Category: Child Poverty

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ASIA/PHILIPPINES – Bishops’ Letter for the Jubilee period: “There is hope for the nation”

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    CC Adam Cohn

    Manila (Agenzia Fides) – “Hope gives us courage and freedom,” says the Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, distributed and read in churches on February 2 at the conclusion of the Plenary Assembly of the Bishops. The letter, signed by the President of the Bishops’ Conference and Bishop of Caloocan, Cardinal Pablo Virgilio David, focuses on the theme of hope, a virtue, and makes a reference to the most burning issues of the nation: from the demand for transparency and accountability – in view of the mid-term elections scheduled for May 2025 – to the desire to “become a more missionary and synodal Church”. The bishops declare that they are engaged in “communal discernment on the current realities affecting our nation”. The letter quotes the Letter to the Romans: “Hoping against all hope” (cf. Rom 4:18) and states that the Filipino people “struggle with hopelessness, striving to find hope amidst adversities”.”In the sphere of morality, we sense widespread confusion, indifference, apathy, and helplessness because of murderous attacks against life, particularly against innocent ones. The culture of impunity, self-entitlement, and loss of sense of sin are alarming,” it says. Added to this are the traumas “of disasters and tragedies due to climate emergencies”. In the area of economy, “the increase in poverty, manifested by the rise of unemployment and the price of commodities and services”, which widens the gap between rich and poor. In the political realm, “the misuse of public funds and resources”, “the culture of patronage and mendicancy are truly disturbing”, and also in the field of communications, “falsehood, misinformation, and disinformation are weaponized against the truth”.In the face of this reality, it is necessary “to pursue the path of personal, institutional, and ecclesial conversion in order to rediscover hope. This is the opportunity that the Jubilee Year provides us,” the pastoral letter says.Recalling that “hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has been poured out into our hearts” (cf. Rom 5:5), the bishops proclaim that Christ is the Savior and that “God’s love penetrates our suffering, our misery and death, saves and transforms us.” “Love piercing through darkness reveals glimpses of hope” that can be seen “in principle-driven leaders who champion good governance.” “We see sparks of hope,” the bishops continue, “in the idealism of young people and responsible citizens who do not sell their idealism and patriotism,” and “in the spontaneous collaboration among NGOs, civic, and religious organizations” or “in ordinary laborers committed to sincere service even without recognition or reward.” They continued: “We see sparks of hope in those who stake their reputation, even lives, to fight corruption and pursue justice” and “in the Filipino spirit of resiliency, and in those who dedicate themselves to genuine service despite being overwhelmed by their own need.” “We, your spiritual leaders,” the bishops said, “share the pain brought about by these wounds of affliction. We, too, feel the deep disturbance and seeming paralysis that plague many who are dragged into the pit of hopelessness.” Therefore, “in this Jubilee Year of Hope, together we hold precious, the gift of hope sparked by the Holy Spirit. This hope is not simply optimism or a positive feeling. These are glimpses of the gift of hope that comes from the Holy Spirit urging us to act.” “Any action of hope is sourced from the Holy Spirit,” the Pastoral Letter says. “We therefore ask you, dear people, to allow the hope within you to be rekindled. May it become a flame of hope.” “Let the Holy Spirit renew the face of the earth and breathe transformation into the dark spaces and places of our lives and our nation,” the bishops say. “The grace of the Holy Spirit is a gentle breeze that spurs us to continue” and by promoting a “spiritual revolution of hope” and walking together “on a Pilgrimage of Hope towards the Father’s Kingdom.””There is hope! May Pag-Asa!”, the bishops write in the local language, Tagalog. They conclude with the advice of Saint Paul: “Let us not grow weary of doing good” (Galatians 6:9). (PA) (Agenzia Fides, 4/2/2024)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Public views sought to help Council tackle poverty

    Source: Northern Ireland – City of Derry

    Public views sought to help Council tackle poverty

    4 February 2025

    Derry City and Strabane District Council is seeking the views of the public on its Draft Anti-Poverty Action Plan. The consultation is open for an eight-week period until 31 March, with the public invited to have their say and give feedback on the proposed approach to tackling poverty in the Council area.

     

    The purpose of the Anti-Poverty Action Plan is to identify local interventions which could help to address the levels of poverty and deprivation across the Council where it is reported that 16% of households here are in poverty with a further 10% at risk of poverty. It further reports that following the pandemic and the rising cost of living more people are becoming vulnerable to poverty, in particular single people, single parents, households with more than three children and people with disabilities.

     

    The Council has produced a Draft Anti-Poverty Action Plan through a co-design approach involving local people and partners following a series of workshops and discussions that helped develop strategic themes and deliverable actions. Among the themes that have draft actions assigned to them are – 1 – Lobbying and Advocacy ‘Voice and Action’, 2 – Access to Support ‘Navigating and Collaborating’, Skills and Employment, ‘Empowerment and Choice’, and 4 – Supporting our Communities ‘Resilience and Partnership’.

     

    Encouraging people to have their say and take part in the consultation process, Mayor of Derry City and Strabane District Council, Councillor Lilian Seenoi Barr, said that while addressing poverty is a complex issue, it’s important that there is a joint and cohesive approach to making support available to people who need it. That the support available is easily accessible and is allocated with compassion and dignity.

     

    “This Council is very aware of the issues around poverty across this district and has been working proactively with Government and statutory partners, local residents, charities and the community and voluntary sector through our local growth partnerships to deliver interventions to support those in need,” she said. “Our Council has been advocating for the NI Executive to progress with the NI Anti-Poverty Strategy which is fundamental to addressing many of the root causes of poverty. Whilst we can look to deliver local actions, there is a need for legislative change and redistribution of resources to tackle issues on welfare reform, housing, health and employment.

     

    “For many years, and particularly post Covid and during the Cost of Living crisis, local groups and charities have been working tirelessly to provide much needed support and I highly commend their efforts and all the work of their volunteers. Council listened to the request to have a local anti-poverty action plan and in collaboration with local partners, we have set out to design a plan that identifies local actions that have the ambition to move people out of poverty and prevent people from getting into poverty.

     

    “The eight-week consultation period is an opportunity for the wider public to feed into this local action plan and to give their views on the themes and actions. I would encourage anyone with an interest in this important issue to get involved and let us know your views and how we can make a real difference to the lives of many in our Council area. No one should be living in poverty in our community and by working together we can do what we can to stamp out poverty,” Mayor Barr stressed.

     

    To get involved in the consultation you can download a copy of the draft plan at –

    https://derrystrabane.uk.engagementhq.com/consultation-pathways-out-of-poverty-anti-poverty-action-plan or request a copy by contacting the Council directly. Comments on the plan can be sent via email to [email protected] or by telephone 028 71 253253 Ext: 6660 or directly on the website.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: How the Council is helping keep thousands of vulnerable residents warm this winter

    Source: City of Manchester

    Over the last few years we know that for some people the cost-of-living crisis has been incredibly tough.

    To combat this millions of pounds has been set aside by the Council to ensure that all kinds of support – from food and medicine, to paying bills or combatting loneliness – has been made available to people of all ages in Manchester. 

    Before Christmas a special payment went out to more than 5,000 people aged over 65, whose details we already had on our system and who we knew might need some extra help. 

    Through this move the Council has been able to pay out just over £757,000 to eligible families and residents, consisting of payments of £150 – £200 made directly to a person’s bank account, or via Post Office vouchers for those who want to pay their bills in person. 

    But, now the council wants to remind people that it has also extended this scheme to include those people aged 66 or over who may not have been contacted before Christmas, or who are still finding it difficult to pay their bills during the cold weather, or who did not get a winter fuel payment and do not receive housing benefit or council tax support. 

    In the last two weeks alone more than 650 people have come forward for payments, and the council is now urging more people to apply in a process that’s quick, easy and does not involve giving any details of any personal savings. 

    People can apply via this form manchester.gov.uk/winterfuelfund. Or, if they need some help with filling out the form they can also ring for free on our cost-of-living advice line on 0800 023 2692. 

    Relatives can also make an application on behalf of a family member. 

    Click here to find out more about the support on offer during the cost-of-living crisis.

    Councillor Bev Craig, Leader of Manchester City Council said: Throughout the cost-of-living crisis, Manchester City Council has prioritised those most in need, spending millions of pounds helping those facing tough times, the most vulnerable and on long term solutions to tackle poverty.   

    “I’m pleased to say that since launching our Winter Hardship Fund for the over 65s this winter, we have helped more than 6,000 Manchester residents. The fact that we have had more than 650 people come forward in the past two weeks alone demonstrates the importance of this winter support 

    “Keeping the heat on at this time is year is incredibly important, especially for older people who may have been struggling during the cost-of-living crisis. That’s why we’ve tried to make the application process as easy as possible, but we do have staff on hand to help anyone who may not have access to a computer, or be able to make the application online. 

    “We’ve already had messages from people telling us this fund has been a big help for people needing to pay their heating bill, but also how it is helping managing health conditions which may have been made worse during the cold weather. 

    “That’s why we want to continue spreading this message, and I’d ask people to check in with their older loved ones to make sure they’re staying warm this winter.” 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scottish Greens made budget fairer, greener and better for Scotland

    Source: Scottish Greens

    This budget makes vital progress on child poverty and climate action.

    More children will be fed, buses will be cheaper and nature will be protected as a result of changes made to the Government’s budget by the Scottish Greens, says the party’s finance spokesperson Ross Greer ahead of a debate and vote taking place today.

    Through negotiations late last year the Scottish Greens secured record investment in climate action, a funding increase for local services including schools, social care and bin collections, free ferry travel for young islanders and free bus travel for asylum seekers. They also increased the tax paid when buying a second or holiday home, giving a boost to first-time home buyers.

    And last week it was announced that the Greens had also secured free school meals for thousands more S1-S3 pupils, more funding for nature restoration and a year-long trial where bus fares in one region of the country will be capped at no more than £2.

    Mr Greer said:

    “As a direct result of Green negotiations, this budget will lift more children out of poverty, make buses cheaper and help tackle the climate crisis.

    “No child should be hungry at school, and the extra meals secured by Green MSPs will take us one step closer to eradicating that hunger completely. This builds on the extension of universal free school meals to P4 and P5 which the Scottish Greens delivered a few years ago.

    “We are determined to make it cheaper to get the bus. That’s why we will launch a year-long trial in one region where bus fares are capped at £2, something we are confident will be successful enough to then roll out across all of Scotland.”

    Mr Greer added:

    “There is a huge contrast between everything the Scottish Greens have delivered for people and planet, and a Scottish Labour Party who allowed the SNP’s budget to pass without securing a single change of their own. 

    “While others played silly games, Green MSPs worked to support families in poverty and protect our natural environment.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Asian Development Blog: From Roads to Riches: Economic Corridors Can Supercharge South Asia

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    Economic corridor development in South Asia enhances trade, industrialization, and connectivity while addressing infrastructure gaps and business constraints. By creating jobs, promoting regional integration, and improving manufacturing competitiveness, corridors contribute to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction.

    Economic corridors are drivers of economic growth and structural transformation and are integral to the pursuit of regional development and economic integration. They not only enhance connectivity and trade but also foster industrialization, job creation, and balanced regional growth. 

    In South Asia, particularly in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India, and Sri Lanka the development of economic corridors presents a promising pathway to unlock economic potential, strengthen regional ties, and promote sustainable development. 

    Economic corridor development efforts aim to improve a country’s manufacturing potential by addressing key constraints such as cumbersome business processes, infrastructure bottlenecks, and low competitiveness of domestic manufacturing leading to low manufacturing jobs and less integration with global value chains.

    An economic corridor is a network of infrastructure projects designed to stimulate economic development across and between regions. These corridors typically include transportation routes, such as highways, railways, and ports, as well as industrial hubs and trade facilitation zones. The aim is to enhance connectivity, reduce trade barriers, and promote investment, ultimately spurring economic activities and job creation.

    India, with its vast and diverse economy, plays a crucial role in the development of economic corridors in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The country’s strategic initiatives, such as the NICDP and the Prime Minister Gati Shakti (PM-GS) National Master Plan, aim to enhance connectivity and promote economic integration.

    In Bangladesh, the development of economic corridors is focused on enhancing infrastructure and trade logistics. Notable examples include the South West Economic Corridor, spanning from Khulna and Jessore to Dhaka, and the North East Economic Corridor, connecting Dhaka to Sylhet. These corridors are designed to improve the country’s trade infrastructure, diversify production networks, and integrate with regional and global value chains, all the while stimulating economic activities in less developed areas.

    Bhutan has planned to develop Gelephu Mindfulness City which will be the biggest economic hub of Bhutan attracting foreign investment and integrating with the rest of South Asia and Southeast Asia. Multimodal connectivity of Gelephu with India and Bangladesh will be a critical factor of its success in future. 

    Economic corridors drive regional integration, boost industrialization, and create jobs by enhancing infrastructure, reducing trade barriers, and fostering economic growth across South Asia.
     

    India’s efforts in industrial corridor development aim to boost the manufacturing sector by addressing key constraints like cumbersome business processes and infrastructure bottlenecks. 

    The National Industrial Corridor Development Program, in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank, focuses on creating a conducive environment for manufacturing, thereby enhancing sectoral growth. The Prime Minister Gati Shakti (PM-GS) National Master Plan further aims to enhance connectivity and promote economic integration across the country.

    Nepal, a landlocked country with challenging terrain, faces unique obstacles in its quest for economic development. The development of economic corridors, such as the East-West Highway and the North-South Corridors, is crucial for improving connectivity, reducing trade barriers, and fostering regional integration. These corridors aim to link Nepal more effectively with its neighbors, promoting economic activities and development in the region.

    Sri Lanka’s Colombo-Trincomalee Economic Corridor (CTEC) connects the Western Region including Colombo Port with the East Coast to Trincomalee Port, aims to facilitate economic growth through a network of export zones and free trade zones. This infrastructure is expected to boost trade, attract investments, and promote balanced regional growth.

    Economic corridor development involves a building block approach of construction and enhancement of transport networks, energy grids, and trade facilitation measures that connect key economic hubs within and across borders. 

    The transport and trade corridors are designed to streamline the movement of goods, services, and people, thereby reducing costs, increasing efficiency, and boosting competitiveness. The initiative also emphasizes the importance of aligning national policies and regulations to ensure seamless operations and to maximize the benefits of regional integration.

    Gradually these corridors will be transformed into economic corridors by addressing both hardware and software aspects of development. Effective corridor development also entails creating a conducive environment for businesses to thrive and for economies to grow.

    One of the key objectives of economic corridor development is job creation. This is a critical development objective for the countries in South Asia.  The creation of formal jobs through the expansion of the manufacturing sector directly contributes to poverty alleviation. 

    By facilitating the formalization of labor and incentivizing firms to adopt modern technology, corridor development helps to increase productivity and wages, thereby improving the standard of living for workers. Government actions to provide gender-inclusive housing, upgrade the skills of female workers, and appoint female board members in industrial node boards, further enhance economic corridors’ impact on poverty reduction and gender equality. 

    Economic corridors are pivotal in shaping South Asia’s economic future by enhancing trade, industrialization, and regional cooperation. Continued investment, policy alignment, and inclusive development strategies will be essential in maximizing their benefits and ensuring sustainable, equitable growth.
     

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Government plan fails on growing public housing stock

    Source: Green Party

    The Green Party says the Government is giving up on growing the country’s public housing stock, despite overwhelming evidence that we need more affordable houses to solve the housing crisis.

    “The Government has given up on the housing crisis, using the review into Kāinga Ora to push their privatisation agenda,” says the Green Party spokesperson for Housing Tamatha Paul.

    “Public housing is as essential as public healthcare and public education. Housing is a human right that this Government is denying our communities from accessing. 

    “The housing crisis in Aotearoa is getting worse and worse. Instead of making excuses to allow poverty and homelessness to skyrocket, the Government needs to back Kāinga Ora to build at scale and at pace. 

    “This Government is deliberately stripping Kāinga Ora to the bare bones, playing straight into the hands of wealthy landlords looking to exploit housing insecurity for private profit. We cannot rely on the private market to solve our problems, we have seen it entrench poverty and homelessness across generations. 

    “The last Government sold just 276 state houses over six years, but increased public housing supply by over 7,000 homes. With this new direction, Bishop will sell 900 per year. That’s not just opening the door to privatisation, it’s welcoming it in with open arms. 

    “In the past, our country’s leaders made a conscious decision to house everybody and grow public housing stock at scale. We can make that decision again and we must resist the sale of public housing at all costs because it will have consequences for generations to come.

    “Public housing is a crucial part of ensuring we don’t have gentrified, segregated communities, and that our neighbourhoods reflect the make-up of our wider society, culturally and economically.

    “Housing is a public good that provides the basis for a stable home for whanau, so that no one is left behind. The Government should be building thousands of new homes,” says Tamatha Paul.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Whether Biden Or Trump, US’ Latin American Policy Will Be Contemptible

    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs – Analysis-Reportage

    By John Perry and Roger D. Harris

    Migration, Drugs, and Tariffs.

    With Donald Trump as the new US president, pundits are speculating about how US policy towards Latin America might change.

    In this article, we look at some of the speculation, then address three specific instances of how the US’s policy priorities may be viewed from a progressive, Latin American perspective. This leads us to a wider argument: that the way these issues are dealt with is symptomatic of Washington’s paramount objective of sustaining the US’s hegemonic position. In this overriding preoccupation, its policy towards Latin America is only one element, of course, but always of significance because the US hegemon still treats the region as its “backyard.”

    First, some examples of what the pundits are saying. In Foreign Affairs, Brian Winter argues that Trump’s return signals a shift away from Biden’s neglect of the region. “The reason is straightforward,” he says. “Trump’s top domestic priorities of cracking down on unauthorized immigration, stopping the smuggling of fentanyl and other illicit drugs, and reducing the influx of Chinese goods into the United States all depend heavily on policy toward Latin America.”

    Ryan Berg, who is with the thinktank, Center for Strategic and International Studies, funded by the US defense industry, is also hopeful. Trump will “focus U.S. policy more intently on the Western Hemisphere,” he argues, “and in so doing, also shore up its own security and prosperity at home.”

    According to blogger James Bosworth, Biden’s “benign neglect” could be replaced by an “aggressive Monroe Doctrine – deportations, tariff wars, militaristic security policies, demands of fealty towards the US, and a rejection of China.” However, notwithstanding the attention of Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, Bosworth thinks there is still a good chance of policy lapsing into benign neglect as the new administration focuses elsewhere.

    The wrong end of the telescope

    What these and similar analyses share is a concern with problems of importance to the US, including domestic ones, and how they might be tackled by shifts in policy towards Latin America. They view the region from the end of a US-mounted telescope.

    Trump’s approach may be the more brazen “America first!,” but the basic stance is much the same as these pundits. The different scenarios will be worked out in Washington, with Latin America’s future seen as shaped by how it handles US policy changes over which it has little influence. Analyses by these supposed experts are constrained by their adopting the same one-dimensional perspective as Washington’s, instead of questioning it.

    Here’s one example. The word “neglect” is superficial because it hides the immense involvement of the US in Latin America even when it is “neglecting” it: from deep commercial ties to a massive military presence. It is also superficial because, in a real sense, the US constantly neglects the problems that concern most Latin Americans: low wages, inequality, being safe in the streets, the damaging effects of climate change, and many more. “Neglect” would be seen very differently on the streets of a Latin American city than it is inside the Washington beltway.

    Who has the “drug problem”?

