and the Member States, in a joint approach, must play in the advancement of climate diplomacy globally;

AK. whereas the report entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’, presented by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, provides strategic recommendations for enhancing Europe’s civilian and military preparedness in the light of escalating and complex security threats;

AL. whereas this report first reviews the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report and subsequently complements it with Parliament’s positions on the CFSP objectives in 2025; whereas in so doing, the report expands particularly on (1) the global consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, (2) conflict and peace in the Middle East, (3) cooperation with like-minded partners and (4) the general visibility and influence of EU action abroad; whereas Parliament’s forward-looking CFSP position is ultimately underlined by key demands concerning the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the parliamentary oversight of the MFF; whereas there is a need to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;

1. Underscores that its resolutions on the implementation of the CFSP are a key component of its contribution to EU foreign policymaking; underlines that these resolutions manifest the practical implication of the strengthened right of scrutiny in the area of foreign policy conferred on Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that the 2024 resolution is the first of this nature in this legislative term and aims to serve as a guide for the EU executive when setting foreign policy priorities for this term; highlights the fact that in an ever volatile international environment, the EU needs to simultaneously tackle numerous foreign policy challenges affecting it directly or indirectly, such as the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, increasing great power competition, constant attempts to undermine the multilateral rules-based international order and an increased nexus of foreign and internal crises; strongly believes that in order to stay relevant on the international stage, the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU’s own strategic objectives and continues defining, asserting and defending its interests in the world; recalls that the EU should be guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Article 2, Article 3(5) and Article 21 TEU, which have inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity; further believes that the CFSP should ensure the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda and the SDGs;

I. The VP/HR’s 2024 annual report

2. Notes that the report was submitted to the European Parliament on 20 June 2024; recalls that the report should be forward-looking in nature; comments hereinafter on several developments emphasised by the VP/HR in his report;

3. Welcomes in particular:

– the local, vibrant civil societies in the enlargement countries that play a constructive role in the EU integration processes, while underlining that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance as well as social progress and that the enlargement countries should provide an enabling space and an appropriate framework for cooperation to ensure their meaningful involvement;

– the successful finalisation of the screening process for Albania at the end of 2023 and the opening of the first cluster of negotiating chapters on external relations (Cluster 6); welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations swiftly; highlights the need to further intensify reforms to address deficiencies that persist regarding the ‘fundamentals’, in particular concerning the rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime; cautions against undermining the work of independent institutions such as the Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK); underscores the importance of a viable political pluralism and a competitive opposition and calls for dialogue and constructive engagement between the majority and the opposition to overcome the strong political polarisation in the country and to foster inclusive democratic processes that respects all parties, including the Greek, Roma and Egyptian minorities in the country; commends the country’s consistent, full alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, including with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus;

– the decision on the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina; encourages the authorities to take all of the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022; urges the country’s political leaders to implement a substantial set of reforms, including electoral reforms, in accordance with the decisions of domestic and international courts, in order to ensure the principles of equality and non-discrimination for all citizens and constituent peoples, as enshrined in its constitution and in full respect of the judgments of domestic and international courts, including all rulings of the European Court of Human Rights regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina; denounces the recurring inflammatory rhetoric and secessionist laws and policies of the leadership of the entity ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS), including the celebration of the unconstitutional ‘RS Day’ on 9 January 2025; calls on the Member States and representatives of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote and support the implementation of these judgments; reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against destabilising actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking officials of RS and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; welcomes the agreement reached to extend the mandate of the EU forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Operation Althea until November 2025 and recalls that this mission still plays a pivotal role in the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina; urges the EU’s military mission to actively prevent unlawful parades and other provocations as well as threats against all people working to help the victims of genocide and investing in inter-ethnic reconciliation and a peaceful future for the country;

– the progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, especially in the areas of freedom of movement and energy; calls on Kosovo and Serbia to continuously engage in this dialogue in good faith and in the spirit of compromise to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisation of their relations, based on mutual recognition, in accordance with international law and without further delay; regrets, in this context, the lack of progress in the implementation of the path to normalisation and calls for efforts to be made and capacity to be dedicated to the EU-facilitated dialogue; commits, hence, to work closely with the outgoing as well as the incoming EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues; calls on the VP/HR to take advantage of the new term of the Commission to overcome the stalemate and give a new impetus to the dialogue and to come up with a new, innovative and balanced approach to the mediation;

– the 2024 Enlargement Report on Serbia, presented by the Commission on 31 October 2024; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should advance only if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the ‘fundamentals’; reminds the Serbian authorities that the proper functioning of democratic institutions is at the core of Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU accession methodology; recalls in this context its position that the Serbian parliamentary and local elections held on 17 December 2023 deviated from international standards and Serbia’s commitments to free and fair elections; reiterates its serious concerns over these irregularities and the overall election environment, which fell below the standards expected of an EU candidate country; urges Serbia’s political leadership to ensure constructive, inclusive dialogue across the political spectrum and to deliver on the necessary reforms for Serbia to progress on the path to EU accession; regrets the biased approach of the EU towards Serbia despite its year-long roll-back on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region;

– Kosovo’s application for EU membership and the Kosovo Report 2024 and asks the Commission to respond to it; recalls that Kosovo’s bid to be considered a candidate country will be assessed on the basis of its own merits and of its success in meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; welcomes, however, the lifting of visa requirements for Kosovo citizens; regrets the restrictive measures imposed by the Council against Kosovo and calls for their immediate lifting, as proposed by the VP/HR;

– the progress made by Montenegro in meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis; encourages the country to continue to make progress on and implement EU-related reforms swiftly; expresses, nonetheless, its concerns over controversial ideas for legislative proposals on citizenship and foreign agents floated in public; stresses the importance of the new government being able and committed to take forward the EU-related reforms and keep Montenegro firmly on the EU strategic path; expects the country to start closing chapters in the accession negotiations and to be ready to join the EU within the next couple of years;

– the successful finalisation of the screening process for North Macedonia at the end of 2023; urges the government of North Macedonia to achieve tangible results in fulfilling its obligation under the EU negotiating framework, including relevant constitutional changes, in line with the country’s commitments;

– the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement is a geostrategic investment, which requires commitment from both the EU and the enlargement countries on their pathways to accession; recalls in this context the continued need for reforms regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and public administration, and for alignment with the CFSP, including on sanctions and on the EU’s visa policy; highlights, additionally, the threats posed by malign foreign interference in the region and underlines the importance of combating disinformation to contain anti-Western and divisive rhetoric which seeks to exploit and exacerbate ethnic tensions in the region; cautions against engagement with the EU’s systemic rivals, which could undermine the prosperous, sustainable and secure future that EU accession offers; recalls, in this context, the added value of the investments made by the EU under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance III, the newly established Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, and the Western Balkans Investment Framework; calls on the Western Balkan countries to use all the resources made available to support their alignment with the EU acquis; calls upon the Commissioner for Enlargement to increase the visibility of EU action in the Balkans;

– the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova; commends the fact that the CFSP alignment rate of Moldova has substantially increased from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024 and encourages Ukraine and Moldova to continue this positive trend towards full alignment; calls for the acceleration of the screening process and the timely organisation of the subsequent intergovernmental conferences;

– Armenia’s decision to suspend its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and cease all payments to its budget in 2024, following Russia’s failure to assist Armenia against Azerbaijan’s military aggression, and to seek a more reliable security architecture; supports Armenia’s official request for the Russian Federation to withdraw its Federal Security Service border guards from its international airport and the Armenia-Iran border; welcomes the regular meetings under the EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue format and the EU-Armenia Partnership Council and commends the decision to adopt the assistance measures under the EPF in support Armenian armed forces on 13 June and 22 July 2024 respectively;

– the ongoing attempts by Armenia and Azerbaijan to normalise their relations, such as through the Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures, as well as the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both parties to sign a comprehensive and fair peace agreement without delay; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory and the release of the 23 remaining Armenian hostages;

– the activities of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), which contributes to security in the region by substantially decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas, and reduces the level of risks for the population living in such areas; welcomes Armenia’s assistance with the activities of the EUMA on its territory; commends the Council for the decision to increase the number of deployed observers as well as the mission’s capacity and to extend its deployment timeframe; calls for further expansion and presence in the region; calls on the Commission to provide support for Armenia for de-mining;

– the continued work of the EEAS on addressing and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) through the EU FIMI Toolbox, the setting up of a STRATCOM taskforce, and through close cooperation with Member States, international partners, civil society and other relevant stakeholders; reiterates its call to promote the continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS on foreign and security issues occurring outside the EU; calls, in this regard, for strengthening the EU INTCEN, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Satellite Centre by enhancing its staff, financial resources and capabilities;

– the proposal of the VP/HR for an anti-corruption sanctions regime, which would allow the EU to target serious acts of corruption worldwide; calls for its swift adoption by the Council;

4. Condemns in particular:

– the ongoing illegal and unjustifiable Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the increasing Russian attacks against civilian targets and civilian infrastructure within Ukraine; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military action and that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops and equipment from Ukraine and any other country whose territory, or parts thereof, it unlawfully occupies; condemns any hybrid attacks executed by Russia in Ukraine and strongly denounces the spread of Russia’s propaganda about its war in Ukraine;

– the role of the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in allowing the country to serve as a Russian military base, effectively surrendering national sovereignty to the Kremlin in order to maintain its grip on Belarus, while brutally oppressing the Belarusian people in order to stay in power; deplores the Lukashenka regime’s instrumentalisation of migration, particularly in the light of the influx of thousands of migrants into Poland, which Belarus orchestrates to force their passage into the European Union;

– the illegal North Korean involvement in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine by its sending of military equipment and ammunition to Russia, as well as by its sending of thousands of soldiers to wage war against Ukraine;

– North Korea’s continued weapons testing and development of its nuclear programme, in violation of the UN resolution, further escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region; demands that North Korea abandon its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; urges the North Korea authorities to cease their ongoing crimes against humanity and to undertake a process of reform whereby all human rights are respected and protected;

– the increasing malicious activities, interference and hybrid warfare deployed by the Russian Federation, its institutions and proxies in undermining and subverting the democratic stability and sovereignty of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and in particular the recent interference in the constitutional referendum on EU accession and the presidential elections;

– the attack on Kosovan police officers by well-organised Serbian paramilitaries in Banjska/Banjskë in the north of Kosovo on 24 September 2023 which resulted in the death of the Kosovan police officer Afrim Bunjaku and the injuring of two more Kosovan police officers; condemns the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay;

– the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks committed by Hamas across Israel on 7 October 2023, which triggered a disproportionate Israeli military response and a conflict in Gaza that has a devastating effect on civilians and caused a catastrophic humanitarian situation;

– the fact that Hamas has taken and is still holding innocent people, including women and children, hostages, and calls for the unconditional and immediate release of hostages;

– the deliberate and malignant fuelling of an exceptionally tense situation, through repeated attacks targeting Israel since 7 October 2023, by state and non-state actors in the region with Iran being the main instigator, as well as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon acting as some of its proxies;

– Iran’s persistent non-compliance with its legal safeguard obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) condemns, further, the advancement of its nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification and the destabilisation of the Middle East this causes, including through proxies, such as attacks on Israel and sponsoring terrorism and civil conflicts; the attacks perpetrated or attempted within the EU by terrorist organisations and networks affiliated to Iran;

– the wrongful detention of European citizens in Iran, the execution of the European citizen of dual German-Iranian nationality Jamshid Sharmahd on 29 October 2024, and the brutal oppression of the people of Iran, in particular the women; reiterates its unwavering support for the women of Iran, who are still subjected to gross violations of their fundamental rights two years after the Women, Life, Freedom movement was brutally repressed; urges the VP/HR to do the utmost to free these citizens and to put an end to the practice of Iranian hostage diplomacy, through which it detains foreign civilians and dual nationals;

– the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, in particular the intention to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership and Iran’s provision of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine and its people;

– the recent adoption of the law on the ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ in Afghanistan, as well as the systematic violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the extreme interpretation of sharia which erases women from public life, bars them from working, hinders their access to all public places without being chaperoned by a male relative and to education beyond the sixth grade, amounting to gender apartheid; demands from the de facto authorities of Afghanistan that all gender-based restrictions on women be lifted and stresses that this must be a key condition for any engagement of the international community with the Taliban; insists on maintaining strict, conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council for engaging with the de facto authorities and by holding the perpetrators of these grave violations of girls’ and women’s rights accountable, including through restrictive measures;

– the increasing breadth and intensity of operations, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation by the Chinese Government, as well as vessels and aircraft attempting to intimidate China’s neighbours, which violate peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters and impede the freedom of navigation rights of all other parties; strongly condemns statements by the Chinese President that the People’s Republic of China will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan, and insists that the use of coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law;

– the government-led system of forced labour and the persistent violations of human rights, in particular the systematic repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province; observes with concern the intense crackdown on ethnic minorities in Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau and the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents, as well as the persistent presence of Chinese police officers on EU territory; has taken note of and deplores the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

– the deterioration of stability in the Sahel, exacerbated by the numerous military coups in the region in recent years; recalls that stability in the Sahel has direct repercussions for the security of European external borders and the management of irregular migration flows from the African continent; emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel;

– the coups in Burkina Faso and in Niger, with President Bazoum being detained and the constitution suspended; is increasingly concerned by the decision of the central Sahel military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), thus plunging ECOWAS into a deep political crisis; condemns additionally the physical attack on 29 September 2024 on an ECOWAS Member of Parliament and other participants of an officially declared opposition rally in Lomé; calls on the Togolese authorities to ensure the promotion and protection of the fundamental principles of human and peoples’ rights enshrined in Article 4 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty, such as the rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, belief and expression; calls on the ECOWAS authorities and its member states to support the efforts needed to safeguard the principles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights throughout the subregion; takes note of the closure of the European Union Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) and of the Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the non-renewal of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); observes with concern how Russia has intensified the development of state-to-state relationships and cooperation initiatives with African states through military cooperation and a commitment to cooperate on the development of nuclear energy; condemns the rise of terrorist attacks and heavy civilian losses in the Sahel, as well as the presence and predation activities of Russian paramilitaries, which have led to the population being displaced and an influx of refugees, also caused by the instability in the region; deplores the fact that the void UN peacekeepers have left has effectively been filled by Wagner Group mercenaries and Russian and Turkish military, whose industries supply arms to Sahelian capitals;

– the civil war in Sudan, the devastating consequences for the civil population, the atrocities committed against them and, in particular, the despicable large-scale use of rape as a weapon of war;

– the last minute tactical and technical constraints imposed by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which prevented the EU Election Observation Mission from monitoring the presidential elections; condemns the violence committed by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel movement destabilising the eastern DRC; calls for a review of the EU strategy for the Great Lakes region;

– the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, who are systematically undermining Nicaragua’s democratic structures; recalls that the regime in Nicaragua maintains strong ties with other autocracies, such as those in Iran, Venezuela and Cuba; condemns the systematic human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime; strongly condemns and fully rejects the electoral fraud orchestrated by the regime in Venezuela and demands that the Maduro government cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition; recalls that on 19 September 2024, Parliament recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela; highlights the fact that various democratic states in the region and throughout the world have recognised González as president-elect; recalls that he should have been sworn in on 10 January 2025; expresses satisfaction that on 17 December 2024, Parliament awarded the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and to president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy;

– the employment of the ‘Cuban medical brigade’ in some European countries as a form of infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms and of slavery and forced labour;

– the risk of collapse of the state structures and difficult humanitarian situation in Haiti due to rampant gang violence;

– the fact that the PRC, Russia, Iran and other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes use information manipulation and malign interference as integral instruments to exert pressure on multilateral institutions and democratic values and norms, to abuse power, to increase the incidence and severity of human rights violations, to constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements, to spread anti-Western disinformation and to use various forms of transnational repression to intimidate and constrict spaces for civil society, independent media and democratic opposition movements in the diaspora;

– the increasing attacks, harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and killings of HRDs worldwide, especially those advocating for environmental, indigenous, women’s, LGBTQI+ and anti-corruption rights; further notes the increasingly sophisticated tactics used by state and non-state actors, including digital surveillance and smear campaigns, aimed at silencing HRDs; stresses the urgent need to protect HRDs, who also play a critical role in upholding democracy and the rule of law globally; calls for enhanced support and protection mechanisms for HRDs facing threats, harassment and violence, especially those in high-risk areas or working on sensitive issues such as environmental, indigenous and women’s rights;

– attempts to circumvent EU and international sanctions, which it sees as strategies posing direct threats to the international rules-based order;

– the failure by Azerbaijan to comply with the order of 17 November 2023, issued by the International Court of Justice, indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of the 100 000 ethnic Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh after the September 2023 pre-planned, unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan, as well as the refusal of Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war it currently detains; stresses the need to support all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; calls, further, on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; highlights the fact that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia; stresses that Parliament’s multiple warnings on the situation have not led to any change in the EU’s stance towards Azerbaijan; calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly; condemns the Russian ‘gas laundering’ through Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan; condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in the country;

5. Concurs with:

– the need to improve relations with Türkiye; welcomes the partial de-escalation of tensions in the east Mediterranean and the Aegean but reiterates its concern that Türkiye’s foreign policy continues to be at odds with EU priorities under the CFSP; recalls, in this context, the signature and the evocation of the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones;

– the call on Türkiye to work on a constructive, and not assertive nor aggressive, approach in its neighbourhood, including the Southern Caucasus; regrets that Türkiye continues to dispute the sovereignty and sovereign rights of an EU Member State; recalls that Türkiye’s accession process is contingent on its full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on its normalisation of relations with all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to cease and reverse all such unilateral activities and refrain from any further actions and provocations; calls for engagement in peaceful UN-led negotiations and for real progress to be made in the Cyprus settlement talks;

– the assessment that, in the absence of a drastic change of course by the Turkish Government, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed;

– the urgent need for the EU and the Turkish Government to move forward toward a mutual reflection process, including a modernised association agreement, which would lead to a mutually beneficial, more dynamic and strategic partnership, with strict conditionality on the respect of rule of law, fundamental rights, international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and good neighbourly relations, considering the key role played by Türkiye, for example, in the Black Sea region and its significance as a NATO ally;

– the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP, including on sanctions and the anti-circumvention of sanctions, as well as with the need for Türkiye to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy; deplores the unacceptable nature of the solidarity and support that the President of Türkiye has publicly provided to the terrorist organisation Hamas; reiterates its concerns about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye; recalls that Türkiye also targets the EU with foreign information manipulation and interference and that its government is considering introducing a Russian-style foreign agents law; underlines the incompatibility between Türkiye’s candidacy for BRICS+ and the EU’s CFSP;

– the concern over democratic backsliding in Georgia, manifested by the fact that the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 did not respect international standards for democratic elections or its commitments as a member of the OSCE to carry out free and fair elections; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country; considers that the reported electoral fraud undermines the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in the government and that the results do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people; considers that, with the legitimacy of the vote severely undermined by the magnitude of the violations, the international community should not recognise the election results; rejects, therefore, any recognition of the parliamentary elections and does not recognise any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country; calls urgently for early elections conducted in an improved election environment, managed by an independent and impartial election administration with widespread international observation, to ensure a genuinely free, fair and transparent process that would represent the will of the people of Georgia; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action, including the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’, the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the Electoral Code, jeopardises Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process; appreciates, at the same time, the efforts made by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili to steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; considers that President Salome Zourabichvili is currently the only clearly legitimate representative of the will of the Georgian people; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations, which are being betrayed by the Georgian Government; demands the immediate release of all people detained for peacefully protesting against the recent decisions by Georgia concerning a suspension of EU integration; calls on the Commission to use the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States to introduce personal sanctions against all those who are responsible for the democratic backsliding, in particular Bidzina Ivanishvili and Irakli Kobakhidze; encourages individual Member States and relevant regional organisations to avoid actively legitimising the self-appointed Georgian Dream authorities and call, in this regard, for suspending the EU Georgia Association Council;

– the observation that Russia and China have become significant players in the Southern Neighbourhood, especially North Africa, while Türkiye and the Gulf states, chief among them the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have risen as regional forces; argues that the idea of a single ‘neighbourhood’ for both Eastern and Southern Europe overlooks their distinct challenges; concurs further with the strategic relevance of the Southern Neighbourhood, its stability, economic development and prosperity; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; underlines the interference of strategic competitors in the region and calls strongly for the EU to send a solid and clear political message in favour of renewed cooperation with countries of the Southern Neighbourhood; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to release, as an urgent matter, the new pact for the Mediterranean and to secure adequate resources for its timely and effective implementation; reiterates that a dynamic network of strategic partnerships tailored to the specific needs and aspirations of each country in our Southern Neighbourhood should be at the centre of the new pact; believes, in this context, that the EU should conduct a thorough review of the current incentive structure that combines the promise of financial assistance and trade benefits in exchange for political and economic reforms and ensure that it aligns with broader EU objectives, including the promotion of human rights and democratic values; stresses that besides prioritising bilateral cooperation, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean, which offers a valuable platform for promoting dialogue and joint action on issues of common concern;

– the concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region in response, given its geostrategic importance; highlights the hesitation of Central Asian states to lend support to Russia’s war of aggression given the effect the war is having on the region; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying political ties with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular with its Sanctions Envoy; encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights;

– the fact that the Arctic is of geostrategic importance as regards the expansion of potential maritime routes, access to natural resources, climate conservation and territorial claims; stresses that this importance is heightened not only by Russian military expansion in the High North but also by China’s increasing presence and interest in the region, and its self-proclamation as a ‘near-Arctic state’; underscores the need for ensuring freedom and safety of navigation amid these two states’ growing influence and militarisation; underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation, while respecting the rights of indigenous peoples; reiterates the need to include the EU’s Arctic policy in the CFSP and engage in effective cooperation with NATO; calls for the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings;

– the strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific in the face of increasing Chinese intimidation in the region, including through military and hybrid means, and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the regions in response; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations and intensifying substantial ties with like-minded partners in the region, including Taiwan;

– the effectiveness of the implementation of a Gulf strategy, advancing in a strategic partnership with each of the Gulf countries and working together to promote global and regional security and prosperity;

– the focus on achieving accountability in the cyberspace, through the operationalisation of the EU digital diplomacy toolbox and the attention given to strengthening global cyber resilience; calls for an increased focus on building the cyber resilience capacity of developing democracies faced with hybrid challenges to their electoral systems; calls for increasing joint cyber defence exercises between the EU and NATO in order to improve interoperability and readiness to counter hybrid threats;

– the commitment to place democracy promotion at the forefront of the CFSP and to ensure the EU’s proactive role in this regard, building on lessons learned from previous democracy support actions, in particular in support of civil society, HRDs, critical voices, democratic opposition and media;

– the need to fight impunity and strengthen accountability efforts globally, including through the ICC, and to stand up for international law and international humanitarian law; remains deeply concerned about the trend of state officials undermining decisions of international institutions and their employees; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the ICC’s work;

– the urgent and ongoing need to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment through all EU external action a foreign policy that takes into account gender mainstreaming in line with the 2021-2025 Gender Action Plan, especially in light of the current global rollback of women’s rights; emphasises that at the current rate of progress, achieving gender equality worldwide will take another 131 years, underscoring the critical importance of accelerating efforts to safeguard and advance women’s rights and opportunities;

II. CFSP objectives in 2025

6. Identifies, in the following section, Parliament’s CFSP objectives in 2025, thus complementing the views expressed in the VP/HR’s annual CFSP report;

Addressing the global consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

7. Emphasises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its consequences, including economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices, in combination with the revisionist behaviour of the Russian Federation against a number of states neighbouring the Black Sea, destabilises and threatens the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, which in turn erodes the European security architecture; underlines, in this context, the need for reinforcing the EU’s capacities to support democratic institutions in our immediate neighbourhood;

8. Notes that the EU’s response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is being closely watched by autocratic actors around the world and will have a decisive influence in shaping their behaviour on the international stage; is concerned by the growing cooperation and coordination among autocratic regimes, including through their material or other support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; urges the Council to impose restrictive measures against countries that deliver military goods, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and surface-to-surface missiles, to the Russian Federation for use against civilian targets; recalls that the use of such military goods against civilian targets is a war crime; notes, with grave concern, the increasing cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and underscores that the employment of North Korean troops by Russia is widening the scale of the conflict; emphasises, equally, the urgent need for further sanctions against Belarus, mirroring all sanctions against Russia;

9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to meaningfully increase and speed up humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid and political support in every possible way until Ukraine’s victory, in order to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people and re-establish full control within its internationally recognised borders; welcomes the rapid creation and successful implementation of the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and suggests that the EU consider strengthening it; underlines, in particular, the urgent need to provide Ukraine with increased air defence and surface-to-surface capacities to defend its critical energy infrastructure, and calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems, such as long-range Taurus missiles, delivered to Ukraine, against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, which would be fully in line with Ukraine’s right to self-defence according to the UN Charter;

10. Calls for the EU and the Member States to reinforce the effectiveness of its 15 sanction packages adopted so far and to agree on new ones as soon as the need arises; recalls that the strict implementation and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is a precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s external action; underscores, thus, the importance of ending all EU imports of Russian energy; calls on the Commission to impose penalties on all European companies that continue to engage in business with the Russian Federation, as well as to further assess and combat sanction circumvention;

11. Appeals for proactive diplomacy with non-EU countries in order to minimise the circumvention of these sanctions; calls on the Commission to critically assess EU assistance to non-EU countries that actively support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and urges the Council to impose restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression, whether through the facilitation of sanction circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance, such as in the case of Iran or North Korea; calls on all countries to fully align with all EU sanctions packages;

12. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;

13. Expresses its most serious concerns over Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructures, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland and Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damaging by a tanker of the Russian shadow fleet of the EstLink2 power cable, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructures; welcomes in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with the participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructures in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York joint statement on the security and resilience of undersea cables,

14. Calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over, prevent and limit the activities of Russia’s shadow fleets which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to ecosystems as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns; urges the Commission to take swift action, within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the International Maritime Organization, and to design more targeted sanctions against the shadow fleet in the next sanctions package against Russia; specifies that such sanctions should designate all possible individual shadow fleet vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, etc.; recommends banning tanker sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia; notes that the flag states contributing to the Russian shadow fleet are thereby also helping the Russian war effort;

15. Reiterates its call for the necessary measures to be taken to return forcibly deported and illegally adopted Ukrainian children from Russia or occupied Ukrainian territory;

16. Calls on the Commission and the Council to designate the Russian state-funded private military Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation; draws attention to the so-called ‘Africa Corps’ that was created following the death of the Wagner Group’s former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, and placed directly under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, in an effort to regroup Wagner elements under government control;

17. Expresses its unwavering support for the 10-point peace formula put forward by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and recalls that any initiative, in particular diplomatic solutions, aimed at ending the Russian war of aggression and achieving a just and lasting peace needs to be based on terms and input provided by Ukraine and ultimately accepted by the Ukrainian people; encourages the Commission and the VP/HR, as well as the Member States, to mobilise international support for the peace formula and the victory plan presented by Ukraine and to engage in security commitments towards Ukraine as recommended in the Kyiv Security Compact;

18. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls on the VP/HR, the Commission the Council and the Member States concerned to enable effective Ukrainian countermeasures against Russia; recalls that Russia has violated international law and that the full seizure of the frozen Russian assets is an appropriate step towards enforcing Russia’s obligation to abide by international law, and to compensate Ukraine and other injured parties for the losses caused by Russia’s war of aggression; calls on the Commission to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state assets frozen by the EU; reminds the Commission that any such proposal does not take away the need for continued financial, political, military and humanitarian support; calls for the inclusion of all assets of the Russian state, Russian local authorities, Russian state-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list, and for those assets to be used to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by this war;

19. Commends the Commission’s proposal to establish the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, worth an estimated EUR 35 billion, which responds to Parliament’s call and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility, as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets; expresses its conviction that the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism is a substantive step towards making Russia financially compensate for the massive damage it continues to cause in Ukraine;

20. Denounces the abusive use by the Hungarian Government of its veto power to delay or effectively block EU essential aid from being granted to Ukraine; condemns the misuse of the position of the EU Presidency by Viktor Orban, in pursuing his so-called peace-mission to the Russian Federation on 5 July 2024, which was an attempt to undermine the unified EU position on Ukraine, and stresses that he did not to any degree or in any capacity represent the EU;

21. Urges the VP/HR and the other Member States to overcome the blockade by the Hungarian Government of the EPF’s funding and disbursement decision and to guarantee that the EU’s only instrument in support of military aid to Ukraine becomes fully functional again; calls on the VP/HR to advance proposals to prevent such blockades in the future or to find an alternative mechanism that is fully reliable;

22. Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies; expresses support for all the activities of the ICC and International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory;

23. Commends Ukraine for its progress in the EU accession screening process and calls on Ukraine to continue its progress towards EU membership using all the resources made available to it under the Ukraine Facility and to ensure the meaningful involvement of its civil society in the implementation and monitoring phases thereof; recalls that EU accession is a strictly merit-based process that requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, including those concerning democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values and the fight against corruption;

24. Believes that both Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession to the EU would be a mutually beneficial investment in a united and strong Europe; stresses that the newly proposed growth plan for the Republic of Moldova serves the purpose of accelerating EU-related reforms; calls on all co-legislators to advance the relevant legislative acts as soon as possible; encourages the VP/HR to additionally enhance the CFSP partnership with Ukraine and Moldova and in this context welcomes the signature of the security and defence partnership between the EU and Moldova in May 2024; recalls the fact that the security of the Republic of Moldova is inextricably linked to the security of Ukraine; underscores, hence, the need to increase financial contributions from the EPF to further enhance Moldova’s defence capabilities;

25. Praises the Moldova for running the presidential election and the referendum professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite the continued massive interference from Russia and its proxies; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 Moldovan European Union membership referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; expresses its support to Moldova in defending its democracy; strongly condemns such constant and coordinated attempts by the Russian Federation, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-European direction through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation campaigns, bomb threats and staged protests as well as the threat or use of violence; commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova which have enhanced the Moldovan authorities’ capabilities to address Russian interference; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to provide the additional resources, including human and financial resources, equipment and civilian experts, necessary to continue implementing the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025;

26. Stresses the importance of the EPF for enhancing the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security;

27. Welcomes the launch of the Belarus-EU consultative group to enable continuous dialogue between the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its support for the release of all political prisoners and the brave activists and journalists in Belarus who continue to resist the regime of the illegitimate leader in spite of ongoing crackdowns, notably the refusal to renew the passports of Belarussians abroad, and who have expressed their desire for democratic development in Belarus and for membership of the EU, including at the New Belarus Conference held in Warsaw in August 2023; underlines that such efforts demonstrate the fundamental role of civil society in strengthening democracy;

Resolving conflict and supporting peace in the Middle East

28. Affirms the right of Israel to defend itself as enshrined in and constrained by international law; recalls that Israel has the obligation to address the risk of mass starvation and the outbreak of disease epidemics in Gaza; recalls that Israel also has the obligation to protect the civilian population and that military operations must be proportionate and in line with international humanitarian law; expresses in the strongest terms its concern about the disproportionate military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank and in Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire including the unconditional release of all hostages;

29. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as their shared capital, which remains the most viable path to lasting peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians; calls for the VP/HR to support all efforts to this end, and in particular the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the two-State Solution; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and to engage in dialogue aimed at achieving mutual understanding and respect; regrets the fact that the Palestinian Authority has not held elections since 2005, which hampers its credibility, and expects elections to be held soon; is convinced that there can be no prospect for peace, security, stability and prosperity for Gaza as well as for reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian populations as long as Hamas and other terrorist groups play a role in the Gaza Strip; calls, therefore, on the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process to support efforts to counteract the further radicalisation of young people in the region; condemns the acceleration of the illegal Israeli settlement of Palestinian territory, which violates international law, undermines efforts towards achieving a two-state solution, and poses a significant obstacle to lasting peace; reiterates in this context the important role of the Abraham Accords as a framework for achieving durable peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East; expresses concern over the rising violence committed by Israeli forces and extremist settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; supports President Biden’s three-phase peace plan and regrets the lack of will on both sides to ensure its implementation; regrets, further, that the latest rounds of peace talks did not bring any tangible results; is aware of the fact that international stakeholders, including the US, the UN, the EU and Arab states, need to complement each other’s efforts in order for negotiations to resume and to be constructive; is committed to the future normalisation efforts between Israel and Arab states in the region;

30. Supports a just and viable solution to the question of Palestinian refugees; underscores that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays an important role in providing humanitarian aid and essential services which in the present circumstances must not be interrupted, and considers that all UN agencies active in the region must be supported in their efforts; recalls, however, its concern regarding serious allegations made against staff members of UNRWA which suggest that UNRWA has employed members of the terrorist organisation Hamas; welcomes the actions taken by the UN following the allegations regarding the Agency’s staff and welcomes UNRWA’s full commitment to implement the recommendations stemming from the ‘Colonna report’; echoes the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 which condemn any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA; insists that the Commission ensure that no funds from the EU budget finance, contribute to or support the activities of Hamas or Hezbollah; stresses that additional measures may be needed in the future to strive for even more transparency and accountability;

31. Welcomes the recent ceasefire in Gaza and the progress made towards the phased release of hostages; emphasises that this represents a significant step towards relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the US, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving this breakthrough; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages and establishing a lasting cessation of violence, as well as allowing unrestrained access for humanitarian and medical assistance into the Gaza Strip; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply;

32. Expresses concern about rising tensions in the Middle East and urges all involved parties to uphold international humanitarian law, to show maximum restraint and to commit to de-escalation, as a regional conflict must be avoided at all costs; deplores the loss of thousands of civilian lives; urges the disarmament of Hezbollah as part of broader measures to reduce hostilities and ensure regional stability; calls on the VP/HR to come forward with a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, to increase the EU’s effective presence in the region, to promotes long-term stability and peace in the region and to strengthen partnerships with key regional stakeholders; stresses that the strategy must be fleshed out within the first months of the new Commission’s mandate and should be reflected in the forthcoming MFF for it to have any tangible impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation; underscores the need for Member States to step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, in order to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue; underlines the need to prioritise and strengthen civil society organisations in the region, particularly organisations working on the protection of human rights and peacebuilding;

33. Strongly condemns the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the region; recalls that Iran has stepped out of the shadow of its proxies and condemns Iran’s two direct and open attacks on Israel’s territory in 2024, to which Israel retaliated both times, representing an unprecedented scaling up of the conflict; strongly condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel which led to an Israeli ground invasion in Lebanon causing a high number of civilian casualties, forced displacement and escalating violence in Lebanon; takes note of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, agreed on 27 November 2024 for a period of 60 days; urges Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; recalls the need for a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as possible to create space for a diplomatic solution along the Blue Line; demands the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in its entirety, as the only path to de-escalate tensions and stabilise the Israel-Lebanon border in a durable manner and fully restore the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Lebanon;

34. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations;

35. Takes note of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024;

36. Highlights the need for the EU to follow up on its election observation and assist in finding solutions to electoral crises such as the one in Lebanon;

37. Strongly condemns recent attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the Israeli Defence Forces and Hezbollah; reiterates the inviolability of all UN personnel and premises and reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, to which 16 Member States contribute, and calls for an immediate end to these attacks;

38. Welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of unmanned drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; highlights the strong links between Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxies such as the Houthis and militias operating in Iraq and Syria; strongly condemns the high number of terrorist and assassination attacks, or attempted attacks, perpetrated by the IRGC all over the world, including on European soil, over the past few decades; reiterates its call for the IRGC to be added to the EU list of terrorist organisations; points out that the sanctioning options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as ‘dual-use’;

39. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation, and strongly urges for continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

40. Shares the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons at all costs; points, however, to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the JCPOA and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; highlights that, at the same time, Iran has increased its nuclear weapons capability; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action for the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls upon the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events;

41. Expresses concern regarding the inflammatory rhetoric, fuelled by mis- and disinformation, that surrounds this conflict, and its instrumentalisation by malicious actors to sow distrust and hatred including within European societies, as illustrated notably, but not solely, by the worrying rise of antisemitism; warns that it should be a primary focus of the EU fight against disinformation and calls for a coordinated approach by the Commission, taking into account the external and internal dimensions of its policies, including but not limited to the forthcoming strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood;

42. Welcomes the historic fall of the Assad regime in Syria; recalls that it only survived so long thanks the support of its Russian and Iranian allies and that its collapse shows they are weakened; welcomes the nomination of a new Chargé d’Affaires of the EU Delegation to Syria, who made early contact with the transition authorities; reiterates its unwavering support for the people in Syria and highlights the need to urgently step up humanitarian aid and protection for the 16.7 million people in need; calls on all parties to contribute to a peaceful and Syrian-led transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation, participation and equal rights of women, minorities and all members of Syrian society regardless of ethnicity or religion and that puts the good functioning of the state institutions and the wellbeing of the Syrian people at the heart of their actions; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to swiftly organise the ninth Brussels Conference on Syria without delay and come up with a comprehensive plan for EU support for the reconstruction of Syria, taking into account the lessons learned from Iraq and Libya, among others; urges the VP/HR to urgently present to the Council an action plan towards the swift yet reversible easing of sanctions that are not linked to the previous regime, with a review process conditional on the progress of the political transition; stresses that the fight against impunity in Syria is a moral and political imperative for Europe and the international community; calls on the EU and its Member States to support the work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; calls on the EU and its Member States to consider the establishment of a special mission, in cooperation with international partners, to help document cases of serious crimes by the Assad regime, as well as by all other factions; stresses the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Syria, also to help preserve stability in the region; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

Incentivising cooperation with like-minded partners

43. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity forces the Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which is the source of the EU’s political leverage on the world stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the high costs of unanimity in terms of credibility on the global stage should be assessed critically, particularly bearing in mind the effective functioning of an enlarged EU;

44. Regrets, in this context, the fact that individual Member States have used their veto right to water down agreements, delay decision-making or thwart a common policy altogether; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has never been used;

45. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States, which fear a decreased ability to influence foreign and security policy at EU level; encourages, pending the full application of qualified majority voting to decisions without military or defence implications, the full use of all currently existing possibilities to enhance decisiveness in this regard, including the use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

46. Highlights that the world is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral; emphasises that multilateral forums, chief among them the UN and its agencies, should be considered the EU’s format of cooperation of choice; calls on the Member States to reinforce inclusive forms of multilateral governance and encourages, in this context, the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to step up interinstitutional cooperation with multilateral organisations that are integral to the international rules-based order and thereby protect the UN and the multilateral system as a whole; expresses concern, in this respect, about the increasing relevance of exclusive formats of cooperation, which experience increasing competition; expresses concern at the growing membership of the BRICS group, which currently includes 45 % of the world’s population; stresses that such cooperation provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects; observes, at the same time, that international institutions and norms are increasingly being instrumentalised and undermined by autocratic regimes; stresses that this trend puts the EU in a delicate position, having to balance the need to appeal for a broad and inclusive concept of multilateralism while reinforcing cooperation with selected, like-minded partners;

47. Stresses, in this context, that the geopolitical context in which the EU is operating remains marked by radical uncertainty and a shift from cooperation to competition; observes with concern how all types of interaction are being weaponised and notes that this trend impairs international cooperation at a time when global transitions need to accelerate in order to effectively address global challenges; recalls that the EU cannot afford to turn inwards and must remain open and engaged in the world to defend its values and its interests; underlines that, in light of intensified efforts by third countries to destabilise the international order and undermine multilateralism through the spread of disinformation, enhanced cooperation and coordination with like-minded partners is essential;

48. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support a comprehensive institutional reform of multilateral institutions, first and foremost the UN system and particularly the UN Security Council, which should include measures aimed at limiting the use of veto powers, boosting regional representation, making the executive body accountable to the assembly that elects it and redefining the composition to better reflect geopolitical reality, including by establishing a permanent seat for the EU; stresses that such reforms are essential to strengthen multilateralism, improve global governance and values-based decision-making, and address international challenges more inclusively and responsively;

49. Recalls the importance of a strong and constructive partnership with the UK; welcomes the renewed impetus from the new UK Government to reflect with the EU on possibilities for closer and more permanent foreign policy and security cooperation, underpinned by concrete actions and building on the good cooperation at UN level as well as the effective coordination between the EU and the UK on the adoption and monitoring of the implementation of sanctions against Russia; believes that such coordination is of added value for both the EU and the UK and hence welcomes the agreement to work towards the creation of an EU-UK security partnership based on shared interest and collective responsibility; believes that in the scope of such a partnership, topics such as maritime security should be consulted on; demands that Parliament be duly involved and informed in such reflections;

50. Takes note of the result of the presidential and congressional elections in the United States; recalls that the transatlantic relationship remains one of the most important and strategic relationship for the EU and its Member States, which has been emphasised by the unity and strength of the partnership demonstrated following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; underlines that a strong transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for the security of the partners on both sides of the Atlantic; calls on the Commission to foster closer ties with key partners in both the US and Canada in order to counter global challenges that affect our shared values, interests, security and prosperity; in this context reiterates its call for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to the future cooperation; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic dialogue, such as through transatlantic parliamentary diplomacy; calls for stronger transatlantic cooperation on trade, on foreign and security policy and on combatting challenges caused by rapid technological changes and growing cyber threats; welcomes in that regard the work of the Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council;

51. Reiterates, irrespectively, the need for Member States to fully operationalise the concept of EU strategic autonomy and defence readiness and to this end make collective and well-coordinated investments in their security and defence with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed;

52. Encourages close relations with western European non-EU countries, in particular cooperation in certain areas of EU external action; welcomes in this context the conclusion of negotiations on a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; calls on the Commission to modernise and deepen bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland; stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway, particularly in the scope of the security and defence partnership as well as the cooperative management of shared stocks and the continuation of long-standing fishing activities; calls for the swift signing of the association agreement between the EU and Andorra and San Marino;

53. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses full support for the newly launched work on the EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda, establishing more ambitious joint priorities for cooperation across all dimensions;

54. Expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to agree to have such a civilian mission on their side of the border as well;

55. Is of the view that the centre of gravity in the global order is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific and that the EU must strengthen its active role and presence in this region to safeguard its interests, promote stability and uphold a rules-based international order; reiterates that a peaceful, free, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region is of vital European interest; is concerned that great power competition in the region is imposing parameters on the EU’s ability to promote multilateralism in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; calls, in this context for enhanced foreign, security and defence policy ties with like-minded partners in the region in line with the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; encourages the VP/HR to promote the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action together with our Indo-Pacific partners, particularly Australia, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan;

56. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral partnership that allows effective policy-shaping in multilateral contexts; notes that the EU and Japan are celebrating 50 years of their respective diplomatic missions in 2024 and strongly emphasises the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening this partnership bilaterally in the 50 years to come; welcomes, to this end, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), the latter of which provides for, among other things, consultations on the development of respective defence initiatives including exchange of information on defence industry-related matters, as well as the exploration of possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives;

57. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interest of the EU and India in ensuring security, prosperity and sustainable development; calls for an India-EU summit to keep bilateral relations high on the agenda; identifies climate change and green growth, digitalisation and new technologies, research and development, connectivity, trade and investment, foreign, security and defence policy as the key areas of cooperation; calls, in this respect, for stronger buy-in from Member States; calls, equally, on the Member States to expand and broaden the India-EU cooperation on maritime security in response to China’s evolving presence in the Indo-Pacific; highlights the need to engage with India on its heavy military dependency on Russia as well as its supply of restricted critical technologies to Russia; urges India to condemn Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and to join the EU sanctions policy towards Russia;

58. Considers India an important democratic partner and encourages the EU to strictly engage with the Indian Government on the respect of human rights and rule of law, both internally and worldwide; calls for the full implementation of the EU Strategy on India of 2018 and the EU-India Roadmap to 2025 in close coordination with Member States’ own actions; stresses in particular the need to promote greater synergies in foreign and security policy through existing dialogue mechanisms and other forums set up under the EU-India Roadmap to 2025; welcomes the announcement of a forthcoming strategic EU-India agenda;

59. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region; recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector, and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; encourages the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on an investment agreement with Taiwan; emphasises that any attempt from authoritarian regimes to restrict the benign development of EU-Taiwan relations is not acceptable;

60. Strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; denounces, furthermore, China’s blocking of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, by its continuous distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758; calls, accordingly, for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations;

61. Expresses deep concern about the latest shifts in China’s domestic and military posture since the 20th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party; holds the view that China demonstrates that it has both the intent and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, technological and military power to redefine the global order; underscores that the military-civil fusion strategy is a testament to such means; stresses, in this context, that the EU needs to be more assertive and unified in its approach to China and therefore calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to review the strategy towards China that takes full account of the increasingly oppressive domestic policies, the assertive foreign policy as well as the use of economic coercion as a means by which China aims to reach its objectives; considers that the challenges stemming from the rise of China as a global actor require a balanced multi-dimensional response along the principle of ‘cooperate where possible, compete where needed and confront where necessary’, through which the EU maintains its selective engagement with China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council on a number of key issues;

62. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

63. Holds the view that China, through the continued growth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, including in the areas of technology and military capability transfers, (indirectly) enables the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;

64. Reiterates its condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments, its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law as well as the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the Commission to assess the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macao in the light of China’s breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations and the crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy;

65. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy;

66. Reiterates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a crucial partner in reinforcing rules-based multilateralism; supports ASEAN’s efforts to finalise negotiations with China on an effective and substantive code of conduct in the South China Sea; encourages enhanced EU engagement and cooperation with ASEAN and efforts towards a comprehensive strategic partnership, building on economic ties and sustainable growth, and in particular on political cooperation with regard to human rights and democracy; calls for increased support for Myanmar’s national unity government and for greater pressure to be applied to ASEAN countries to align on international sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta;

67. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on bilateral relations with partners in Africa, among others Ghana, Morocco, Kenya, Senegal and Mauretania, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real and balanced partnerships; believes that the ‘more for more’ principle should be integrated fully into relations with non-EU countries, whereby the EU develops stronger partnerships with those countries that uphold the principles of the CFSP and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and the fundamental values of the EU; is of the belief that the EU needs to maintain a continued focus on Africa, which is already a strategic continent and will become an increasingly important player in the future;

68. Calls for the EU to suspend both its Memorandum of Understanding on raw materials and all military cooperation with Rwanda, including through the EPF and any other mechanisms, until Rwanda ends its illegal support for armed groups and fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the eastern DRC by the rebels of M23; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousands of displaced persons in the area; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU’s Great Lakes strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for the protection of civilians in the eastern DRC;

69. Underlines that the recent developments in Tunisia have raised concerns about human rights and democratic standards, with reports indicating limited transparency, restricted opposition participation and reduced political competition in the presidential election; underlines the EU’s continued commitment to and support for Tunisia during this politically and socio-economically sensitive period, through maintaining contact at various levels;

70. Underscores that the EU has a direct and vital interest in the stability, security and economic growth of the Mediterranean basin as well as the wider Southern Neighbourhood; recalls that the European neighbourhood policy was launched with the laudable goals of fostering stability, prosperity and good governance in the southern Mediterranean; acknowledges, however, that it is evident today that its instruments, objectives and principles are no longer aligned with the region’s current realities; regrets that, almost 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, the creation of an area of shared prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries of the Southern Neighbourhood has not been achieved; calls on the Commission to present a new pact for the Mediterranean; believes that the EU and the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood should conclude memorandums of understanding aimed at promoting stability, prosperity and the defence of human rights, conditional on cooperating on migration; recalls that instability and insecurity in the Southern Neighbourhood remains an ongoing challenge for European external border management; argues that, while prioritising bilateral relations with countries in the region, the EU should also continue to foster regional cooperation through existing frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean; welcomes the appointment of a Commissioner in charge of the Mediterranean;

71. Stresses the need for the EU to strengthen and deepen its cooperation with Arab countries and the Gulf, in response to the pressing geopolitical, social, and economic challenges facing the region; emphasises that enhanced collaboration should prioritise key areas such as migration, digital transformation, security, the green transition and cultural exchange to build a resilient partnership; calls for a strategic approach that tailors engagement with each country to foster sustainable development and mutual understanding;

72. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit and believes this summit to have marked a pivotal moment in the relationship between the EU and its partners from the GCC, stressing mutual commitment to strengthening ties across key strategic, economic, and cultural areas;

73. Underlines the importance of upholding and promoting democratic values in the region; condemns the rise of hate speech, including against the European institutions, and attacks on individual freedoms and the international order, both within Member States and abroad;

74. Emphasises that the countries of the EU, Latin American and the Caribbean are like-minded and share values, languages, history, culture and religion, which should make them natural partners in today’s geopolitical context; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for the growing influence of China and Russia; urges countries across Latin America to adopt a firmer attitude of condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to pursue proactive diplomacy in the region, with a strong emphasis on defending the multilateral global order, international law and respect for democracy and human rights; urges for multilateral initiatives to address political instability in the most volatile countries in the region, for instance in Haiti;

75. Welcomes the signing of the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement and calls for its swift and full ratification; calls for progress to be made towards the signing and ratification of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement;

76. Welcomes the conclusion of the agreement with Mercosur; underlines that Parliament will examine whether the provisions on sustainability meet the highest levels of ambition;

77. Welcomes the EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) informal meeting and the implementation of initiatives under the EU-CELAC Roadmap 2023-2025 and, in this regard, underlines the need to adopt a new and ambitious roadmap at the 2025 summit, that keeps strengthening the partnership and takes into account best practices accomplished so far;

78. Underlines the need for a tougher approach to address violence against environmental defenders and to step up the EU’s efforts to assist in the preservation of biodiversity and in adaptation to the climate emergency; suggests further strengthening cooperation against organised crime and drug trafficking which also has an impact on the EU; calls for a substantial increase in bi-regional cooperation in the fight against this phenomenon;

79. Calls on the VP/HR to make the work with like-minded democracies a priority of her term and to systematise cooperation and consultation with democratic like-minded partners in order to promote democracy and improve common preparedness and access to crisis response resources; reiterates, in this context, the recommendation to deepen ties with regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union to enhance cooperative security frameworks;

80. Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

81. Believes also in the significance of building new alliances, inter alia with the countries in our neighbourhood as well as in the Global South, taking into account mutual needs and interests in order to foster real, balanced and equal partnerships; stresses the importance of establishing these political agreements with third countries, based on common European values and fundamental rights; calls for the EU to respond to partner countries’ expectations and to deliver quickly on political agreements with them in order to show that the EU is a reliable and strategic partner and demonstrate that the international rules-based system can meet contemporary challenges; calls, in this context, for collaborative initiatives between the EU and Global South countries to assess and tackle the debt crisis; notes that agreements with the Global South, especially on raw materials, should contribute to local economic development rather than deepening dependence and excessive resource exploitation;

Fostering EU action abroad

82. Highlights the role of the VP/HR as a bridge-builder between the CFSP and EU external relations to ensure the highest level of coordination and coherence in EU external action; stresses the need for the EU to foster the visibility and effectiveness of its external action and development cooperation efforts, regrets, nonetheless, that in some cases there is a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU, hindering the EU’s strategic communication abroad; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation so that the EU’s voice is coherent and perceived as such by its partners; calls on the Commission to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS in external action, including by ensuring full compliance with Articles 3.2 and 9 of the EEAS Decision [16], which may need to be updated;

83. Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of the appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls for the EEAS to be able to select and recruit its permanent EU diplomatic staff and to ensure a fair gender and geographical balance among Member States across all levels within the EEAS; calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action and to that end to fully take into account Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world [17]; stresses the need to strengthen strategic communication and the EU’s work on countering disinformation via dedicated resources and offices in strategically relevant regions and countries;

84. Recalls that the EU has a strategic interest in advancing sustainable development, poverty reduction and equality globally, as these efforts contribute to long-term global peace and security; calls on the Commission to effectively and swiftly use the Global Gateway Initiative as a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as an instrument to increase the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide; recalls that the Global Gateway Initiative is to be understood as a strategic concept integrating foreign, economic and development policy, including the climate and digital transitions, as well as infrastructure investment in order to strengthen close partnership based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; stresses, in this context, that coordination with international financial institutions, well-defined private-sector involvement and tailored strategic communications, including in the recipient countries, are essential in order for the instrument to reach the desired scale; is concerned by reports that a number of Global Gateway projects are being implemented by Chinese companies in direct violation of the initiative’s aims and objectives, which includes the strengthening of the EU’s economic security and fostering economic development and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries; calls, therefore, for an immediate investigation and the removal of all Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway; stresses that the EU’s support should complement other initiatives such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and the Lobito Corridor, and should in particular aim at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals;

85. Reiterates that Parliament plays an integral role in the CFSP and makes a specific contribution thereto by virtue of its parliamentary diplomacy and its distinct instruments, channels and contacts, including its democracy support programmes, the Foreign Affairs Committee, regular parliamentary dialogues and official delegations; emphasises that parliamentary diplomacy has a great potential to engage key political stakeholders and facilitate democratic governance; stresses, in particular, the added value of parliamentary diplomacy during the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and highlights, in this context, the valuable cooperation at political and technical level between the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament;

86. Firmly believes that diplomacy is a significant part of EU action; calls, in this light, for the further development of the EU’s preventive diplomacy as a proactive external policy tool to pre-empt, mediate and peacefully resolve conflict between parties, calls on the EEAS to integrate the EU’s preventive diplomacy tools within structural prevention mechanisms and actions, such as political agreements among different actors involved in conflicts, national dialogues for reconciliation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions; urges the EEAS to conduct ‘lessons learnt’ exercises to assess diplomatic efforts, identify areas for improvement and integrate best practice into future initiatives; calls for the EEAS’ capacities in those regards to be increased, in particular in the relevant crisis preparedness and response divisions; stresses the urgent need to double the relevant EU budget within the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and strongly increase EU action on mediation, dialogue and reconciliation;

87. Reaffirms the role of the EU special representatives (EUSRs), who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU and its policies; emphasises the importance of equipping EUSRs with sufficient resources enabling them to effectively implement those tasks; stresses the importance for EUSRs of having a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an active role in preventive diplomacy efforts; insists that the appointment of new EUSRs should take place only after a hearing in Parliament;

88. Underlines the EU’s missions and operations abroad for promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world; calls on the VP/HR:

– to prepare the proposals for the necessary CFSP missions to be launched in 2025, using the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) as preventive military reinforcement; recalls that the administrative expenditure for these measures, including the RDC’s standby expenditure, should be charged to the EU budget;

– to work with Cyprus, Türkiye, the UK and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone in Cyprus, and to improve security on the island, both of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community;