    The vacuum in US thinking is nowhere more apparent than in responses to the drug problem. Trump threatens to declare Mexican drug cartels to be terrorist organizations and to invade Mexico to attack them.

    But, as academic Carlos Pérez-Ricart told El Pais: “This is a problem that does not originate in Mexico. The source, the demand, and the vectors are not Mexican. It is them.” Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum also points out that it is consumption in the US that drives drug production and trafficking in Mexico.

    Trump could easily make the same mistake as his predecessor Clinton did two decades ago. Back then, billions were poured into “Plan Colombia” but still failed to solve the “drug problem,” while vastly augmenting violence and human rights violations in the target country.

    A foretaste of what might happen, if Trump carries out his threat, occurred last July, when Biden’s administration captured Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. That caused an all-out war between cartels in the Mexican state of Sinaloa.

    Sheinbaum rightly turns questions about drug production and consumption back onto the US. Rhetorically, she asks: “Do you believe that fentanyl is not manufactured in the United States?…. Where are the drug cartels in the United States that distribute fentanyl in US cities? Where does the money from the sale of that fentanyl go in the United States?”

    If Trump launches a war on cartels, he will not be the first US president to the treat drug consumption as a foreign issue rather than a concomitantly domestic one.

    Where does the “migration problem” originate?

    Trump is also not the first president to be obsessed by migration. Like drugs, it is seen as a problem to be solved by the countries where the migrants originate, while both the “push” and “pull” factors under US control receive less attention.

    Exploitation of migrant labor, complex asylum procedures, and schemes such as “humanitarian parole” to encourage migration are downplayed as reasons. Biden intensified US sanctions on various Latin American countries, which have been shown conclusively to provoke massive emigration. Meanwhile Trump threatens to do the same.

    Many Latin American countries have been made unsafe by crime linked to drugs or other problems in which the US is implicated. About 392,000 Mexicans were displaced as a result of conflict in 2023 alone, their problem aggravated by the massive, often illegal, export of firearms from the US to Mexico.

    Costa Rica, historically a safe country, had a record 880 homicides in 2023, many of which were related to drug trafficking. In Brazil and other countries, US-trained security forces contribute directly to the violence, rather than reducing it.

    Mass deportations from the US, promised by Trump, could worsen these problems, as happened in El Salvador in the late 1990s. They would also affect remittances sent home by migrant workers, exacerbating regional poverty. The threatened use of tariffs on exports to the US could also have serious consequences if Latin America does not stand up to Trump’s threats. Economist Michael Hudson argues that countries will have to jointly retaliate by refusing to pay dollar-based debts to bond holders if export earnings from the US are summarily cut.

    China in the US “backyard”

    Trump also joins the Washington consensus in its preoccupation with China’s influence in Latin America. Monica de Bolle is with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a thinktank partly funded by Pentagon contractors. She told the BBC: “You have got the backyard of America engaging directly with China. That’s going to be problematic.”

    Recently retired US Southern Command general, Laura Richardson, was probably the most senior frequent visitor on Washington’s behalf to Latin American capitals, during the Biden administration. She accused China of “playing the ‘long game’ with its development of dual-use sites and facilities throughout the region, “adding that those sites could serve as “points of future multi-domain access for the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] and strategic naval chokepoints.”

    As Foreign Affairs points out, Latin America’s trade with China has “exploded” from $18 billion in 2002 to $480 billion in 2023. China is also investing in huge infrastructure projects, and seemingly its only political condition is a preference for a country to recognize China diplomatically (not Taiwan). Even here, China is not absolute as with Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay, which still recognize Taiwan. China still has direct investments in those holdouts, though relatively more modest than with regional countries that fully embrace its one-China policy.

    Peru, currently a close US ally, has a new, Chinese-funded megaport at Chancay, opened in November by President Xi Jinping himself. Even right-wing Argentinian president Milei said of China, “They do not demand anything [in return].”

    What does the US offer instead? While Antony Blinken proudly displayed old railcars that were gifted to Peru, the reality is that most US “aid” to Latin America is either aimed at “promoting democracy” (i.e. Washington’s political agenda) or is conditional or exploitative in other ways.

    The BBC cites “seasoned observers” who believe that Washington is paying the price for “years of indifference” towards the region’s needs. Where the US sees a loss of strategic influence to China and to a lesser extent to Russia, Iran, and others, Latin American countries see opportunities for development and economic progress.

    Remember the Monroe Doctrine

    Those calling for a more “benign” policy are forgetting that, in the two centuries since President James Monroe announced the “doctrine,” later given his name, US policy towards Latin America has been aggressively self-interested.

    Its troops have intervened thousands of times in the region and have occupied its countries on numerous occasions. Just since World War II, there have been around 50 significant interventions or coup attempts, beginning with Guatemala in 1954. The US has 76 military bases across the region, while other major powers like China and Russia have none.

    The doctrine is very much alive. In Foreign Affairs, Brian Winter warns: “Many Republicans perceive these linkages [with China], and the growing Chinese presence in Latin America more broadly, as unacceptable violations of the Monroe Doctrine, the 201-year-old edict that the Western Hemisphere should be free of interference from outside powers.”

    Bosworth adds that Trump wants Latin America to decisively choose a side in the US vs China scrimmage, not merely underplay the role of China in the hemisphere. Any country courting Trump, he suggests, “needs to show some anti-China vibes.”

    Will Freeman is with the Council on Foreign Relations, whose major sponsors are also Pentagon contractors. He thinks that a new Monroe Doctrine and what he calls Trump’s “hardball” diplomacy may partially work, but only with northern Latin America countries, which are more dependent on US trade and other links.

    Trump has two imperatives: while one is stifling China’s influence (e.g. by taking possession of the Panama Canal), another is gaining control of mineral resources (a reason for his wanting to acquire Greenland). The desire for mineral resources is not new, either. General Richardson gave an interview in 2023 to another defense-industry-funded thinktank in which she strongly insinuated that Latin American minerals rightly belong to the US.

    Maintaining hegemonic power against the threat of multipolarity

    Neoconservative Charles Krauthammer, writing 20 years ago for yet another thinktank funded by the  defense industry, openly endorsed the US’s status as the dominant hegemonic power and decried multilateralism, at least when not in US interests. “Multipolarity, yes, when there is no alternative,” he said. “But not when there is. Not when we have the unique imbalance of power that we enjoy today.”

    Norwegian commentator Glen Diesen, writing in 2024, contends that the US is still fighting a battle – although perhaps now a losing one – against multipolarity and to retain its predominant status. Trump’s “America first!” is merely a more blatant expression of sentiments held by his other presidential predecessors for clinging on to Washington’s contested hegemony.

    The irony of Biden’s presidency was that his pursuit of the Ukraine war has led to warmer relations between his two rivals, Russia and China. In this context, the growth of BRICS has been fostered – an explicitly multipolar, non-hegemonic partnership. As Glen Diesen says, “The war intensified the global decoupling from the West.”

    Other steps to maintain US hegemony – its support for Israel’s genocide in Gaza, the regime-change operation in Syria and the breakdown of order in Haiti – suggest that, in Washington’s view, according to Diesen, “chaos is the only alternative to US global dominance.” Time and again, Yankee “beneficence” has meant ruination, not development.

    These have further strengthened desires in the global south for alternatives to US dominance, not least in Latin America. Many of its countries (especially those vulnerable to tightening US sanctions) now want to follow the alternative of BRICS.

    Unsurprisingly, Trump has been highly critical of this perceived erosion of hegemonic power on Biden’s watch. Thomas Fazi argues in UnHerd that this is realism on Trump’s part; he knows the Ukraine war cannot be conclusively won, and that China’s power is difficult to contain. Accordingly, this is leading to a “recalibrating of US priorities toward a more manageable ‘continental’ strategy — a new Monroe Doctrine — aimed at reasserting full hegemony over what it deems to be its natural sphere of influence, the Americas and the northern Atlantic,” stretching from Greenland and the Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and Antarctica.

    The pundits may not agree on quite what Trump’s approach towards Latin America will be, but they concur with Winter’s judgment that the region “is about to become a priority for US foreign policy.” His appointment of Marco Rubio is a signal of this. The new secretary of state is a hawk, just like Blinken, but one with a dangerous focus on Latin America.

    However, the mere fact that such pundits hark back to the Monroe Doctrine indicates that this is only, so to speak, old wine in new bottles. Even in the recent past, an aggressive application of the 201-year-old Monroe Doctrine has never seen a hiatus.

    Recall US-backed coups that deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya (2009) and Bolivian Evo Morales (2019), plus the failed coup against Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2018), along with the parliamentary coup that ousted Paraguayan Fernando Lugo (2012). To these, US-backed regime change by “lawfare” included Dilma Rousseff in Brazil (2016) and Pedro Castillo in Peru (2023). Currently presidential elections have simply been suspended in Haiti and Peru with US backing.

    Even if Trump is more blatant than his predecessors in making clear that his policymaking is based entirely on what he perceives to be US interests, rather than those of Latin Americans, this is not new.

    As commentator Caitlin Johnstone points out, the main difference between Trump and his predecessors is that he “makes the US empire much more transparent and unhidden.” From the other end of the political spectrum, a former John McCain adviser echoes the same assessment: “there will likely be far more continuity between the two administrations than meets the eye.”

    Regardless, Latin America will continue to struggle to set its own destiny, patchily and with setbacks, and this will likely draw it away from the hegemon, whatever the US does.

    Nicaragua-based John Perry is with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition and writes for the London Review of Books, FAIR, and CovertAction.

    Roger D. Harris is with the Task Force on the Americas, the US Peace Council, and the Venezuela Solidarity Network

    Featured image courtesy of Cornell University/Wikimedia Commons

    First published by Popular Resistance: https://popularresistance.org/whether-biden-or-trump-us-latin-american-policy-will-still-be-contemptible/

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Europe: AFRICA/NIGERIA – Poverty, food insecurity, inadequate health care and high cost of living

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Monday, 3 February 2025

    Abuja (Agenzia Fides) – In addition to the serious waves of violence that are affecting the Nigerian population, including kidnappings, clashes, terrorist attacks and brutal murders, there is poverty, food insecurity, inadequate health care and a disproportionate increase in the cost of living.”We are suffering greatly. We have almost nothing to eat and for more than four years we have not been able to dedicate ourselves to agricolture because the bandits have driven us out of our communities. We urgently need the government’s support,” says a statement from residents of a refugee camp in Zamfara state, in northwest Nigeria.In this region of the country, armed groups are driving farmers off their land, closing markets and extorting money from communities. More than 2.2 million people have been forced to flee, many of them now living in overcrowded camps without any resources. According to local press reports, the ongoing conflicts are also affecting agriculture and food production in the northeast. Families returning to their land are reluctant to farm away from militarized cities, risking starvation. Food shortages are so severe that some families are forced to eat cassava husks to survive.In 2020, the Nigerian government launched the so-called “National Multisectoral Action Plan for Food and Nutrition”, an initiative for the period 2021-2025 to combat food security and malnutrition, with a focus on increasing food production through agricultural investments. Unfortunately, so far, the funds have not been sufficient.Agriculture generates 24% of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs more than 30% of the total workforce, but the funding for the sector remains well below the 10% target set by the African Union in the 2003 Maputo Declaration, which calls for at least 10% of national budgets to be allocated to agriculture and rural development within five years (see Fides, 21/9/2006).Africa’s most populous country, with around 225 million inhabitants, has one of the highest rates of childhood stunting in the world: 32% of children under five are affected.According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), two million children in Nigeria, mainly in the north of the country, are affected by malnutrition, which kills around 2,400 children under five every day. (AP) (Agenzia Fides, 3/2/2025)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova – A10-0006/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova

    (COM(2024)0469 – C10‑0127/2024 – 2024/0258(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0469),

     having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0127/2024),

     having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Budgetary Control,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Budgets (A10-0006/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

    AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT[*]

    to the Commission proposal

    ———————————————————

    2024/0258 (COD)

    Proposal for a

    REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova
     

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

    Whereas:

    (1) The Union is founded on the values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which include democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Those values form part of the accession criteria established at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 (‘Copenhagen criteria’), which constitute the conditions of eligibility for the Union membership,

    (2) The enlargement process is built on established criteria, fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits. A firm commitment to ‘fundamentals first’ approach, which requires a strong focus on the rule of law, fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform, as well as on economic criteria, remains essential. Progress depends on  implementation by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafer referred to as ‘Moldova’) of the necessary reforms to align with the Union acquis,

    (3) Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine further showed that enlargement is a geo-strategic investment in peace, security and stability. The Union is fully and unequivocally committed to the Union membership perspective of Moldova. Moldova’s orientation and commitment towards the Union is a strong expression of its strategic choice and place in a community of values. Moldova’s EU path needs to be firmly anchored in tangible and concrete progress on reforms,

    (4) It is in the common interest of the Union and Moldova to advance with the reforms its political, legal and economic systems with a view to its future Union membership and to support its accession process. The prospect of Union membership has a powerful transformative effect, embedding positive democratic, political, economic and societal change,

    (5) It is necessary to bring forward some of the advantages of Union membership before accession. Economic convergence is at the heart of those benefits. Currently, the convergence of Moldova in terms of GDP per capita expressed in purchasing power standards remains low at 29% of the Union average and is not progressing fast enough,

    (6) As accession negotiations with Moldova opened in June 2024, it is important that support to Moldova’s accession track is brought to levels that are comparable with other candidate countries engaged in accession negotiations and to ensure commensurate resources.

    (7) The implementation of the Growth Plan for Moldova requires the appropriate funding under a dedicated new financing instrument, the Facility to assist the country in implementing reforms for sustainable economic growth and advance on the fundamentals.

    (8) To achieve the goals of the Growth Plan for Moldova, emphasis with respect to investment areas should be placed on sectors that are likely to function as key multipliers for social and economic development: connectivity, infrastructure, including sustainable transport, decarbonisation, energy, green and digital transitions, agriculture and rural communities as well as education, labour market participation and skills development, with a particular focus on children and youth and on raising the standard of living throughout the country. Moldova’s diaspora should also be considered as an important contributor to Moldova’s social and economic development.

    (9) The Facility should build on the Association Agenda with Moldova as well as the work of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Eastern Partnership in Moldova which spearheaded investments in critical sectors such as connectivity, energy efficiency and energy security, while avoiding stranded assets, business development, and competitiveness, recognising that the liberalisation of tariff-rate quotas for key Moldovan exports, facilitation of trade through infrastructure and regulatory alignment, and strengthening Moldova’s integration into Union-led economic initiatives and programs will contribute to Moldova’s  integration into the Union single market and will deliver immediate and tangible socio-economic benefits.

    (9a) Given Russia’s unjust war of aggression against Ukraine, which has profoundly impacted Moldova’s security, economy, and citizens’ livelihoods, as well as the ongoing and unprecedented hybrid attacks targeting the country and democratic institutions, it is appropriate for the Facility to provide support to Moldova in a timely manner and to enable Moldova to strengthen its resilience to foreign malign interference in its sovereignty, democratic processes and institutions. The Facility should also seek to support Moldova’s needs for energy independence from Russia.

    (10) Sustainable and cohesive transport infrastructure is essential to improve connectivity between Moldova and the Union. It should contribute to the integration of Moldova in the Union’s transport network In the revised trans-European transport network (TEN-T), the Commission extended the Baltic Sea – Black Sea – Aegean Sea European Transport Corridor to Moldova. The TEN-T network is the reference for funding sustainable transport infrastructure, including for environmentally friendly means of transport, such as railways as well as digitalisation of transport. Cross-border energy infrastructure projects and interconnections are essential for regional energy security and integration within the Union.

    (11) The Facility should support investments and reforms that promote Moldova’s path to the digital transformation of the economy and society in line with the Union vision for 2030 presented in the Commission communication, entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’, fostering an inclusive digital economy that benefits all citizens. The Facility should strive to facilitate Moldova’ achievement of the general objectives and digital targets with regard to the Union. As outlined by the Commission in its communication of 15 June 2023, entitled ‘Implementation of the 5G cybersecurity Toolbox’, the 5G cybersecurity Toolbox should be the reference for Union funding to ensure security, resilience and the protection of integrity of digital infrastructure projects in the region.

    (12) The support under the Facility should be provided to meet general and specific objectives, based on established criteria and with clear payment conditions. Those general and specific objectives should be pursued in a mutually reinforcing manner. The Facility should support the enlargement process by accelerating the alignment with Union values, laws, rules, standards, policies and practices (‘acquis’) with a view to Union membership, accelerate progressive integration of Moldova in the Union single market, and accelerate its socio-economic convergence with the Union. The Facility should also foster good neighbourly relations.

    (13) In addition to boosting socio-economic convergence, the Facility should also help accelerate reforms related to the fundamentals of the enlargement process including rule of law, fundamental rights, inter alia, the rights of refugees, of persons belonging to minorities, including national minorities and Roma, as well as the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. It should also improve the functioning of democratic institutions and public administrations; public procurement, state aid control and public finance management; the fight against all forms of corruption and organised crime; quality education and training as well as employment policies; the country’s green transition, climate and environmental objectives.

    (14) This Facility should help Moldova in its preparation for Union Membership and in line with the existing enlargement methodology[1].

    (15) The Facility should complement the existing Economic and Financial Dialogue without compromising its scope, thereby enhancing economic integration and preparation for the Union’s multilateral surveillance of economic policies.

    (16) The Facility should promote the development of effectiveness principles, respecting additionality to and complementarity with the support provided under other Union programmes and instruments and striving to avoid duplication and ensure synergies between assistance under this Regulation and other assistance, including integrated financial packages composed of both export and development financing provided by the Union, the Member States, third countries, multilateral and regional organisations and entities. Moldova’s participation in other EU funding programmes should be promoted and encouraged.

    (17) In line with the principle of inclusive partnerships, the Commission should strive to ensure that relevant stakeholders in Moldova, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations are duly consulted and have timely access to relevant information to allow them to play a meaningful role during the design and implementation of programmes and the related monitoring processes.

    (18) Technical assistance, as well as cross-border cooperation assistance, should be provided in support of the objectives of this Facility and in order to strengthen the relevant capacities of Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda.

    (19) The Facility should ensure consistency with, and support for the general objectives of Union external action as laid down in Article 21 of the TEU, including the respect for fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It should in particular ensure the protection and promotion of human rights, and the rule of law.

    (20) The Facility should boost innovation, research, and cooperation between academic institutions and industry in support of the green and digital transitions, promoting local industries with a particular emphasis on locally based micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups;

    (21) Moldova should demonstrate a credible commitment to European values, including through its alignment with the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including Union restrictive measures.

    (22) In the implementation of the Facility, account should be taken of the Union’s strategic autonomy as well as of the Union and its Member States’ strategic interests and the values on which the Union is founded.

    (23) Activities under the Facility should support progress towards Union social, climate and environmental standards, and support progress towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and should not contribute to environmental degradation or cause harm to the environment or climate. Measures funded under the Facility should be in line with Moldova’ Energy and Climate Plans, their Nationally Determined Contribution and ambition to reach climate neutrality by 2050. The Facility should contribute to the mitigation of climate change and to the ability to adapt to its adverse effects, and foster climate resilience. In particular, funding under the Facility should promote the transition towards a decarbonised, climate-neutral, climate-resilient and circular economy.

    (24) The implementation of this Regulation should be guided by the principles of equality and non-discrimination, as elaborated in the Union of Equality strategies. It should promote and advance gender equality and mainstreaming, ensure meaningful participation of women in decision-making processes, and the empowerment of women and girls, and seek to protect and promote women’s and girls’ rights, as well as prevent and combat violence against women and domestic violence, taking into consideration relevant EU Gender Action Plans and relevant Council conclusions and international conventions. Furthermore, this Regulation should be implemented in full respect of the European Pillar of Social Rights, including on child protection and labour rights. The implementation of the Facility should be in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its protocol and ensure accessibility in its investments and technical assistance, in line with Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

    (25) Reflecting the European Green Deal as Europe’s sustainable growth strategy and the importance of tackling climate and biodiversity objectives in line with the commitments of the Interinstitutional Agreement, the Facility should contribute to the achievement of an overall target of 30 % of Union budget expenditure supporting climate objectives and 7,5 % in 2024 and 10 % in 2026 and 2027 to biodiversity objectives. At least 37 % of the non-repayable financial support, including provisioning, provided to investment projects approved under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP), one of the regional investment platforms referred to in Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947[2], should account to climate objectives. That amount should be calculated using the Rio markers following the obligation to report the EU’s international climate finance to the OECD, as well as other international agreements or frameworks. As early as June 2025, the EU climate coefficients, applicable across all programmes under the 2021-2027 Multi-annual Financing Framework (MFF) and set out in the Commission Staff Working Document entitled ‘Climate Mainstreaming Architecture in the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework’ (SWD(2022) 225), will also be applied to climate expenditure under the MFF’s Heading 6 (‘Neighbourhood and the world’). The Facility will align with the approach of other Heading 6 instruments, in order to ensure consistent climate reporting in the region. The Facility should support activities that fully respect the climate and environmental standards and priorities of the Union and the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6).

    (26) Projects are approved under the NIP after assessment by the Commission and subject to a positive opinion by the Member States in the NIP Board.

    (27) The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States and Moldova, should ensure the compliance, coherence, consistency and complementarity, increased transparency and accountability in the delivery of assistance, including by implementing appropriate internal control systems and anti-fraud policies. The support under the Facility should be made available under the preconditions that Moldova upholds and respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, free and fair elections, independent and pluralistic media, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and to guarantee respect for all human rights obligations, including the effective rights of persons belonging to minorities.

    (28) The Facility should be supported with resources from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe amounting to EUR 420 million and a maximum amount of EUR 1 500 million in loans for the period from 2025-2027. The amount should cover the 9% provisioning required for the loans corresponding to EUR 135 million, support provided by the Union for projects approved under the NIP, as referred to in Article 18(2), and complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance.  The non-repayable support should be financed from the envelope allocated to the Neighbourhood geographic programme under Article 6(2), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. In order to maximise EU financial support, the 9 % provisioning required for the loans corresponding to EUR 135 million should be covered from the NDICI- Global Europe Emerging challenges and priorities cushion, in line with Articles 6(3) and 17 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. All provisions under Regulation (EU) 2021/947 should apply unless otherwise mentioned in this Regulation. In particular, Moldova should remain eligible for NDICI regional, thematic and rapid response programmes as well as humanitarian aid. The proposed Facility is closely modelled on the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans.

    (29) Decisions on the release referred to in Article 19(3) for the support in the form of loans should be adopted in the period from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2029. This final date includes the time necessary for the Commission to evaluate the successful fulfilment of the payment conditions concerned and to adopt the subsequent release decision.

    (30) In order to maximise the leverage of Union financial support to attract additional investment, and to ensure Union control over the expenditure, the investments supporting the Reform Agenda should be implemented through the NIP. At least 25% of the loan amount released to Moldova should be made available by Moldova to investment projects approved under the NIP. This is in addition to the non-repayable support provided by the Union for these projects.

    (31) The financial liability from loans under the Facility should not constitute part of the amount of the External Action Guarantee within the meaning of Article 31(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

    (32) Horizontal financial rules adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of Article 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should apply to this Regulation. Those rules are laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and determine in particular the procedure for establishing and implementing the budget in direct and indirect management through grants, procurement, financial assistance, blending operations and the reimbursement of external experts, and provide for checks on the responsibility of financial actors.

    (33) Restrictions on eligibility in award procedures under the Facility should be provided for, where appropriate, given the specific nature of the activity or when the activity affects security or public order.

    (34) In order to ensure the efficient implementation of the Facility, including the facilitation of Moldova’ integration in European value chains, all supplies and materials financed and procured under this Facility should originate from Member States, Moldova, candidate countries and contracting parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and countries which provide a level of support to Moldova comparable to the one provided by the Union, taking into account the size of their economy, and for which reciprocal access to external assistance in Moldova is established by the Commission, unless the supplies and materials cannot be sourced under reasonable conditions in any of those countries.

    (35) A Facility Agreement should be concluded with Moldova to set up the principles of the financial cooperation between the Union and Moldova, and to specify the necessary mechanisms related to the control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of Union funding under the Facility, rules on taxes, duties and charges and measures to prevent, detect, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest. Consequently, a loan agreement should also be concluded with Moldova setting out specific provisions for the management and implementation of funding provided in the forms of loans. Both the Facility Agreement and the loan agreement should be transmitted without delay, simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council ▌.

    (36) The Facility Agreement should provide the obligation for Moldova to ensure the collection of, and access to data in compliance with Union data protection principles and with applicable data protection rules, adequate data on persons and entities receiving funding, including beneficial ownership information, for the implementation of Reform Agenda.

    (37) The implementation of the Facility should be underpinned by a coherent and prioritised set of targeted reforms and investment-related priorities in Moldova (the ‘Reform Agenda’), providing a framework for boosting inclusive sustainable socio-economic growth, clearly articulated and aligned with Union accession requirements and the fundamentals of the enlargement process. The Reform Agenda will serve as an overarching framework to achieve the objectives of the Facility. The Reform Agenda should be prepared in close consultation with relevant stakeholders, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations and their input should be reflected, in accordance with the national legal framework. Disbursement of Union support should be conditional on compliance with the payment conditions and on measurable progress in the implementation of reforms set out in the Reform Agenda assessed and formally approved by the Commission. The release of funds should be structured accordingly, reflecting the objectives of the Facility.

    (38) The Reform Agenda should include targeted reform measures and priority investment areas, along with payment conditions in the form of measurable qualitative and quantitative steps that indicate satisfactory progress or completion of those measures, and a timetable for the implementation of those measures. The Reform Agenda should also include a preliminary list of planned investment projects intended for implementation under NIP. Those steps should be planned to be implemented for no later than 31 December 2027, although it should be possible for the overall completion of the measures, to which such steps refer, to extend beyond 2027 but not later than 31 December 2028. The Reform Agenda should include an explanation of Moldova’s system to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, corruption, including high-level corruption, fraud and conflicts of interest, when using the funds provided under the Facility, and the arrangements to avoid double funding from the Facility and other Union programmes as well as other donors.

    (39) The Reform Agenda should include an explanation on how the measures are expected to contribute to the climate and environmental objectives and the principle of ‘do no significant harm’, and the digital transformation.

    (40) Measures under the Reform Agenda should contribute to improving an efficient public financial management and control system, money laundering, tax avoidance, tax evasion, fraud and organised crime and to an effective system of State aid control, with the aim of ensuring fair conditions for all undertakings.

    (41) The Reform Agenda should contain a description of such systems as well as specific steps related to Chapter 32 in order to support Moldova in bringing its audit and controls requirements in line with Union standards. In the event that a request for the release of funds includes a step related to Chapter 32, referred to in Article 19(2), the Commission may not adopt a decision authorizing the release of funds unless it assesses such step positively.

    (42) The Facility Agreement should also include indicators for assessing progress towards the achievement of general and specific objectives of the Facility set out in this Regulation. Those indicators should be based on internationally agreed indicators. Indicators should also, to the extent possible, be coherent with the key performance indicators included in Commission Implementing Decision approving the Reform Agendas for the Western Balkans under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 and in the EFSD+ Results Measurement Framework. The indicators should be relevant, accepted, credible, easy, and robust.

    (43) The Commission should assess the Reform Agenda based on the list of criteria set out in this Regulation. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to approve the Reform Agenda. The Commission will duly take into account Council decision 2010/427/EU (11) and the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS), where appropriate.

    (44) The work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 adopted in accordance with the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 should cover the amounts funded from the envelope allocated to the Neighbourhood geographic programme under Article 6(2), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    (45) Given the need for flexibility in the implementation of the Facility, it should be possible for Moldova to make a reasoned request to the Commission to amend the implementing decision, where the Reform Agenda, including relevant payment conditions, is no longer achievable, either partially or totally, because of objective circumstances. Moldova should be able to make a reasoned request to amend the Reform Agenda, including by proposing addenda, where relevant. The Commission should be able to amend the implementing decision.

    (46) The Facility Agreement should provide the obligation for Moldova to ensure the collection of, and access to data in compliance with Union data protection principles and with applicable data protection rules, adequate data on persons and entities receiving funding, including beneficial ownership information, for the implementation of the Reform Agenda. Financial support for the Reform Agenda should be possible in the form of a loan. In the context of Moldova’s financing needs, it is appropriate to organise the financial assistance under the diversified funding strategy provided for in Article 224of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and established as a single funding method therein, which is expected to enhance the liquidity of Union bonds and the attractiveness and cost-effectiveness of Union issuance.

    (47) It is appropriate to provide loans to Moldova on highly concessional terms with a maximum duration of 40 years and to not start the repayment of the principal before 2034.

    (48) Considering that the financial risks associated with the support to Moldova in the form of loans under the Facility is comparable to the financial risks associated with lending operations under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, provisioning for the financial liability from loans under this Regulation should be constituted at the rate of 9 %, in line with Article 214 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and the funding of the provisioning should be sourced from the emerging challenges and priorities cushion under Article  6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    (49) In order to ensure that Moldova disposes of start-up funding for the implementation of the first reforms, it should have access to up to 20 % of the total amount provided for in this Facility, after deduction of complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance, and provisioning for loans, in the form of a pre-financing, subject to availability of funding and to the respect of the preconditions for support under the Facility.

    (50) It is important to guarantee both flexibility and programmability in providing Union support to Moldova. Moldova should submit on a six-monthly basis a duly justified request for the release of funds at the latest two months after the timeline for the planned fulfilment of steps, set in the Commission Implementing Decision approving the Reform Agenda. For that purpose, funds under the Facility should be released according to a fixed semi-annual schedule, subject to availability of funding, on the basis of a request for the release of funds submitted by Moldova and following verification by the Commission of the satisfactory fulfilment of both the general conditions related to macro-financial stability, sound public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget and the relevant payment conditions. Where a payment condition is not fulfilled as per the indicative timeline set in the decision approving the Reform Agenda, the Commission could withhold in whole or in part the release of funds corresponding to that condition, following a methodology on partial payments. The release of the corresponding withheld funds could take place during the next window for the release of funds and up to twelve months after the original deadline set out in the indicative timeline, provided that the payment conditions have been fulfilled. In the first year of implementation, that deadline should be extended to 24 months from the initial negative assessment.

    (51) By way of derogation from Article 116(2) and (5) of the Financial Regulation, it is appropriate to set the payment deadline for contributions to state budgets starting from the date of the communication of the decision authorising the disbursement to Moldova and to exclude the payment of default interest by the Commission to Moldova.

    (52) The Commission should provide▌ the European Parliament in the framework of the discharge procedure with detailed information about the implementation of the Union budget under the Facility, in particular as regards audits carried out, including weaknesses identified and corrective measures taken, and as regards projects approved under NIP, including where applicable the amount of Moldova’s co-financing as well as other sources of contributions including from other Union financing instruments.

    (53) In the framework of the Union’s restrictive measures, adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, no funds or economic resources may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of designated legal persons, entities or bodies. Such designated entities, and entities owned or controlled by them, therefore should not be supported by the Facility.

    (54) In the interest of transparency and accountability, Moldova should publish data on final recipients receiving amounts of funding exceeding the equivalent of EUR 50 000 cumulatively during the implementation of reforms and investments under this Facility.

    (55) In accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13) and Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (14), (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (15) and (EU) 2017/1939 (16), the financial interests of the Union are to be protected by means of proportionate measures, including measures relating to the prevention, detection, correction and investigation of irregularities, fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, double funding, to the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used.

    (56) In particular, in accordance with regulations (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 and (EU, Euratom) 883/2013, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) should be in a position to carry out administrative investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union.

    (57) In accordance with Article 129 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the necessary rights and access should be granted to the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, where applicable the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), including by third parties involved in the implementation of Union funds.

    (58) The Commission should ensure that the financial interests of the Union are effectively protected under the Facility. Considering the long track record of financial assistance provided to Moldova also under indirect management and taking into account its gradual alignment with the Unions internal control standards and practices, the Commission should rely to a great extent on the operation of Moldova’s internal control and fraud prevention systems. In particular, the Commission and OLAF and, where applicable, the EPPO should be informed of all suspected cases of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the implementation of funds under the Facility without delay.

    (59) Furthermore, Moldova should report the irregularities including fraud which have been the subject of a primary administrative or judicial finding, without delay, to the Commission and keep it informed of the progress of administrative and legal proceedings. With the objective of alignment to good practices in Member States, this reporting should be done by electronic means, using the Irregularity Management System, established by the Commission.

    (60) Moldova should establish a monitoring system feeding into a semi-annual report on the fulfilment of its Reform Agenda’s payment conditions accompanying the semi-annual request for the release of funds. Moldova should collect and provide access to data and information allowing the prevention, detection and correction of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, in relation to the measures supported by the Facility.

    (61) The Commission should ensure that clear monitoring and independent evaluation mechanisms are in place in order to provide effective accountability and transparency in implementing the Union budget, and to ensure effective assessment of progress towards the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation.

    (62) The Commission should provide an annual report to the European Parliament and the Council on progress towards the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation.

    (63) The Commission should carry out an evaluation of the Facility upon its completion.

    (64) Moldova should support free pluralistic media that enhance and promote the understanding of Union values and the benefits and obligations of potential Union membership, while undertaking decisive actions in terms of tackling Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. They should also ensure pro-active, clear and consistent public communication, including on the Union support. The recipients of Union funding should actively acknowledge the origin and ensure visibility of the Union funding, in line with the Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions.

    (65) Implementation of the Facility should also be accompanied by enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy to promote the values of the Union and highlight the added value of the Union’s support.

    (66) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

    (67) In order to provide funding for Moldova in due time without further delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

     

    CHAPTER I

    General Provisions

     

    Article 1

    Subject matter

    1. This Regulation establishes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova for the period 2025-2027 (the ‘Facility’).

    2. The Regulation shall provide assistance to Moldova for the delivery of EU-related reforms, in particular inclusive and sustainable socio-economic reforms and reforms concerning fundamentals of the enlargement process, aligned with Union values, as well as investments to implement Moldova’s Reform Agenda.

    3. The rules set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/947 shall apply to the implementation of the Facility, unless specified otherwise in this Regulation.

    Article 2

    Definitions

    For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

    (1) ‘Moldova’ means the Republic of Moldova.

    (2) ‘Facility Agreement’ means an arrangement concluded between the Commission and Moldova laying down the principles for the financial cooperation between Moldova and the Commission under this Regulation; this arrangement constitutes a financing agreement within the meaning of Article 114(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 ;

    (3) ‘enlargement policy framework’ means the overall policy framework for the implementation of this Regulation as defined by the European Council and the Council, and includes the revised enlargement methodology, agreements that establish a legally binding relationship with Moldova, the negotiating frameworks governing accession negotiations with candidates, where applicable, as well as resolutions of the European Parliament, relevant communications from the Commission, including, where applicable, on the rule of law, and joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 

    (4) ‘loan agreement’ means an agreement concluded between the Union and Moldova laying down the terms of the loan support under the Facility;

    (5) ‘Reform Agenda’ means a comprehensive, coherent and prioritised set of targeted reforms and priority investment areas in Moldova, including payment conditions that indicate satisfactory progress or completion of related measures, and an indicative timetable for their implementation;

    (6) ‘measures’ means reforms and investments as set out in the Reform Agenda under Chapter III;

    (7) ‘payment conditions’ means conditions for the release of funds that take the form of observable and measurable qualitative or quantitative steps to be implemented by Moldova, as set out in the Reform Agenda under Chapter III;

    (8) ‘blending operation’ means an operation supported by the Union budget that combines non-repayable forms of support from the Union budget with repayable forms of support from development or other public financial institutions, including export credit agencies, or from commercial finance institutions and investors;

    (9) ‘final recipient’ means a person or entity receiving funding under the Facility; for the part of the funding that is made available as financial assistance, final recipient will be the treasury of Moldova; for the part of the funding that is made available through the Neighbourhood Investment Platform, final recipient will be the contractor or sub-contractor implementing the investment project; 

    (10) ‘do no significant harm’ means not supporting or carrying out economic activities that do significant harm to any environmental objective, where relevant, within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852;

    (11) ‘the Neighbourhood Investment Platform’ is one of the regional investment platforms referred to under Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

     

    Article 3

    Objectives of the Facility

    1. The general objectives of the Facility shall be to:

    (a) support the enlargement process by accelerating the alignment with Union values, laws, rules, standards, policies and practices (‘acquis’) through the adoption and implementation of reforms with a view to future Union membership;

    (b) support progressive integration of Moldova into the Union single market;

    (c) accelerate the socio-economic convergence of Moldova’s economy with the Union;

    (d) foster good neighbourly relations, as well as people-to-people contact.

     

    2. The specific objectives of the Facility shall be to:

    (a) further strengthen the fundamentals of the enlargement process, including the rule of law and fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions, including de-polarisation, public administration and fulfil the economic criteria; build a functioning market economy capable of coping with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, ▌ promoting an independent judiciary, reinforcing security and stability, strengthening the fight against fraud and all forms of corruption, including high-level corruption, oligarchic influence and nepotism, organised crime, cross-border crime and money laundering as well as terrorism financing, tax evasion and tax fraud, tax avoidance; increasing compliance with international law; strengthening freedom and independence of media and academic freedom; combating hate speech; reinforce territorial integrity; enabling an environment for civil society, fostering social dialogue; promoting gender equality, gender mainstreaming and the empowerment of women and girls, children’s rights and child and youth participation, non-discrimination and tolerance, to ensure and strengthen respect for the rights of refugees and persons belonging to minorities, including national minorities and Roma, as well as rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons;

    (b) move towards full alignment of Moldova with the Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including Union restrictive measures;

    (c) fight disinformation, hybrid threats, cyberattacks and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, in particular by Russia, against Moldova’s sovereignty, democratic processes and institutions, as well as against the Union and its values;

    (d) move towards harmonisation of visa policies with the Union;

    (e) reinforce the effectiveness of public administration, build capacities and invest in administrative staff in Moldova; ensure access to information, public scrutiny and the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes; support transparency, accountability, structural reforms and good governance at all levels, including as regards their powers of oversight and inquiry over the distribution of and access to public funds as well as in the areas of public financial management and public procurement and State aid control; support initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Moldova;

    (f) accelerate the transition of Moldova to sustainable, climate-neutral and inclusive economy, that is capable of withstanding competitive market pressures of the Union single market, and to a stable investment environment and reduce its strategic dependency by diversifying energy sources and by constructing new electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries in order to achieve energy security;

    (g) foster economic integration of Moldova with the Union single market, in particular through increased trade and investment flows, and resilient value chains;

    (h) support enhanced integration with the Union single market through improved and sustainable connectivity in line with trans-European networks to reinforce good neighbourly relations, as well as people-to-people contact;

    (i) accelerate the inclusive and sustainable green transition to climate neutrality by 2050, in accordance with the Paris Agreement and the Green Deal and covering all economic sectors, particularly energy, including the transition towards a de-carbonised, climate-neutral, climate-resilient and circular economy, while ensuring that investments respect the ‘do no significant harm’ principle;

    (j) promote the digital transformation and digital skills as an enabler of sustainable development and inclusive growth;

    (k) boost innovation, research, and cooperation between academic institutions and industry in support of the green and digital transitions, promoting local industries with a particular emphasis on locally based micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups;

    (l) boost quality education, training, reskilling and upskilling at all levels, with a particular focus on youth, including tackling youth unemployment, preventing brain drain and supporting vulnerable communities, including refugees, and support employment policies, including labour rights, in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights, and fighting poverty.