– to support an increased role of the two EU civilian CSDP missions, EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, in line with European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, recalling they can play an important role based on the principle of the two-state solution and the viability of a future Palestinian state, and to participate in the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, to improve the efficiency of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and to prepare for its return to the Gaza Strip;

– to create the necessary conditions for the full reactivation of EUBAM Rafah to allow it to act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; expects the reinforcement of the scope and mandates of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah on the ground to be included as key priorities of the forthcoming EU-Middle East strategy;

– to further increase the number of observers deployed as part of the EU civilian mission in Armenia on the Armenian side of the international border with Azerbaijan and reiterate calls for Azerbaijan to cooperate with the mission and cease its smear campaign against it;

– to work with Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and ASEAN member states to facilitate the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific and south-east Asian regions;

– to develop strategies to counter hybrid attacks on the EU’s eastern border, particularly those involving instrumentalising migration as a tactic to destabilise Member States and exert political pressure;

89. Calls on the VP/HR to follow up on the examples of the successful evacuation actions in Sudan and of the stepped-up consular protection, and to work towards a comprehensive system of protection for EU citizens abroad; stresses that the impact of continuous crises and conflicts worldwide can entail the risk of overloading Member States’ consular protection and/or assistance capacities and calls, in this regard, for the strengthening of the capabilities and resources of the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; recalls its longstanding position of applying a similar level of protection for the local staff in EU delegations and CFSP missions and operations;

III. The next MFF and its parliamentary oversight

90. Believes that there is a need for stronger institutionalised parliamentary oversight of the EU’s external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information and briefings in the European Parliament in line with Article 36 TEU; emphasises the need for more feedback from the VP/HR and the EEAS about the actions taken and the effects achieved, in order to fulfil Parliament’s recommendations outlined in the resolutions on foreign affairs matters;

91. Underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, the European Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that the European Parliament also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies as referred to in Article 36 TEU;

92. Recalls that in line with Article 41 TEU, all CFSP and CSDP administrative and operating expenditure should be charged to the EU budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications;

93. Underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for those policies and must be subject to parliamentary oversight; calls on the VP/HR to consult Parliament before proposing CFSP or CSDP decisions, thereby ensuring transparency and accountability in line with Article 36 TEU;

94. Recalls that Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function of political control and consultation; recalls that Article 36 TEU establishes a specific relationship between the VP/HR and the European Parliament, which is a prerequisite for Parliament to exercise those functions, and that the VP/HR should support Parliament in those regards;

95. Regrets that the budget for civilian CSDP missions is insufficient; recalls that the number and tasks of such missions have increased, the security environment has become more challenging, and the cost of operations has increased; urges the European Council to provide for a substantive increase in CFSP funding placed under a separate Civilian CFSP and Crisis Management heading; calls for the efficient use of the funds allocated to civilian CSDP missions to be ensured, in order to make sure that these missions are able to respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to come forward with joint proposals to those ends;

96. Is deeply concerned that the EEAS is structurally underfunded and that this already entails serious and far-reaching negative consequences for the EU’s external action and the performance of the EU institutions in this area; underlines that a specific approach to the EEAS’ administrative budget is necessary and recalls that the absence of corrective action risks having a severe impact on the EU’s relations with third countries;

97. Calls on the Commission to consider in its proposal for the next MFF under the EU external action heading:

– robust capabilities and resources for EU external action that take into account the increasingly challenging international arena, recalling in this regard that it is crucial to further strengthen EU support for human rights, democracy and development in third countries;

– resources for the EU’s digital diplomacy, given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition;

– resources for green diplomacy;

– a dedicated budget for specific EU foreign policy actions on gender equality and the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, in order to integrate gender perspectives into EU diplomatic and human security efforts,

– resources for preventive scrutiny of potential beneficiaries to ensure that EU funds under no circumstance directly or indirectly support activities, projects or literature that incite violence and hatred, including antisemitism, and to ensure that all recipients of EU funding are monitored accordingly;

98. Calls on the Commission to present its proposals for the next MFF in the first semester of 2025 to allow for sufficient time to negotiate the programmes; underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and the CFSP budget, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

99. Underlines that each matter raised above requires an appropriate response by the executive; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between the European Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding; expects, in addition, Parliament to be effectively incorporated throughout EU external policies and action, thereby mobilising parliamentary diplomacy in support of the VP/HR’s efforts;

°

° °

100. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024 – A10-0011/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2024

(2024/2082(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022,

– having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

– having regard to the national security strategies of the EU Member States,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States [1],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)[2],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia [3],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2507 of 19 December 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM, Georgia [4],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 January 2023 on a European Union mission in Armenia (EUMA)[5],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility [6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 [8],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[9],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[10],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 [11],

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [12],

– having regard to the annual financing decision, constituting the first part of the annual work programme for the implementation of the European Defence Fund for 2024, adopted by the Commission on 21 June 2023 (C(2023)4252),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises and of 24 January 2022 on the European security situation,

– having regard to the Granada Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 6 October 2023,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, concerning the decision to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on EU security and defence,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, by the candidate for European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, of 18 July 2024, entitled ‘Europe’s choice’,

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in particular the section on ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’, published in April 2024,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the security and defence partnerships respectively signed on 21 May 2024 by the EU and Moldova, and on 28 May 2024 by the EU and Norway,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2(4) thereof on prohibiting the use of force and of Article 51 on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, 1889 (2009) of 5 October 2009, 2122 (2013) of 18 October 2013, 2242 (2015) of 13 October 2015 and 2493 (2019) of 29 October 2019 on Women, Peace and Security, and Resolutions 2250 (2015) of 9 December 2015, 2419 (2018) of 6 June 2018 and 2535 (2020) of 14 July 2020 on Youth, Peace and Security,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,

– having regard to the Pact for the Future and Chapter Two thereof on international peace and security, adopted on 23 September 2024 by the heads of state or government of the UN member states,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the heads of state or government of NATO at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the NATO 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué,

– having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,

– having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the heads of state or government of NATO participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine [13],

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement [14],

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism [15],

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation [16],

– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2023 [17],

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine [18],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine [19],

– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States [20],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the security and defence implications of China’s influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union [21],

– having regard to its position of 22 October 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine [22],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2024 on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan [23],

– having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0011/2025),

A. whereas this past year has been marked by a decline in global peace and security, resulting, inter alia, from conflict, geopolitical rivalry, growing militarisation, terrorism and hybrid threats, as assessed by the Normandy Index 2024 [24];

B. whereas Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, continued armament efforts and armaments cooperation with other authoritarian powers far surpassing European stocks and production capacities, and the Russian regime’s choice to undermine the rules-based international order and the security architecture of Europe and to wage war on European countries or seek to destabilise them in order to realise its imperialist vision of the world, poses the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace, as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas Russia currently produces three million artillery shells per year, while the EU’s declared ambition within its first European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) aims for a production capacity of 2 million shells per year by the end of 2025; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties with the autocratic leadership of China, Iran and North Korea to achieve its objectives;

C. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including, inter alia, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyberattacks, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence;

D. whereas Russia illegally invaded and annexed Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine; whereas Ukraine needs to be provided with the necessary military capabilities for as long as it takes for Ukraine to achieve a decisive military victory, end Russia’s illegal war of aggression, restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and deter any future aggression; whereas Ukraine, in defending itself, is also protecting and fighting for European values and core security interests; whereas Russia is still illegally occupying the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia and the Transnistria region of Moldova;

E. whereas, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, China is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods employed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European interests; whereas China is also heavily arming itself militarily, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;

F whereas China has, for many years, promoted an alternative narrative, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

G. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in Eastern Europe, but also in its southern neighbourhood and beyond;

H. whereas the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel, the ongoing war in Gaza and the military operations against the Hezbollah on Lebanese territory have significantly increased the danger of a regional military confrontation in the Middle East, and the risk of escalation in the region is at its highest in decades; whereas the ongoing attacks in the Red Sea launched from the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, with the support of Iran, and the hijackings of commercial vessels by Somali pirates, from the Red Sea to the northwestern Indian Ocean, pose a significant threat to freedom of navigation, maritime security and international trade; whereas additional attacks by various Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria are further increasing the risk of regional escalation; whereas the EU has launched its own military operation, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, to improve the security situation in the area;

I. whereas the eastern neighbourhood and Western Balkan countries face increasingly diverse threats to their security and are being negatively affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the increased assertiveness of regional and global actors, such as China; whereas Kosovo and the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue face, in particular, threats of destabilisation;

J. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, northeast Africa and Libya, poses serious risks to EU security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo, fighting illicit weapons and human trafficking, and training the Libyan coastguard;

K. whereas a part of Cyprus, an EU Member State, still remains under illegal occupation by Türkiye;

L. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while, at the same time, it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration;

M. whereas past underinvestment in defence by EU Member States has led to an investment gap; whereas the Member States have agreed on more, better and smarter defence spending; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies, compared to 9 in 2023, were expected to exceed the NATO guidelines to spend at least 2 % of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence; whereas an increasing number of experts consider defence investments of 3 % of GDP to be a necessary objective in the light of the direct threat that Russia poses to the EU and its Member States;

N. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through a common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, replenish depleted stocks and reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector;

O. whereas in 2024, the Commission issued proposals for establishing a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the upgrade of EU security and defence capabilities;

P. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture, shared threat perception and solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts;

Q. whereas the exception to the EU budget funding principle set out in Article 41(2) TEU applies to expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications only; whereas in all other cases, the VP/HR, together with the Commission, where necessary, should propose that CFSP- or CSDP-related expenditure be financed through the EU budget; whereas Articles 14(1) and 16(1) TEU establish a balance between Parliament and the Council as regards their budgetary functions; whereas the current practice does not reflect this balance;

R. whereas the Draghi report highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence spending and limited access to financing; whereas the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) lending policy excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

S. whereas the report by Mr Niinistö underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating external environment; whereas the report states that many threats are already taking place continuously; whereas it insists that preparedness is needed to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the Union lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security; whereas it underlines the importance of the EU being ready to act in support of a Member State in the event of external armed aggression and of further unlocking the EU’s potential for enhanced civil-military cooperation and dual-use infrastructure and technologies, through optimising the use of scarce resources and strengthening coordination mechanisms for the most severe crisis situations;

T. whereas the integration of artificial intelligence into the security and defence domain, including weapon technologies, impacts military operations by enabling autonomous systems, predictive analytics and enhanced decision-making capabilities to play a significant role in battlefields; whereas this development presents both unprecedented opportunities and profound risks;

U. whereas CSDP has 13 civilian missions, 8 military operations and 1 civilian-military mission under way, with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas reviews by the European External Action Service (EEAS) state that these missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas they also lack rapid decision-making and suffer from a lack of flexibility and adaptation to the specific local needs on the ground; whereas such obstacles limit the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas one of the objectives of the Strategic Compass is to reinforce EU civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, promoting rapid and more flexible decision-making processes and ensuring greater financial solidarity; whereas EU missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, jeopardising their effectiveness in stabilising the countries in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability, often benefiting malicious non-state actors;

V. whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood, including in the Mediterranean, the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership countries, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, by providing services such as military, police, coastguard, border management training and capacity building;

W. whereas the EU assistance to the Libyan coastguard is provided through the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) and EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI; whereas the main goal of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI is to support the implementation of the UN Security Council’s arms embargo on Libya; whereas the Council of the EU extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI until 31 March 2025, including the task of training the Libyan coastguard and navy;

X. whereas the EUFOR Althea operation sets a path towards peace, stabilisation and the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and still plays a pivotal role in ensuring the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region;

Y. whereas on 17 May 2024, the EU ended the mandate of the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM); whereas on 30 June 2024, it ended the mandate of the European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM) and on 30 September 2024, it ended the ground mission of personnel from the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger);

Z. whereas the EU will allocate EUR 1.5 billion for the 2021-2027 period to support conflict prevention, peace and security initiatives at national and regional level in sub-Saharan Africa; whereas additional support is also provided in Africa under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which enables the EU to provide all kinds of equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of EU partners;

AA. whereas the EU and its Member States are facing increasing hybrid attacks on their soil, including FIMI, political infiltration and sabotage, aimed at undermining sound political debate and the trust of EU citizens in democratic institutions, as well as creating divisions in European societies and between nations; whereas in the years to come, hybrid threats will involve increased use of the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyberwarfare and emerging and disruptive technologies, from seabed to space, with the deployment of advanced space-based surveillance and strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced AI, quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems and nanotech- and bio-warfare; whereas Russia and China have demonstrated increased use of hybrid tools to undermine the security and stability of the EU;

AB. whereas the Russian Federation makes use of private military companies (PMCs), such as Africa Corps and the Wagner Group, as part of a hybrid warfare toolbox to maintain plausible deniability while exerting influence in various regions and gaining access to natural resources and critical infrastructure; whereas Africa Corps and the Wagner Group have reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the Central African Republic; whereas the Russian Federation has reinforced anti-European sentiments, especially in countries with a strong European presence or hosting CSDP missions;

AC. whereas on 7 March 2024, Sweden joined NATO as a new member, following Finland which joined in 2023; whereas security and defence cooperation with partners and allies is crucial to the EU’s ambition of becoming an international security provider and constitutes an integral pillar of the CSDP; whereas cooperation with the UN, NATO, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as numerous allies and like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkan countries, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and certain Latin American countries, among others, is crucial to the successful implementation of the CSDP;

The consequences of a changing geopolitical paradigm for European security

1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, new and renewed imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry of great powers, nationalist unilateralism, the spread of terrorism, including jihadist terrorism, and the primary and growing use of force and violence by certain malicious actors to promote their political and economic objectives and interests or to resolve disputes;

2. Believes that the geopolitical theatres in Ukraine, the Middle East and the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific are increasingly interconnected as Russia and China, in particular, are deepening their ties, and pose significant challenges to global peace and security and the rules-based international order that must be addressed by the international community; highlights the increase in attacks and hybrid threats aimed at undermining democratic values and structures, among other things, during elections, as well as the cohesion of and citizens’ adhesion to European values-based societies and the rule of law; believes that this trend amounts to a paradigm shift, as it reverses the logic of building international security on the basis of respect for international law, a rules-based international order and multilateralism;

3. Recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy, development cooperation and arms control and disarmament play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-lasting international peace and security; notes, however, the limited impact of diplomatic efforts aimed at building peace and security in recent times; underscores that sustainable global peace and stability cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but require comprehensive strategies that address the key drivers of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change; stresses that the EU’s Global Gateway initiative and other development programmes should be aligned with security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights;

The EU’s response: a new era of European security and defence

4. Emphasises the absolute need for the EU to recognise and meet the challenges posed by the multiple and constantly evolving threats to its security, and, for this purpose, to engage in improved and new policies and actions that enable the EU and its Member States to collectively and coherently strengthen their defence in Europe, in order to ensure the security of all EU Member States and their citizens, as well as enhancing their ability to act at the global level;

5. Recalls the importance of the EU achieving greater strategic autonomy and defence readiness, as outlined in the Strategic Compass, to ensure that its objectives are aligned with the collective and sovereign interests of its Member States and the broader vision of European security and defence; acknowledges, in this regard, that some Member States have long-standing policies of military neutrality, and respects the right of every Member State to determine its own security policy;

6. Emphasises the importance of continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, and regardless of whether they are NATO members; calls for concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State activating Article 42(7) TEU and the coherence between Article 42(7) TEU and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

7. Notes the overall limited progress and underinvestment in the development of a common European defence capability, industrial capacity and defence readiness since the CSDP’s establishment 25 years ago; notes, with regret, that despite the ambition of framing a common Union defence policy, as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU, concrete steps are still missing;

8. Insists on the need for a truly common approach, policies and joint efforts in the area of defence as well as a paradigm shift in the EU’s CSDP that enable the EU to act decisively and effectively in its neighbourhood and on the global stage, safeguard its values, interests and citizens and promote its strategic objectives; underlines the importance of presenting the EU as a strong and united international actor, capable of acting more strategically and autonomously, defending itself against potential enemy attacks and supporting its partners, and delivering peace, sustainable development and democracy; stresses the utmost importance of the EU and its Member States continuing to work on creating a common strategic culture in the area of security and defence; underlines the need for the Member States to collectively reflect on the future of their deterrence policies and doctrines, as well as their adaptation to the changing security environment in Europe; stresses, further, that in order to develop coherent foreign and defence policies, the EU must strengthen its democratic and independent structures, decision-making processes and operational autonomy;

9. Welcomes the objective of the Commission President to usher in a new era for European defence and security, by building a true European defence union; welcomes the appointment of Andrius Kubilius, the first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space, tasked with working jointly with the VP/HR on a white paper on the future of European defence within the first hundred days of their mandate; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States, acting to define the European defence union, to take priority measures and prepare future actions in order to ensure the defence readiness of the EU, notably with regard to the threat posed by Russia, and to bolster deterrence and enhance operational capabilities as a tool of defence in wartime, while meeting civilian and humanitarian needs, and thus leveraging the concept of ‘dual-use’;

10. Calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate their commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and to assume greater responsibility for their defence and security, including by achieving greater strategic autonomy and bolstering defence and deterrence capabilities, in particular on its eastern borders; stresses that NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the United States remain the cornerstones of European collective defence and that the EU and NATO play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security; stresses the need for EU Member States and the EU as a whole to step up their efforts through increased and targeted joint investments, joint procurement of defence products that are, for the most part, designed and manufactured in the EU, and the development of more joint capabilities, via, inter alia, pooling and sharing, thereby strengthening their armed forces whether for national, NATO or EU operational purposes;

11. Concurs with the ambition of strengthening the European pillar within NATO and stresses that the development of a European defence union should go hand-in-hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation, making full use of the unique capacities of each organisation;

12. Stresses the need for close coordination on deterrence and collaboration between the EU and NATO with regard to developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities and reinforcing industrial production capacities; stresses that a European pillar within NATO notably consists of jointly acquiring strategic enablers or strategic weapons systems, which are often too expensive for a single member state, such as air-to-air refuelling capability, command and control capability, hypersonic weapons, layered air defence, electronic warfare capabilities and air and missile defence systems; believes that the European added value lies in jointly developing or buying these enablers and systems that individual EU Member States severely lack; points out that EU capability development strengthens the European pillar within NATO and contributes accordingly to transatlantic security; calls for the establishment of a regular conference between the EU and NATO in order to ensure close coordination and complementarity between both organisations and their member states in their efforts to strengthen capability development and armaments, while avoiding unnecessary and dysfunctional duplication; calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that EU efforts in defence capability development are coherent with the objectives of the NATO Defence Planning Process; calls, further, for all EPF support for the provision of equipment to be carried out in coordination with NATO to increase efficiency and avoid unnecessary duplication;

Enhancing European security: supporting Ukraine by providing military capabilities in order to end Russia’s war of aggression

13. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression and to provide Ukraine with the necessary military means and in the time it needs to defend itself, repel the Russian Armed Forces and their proxies, end the conflict, protect its sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; welcomes the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine, and the bilateral security agreements concluded by Ukraine with several Member States; underlines that such commitments and agreements are part of a wider internationally coordinated package of security guarantees for Ukraine, including the G7’s launch of a multilateral framework for the negotiation of bilateral security commitments and arrangements for Ukraine; believes that without decisive EU military support, Ukraine will not be able to achieve victory against Russia; strongly reiterates its call for EU Member States to urgently meet their commitments and deliver weapons, fighter aircrafts, drones, air defence, weapon systems and ammunition to Ukraine, including air-launched cruise missiles and surface-to-surface systems, and to significantly increase the relevant quantities; notes the successful delivery of 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine as agreed in March 2023 by the Council, despite the regrettable nine-month delay; acknowledges the notable advancements in the EU’s artillery ammunition production capacity, which contribute to the EU’s preparedness and ability to support Ukraine; stresses the importance of enhancing Ukraine’s anti-drone capabilities as a critical element in countering aerial threats and maintaining operational security; calls for the provision of specialised equipment and expertise to enable Ukrainian forces to swiftly identify, track and respond to hostile drone activities, ensuring robust protection for both military and civilian infrastructure; calls for the Member States to lift all restrictions hindering Ukraine from using Western weapons systems against legitimate military targets within Russia, in accordance with international law; calls on the Council to commit to transferring all confiscated military equipment or ammunition from EU operations and missions within and outside the EU to Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their GDP annually;

14. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support Ukraine in expanding the international coalition in support of its victory plan and peace formula, presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the only viable route to restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis of international law, and thereby holding Russia, its leadership and its accomplices, in particular the Belarusian regime, to account for waging a war of aggression against Ukraine and committing war crimes and the crime of aggression, and ensuring Russian reparations and other payments for the extensive damage caused in Ukraine; emphasises that all initiatives aimed at ending the conflict must have the support of Ukraine and, ultimately, its people;

15. Calls on the VP/HR to mobilise more diplomatic support for Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia, using the full spectrum of the diplomatic toolbox, and encouraging EU Member States to consider imposing secondary sanctions; deplores the fact that some components of Western origin have been found in weapons and weapon systems used by Russia against Ukraine, and calls for the EU and its Member States to implement sanctions more rigorously;

16. Strongly condemns the role that North Korea plays in aiding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine through the training of North Korean troops and their deployment to Russia to directly participate in the war or support the Russian Armed Forces; also condemns, in the strongest possible terms, North Korea’s supply of military equipment and weaponry actively deployed on the battlefield, and its involvement in sanctions evasion; considers North Korea’s actions a blatant violation of international norms and warns of the dangerous and significant risk of escalation that they pose to Europe and the broader international community; underlines, with serious concern, the risk that North Korea is using the battlefield in Ukraine as a platform to study advanced combat tactics, including drone warfare, with the intention of applying these techniques in potential future conflicts; expresses its outrage at the fact that several other rogue states are actively supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including Iran, among others; condemns, in this regard, Iran’s transfer of Shahed drones, ammunition and ballistic missiles to Russia, heightening the risk of potential military intervention by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; firmly believes that the EU and the international community must firmly respond to this with a combination of diplomatic, military and economic measures, and, most importantly, by providing increased support to Ukraine to strengthen its defence against this alliance of rogue states that Russia has built up; underlines the importance of closely liaising with the 2025-2029 US Administration in this regard;

17. Stresses the importance of the EPF, which has been instrumental in supporting the provision of military capabilities and training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while facilitating coordination for all stakeholders through the clearing house mechanism within the EU Military Staff; welcomes the establishment of the dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund under the EPF and calls for an increase in financial resources for military assistance to Ukraine through this instrument, while also providing a medium-term financial perspective; urges the Hungarian Government to immediately cease its efforts to hinder the EU’s actions in support of Ukraine and to lift its veto on the extension of the EU’s sanctions renewal period and the EPF military support to Ukraine, including the agreed reimbursement to EU Member States for the military aid they have delivered; expresses its deep concern that the veto by the Hungarian Government has blocked the opening of a new tranche of expenditure to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces and has prevented the release of EUR 6.6 billion in partial reimbursement to the EU Member States providing military support to Ukraine; urges the Council and the VP/HR to find innovative solutions capable of lifting these blockages and offsetting these funding cuts; encourages the Member States to develop scenario-based and predictable inventories of military capabilities that can be provided under the EPF to ensure that the short-term provision of capabilities is rapidly sourced from Member States and delivered without delay, and that the long-term provision of capabilities that assist Ukraine in restoring deterrence is provided in a foreseeable time frame, in coordination with non-EU countries, when necessary; appreciates that all military assistance and weapon deliveries under the EPF have been in full compliance with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, while ensuring adequate transparency and accountability;

18. Highlights the outcome of the NATO Washington Summit, which reaffirmed that Ukraine’s future is in NATO and that the alliance supports Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements and decide its own future, free from outside interference; concurs that both the EU and NATO have demonstrated political unity in solidarity with and commitment to supporting Ukraine; reiterates its belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO membership; welcomes the allies’ pledge of long-term security assistance for the provision of military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine; recognises the crucial role of NATO, EU-NATO cooperation and NATO allies such as the US and the UK, in coordinating efforts to support Ukraine militarily not only through the supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment, but also intelligence and data;

19. Welcomes the Council’s decision of 21 May 2024, ensuring that the net profits stemming from extraordinary revenues generated by immobilised Russian Central Bank (RCB) assets in the EU, as a result of the implementation of the EU restrictive measures, are used for further military support to Ukraine, as well as its defence industry capacities and reconstruction; also welcomes the agreement reached with the Council, which led to the Council’s decision of 23 October 2024 to adopt a financial assistance package, including an exceptional macro-financial assistance loan of up to EUR 35 billion and the establishment of a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism that will use contributions raised from the profits of immobilised RCB assets and support Ukraine in repaying loans of up to EUR 45 billion from the EU and its G7 partners; recalls, however, that the mobilisation of this financial assistance will be at the expense of the sum earmarked for EU military support via the Ukraine Facility, which will now only benefit from a maximum of 15 % of the profits from the immobilised RCB assets;

20. Welcomes the achievements of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM), which, to date, has trained more than 70 000 Ukrainian soldiers on EU territory, thereby making the EU the biggest provider of military training to Ukraine and significantly contributing to enhancing the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; takes note of the new goal of training 75 000 Ukrainian soldiers by the end of winter 2024/2025; welcomes the Council’s decision of 8 November 2024 to extend the mandate of the mission for two years; calls for EUMAM’s financial, logistical and human resources to be expanded and adapted to the evolving military training needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including in the air and maritime defence domains, as well as to the requested long-term reform efforts in line with the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine; welcomes the Member States’ strong participation in EUMAM, which can be described as a template for future military training missions, advancing deterrence by significantly enhancing interoperability between Member States and partners, and calls on the Member States to demonstrate similar ambition and contributions to other current and future CSDP missions and operations; emphasises that EUMAM should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices to ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; welcomes the launch of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), announced at the NATO Washington Summit, which coordinates the provision of military training and equipment for Ukraine by NATO allies and partners and provides logistical support; stresses the importance of close coordination between EUMAM and NSATU;

21. Commends the work of the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) in implementing, in difficult conditions, its newly reinforced mandate; calls for the EU to ensure that EUAM can operate with the adequate financial, logistical and expert personnel to meet Ukraine’s needs, and welcomes the participation of non-EU countries in this regard; stresses the importance of EUAM and its role as the largest EU footprint on the ground, providing strategic advice to Ukraine’s national and state security authorities; highlights EUAM’s key tasks in combating organised and cross-border crimes, restoring public services in liberated territories and supporting the investigation and prosecution of international crimes, building on EUAM’s presence and expertise;

22. Stresses the importance of cooperation with and the gradual integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and, to this end, calls for Ukraine’s defence to be fully taken into account in the preparation of the Commission’s new legislative initiatives aimed at strengthening the EDTIB; stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration into EU defence policies and programmes during Ukraine’s EU accession process, including by adapting the Ukrainian Armed Forces to EU capability requirements and involving them in cross-border defence industrial and technological cooperation projects and programmes; welcomes, in this respect, the opening of the EU Defence Innovation Office in Ukraine to identify Ukrainian needs and capacities in defence innovation, facilitate joint initiatives and promote cross-border cooperation between EU and Ukrainian defence industry stakeholders, and to be a focal point for Ukrainian partners, as well as a coordination and information hub; welcomes the ongoing initiatives of several EU Member States to deepen cooperation with Ukraine in the field of defence research and industrial production, and calls for further use of Ukraine’s innovative defence potential to develop weapons and ammunition and to accelerate their production in close cooperation with the EU and other Western partners, using available support mechanisms; calls on the military industries of EU Member States to honour their commitment to establish military production on Ukrainian territory;

23. Emphasises the need to strengthen demining capabilities within Ukraine to address the widespread presence of unexploded ordnance and landmines, as well as to demine Ukraine’s seawaters in the Black Sea; advocates the allocation of dedicated resources to support comprehensive demining training, including advanced detection and disposal techniques; notes that enhanced demining capacity will not only facilitate safer military operations, but also support the recovery and safety of civilian areas affected by the war;

Joining forces to increase defence capabilities

24. Welcomes the ambition set out in the EDIS to achieve the defence readiness of the EU and its Member States and to boost the EDTIB; considers the Commission’s proposal to establish a European defence industry programme (EDIP) vital in that regard; supports the objectives of strengthening EU defence industrial preparedness, improving joint defence planning and further facilitating joint procurement by the Member States in line with the priorities set out in the capability development plan (CDP) and the areas for cooperation identified in the coordinated annual review on defence in order to launch European defence projects of common interest, in particular in strategic capability areas, such as air and missile defence, as well as to ensure security of supply and access to critical raw materials and to prevent shortages in defence production; strongly supports the idea of predominantly using EU-level cooperation in the European defence industrial sector, and supports the concrete quantified targets for cooperation presented in the EDIS, which focus in particular on joint procurement, specifically, inviting the Member States to procure at least 40 % of defence equipment in a collaborative manner by 2030, to ensure that, by 2030, the value of intra-EU defence trade represents at least 35 % of the value of the EU defence market, and to procure at least 50 % of their defence investments within the EU by 2030 and 60 % by 2035;

25. Highlights the importance of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) for improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; notes again, with regret, that the Member States continue not to make full use of the PESCO framework and that tangible results within the currently 66 ongoing projects remain limited; further notes with regret the lack of information provided to Parliament about the reasons for the closure of six projects and their possible results; points out that the participating Member States agreed to 20 binding commitments in order to fulfil the EU’s ambition in defence; considers it necessary to conduct a thorough review of PESCO projects with regard to results and prospects, with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects while closing projects that lack sufficient progress; suggests establishing a priority scheme within PESCO in order to effectively address the identified capability gaps and priorities;

26. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for an EDIP; notes with concern the assessment of the European Court of Auditors that the financial envelope of the EDIP is insufficient given its objectives, and therefore reiterates its call to ensure the required funding for defence; stresses that substantial budgetary efforts will be necessary for the EDIP to have a significant effect on military support for Ukraine, the development of a genuine EU defence capability and a competitive EDTIB; welcomes the 2023 revision of the CDP; regrets the limited progress made on capability development since the adoption of the first CDP in 2008; calls on the Member States to significantly increase joint efforts to achieve timely substantial progress by making full and coherent use of EU instruments, including the European Defence Fund (EDF), PESCO and the coordinated annual review on defence, as well as the instruments put forward in the EDIP proposal;

27. Welcomes the joint efforts undertaken thus far to strengthen the EU’s defence readiness through measures reinforcing and supporting the adaptation of the EDTIB, notably through the EDIRPA and ASAP regulations, and calls for their swift implementation; regrets that the financial envelope of EDIRPA remains limited and points out that the role of ASAP in relation to the ambition of supplying Ukraine with one million pieces of ammunition was restrained by the Council’s objection to its regulatory elements;

28. Welcomes the efforts and investments made thus far by companies of the EDTIB to reinforce industrial capacity, including with the support of EU instruments; highlights that further and lasting reinforcement of the EDTIB’s capacity requires first and foremost orders by the Member States, which should be conducted jointly in order to ensure the Union’s defence readiness, improve interoperability between Member States’ armed forces and achieve economies of scale, thus making the most of EU taxpayers’ money; calls, accordingly, on the Member States to intensify joint procurement efforts in line with the capability gaps identified in the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and the capability priorities of the CDP; underlines that effective joint procurement with regard to development projects, especially in the framework of the EDF, requires a joint definition of the military requirements of the respective systems in order to achieve adequate economies of scale; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise to produce such a joint definition in order to ensure military coherence at the industrial level; calls on the Member States to engage in joint procurement with a view to establishing pan-European value chains by distributing production throughout the Union and thereby increasing the economic attractiveness of joint procurement, while building strategic redundancies into production capacities for greater resilience in the event of an armed conflict; further calls on the Member States and the Commission to aim for a further strengthening of joint procurement mechanisms and sufficient coordination by the European Defence Agency;

29. Underlines the need to further support the transition of development projects to marketable solutions and welcomes the provision in the EDIP proposal in that regard; deplores the unnecessary and dysfunctional duplication of efforts with regard to the projects on the future main battle tank and the hypersonic interceptor; voices its concern that such duplications counteract the ambition laid out in the EDIS to procure 60 % from the EDTIB by 2035, as scattered resources will extend the time required to achieve marketable solutions, thus most likely leading to procurement from the United States; regrets, similarly, the mounting delays in essential capability projects, notably the Franco-German project on the Main Ground Combat System and the Franco-German-Spanish project on the Future Combat Air System, which also entail the risk of the future procurement of US solutions; stresses that all possible synergies with the EDF should be used, while avoiding the duplication of efforts;

30. Stresses the need to ensure the coherence of output between respective EU and NATO capability development planning processes; calls for the interoperability of military equipment from EU Member States and NATO Allies to be improved and for industrial cooperation to be fostered by ensuring that future EU legal standards for defence products components and ammunition are based on the NATO standards; stresses that European defence projects of common interest, as defined in the EDIP proposal, should be implemented in close coordination with NATO;

31. Highlights the vital necessity of overcoming the fragmentation of the EU’s defence industrial landscape and of finally achieving the full implementation of the EU’s internal market for defence products, as the current structure leads to unnecessary duplications and the multiplication of inefficiencies in defence investments and their use, and structurally hampers the strengthening of defence readiness; is concerned that the internal market for defence products is still undermined by insufficiently harmonised application of its rules by the Member States and by disproportionate use of the exemption provided for in Article 346 TFEU; endorses the call for the creation of a true single market for defence products and services, as also presented in Mr Niinistö’s report; emphasises the need for a newly updated and effective regulatory framework aimed at reducing barriers for market entry for defence products, enabling EU defence industrial consolidation and permitting EU companies to fully exploit business potential, encouraging innovation and more and smoother cross-border as well as civil and military cooperation, boosting production, increasing security of supply and ensuring smarter and more efficient public investments in the EDTIB; underlines, at the same time, the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different competitors and of avoiding oligopolies in which individual providers can freely determine the prices and availability of defence goods; calls on the Commission to present proposals to complete the EU internal market for defence, based, in particular, on an assessment of EU rules for defence procurement and transfer of defence-related products, and on the identification and analysis of limitations and loopholes in the current legal framework; further calls on the Commission to make suggestions for an interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in line with the current reality of an interdependent security architecture in the EU; calls for the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and sensitive security procurement [25] and Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-EU transfers of defence-related products [26] (the Transfers Directive) to be improved, and where needed, in the light of the EDIS, for proposals for the revision of these directives to be submitted;

32. Stresses the importance of ensuring a balanced effort between strengthening the existing armament industrial capabilities of the Member States in the short- and medium-term and supporting research and development (R&D) for new and innovative military equipment and armament tailored to the present and future needs of the armed forces of the Member States and to EU defence capabilities, such as those required by CSDP missions and operations and the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC); emphasises that priority should be given to keeping and enhancing the technological advantage through targeted strategic projects as a key element in deterrence with regard to our adversaries and competitors; underlines the importance of including all Member States in security and defence strategies, particularly with regard to the development of the defence industry;

33. Stresses the need to develop an effective EU-level armaments policy that includes the establishment of a functioning and effective external trade dimension, is aimed at supporting partners that face threats by aggressive authoritarian regimes, and prevents arms deliveries to undemocratic aggressive regimes in line with the eight existing EU criteria; stresses the need to overcome the very narrow and national interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in this regard;

34. Stresses that cooperation with international partners in the defence sector should be limited to like-minded partners and should not contravene the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States; recalls that dependencies on high-risk suppliers of critical products with digital elements pose a strategic risk that should be addressed at EU level; calls on the Member States’ relevant authorities to reflect on how to reduce these dependencies and undertake an immediate assessment and review of existing Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including power grids, the transport network and information and communication systems, to identify any vulnerabilities that could impact the security and defence of the Union;

35. Welcomes the revision of the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regulation; stresses the need to further strengthen FDI screening procedures by incorporating due diligence standards to identify cases where governments of states hold leverage over investors in EU critical infrastructure, such as European ports, and in undersea cables in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Arctic seas in ways that would contravene the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, as established within the framework of the CFSP pursuant to Title V of the TEU; underlines that this approach should also be applied to candidate countries; believes that additional legislation is needed to effectively protect the security of European ICT supply chain from high-risk vendors and protect against cyber-enabled intellectual property theft; calls for the creation of a European framework aimed at closely regulating and setting minimum standards and conditions for the export of intellectual property and technologies that are critical to the security and defence of the Union, including dual-use goods;

Research and development for defence technology and equipment

36. Supports a significant increase in investments in defence R&D, with a particular emphasis on collaborative initiatives, thereby strengthening the EU’s technological leadership and competitiveness in defence and ensuring a spillover effect in the civilian marketplace; notes, in this regard, that in 2022, the Member States invested approximately EUR 10.7 billion in defence R&D; underlines that technological advancement in critical domains – air, land, maritime, space and cyber – requires stable long-term investment across the Member States to keep pace with rapid global innovation;

37. Stresses the need for EU R&D instruments and funding to be used as effectively as possible in order to address capability gaps and priorities in a timely manner as laid out in the Defence Investment Gap Analysis and the CDP; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to align EDF projects and funding with the EU’s urgent capability needs and prioritise them on this basis, and to focus on the most relevant and promising research activities; further calls on the Commission to initiate a thorough review of the EDF in view of a revised follow-up financial instrument for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF); calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt an approach that incorporates a low energy, carbon and environmental footprint by design when implementing relevant EU funds and to regularly report on progress; recalls that the R&D actions can be directed at solutions to improve efficiency, reduce the carbon footprint and achieve sustainable best practices; welcomes the relevant investment of EUR 133 million provided for in the first annual work programme, but notes that this represents only 11 % of the overall annual EDF budget; recalls the role of NextGenerationEU in climate action and calls on the Member States to use resources from their national recovery plans to invest in the sustainability of their military infrastructure;

Dual-use and emerging and disruptive technologies

38. Stresses the need to develop a more proactive role for the EU in sustaining investment in dual-use technologies, which can be applied in both civilian and military contexts, as a means to enhance the EU’s resilience against hybrid and emerging threats; underlines the need to support, in particular, the testing of prototypes of new products and to focus on new technologies in close cooperation with Ukrainian defence and technological actors; underlines the importance of ensuring the financial viability of companies, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), that invest in such innovation; advocates the promotion of civilian commercialisation of these technologies as a way to expand market opportunities and strengthen the European industrial base, fostering synergies between military and civilian development;

39. Highlights the important role that emerging disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and robotics, play in defence; stresses that the development and harnessing of these technologies in defence require further EU-coordinated investment and research efforts so that the defence equipment suppliers in the EU remain at the forefront of innovation; notes that under the current EDF Regulation, with its long implementation cycles, the Commission fails to provide funding to research projects in a timely manner; calls, therefore, for a more flexible and faster approach for research projects on emerging disruptive technologies, reflecting the increasing pace of developments in that field building on the work of the European Defence Agency’s Hub for European Defence Innovation and drawing on the work of the US Defence Advanced Research Project Agency; further calls for the EU to play a leading role in promoting research into the military applications of artificial intelligence and in establishing governance frameworks for the responsible development and use of this technology;

40. Reiterates its call on the Commission to share with Parliament a detailed analysis of the risks linked to the misuse, by our adversaries, of technologies such as semiconductors, quantum computing, blockchains, space, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies, including genomics, as well as the list of proposed EU actions in these fields, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy; is concerned about the role of Chinese military-linked companies in gathering the genetic data of EU citizens;

Defence SMEs

41. Reiterates that defence-related SMEs from across the Union are the backbone of the European defence industry and supply chains and are key to innovation in these areas, and emphasises the need to provide support to SMEs and start-ups, in particular, in the defence and dual-use sector; stresses that the EDIS and the EDIP must ensure a level playing field for all defence industry actors across the Union and promote cooperation between bigger and smaller companies from all Member States, ensuring that the industry will not be dominated by some large companies from a limited number of Member States; encourages the Member States to provide special opportunities for SMEs in the European defence sector to participate in the bidding process through such measures as creating a pre-approved list of companies to facilitate a faster engagement process, introducing private equity firms that invest in SMEs into the procurement process, assisting SME growth through incubation and capital investment, reducing the complexities of bidding for contracts, and implementing internal measures to reform the amount of time taken to process contract details;

Military mobility

42. Highlights the importance of developing, maintaining and protecting the infrastructure necessary to ensure the rapid and efficient military mobility of our armed forces across the Member States; underlines the need to ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure that allows military mobility and the provision of essential services; recognises that military logistics can contribute to deterrence by signalling the EU’s overall military preparedness;

43. Underlines the urgent need to substantially enhance and invest in military mobility, prioritising investments and removing bottlenecks and missing links; stresses, in this regard, the importance of swiftly implementing projects and regulatory measures in accordance with the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0; supports new strategic investments in civil and military infrastructure, such as ports, airports and highways, which will also allow the smooth transfer of military units and supplies, including rapid reaction forces, heavy equipment, goods and humanitarian aid;

44. Calls on the Commission to develop an integrated approach to military mobility and logistics that ensures that the Council’s pledge to remove all remaining barriers by 2026 is upheld, and that coincides with much higher EU investment in key aspects of military mobility; further calls for the appropriate EU funding for ongoing and necessary military mobility projects to be secured in the next MFF; calls on the Member States to take further action to simplify and harmonise procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines for granting permissions so that the Member States can act faster and increase their efficiency of response, in line with their defence needs and responsibilities, both in the context of CSDP missions and operations and in the context of national and multinational activities; encourages the Member States to use the third-country PESCO agreement on military mobility as a template for partner country participation, with an emphasis on tailoring PESCO projects to CSDP mission needs;

An updated Strategic Compass: promoting a common strategic vision and coherence, and improving EU decision-making on defence issues within the EU institutional framework

Strategic Compass

45. Stresses that geopolitical developments and threats have continued to evolve rapidly since the Strategic Compass was adopted by Member States in March 2022; calls, therefore, for a review of the comprehensive joint threat assessment enshrined in the Strategic Compass, from which priorities for EU action should derive; believes that this review exercise should serve to define common views on Europe-wide capability gaps, which should be addressed via bilateral, multinational or EU-level programmes, funds, projects and instruments, and set out the timeframe within which this should be done; calls, furthermore, for the Commission and the VP/HR to present updated measures for the Strategic Compass following this review exercise, if necessary, and for this to inform the preparation of the white paper on the future of European defence; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with corresponding political willingness and action on behalf of the Member States and the EU institutions; stresses the need for coherence and compatibility between the Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept;

46. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap is fully implemented and is improved within the context of updated measures under the Strategic Compass; calls for the timeframes for reviewing the Roadmap to be reconsidered and, in particular, for the overall objectives to be reviewed much earlier than 2030; calls on the Member States to develop national structures in support of the objectives; urges the VP/HR to propose to the Member States an action programme composed of priority actions presented in the Roadmap that can be implemented in the short term;

Defence governance: consolidating the EU institutional framework and decision-making process in defence and security fields

47. Suggests that the Council review the institutional settings of its decision-making bodies competent for defence and security, and consider setting up a new permanent decision-making body made up of ministers of defence from Member States, without prejudice to the respective distribution of competences within national ministries in this regard;

48. Stresses that effective EU-level cooperation in the field of security and defence and swift, coordinated responses to security challenges require coherence between the different structures of the Council and the Commission; stresses, furthermore, the need to prevent overlaps, guarantee efficient public investments, address critical capabilities gaps and develop coherent security strategies with respect to partners, third countries and various regions of the world, both in policymaking processes and in current and future initiatives; notes the unclear division of portfolios and the potential overlap of competences among commissioners in the field of security and defence following the creation of the position of Commissioner for Defence and Space, and therefore calls on the Commission to clearly delineate the competences of the commissioners in this field; invites the Commission to carry out an internal review of its various structures, including the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) and the European Defence Agency, and of their mandates in order to ensure complementarity and the efficient administration of current and future initiatives under the CSDP; calls on the Member States and the Commission to dedicate further financial and human resources to the EEAS to ensure that it can effectively perform its role as the EU’s diplomatic service in the light of the highly competitive geopolitical context and the increased demands on its limited capacities in recent years;

49. Reaffirms that, in order to become a credible geopolitical player, the EU should reform its process for decision-making on the CFSP/CSDP and underlines, in this regard, that institutional reflections on lifting the requirement for unanimity in this process should be considered; recalls that the EU Treaty framework already allows a number of different institutional forms of cooperation in the field of foreign, security and defence policy and notes with regret that the potential for fast action in this field, as provided for in the ‘passerelle clauses’ of the TEU, has been used only in a very limited manner; calls on the Council to consider all possibilities to strengthen and deepen its process for decision-making on the CFSP/CSDP with a view to realising the untapped potential within the Treaties; reiterates its call for the Council to gradually switch to qualified majority voting for decisions on the CFSP and CSDP, at least in those areas that do not have military implications; suggests, furthermore, that the Council pursue making full use of the ‘passerelle clauses’ and the scope of articles that enhance EU solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises;

50. Strongly reiterates its call to strengthen the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and achieve its full operational readiness, including through the provision of adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; stresses the need to achieve timely results with regard to the MPCC, given the ambition of the Strategic Compass that the MPCC should function as the EU’s preferred command and control structure and be capable of planning and conducting all non-executive military missions and two small-scale or one medium-scale executive operation, as well as live exercises; stresses the need for the MPCC to facilitate synergies between civil and military instruments and calls for joint civil-military headquarters combining civil and military instruments to be set up at European level in the longer term, in order to make full use of the EU’s integrated approach in crisis management right from the strategic planning phase to the actual conduct of the mission or operation; takes the view that the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) should consider how to protect a deployed force against multiple hybrid threats and conduct advanced operations at a far higher level of risk than in current contexts; calls on the Commission, the EEAS, the MPCC, the CPCC, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff to foster a new culture of understanding between civilian and military partners, develop interagency cooperation and ensure the transfer of best practices in mission planning and the associated concepts, including by developing a model for generating and sharing best practices;

51. Reiterates its full support for the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) to achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or the temporary reinforcement of missions; notes that EU Battlegroups, which have never been deployed despite being operational since 2007, will be an integral part of the wider EU RDC framework; welcomes the planning and realisation of live exercises within the framework of the RDC and encourages the continuation of such initiatives;

52. Considers the RDC to be a key element for achieving the EU’s level of ambition and believes that additional troops and force elements should gradually be assigned to it, with reference to the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999; believes that it would make sense to use the White Paper process to launch a discussion about the creation of additional permanent multinational EU military units that could fulfil complementary tasks to the RDC; highlights the need to engage further with NATO on the establishment of the RDC, in line with the principle of the single set of forces;

53. Reiterates its call on the Member States to consider the practical aspects of implementing Article 44 TEU during the operationalisation of the RDC, as well as in other relevant CSDP missions, in order to enable a group of willing and capable Member States to plan and carry out a mission or operation within the EU framework, thereby facilitating the swift activation of the RDC; calls on the Member States to commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps in strategic enablers in a timely manner, in particular those linked to the RDC, such as strategic airlift, secure communications and information systems, medical assets, cyber-defence capabilities and intelligence and reconnaissance; calls on the Commissioner for Defence and Space to consider including, in his proposed European defence projects of common interest, initiatives aimed at providing the necessary strategic enablers that would facilitate CSDP missions and operations and the RDC;

Increasing resources dedicated to the EU common security and defence policy

54. Welcomes the increased budgets and investment in defence by Member States and the increase, albeit modest, in the EU budget for the CSDP in 2024; strongly believes that, in the light of unprecedented security threats, all EU Member States should urgently reach a level of defence spending, as a proportion of their GDP, that is significantly higher than NATO’s current target of 2 %; acknowledges that 23 of the 32 NATO Allies, including 16 countries that are members of both the EU and NATO, were expected to meet NATO’s spending target of devoting 2 % of their GDP to defence expenditure by the end of 2024; points out that this has increased sixfold since 2014, when this target was pledged; notes that the EU’s current budget for security and defence given the current geopolitical upheaval and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, is not equal to the challenges to be met in the short and long term; recommends, in the light of the estimated need for EUR 500 billion of defence investment by 2035 and on the basis of continuous analysis of capability needs and gaps, that the Member States further increase defence investments, in particular for the joint procurement of defence capabilities, and fully supports the targets set under the EDIS in this respect;

55. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to initiate an open discussion on the basis of among other things, the recommendations presented in the reports by Mr Draghi and Mr Niinistö, including increasing the resources allocated to security and defence in the next MFF and exploring all effective funding options to this end, and pooling parts of national defence budgets at EU level in order to generate economies of scale; further calls on the Member States to amend the EPF financing process to ensure adequate and sustainable support for partners and allies, while also aligning with CSDP missions and operations; calls for a strategy to be devised with the aim of creating centres of excellence in different regions of the EU, without duplicating NATO’s work in these fields, in order to promote innovation and the participation of all Member States, ensuring that the capabilities and specialised knowledge of each Member State contribute to a more cohesive and integrated defence industrial base;

56. Recalls that the EU’s objectives of solidarity, cohesion and convergence also apply to defence; stresses that the financial means needed to rebuild and expand our defence capabilities in the decade to come will have a significant impact on the soundness and sustainability of public finances, and therefore requires cooperation and coordination at EU level through a genuine defence economic policy; underlines that increases in defence investment should not compete with other investment priorities, including social cohesion; further recalls that financing orientations should be anchored in a whole-of-society approach to resilience and therefore need to be broadly supported by European citizens, and that this support needs be sustainable in the long term; stresses that the financial burden must therefore be shared fairly, especially by profitable companies that already benefit from public participation or state aids; emphasises, furthermore, that public spending should be complemented by increased private funding; calls on the Commission to reflect upon possible fiscal avenues that would allow a fairer distribution of the financial burden and limit competition disturbances in the EDTIB induced by state aids and market-distorting tendering processes;

57. Calls for the next MFF to genuinely provide the means for a defence union; supports proposals to provide massive EU financial investment in European defence and to stimulate research and technological innovation and dual-use projects in the European defence industry, thereby strengthening its competitiveness and promoting advances that contribute both to security and to sustainable economic growth; underlines that defence investment from the EU budget should only complement, but not replace, financial efforts by the Member States, especially with regard to the ambition of countries that are members of both the EU and NATO to invest 2 % of their GDP in defence; invites the Member States to bring forward the re-assessment of the scope and definition of common costs, to enhance solidarity and stimulate participation in CSDP military missions and operations, and of exercise-related costs, in line with the Strategic Compass;

58. Is concerned about the lack of much-needed private financing for the EDTIB, particularly for SMEs, which may derive from a lack of long-term government contracts or from an overly narrow interpretation of environmental, social and governance criteria; welcomes, therefore, the clarification provided by the European Securities and Market Authority on 14 May 2024 to the effect that only companies involved in weapons banned under international law are automatically excluded from accessing funds; welcomes the proposals made in Mr Niinistö’s report to avoid fragmentation in defence spending, combine relevant funding streams and trigger more private-sector investment; calls on the Commission to assess the recommendations and come up with concrete proposals; highlights the need for the defence industry to get better access to capital markets;

EIB lending policy for the defence sector

59. Stresses the importance of access for the defence sector to the loans provided by the EIB as a catalyst for private investment in the European defence industry; welcomes the further extension of the EIB’s eligibility criteria to dual-use goods and calls on the EIB to take further measures in this regard; stresses that given that the EIB’s objective of promoting the development of the EU and supporting its policies, in particular defence policy and the strengthening of the EDTIB, in line with Article 309 TFEU, the EIB should further review its lending policy and continuously adapt it; calls on the EIB to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its dual-use goods policy and to reform its eligibility list as appropriate so that ammunition and military equipment that go beyond dual-use application are no longer excluded from EIB financing; welcomes the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting dual-use research, development and innovation, security infrastructure and technology projects focused on cybersecurity, New Space, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies;

Contributing more effectively to global security through EU common security and defence policy and strengthening the role of the EU as a security actor

De-escalation, preventing wars and supporting conflict resolution

60. Expresses its very strong concern about and condemnation of China’s support to Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through cooperation with Russia’s military industrial and technological base, the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of China-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention; expresses, in this regard, serious concern about recent reports claiming that China is producing long-range attack drones for use by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and demands that if China continues to support Russia’s armament efforts, this must have serious consequences for the EU’s external policy towards China; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China and expresses serious concern about the renewed commitment by China and Russia to further strengthen their ties; welcomes the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for their support for Russia’s war in Ukraine;

61. Is deeply concerned about China’s increasing investments in military capabilities and the militarisation of its supply chains to bolster its industry while taking advantage of the political and economic opportunities created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; is also deeply concerned about the effect that European dependencies on China have on the credibility of the Member States’ ability to safeguard their national security and of the ability of the EU as a whole to effectively criticise and counter China’s economic coercion, possible further escalation with Taiwan and support to Russia; calls on the Commission and the Member States to seriously implement a policy of ‘de-risking’ with the aim of managing the risks coming from economic and technological engagement with China; calls, in this regard, for the risks posed by Chinese suppliers in EU critical infrastructure to be addressed, and for no EU funds or subsidies to be directed to advancing the position of these suppliers in Europe;

62. Strongly condemns China’s unwarranted military exercises of 14 October 2024 around Taiwan; condemns, furthermore, the increasing number of hostile acts being conducted by China against Taiwan, including cyberattacks, influence campaigns, the entry of Chinese warplanes into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone and the severing of subsea cables; reaffirms its strong commitment to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and underscores that any attempt to unilaterally change it, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction; lauds the restraint and disciplined reaction of the Taiwanese authorities and calls on the Chinese authorities to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-strait tensions; calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues and for stronger cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; stresses that any escalation in the Taiwan Strait would have detrimental effects on Europe’s security and economy and therefore urges the Commission to start developing contingency planning and mitigation measures on the basis of likely escalation scenarios, such as an economic blockade of Taiwan by China;

63. Expresses deep concern at China’s increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea and in the Indo-Pacific region, namely its use of military and economic coercion, hybrid warfare tactics, dangerous manoeuvres conducted by its navy and coast guard against its neighbours and island-building, in order to advance unlawful maritime claims and threaten maritime shipping lanes; points to reports that a Chinese-linked ship cut a Taiwanese undersea cable in early January 2025 and calls for a thorough investigation into the matter; calls, furthermore, for Taiwan and the EU to share information about such incidents; reiterates its strong interest in and support for freedom of navigation and maritime security everywhere, and notably in the South China Sea; calls on the Chinese authorities to put an end to all aggressive and provocative actions, in particular air and maritime operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, that endanger stability in the Indo-Pacific region and thereby undermine international peace and security, the sovereignty of countries in the region, the safety of life at sea and freedom of navigation in full compliance with UNCLOS; applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners, including through Coordinated Maritime Presences in the north-western Indian Ocean, among other areas, in order to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;