    (la) support communication activities to improve Moldovan citizens’ awareness of the positive impact of Union accession and understanding of the required reforms.

     

    Article 4

    General principles

    1. Support from the Facility shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and the EU enlargement policy.

    2. Cooperation under the Facility shall be needs-based and shall promote the development effectiveness principles, namely ownership of development priorities by Moldova with a focus on clear conditionality and tangible results, inclusive partnerships with local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations, as well as transparency and mutual accountability. That cooperation shall be based on an effective and efficient allocation and use of resources.

    3. The provision of macro-financial assistance shall not fall within the scope of this Facility.

    4. Support from the Facility shall be additional and complementary to the support provided under other Union programmes and instruments. Activities eligible for funding under this Regulation may receive support from other Union programmes and instruments provided that such support does not cover the same cost and that appropriate oversight and budget control is ensured. The Commission shall ensure complementarities and synergies between the Facility and other Union programmes, with a view to avoiding the duplication of assistance and double funding.

    5. In order to promote the complementarity, coherence and efficiency of their actions, the Commission and the Member States shall cooperate and shall strive to avoid duplication and ensure synergies between assistance under this Regulation and other forms of assistance, including integrated financial packages composed of both export and development financing provided by the Union, Member States, third countries, multilateral and regional organisations and entities, such as international organisations and the relevant international financial institutions, agencies and non-Union donors, in line with the established principles for strengthening operational coordination in the field of external assistance, including through enhanced coordination with Member States at local level. Such coordination at local level shall involve regular and timely consultations and frequent exchanges of information throughout the implementation of the Facility.

    5a. In order to maximise international support, it shall be possible for Member States, third countries, international organisations, international financial institutions or other sources to contribute to the implementation of the Facility. Such contributions shall be implemented in accordance with the same rules and conditions and shall constitute external assigned revenue within the meaning of Article 21(2), points (a), (d) and (e), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    6. Activities under the Facility shall mainstream and promote democracy, human rights and gender equality, progressively align with the social, climate and environmental standards of the Union, mainstream climate change mitigation and adaptation, where relevant, disaster risk reduction, environmental protection and biodiversity conservation, including through, where appropriate, environmental impact assessments, and shall support progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, promoting integrated actions that can create co-benefits and meet multiple objectives in a coherent way. Those activities shall avoid stranded assets, and shall be guided by the principles of ‘do no significant harm’ and of ‘leaving no one behind’, as well as by the sustainability mainstreaming approach underpinning the European Green Deal. At least 37 % of the non-repayable financial support, including provisioning, provided to investment projects approved under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) should account to climate objectives.

    7. Moldova and the Commission shall ensure that gender equality, gender mainstreaming and the integration of a gender perspective are taken into account and promoted throughout the preparation of the Reform Agenda and the implementation of the Facility. Moldova and the Commission shall take appropriate steps to prevent any discrimination based upon gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Commission shall report on these measures in the context of its regular reporting under the Gender Action Plans.

    8. The Facility shall not support activities or measures which are incompatible with Moldova’s Energy and Climate Plans, their Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement, and ambition to reach climate-neutrality by 2050 at the latest or that promote investments in fossil fuels, or that cause significant adverse effects on the environment, the climate or biodiversity, while taking into account possible transitional arrangements, in line with existing Union legislation, to mitigate energy crises.

    9. In line with the principle of inclusive partnership, the Commission shall ▌ensure, as appropriate, democratic scrutiny in the form of consultation by Moldova’s government of the parliament of Moldova as well as of relevant stakeholders, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, including vulnerable groups, refugees, and all minorities and communities, as relevant, so as to allow them to participate in shaping the design and the implementation of activities eligible for funding under the Facility and in the related monitoring, scrutiny and evaluation processes, as relevant. That consultation shall seek to represent the pluralism of Moldova’s society. In addition, the Commission shall ensure that civil society in Moldova, including non-governmental organisations, is able to directly report any irregularities concerning funding or final beneficiaries to the Commission via appropriate standing channels, as well as to send to the Commission opinions on the implementation of the Reform Agenda and the evaluation of its measures by the Moldovan government.

    10. The Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and Moldova, shall ensure the implementation of Union commitments to increased transparency and accountability in the delivery of support, including by promoting the implementation and reinforcement of internal control systems and anti-fraud policies. The Commission shall make information on the volume and allocation of support publicly available through the Scoreboard referred to in Article 24. Moldova shall publish up-to-date data on final recipients receiving Union funds for the implementation of reforms and investments under this Facility, as described in Article 20.

    Article 5

    Preconditions for Union support

    1. Preconditions for the support under the Facility shall be that Moldova upholds and respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, free and fair elections, pluralistic media, meaningful engagement of the civil society, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and guarantee respect for all human rights obligations, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

    2. The Commission shall monitor the fulfilment of the preconditions set out in paragraph 1 before funds, including pre-financing, are released to Moldova under the Facility and throughout the period of the support provided under the Facility taking duly into account the enlargement policy framework. The Commission shall also take into account the relevant recommendations of international bodies, such as the Council of Europe and its Venice Commission, or the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the monitoring process.

    3. The Commission may adopt a decision concluding that some of the preconditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article are not met, and in particular, withhold the release of funds referred to in Article 19, irrespective of whether the payment conditions referred to in Article 10 are fulfilled.

     

    CHAPTER II

    Financing and implementation

    Article 6

    Implementation

    1. The Facility shall be supported with resources from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe amounting to EUR 420 million and a maximum amount of EUR 1 500 million in loans. The amount for loans shall not constitute part of the amount of the External Action Guarantee within the meaning of Article 31(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    2. The non-repayable financial support shall be financed for the period from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2027 from the envelope allocated to the Neighbourhood geographic programme under Article 6(2), point (a) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. It shall cover▌ support provided by the Union for projects approved under the NIP, as referred to in Article 18(2)and complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance. That funding shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947. The provisioning for loans amounting to EUR 135 million shall be covered from the NDICI-Global Europe Emerging challenges and priorities cushion in accordance with Articles 6(3) and 17 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    Decisions on the release referred to in Article 19(3) for the support in the form of loans shall be adopted in the period from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2029.

    3. The release of the Union’s assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the key principles and objectives of reforms set out in the Reform Agenda. All funds, with the exception of complementary support referred to in paragraph 2, and resources referred to in paragraph 5 and the exceptional bridge financing shall be provided in twice-yearly instalments based on the completion of the necessary reforms in the specified timelines as agreed in the reform agenda and agreed in the Commission Implementing Decision.

    4. At least 25% part of the loan component released to Moldova shall be made available by Moldova to investment projects approved under the NIP, one of the regional investment platforms referred to in Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. The Facility Agreement, referred to in Article 8, shall detail this obligation, as well as the detailed rules and principles for implementation. Failure to comply with this obligation shall trigger suspension of further operations under this Facility and recovery of said amounts from Moldova, as referred to in Article 19.

    4a  Complementary support shall correspond to at least 20 % of total non-repayable financial support as referred to in Article 6(2) and shall include measures to strengthen the administrative capacities of Moldovan authorities and other stakeholders, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations.

    5. An amount of up to 1% of the non-repayable support referred to in paragraph 2 may be used for technical and administrative assistance for the implementation of the Facility, such as preparatory actions, monitoring, control, audit and evaluation activities, which are required for the management of the Facility and the achievement of its objectives, in particular studies, meetings of experts, training consultations with Moldova’s authorities, conferences, consultation of stakeholders, including local and regional authorities and civil society organisations, information and communication activities, including inclusive outreach actions▌insofar as they are related to the objectives of this Regulation, expenses linked to IT networks focusing on information processing and exchange, corporate information technology tools, as well as all other expenditure at headquarters and Union delegation for the administrative and coordination support required for the Facility. Expenses may also cover the costs of activities supporting transparency and of other activities such as quality control and monitoring of projects or programmes on the ground and the costs of peer counselling and experts for the assessment and implementation of reforms and investments.

    5a  Member States, third countries, international organisations, international financial institutions or other sources may provide additional financial contributions to the Facility. Such contributions shall constitute external assigned revenue within the meaning of Article 21(2), points (a), (d) and (e), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. Additional amounts received as external assigned revenue within the meaning of Article 21(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 under the relevant Union legal acts shall be added to the resources referred to in Article 6(1) and be implemented in accordance with the same rules and conditions.

    Article 7

    Rules on the eligibility of persons and entities, on the origin of supply and materials and on restrictions under the Facility

    1. By way of derogation from Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947, participation in procurement and in grant award procedures for activities financed under the Facility shall be open to international and regional organisations and to all natural persons who are nationals of, or legal persons effectively established in:

    (a) Member States, Moldova, candidate countries and contracting parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area;

    (b) countries which provide a level of support to Moldova comparable to that provided by the Union, taking into account the size of their economy, and for which reciprocal access to external assistance in Moldova is established by the Commission.

    2. The reciprocal access referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), may be granted for a limited period of at least one year where a country grants eligibility on equal terms to entities from the Union and from countries eligible under the Facility.

    The Commission shall decide on the reciprocal access after consulting Moldova.

    3. All supplies and materials financed and procured under this Facility shall originate from any country referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), unless those supplies and materials cannot be sourced under reasonable conditions in any of those countries. In addition, the rules on restrictions laid down in paragraph 6 shall apply.

    4. The eligibility rules under this Article shall not apply to, and shall not create nationality restrictions for, natural persons employed or otherwise legally contracted by an eligible contractor or, where applicable, subcontractor except where the nationality restrictions are based on the rules provided for in paragraph 6.

    5. For activities jointly co-financed by an entity or implemented under direct management or indirect management with entities referred to in Article 62(1), first subparagraph, point (c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the rules applicable to those entities shall also apply in addition to the rules established under this Article, including, where applicable, the restrictions provided for under paragraph 6 of this Article and duly reflected in the financing agreements and contractual documents signed with those entities.

    6. The eligibility rules and rules on the origin of supplies and materials set out in paragraphs 1 and 3 and rules on the nationality of the natural persons as set out in paragraph 4 may be restricted with regard to the nationality, geographical location or nature of the legal entities participating in award procedures, as well as with regard to the geographical origin of supplies and materials where:

    (a) such restrictions are required on account of the specific nature or objectives of the activity or specific award procedure or where those restrictions are necessary for the effective implementation of the activity;

    (b) the activity or specific award procedures affect security or public order, in particular concerning strategic assets and interests of the Union, of Member States, or of Moldova, including the security, resilience and protection of integrity of digital infrastructure, including 5G network infrastructure, communication and information systems, and related supply chains.

    7. Tender applicants and candidates from non-eligible countries may be accepted as eligible in cases of urgency or where services are unavailable in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of an activity impossible or exceedingly difficult.

    8. In the framework of the Union’s restrictive measures, adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, no funds or economic resources may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of legal persons, entities or bodies subject to Union restrictive measures. Such persons and entities, and entities owned or controlled by them, shall not be supported by the Facility either directly or indirectly, including as indirect owners, sub-contractors in the supply chain or ultimate beneficiaries.

    Article 8

     Facility Agreement

    1. The Commission shall conclude a Facility Agreement with Moldova for the implementation of this Regulation setting out the obligations and payment conditions for the disbursement of funding.

    2. The Facility Agreement shall be complemented by a loan agreement in accordance with Article 15, setting out specific provisions for the management and implementation of funding provided in the form of a loan. The Facility Agreement, including any related documentation, shall be made available▌, to the European Parliament and the Council simultaneously and without delay.

    3. With the exception of bridge financing referred to in Article 17a, funding shall be granted to Moldova only after the Facility Agreement and the loan agreement have entered into force.

    4. The Facility Agreement and the loan agreement concluded with Moldova shall ensure that the obligations set out in Article 129 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 are fulfilled.

    5. The Facility Agreement shall lay down the necessary detailed provisions concerning:

    (a) the commitment of Moldova to make decisive progress towards a robust legal framework to fight fraud, and establish more efficient and effective control systems, including appropriate mechanisms for the protection of whistleblowers as well as appropriate mechanisms and measures to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest as well as to strengthen the fight against money laundering, organised crime, misuse of public funds, terrorism financing, tax avoidance, tax fraud or tax evasion, and other illegal activities affecting the funds provided under the Facility;

    (b) the rules on the release, withholding and reduction of funds in accordance with Article 19;

    (c) the detailed rules on and the obligation of Moldova to provide part of total loan amount for projects approved under the NIP, pursuant to Art. 6(4).

    (d) the activities related to management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit, as well as system reviews, investigations, anti-fraud measures and cooperation;

    (e) the rules on reporting to the Commission on whether and how the payment conditions referred to in Article 10 are fulfilled;

    (f) the rules on taxes, duties and charges in accordance with Article 27(9) and (10) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947;

    (g) the measures to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and the obligation for persons or entities implementing Union funds under the Regulation to notify the Commission, OLAF and, where applicable, EPPO, without delay, of suspected or actual cases of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest and other illegal activities affecting the funds provided under the Facility and their follow-up;

    (h) the obligations referred to in Articles 21 and 22, including the precise rules and a timeframe on collection of data by Moldova and access to it for the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, where applicable, EPPO;

    (i) a procedure to ensure that disbursement requests for loan support fall within the available loan amount, in accordance with Article 6(1);

    (j) the right of the Commission to reduce proportionately the support provided under the Regulation and to recover any amount referred to in Article 6(1) spent to achieve the objectives of the Regulation, or to ask for early repayment of the loan, in cases of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by Moldova, of a reversal of qualitative or quantitative steps, or of a serious breach of an obligation provided for in the Facility Agreement;

    (k) rules and modalities for Moldova to report for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the Facility and assessing the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3.

    (l) the obligation for Moldova to transmit electronically to the Commission the data referred to in Article 20.

     

    CHAPTER III

    Reform Agenda

     

    Article 9

    Submission of Reform Agenda

    1. In order to receive any support under this Regulation, Moldova shall submit to the Commission a Reform Agenda for 2025-2027 based on the key principles and objectives of socio-economic and fundamental reforms set out in the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, agreed under the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the enlargement policy framework.

    2. The Reform Agenda shall provide an overarching framework to achieve the general and specific objectives set out in Article 3, setting out the reforms to be undertaken by Moldova, as well as investment areas. The Reform Agenda shall comprise measures for the implementation of reforms through a comprehensive and coherent package. In the areas of the fundamentals of the enlargement process, including the rule of law, the fight against corruption, including high-level corruption, fundamental rights and the freedom of expression, the Reform Agendas shall reflect the assessments in the enlargement policy framework.

    3. The Reform Agendas shall be consistent with the latest macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework submitted to the Commission in the context of the Economic and Financial Dialogue with the Union.

    4. The Reform Agenda shall be consistent with and support the reform priorities identified in the context of Moldova’s accession path, and in other relevant documents, the Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement and the ambition to reach climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest.

    5. The Reform Agenda shall respect the general principles set out in Article 4.

    6. The Reform Agenda shall be prepared in an inclusive and transparent manner, in consultation with social partners and civil society organisations.

    7. The Commission shall invite Moldova to submit its Reform Agenda within three months of the entry into force of this Regulation. The Commission shall transmit Moldova’s Reform Agenda to the European Parliament and the Council as soon as it is received.

     

    Article 10

    Principles for financing under the Reform Agenda

    1. The Regulation shall provide incentives for the implementation of the Reform Agenda by setting payment conditions on the release of funds. Those payment conditions shall apply to funds under Article 6(1), with the exception of complementary support including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance. Those payment conditions shall take the form of measurable qualitative or quantitative steps. Such steps shall reflect progress on specific socio-economic reforms and on the fundamentals of the enlargement process linked to the achievement of the objectives of the Facility set out in Article 3, consistent with the enlargement policy framework.

    2. The fulfilment of those payment conditions shall trigger full or partial release of funds, depending on the degree of their completion.

    3. Macro financial stability, sound public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget are general conditions for payments that shall be fulfilled for any release of funds.

    Funds under the Facility shall not support activities or measures which undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova.

    Article 11

    Content of the Reform Agenda

    1. The Reform Agenda shall in particular set out the following elements, which shall be reasoned and substantiated:

    (a) measures constituting a coherent, comprehensive and adequately balanced response to the objectives set out in Article 3, including structural reforms, investments, and measures to ensure compliance with preconditions referred to in Article 5, where appropriate;

    (b) an explanation of how the measures are consistent with the general principles referred to in Article 4, as well as the requirements, strategies, plans and programmes referred to in Articles 4 and 10;

    (c) an explanation of how the measures are expected to further strengthen the fundamentals of the enlargement process as referred to in Article 3(2), point (n), including the rule of law, fundamental rights and the fight against corruption;

    (d) an indicative list of investment projects and programmes intended for discussion and approval under the NIP,, including respective overall investment volumes and envisaged timelines for implementation;

    (e) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to climate and environmental objectives and their compatibility with the principle ‘do no significant harm’;

    (f) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to digital transformation;

    (g) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to education, training and employment and social objectives;

    (h) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, and the promotion of women and girls’ rights;

    (i) for the reforms and investments, an indicative timetable, and the envisaged payment conditions for the release of funds in the form of measurable qualitative and quantitative steps planned to be implemented by 31 December 2027 at the latest;

    (j) an explanation of how the measures are expected to contribute to a progressive and continuous alignment with the CFSP, including Union restrictive measures;

    (k) the arrangements for the effective monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the Reform Agenda by Moldova, including the proposed measurable qualitative and quantitative steps and relevant indicators set out in paragraph 2;

    (l) an explanation of Moldova’s system to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption, including high-level corruption, and conflicts of interest and to enforce State aid control rules, and the proposed measures to address existing deficiencies in the first years of the implementation of the Reform Agenda;

    (m) for the preparation and, where available, for the implementation of the Reform Agenda, a summary of the consultation process, conducted in accordance with Moldova’s legal framework, of relevant stakeholders, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional representative bodies and authorities, social partners and civil society organisations, and how the input of those stakeholders is reflected in the Reform Agenda;

    (n) a communication and visibility plan on the Reform Agenda for the local audiences of Moldova;

    (o) any other relevant information.

    2. The Reform Agenda shall be results-based and include indicators for assessing progress towards the achievement of the general and specific objectives set out in Article 3. Those indicators shall be based, where appropriate and relevant, on internationally agreed indicators and those already available related to the Moldova’s policies. Indicators shall also be coherent, to the extent possible, with the key performance indicators included in Commission Implementing Decision approving the Reform Agendas for the Western Balkans under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 and in the EFSD+ Results Measurement Framework.