64. Remains concerned about the political and economic pressure being exerted by China and Russia in Central Asia and stresses the need to scale up the EU’s presence in the region in response; underlines the EU’s interest in strengthening security cooperation, economic relations and political ties with the countries of Central Asia, including in order to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus;

65. Condemns Iran, in the strongest terms, for its destabilising activities in the Middle East region, including through its proxies, and for its continued support for terrorist groups, which pose a direct threat to regional, European and global security; condemns the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, in particular their intention to sign a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership; expresses, however, full support for and solidarity with Iran’s civil society and democratic forces and calls for increased international efforts to support these groups in their struggle for freedom and human rights; welcomes the EU’s decision to renew sanctions against Iran until July 2025, including by sanctioning Iran’s production of drones and missiles and its supply thereof to Russia and the wider Middle East region; points out that the sanction options that have not yet been exhausted include a much more restrictive approach to technology transfers through exports of products that are not categorised as dual-use;

66. Unequivocally condemns the Iranian Government for aiding and abetting internationally recognised terrorist organisations and networks that have perpetrated or attempted attacks within the EU, posing a direct threat to European security, sovereignty and stability; recalls, in this respect, that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has been involved in planning and carrying out dozens of assassinations and terrorist attacks, including on EU soil, over the past 30 years and, more recently, in attacks against Jewish synagogues and individuals, as well as against Israeli embassies in several Member States; urges the EU and the Member States to enhance intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism measures to prevent any future attacks; reiterates its long-standing call to add the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the EU list of terrorist organisations and supports the initiatives taken by some Member States in this regard;

67. Considers Iran’s nuclear weapons programme to be one of the foremost threats to global security and stresses that if Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear breakout capability, it risks intensifying in belligerence and stepping up its state sponsorship of terrorism and proliferation of missiles and drones;

68. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest terms, of the despicable terrorist attacks perpetrated by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, which contributed to further destabilisation in the Middle East, intensified by aggressions against Israel by Iranian proxies (such as terrorist organisations including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen) and the Iranian regime itself; reiterates that Israel has the right to defend itself, as enshrined in and constrained by international law; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all remaining hostages held by Hamas; calls for all parties to put an immediate end to all hostilities and fully abide by international law, including international humanitarian law; welcomes the recent ceasefire in Gaza and the progress made towards the phased release of hostages; emphasising that this represents a significant step in relieving the immense suffering endured by civilians on both sides over the past months; praises the commitment of mediators, including the United States, Egypt and Qatar, whose efforts were pivotal in achieving this breakthrough; considers that it is crucial that all obligations made under the deal are upheld, ensuring the release of all hostages, establishing a lasting cessation of violence and allowing unrestrained access of humanitarian and medical assistance to the Gaza Strip; calls for all parties to fully commit to their obligations and to prioritise the protection of civilians; urges all European and international actors to actively oversee the implementation of the ceasefire and hold accountable those who fail to comply with it;

69. Expresses its deep concern regarding the military escalation in the Middle East, which contributes to further destabilisation in the region; deplores the unacceptable number of civilian casualties, the forced displacement caused by the escalating violence and the persistent use of military force; expresses serious concern, furthermore, about the ongoing military action by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank; condemns the Israeli Defence Forces firing on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is a grave violation of international law; reaffirms the essential stabilising role played by UNIFIL, to which 16 Member States contribute, in southern Lebanon; calls for immediate ceasefires in both Gaza and Lebanon, an end to the hostilities, the full and symmetrical implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006) and the protection of the civilian populations; stresses the need for the EU and other international actors to assume greater responsibility and assist governments and civil society organisations in the Middle East with reaching durable and sustainable peace, in particular by continuing to support a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, as well as by countering terrorism and radicalisation in the region; underscores that the evolution of conflicts in the region has repercussions on neighbouring regions and on Europe and poses security challenges for the EU with regard to the future of deterrence, humanitarian law and crisis management;

70. Urges the Council and the Member States to designate Hezbollah, in its entirety, as a terrorist organisation and to push for its full disarmament in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006); highlights recent decisions taken by several states, including the United States and Canada, to list Samidoun as a terrorist organisation acting as proxy of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; stresses that Samidoun was banned in Germany in 2023 and calls on other EU Member States to take similar measures by banning the organisation within their territory;

71. Notes that the Jordan-Syria border is being used as a crossing point for arms and drug trafficking; emphasises the need for the EU to further support Jordan, which has been weakened by the current crisis in the Middle East, and calls for the increased use of the EPF protect the Jordan-Syria border;

72. Recognises that Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance for the EU; notes that Türkiye is increasingly present in areas where the EU has key security interests and CSDP missions and operations, and notes with regrets the role that Türkiye plays in destabilising certain areas of concern for the EU and in its neighbourhoods; points out Türkiye’s illegal activities against the EU’s interests in the eastern Mediterranean, which violate international law, including UNCLOS; reiterates its condemnation of the signature of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are interconnected and are clear violations of international law, the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the sovereign rights of EU Member States; deplores the fact that Türkiye undermines the effectiveness of EU sanctions against Russia and reiterates its call on Türkiye to fully align with these; calls on Türkiye to refrain from undermining EU CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation regarding the full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement with respect to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus;

73. Deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues to retain the threat of casus belli against Greece and to illegally occupy the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus; strongly condemns Türkiye’s illegal activities in Cyprus, including its violation of the status of the buffer zone, its increasing militarisation of the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus and its efforts to upgrade the secessionist entity in the occupied area of Cyprus in violation of international law, noting that these activities that are not conducive to the resumption of the UN-led negotiations; condemns Türkiye’s continuous violations of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992), which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN by supporting the opening of the town of Varosha to the public; strongly urges Türkiye, once more, to reverse its illegal and unilateral actions in Varosha; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus;

74. Calls urgently for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and reaffirms its unconditional support for Cyprus in resolving the issue; calls on Türkiye to accept a fair, comprehensive and viable solution to this issue;

75. Calls for the EU to play a significant role in the Mediterranean and to become a security actor with the ability to guarantee the stability of the region and respect for international law and UNCLOS; welcomes, in this regard, the appointment of a Commissioner for the Mediterranean, working under the guidance and political steering of the VP/HR; stresses the need for the VP/HR, in cooperation with the Commissioner for the Mediterranean where necessary and in consultation with Member States, to develop a coherent security strategy with regard to the Mediterranean region and its neighbouring countries, including in North Africa, the Levant and the Sahel; calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, the illicit trade in weapons and human trafficking;

76. Notes with concern the violations of migrants’ fundamental rights in Libya, as highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution 2755(2024); stresses the need to examine the role of CSDP missions and operations – EUBAM Libya and EUNAVFOR IRINI – in effectively fighting against the smuggling and trafficking of human beings, and their activities in relation to the need to protect migrants’ fundamental rights;

77. Notes that the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s criminal regime in Syria, which has been supported by the Kremlin since 2015, constitutes a significant political defeat for Vladimir Putin and threatens Russia’s strategic and military presence in Syria; recalls that since 2015, the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases have served as key points for Russian power projection in the Middle East and Africa; notes further that the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases were vital for the supply and transport of heavy weaponry and equipment to Russia’s private military companies, such as the Wagner Group and its operations in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan; stresses that losing military bases in Syria could weaken Russia’s operational capacity and influence in Africa; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the situation in Syria, make ties with the new Syrian regime conditional on Russia’s full withdrawal from the country and prevent Russia from establishing new military bases elsewhere in the region; recognises, in this regard, the EU’s significant leverage with regard to Syria in terms of political recognition, the easing of sanctions, trade agreements, and financial support for reconstruction, positioning the EU as an alternative to Türkiye in shaping Syria’s future;

78. Expresses its growing concern about and condemns the continuing attempts by Russia to destabilise the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood through the use of FIMI, political assassinations, threats and territorial occupations in a bid to negatively impact their European aspirations and stability; underlines the need to reinforce the EU’s capacities to defend and develop democratic and value-based societies in the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood;

79. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders and the efforts to reach a peaceful, lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict; strongly condemns the constant and coordinated attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s European course through hybrid attacks, the weaponisation of energy supplies, disinformation, bomb threats and staged protests, as well as the threat or use of violence; notes with concern that the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova has reported an unprecedented level of intensity in Russia’s actions aimed at anchoring Moldova within its sphere of influence; underlines that this hybrid threat is targeted at democratic processes and undermines European integration, including by amplifying radical separatist tendencies in the south of the country, particularly in Gagauzia, using propaganda, manipulating the information space, interfering in the electoral process and conducting subversive operations;

80. Reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to ensure the full destruction of all ammunition and equipment in the Cobasna depot under international oversight and to support a peaceful resolution to the Transnistrian conflict, in line with the principles of international law; calls for enhanced EU support for Moldova in combating FIMI, hybrid threats and cyberattacks; urges the Member States to increase funding for the EPF to strengthen the defence capabilities of Moldova;

81. Recognises that Georgia was the first target, in 2008, of Russia’s full-scale military aggression and its attempts to forcefully redraw the borders of a sovereign state in Europe; stresses that since 2008, Russia has persisted in its illegal occupation of and effective control over the occupied regions of Georgia; underlines that Russia’s military presence and significant military build-up in the occupied regions, its unlawful activities, its continued borderisation activities along the administrative boundary lines and its human rights abuses in Georgia pose a serious risk to the country’s security and to the broader security framework of Europe; reiterates its calls on Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the territory of Georgia;

82. Strongly condemns Russia’s shooting down of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 on 25 December 2024, killing 38 of the 67 passengers on board; underlines that this highlights once more the brutal and belligerent nature of the Russian regime;

83. Urges the EU to continue its active engagement and take decisive steps, through its important instruments, to ensure that Russia fulfils its obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, in particular its obligations to withdraw all its military forces from the occupied regions of Georgia, to allow the deployment of international security mechanisms inside both Georgian regions and the EU Monitoring Mission’s unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia, and to engage constructively in the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms; calls on the EEAS to prepare a comprehensive report on violations of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, to identify and communicate clearly the provisions that have still not been fulfilled by Russia and to submit recommendations;

84. Condemns Azerbaijan for its continued efforts to undermine the possibility of regional peace and its continued threats against Armenia; calls for the EU and its Member States to suspend any security, technical or financial assistance provided to Azerbaijan, including through various EU instruments, that might contribute to the increase of Azerbaijan’s offensive capabilities or endanger the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia;

85. Recalls that a year has passed since Azerbaijan’s seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the forced displacement of more than 140 000 Armenians from the region; condemns the military support and the supply of arms provided by non-EU countries to Azerbaijan; points out that Azerbaijan has been guilty of serious breaches of human rights in Nagorno-Karabakh; condemns the destruction of the Armenian cultural heritage in the region by Azerbaijan; calls on the Council to consider imposing targeted and individual sanctions against those responsible for ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Nagorno-Karabakh;

86. Welcomes the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the EPF in support of Armenian armed forces, as this would strengthen the resilience of Armenia in the context of ensuring security, independence and sovereignty; calls for the further reinforcement of the cooperation between Armenia and the EU in the field of security and defence, in particular in the area of mine clearance, including through the use of the EPF, taking into account Armenia’s reconsideration of its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the other Member States to consider similar initiatives;

87. Emphasises that the EU should urgently review its regional strategy for the Sahel, following the various coups in the region; strongly deplores the forced departure of French troops and UN peacekeeping forces from the region and condemns the presence instead of private military companies (PMCs) and state-sponsored proxies such as the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group); underscores that that these PMCs have played a destabilising role in the Sahel and have supported various repressive regimes in an attempt to further Russia’s influence in Africa; points out the supply of weapons by Russia to the Sahel’s military regimes; further notes that other actors, such as Türkiye, are increasingly present in the region; urges the EU Special Representative for the Sahel and the Member States to maintain diplomatic engagement and continue supporting civil society and spending on development and humanitarian aid;

88. Expresses its concern about the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess its renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy adopted on 20 February 2023; recognises the importance of a genuine commitment by the EU to peace in the region; notes with concern the role that Rwanda has played in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and calls on the EU to impose conditions on any military support to Rwanda; condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by M23 rebels; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of thousands of displaced persons in the area; urges the VP/HR to engage in clear actions in line with the EU Great Lakes Strategy in order to restore stability and to cooperate with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to protect civilians in eastern DRC; urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; urges the VP/HR and the Member States to urgently review military assistance to the Rwandan armed forces through the European Peace Facility and consider suspending it in the event that the Rwandan Government does not comply with urgent calls for its withdrawal from DRC by the UN and the EU;

89. Is concerned about the limited role played by the EU in the Horn of Africa, while the involvement of other foreign actors is growing; calls for a review of the EU strategy in the region, with a view to achieving the EU’s goals of promoting peace, stability, and inclusive and sustainable economic development in the region; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to reflect on how to best use CSDP missions and operations deployed in the region to further these goals and enhance the EU’s activities;

90. Recognises that the Arctic region has significant strategic and geopolitical importance owing to its emerging maritime routes, wealth of natural resources and opportunities for economic development unlocked by global warming, while being increasingly contested; is alarmed by the intensifying militarisation and resource competition driven by Russian and Chinese activities in the region;

91. Underlines the importance of preserving security, stability and cooperation in the Arctic; stresses that the region must remain free from military tensions and natural resource exploitation and that the rights of indigenous peoples must be respected; reiterates the need to include the Union’s Arctic policy in the CSDP and to strengthen deterrence and defence capabilities in close coordination with NATO; emphasises that EU-NATO cooperation is essential to counterbalance the expanding influence of Russia and China in the region; calls for issues of interest to the Arctic to be addressed regularly within the Political and Security Committee and Council meetings;

Gender dimension and women’s role in peace and security

92. Emphasises the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflicts on women and girls, especially in terms of conflict-related sexual violence; highlights the imperative need to ensure the provision and accessibility of the appropriate healthcare in armed conflicts, including sexual and reproductive health and rights; calls on the EU and Member States to ensure that armed conflicts are considered through a gender lens;

93. Recalls that mainstreaming and operationalising gender perspectives in external relations and implementing the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions are long-standing priorities for the EU; recalls in this regard the importance of strengthening women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, humanitarian action and post-conflict reconstruction;

94. Stresses that the integration of a gender perspective into all external and internal CSDP activities helps to improve the CSDP’s operational effectiveness and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of gender equality worldwide; insists therefore on the importance of delivering on all the commitments made by the EU, including those in the EU’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) III (2020-2024) and in the Strategic Compass; also insists that the update of the Strategic Compass propose further measures to ensure gender equality and the full and meaningful participation of women in the CSDP, especially in military missions;

95. Welcomes the inclusion of gender and human rights perspectives and the appointment of gender advisers in all CSDP missions and operations and the establishment of a network of gender focal points; calls for the new Civilian CSDP Compact to be used to strive for the full participation of women in civilian CSDP missions;

CSDP missions and operations

96. Underlines the importance of clear and achievable goals, openness to the host country’s perspectives and ownership, as well as of equipment and the necessary financial, logistical and human resources for each of the CSDP missions and operations; also underlines the deterioration of the security environment where many CSDP missions are present; calls for improvements to the governance of evaluation and control of CSDP missions and operations; reiterates its call for comprehensive assessments of CSDP missions and operations, in particular of the realism of their mandates in relation to the resources and equipment allocated, their management, methods of recruiting their staff and of matching profiles to the skills required, transparency on calls for tender, activities and results obtained, lessons learned on good practices and difficulties encountered; stresses the particular need for all missions and operations to have sunset provisions to allow a sustainable termination if necessary; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to continue to effectively design CSDP missions and operations, including robust, result-oriented, flexible and modular mandates, in order to adapt to the changing security context and needs of host countries, and to maintain a strong partnership with host governments, civil society and local populations, ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the missions and operations to achieve their goals over the long term; calls for the Member States to use the new Civilian CSDP Compact to strengthen their strategic vision of civilian crisis management by clarifying the role, effectiveness and added value of civilian CSDP, and by defining a shared level of ambition for civilian crisis management; also calls for the synergies and complementarities between the civilian and military dimensions of the CSDP to be built on; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to develop, together with the Member States, a structured and regular civilian Capability Development Process to assess the availabilities of Member States’ capability needs, develop requirements, conduct a gap analysis and periodically review progress; believes in the necessity of establishing a solid policy on the equipment and services needed by partner countries where civilian CSDP missions take place;

97. Notes that the CFSP budget for civilian CSDP missions has only marginally increased between the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020 and the MFF 2021-2027, while at the same time the number of missions and their tasks and costs have increased; calls for a substantive increase in funding for the CFSP budget, while at the same time ensuring the efficient use of the funds allocated to CSDP civilian missions, in order to make sure that they respond effectively to crisis situations and unforeseen events; calls for the establishment of a dedicated budget line or ‘civilian support facility’, to provide partner countries with the necessary equipment and services to enhance their civilian capabilities;

98. Reiterates its call on the EEAS to take concrete action to support CSDP missions and operations defending against cyber and hybrid attacks and countering FIMI in countries where CSDP missions and operations are deployed, in particular in the Western Balkans and in the Eastern Partnership countries; calls on the Commission to take into account CSDP missions and operations when formulating its European Democracy Shield in order to pre-empt threats aiming to discredit the EU’s external actions and safeguard EU personnel deployed abroad; insists on the need to build on lessons learned across the different CSDP missions and operations, as well as cooperating with Member States’ missions and operations so as to better communicate and identify threats in order to pre-empt or respond to them in a timely manner when necessary; calls for an improved response capability, strategic communication and enhanced outreach in the areas of deployment – using the relevant local languages – in order to better inform the local population of the rationales, benefits and roles of the CSDP missions and operations in their respective regions, informing them as well of the consequences of relying on the support of other actors aiming at destabilising them, in particular Russia and China; also calls on the Commission and the EEAS to increase the visibility of CSDP missions and operations in the Eastern Partnership countries by including them in their political messaging, making documents publicly accessible and engaging with the international press; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to adjust the advisory mandates of CSDP missions and operations to include specialised training on combating hybrid warfare activities, cyber warfare and open source intelligence (OSINT) analysis; calls on the EEAS to increase its cooperation and coordination with other missions and operations by like-minded partners and organisations, including United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in countering FIMI operations in the field;

99. Stresses that corruption in theatres of operations can adversely impact CSDP missions and operations by exposing them to reputational damage, wasting resources, and exacerbating poor governance and maladministration, as well as increasing local levels of bribery, fraud, extortion, and nepotism; calls for strategies to be implemented to prevent and combat corruption, developing anti-corruption expertise and knowledge and stepping up efforts to mitigate corruption risks in current and future CSDP missions and operations;

100. Calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a cultural heritage protection component in its CSDP missions and operations in order to provide assistance and education to local partners on addressing security challenges relating to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; notes that the inclusion of cultural heritage protection and intercultural dialogue in mission mandates would be beneficial to the process of conflict resolution and reconciliation;

101. Highlights the need to extend the mandates of CSDP missions and operations deployed in neighbouring eastern European countries, where heightened security threats justify a reinforced EU presence; encourages all Member States to deploy personnel to those missions and operations; also encourages greater third country participation in these missions, particularly from third countries that have successfully hosted completed CSDP missions; calls on the Member States to examine how new CSDP missions and operations can be established in EU candidate countries, if necessary, and in close cooperation with their national authorities; calls on the EEAS to ensure that the CSDP missions’ support to security sector reforms includes training for ministerial officials; calls for the EEAS and the European Security and Defence College to help develop the expertise of civil and defence staff supporting and deployed in CSDP missions and operations; recognises the opportunity for third countries hosting CSDP missions and operations to help the EU achieve CSDP objectives and demonstrate their capacity to provide security to others via their participation in out-of-area CSDP missions and operations;

102. Welcomes the UN Security Council’s extension of the mandate of the European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) beyond 2025, as an established and proven peacekeeping mission that has significantly contributed to the stability of both the country and the region; further welcomes the mission’s positive response to the request from the BiH Ministry of Security’s Civil Protection Agency, offering assistance to national authorities on addressing the impact of the recent flooding; takes the view that this extension reflects the shared commitment across the political spectrum in BiH to uphold peace and security in cooperation with the EU; welcomes the continued presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo and commends the role it plays in strengthening security and stability; calls on all parties involved to adhere to the requirements of international law, restrain and prevent any disruptive actions from destabilising the northern region of Kosovo; urges them to engage in the structured dialogue mediated by the EU; condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack by Serbian paramilitaries against Kosovo’s police and the hideous terrorist attack on critical infrastructure near Zubin Potok in northern Kosovo; stresses that the perpetrators of these deplorable terrorist attacks must be held accountable and face justice without delay; calls for the strengthening of both EUFOR’s Operation Althea and KFOR with additional resources;

103. Commends the establishment and operations of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), which has contributed to strengthening the country’s crisis management structures and to enhancing its resilience to cyber and hybrid threats, and countering FIMI; calls for the mission’s mandate to be extended beyond May 2025, the adequacy of its means, methods and resources in relation to the mission’s objectives to be assessed and its resources adapted in the light of the evaluation’s conclusions in order to enhance its effectiveness; recognises the important role that the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) plays in helping to re-open rail freight through Transnistria and in thwarting multiple smuggling operations; encourages EUBAM to expand its collaboration with multiple international organisations including Europol, FRONTEX and the OSCE via its Arms Working Group, ORIO II Joint Operations and ‘EU 4 Border Security’ initiatives;

104. Welcomes the role of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to Georgia in monitoring the situation on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line; condemns the temporary detention of EUMM officers by security actors while conducting a routine patrol along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL); expresses its profound concern about any actions that obstruct EUMM actions and seek to undermine efforts to build confidence; urges the Council and the EEAS to monitor the situation closely, promote the unimpeded access of the EUMM to Georgia’s territories occupied by Russia according to the mission’s mandate, support the extension of its mandate and strengthen its capacities in order to properly address the security and humanitarian needs of the local population in conflict-affected areas;

105. Welcomes and strongly supports the activities of the civilian European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) under the CSDP, which is helping to increase security in the region by substantially decreasing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas, building confidence and reducing the level of risks for the population living in these areas; welcomes Armenia’s assistance to the activities of the EUMA on its territory; commends the Council for the decision to boost the mission’s capacity and increase the number of observers deployed as well as to extend its deployment timeframe, and calls for further expansion and a stronger presence in the region in order to create an environment conducive to EU-supported normalisation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan; urges Azerbaijan to allow EU observers on its side of the border as well; condemns Azerbaijani threats and Russia’s negative narrative against the EUMA;

106. Considers that the two EU civilian CSDP missions – European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) can play an essential role in supporting Palestinian state-building efforts; supports a stronger role for the EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah, in line with the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024 and based on the principle of the two-state solution and the viability of a future Palestinian state, so that they can participate in the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip, improve the efficiency of the Palestinian authority in the West Bank, and prepare for the authority’s return to the Gaza Strip; stresses in particular the need to create the necessary conditions for the full reactivation of EUBAM Rafah to allow it act as a neutral third party at the Rafah crossing point, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority as well as the Israeli and Egyptian authorities; expects the reinforcement of the scope and mandates of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah on the ground to be included as key priorities of the forthcoming EU-Middle East Strategy; welcomes the Council decision to extend the mandates of the two missions until 30 June 2025;

107. Takes note that the mandates of the EUTM Mali, EUMPM in Niger and of the ground mission of personnel from EUCAP Sahel Niger ended in 2024, while the EU Capacity Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and the EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (EU RACC) for the Sahel are still ongoing; acknowledges that the various international missions have not been able to achieve their goal of stabilising the region and its fragile democracies or ensuring peace in the region; is concerned by the failure of the EU’s Sahel strategy in terms of security and defence; expresses deep concern about the worsening security situation, the continuous failure of states and the resurgence of terrorism in the Sahel; takes note of the creation of a new type of hybrid civilian-military EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea (EUSDI Gulf of Guinea), established in August 2023, aiming to empower the security and defence forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin to improve the stability and resilience of their northern border areas; calls on the EEAS and the Member States to closely examine the mandate of all CSDP missions in Africa, with the aim of providing achievable goals and milestones for each mission given the current political context, as well as exploring whether these missions could be amended to more effectively serve a new revised multi-dimensional EU strategy for Africa and the Sahel, as part of its integrated approach; calls in this regard, for a review, as a matter of priority, of the mandate and resources of the EUCAP Sahel Mali and EU RACC for the Sahel, proposing changes to them and consider their termination if necessary;

108. Welcomes the creation in February 2024 of EUNAVFOR ASPIDES as an EU military operation in response to the Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, in order to contribute to the protection of freedom of navigation and the safeguarding of maritime security, especially for merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; calls on the Member States to increase the capabilities of the EUNAVFOR ASPIDES operation and to consider merging it with the EU ATALANTA military operation, as originally envisaged, to improve the efficiency of both operations;

Improving the EU’s ability to address security challenges

Intelligence capacity

109. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to combat foreign interference, improve situational awareness and be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the CSDP, particularly in the area of crisis management;

110. Underlines the need for the EU to make full use of the necessary first-hand information on global issues occurring outside its borders in the light of increasing geopolitical challenges and crises worldwide; commends the efforts of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) and the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate, cooperating in the framework of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), as well as the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen), to produce all-source intelligence assessments; calls on the EU Member States to reinforce the EU INTCEN, the SIAC, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU SatCen by enhancing its staff and financial resources, as well as capabilities and information security; urges these centres, provided they have adequate information security provisions, to draw lessons from NATO’s role in facilitating public-private sharing of cyber threat intelligence, and apply this to their field, thereby offering added value to the Member States;

111. Calls on the Member States to utilise the EU INTCEN as an effective intelligence-sharing body in order to share intelligence in a secure fashion, formulate a common strategic and security culture and provide strategic information; stresses that on the basis of the intelligence gathered, the EU INTCEN should be further involved in the threat assessments carried out by the EU institutions, as well as attribution of digital operations and sanctions evasions; reiterates its call to promote the establishment of a system for the regular and continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS and between EU Member States on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; underlines the importance of secure communications and a high level of information security for reliable intelligence and calls for efforts to enhance and streamline security rules and regulations to be pursued in this respect to better protect sensitive information, infrastructure and communication systems from foreign interference and attacks;

112. Calls for regular joint threat assessments with input from Member States’ intelligence services in order to inform CSDP decision-making bodies and reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU Military Staff (EUMS), the MPCC and the CPCC;

Defence against hybrid attacks and disinformation

113. Expresses serious concern about the growing security challenges posed by cyber and hybrid attacks, as well as FIMI, all of which are aimed, inter alia, at undermining the stability of the EU’s democratic societies, in particular in EU territories far from their mainland, the alliances of EU Member States, and fostering polarisation, especially in the run-up to elections; stresses that Member States, particularly those on the EU’s eastern external border, are vulnerable to such hostile influence from Russia and Belarus; welcomes the established institutional cooperation at administrative level between the Commission, the EEAS and Parliament during the past European election campaign to prevent a massive use of FIMI by malicious third state and non-state actors; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and Parliament’s administration to strengthen their capabilities to increase resilience against hybrid attacks and FIMI; points in this regard to the recent decision by the Romanian constitutional court to annul the first round of the presidential elections following reports of massive hybrid attacks by Russia, especially via social media platforms; further calls on the administrations of the EEAS and Parliament to closely cooperate with the private sector, civil society as well as the academic and scientific community in countering malign influence campaigns and hybrid threats, including the weaponisation of new technologies;

114. Supports the pledged establishment of a ‘European Democracy Shield’ and reiterates its call on the Member States, the Commission and the EEAS to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting FIMI threats against the EU as a whole, to detect, track and request the removal of deceptive online content, to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI; considers that this structure would serve as a reference point and specialised knowledge hub to facilitate and foster operational exchange between Member States’ authorities and the EU institutions; stresses that the structure should clarify and enhance the role of the EEAS Strategic Communications division and its task forces as the strategic body of the EU’s diplomatic service and prevent the overlap of activities; highlights its own decision to establish a special committee on the EU Democracy Shield in the European Parliament and deems it an important way to consolidate European efforts in this field;

115. Highlights the importance of intensifying efforts to combat disinformation promoted by foreign actors aiming to undermine the credibility of the EU, particularly in EU candidate or neighbouring countries and regions where CSDP missions and operations are under way; underlines that the coordination between the EEAS and relevant EU agencies, including the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and relevant authorities at Member State level, must be significantly increased in order to develop coherent and efficient strategies against FIMI; underlines in this regard the need for strategic and preventive communication, and invites all EU institutions to work hand in hand with the EEAS, to strengthen the visibility, the positive perception and legitimacy of the EU’s external actions;

116. Considers that hybrid threats in the years ahead will see the combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvre, mass cyberwarfare, and emerging and disruptive technologies from the seabed to space with the deployment of advanced air and space surveillance and strike systems, all of which will possibly be enabled by AI, quantum computing, ever smarter drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, nanotechnologies and biological warfare; recognises in particular the increasing role of AI in hybrid warfare and its potential use in undermining democratic institutions, spreading disinformation, disrupting critical infrastructure, as well as influencing public opinion through automated and data-driven operations;

117. Calls for strategic, proactive and coordinated EU-level measures to counter hybrid threats and to strengthen the security and integrity of critical infrastructure in the EU, de-risking and promoting the EU’s technological edge in critical sectors, including measures to restrict or exclude high-risk suppliers; stresses in this regard the importance of the PESCO project that aims to support the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC) to facilitate the planning and conduct of EU missions and operations with cyber- and information-domain capabilities as well as enhancing the general resilience of the EU in this area; calls, therefore, for its permanent integration in CSDP;

118. Condemns the continued malicious actions by Russia and Belarus aimed at destabilising the EU by pushing migrants to forcibly enter EU countries, constituting a hybrid attack; calls on the EU to review and update its policies concerning the strengthening of its external borders in order to bolster the security of the Union as a whole;

Cybersecurity

119. Welcomes the Cyber Solidarity Act [27] and its importance to Member States’ cyber defence capabilities; supports the promotion of platforms for information sharing and analysis and calls for this to be expanded to include the provision of threat or vulnerability intelligence with cross-border security operations centres (SOCs); calls for a clearer funding plan that specifies the amount of funds that will be used to implement the act;

120. Is concerned by the delay by many Member States in implementing the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive)[28] and calls for swift implementation to secure European critical infrastructure; calls on the VP/HR to better synchronise the cyber, hybrid and FIMI sanction toolboxes and use them more actively while also exploring how sectoral sanctions may be implemented;

Space

121. Welcomes the findings and recommendations in Mr Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness, which encourages Member States to update governance and investment rules in the space domain, in particular for defence-related areas; calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest appropriately in this domain in the context of the next MFF and also by considering any other financing instrument; highlights in particular the need to further develop the European Space Programme considering the strong connections between the space and the defence and security sectors when planning the new MFF; underlines the importance of improving cooperation between the Commission and the European Space Agency to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure more efficient use of resources; calls for fostering transatlantic cooperation and synergies with NATO to ensure effective coordination in the development of space and defence capabilities;

122. Stresses that the current pillars of the EU’s space programme – the Galileo global satellite navigation programme and the Copernicus Earth observation programme – have clear dual-use potential in developing space applications and services; stresses the importance of establishing, as a third pillar of the EU’s space programme, the IRIS2 satellite constellation to provide secure communication services to the EU and its Member States as well as broadband connectivity for European citizens, private companies and governmental authorities; recommends that Taiwan and Ukraine be granted access to the IRIS2 Satellite Constellation; highlights that, beyond satellite communications, sectors such as positioning, navigation, timing, as well as earth observation, are essential in strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses that the development of these capabilities directly contributes to an effective crisis response and the protection of critical infrastructure; calls therefore for new EU space programmes to be considered, enabling the EU to strengthen its strategic autonomy and its status as a global space power;

123. Recognises the inadequacy of launch vehicle capabilities and satellite communications within the EU; underlines the strategic importance of advancing and enhancing these capabilities to enable the EU to effectively support Member States and CSDP missions and operations, while maintaining a resilient and autonomous posture; stresses that the development of EU-led solutions in this domain is essential for the protection of critical infrastructure and to ensure a secure and competitive presence in the space sector;

124. Calls on the Member States to address the growing threat of the weaponisation of space, in particular reports of Russia’s progress on space-based nuclear weapons technology, which would constitute a blatant violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty;

Maritime domain

125. Stresses that, given the growing geopolitical maritime tensions, the EU must step up its activities at sea, by leading in maritime domain awareness, protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively in order to prevent illegal activities, and contributing to ensuring freedom of navigation, the safety of maritime lines of communication and of vessels and crews, and to countering illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing;

126. Underlines the commitment to strengthen the EU’s role as a guarantor of international maritime security; stresses in this regard the importance of the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, enhancing the role of the EU as a global maritime security provider and its visibility in key maritime regions, highlights the activities of CMPs in the Gulf of Guinea and in the northwestern Indian Ocean; calls on the Member States to engage actively with those initiatives and to build up their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the global maritime sector; recommends that CMPs be expanded to other key maritime areas across the globe;

127. Expresses its serious concerns about Russia’s and China’s surveillance and sabotage of critical maritime infrastructure, such as seabed communication cables and offshore energy facilities; expresses in particular its strong concern about the damage to two subsea communications cables, one linking Finland to Germany and the other connecting Sweden to Lithuania, within less than 24 hours on 17 and 18 November 2024, and about the damage by a tanker belonging to the Russian shadow fleet of EstLink2, linking Estonia and Finland, on 25 December 2024; calls on the EU to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems and regional coastguard cooperation to ensure the prevention and rapid detection of attacks against such infrastructure; welcomes, in that regard, the launch of the operation ‘Baltic Sentry’ by NATO, with participation of several Member States, to improve the security of critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea; calls on Member States to fully abide by the commitments of the New York declaration on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables, including the procuring of submarine cable equipment only from companies in allied countries; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to the research and development of cutting-edge underwater assets and defence equipment to protect islands against possible landings and attacks by forces from third countries;

Arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament

128. Deplores the weakening of non-proliferation and arms control regimes during these unstable geopolitical times and calls for the redoubling of efforts to reverse this trend; emphasises in this regard the critical and substantial need for an increase in investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, with a particular focus on multilateral strategies; stresses that those strategies should address issues relating to unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons dumped in the previous century, which pose a threat to security, the environment, health and the economy, in particular in the Baltic, Adriatic and North seas;

129. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognising it as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament framework; recalls that Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 2023;

130. Recalls that international negotiations related to non-proliferation and arms control regimes and their outcomes have an impact on Europe, in particular on EU Member States; highlights the importance of giving renewed impetus to reviving those regimes; also stresses the importance of ensuring that the EU takes an active and constructive role in advancing and strengthening the international rules-based efforts towards non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament architecture, in particular in the field of weapons of mass destruction and dual-use digital surveillance and manipulation tools;

131. Calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment as amended by Council Decision (CFSP)2019/1560, and to strictly implement criterion 4 on regional stability;

132. Stresses the need to prevent sensitive emerging technologies and key dual-use items, especially those that are critical for EU security, from being transferred to destinations of concern outside the EU; calls for the establishment and implementation of EU-wide electronic customs and export licensing systems, as a critical step towards making export controls by Member States of those technologies and items more effective;

Defence and society and civilian and military preparedness and readiness

133. Highlights the need for a broader understanding of security threats and risks among EU citizens to develop a shared understanding and alignment of threat perceptions across Europe and to create a comprehensive notion of European defence; stresses that securing support by democratic institutions and consequently by citizens is essential to develop a successful and coherent long-term EU defence, which requires an informed public debate; calls for the EU and its Member States to develop awareness-raising and educational programmes, especially for the young, aimed at improving knowledge and facilitating debates on security, defence and the importance of the armed forces and at strengthening the resilience and preparedness of societies to face security challenges, while allowing for greater public and democratic control and scrutiny of the defence sector; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop those programmes within the framework of the European Democracy Shield, building on the model of national programmes, such as the Swedish Civil Contingency Initiative;

134. Welcomes the efforts to strengthen Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness, as also proposed in Mr Niinistö’s report; acknowledges the critical importance of citizens in crisis preparedness and response, in particular the psychological resilience of individuals and household preparedness; also recognises the importance of civil protection infrastructures and planning for emergency situations; supports a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of EU institutions, Member States, civil society, and individual citizens in strengthening the EU security framework; stresses that CSDP decision-making bodies responsible for planning, resources and logistics have the potential to become the primary enablers of civilian crisis management during emergency situations; calls on the Member States and the Commission to closely examine the report’s recommendations and develop an EU risk assessment and preparedness strategy, joint exercises, a stronger EU-NATO cooperation interface in view of crisis situations; calls for the development of adequate civil protection infrastructure and thorough emergency planning and for the necessary investments for these purposes to be ensured, including through a dedicated EIB investment guarantee programme for crisis-proof civil defence infrastructure;

135. Recalls that terrorism, including jihadi terrorism, poses a persistent threat to the security of the EU and of its partners; calls on the EU to continue efforts to prevent this threat with determination and full solidarity, in particular through greater coordination to improve knowledge, develop preparedness and response capabilities, and to ensure closer interaction with partners and other international actors;

136. Points out that the EU’s defence policies should reflect the principles of gender equality and diversity, promoting inclusive military environments that reflect the values and diversity of European society while ensuring that all members of the European armed forces, regardless of gender or background, have equal opportunities and access to support; reiterates the important role of young people and youth organisations in maintaining and promoting peace and security and calls on the EEAS to commit to integrating young people into its youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda more systematically; also calls for developing train-the-trainers programmes and cooperation between defence institutions and universities of EU Member States, such as military courses, exercises and role playing training activities for civilian students;

137. Stresses that the EU and its Member States must address critical recruitment and retention challenges in the military by developing coordinated national and EU-level actions in order to ensure a sustainable military workforce; recommends, that the EU should support the Member States in developing policies that enhance career attractiveness and long-term retention strategies; stresses the need for the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to provide follow-up on its task of gathering and analysing data across the EU Member States on the issues of recruitment and retention, in order to identify possible measures addressing these issues; highlights that supporting the mental health and well-being of military personnel, with a focus on professional development and long-term care for veterans, must be adequately taken into consideration in the further development of the Defence Union;

138. Recalls the importance of organising joint training and exercises between European armed forces, thereby promoting interoperability, with a view to maximising mission preparedness and addressing a broad range of threats, both conventional and non-conventional; calls for the development and creation of exchange programmes at EU level for military personnel from the Member States, aimed at providing training opportunities and experience in different European military environments and structures and thereby fostering mutual understanding, cohesion, and interoperability, between the EU’s armed forces; reiterates in this respect its support for the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (Military Erasmus – EMILYO), operated by the European Security and Defence College;

Strengthening defence cooperation and partnerships

139. Underlines the importance of the partnership dimension of the Strategic Compass in reinforcing cooperation between the EU and its allies and partners around the world on the basis of common values and respect for human rights and democracy, in order to strengthen the perception of the deterrence principle and to counter foreign strategies aimed at undermining the EU and its partners, and destabilising the rules-based international order; calls on the EU to further engage in security cooperation with partners in all the priority areas identified in the Strategic Compass, notably in strengthening resilience of local security sectors in the area of crisis management, countering hybrid threats as well as upgrading capacities of cybersecurity institutions; also calls for closer cooperation between relevant organisations from partners with the EU Satellite Centre, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA); believes that the participation of partners and NATO Allies in PESCO projects, subject to the agreement by the EU Member States, contributes to improving compatibility between their standards in the defence sector as well as to sharing experience, intelligence and technical expertise in various fields;

140. Reaffirms that the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) must always strictly observe international law and the multilateral decisions taken deriving from international institutions; welcomes the adoption of the EU’s human rights and international humanitarian law due diligence policy on security sector support to third parties (EU HRDDP), serving as a basis for security and military cooperation with third countries in a way that is more compliant with human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL); calls for its thorough implementation; reiterates the call for closer cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the African Union, and their peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security;

141. Welcomes the Joint Declaration of the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024 and their declaration of intent to increase cooperation in the defence sector; stresses the strong interest for the EU of developing international partnerships with like-minded partners in this area and the need to strengthen EU efforts to ensure that countries which were once strategic partners, and with which some Member States maintain strong cultural ties, are not drawn into the sphere of influence of systemic rivals; recalls that economic diplomacy plays a crucial role in this endeavour, serving as an essential tool to reinforce cooperative ties, promote mutual prosperity, and consolidate the EU’s presence and influence, contributing to the resilience of partners against external pressures;

EU-NATO cooperation

142. Stresses the importance of the EU’s strategic partnership with NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness, as well as respect for the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each organisation; highlights that NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security and thus avoiding the duplication of defence efforts, while maintaining strong close cooperation; welcomes the accession of Sweden to NATO in 2024, and that of Finland in 2023, representing a historic step forward in strengthening security in Europe, notably in the Baltic sea region; calls on the VP/HR to operate in close coordination and unity with the NATO Secretary General;

143. Calls for further deepening of EU-NATO cooperation by building on the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, including in the fields of cybersecurity, hybrid warfare, counter terrorism, military mobility, dual-use infrastructure, conflict prevention and crisis management, military-security cooperation, countering malicious foreign interference from third countries, a coordinated approach in the Indo-Pacific, as well as increasing common action on the international stage to protect democracy; strongly supports NATO’s Open Door Policy; invites the EU and NATO to reinforce their cooperation on supporting the capacity-building of common partners;

144. Stresses the constant need for alignment among states that are both EU and NATO members and the obligation under Articles 1 and 3 of the NATO charter for cooperation, self-help and mutual aid; calls on the EU to step up its efforts on common security and defence initiatives wherever there is no NATO equivalent, to increase standardisation, improve interoperability and develop common operating procedures between Member States’ and the EU’s defence capabilities;

145. Commends the close EU-NATO cooperation in the Western Balkans, including through EUFOR Operation Althea and the KFOR military operations, which guarantee the necessary stability for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the wider region;

146. Emphasises the vital role of the Black Sea region in the European security landscape and calls for the EU to collaborate with NATO on formulating a comprehensive strategy for this region, which should address security challenges, counter hybrid threats, enhance maritime cooperation and bolster regional partnerships;

147. Welcomes the appointment of NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood and NATO’s focus on this region; considers it appropriate to strengthen coordination and consultation between EU officials in charge of policy for the Southern Neighbourhood and the Sahel and their NATO counterparts, in order to avoid publicity and fragmentation of efforts and resources;

148. Welcomes the proposal from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) to enhance Parliament’s status to ‘partner’ under the ongoing reform of partnerships; invites its Delegation for relations with the NATO PA (DNAT) to make full use of Parliament’s current and future privileges; considers DNAT an important instrument of Parliament’s diplomacy in an enhanced EU-NATO partnership aimed at strengthening the European pillar of NATO and contributing to reaching the Alliance’s overall objectives; is of the view that DNAT can play a pivotal role in reinforcing EU-NATO cooperation, strengthening the democratic resilience of accession countries and key partners, as well as, overall, enhancing the parliamentary dimension of this essential partnership;

Partnership with the United States

149. Considers it essential to further develop the EU’s close relationship with the United States, which is based on mutual respect, the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law, as well as a broad range of common or converging interests; values the United States’ commitment to and involvement in the territorial defence of Europe, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and its Article 5, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages mutual security and defence initiatives, disarmament and non-proliferation, the impact of disruptive technologies, climate change, hybrid threats, cyber defence, military mobility, crisis management and the relationship with strategic competitors; calls for further strengthening of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important instrument in closer transatlantic cooperation;

150. Notes the importance of greater collaboration in defence production and procurement, including through equal market access for both defence industries; takes note of the US National Defence Industry Strategy of January 2024 and its ambition to deepen industrial cooperation with partners; acknowledges the vast range of possible mutually beneficial areas of cooperation in defence and its positive implications for a stronger transatlantic partnership in times of increasing geopolitical competition; stresses, however, that such cooperation requires a level playing field, which is incompatible with the provisions of the US International Trade in Arms Regulation; calls, accordingly, upon the Commission to launch a dialogue with the United States to explore the possibilities of developing mutually beneficial defence industrial cooperation based on a legal framework that ensures a level transatlantic playing field;

Partnership with the United Kingdom

151. Recognises the UK’s significant contributions to Europe’s security and stability, as well as its commitment to shared defence objectives, which enhance collective security across Europe; welcomes the strong cooperation between the EU, EU Member States and the United Kingdom when it comes to supporting Ukraine, as well as bilateral agreements such as the Trinity House agreement between the UK and Germany to deepen defence cooperation; welcomes the participation of the UK Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs at the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in October 2024; calls for the EU and the UK to swiftly upgrade defence cooperation and become closer security partners by signing a joint declaration with concrete engagements and structured dialogue to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges the EU and UK face on the European continent; underlines in this regard the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, counter terrorism, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats and FIMI, and on jointly addressing shared threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

152. Considers it essential to make progress on practical cooperation by formalising a joint declaration on a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; encourages the VP/HR to regularly invite the United Kingdom to informal Council meetings of foreign affairs (and defence) ministers to exchange views on issues of common concern while fully safeguarding the EU’s decision-making autonomy;

Partnership with Western Balkan and Eastern European partners

153. Believes that the EU’s security is closely interlinked with the security of its immediate European neighbours and that the EU has an interest in giving priority to its enlargement policy and strengthening the stability of its South-Eastern and Eastern European neighbours, in particular candidate countries; calls for stronger military-security cooperation, including civilian and military as well as policy and military security, cooperation with candidate countries and partners, particularly in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; reiterates the need for close cooperation with NATO in this regard;

154. Highlights that the Union should facilitate the participation of European partners with a high level of alignment with CSDP matters, most notably the Western Balkans countries, in current and future programmes linked to the defence sector; reaffirms that thorough involvement of the candidate countries would substantially facilitate their accession process by increasing their industrial and operational capacities in the defence sector, thus increasing interoperability with EU Member States’ armed forces; is of the opinion that the comprehensive inclusion of the Western Balkans candidate countries in EU defence initiatives would represent a strategic investment, as well as an integral part of the EU’s efforts to counter the growing assertiveness and foreign interference orchestrated in those countries;

155. Encourages the Member States to further utilise the European Peace Facility (EPF) for training and outfitting security services in South-Eastern and Eastern European partners hosting CSDP missions, particularly military police, medical and law enforcement infrastructure and to increase intelligence exchange capabilities via secure lines of communication;

Partnership with the African Union and African countries

156. Stresses the importance of the EU-Africa relationship for European security; considers it essential to significantly step up the EU’s partnerships with African countries;

Partnership with the Indo-Pacific region

157. Stresses the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region within the EU’s defence framework, recognising the necessity of addressing growing security concerns linked to China’s regional activities and their broader implications for global stability; considers it essential to strengthen the EU’s presence and partnerships in this region; is also aware of Taiwan’s leading role in high-tech development, and its extensive experience defending itself against China’s hybrid attacks, disinformation, and FIMI, which should be a foremost consideration when assessing the possibilities of strengthening multilateral exchanges and cooperation;

158. Underscores the imperative for the EU of establishing more enduring collective security through a network of regional allies and partners, forming the conventional foundation of its engagement in the region; strongly welcomes the recent conclusion of the EU-Japan Security and Defence Partnership; believes that a further deepening of the strategic and defence partnership of the EU with Japan, and the development of regular dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building with other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan, are fundamental to advancing common security; reiterates its call on the EU for further engagement with emerging strategic partners in the region, such as Indonesia and Viet Nam;

Greater involvement of the European Parliament in the CSDP

159. Stresses that the strengthening of the CSDP as a political priority in the tenth legislative term and the increase in spending on defence policies and programmes at EU level and by the Member States requires full parliamentary scrutiny and accountability;

160. Calls, in this regard, for Parliament’s scrutiny, legislative and budgetary role over a growing range of defence initiatives across the EU institutions and in particular the work carried out under the CSDP to be reinforced, including by strengthening regular dialogue, the exchange of information and maintaining permanent channels of communication open between the VP/HR, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the competent Parliament bodies; recommends the inclusion of regular intelligence updates to relevant parliamentary committees;

161. Deplores that the lack of access to information means Parliament is not in a situation to properly scrutinise PESCO projects; reiterates its call to the Member States to submit an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year; further reiterates its call on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass and other security and defence initiatives and programmes to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence; further reiterates its call on the EEAS to regularly and comprehensively report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass, other security and defence initiatives and programmes and their assessment to Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence; stresses the need to improve the scrutiny of the implementation of defence industrial regulations by the introduction of the procedure for delegated acts;

° °

162. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and partner countries.

* * *

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

During the last years, and particularly since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has had to face multiple and unprecedented threats to its security and new crises in its close geographical environment, including the consequences of the Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel in October, 2023.

The EU has reacted to these negative developments by involving more deeply in European security and defence, exploring new directions and launching new initiatives to strengthen and develop its defence capabilities in a collective and cooperative manner.

This first annual report on the implementation of the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) under the tenth parliamentary term aims to present the assessment of the European Parliament on CSDP progress in the current geopolitical and security context and thus responds to the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy, published on 20 June 2024 and entitled “Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2024”. It also provides recommendations on the main avenues for strengthening policies and actions for the future along several dimensions, including institutional decision-making progress, the joint development of military and armament capabilities and the means of financing them.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

ESCRIBANO MECHANICAL AND ENGINEERIING

Apple Inc.

TECNOBIT (Grupo Oesia)

SOPRA STERIA GROUP

Human Rights Working Group of NCRI

American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium

Boeing International Corporation, Belgium

General Electric Company Honeywell Europe, RTX Corporation W.L.

Gore

Ericsson

US. Mission to the European Union

IQM Quantumm Computers

Rasmussen Global

Munich Security Conference

General Electric Company

Business Bridge Europe

Airbus

Atlantic Council of the United States, Inc

International Centre for Ukrainian Victory

Prisoner’s defenders International Network

Official Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Belgium and Luxembourg

Deloitte Advisory

Amazon Europe Core

Indra

International Committee in Search of Justice

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing

MINORITY POSITION

pursuant to Rule 55(4) of the Rules of Procedure

by Özlem Alev Demirel, Marc Botenga, Giorgos Georgiou (The Left)

This report rightly states that considering the conflicts in Ukraine, Middle East, Indo-Pacific are escalating; diplomacy, arms control/disarmament should play a crucial role. Simultaneously it denies the escalating EU-role through either direct participation in, or fuelling conflicts with arms exports. EU does not appear as diplomatic force.

We reject this report since it

• uses Russia’s illegal war as pretext for massive armament and financing the defence industry, focuses solely on a military approach instead of diplomacy, demands secondary sanctions, calls for testing of (military) prototypes in cooperation with Ukrainian defence actors

• promotes concept of “dual use” and procurement of hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare capabilities together with NATO

• demands 0.25 % of MS GDP annually for military assistance for Ukraine, which will lead to cuts in social policy

• calls for military spending above NATO’s target of 2% GDP

• calls for lifting CFSP/CSDP unanimity principle which further increases the power of big MS

• advocates youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda in view of cooperation between defence institutions and universities, including military courses/exercises

We demand:

• establishment of a system of collective security along with diplomatic efforts to end ongoing wars and conflicts

• achieving peace through conflict resolution, confidence-building, serious arms control, disarmament measures

• strict application of Article 41.2 TEU

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted	30.1.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	55 19 1
Members present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Loucas Fourlas, Michael Gahler, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko
Substitutes present for the final vote	Jaume Asens Llodrà, Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Chloé Ridel, Tineke Strik, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Nikos Papandreou, Catarina Vieira

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 27, 2025

MIL-OSI United Nations: Somalia: Drought, conflict and high food prices risk pushing 4.4 million people into hunger, The Federal Government of Somalia and UN warn

Source: World Food Programme

MOGADISHU, Somalia, 26 February 2025 – New data from Somalia shows that 4.4 million people could face hunger by April 2025, driven by worsening drought conditions, conflict and high food prices.

The Federal Government of Somalia and the United Nations agencies warn that without adequate funding for humanitarian action, the country – which in 2022 was pushed to the brink of famine by severe drought, resulting in thousands of deaths, with nearly half being children – could once again face deepening hunger.

Today’s warning from the Somali Disaster Management Agency (SoDMA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN World Food Programme (WFP) comes as the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis shows that 3.4 million people are already experiencing crisis-levels, or higher, of hunger in Somalia (IPC3+). This number is projected to rise to 4.4 million (23 per cent of the population) between April and June 2025, when below-average Gu rains are forecast.

“Worsening drought poses a severe threat to communities already grappling with immense hardship and ongoing conflict. Urgent action is required to save lives, protect livelihoods, and prevent further suffering,” said His Excellency Mohamuud Moallim, Commissioner of the Somali Disaster Management Agency (SoDMA). “This time, we are not only confronting the devastating impacts of drought but also compounding risks, including conflict and an unprecedented decline in humanitarian funding. These overlapping crises demand immediate, collective and well-coordinated action to strengthen Somalia’s resilience and safeguard our most vulnerable communities.”

The hardest-hit households include those with low agricultural yields who have depleted their food stocks, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and pastoralists with limited livestock and below-average earnings from livestock sales.

“Worsening drought, erratic rainfall, and ongoing conflict are eroding livelihoods, pushing families deeper into crisis,” said FAO Somalia Country Representative Etienne Peterschmitt. “FAO is responding by scaling up its support for increased agricultural production, promoting climate-smart solutions, and strengthening resilient agrifood systems. Through early warning systems and anticipatory action, we help communities prepare for shocks before they escalate, mitigating the worst impacts of food crises.”

Acute funding shortfalls have resulted in life-saving programmes being reduced or cut altogether. The UN is calling for more urgent funding to scale up food assistance, nutrition support, water and sanitation services, as well as livelihood initiatives to mitigate the impacts of the expected drought in Somalia. Today, the 2025 Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, calling for US$1.42 billion, is only 12.4 per cent funded.

“Recurrent climate shocks, protracted conflict, disease outbreaks and widespread poverty, among other factors, have aggravated the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Aid agencies are doing their best to save lives, but they urgently need adequate funding to meet the most critical needs at this juncture in Somalia,” said Crispen Rukasha, Head of Office, OCHA Somalia.

An estimated 1.7 million children under the age of five face acute malnutrition through December 2025. Of those, 466,000 face severe acute malnutrition – an increase of nine per cent compared to the same period last year. Nearly two-thirds (64 per cent) of the total malnutrition burden is concentrated in southern Somalia, where drought conditions and insecurity are the worst.