    Article 12

    Commission assessment of the Reform Agenda

    1. The Commission shall assess the relevance, comprehensiveness and appropriateness of Moldova’s Reform Agenda or, where applicable, any amendment to that Agenda, without undue delay. When carrying out its assessment, the Commission shall act in close cooperation with Moldova, and may make observations, seek additional information or require Moldova to review or modify its Reform Agenda.

    2. As regards the objective set out in Article 11(1)(j) of this Regulation, the Commission, in accordance with Decision 2010/427/EU, shall duly take into account the role and the contribution of the EEAS.

    3. When assessing the Reform Agenda, the Commission shall take into account relevant available analytical information about Moldova, including its macroeconomic situation and debt sustainability, the justification and the elements provided by Moldova as referred to in Article 13, as well as any other relevant information such as the information listed in Article 11.

    4. In its assessment, the Commission shall consider in particular the following criteria:

    (a) whether the Reform Agenda represents a relevant, comprehensive, coherent and adequately balanced response to the objectives set out in Article 3 and elements set out in Article 11;

    (b) whether the Reform Agenda and its measures are consistent with the principles, strategies, plans and programmes referred to in Articles 4 and 11;

    (c) whether the Reform Agenda can be expected to accelerate progress towards bridging the socio-economic gap between Moldova and the Union, and thereby enhances their economic, social and environmental development and supports the convergence towards the Union’s standards, reduces inequalities and reinforces social cohesion;

    (d) whether the Reform Agenda can be expected to further strengthen the fundamentals of the enlargement process as referred to in Article 3(2), point (a);

    (e) whether the Reform Agenda can be expected to accelerate the transition of Moldova towards sustainable, climate-neutral and climate resilient and inclusive economy by improving connectivity, making progress on the twin transition of green and digital, including biodiversity, reducing strategic dependencies and boosting research and innovation, education, training, employment and skills and the wider labour market, with particular attention on youth;

    (f) whether the measures included in the Reform Agenda are compatible with the principles of ‘do no significant harm’ and of ‘leaving no one behind’;

    (g) whether the Reform Agenda appropriately addresses potential risks in compliance with preconditions and payment conditions;

    (h) whether the payment conditions proposed by Moldova are appropriate and ambitious, consistent with the enlargement policy framework, as well as sufficiently meaningful and clear to allow for the corresponding release of funds in case of their fulfilment and whether the proposed reporting indicators are appropriate and sufficient to monitor and report on the progress made towards the overall objectives;

    (i) whether the arrangements proposed by Moldova are expected to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, organised crime and money laundering as well as to effectively investigate and prosecute criminal offences affecting the funds under the Facility,;

    (j) whether the Reform Agenda effectively reflects the input of relevant stakeholders, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional representative bodies and authorities, social partners and civil society organisations.

    5. For the purpose of the assessment of the Reform Agenda submitted by Moldova, the Commission may be assisted by independent experts.

    Article 13

    Commission Implementing Decision

    1. In case of positive assessment, after informing the European Parliament and the Council, the Commission shall approve by means of an implementing decision the Reform Agenda submitted by Moldova, in accordance with Article 12 or, where applicable, of the amended Agenda submitted in accordance with Article 14. The provisions of Article 25(2) shall apply to the adoption of that implementing decision.

    2. The Commission implementing decision, referred to in paragraph 1, shall set out the reforms to be implemented by Moldova concerned, the investment areas to be supported and the payment conditions stemming from the Reform Agenda, including the timetable.

    3. The Commission implementing decision, referred to in paragraph 1, shall also lay down:

    (a) the indicative amount of overall funds available to Moldova against fulfilment of payment conditions, as referred in Article 10(1), and the scheduled instalments to be released, including pre-financing, structured in accordance with Article 11, once Moldova has achieved satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant payment conditions in the form of qualitative and quantitative steps identified in relation to the implementation of the Reform Agenda;

    (b) the breakdown by instalment of financing between loan support and non-repayable support;

    (c) the time limit by which the final payment conditions for the reforms must be completed;

    (d) the arrangements and timetable for the monitoring, reporting and implementation of the Reform Agenda, including, where appropriate, through democratic scrutiny as referred to in Article 4 as well as, where relevant, measures necessary for complying with Article 23.

    (e) the indicators referred to in Article 11(2) for assessing progress towards the achievement of the general and specific objectives set out in Article 3.

    Article 14

     Amendments to the Reform Agenda

    1. Where the Reform Agenda, including relevant payment conditions, is no longer achievable by Moldova, either partially or totally, because of objective circumstances, Moldova may propose an amended Reform Agenda. In that case, Moldova may make a reasoned request to the Commission to amend its implementing decision referred to in Article 13(1).

    2. The Commission, after informing the European Parliament and the Council, may amend the implementing decision, in particular to take into account a change of the amounts available in line with the principles under Article 19.

    3. Where the Commission considers that the reasons put forward by Moldova justify an amendment to its Reform Agenda, the Commission shall assess the amended Agenda in accordance with Article 12 and may amend the implementing decision referred to in Article 13(1) without undue delay.

    4. In an amendment, the Commission may accept timelines for payment conditions extending until 31 December 2028.

    Article 15

    Loan agreement, borrowing and lending operations

    1. In order to finance the support under the Facility in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered on behalf of the Union to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    2. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Moldova. The loan agreement shall lay down the maximum loan amount, the availability period and the detailed terms and conditions of the support under the Facility in the form of loans. The loans shall have maximum duration of 40 years from the date of the signature of the loan agreement. The loan agreement shall contain the amount of pre-financing and rules on clearing of pre-financing.

    In addition to and by way of derogation from Article 220(5) of the Financial Regulation, the loan agreement shall contain the amount of pre-financing and rules on clearing of pre-financing.

    2a  The Commission shall provide the European Parliament and the Council, simultaneously, with the following information:

    (a) the amount of the loan in EUR;

    (b) the average maturity of the loan;

    (c) the pricing formula, and the availability period of the loan;

    (d) the maximum number of instalments and a clear and precise repayment schedule.

    3. The loan agreement shall be made available, simultaneously and without delay, to the European Parliament and the Council.

    Article 16

    Provisioning

    1. Provisioning for the loans shall be constituted at the rate of 9 % from the envelope allocated to the emerging challenges and priorities cushion under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 and shall be used as part of provisions supporting similar risks.

    2. By way of derogation from Article 211 (2), last sentence, of the Financial Regulation, the provisioning shall be paid progressively and fully constituted at the latest when the loans are fully disbursed.

    3.  The provisioning rate shall be reviewed at least every three years from the date of application of this Regulation. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article xx [on exercise of the delegation] of this Regulation to amend the provisioning rates, following the principles laid down in Article 214(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2509.

     

    Article 17

    Pre-financing

    1. Following the submission of the Reform Agenda to the Commission, Moldova may request the release of a pre-financing of up to 20 % of the total amount foreseen under this Facility in accordance with Article 6(1), after deduction of complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance, and provisioning for loans. Financing under this Article may be granted in addition to and during the same period of exceptional bridge financing granted under Article 17a.

    2. The Commission may release the requested pre-financing after the adoption of its implementing decision referred to in Article 13 and the entry into force of the Facility Agreement and of the loan agreement referred to in Articles 8 and 15 respectively. The funds shall be released in accordance with Article 19(3), first sentence, and subject to the respect of the preconditions set out in Article 5.

    3. The Commission shall decide on the timeframe for the disbursement of the pre-financing, which may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    Article 17a

    Exceptional bridge financing

     

    1. Without prejudice to Article 17, if the Facility Agreement is not signed or the Reform

    Agenda is not adopted by 1 May 2025, the Commission may decide to provide limited, exceptional support to Moldova in the form of loans for a period of up to 4 months starting from [the date of entry into force of the Regulation], subject to satisfactory progress on the preparation of the Reform Agenda, subject to conditions to be agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Commission and Moldova, to the respect of the precondition set out in Article 5(1), to compliance with Article 6 and to available funding.

     

    2.   The MoU shall in particular establish policy conditions, indicative financial planning and the reporting requirements, proportionate to the duration of the financing. The policy conditions shall include a commitment to the principles of sound financial management with a focus on anti-corruption and anti-money laundering.

     

      The MoU shall be adopted and amended by means of implementing acts. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 27.

     

    3.  The amount of support referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed EUR 50 000 000. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Moldova, which shall comply as appropriate with Article 15.

    Article 18

    Implementation of investment projects under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform

    1. In order to benefit from the leverage of Union financial support to attract additional investment, investments supporting the Reform Agenda shall be implemented in cooperation with international financial institutions in the form of investment projects approved under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform.

    2. Following satisfactory fulfilment of payment conditions, the Commission will adopt a decision authorising a release of funds, as referred to in Article 19(3). This decision shall, in accordance with Article 6(1), set the amount of funds to be made available in the form of non-repayable support provided by the Union for projects approved under the NIP, and the amount of financial assistance in the form of loan support to be released to Moldova. This decision shall also set out, in accordance with the ratio set in the Facility Agreement as referred to in Article 8(5)(c), the share of this loan support to be made available by Moldova as co-financing for projects approved under the NIP.

    Article 19

    Assessment of the fulfilment of payment conditions, withholding and reduction of funds, rules on payments

    1. Twice per year, Moldova shall submit a duly justified request for the release of funds at the latest two months after the timeline set in the Commission Implementing Decision in respect of fulfilled payment conditions related to the quantitative and qualitative steps as set out in the Reform Agenda.

    2. The Commission shall assess without undue delay whether Moldova has met the preconditions set out in Article 5 and the principles for financing set out in Article 10(3) and achieved satisfactory fulfilment of the payment conditions set out in the Commission implementing decision referred to in Article 13. In case the Commission finds that payment conditions for which it had previously paid have been reversed by Moldova, the Commission will reduce future disbursements by an equivalent amount. The Commission may be assisted by experts, including experts from Member States. In the event that a request for the release of funds or a request for payment includes a step related to Chapter 32, referred to in Article 19(2), the Commission may not adopt a decision authorizing the release of funds unless it assesses such step positively.

    3. Where the Commission makes a positive assessment of the satisfactory fulfilment of all applicable conditions, it shall adopt without undue delay a decision authorising the release of funds corresponding to those conditions. In respect of those amounts, the decision shall constitute the condition referred to in Article 10.

    4. Where the Commission makes a negative assessment of the fulfilment of any conditions as per the timetable, the release of funds corresponding to such conditions shall be withheld. The withheld amounts shall be released only when Moldova has duly justified, as part of the subsequent request for release of funds, that it has taken the necessary measures to ensure satisfactory fulfilment of the corresponding conditions.

    5. Where the Commission concludes that Moldova has not taken the necessary measures within a period of 12 months from the initial negative assessment referred to in paragraph 4, the Commission shall reduce the amount of the non-repayable financial support and of the loan proportionately to the part corresponding to the relevant payment conditions. During the first year of implementation, a deadline of 24 months shall apply, calculated from the initial negative assessment referred to in paragraph 4. Moldova may present its observations within two months from the communication to them of the Commission’s conclusions.

    6. Any amount corresponding to payment conditions that have not been fulfilled by 31 December 2028 shall not be due to Moldova and shall be decommitted, or cancelled from the available amount of loan support, as appropriate.

    7. The Commission may reduce the amount of the non-repayable financial support and recover from Moldova, including by offsetting, any amount spent to achieve the objectives of the Facility, or to reduce the amount of the loan to be disbursed to Moldova or request early repayment of the loan in accordance with the loan agreement, in the event of funds unduly paid, identified cases of, or serious concerns in relation to, irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by Moldova, or of a reversal of qualitative or quantitative steps or in cases it is found, after the payment has taken place, that steps were not satisfactorily fulfilled, or of a serious breach of an obligation resulting from the Facility Agreements or from the loan agreements-, including on the basis of information provided by OLAF or of the Court of Auditors’ reports. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council prior to taking any decision of such reductions.

    8. By way of derogation from Article 116(2) of the Financial Regulation, the payment deadline as referred to in Article 116(1), point (a), of the Financial Regulation shall start running from the date of the communication of the decision authorising the disbursement to Moldova pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.

    9. Article 116(5) of the Financial Regulation shall not apply to payments made as financial assistance, channelled directly to Moldova’s treasury pursuant to this Article and to Article 23 of this Regulation.

    10. Payments of the non-repayable financial support and of the loans under this Article shall be made in accordance with the budget appropriations, as set in the annual budgetary procedure, and subject to the available funding, respectively. Funds shall be paid in instalments. An instalment may be paid in one or more tranches.

    11. The amounts shall be paid following the decision referred to in paragraph 3 in accordance with the loan agreement.

    12. Payment of any amount of the support in the form of loans shall be subject to the submission by Moldova of a request for payment in the form set out in the loan agreement, , and in accordance with the provisions set out in the Facility Agreement. This shall not apply to payment of pre-financing.

     

    Article 20

    Transparency with regard to persons and entities receiving funding for the implementation of the Reform Agenda

    1. Moldova shall publish up-to-date data on final recipients receiving amounts of funding exceeding the equivalent of EUR 50 000 cumulatively over the period of three years for the implementation of reforms and investments under this Facility.

    2. For final recipients referred to in paragraph 1, the following information shall be published in a machine- readable format on a webpage, in order of total funds received, having due regard to the requirements of confidentiality and security, in particular the protection of personal data:

    (a) in the case of a legal person, the recipient’s full legal name and VAT identification number or tax identification number, where available, or another unique identifier established by the legislation applicable to the legal person;

    (b) in the case of a natural person, the first and last name or names of the recipient;

    (c) the amount received by the recipient and the reforms and investments under the Moldova Facility that this amount contributes to implementing.

    3. The information referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be published where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the final recipients concerned or seriously harming their commercial interests. Such information shall be made available to the Commission.

    4. Moldova shall transmit electronically to the Commission at least once a year the data on the final recipients referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, in a machine-readable format to be defined in the Facility Agreement, as referred to in Article 8(5)(l).

     

    CHAPTER IV

    Protection of financial interests of the Union

     

    Article 21

     Protection of the financial interests of the Union

    1. In implementing the Facility, the Commission and Moldova shall take all the appropriate measures to protect the financial interests of the Union, taking into account the principle of proportionality and the specific conditions under which the Facility will operate, the preconditions set out in Article 5(1) and conditions set out in the specific Facility Agreements, in particular regarding the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities as well as the investigation and prosecution of offences affecting the funds provided under the Facility. Moldova shall commit to progressing towards effective and efficient management and control systems and ensure that amounts wrongly paid or incorrectly used can be recovered.

    2. The Facility Agreement shall provide for the following obligations of Moldova:

    (a) to regularly check that the financing provided has been used in accordance with the applicable rules, in particular regarding the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities;

    (b) to protect whistleblowers;

    (c) to take appropriate measures to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities as well as to investigate and prosecute criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union, to detect and avoid double funding and to take legal actions to recover funds that have been misappropriated, including in relation to any measure for the implementation of reforms and investment projects or programmes under the Reform Agenda and to take appropriate measures to treat mutual legal assistance requests by EPPO and Member States’ competent authorities concerning criminal offences affecting the funds under the Facility, where applicable and without delay;

    (d) for the purpose of paragraph 1, in particular for checks on the use of funds in relation to the implementation of reforms in the Reform Agenda, to ensure the collection of, and access to, in compliance with Union data protection principles and with applicable data protection rules, adequate data on persons and entities receiving funding, including beneficial ownership information, for the implementation of measures of the Reform Agenda under Chapter III;

    (e) to expressly authorise the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, where applicable, EPPO to exert their rights as provided for in Article 129 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    (ea) to include all information related to project implementation, in particular concerning performance and financial implementation, and final recipients in an interoperable information system provided by the Commission as laid down under Article 36(2)(d) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    3. The Facility Agreement shall also provide for the right of the Commission to reduce proportionately the amount of the non-repayable financial support provided under the Facility and to recover from Moldova, including by offsetting, any amount spent to achieve the objectives of the Facility and to reduce the amount of the loan to be disbursed to the Beneficiary or request early repayment of the loan in accordance with the loan agreement, in the event of funds unduly paid, identified cases of, or serious concerns in relation to, irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by Moldova, or in cases it is found, after the payment has taken place, that steps were not satisfactorily fulfilled, or of a serious breach of an obligation resulting from the Facility Agreement or from the loan agreement When deciding on the amount of the recovery and reduction, or the amount to be repaid early, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness of the irregularity, fraud, corruption or conflict of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union, or of a breach of an obligation. Moldova shall be given the opportunity to present its observations before the reduction is made or early repayment is requested.

    4. Persons and entities implementing funds under the Facility shall report any suspected cases of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities affecting financial interests of the Union without delay, to the Commission and to OLAF.

     

    Article 22

    Role of Moldova’s internal systems and audit authority

    1. For the part of the Facility funding made available as financial assistance, the Commission can rely on the audit authorities established by Moldova for the purpose of controlling public expenditure. As appropriate, the Commission shall also rely on further democratic scrutiny as referred to in Article 4(9).

    2. The Reform Agenda shall prioritise in the first years of their implementation reforms related to negotiation Chapter 32, particularly on public financial management and internal control, as well as on the fight against fraud, together with Chapters 23 and 24, particularly when it comes to justice, corruption and organised crime and Chapter 8, particularly on State aid control.

    3. Moldova shall report any irregularities, including fraud, which have been the subject of a primary administrative or judicial finding, without delay, to the Commission and shall keep the Commission informed of the progress of any administrative and legal proceedings in relation to such irregularities. Such reporting shall be done by electronic means, using the Irregularity Management System, established by the Commission.

    4. The entities referred to in paragraph 1 shall maintain regular dialogue with the Court of Auditors, OLAF and, where appropriate, EPPO.

    5. The Commission may carry out detailed systems reviews of Moldova’s budget implementation based on a risk-assessment and dialogue with audit authorities, and issue recommendations for improvements in the systems.

    6. The Commission may adopt recommendations to Moldova on all cases where in its views competent authorities have not taken the necessary steps to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities that have affected or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the expenditure financed under the Facility and in all cases where it identifies weaknesses affecting the design and functioning of the control system put in place by the those authorities. Moldova concerned shall implement such recommendations or provide a justification on why it has not done so.

     

     

    CHAPTER V

    MONITORING, REPORTING AND EVALUATION

     

    Article 23

    Monitoring and reporting

    1. The Commission shall monitor the implementation of the Facility and assess the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3. The monitoring of implementation shall be targeted and proportionate to the activities carried out under the Facility Agreement, and shall be without prejudice to the reporting requirements set out under Regulation (EU) 2021/947. The indicators referred to in Article 11(2) shall be expected to contribute to the Commission’s monitoring of the Facility.

    2. The Facility Agreement referred to in Article 8 shall set out rules and modalities for Moldova to report to the Commission for the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article.

    3. The Commission shall provide an annual report to the European Parliament and the Council on progress towards the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation. The annual report shall be complemented by presentations on the state of play of the implementation of the Facility twice per year.

    4. The Commission shall provide the annual report referred to in paragraph 3 to the Committee referred to in Article 27(1).

    5. The Commission shall report on the progress of the implementation of the Reform Agenda of Moldova in the context of the scoreboard established under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449.

     

    Article 24

    Facility scoreboard

    6. The Commission shall establish display the progress of the implementation of the Reform Agenda in the Facility scoreboard, established under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449.

    Article 25

     

    Evaluation of the Facility

    1. After 31 December 2027 and by 31 December 2031 at the latest, the Commission shall carry out an independent ex-post evaluation of the Regulation. That ex-post evaluation shall assess the Union contribution to the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation.