“Past climate events demonstrate that children are the most affected, facing severe malnourishment and diseases that increase their risk of death and long-term developmental issues,” said Nisar Syed, UNICEF Somalia Representative Officer in Charge. “As prevention is key, UNICEF provides access to clean water and sanitation, provides micronutrients, trains caregivers to identify early signs of malnutrition and operates in remote areas. Given the recurring nature of these crises, we must emphasize a multi-sector approach while working with all stakeholders and the Government to invest in resilience, anticipatory action and a robust health system.”

The IPC findings also confirm that erratic rainfall in 2024 led to low crop yields, rapid depletion of pasture and water sources, flooding of food crops, and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

“Recurrent shocks such as droughts are leaving millions of Somalis at risk of hunger as food prices increase and harvests dwindle. Famine was narrowly avoided in 2022 due to large-scale humanitarian support, which is needed again to provide immediate assistance while implementing longer-term solutions. However, funding shortfalls are forcing us to prioritize and reduce assistance at the worst possible time,” said El-Khidir Daloum, WFP’s Country Director in Somalia.

MORE INFORMATION

MIL OSI United Nations News –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: 15 million South Africans don’t get enough to eat every day: 4 solutions
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Devereux, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

At least 15 million South Africans suffer from food insecurity. That means they don’t have enough nutritious food to live healthy lives.

This is due to a combination of factors, including unemployment, poverty, inequality and food system failures.

More than 1,000 children die from malnutrition each year. This compares unfavourably with 350 child deaths from malnutrition in Brazil, which has more than three times South Africa’s population, and 269 child deaths in Colombia, which has about the same per capita income as South Africa.

A robust indicator of chronic hunger is child stunting. Stunting in South Africa has flatlined at around 25%, or one in four children, since the early 1990s. Other middle-income countries such as Brazil and Peru have made impressive progress. Peru halved its rate from 28% in 2008 to 13% in 2016, after the president committed to reducing stunting.

Read more: South Africa’s hunger problem is turning into a major health crisis

How can South Africa’s government deliver on the right to food and begin the urgent process of eradicating hunger?

We have worked on food security and food justice for many years. We’ve researched the links between social protection and hunger and between food systems and nutrition, and the cost of hunger.

Based on this experience, our view is that food shortages are not a cause of hunger in South Africa. The country produces and imports all the food it needs. Instead, the problem is unequal access to food. While some South Africans live in a world of abundance, with no budget constraints, millions more survive below the food poverty line, unable to afford even a basic nutritious diet for their families.

We believe that the government must deliver on the constitutional right to food and begin the urgent process of eradicating hunger. It can do this by expanding the social grant system, extending the school nutrition programme, reducing food waste, and ensuring access to land for low-income rural and peri-urban households.

Above all, a coherent and coordinated strategy for tackling hunger is needed, led by a minister of food, following models like Brazil’s Zero Hunger initiative. In December 2024, Brazil handed over the G20 presidency to South Africa, after it launched the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty. South Africa should embrace the embrace the spirit and focus of the alliance to develop its own Zero Hunger strategy.

Four steps to end hunger

The South African government pays out 19 million social grants a month, or 26 million if the 9 million recipients of the special social relief of distress grant are included. Without these cash transfers, poverty and malnutrition in the country would be even higher. But they are inadequate, especially in a context of high and rising food prices.

Read more: South Africa’s fight against extreme poverty needs a new strategy – model shows how social grants could work

Pregnant women must receive a maternal grant. Shutterstock

Firstly, the following changes should be made to social grant payments.
- An immediate increase in the child support grant, followed by further increases. The goal should be to get this grant, which is currently below the food poverty line at R530 a month (US$28), to R1,634 (US$34). This is the minimum amount of money needed to meet basic needs, including nutritious food, clothing and shelter.
- Pregnant women should receive a maternal support grant from 12 weeks of pregnancy, to reduce the risk of low birth weight.
- Social grants should increase to match inflation every year.
Secondly, the National School Nutrition Programme, which provides one nutritious meal to all learners in poorer primary and secondary schools, has limited impact because meals are provided only on weekdays during school terms.

The programme should be boosted in the following ways:
- The Department of Basic Education must deliver adequate nutrition to all children in early learning programmes, all year round.
- Programmes for school-age children should be extended to ensure that they all receive at least one nutritious meal every day, including on weekends and school holidays.
- Adequate funding should be given to school food gardens and nutrition education. Moreover, the national school nutrition programme starts too late to address under-5 stunting. It only begins when children enter grade R, aged 5.
Read more: Malnutrition in South Africa: how one community wants resources to be spent

Thirdly, interventions are needed in the food system.
- Prices of essential food items should be regulated, to keep them affordable for low-income South Africans and to encourage shifts in consumption choices towards healthier, more nutritious diets.
- Positive dietary choices can also be promoted through the use of subsidies, discounts or vouchers on “best buy” foods, either for all consumers or for shoppers receiving social grants. They could be given vouchers for nutritious food items along with their cash transfers. Food subsidies or vouchers must include foods that are protein-rich (meat, fish, eggs, dairy), since protein is highly inaccessible to the poor.
Read more: How do people choose what food to buy? Answers depend on what you ask – so we built a research tool for African countries
- Government must extend social security protections to seasonal and informal workers during periods of unemployment and underemployment. Seasonal hunger requires specific attention. Seasonal farm workers – most of whom are women – have low incomes, few savings, and limited access to unemployment insurance. They face food insecurity and hunger during the off-season winter months.
- The government’s land redistribution programme should prioritise securing access to land for poor agrarian or peri-urban households, and providing support (water, inputs, extension advice) to farm that land. This would help vulnerable groups which derive most of their food from production.
Agrarian households (smallholder farmers, farm workers, farm dwellers) are poorer and more food insecure, especially the female-headed households who survive below the food poverty line. When farm women with food gardens have direct access to fresh vegetables, their dietary diversity improves, and they earn income by selling produce to meet their basic needs.

Reforms are needed to bolster smallholder farmers. Shutterstock

Lastly, steps must be take to reduce loss and waste in the food system.

A third of food produced in South Africa, 10 million of 31 million tons, goes to waste each year. This is equivalent to 30 billion meals, in a context where an estimated 20 billion meals would be enough to end hunger. The government has committed to halving food waste by 2030, in its draft food losses and waste strategy of 2023. It must be finalised and operationalised.

Next steps

These interventions would cost money. And the government will argue that it is doing all it can to address hunger with the resources available.

There are many options for raising additional resources to address the hunger crisis – as seen when the government found R500 billion (US$33 billion) to address the COVID-19 crisis in 2020.

The government should also consider raising additional revenue by introducing a wealth tax targeting high-net-worth individuals. This could be used to increase social grants or subsidise nutritious foods.

Read more: Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study

Finally, government needs to tackle hunger in a coordinated way. Several government departments, including agriculture, social development and health, address issues related to food security. However, no government ministry focuses specifically on hunger.

The president should appoint a minister of food to address the hunger crisis along the lines of the special minister of electricity position established in 2023 to deal with the country’s energy supply problem.

Read more: South Africa needs to change direction on maternal health to solve child malnutrition

At the same time, a national food commission should be established, to monitor and coordinate all initiatives that focus on the goal of eradicating hunger.

The government should be guided by the priorities set down by a new coalition – the Union Against Hunger – which is due to be launched on 26 February. The initiative is a coalition of civil society organisations and academics (the authors are among the founding members). It has compiled a list of 10 demands that reflect our analysis of the causes of hunger and recommended solutions. They include realising everyone’s constitutional right to food, halving child stunting by 2030 and making nutritious food accessible to all.

– 15 million South Africans don’t get enough to eat every day: 4 solutions
– https://theconversation.com/15-million-south-africans-dont-get-enough-to-eat-every-day-4-solutions-250700

MIL OSI Africa –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: 15 million South Africans don’t get enough to eat every day: 4 solutions
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Devereux, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

At least 15 million South Africans suffer from food insecurity. That means they don’t have enough nutritious food to live healthy lives.

This is due to a combination of factors, including unemployment, poverty, inequality and food system failures.

More than 1,000 children die from malnutrition each year. This compares unfavourably with 350 child deaths from malnutrition in Brazil, which has more than three times South Africa’s population, and 269 child deaths in Colombia, which has about the same per capita income as South Africa.

A robust indicator of chronic hunger is child stunting. Stunting in South Africa has flatlined at around 25%, or one in four children, since the early 1990s. Other middle-income countries such as Brazil and Peru have made impressive progress. Peru halved its rate from 28% in 2008 to 13% in 2016, after the president committed to reducing stunting.

Read more:
South Africa’s hunger problem is turning into a major health crisis

How can South Africa’s government deliver on the right to food and begin the urgent process of eradicating hunger?

We have worked on food security and food justice for many years. We’ve researched the links between social protection and hunger and between food systems and nutrition, and the cost of hunger.

Based on this experience, our view is that food shortages are not a cause of hunger in South Africa. The country produces and imports all the food it needs. Instead, the problem is unequal access to food. While some South Africans live in a world of abundance, with no budget constraints, millions more survive below the food poverty line, unable to afford even a basic nutritious diet for their families.

We believe that the government must deliver on the constitutional right to food and begin the urgent process of eradicating hunger. It can do this by expanding the social grant system, extending the school nutrition programme, reducing food waste, and ensuring access to land for low-income rural and peri-urban households.

Above all, a coherent and coordinated strategy for tackling hunger is needed, led by a minister of food, following models like Brazil’s Zero Hunger initiative. In December 2024, Brazil handed over the G20 presidency to South Africa, after it launched the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty. South Africa should embrace the embrace the spirit and focus of the alliance to develop its own Zero Hunger strategy.

Four steps to end hunger

The South African government pays out 19 million social grants a month, or 26 million if the 9 million recipients of the special social relief of distress grant are included. Without these cash transfers, poverty and malnutrition in the country would be even higher. But they are inadequate, especially in a context of high and rising food prices.

Read more:
South Africa’s fight against extreme poverty needs a new strategy – model shows how social grants could work

Firstly, the following changes should be made to social grant payments.
- An immediate increase in the child support grant, followed by further increases. The goal should be to get this grant, which is currently below the food poverty line at R530 a month (US$28), to R1,634 (US$34). This is the minimum amount of money needed to meet basic needs, including nutritious food, clothing and shelter.
- Pregnant women should receive a maternal support grant from 12 weeks of pregnancy, to reduce the risk of low birth weight.
- Social grants should increase to match inflation every year.
Secondly, the National School Nutrition Programme, which provides one nutritious meal to all learners in poorer primary and secondary schools, has limited impact because meals are provided only on weekdays during school terms.

The programme should be boosted in the following ways:
- The Department of Basic Education must deliver adequate nutrition to all children in early learning programmes, all year round.
- Programmes for school-age children should be extended to ensure that they all receive at least one nutritious meal every day, including on weekends and school holidays.
- Adequate funding should be given to school food gardens and nutrition education. Moreover, the national school nutrition programme starts too late to address under-5 stunting. It only begins when children enter grade R, aged 5.
Read more:
Malnutrition in South Africa: how one community wants resources to be spent

Thirdly, interventions are needed in the food system.
- Prices of essential food items should be regulated, to keep them affordable for low-income South Africans and to encourage shifts in consumption choices towards healthier, more nutritious diets.
- Positive dietary choices can also be promoted through the use of subsidies, discounts or vouchers on “best buy” foods, either for all consumers or for shoppers receiving social grants. They could be given vouchers for nutritious food items along with their cash transfers. Food subsidies or vouchers must include foods that are protein-rich (meat, fish, eggs, dairy), since protein is highly inaccessible to the poor.
Read more:
How do people choose what food to buy? Answers depend on what you ask – so we built a research tool for African countries
- Government must extend social security protections to seasonal and informal workers during periods of unemployment and underemployment. Seasonal hunger requires specific attention. Seasonal farm workers – most of whom are women – have low incomes, few savings, and limited access to unemployment insurance. They face food insecurity and hunger during the off-season winter months.
- The government’s land redistribution programme should prioritise securing access to land for poor agrarian or peri-urban households, and providing support (water, inputs, extension advice) to farm that land. This would help vulnerable groups which derive most of their food from production.
Agrarian households (smallholder farmers, farm workers, farm dwellers) are poorer and more food insecure, especially the female-headed households who survive below the food poverty line. When farm women with food gardens have direct access to fresh vegetables, their dietary diversity improves, and they earn income by selling produce to meet their basic needs.

Lastly, steps must be take to reduce loss and waste in the food system.

A third of food produced in South Africa, 10 million of 31 million tons, goes to waste each year. This is equivalent to 30 billion meals, in a context where an estimated 20 billion meals would be enough to end hunger. The government has committed to halving food waste by 2030, in its draft food losses and waste strategy of 2023. It must be finalised and operationalised.

Next steps

These interventions would cost money. And the government will argue that it is doing all it can to address hunger with the resources available.

There are many options for raising additional resources to address the hunger crisis – as seen when the government found R500 billion (US$33 billion) to address the COVID-19 crisis in 2020.

The government should also consider raising additional revenue by introducing a wealth tax targeting high-net-worth individuals. This could be used to increase social grants or subsidise nutritious foods.

Read more:
Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study

Finally, government needs to tackle hunger in a coordinated way. Several government departments, including agriculture, social development and health, address issues related to food security. However, no government ministry focuses specifically on hunger.

The president should appoint a minister of food to address the hunger crisis along the lines of the special minister of electricity position established in 2023 to deal with the country’s energy supply problem.

Read more:
South Africa needs to change direction on maternal health to solve child malnutrition

At the same time, a national food commission should be established, to monitor and coordinate all initiatives that focus on the goal of eradicating hunger.

The government should be guided by the priorities set down by a new coalition – the Union Against Hunger – which is due to be launched on 26 February. The initiative is a coalition of civil society organisations and academics (the authors are among the founding members). It has compiled a list of 10 demands that reflect our analysis of the causes of hunger and recommended solutions. They include realising everyone’s constitutional right to food, halving child stunting by 2030 and making nutritious food accessible to all.

Stephen Devereux receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). He holds a Research Chair in Social Protection for Food Security, affiliated to the DSI–NRF Centre of Excellence in Food Security and the Institute for Social Development at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Busiso Moyo previously received funding from the Centre of Excellence in Food Security – UWC and the IDRC-Canada. He is affiliated with the Union Against Hunger (UAH) initiative.

Mark Heywood previously headed Section 27, which receives funding and received funding for the Justice and Activism Hub. He is affiliated with the Union Against Hunger initiative.

– ref. 15 million South Africans don’t get enough to eat every day: 4 solutions – https://theconversation.com/15-million-south-africans-dont-get-enough-to-eat-every-day-4-solutions-250700
MIL OSI – Global Reports –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Co-Leaders announce plans to launch Green Budget this year

Source: Green Party

Green Party Co-Leaders Marama Davidson and Chlöe Swarbrick have announced the party’s plans to deliver a Green Budget this year to offer an alternative vision to the Government’s trickle-down economics and austerity politics.

“New Zealanders care about each other and the planet we live on. Our Green Budget will lay out the plan for an economy that respects and protects those things, instead of exhausting and exploiting both,” says Green Party co-leader and spokesperson for Finance Chlöe Swarbrick.

“Poverty, and all the social ills that stem from it, doesn’t come from nowhere. It comes from a tolerance of extreme inequality. It comes from the privatisation of profit and the socialisation of cost.

“In December, we released He Ara Anamata, our Emissions Reduction Plan, which showed how we could reduce emissions five times faster than the Government’s proposed ‘plan’. It showed we can not only reduce the cost of living, but increase quality of life.

“Our Green Budget will build on that to continue to show precisely how a different world is possible, and entirely within our reach,” says Chlöe Swarbrick.

“More and more tamariki continue to fall through the cracks and live below the poverty line, as a result of this Government’s choices; the choices to gut housing for our most vulnerable, to gut school lunches, to gut our health system and put growing pressure on our health workers,” says Marama Davidson.

“We all depend on each other when times are rough. People want to care for each other – manaakitanga is part of human nature. This is the core value that will underpin our Green Budget.

“Our mokopuna deserve better, and we can deliver better by channelling community power and finally putting people and planet ahead of profit,” says Marama Davidson.

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Child Care – Save the Children calls for immediate action to meet minimum standards for children in care, following new report

Source: Save the Children

Save the Children is deeply concerned by the lack of progress to ensure all children in care are receiving the minimum standard of care required by the National Care Standards and Related Matters Regulations (NCS Regulations).

Today’s report by Aroturuki Tamariki, the Independent Children’s Monitor highlights the lack of progress of Oranga Tamariki to meet the minimum regulatory care standards that are requirements for children in the care of the State over the past four years, and do not expect to see progress by the next report one year from now.

“The Royal Commission of Inquiry has illuminated the painful failures of the past where many children were let down by the State, subjected to horrifying levels of abuse and harm while in the care of the State. Sadly, this report shows that abuse and harm to children while in care of the State remains a current issue,” says Save the Children Advocacy Director Jacqui Southey.

“It is unacceptable that funding cuts are impacting the delivery of care and protection of children in vulnerable situations. Adequate investment is required to ensure our care system is working effectively and cohesively, protecting and improving the lives of children that have already experienced significant harm or neglect.

“Enduring failures to meet the minimum standards required by the National Care Standard Regulations are not good enough.”

Ms Southey says significant areas of concern include unacceptably high numbers of children in care continue to be harmed, with highest rates of harm occurring in secure residential care settings or when children return home to their families.

The report shows 23 % of tamariki and rangatahi were found to have been abused in secure residences, with 18 % of the harm caused by residence staff and 79 % by other rangatahi. For tamariki and rangatahi returned home to the care of a parent while in the custody of Oranga Tamariki, 11% of tamariki and rangatahi were abused or neglected.

“Failure to complete assessments and care plans for all children is worrying, as is the lack of collaboration of agencies across the care and protection systems potentially leading to gaps creating risks that children could be harmed instead of being protected,” says Ms Southey.

“There are strong expectations that when a child is being harmed or at serious risk of harm and the State is required to step in, that the situation for that child will dramatically improve, that their care and protection is guaranteed, and that the State will uphold their parental responsibilities to ensure the child’s rights and wellbeing are met in the short and longer duration of their care. The role of social workers, working alongside tamariki, carers and families is critical to achieving this.”

Save the Children is calling for immediate action based on the findings of the report to change the trajectory to meet the minimum care standards, ensure that all children have required assessments completed, and up to date care plans in place that are communicated to and developed with the children they are about.

Other areas that urgently need to be improved include ensuring all children that are 18 years transitioning out of the care system are well supported in the next steps of their lives to have emotional support, housing, financial support, support to access employment or undertake further education.

About Save the Children NZ:

Save the Children works in 120 countries across the world. The organisation responds to emergencies and works with children and their communities to ensure they survive, learn and are protected.

Save the Children NZ currently supports international programmes in Fiji, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Laos, Nepal, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Areas of work include child protection, education and literacy, disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, and alleviating child poverty.

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to the Climate Change Committee’s Seventh Carbon Budget

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

February 26, 2025

Scientists comment on the Seventh Carbon Budget, published by the Climate Change Committee.

Prof John Barrett, Professor in Energy and Climate Policy and Director of the Climate Evidence Unit at the University of Leeds, said:

“This is a very welcome report with a robust analysis that lets the Government, industry and citizens know that the pathway to net zero is possible and very much needed. However, it does place enormous responsibility on some key technologies and their rapid roll out to achieve these goals. As the UK Government digests the findings, we would suggest greater consideration of the “social” transformation that examines how we travel and what we buy.”

“While the report acknowledges some upfront costs, it confirms that acting now will reduce expenses in the long run, with cost savings emerging by the late 2030s and beyond.”

“The key takeaway from today’s report is clear: the transition to net zero is not only possible but highly beneficial. Independent academic analyses consistently supports this conclusion, showing that it will strengthen the economy, deliver widespread co-benefits, and position the UK as a leader in global climate action.”

Dr Sean Beevers, Reader in Atmospheric Modelling, School of Public Health, Imperial College London, said:

“A National Institute for Health and Care Research project examined the effects of net zero policies on air quality, active travel, health, and associated economic benefits in the UK.

“Our cost benefit analysis showed that net zero transport and building policies deliver substantial co-benefits, including improved indoor and outdoor air quality, better health, increase active travel, lessening inequalities and with long-term economic gains. We estimated an overall monetised air quality and active travel benefit of £46.4 billion by 2060 and £153 billion by 2154.

“Net zero policy analyses should include benefits from the air pollution reductions and physical activity increases. These benefits apply to current and future generations and failure to act will lead to worse health outcomes and higher costs for attaining net zero.”

Dr Edward Gryspeerdt, Research Fellow at the Department of Physics, Imperial College London, said:

“The CCC’s advice highlights that aviation will become the highest emitting sector in the UK by 2040. Clean alternatives, such as low-carbon fuel and technology for low emission flights are currently limited and a range of measures will be needed to meet net-zero – there is no silver bullet.

“The government has described ‘sustainable aviation fuels’ as a ‘game changer.’ However, to have a significant impact on the climate impact of flying, they will need to be produced at a huge scale. It is not yet clear how this will be achieved. To reach net zero, the CCC also note that a switch from flying to other modes of transport will be required, especially for flights with an easy rail alternative.

“These measures alone won’t solve the problem. The CCC’s report highlights that a significant amount of carbon capture will be needed, highlighting the simple fact that the technological solutions to eliminate the climate impact of flying don’t yet exist. Any expansion of the UK’s aviation infrastructure will have to be coupled with improved sustainable transport options.”

Dr Caterina Brandmayr, Director of Policy and Translation at the Grantham Institute – Climate Change and the Environment, Imperial College London, said:

“Today’s advice marks an important milestone in charting the UK’s path to net zero. Public opinion surveys continue to show that climate change remains a key issue of concern for a large majority of people in the UK.

“To put us firmly on track to deliver the deep emission cuts needed from 2038 to 2042, the UK government needs to strengthen its action in the near term, giving confidence to businesses and households to invest in clean alternatives in sectors like housing, transport and energy.

“There is strong public support for the benefits that emission reduction interventions can bring, such as warmer homes, energy security and cleaner air.

“Effectively communicating these benefits, while ensuring fairness and choice in policy design, will be key to sustaining public support for the transition and driving change in harder to decarbonise sectors, such as aviation and land use.”

Dr Friederike Otto, Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Environmental Policy and co-lead of World Weather Attribution, Imperial College London, said

“People shouldn’t forget why we need these targets – we’re already feeling the pain at 1.3°C of warming and things will keep getting worse until emissions are reduced to net zero.

“Here in the UK, we’ll experience even wetter winters that could wipe out crops, threaten our food security and turn sports pitches into miserable bogs. In summer, more frequent heatwaves will contribute to thousands of premature deaths, could put additional strain on the NHS, and reduce economic productivity. Overseas, extreme weather could disrupt supply chains we depend on and could contribute to worsening political instability and conflict.

“Arguments that climate action is too costly are dangerous, short-sighted and disproportionately harm poorer people. If governments don’t cut emissions, both now and in the future, our children will live in an increasingly hostile climate and even more inequal society.

“The UK needs to push ahead and lead the way in emission reductions for a safer, healthier future.”

Prof Lorraine Whitmarsh, Director at the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations (CAST) at the University of Bath, said:

“The government’s climate advisors make clear that tackling climate change requires significant action from all sections of society in the coming years. A third of emission reductions will come from household behaviour change alone. Low-carbon choices include switching to electric vehicles and heat pumps, eating more plant-based foods, and shifting to cleaner forms of transport. Many of these changes offer wider benefits, like improved health and lower bills. The report also highlights the need for government to reduce the barriers for the public to make these changes and to engage the public more actively in the net zero transition. The citizens panel that fed into these recommendations highlight that measures need to be fair and reduce the cost of low-carbon options.”

Dr Christina Demski, Deputy Director at the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations (CAST) at the University of Bath, said:

“The latest CCC progress report makes it clear that decisive action is needed now to ensure we meet the net zero target, and that action to reduce emissions also has other benefits like economic security, better health and reducing fuel poverty. While the UK is on track to reduce emissions substantially from energy supply, the report clearly shows that action is also needed in sectors like transport, buildings and agriculture, and that this requires widespread uptake of essential low-carbon technologies like EVs and heat pumps.

“We have long called for a comprehensive engagement strategy, so it is great to see this included as one of the key recommendations, especially the recommendation to go beyond one-way communication strategies.”

Dr Sam Hampton, Research Fellow at the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations (CAST) at the University of Bath, said:

“The Climate Change Committee’s 7th Carbon Budget provides a comprehensive account of the changes required across UK society to address the increasingly alarming impacts of climate change. As we have largely exhausted the low-hanging fruit of decarbonising our electricity supply, the focus in the 2030s and 2040s must shift towards demand-side changes. This includes changes in how we eat and travel, as well as the technologies we adopt. The report highlights key solutions including the adoption of electric vehicles and heat pumps, as well as the need for innovation to rid fossil fuels from industry. Another important takeaway is that Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) is not a viable solution to decarbonising air travel. This comes just weeks after government expressed its support for airport expansion, and highlights the need for more radical solutions to limit flying, especially amongst the rich.”

The Climate Change Committee’s Seventh Carbon Budget was published at 00:01 UK Time Wednesday 26 February 2025.

Declared interests

Prof John Barrett: Deputy Director for Policy, Priestly Centre for Climate Futures, University of Leeds, Theme Leader for the UKRI Energy Research Demand Centre

For all other experts, no reply to our request for DOIs was received.

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: USAID’s apparent demise and the US withdrawal from WHO put millions of lives worldwide at risk and imperil US national security

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Nicole Hassoun, Professor of Philosophy, Binghamton University, State University of New York

USAID was established by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 as a way to consolidate existing foreign aid programs. JAM STA ROSA/AFP via Getty Images

On his first day in office, Jan. 20, 2025, President Donald Trump began a drastic reshaping of the United States’ role in global health as part of the first 26 executive orders of his new term.

He initiated the process of withdrawing the U.S. from the World Health Organization, which works to promote and advance global health, following through on his first attempt in 2020. He also ordered staff members of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to cut off all communications with WHO representatives.

In his first week, Trump also issued a stop-work order pending a 90-day review on nearly all programs of the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID.

Many experts view this as a first step in dismantling the organization, which facilitates global efforts to improve health and education and to alleviate poverty. The sweeping move left aid workers and the people who depend on them in a panic and interrupted dozens of clinical trials across the world.

President Trump’s executive order sparked legal action from international health care organizations, resulting in a federal judge ordering a temporary halt to the Trump administration’s freeze on foreign aid. Ultimately, that legal action was unsuccessful.

On Feb. 23, the Trump administration put nearly all of USAID’s 4,700 workers on paid administrative leave globally and stated that it would be terminating 1,600 of those positions.

Most recently, on Feb. 25, a federal judge ordered the Trump administration to allow some USAID funding to resume and required that it pay all of its invoices for work completed before the foreign aid freeze went into effect.

I am the executive director of the Global Health Impact project, an organization that aims to advance access to essential medicines in part by evaluating their health consequences around the world, and a researcher focusing on global health and development ethics and policy.

In my view and that of many other public health scholars, closing down USAID will imperil our national security and put millions of lives at risk.

Because of the USAID stop-work order, 500,000 metric tons of food are at risk of spoiling.