    2. The ex-post evaluation shall make use of the good practice principles of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, seeking to ascertain whether the objectives have been met and to formulate recommendations with a view to improving future actions.

    3. The Commission shall communicate the findings and conclusions of the ex-post evaluation accompanied by its observations and follow-up, to the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States. That ex-post evaluation may be discussed at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or the Member States. The results shall feed into the preparation of future programmes and actions and resource allocation. That ex-post evaluation and follow-up shall be made publicly available.

    4. The Commission shall, to an appropriate extent, associate all relevant stakeholders, including Moldova, social partners, civil society organisations, in the evaluation process of the Union’s funding provided under this Regulation, and may, where appropriate, seek to undertake joint evaluations with the Member States and other partners with close involvement of Moldova.

     

    Article 26

    Reporting by Moldova in the context of the Economic and Financial Dialogue

    1. The beneficiary shall report once a year in the context of the Economic and Financial Dialogue on the progress made in the achievement of the reform-related part of its Reform Agenda.

     

    Article 26a

     

    Parliamentary oversight and scrutiny over the Facility

     

    1. The Commission shall report to the competent committees of the European Parliament on the state of progress in the implementation of the Facility and the Reform Agenda. The Commission shall provide the European Parliament with written information on:

     

    (a) the state of progress in the implementation of the Facility, in particular the Reform Agenda and related investments and reforms, as well as the Facility Agreement;

    (b) the assessment of the Reform Agenda, and any amendments thereof;

    (c) the main findings of the report referred to in Article 23(3);

    (d) payment, withholding and reduction procedures, where applicable, including any observation presented to ensure a satisfactory fulfilment of the conditions;

    (e) the withholding and suspension of payments as well as the reduction of funds, including any observation presented and remedial measures taken by the beneficiary to ensure a satisfactory fulfilment of the payment conditions;

    (f) any other relevant elements in relation to the implementation of the Facility.

    2.  The regular dialogue between the European Parliament and the Commission shall take place at least once a year, in addition to ad-hoc meetings responding to sudden developments in the country. Ahead of each dialogue, the Commission shall provide the Parliament with information referred to in paragraph 1. The Facility scoreboard referred to in Article 24 may serve as a basis for the dialogue.

    3.  The European Parliament may express its views in resolutions as regards the matters referred to in paragraph 1 and the Commission shall take those views into account.

     

     

    CHAPTER VI

    FINAL PROVISIONS

     

    Article 27

    Committee procedure

    1. The Commission shall be assisted by the Committee, established by the Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    3. For implementing acts referred to in Articles 13(1) and 14(2), where the committee delivers no opinion, the Commission shall not adopt the draft implementing act and Article 5(4), third subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

     

    Article 28

    Information, communication and publicity

    1. Without prejudice to the requirements set out under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, the Commission shall engage in communication activities to ensure the visibility of the Union funding for the financial support envisaged in the Reform Agenda, including through joint communication activities with Moldova. The Commission shall ensure that support under the Facility is communicated and acknowledged through a funding statement. Actions financed under the Facility shall be carried out in accordance with communication and visibility requirements in Union-financed external actions and in other relevant guidelines.

    2. The recipient of Union funding shall actively acknowledge the origin and ensure the visibility of the Union funding, including, where applicable, by displaying the emblem of the Union and an appropriate funding statement that reads ‘funded by the European Union’, in particular when promoting the actions and their results, by providing coherent, effective and proportionate targeted information to multiple audiences, including the media and the public.

    3. Information, communication and publicity shall be provided in accessible format.

    Article 29

    Entry into force

    This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump’s Project 2025 agenda caps decades-long resistance to 20th century progressive reform

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Colin Gordon, Professor of History, University of Iowa

    There has long been a tug-of-war over White House plans to make government more liberal or more conservative. Douglas Rissing/iStock / Getty Images Plus

    For much of the 20th century, efforts to remake government were driven by a progressive desire to make the government work for regular Americans, including the New Deal and the Great Society reforms.

    But they also met a conservative backlash seeking to rein back government as a source of security for working Americans and realign it with the interests of private business. That backlash is the central thread of the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” blueprint for a second Trump Administration.

    Alternatively disavowed and embraced by President Donald Trump during his 2024 campaign, Project 2025 is a collection of conservative policy proposals – many written by veterans of his first administration. It echoes similar projects, both liberal and conservative, setting out a bold agenda for a new administration.

    But Project 2025 does so with particular detail and urgency, hoping to galvanize dramatic change before the midterm elections in 2026. As its foreword warns: “Conservatives have just two years and one shot to get this right.”

    The standard for a transformational “100 days” – a much-used reference point for evaluating an administration – belongs to the first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

    President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Social Security Bill in Washington on Aug. 14, 1935.
    AP Photo, file

    Social reforms and FDR

    In 1933, in the depths of the Great Depression, Roosevelt faced a nation in which business activity had stalled, nearly a third of the workforce was unemployed, and economic misery and unrest were widespread.

    But Roosevelt’s so-called “New Deal” unfolded less as a grand plan to combat the Depression than as a scramble of policy experimentation.

    Roosevelt did not campaign on what would become the New Deal’s singular achievements, which included expansive relief programs, subsidies for farmers, financial reforms, the Social Security system, the minimum wage and federal protection of workers’ rights.

    Those achievements came haltingly after two years of frustrated or ineffective policymaking. And those achievements rested less on Roosevelt’s political vision than on the political mobilization and demands made by American workers.

    A generation later, another wave of social reforms unfolded in similar fashion. This time it was not general economic misery that spurred actions, but the persistence of inequality – especially racial inequality – in an otherwise prosperous time.

    LBJ’s Great Society

    President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society programs declared a war on poverty and, toward that end, introduced a raft of new federal initiatives in urban, education and civil rights.

    These included the provision of medical care for the poor and older people via Medicaid and Medicare, a dramatic expansion of federal aid for K-12 education, and landmark voting rights and civil rights legislation.

    As with the New Deal, the substance of these policies rested less with national policy designs than with the aspirations and mobilization of the era’s social movements.

    Resistance to policy change

    Since the 1930s, conservative policy agendas have largely taken the form of reactions to the New Deal and the Great Society.

    The central message has routinely been that “big government” has overstepped its bounds and trampled individual rights, and that the architects of those reforms are not just misguided but treasonous. Project 2025, in this respect, promises not just a political right turn but to “defeat the anti-American left.”

    After the 1946 midterm elections, congressional Republicans struck back at the New Deal. Drawing on business opposition to the New Deal, popular discontent with postwar inflation, and common cause with Southern Democrats, they stemmed efforts to expand the New Deal, gutting a full employment proposal and defeating national health insurance.

    They struck back at organized labor with the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which undercut federal law by allowing states to pass anti-union “right to work” laws. And they launched an infamous anti-communist purge of the civil service, which forced nearly 15,000 people out of government jobs.

    In 1971, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce commissioned Lewis Powell – who would be appointed by Republican President Richard Nixon to the Supreme Court the next year – to assess the political landscape. Powell’s memorandum characterized the political climate at the dawn of the 1970s – including both Great Society programs and the anti-war and Civil Rights movements of the 1960s – as nothing less than an “attack on the free enterprise system.”

    In a preview of current U.S. politics, Powell’s memorandum devoted special attention to a disquieting “chorus of criticism” coming from “the perfectly respectable elements of society: from the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary journals, the arts and sciences, and from politicians.”

    Powell characterized the social policies of the New Deal and Great Society as “socialism or some sort of statism” and advocated the elevation of business interests and business priorities to the center of American political life.

    A copy of Project 2025 is held during the Democratic National Convention on Aug. 21, 2024, in Chicago.
    AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

    Building a conservative infrastructure

    Powell captured the conservative zeitgeist at the onset of what would become a long and decisive right turn in American politics. More importantly, it helped galvanize the creation of a conservative infrastructure – in the courts, in the policy world, in universities and in the media – to push back against that “chorus of criticism.”

    This political shift would yield an array of organizations and initiatives, including the political mobilization of business, best represented by the emergence of the Koch brothers and the powerful libertarian conservative political advocacy group they founded, known as Americans for Prosperity. It also yielded a new wave of conservative voices on radio and television and a raft of right-wing policy shops and think tanks – including the Heritage Foundation, creator of Project 2025.

    In national politics, the conservative resurgence achieved full expression in President Ronald Reagan’s 1980 campaign. The “Reagan Revolution” united economic and social conservatives around the central goal of dismantling what was left of the New Deal and Great Society.

    Powell’s triumph was evident across the policy landscape. Reagan gutted social programs, declared war on organized labor, pared back economic and social regulations – or declined to enforce them – and slashed taxes on business and the wealthy.

    Publicly, the Reagan administration argued that tax cuts would pay for themselves, with the lower rates offset by economic growth. Privately, it didn’t matter: Either growth would sustain revenues, or the resulting budgetary hole could be used to “starve the beast” and justify further program cuts.

    Reagan’s vision, and its shaky fiscal logic, were reasserted in the “Contract with America” proposed by congressional Republicans after their gains in the 1994 midterm elections.

    This declaration of principles proposed deep cuts to social programs alongside tax breaks for business. It was perhaps most notable for encouraging the Clinton administration to pass the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, “ending welfare as we know it,” as Clinton promised.

    Aiming at the ‘deep state’

    Project 2025, the latest in this series of blueprints for dramatic change, draws most deeply on two of those plans.

    As in the congressional purges of 1940s, it takes aim not just at policy but at the civil servants – Trump’s “deep state” – who administer it.

    In the wake of World War II, the charge was that feckless bureaucrats served Soviet masters. Today, Project 2025 aims to “bring the Administrative State to heel, and in the process defang and defund the woke culture warriors who have infiltrated every last institution in America.”

    As in the 1971 Powell memorandum, Project 2025 promises to mobilize business power; to “champion the dynamic genius of free enterprise against the grim miseries of elite-directed socialism.”

    Whatever their source – party platforms, congressional bomb-throwers, think tanks, private interests – the success or failure of these blueprints rested not on their vision or popular appeal but on the political power that accompanied them. The New Deal and Great Society gained momentum and meaning from the social movements that shaped their agendas and held them to account.

    The lineage of conservative responses has been largely an assertion of business power. Whatever populist trappings the second Trump administration may possess, the bottom line of the conservative cultural and political agenda in 2025 is to dismantle what is left of the New Deal or the Great Society, and to defend unfettered “free enterprise” against critics and alternatives.

    Colin Gordon receives funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Mellon Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation.

    ref. Trump’s Project 2025 agenda caps decades-long resistance to 20th century progressive reform – https://theconversation.com/trumps-project-2025-agenda-caps-decades-long-resistance-to-20th-century-progressive-reform-247176

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Global: Addicted: how the world got hooked on illicit drugs – and why we need to view this as a global threat like climate change

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ian Hamilton, Honorary Fellow, Department of Health Sciences, University of York

    Alex Solyanik/Shutterstock

    It has taken decades for some to accept the devastating effects of climate change on our planet. Despite scientific evidence that was available years ago, many people were reluctant to make the connection between increasing use of fossil fuels, rising global temperatures and devastating weather events.

    A key reason for this reluctance is the dislocation of cause and effect, both in time and geography. And here there are clear parallels with another deadly human activity that is causing increasing levels of suffering across the planet: the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs. Here are some troubling “highlights” from the UN’s latest World Drugs Report:

    Cocaine production is reaching record highs, with production climbing in Latin America coupled with drug use and markets expanding in Europe, Africa and Asia.

    Synthetic drugs are also inflicting great harm on people and communities, caused by an increase in methamphetamine trafficking in south-west Asia, the near and Middle East and south-eastern Europe, and fentanyl overdoses in North America.

    Meanwhile, the opium ban imposed by the de facto authorities in Afghanistan is having a significant impact on farmers’ livelihoods and incomes, necessitating a sustainable humanitarian response.

    The report notes how organised criminal groups are “exploiting instability and gaps in the rule of law” to expand their trafficking operations, “while damaging fragile ecosystems and perpetuating other forms of organised crime such as human trafficking”.



    Illicit drug use is damaging large parts of the world socially, politically and environmentally. Patterns of supply and demand are changing rapidly. In our new longform series Addicted, leading drug experts bring you the latest insights on drug use and production as we ask: is it time to declare a planetary emergency?


    At every stage of the process of producing drugs such as cocaine, there are not only societal impacts but environmental ones too. An example of the interconnected relationship between climate change and drugs is demonstrated in the use of land.

    Demand for cocaine has grown rapidly across many western countries, and meeting this can only be met by changing how land is used. Forests are cleared in South America to make way for growing coca plants. The refinement of coca into cocaine involves toxic chemicals that pollute the soil and nearby watercourses. This in turn compromises those living in these areas as access to clean water and fertile land is reduced.

    Until this is reversed, these local communities will not be able to cultivate the land to earn an income or rely on water sources to live. And each year, some of their number will add to the hundreds of thousands of people around the world who die, directly or indirectly, as a result of illicit drug use.

    People in the world with drug use disorders (1990-2021)


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Having spent most of my career researching the human toll of drug use at almost every stage of the supply and consumption chain, I believe a complete shift in the way we think about the world’s drug problem is required.

    We already have many years of evidence of the ways that drugs – both natural and (increasingly) synthetic – are destabilising countries’ legal and political institutions, devastating entire communities, and destroying millions of lives. My question is, as with climate change, why are we so slow to recognise the existential threat that drug use poses to humanity?

    The disconnect between users and producers

    For decades, problems with drugs have been viewed as a mainly western issue, affecting Europe, North America and Australasia in terms of drug taking. This perception was fostered in part by US president Richard Nixon’s “war on drugs” announcement in June 1971, when he declared drug abuse to be “public enemy number one”.

    This western-centric focus has come at a cost – we still have little data and information about drug use and problems in Africa, for example. But we are beginning to see how far drugs and their associated devastation has reached beyond traditional western borders.

    Deaths attributed to illicit drug use (2021):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Illicit drug use has increased by 20% over the past decade, only partly due to population growth. Almost 300 million people are estimated to consume illicit drugs regularly, with the three most popular being cannabis (228 million users), opioids (60 million) and cocaine (23 million). According to the UN report:

    The range of drugs available to consumers has expanded, making patterns of use increasingly complex and polydrug use a common feature in most drug markets. One in 81 people (64 million) worldwide were suffering from a drug use disorder in 2022, an increase of 3% compared with 2018.

    There are multiple harmful consequences of drug use. The largest global burden of disease continues to be attributed to opioids, use of which appears to have remained stable at the global level since 2019, in contrast to other drugs.

    In the same way that climate change has threatened whole populations, so too have drugs. Yet many of us remain disconnected from how they are produced and distributed – and the misery they cause throughout the supply chain, all over the world.

    The production of cocaine, for example, is associated with violence and exploitation at every stage of the manufacturing process. Death threats to farmers and unwilling traffickers have all increased in parallel with the growing demand for cocaine in the US and Europe.

    Global drug use disorder deaths by substance (2000-21):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Organised crime groups not only supply and distribute drugs but also trade in people, whether for the commercial sex trade or other forms of modern slavery. This makes sense as the infrastructure and contacts to move drugs are similar to those used to move humans across borders and even continents. Yet many cocaine users are oblivious – wilfully or otherwise – of the violence associated with how this drug is supplied to them. As the UK National Crime Agency points out:

    Reducing demand is another critical factor in reducing the supply of illegal drugs. Many people see recreational drug use as a victimless crime. The reality is that the production of illegal drugs for western markets has a devastating impact in source countries in terms of violence, exploitation of vulnerable and indigenous people and environmental destruction.

    While some of the suffering associated with the production of drugs like cocaine makes the headlines, it’s often overshadowed by the glamorisation of criminal drug gangs in films and on TV. To the extent that people worry about the impact of drugs, it’s usually focused on those in our immediate communities, such as people dependent on heroin who are sleeping rough and vulnerable to exploitation. But there have already been other victims before the drug reaches our streets.

    Shifts in the global supply chain

    Tracking heroin routes demonstrates the way that drug supply is an international effort which affects every community on its journey, from the Afghan farmer to officials who are bribed so the drug can cross borders or be let through ports without being seized, to the person injecting or smoking the finished product.

    Much of Europe’s heroin is produced in Afghanistan by small farming operations growing opium, which is then transformed into the drug. Most Afghan farmers are simply surviving growing the crop, and don’t reap significant wealth from their harvest. It is those supplying and distributing the opium as heroin who can make serious money from it.

    Meanwhile, following the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, those farmers’ livelihoods have faced a new threat.

    The Taliban is ideologically opposed to the production of opium. Soon after assuming control, its leaders issued a decree banning farmers from growing opium. They have enforced this by destroying crops when farmers have ignored the ban – although there is still believed to be a significant stockpile of heroin in the country, meaning that as yet, there has not been a big impact on supply to Europe and the UK. But this could change amid the emergence of more deadly synthetic alternatives, including nitazenes and other new synthetic opioids.

    Heroin trafficking flows based on reported seizures (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    Either way, the drug gangs who traffic heroin won’t worry about the opium farmers’ wellbeing. As so often happens with changes in the availability of illicit drugs, when there is a shortage, these groups prove adaptable and nimble at providing alternatives quickly.

    While gathering intelligence about organised crime gangs is difficult and potentially dangerous, the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) has provided some insights about who these groups are and how they operate. The Netherlands remains an important hub for the distribution of heroin, with several Dutch criminal groups involved in importing and distributing heroin from Afghanistan.

    But others are involved too: the EUDA’s intelligence shows that criminal networks with members from Kurdish background are central to the wholesale supply and have control over many parts of the supply chain. These professional, well-organised groups have established legal businesses throughout the route of supply that facilitate their illicit activities – largely along the Balkan route with hubs in Europe.

    Intermediate & final recipients of heroin shipments (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    Unlike these organised crime gangs, governments and law enforcement appear to respond to emerging threats slowly and lack the flexibility and ingenuity that the gangs repeatedly demonstrate.

    As drug detection techniques have improved, organised crime has shown how inventive it can be. Taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic, dealers used consignments of surgical masks to conceal large quantities of cocaine being trafficked to China and Hong Kong from South America.

    And as western markets for cocaine become saturated, organised crime gangs have exploited new markets in Asia, where cocaine seizures, a proxy for use of cocaine, have increased. But the shifting landscape is also reflected in changes in consumption, with use of the synthetic stimulant methamphetamine growing rapidly in Asia – reflected in record levels of seizures in the region in 2023.

    Main methamphetamine trafficking flows (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    For the organised crime gangs, production and supply of synthetic drugs is in many ways easier, as it is not reliant on an agricultural crop in the way that heroin and cocaine are and can be manufactured locally. This reduces the distribution logistics and distance needed for an effective supply chain. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, organised crime gangs are exploiting gaps in law enforcement and state governance to both traffic large volumes of drugs and expand their production in the region.

    Where there is destabilisation, there is opportunity for those who seek to profit from drug addiction. In Syria, Russia and Ukraine, war has made some people very rich.

    Syria and Russia: the new drug hotspots

    The wars in Syria and Ukraine bear testament to the way drugs provide solutions to people who are experiencing the worst of times – and to governments that are ready to exploit evolving situations.

    As the war in Syria progressed, the Bashar Al-Assad regime actively developed a strategy to dominate the captagon market in the Middle East and North Africa. First produced in the 1960s in Germany to treat conditions such as attention deficit disorders and narcolepsy and other conditions, captagon is a stimulant that staves off hunger and sleep, making it ideal for military use – particularly in countries where food supplies are inconsistent. It has been referred to as the “drug of jihad” used by Islamic fighters in the region.

    As the war progressed in Syria, the country and its leader became increasingly isolated, its economy crashed creating the perfect conditions to develop the trade in captagon. Rather than drug production leading to the collapse of law and order, it was the other way round.

    Isolated by the west and with a historically strained relationship with its neighbours including Saudi Arabia, the Assad regime – under the guidance, reportedly, of Assad’s brother Maher al-Assad– ruthlessly positioned itself as the world’s main producer and distributor of this drug, then used this position to leverage its influence and try to reintegrate into the Arab world.

    Video by TRT World.

    Captagon also provided much-needed revenue for the Assad regime. The drug was estimated to be worth US$5.7 billion annually to the Syrian economy – at a time when western governments have placed severe sanctions on the country, restricting its ability to raise revenue. Saudi Arabia was one of the main countries being supplied captagon by Syria. Until the fall of Assad, it was the senior leadership in Syria that controlled the supply and distribution of the drug – giving rise to the label “the world’s largest narco state”.

    The Assad government achieved this position by making captagon good value – a viable alternative to alcohol in terms of price and for those who don’t drink. Exploiting many of its own citizens, the regime encouraged individuals and businesses to participate in manufacturing and distributing the drug.

    The fall of Assad and his hurried escape to Russia left the rebel fighters to pick up vast hauls of captagon and other drug ingredients. “We found a large number of devices that were stuffed with packages of captagon pills meant to be smuggled out of the country. It’s a huge quantity,” one fighter belonging to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group told the Guardian. What this will do to drug production and supply in the region is unclear.




    Read more:
    What is the drug captagon and how is it linked to Syria’s fallen Assad regime?


    While the latest UN World Drug Report highlights “a rapid increase in both the scale and sophistication of drug trafficking operations in the region over the past decade”, it goes on to highlight that “one of the most striking changes worldwide in drug trafficking and drug use over the past decade has taken place in Central Asia, Transcaucasia [Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia] and eastern Europe”, where there has been a shift “away from opiates, mostly originating in Afghanistan – towards the use of synthetic stimulants, notably cathinones … There is hardly any other region where cathinones play such a significant role.”

    This is part of “a groundbreaking shift in the global drug trade, pioneered in Russia and now spreading globally,” according to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. This shift is changing the nature of drug sales, using “darknet markets and cryptocurrency for anonymous transactions, allowing buyers to retrieve drugs from hidden physical locations or ‘dead drops’, rather than direct exchanges.”

    The rise of Russia’s dead drop drug trade stems from several unique national factors: restrictive anti-drug policies, strained western trade relations, and a strong technological foundation. Enabled by these conditions, the dead drop model has reshaped how drugs are distributed in Russia.

    Drug transactions now involve no face-to-face interactions; instead, orders are placed online, paid for with cryptocurrency, and retrieved from secret locations across cities within hours. This system, offering convenience and anonymity, has seen synthetic drugs – especially synthetic cathinones like mephedrone – overtake traditional imported substances like cocaine and heroin in Russia … These potent synthetic drugs are cheap, easy to manufacture, and readily distributed through Russia’s vast delivery networks.

    The report notes that this shift in drug distribution has been accompanied by rising levels of violence including punishment beatings, and a public health crisis.

    Podcast by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    Yet officially, there is very little reliable data about drug use in Russia. Under the premiership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has no sympathy with those who are dependent, viewing them as weak and without value. And its invasion of Ukraine three years ago has had ramifications for Ukraine’s users too.

    Prior to the war, Ukraine had demonstrated an increasingly progressive policy towards those who had problems with drugs, establishing treatment centers and encouraging access to treatment. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, this strategy has been severely set back, with many people who need access to substitute treatments such as methadone unable to secure consistent supply of these drugs.

    Another global blind spot is China, where, like Russia, little is known about the extent or type of problems that drugs are causing. Both regimes are ideologically opposed to recreational or problem drug use and, as far as we know, there is no state-funded rehabilitation provided in either country; the approach is to criminalise people rather than offer health-based interventions.

    We shouldn’t be too critical as many western countries, including the UK, also need to pivot from a criminal approach to drug problems towards a health-focused one. Portugal made such a policy change several years ago, recognising that people who develop problems with drugs such as dependency need help rather than punishment.

    This radical shift in thinking has made a significant change to the way those using drugs are treated, in the main offered help and specialist support rather than being arrested and sent to jail, only to be released and then repeat the same cycle of drug use, arrest and prison.

    The evidence of this policy change is impressive: not only have drug-related deaths fallen, but population-level drug use is among the lowest in Europe. Nowhere is this policy shift more urgent than the US.

    North America: epicentre of the opioid crisis

    In the US, the synthetic opioids fentanyl and oxycodone have contributed to more than 100,000 fatal overdoses each year since 2021. While there are signs this deaths toll is at last beginning to fall, the harm and pain of addiction and overdose affects every strata of American society – as shown in moving portrayals of America’s opioid crisis such as Painkiller and Dopesick. Most fatalities are caused by respiratory depression where breathing is significantly slowed or stops altogether.

    Official trailer for Painkiller (Netflix)

    Fentanyl is an analgesic drug that is 50-100 times more potent than heroin or morphine. Where China used to be the principal manufacturer and supplier of fentanyl to the US, Mexico is now the primary source. In December 2024, Mexican authorities announced “the largest mass seizure of fentanyl pills ever made” – amounting to more than 20 million doses of fentanyl pills worth nearly US$400 million. The pills were found in Mexico’s Sinaloa state, home of the Sinaloa drug cartel and a hub of fentanyl production,

    “This is what makes us rich,” one fentanyl cook recently told the New York Times. He was scathing about the idea that Donald Trump would be able to stamp out the supply of fentanyl from Mexico to the US by threatening Mexico’s government with tariffs. “Drug trafficking is the main economy here.”

    However, the introduction of synthetic opioids to the US came not via organised crime but through a deliberate strategy of the pharmaceutical industry. Upon launching its prescription opioid painkiller OxyContin (a brand name for oxycodone) in 1996, Perdue Pharma, owned by the Sackler family, devised a plan to increase prescriptions of the drug by incentivizing and rewarding doctors to give these drugs to their patients. On a business level, this was a success; on a human level, it has been a disaster.

    As patients quickly developed tolerance to drugs such as OxyContin, they had to take higher doses to avoid withdrawal symptoms or the positive feelings it gave them. Taking more of these opiates increases the risk of accidental overdose, many of which proved to be fatal. It has also driven those dependent on drugs to the black market, and into the hands of organised drug gangs, as they seek the drugs in greater quantities.

    US overdose death rates by drug type (1999-2020):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Dependency on fentanyl and other opioids is all-consuming. When not using these drugs, people are entirely focused on ensuring sufficient supply of the next dose. This includes funding supply which can take people to places they thought they would never be, for example breaking the law, shoplifting or getting involved in commercial sex to make enough money to buy drugs.

    Synthetic opiates like OxyContin and fentanyl have proved to be classless, ageless and sex blind. The first-hand experience of addiction and fatalities have radically altered the way many Americans think about drugs and the problems they cause. Canada, too, is suffering a major crisis.

    Compounding this tragedy is the failure of the state to provide interventions and treatment that could have reduced fatal and non-fatal overdoses. It is only now that evidence-based interventions are beginning to be made widely available, such as access to Naloxone – a drug that can reverse the effects of opiates and potentially save a life.

    Of course, it isn’t just hospitals and health professionals that are challenged by the results of widespread use of opioids, but public services like the police and fire service. In some areas of the US, there have been so many daily overdoses that every service was called on to try and deal with it. Local mayors have made it a priority to train police and fire personnel to be trained as first responders, such is the scale of the problem.

    But it is not just in North America that we see the failure of politicians and the state to act when faced with growing problems with drugs. In the UK, where record numbers are dying because of using drugs such as heroin, the government has not invested in overdose prevention strategies. At a time when fatal overdoses increase year on year, budgets for specialist treatment have been reduced. It remains to be seen what the recently elected Labour government will do, if anything, to tackle the tragic rise in drug related fatalities.

    Death rates from opioid use disorders (2021):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    What connects both examples from the US and UK is the attitude and perception of drug use many of us have. Drug use and the heavy use of prescription painkillers is still heavily stigmatised. Many of us still view this as something individuals bring on themselves or have a choice about.

    So, if we don’t care about what happens to people who develop problems with drugs, why should our elected representatives? In part, it is our bigotry that is enabling the lack of timely intervention, despite us possessing the knowledge and evidence of how drug harms can be minimised.

    Latin America: breakdown of the rule of law

    Under the last Conservative government, the UK Home Office asserted that people who used cocaine recreationally are supporting violence not only in the UK but in the countries that produce its raw ingredients. It’s not clear if this has made any difference to those using cocaine in the UK – personally, I doubt many people consider or are aware of how cocaine is produced or its provenance.

    Perhaps if those using cocaine, mainly in western countries, realised the extent of violence and suffering that cocaine manufacture causes they might think again. Latin America has suffered enormously, with few countries there not touched in some way by the violence and breakdown of law associated with drug production and supply. According to the latest UN World Drugs Report:

    Global cocaine supply reached a record high in 2022, with more than 2,700 tons of cocaine produced that year, 20% more than in the previous year … The impact of increased cocaine trafficking has been felt in Ecuador in particular, which has seen a wave of lethal violence in recent years linked to both local and transnational crime groups, most notably from Mexico and the Balkan countries.

    Cocaine seizures and homicide rates increased five-fold between 2019 and 2022 in Ecuador, with the highest such rates reported in the coastal areas used for trafficking the drug to major destination markets in North America and Europe.

    Cocaine trafficking flows based on reported seizures (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    As with opium production in Afghanistan, it is small-scale farmers in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia that grow the coca plant that will be turned into cocaine. Like their Afghan counterparts, they grow coca as it is more profitable than alternatives such as coffee. While it may be profitable in the short term, there are greater costs to them and their society.

    Cocaine production brings with it violence as those further up the drug production chain try to control its trade. Few parts of these societies are unscathed, from bribing local politicians through to whole regions that are controlled by organised crime. Keeping control means that the use of firearms and violence increases. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that basic health and social services suffer.

    So, while a coca grower may have more money, every other aspect of their life is negatively impacted. Whether it is regional or state institutions, both are compromised by the drug trade and those that control it. While this may not lead to the total collapse of law and order, it does create injustice and distorts the rule of law in many areas of Latin America and the Caribbean, where competition between gangs has also resulted in an increase in homicides.

    The impact is on all sectors of society, now and into the future. For example, while historically the role of women has been largely underrepresented in research and drug policy, the UN report recognises that this is changing:

    As women increasingly participate in economic activities, the role that women play in the drug phenomenon may become increasingly important. For example, a shift away from plant-based drug production may affect many women in rural households involved in opium poppy and coca bush cultivation.

    The UN also identifies the specific risk to young people and the drugs trade, highlighting:

    Long-term efforts to dismantle drug economies must provide socioeconomic opportunities and alternatives, which go beyond merely replacing illicit crops or incomes and instead address the root structural causes behind illicit crop cultivation, such as poverty, underdevelopment, and insecurity. They must also target the factors driving the recruitment of young people into the drug trade, who are at particular risk of synthetic drug use.

    Meanwhile, demand for treatment in Europe due to problems with cocaine has risen significantly in recent years, since 2011 there has been an 80% increase in treatment presentations. This reflects the growing number of people using cocaine and the rise in purity of the drug.

    Death rates from cocaine use disorders (2021):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Change is possible

    Amid what may seem to be a story of unrelenting despair and hopelessness, there are local initiatives and even a few state-wide policies that provide optimism that change is possible.

    In my roles both as clinician and scientist, I’ve often been amazed by how ingenious people can be when faced with the apparently impossible. For example, the way some people use heroin to dampen their psychotic symptoms, such as auditory and visual hallucinations – or the development of Naloxone, a drug that can temporarily reverse the effects of opioids, providing a short window for emergency services to treat people who have overdosed.

    Early in my career, I witnessed the emergence of HIV in the UK in the 1980s. The speed at which this disease spread was not matched by our ability to treat it. Our response to HIV was undoubtedly hampered by prejudice and stigma towards marginalised groups in society, namely gay men and those using drugs (particularly injecting them).

    However, unexpectedly and courageously, the Conservative government recognised those who were most at risk of contracting HIV, and organised a package of measures to contain the spread of infection. One part of this was a media campaign based on public health messaging designed to reduce the risk of contracting the disease. But the government also invested in treatment for those who had been infected and engaged with people at high risk, such as those intravenously injecting drugs.




    Read more:
    Drug consumption facilities: they’ve been around since 1986 and now Scotland has one – but do they work?


    I worked in specialist HIV clinics for those using drugs. At the time, methadone and diamorphine were provided as an alternative to heroin. Regulations and protocols that restricted the prescribing of these medical opioids were eased, so we could ensure patients attending these clinics were given sufficient oral and injectable opioids that they didn’t need to source street heroin.

    This meant they had access to medical grade opioids and, crucially, were given regular supplies of sterile injecting equipment. It was this that reduced the risk of contracting HIV, as some people would share injecting equipment when using heroin.

    This impressive policy ran counter to the Conservative party’s ideology at the time, which was to punish rather than help those using drugs like heroin. It showed me how, even with traditional mindsets, it is possible to shift policy thinking in the face of a health crisis. And make no mistake, the global drug problem is an ongoing health crisis. Today, the UN points to the risks that intravenous users of drugs still face:

    An estimated 13.9 million people injected drugs in 2022, with the largest number living in North America and East and South-East Asia … The relative risk of acquiring HIV is 14 times higher for those who inject drugs than in the wider population globally.

    There are, though, signs of positive change in the way some countries and regions are changing their drug policies. Scotland recently opened a drug consumption facility in Glasgow – a safe place for people to use their drugs, usually injecting drugs like heroin. Such spaces provide access to sterile injecting equipment, reducing the risk of blood-borne infections such as HIV or Hepatitis. At the same time, they offer the opportunity to engage with people who have not accessed traditional health services.




    Read more:
    Why Colombia sees legalising drugs as the way forward. Here’s what’s being proposed


    Portugal, as mentioned earlier, has made substantial changes to the way it approaches drug use and the problems associated with it. This policy shift since 2000 has saved lives and brought a more humane way of treating people who develop problems with drugs.

    Contrast this with the wasted effort and resources ploughed into the war on drugs – initiated by Nixon and followed by so many western governments ever since. My plea to policymakers is simple: employ the same evidence-based science you use for health issues towards drugs and problem drug use.

    Science and research can help in many ways, if given the chance. Some of it might seem radical, like providing safe drug consumption spaces. Some of it is more mundane, but vital – like tackling inequality, a clear driver of problem drug use across the world.

    But while we often look to politicians to take the lead on change, it is people – us – that really hold the solution. By far the greatest threat to people and society from drugs is ignorance and bigotry. So many lives have been lost to drugs because of shame, either as a driver of drug use or a barrier to seeking help.

    Beliefs are notoriously difficult to shift. As with climate change, the most powerful driver of change is personal experience. We know that when a family or community is affected by a drug overdose, their beliefs and perceptions change. But this is not the way any of us should want to see change happen.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Ian Hamilton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Addicted: how the world got hooked on illicit drugs – and why we need to view this as a global threat like climate change – https://theconversation.com/addicted-how-the-world-got-hooked-on-illicit-drugs-and-why-we-need-to-view-this-as-a-global-threat-like-climate-change-248401

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Community groups urged to submit funding bids

    Source: Scotland – City of Perth

    Perth & Kinross Council is focusing participatory budgeting in four localities that face significant challenges and have a need for targeted community investment.

    The £100,000 funding will be split over four targeted localities as follows:

    • Central and North Perth: £47,837
    • Coupar Angus, Meigle, and Alyth: £18,846
    • South Crieff: £16,625
    • Rattray: £16,690

    Bids must be community-led and focus on tackling poverty and alleviating the cost of living crisis in these areas.

    Applications can be made online now.

    Successful applicants are expected to demonstrate how they will target these localities, though some beneficiaries may come from outside these areas.

    Applications can also include costs towards upskilling and resourcing volunteers to support the delivery of projects aimed at tackling poverty and the cost of living.

    Councillor Tom McEwan, convenor of Perth and Kinross Council’s Housing and Wellbeing Committee, said: “Tackling poverty is a priority for this Council and this is a great opportunity for community groups to access financial support for projects in their areas.

    “It does not take long to apply and I would urge community groups across all areas to make sure they submit their bids by the end of the week.

    “Residents will then have the chance to vote for the projects they think will make the biggest difference to their communities.”

    All bid will be screened and eligible applications will be put to the public vote, with the successful bids announced on 7 March 2025.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: GB Energy: Labour’s broken promises will hurt North East of Scotland

    Source: Scottish Greens

    Labour must not break its promise to workers in Aberdeen and beyond.

    People in the North East of Scotland will not forget it if Labour’s GB Energy fails to deliver on promised jobs for Aberdeen, says Scottish Green MSP Maggie Chapman.

    The comments come as the boss of Keir Starmer’s energy company has revealed that it could take 20 years for the promised jobs to be created.

    At the general election, Scottish Labour leader Anas Sarwar promised “lower bills, more jobs, greater energy security”, but today Scotland discovered that Labour had yet again over-promised in their desire for power. Now Scotland could have to wait decades to feel any benefit.

    This is just the latest failure by Labour to make good on its promise to working Scots to make household bills cheaper. In August 2024, The UK Government dumped a key election promise to cut energy bills by £300 a year, and when questioned by MPs at Westminster in October, the boss of GB Energy was unable to say when GB Energy would reduce household bills.

    Scottish Greens MSP for North East, Maggie Chapman said:

    “Labour promised that GB Energy would finally cut energy bills while creating hundreds of new jobs in Aberdeen, but it’s looking increasingly likely that neither of these things will happen.

    “GB Energy looks like yet another Westminster white elephant that is designed by businessmen for businessmen. If it is not lowering bills or creating jobs then what will it do?

    “Energy bills are too high and are stretching people to their limits. We must get away from a broken and destructive system that means sky high bills for households and families and chaos for our climate.

    “People were told that they were voting for change at the election, but it’s clear that Starmer and Sarwar have no intention of delivering it.

    “Time and again, this Labour government has shown that it cannot be trusted. It has already chosen to plunge pensioners into fuel poverty by cutting winter fuel payments, kept the cruel two-child cap and betrayed millions of working class WASPI women. Are workers in Aberdeen the next to be betrayed?

    “Scotland deserves so much better than this. We have masses of unlocked potential in our skilled workforce, and vast renewable resources. We need politicians to invest in our communities and our skills and put people and planet before profit.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Regulator investigates charities over conflicts of interest

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The Charity Commission has opened a statutory inquiry to examine ongoing regulatory concerns regarding the trustees’ management and administration of Solev Co Limited.

    SOLEV CO LIMITED – 254623 was established in 1967 with general charitable purposes. The regulator’s primary concerns focus on related-party transactions recorded in the charity’s accounts and whether conflicts of interest have been managed appropriately, particularly given that the trustees were, until recently, all part of the same family. The previous trustees were all closely related.  Trustees are expected to act in the best interests of the charity and properly manage any conflicts of interest.