20 million with HIV treated

USAID works with both nongovernmental organizations and private companies to help distribute medicines and vaccines around the world. The agency also helps improve government policies and invest in research and development to contain and address epidemics and pandemics.

Starting in the late 1960s, for instance, USAID helped lead the effort to eliminate smallpox and has also helped fight polio and other devastating diseases over the past six decades.

The smallpox pandemic was one of the worst of all time – it killed one-third of the people infected, causing an estimated 300 million to 500 million deaths worldwide in the 20th century. By contrast, COVID-19 killed less than 1% of those infected.

These efforts have brought immense financial as well as health benefits to the U.S. and the rest of the world. Some economists estimate that the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, created in 1988, alone saved the world more than US$27 billion as of 2017, and that it will save a total of $40 billion to $50 billion by 2035.

USAID also plays an important role in promoting global health equity. The agency works to increase access to primary health care, combat hunger and strengthen health systems – ultimately saving lives. In addition, USAID has provided a great deal of funding to fight infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV.

For instance, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, provides treatment for 20 million people living with HIV in Africa. Trump’s federal aid freeze has halted funding for PEPFAR projects.

While the limited waiver under which the agency must now operate means some PEPFAR activities may eventually resume, many are now left without federal funding indefinitely. Unless another organization fills the gap, millions will die without USAID assistance.

A 2022 photo of men in Afghanistan lining up to receive a monthly food ration, largely supplied by USAID.
Scott Peterson/Getty Images News via Getty Images

Mistakes made

This is not to deny that USAID has made some grave errors in its history.

For instance, USAID provided significant funding to the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) during the murderous regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, who was in power from 1965 to 1997.

But USAID also has done an immense amount of good. For instance, it has helped contain the Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 2018. USAID’s work in preventing epidemics from spreading helps people everywhere, including in the U.S.

If anything, there is a strong argument for increasing USAID funding. China has invested heavily in Asia and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative, which is an attempt to recreate ancient trade routes by investing in roads, trains and ports. Some researchers argue that this has shifted diplomatic relations in favor of China. They believe that if the U.S. does not make similar investments and instead cuts foreign aid, it will affect the United States’ ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

Similarly, there is a strong argument for increasing U.S. support for the WHO rather than withdrawing from the organization.

Trump’s withdrawal order cites what he sees as the organization’s failures in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic as the rationale. But the WHO helped lead efforts to accelerate vaccine development and distribution, and retrospective reports claim that even more deaths could have been avoided with greater international cooperation.

While dismantling USAID will cause irreparable harm to global health, these actions taken together are likely to deal a devastating blow to efforts to protect Americans and everyone else in the world from sickness and death.

Alyssa Figueroa, an undergraduate student at Binghamton University, contributed to this article.

Nicole Hassoun has received funding for research from the World Health Organization and the United Nations. She is the executive director of Global Health Impact (global-health-impact.org) which participates in the Pandemic Action Network.

– ref. USAID’s apparent demise and the US withdrawal from WHO put millions of lives worldwide at risk and imperil US national security – https://theconversation.com/usaids-apparent-demise-and-the-us-withdrawal-from-who-put-millions-of-lives-worldwide-at-risk-and-imperil-us-national-security-249260

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: English rendering of PM’s speech at inauguration of Advantage Assam 2.0 Investment & Infrastructure Summit 2025 in Guwahati

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 25 FEB 2025 2:06PM by PIB Delhi

Governor of Assam, Shri Lakshman Prasad Acharya ji, dynamic Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma ji, industry leaders, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen!

The land of Eastern India and the Northeast is about to embark on a new future today. Advantage Assam is a grand initiative to connect the entire world with Assam’s potential and progress. History bears witness that Eastern India played a significant role in Bharat’s prosperity in the past. Today, as Bharat moves towards becoming a developed nation, Eastern India and our Northeast are once again set to showcase their strength. I see Advantage Assam as a reflection of this very spirit. I extend my heartfelt congratulations to the Assam government and the entire team of Himanta ji for organising this grand event. I recall when I was visiting Assam for an election campaign in 2013, I spontaneously said something at a gathering— “The day is not far when people, while learning the alphabet, will say: A for Assam.”

Friends,

Today, we are all closely observing and understanding global circumstances. Even amidst this global uncertainty, experts around the world have one certainty—and that certainty is Bharat’s rapid growth. There is a solid reason behind this confidence in Bharat. The Bharat of today is taking one step after another, working on a large scale, keeping in mind a long-term vision for the next 25 years of this 21st century. The world’s confidence today rests on Bharat’s young population, which is rapidly becoming skilled and driving innovation. The world trusts Bharat’s neo-middle class, which is emerging from poverty and advancing with new aspirations. The world believes in Bharat’s 1.4 billion people, who support political stability and policy continuity. The world has faith in Bharat’s governance, which is continuously implementing reforms. Today, Bharat is strengthening its local supply chains. Bharat is signing free trade agreements with different regions across the world. Our connectivity with East Asia is continuously improving. Additionally, the new India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor is opening up many new opportunities.

Friends,

Amidst the growing global trust in Bharat, we have all gathered here today in Assam, on the sacred land of Maa Kamakhya. Assam’s contribution to Bharat’s growth is steadily increasing. The first edition of the Advantage Assam Summit was held in 2018. Back then, Assam’s economy was worth 2.75 lakh crore rupees. Today, Assam has become a 6 lakh crore rupee economy. This means that in just six years under the BJP government, Assam’s economy has doubled in value. This is the double effect of the double-engine government. The large-scale investments in Assam, including those made by all of you, have transformed Assam into a state of unlimited possibilities. The Assam government is focusing on education, skill development, various infrastructure projects, and creating a better investment environment.

In recent years, the BJP government has worked extensively on connectivity-related infrastructure in the state. Let me give you an example. Before 2014, there were only three bridges over the Brahmaputra River, meaning that just three bridges were built in 70 years. However, in the past 10 years, we have constructed four new bridges. One of these bridges has been named after Bharat Ratna Bhupen Hazarika ji. Between 2009 and 2014, Assam received an average of 2,100 crore rupees in the railway budget. Our government has increased Assam’s railway budget more than four times, taking it to 10,000 crore rupees. Additionally, over 60 railway stations in Assam are being modernised. Today, the first semi-high-speed train of the Northeast has started running between Guwahati and New Jalpaiguri.

Friends,

Assam’s air connectivity is expanding rapidly. Until 2014, flights operated on only seven routes here. Today, flights are running on nearly 30 routes. This has provided a major boost to the local economy and created employment opportunities for the youth of Assam.

Friends,

This transformation is not limited to just infrastructure. There has been an unprecedented improvement in law and order. Over the past decade, numerous peace accords have been signed, and long-pending border issues have been resolved. Today, every region, every citizen, and every young person in Assam is working tirelessly for the development of this state.

Friends,

Today, major reforms are taking place across every sector and every level of Bharat’s economy. We have consistently worked to improve the Ease of Doing Business. We have built a complete ecosystem to promote industry and an innovation culture. Whether it is policies for start-ups, PLI schemes for manufacturing, or tax exemptions for manufacturing companies and MSMEs, we have formulated excellent policies for all. The government is also making massive investments in infrastructure. This combination of institutional reforms, industry, infrastructure, and innovation is the foundation of Bharat’s progress. That is why investors are recognizing Bharat’s potential and the transformative possibilities of growth. Assam, too, is moving forward at double-engine speed in this progress. Assam has set a target to grow its economy to 150 billion dollars by 2030. I firmly believe that Assam can achieve this goal. My confidence stems from the capable and talented people of Assam and the commitment of the BJP government here. Today, Assam is emerging as the gateway between Southeast Asia and Bharat. To further enhance this potential, the government has launched the North East Transformative Industrialisation Scheme, also known as “Unnati”. This scheme will boost industry, investment, and tourism across the Northeast, including Assam. I urge all industry leaders here to take full advantage of this scheme and Assam’s unlimited potential. Assam’s natural resources and strategic location make it a preferred investment destination. One example of Assam’s strength is Assam Tea. Assam Tea is a global brand, a cherished part of tea lovers’ lives worldwide. Assam Tea has now completed 200 years. This legacy inspires Assam to excel in other sectors as well.

Friends,

Today, a major transformation is taking place in the global economy. The world is demanding a resilient supply chain. At this crucial time, Bharat has launched an initiative to strengthen its manufacturing sector in mission mode. Under Make in India, we are promoting low-cost manufacturing. Our industries—pharmaceuticals, electronics, and automobiles—are not only meeting domestic demand but are also setting new benchmarks of manufacturing excellence in international markets. Assam is playing a crucial role in this manufacturing revolution.

Friends,

Assam has always had a significant share in global trade. Today, Assam accounts for more than 50% of Bharat’s onshore natural gas production. In the past few years, the capacity of Assam’s refineries has increased significantly. Assam is also emerging rapidly in new-age sectors such as electronics, semiconductors, and green energy. Due to the government’s policies, Assam is becoming a hub for high-tech industries as well as start-ups.

Friends,

Just a few days ago, the central government approved the Namrup-IV plant in the Union Budget. In the coming years, this urea production plant will meet the fertilizer demand of not just the Northeast but the entire country. The day is not far when Assam will become a major manufacturing hub of Eastern India. The central government is fully supporting the BJP-led state government in achieving this goal.

Friends,

In the 21st century, the world’s progress depends on digital revolution, innovation, and technological advancements. The better we prepare for this, the stronger we will be on the global stage. That’s why our government is moving forward at full speed with 21st-century policies and strategies. We all know how Bharat has made a huge leap in electronics and mobile manufacturing over the past 10 years. Now, Bharat aims to replicate this success story in semiconductor production as well. I am proud that Assam is emerging as a key centre for semiconductor manufacturing in Bharat. A few months ago, the Tata Semiconductor Assembly & Test Facility was inaugurated in Jagiroad, Assam. This plant will play a crucial role in promoting technological growth across the entire Northeast region in the coming years.

Friends,

We have also collaborated with IITs to drive innovation in the semiconductor sector. A semiconductor research centre is also being developed in the country. By the end of this decade, the electronics sector is expected to reach a value of 500 billion dollars. Given our speed and scale, it is certain that Bharat will emerge as a global powerhouse in semiconductor production. This will create millions of jobs and significantly benefit Assam’s economy.

Friends,

Over the past 10 years, Bharat has taken policy decisions while being mindful of its environmental responsibilities. The world today considers our Renewable Energy Mission a model practice and is following our approach. The country has made massive investments in solar, wind, and sustainable energy resources in the last 10 years. This has not only fulfilled our ecological commitments but has also significantly expanded our renewable energy production capacity. We have set a target to add 500 GW of renewable energy capacity to the country’s energy infrastructure by 2030. The government is also working on a mission to achieve an annual production of 5 million metric tons of green hydrogen by 2030. With the expansion of gas infrastructure, demand for gas in the country has also risen rapidly. The gas-based economy is expanding at a fast pace, and Assam holds a huge advantage in this journey. The government has created numerous opportunities for industries—from PLI schemes to green initiatives, all policies have been designed in your favour. I want Assam to emerge as a leader in the renewable energy sector. However, this can only happen when industry leaders like you step forward and maximise Assam’s full potential.

Friends,

By 2047, Eastern India will play a crucial role in making Bharat a ‘Viksit Bharat’ (Developed India). Today, the Northeast and Eastern India are advancing rapidly in infrastructure, logistics, agriculture, tourism, and industry. The day is not far when the world will witness this region leading the way in Bharat’s development journey. I firmly believe that you will be partners in this journey and will contribute to Assam’s growth. Let us work together to make Assam a state that takes Bharat’s capabilities to new heights in the entire Global South. Once again, I extend my best wishes to all of you for this summit. And as I say this, I give you my assurance—I stand with you and fully support your contributions in the ‘Viksit Bharat’ journey.

Thank you very much.

DISCLAIMER: This is the approximate translation of PM’s speech. Original speech was delivered

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Deputy Secretary-General, at Asia-Pacific Forum, Urges Faster Regional Action Warning on Current Trends Less Than One Sixth of Sustainable Development Goals Will Be Met

Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

Following is the text of UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed’s video message at the twelfth session of the Asia-Pacific Forum for Sustainable Development 2025, in Bangkok today:

I thank the Government of Thailand for hosting this important Forum and Executive Secretary Ibu Armida Alisjahbana for bringing us together. We stand at a critical juncture in history, where our actions over the next five years will define the future of our planet and its people. All of you here today share the immense responsibility of steering the Asia-Pacific region towards a sustainable and prosperous future.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is not just a set of goals, it is our collective promise to future generations.

Yet, globally, only 17 per cent of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are on track. Progress on almost a third of targets has stalled or gone into reverse. Here in the Asia-Pacific, less than a sixth of the SDG targets will be met on current trends. Though economic growth has lifted millions out of poverty, it has been uneven, and a series of global crises have disproportionately affected vulnerable populations.

Five years to the 2030 deadline, we need urgent action to get the Goals on track. The Pact for the Future, agreed by countries last year, includes commitments to action to turbocharge sustainable development. We must come together to ensure they are delivered.

This region has immense potential to accelerate SDG progress — through action to harness the power of technology, accelerate the energy transition and transform food systems, driving progress across all the Goals.

You are a global leader in digital innovation and connectivity. You have accessible emerging technologies. And you are transforming financial inclusion and service delivery through rapid fintech adoption and initiatives. The Republic of Korea’s Digital New Deal and Thailand’s Big Data Initiative are prime examples.

The region is also uniquely positioned to lead the global energy transition. You are rapidly deploying clean energy and embracing cross-border energy integration. Initiatives like the South Asian Hydropower Trade and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Power Grid are enhancing energy security while reducing emissions. Innovations in food systems, such as regenerative agriculture in India, are improving sustainability and food security.

Accelerating action requires regional collaboration. With a common vision of sustainability and prosperity, we can create new opportunities for economic resilience and social progress. Strengthened financial cooperation can enhance cross-border connectivity and drive regional supply chain integration.

The United Nations and the Regional Economic Commissions will continue to work closely with Resident Coordinators and the UN country Teams to strengthen support for sustainable development across the region. Helping to forge investment paths. Shape policy and regulatory frameworks. And garner support from United Nations agencies and partners, including multilateral and regional development banks and private investors.

The strong link between the Regional Economic Commissions and our Resident Coordinators since the reforms made by Secretary-General António Guterres has been critical in bringing together our policy and operational assets in ways we had not witnessed before.

It gives me great hope that we can build on this strong foundation to step up our support to each country in Asia and the Pacific, as you strive to accelerate action and protect our ambition for people and planet.

And I urge all of you to make the most of the opportunities this year to accelerate action. From Beijing+30 to the Fourth Conference on Financing for Development, the World Social Summit, the Fourth Food System Summit Stocktake, and COP30 (Thirtieth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Use your voice to ensure that the needs and priorities of this region shape action over the coming years. So, together, we ensure sustainable development truly leaves on one behind.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Budget Bill passed
Source: Scottish Government
Parliament approves spending plans.

The 2025-26 Scottish Budget has been approved by Parliament, including £21.7 billion for health & social care and more than £15 billion for local councils, alongside social security measures supporting an estimated two million people.

The Budget invests:

£21.7 billion in health and social care services, including almost £200 million to cut waiting times and help reduce delayed discharge

£6.9 billion in social security, expected to support around two million people in 2025‑26

£4.9 billion in climate-positive investment

more than £7 billion for infrastructure

more than £2 billion for colleges, universities and the wider skills system

an additional £25 million to support the Grangemouth Industrial Cluster, taking total investment to almost £90 million

Finance Secretary Shona Robison said:

“I am pleased that Parliament has approved the Scottish Government’s Budget – confirming plans to invest in public services, lift children out of poverty, act in the face of the climate emergency and support jobs and economic growth.

“This is a Budget by Scotland for Scotland. It includes record NHS investment, social security spending to put money in the pockets of low income families and action to effectively scrap the two-child benefit cap next year. We are delivering a universal winter heating payment for the elderly, providing record funding for local government and increasing investment in affordable housing.

“This Budget has been developed through effective engagement and negotiation across Parliament to build broad support. It is through this compromise that we are delivering spending plans that will most effectively strengthen services and support Scotland’s communities.”

Background

Scottish Budget 2025 to 2026

Budget (Scotland) (No. 4) Bill
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Green parliamentarians write to Defence Secretary over defence spending principles
Source: Green Party of England and Wales
- Green MPs and peers call for defence spending decisions to be based on “core principles”
- Ellie Chowns MP calls foreign aid cut announcement “cruel and unncecessary”
- Green letter highlights growing security threats relating to climate breakdown, food security and cyber security
The six Green Party parliamentarians have written to the Defence Secretary John Healey setting out a series of “core principles” they say any decisions about defence spending should be based on [1].

The letter comes as Keir Starmer announced that a rise in the defence budget will be funded by cuts to foreign aid.

In the letter, the MPs and peers call on Healey to ensure that all decisions on defence spending “tackle the biggest threats to long term human security, including climate chaos, food insecurity, and cyber-attacks on democracy”.

They also urge an increase in spending on diplomacy, peace-building and overseas aid in order to improve our security.

Responding to Starmer’s announcement today, Ellie Chowns MP said:

“It’s horrifying to see Keir Starmer follow Trump’s lead, gutting our international aid budget to increase defence spending. This is naive populism playing with life-and-death decisions.

“How many people will fall ill or die because they cannot access health services; how many more will go hungry? And how many children will be denied an education as a result of this decision? Cutting aid risks making the world more volatile and more dangerous, not safer. Real security means tackling hunger, poverty, and climate chaos.

“Taking money from the poorest in the name of defence is both cruel and unnecessary – we could and should instead be taxing the wealthiest who can afford to contribute more.

“The idea that the only way to strengthen our defences is by taking from those with the least is immoral. It’s a choice and it’s the wrong one.”

Notes:
1. The full text of the letter reads:
Dear John,

We are writing to set out the importance of any decisions about future defence spending being underpinned by core principles. In an ever more insecure world, made more unstable by the comments and actions of the US President, and with the ongoing need to stand up to Putin, it is vital that genuine long-term stability, safety and security is a priority. Alongside addressing the threats posed by the international political situation, the government must also address the significant and growing security threats relating to climate breakdown, food security and cyber security.

As such, we call on you to uphold the following principles:
- Tackle the biggest threats to long term human security, including climate chaos, food insecurity, and cyber-attacks on democracy
- Increase spending on diplomacy, peace-building and overseas aid, as key to security and defence policy
- Don’t cut spending from other departmental budgets to increase defence spending
- Strengthen our ties with Europe
- Uphold international law, the rule of law and the right to self-determination
- Recognise that a global prohibition on nuclear weapons will make everyone safer
- Address the underlying causes of conflict and insecurity such as poverty, human rights abuses and resource scarcity
- Restore UK sovereignty by decoupling from reliance on the US
- Use economic levers such as sanctions on companies still operating in the UK and complicit in Russian fossil fuel exports
We look forward to your response and to working constructively with the government towards enduring safety and security.

Yours sincerely, all Green parliamentarians
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Powers for landlords to collect rent from benefit payments to be re-examined
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 2

Press release

Powers for landlords to collect rent from benefit payments to be re-examined

A controversial system that automatically approves landlord requests to deduct tenants’ benefits to pay rent arrears and ongoing rent payments is being re-examined, Work and Pensions Secretary Liz Kendall announced today [Tuesday 25 February].
Work and Pensions Secretary pledges to “right the wrongs” of controversial benefit deduction system.

Follows decision by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) not to appeal court judgement which found one claimant’s landlord payments were unfair.

Action is part of wider plans to make the benefits system fairer and protect people from falling into debt.

It comes amid concerns that the system – aimed at helping people avoid issues with their landlords such as eviction – may actually be pushing the poorest into debt.

Currently, a computer program automatically approves landlord requests to deduct up to a fifth of someone’s monthly Universal Credit payments for outstanding rent repayments without them being consulted by either their landlord or DWP.

The department will now look at this process and consider better ways of ensuring landlords get the rent they are owed in a fair and proportionate way while benefit claimants are protected from falling into debt.

It comes as part of wider efforts by the Work and Pensions Secretary to fix the broken welfare system to make it fairer and ensure it improves living standards which will unlock economic growth – a key commitment in the government’s Plan for Change.

Work and Pensions Secretary, Rt Hon Liz Kendall MP, said:

I am determined to right the wrongs that have persisted in the benefits system for too long. The automatic approval of landlords’ requests for tenants’ benefits to be deducted is one of these.

As well as urgently reviewing this system, I am bringing forward major changes to the health and disability benefits system so that it works for everyone, underpinned by the biggest employment reforms in a generation.

We will continue to listen to people’s concerns, and transform our benefits system to one of fairness, not punishment.

This decision comes in response to a high-profile legal challenge in January, which was won by Nathan Roberts whose benefits were deducted and automatically paid to his landlord to cover alleged rent arrears and ongoing rent payments – despite a dispute about repairs to the property. The Work and Pensions Secretary has confirmed DWP will not appeal this decision.

Minister for Social Security and Disability, Rt Hon Sir Stephen Timms MP, said:

The benefits system needs urgent reform and we are taking action across the board to do this – whether that’s tackling the huge accumulation of debt by Carer’s Allowance recipients through no fault of their own, or this automatic deduction of benefits purely at the request of a landlord.

Combined with our efforts to Get Britain Working and our upcoming health and disability benefits reform, all of this will lead to better support for those who need it, and open doors for those who can work.

This comes ahead of a manifesto commitment to deliver a wider review of Universal Credit to ensure it is getting people into work, making work pay and tackling poverty.

In April, the Universal Credit Fair Repayment Rate will also come into force, reducing the cap on how much can be deducted from someone’s benefits from 25% to 15%. This means approximately 1.2 million households will keep more of their Universal Credit payment each month, with households expected to be better off by £420 a year on average.

Share this page

The following links open in a new tab

Share on Facebook (opens in new tab)

Share on Twitter (opens in new tab)

Updates to this page

Published 25 February 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
February 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Understanding the cultural experience of keeping warm can help us embrace clean energy

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Becky Shaw, Professor in Fine Art, Birmingham City University

The way we heat our homes is a major contributor to the greenhouse gases that are heating up the planet. So moving to more sustainable home heating is vital for decarbonisation and meeting emissions targets.

Campaigns usually offer technological solutions as well as environmental and economic incentives. But they rarely recognise that the way we heat our homes is a way of life – connected to our identities, relationships, communities, culture, values and the “practice” of making a home.

Changing something as fundamental as heating can bring up complex feelings. To understand how people are connected to the way they heat their homes, we – a group of academics at Sheffield Hallam University, Birmingham City University and universities in Finland, Sweden and Romania – embarked on a project that combined history, art, and social science research to find out how cultures and histories of heating can inform fair and effective change.

Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

The Justheat research project explores the experience of eight communities in four nations that have had different heating transition journeys. These are: Sweden, which is at an advanced stage of energy transition; Finland, where a culture of burning wood is in conflict with decarbonisation; Romania, with a hesitant energy plan where experiences of heating poverty make change unpopular; and the UK which has a “lagging” uptake of low carbon heating sources.

We gathered oral histories from selected communities to encourage personal reflection on the past through the perspective of the present. Oral histories encourage people to decide what is important to tell – not the researcher. We collected more than 300 accounts of changes in the way people heated their homes since 1940.

Artists were appointed in each country to create artworks that highlighted various aspects of the oral histories. This included Finnish painter and textiles artist Henna Aho, Romanian photographer Denise Lobont and video artist Ram Krishna Ranjan, who lives in Sweden. I am both the project UK artist and co-ordinator of the other artists. All were selected because they had an existing interest in home heating and had experience of collaboration.

When listening to people’s stories, the artists noted how detailed descriptions or emotional intensity stood out. These included reflections on how children found fires to be a source of play (one participant described “crashing” toy planes into the flames), a son’s guilt for not helping his mother with making the fire, and a woman’s memory of a friend becoming ill from severe cold. The artists were inspired by the creative ways people mixed past, present and future in their stories.

Each nation and story is unique, but the tension between government (or other forms of authority) and communities was a common theme. For example, in Finland people value wood as a secure fuel that they can grow and control themselves – but this means some people move away from the efficient and sustainable networked heating solutions that are already in use there.

In Sweden, oral histories showed a strong trust in government energy policy, but renters struggled with the ways that landlords can limit heating. In Romania, a severe lack of energy during the fall of Communism in 1989 and austerity measures to pay off national debt led to desperate households burning furniture to keep warm.

In Romania and some other countries, descriptions of past distrust in the government often accompanies a negative reaction to current policies, fearing that they will reduce individual control and benefit.

In the UK the last mining pits closed as recently as 2013, so the pain of losing livelihoods and communities is still felt. Some of our UK oral histories documented how coal provided people with a sense of security because they could control how long the fuel would last.

Coal was described as a total way of life, linking home, family, work, community, love, food, safety and care. Despite the dirt and drudgery of coal home heating, the joy of getting warm by the fire was seared into people’s memory. While there were stories of feeling cold, they often described feeling joy in the contrast of being cold and then getting warm. This was seen as part of the intense joy of radiant heat.

When gas central heating was rolled out in the 1970s and 1980s, our oral histories described it as “marvellous” in its speed and cleanliness, but some participants also felt that it lacked the comfort, cheer and invitation to gather together that a solid fuel fire offers.

Despite Sweden’s successful electric heating network, the Swedish oral histories recorded an enduring joy in the use of wood-burning stoves to heat their summer houses. This did not counter their appreciation of electric networked heating, but the delight of an additional fire and its capacity to draw people together, persists.

Combined, the oral histories and the artworks inspired by them let us understand how past changes to the way we heat our homes have affected us. We are currently sharing the artists’ work with communities and local energy leaders, and we are interested to see how artworks might encourage discussion.

Current research and policy focuses on technological change to generate rapid decarbonisation. However, no change can be made without getting households on board. As part of this, we need to understand how past experiences influence communities’ response to energy change.

Changing the way we heat our homes is likely to be attractive only if it offers a significant improvement in the experience of keeping warm, rather than merely appealing to us in economic terms, or for environmental reasons.

Becky Shaw receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council and Birmingham City University.

– ref. Understanding the cultural experience of keeping warm can help us embrace clean energy – https://theconversation.com/understanding-the-cultural-experience-of-keeping-warm-can-help-us-embrace-clean-energy-244710

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

February 26, 2025

Category: Child Poverty

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

Consecutive climate shocks

Children most at risk

Multiple pressures

Action stations

Testimony from Ex-Hostage

Determined to Eradicate Hamas

Recordings of Gunfire at Family

Support for Ceasefire’s Second Phase

Gaza’s Future without Hamas

Save West Bank from Becoming Next Gaza

Exposing a housing crisis

The cost of land – social and economic

Moving toward higher ground, slowly

A personal lens on the topic

Not deterring crime

Harming society at large

Costing taxpayers dearly

A different path

A way forward

Mobilising funds to unlock new growth sectors, bridge financing gap and drive sustainable growth for ASEAN

Responsible deployment of technology in financial services is key to maximise its potential while minimising risk

Investing in talent strategies that not only creates a more agile and adaptive workforce, but also paves the way for regional talent mobility

Where aid is really used

Share this

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

MINORITY POSITION

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Four steps to end hunger

Next steps

Four steps to end hunger

Next steps

Source: Save the Children

February 26, 2025

20 million with HIV treated

Mistakes made

Powers for landlords to collect rent from benefit payments to be re-examined

Share this page

Updates to this page