    The inquiry will also investigate why the charity has not submitted accounts and annual returns within the statutory timeframe for the past five years and is currently in default with their 2023 and 2024 accounts, which is a legal obligation for trustees.

    The Commission has also opened an inquiry into HATZLOCHO LIMITED – 1082076 to examine similar concerns. The charity’s purposes include advancing the Orthodox Jewish faith, and relieving poverty.

    Both inquiries will examine the administration, governance and management of the charity, in particular the extent to which:

    • the trustees have complied with their statutory reporting duties including the submission of the charity’s annual reports and accounts to the Commission
    • the trustees have acted in accordance with their legal duties, with particular regard to the composition of the trustee board, the management of the charity’s finances, related party transactions and conflicts of interest and/or loyalty
    • any failings or weaknesses identified in the administration of the charity are a result of misconduct and/or mismanagement by the trustees

    The Commission may extend the scope of either inquiry if additional regulatory issues emerge.

    It is the Commission’s policy, after it has concluded an inquiry, to publish a report detailing what issues the inquiry looked at, what actions were undertaken as part of the inquiry and what the outcomes were.  

    ENDS

    Notes to editors

    1. The Charity Commission is the independent, non-ministerial government department that registers and regulates charities in England and Wales. Its ambition is to be an expert regulator that is fair, balanced, and independent so that charity can thrive. This ambition will help to create and sustain an environment where charities further build public trust and ultimately fulfil their essential role in enhancing lives and strengthening society. Find out more: About us – The Charity Commission – GOV.UK
    2. The Charity Commission opened  statutory inquiries into the charities under section 46 of the Charities Act 2011 as a result of its regulatory concerns that there is or has been misconduct and/or mismanagement in their administration. The inquiry into Solev Co Limited (254623) opened on 13 December 2024. The separate inquiry into Hatzlocho Limited (1082076) opened on 19 December 2024.
    3. A statutory inquiry is a legal power enabling the Commission to formally investigate matters of regulatory concern within a charity and to use protective powers for the benefit of the charity and its beneficiaries, assets, or reputation. An inquiry will investigate and establish the facts of the case so that the Commission can determine the extent of any misconduct and/or mismanagement; the extent of the risk to the charity, its work, property, beneficiaries, employees or volunteers; and decide what action is needed to resolve the concerns.
    4. Please note that the Commission has not made any conclusions, and the opening of the inquiry is not a finding of wrongdoing.

    Press office

    Email pressenquiries@charitycommission.gov.uk

    Out of hours press office contact number: 07785 748787

    Updates to this page

    Published 3 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: 3 ways the Trump administration could reinvest in rural America’s future, starting with health care

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Randolph Hubach, Professor of Public Health, Purdue University

    Rural America can be idyllic, but many communities still need support. Mint Images via Getty Images

    Rural America faces many challenges that Congress and the federal government could help alleviate under the new Trump administration.

    Rural hospitals and their obstetrics wards have been closing at a rapid pace, leaving rural residents traveling farther for health care. Affordable housing is increasingly hard to find in rural communities, where pay is often lower and poverty higher than average. Land ownership is changing, leaving more communities with outsiders wielding influence over their local resources.

    As experts in rural health and policy at the Center for Rural and Migrant Health at Purdue University, we work with people across the United States to build resilient rural communities.

    Here are some ways we believe the Trump administration could work with Congress to boost these communities’ health and economies.

    1. Rural health care access

    One of the greatest challenges to rural health care is its vulnerability to shifts in policy and funding cuts because of rural areas’ high rates of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.

    About 25% of rural residents rely on Medicaid, a federal program that provides health insurance for low-income residents. A disproportionate share of Medicare beneficiaries – people over 65 who receive federal health coverage – also live in rural areas. At the same time, the average health of rural residents lags the nation as a whole.

    Rural clinics and hospitals

    Funding from those federal programs affects rural hospitals, and rural hospitals are struggling.

    Nearly half of rural hospitals operate in the red today, and over 170 rural hospitals have closed since 2010. The low population density of rural areas can make it difficult for hospitals to cover operating costs when their patient volume is low. These hospital closures have left rural residents traveling an extra 20 miles (32 km) on average to receive inpatient health care services and an extra 40 miles (64 km) for specialty care services.

    The government has created programs to try to help keep hospitals operating, but they all require funding that is at risk. For example:

    • The Low-volume Hospital Adjustment Act, first implemented in 2005, has helped numerous rural hospitals by boosting their Medicare payments per patient, but it faces regular threats of funding cuts. It and several other programs to support Medicare-dependent hospitals are set to expire on March 31, 2025, when the next federal budget is due.

    • The rural emergency hospital model, created in 2020, helps qualifying rural facilities to maintain access to essential emergency and outpatient hospital services, also by providing higher Medicare payments. Thus far, only 30 rural hospitals have transitioned to this model, in part because they would have to eliminate inpatient care services, which also limits outpatient surgery and other medical services that could require overnight care in the event of an emergency.

    Rural emergency hospitals can get extra funding, but there’s a catch: They have no inpatient beds, so people in need of longer care must go farther.
    AP Photo/Rogelio V. Solis

    Services for pregnant women have also gotten harder to find in rural areas.

    Between 2011 and 2021, 267 rural hospitals discontinued obstetric services, representing 25% of the United States’ rural obstetrics units. In response, the federal government has implemented various initiatives to enhance access to care, such as the Rural Hospital Stabilization Pilot Program and the Rural Maternal and Obstetric Management Strategies Program. However, these programs also require funding.

    Expanding telehealth

    Before the COVID-19 pandemic, telehealth – the ability to meet with your doctor over video – wasn’t widely used. It could be difficult for doctors to ensure reimbursement, and the logistics of meeting federal requirements and privacy rules could be challenging.

    The pandemic changed that. Improving technology allowed telehealth to quickly expand, reducing people’s contact with sick patients, and the government issued waivers for Medicare and Medicaid to pay for telehealth treatment. That opened up new opportunities for rural patients to get health care and opportunities for providers to reach more patients.

    However, the Medicare and Medicaid waivers for most telehealth services were only temporary. Only payments for mental and behavioral health teleheath services continued, and those are set to expire with the federal budget in March 2025, unless they are renewed.

    One way to expand rural health care would be to make those waivers permanent.

    Increasing access to telehealth could also support people struggling with opioid addiction and other substance use disorders, which have been on the rise in rural areas.

    2. Affordable housing is a rural problem too

    Like their urban peers, rural communities face a shortage of affordable housing.

    Unemployment in rural areas today exceeds levels before the COVID-19 pandemic. Job growth and median incomes lag behind urban areas, and rural poverty rates are higher.

    Rural housing prices have been exacerbated by continued population growth over the past four years, lower incomes compared with their urban peers, limited employment opportunities and few high-quality homes available for rent or sale. Rural communities often have aging homes built upon outdated or inadequate infrastructure, such as deteriorating sewer and water lines.

    Rental homes in older towns can become run down. Community maintenance of pipes and other services also requires funding.
    LawrenceSawyer/E+ via Getty Images

    One proposal to help people looking for affordable rural housing is the bipartisan Neighborhood Homes Investment Act, which calls for creating a new federal tax credit to spur the development and renovation of family housing in distressed urban, suburban and rural neighborhoods.

    Similarly, the Section 502 Direct Loan Program through the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which subsidizes mortgages for low-income applicants to obtain safe housing, could be expanded with additional funding to enable more people to receive subsidized mortgages.

    3. Locally owned land benefits communities

    Seniors age 65 and older own 40% of the agricultural land in the U.S., according to the American Farmland Trust. That means that more than 360 million acres of farmland could be transferred to new owners in the next few decades. If their heirs aren’t interested in farming, that land could be sold to large operations or real estate developers.

    That affects rural communities because locally owned rural businesses tend to invest in their communities, and they are more likely to make decisions that benefit the community’s well-being.

    A farmer carries organic squash during harvest. Young farmers often struggle to find land to expand their operations.
    Thomas Barwick/Stone via Getty Images

    Congress can take some steps to help communities keep more farmland locally owned.

    The proposed Farm Transitions Act, for example, would establish a commission on farm transitions to study issues that affect locally owned farms and provide recommendations to help transition agricultural operations to the next generation of farmers and ranchers.

    About 30% of farmers have been in business for less than 10 years, and many of them rent the land they farm. Programs such as USDA’s farm loan programs and the Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development Program help support local land purchases and could be improved to identify and eliminate barriers that communities face.

    We believe that by addressing these issues, Congress and the new administration can help some of the country’s most vulnerable citizens. Efforts to build resilient and strong rural communities will benefit everyone.

    Randolph Hubach receives funding from the National Institutes of Health and the Health Resources and Services Administration.

    Cody Mullen receives funding from the Health Resources and Services Administration. He is affiliated with the National Rural Health Association.

    ref. 3 ways the Trump administration could reinvest in rural America’s future, starting with health care – https://theconversation.com/3-ways-the-trump-administration-could-reinvest-in-rural-americas-future-starting-with-health-care-245451

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s Project 2025 agenda caps decades-long resistance to 20th century progressive reform

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Colin Gordon, Professor of History, University of Iowa

    There has long been a tug-of-war over White House plans to make government more liberal or more conservative. Douglas Rissing/iStock / Getty Images Plus

    For much of the 20th century, efforts to remake government were driven by a progressive desire to make the government work for regular Americans, including the New Deal and the Great Society reforms.

    But they also met a conservative backlash seeking to rein back government as a source of security for working Americans and realign it with the interests of private business. That backlash is the central thread of the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” blueprint for a second Trump Administration.

    Alternatively disavowed and embraced by President Donald Trump during his 2024 campaign, Project 2025 is a collection of conservative policy proposals – many written by veterans of his first administration. It echoes similar projects, both liberal and conservative, setting out a bold agenda for a new administration.

    But Project 2025 does so with particular detail and urgency, hoping to galvanize dramatic change before the midterm elections in 2026. As its foreword warns: “Conservatives have just two years and one shot to get this right.”

    The standard for a transformational “100 days” – a much-used reference point for evaluating an administration – belongs to the first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

    President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Social Security Bill in Washington on Aug. 14, 1935.
    AP Photo, file

    Social reforms and FDR

    In 1933, in the depths of the Great Depression, Roosevelt faced a nation in which business activity had stalled, nearly a third of the workforce was unemployed, and economic misery and unrest were widespread.

    But Roosevelt’s so-called “New Deal” unfolded less as a grand plan to combat the Depression than as a scramble of policy experimentation.

    Roosevelt did not campaign on what would become the New Deal’s singular achievements, which included expansive relief programs, subsidies for farmers, financial reforms, the Social Security system, the minimum wage and federal protection of workers’ rights.

    Those achievements came haltingly after two years of frustrated or ineffective policymaking. And those achievements rested less on Roosevelt’s political vision than on the political mobilization and demands made by American workers.

    A generation later, another wave of social reforms unfolded in similar fashion. This time it was not general economic misery that spurred actions, but the persistence of inequality – especially racial inequality – in an otherwise prosperous time.

    LBJ’s Great Society

    President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society programs declared a war on poverty and, toward that end, introduced a raft of new federal initiatives in urban, education and civil rights.

    These included the provision of medical care for the poor and older people via Medicaid and Medicare, a dramatic expansion of federal aid for K-12 education, and landmark voting rights and civil rights legislation.

    As with the New Deal, the substance of these policies rested less with national policy designs than with the aspirations and mobilization of the era’s social movements.

    Resistance to policy change

    Since the 1930s, conservative policy agendas have largely taken the form of reactions to the New Deal and the Great Society.

    The central message has routinely been that “big government” has overstepped its bounds and trampled individual rights, and that the architects of those reforms are not just misguided but treasonous. Project 2025, in this respect, promises not just a political right turn but to “defeat the anti-American left.”

    After the 1946 midterm elections, congressional Republicans struck back at the New Deal. Drawing on business opposition to the New Deal, popular discontent with postwar inflation, and common cause with Southern Democrats, they stemmed efforts to expand the New Deal, gutting a full employment proposal and defeating national health insurance.

    They struck back at organized labor with the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which undercut federal law by allowing states to pass anti-union “right to work” laws. And they launched an infamous anti-communist purge of the civil service, which forced nearly 15,000 people out of government jobs.

    In 1971, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce commissioned Lewis Powell – who would be appointed by Republican President Richard Nixon to the Supreme Court the next year – to assess the political landscape. Powell’s memorandum characterized the political climate at the dawn of the 1970s – including both Great Society programs and the anti-war and Civil Rights movements of the 1960s – as nothing less than an “attack on the free enterprise system.”

    In a preview of current U.S. politics, Powell’s memorandum devoted special attention to a disquieting “chorus of criticism” coming from “the perfectly respectable elements of society: from the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary journals, the arts and sciences, and from politicians.”

    Powell characterized the social policies of the New Deal and Great Society as “socialism or some sort of statism” and advocated the elevation of business interests and business priorities to the center of American political life.

    A copy of Project 2025 is held during the Democratic National Convention on Aug. 21, 2024, in Chicago.
    AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

    Building a conservative infrastructure

    Powell captured the conservative zeitgeist at the onset of what would become a long and decisive right turn in American politics. More importantly, it helped galvanize the creation of a conservative infrastructure – in the courts, in the policy world, in universities and in the media – to push back against that “chorus of criticism.”

    This political shift would yield an array of organizations and initiatives, including the political mobilization of business, best represented by the emergence of the Koch brothers and the powerful libertarian conservative political advocacy group they founded, known as Americans for Prosperity. It also yielded a new wave of conservative voices on radio and television and a raft of right-wing policy shops and think tanks – including the Heritage Foundation, creator of Project 2025.

    In national politics, the conservative resurgence achieved full expression in President Ronald Reagan’s 1980 campaign. The “Reagan Revolution” united economic and social conservatives around the central goal of dismantling what was left of the New Deal and Great Society.

    Powell’s triumph was evident across the policy landscape. Reagan gutted social programs, declared war on organized labor, pared back economic and social regulations – or declined to enforce them – and slashed taxes on business and the wealthy.

    Publicly, the Reagan administration argued that tax cuts would pay for themselves, with the lower rates offset by economic growth. Privately, it didn’t matter: Either growth would sustain revenues, or the resulting budgetary hole could be used to “starve the beast” and justify further program cuts.

    Reagan’s vision, and its shaky fiscal logic, were reasserted in the “Contract with America” proposed by congressional Republicans after their gains in the 1994 midterm elections.

    This declaration of principles proposed deep cuts to social programs alongside tax breaks for business. It was perhaps most notable for encouraging the Clinton administration to pass the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, “ending welfare as we know it,” as Clinton promised.

    Aiming at the ‘deep state’

    Project 2025, the latest in this series of blueprints for dramatic change, draws most deeply on two of those plans.

    As in the congressional purges of 1940s, it takes aim not just at policy but at the civil servants – Trump’s “deep state” – who administer it.

    In the wake of World War II, the charge was that feckless bureaucrats served Soviet masters. Today, Project 2025 aims to “bring the Administrative State to heel, and in the process defang and defund the woke culture warriors who have infiltrated every last institution in America.”

    As in the 1971 Powell memorandum, Project 2025 promises to mobilize business power; to “champion the dynamic genius of free enterprise against the grim miseries of elite-directed socialism.”

    Whatever their source – party platforms, congressional bomb-throwers, think tanks, private interests – the success or failure of these blueprints rested not on their vision or popular appeal but on the political power that accompanied them. The New Deal and Great Society gained momentum and meaning from the social movements that shaped their agendas and held them to account.

    The lineage of conservative responses has been largely an assertion of business power. Whatever populist trappings the second Trump administration may possess, the bottom line of the conservative cultural and political agenda in 2025 is to dismantle what is left of the New Deal or the Great Society, and to defend unfettered “free enterprise” against critics and alternatives.

    Colin Gordon receives funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Mellon Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation.

    ref. Trump’s Project 2025 agenda caps decades-long resistance to 20th century progressive reform – https://theconversation.com/trumps-project-2025-agenda-caps-decades-long-resistance-to-20th-century-progressive-reform-247176

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Will multinational companies flock to Syria? Maybe, if foreign aid arrives first

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ana Carolina Garriga, Professor of Political Science, University of Essex

    hanohiki / Shutterstock

    Syria’s new foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, recently appeared at the World Economic Forum’s annual conference in the Swiss resort of Davos. He announced that his country is open for business and seeking foreign investment.

    After more than 13 years of civil war and decades of dictatorship that saw Syria become a pariah state, the country needs all the financial support it can get. But will foreign firms set up shop in Syria?

    Countries like Syria, emerging from conflict, face the challenge of convincing investors they are a safe environment for investment. Our research suggests companies look at what governments are doing in terms of aid when considering whether to invest. In general, post-war countries that receive more foreign aid subsequently receive more foreign investment.

    Foreign direct investment (FDI) typically involves multinational companies building factories, opening stores or investing capital in businesses abroad. It can be highly beneficial for developing countries.

    FDI is the most stable source of international financing, and generally has positive long-term effects on economic growth and poverty reduction. More importantly for incumbent governments, FDI has positive short-term effects on domestic employment, government financing and spending, and foreign exchange reserves.

    It also has a potential positive effect on government approval ratings, as attracting inward FDI signifies political competence to voters. These reasons are why almost all governments compete to receive these financial flows.

    FDI is especially important in post-conflict countries. Civil wars typically destroy or seriously harm the productive capacity of countries. In Syria, the conflict destroyed tens of billions of US dollars worth of infrastructure, and incapacitated more than half its electrical grid.

    After 13 years of civil war, Syria needs all the financial support it can get.
    Vagabjorn / Shutterstock

    War often disrupts a country’s access to the international economic exchanges that help economic growth. Since the beginning of its conflict in March 2011, Syria’s annual exports have dropped from US$8.8 billion (£7.1 billion) to US$1 billion, due to the war and war-related sanctions. Its economy has shrunk by 54%.

    Foreign investment can contribute substantially to rebuilding the economy. But post-conflict countries might seem risky to investors.

    Foreign firms sometimes avoid countries plagued by violence, political instability, or political risk. Conflict could reemerge in Syria, and multinational corporations probably do not want their business in a place where factories could be bombed or customers killed.

    Post-conflict situations are also relatively information-poor environments. Conflict often hampers data collection efforts, and governments, in desperate need of capital, may be incentivised to misrepresent the actual state of the economy or strength of the political system.

    In the case of Syria, foreign observers do not know what to make of the new ruling coalition, which is led by a designated terrorist organisation in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. While the international community seems to want to support Syria – the UK, for example, has been clear about its intention to help the country – observers are unsure about the environment and how it might change in the coming years.

    In these kinds of situation, international investors look at a variety of signals. In our research, we show that one key signal is whether other governments have sent official development aid to post-conflict countries.

    Following the aid

    We argue that the decision to send aid to a country signals the donors’ trust of local authorities. What matters is this presence of aid, whether or not the aid achieves its intended purpose.

    Examining decades of global data, we have found a robust relationship between foreign aid and subsequent investment in post-conflict countries – with one striking exception.

    There does not seem to be a relationship between aid from the US and foreign investment. Because so much of US foreign aid is geostrategic – to shore up alliances or secure access to particular areas – investors do not seem to view it as a valuable signal about the recipient country.

    So, Syria should perhaps not worry too much about the new US president Donald Trump’s plan to cut American foreign aid. If aid from other government donors can still flow in, this could encourage investment to follow.

    Fortunately for Syria, some countries and international organisations have already pledged aid – including the UK, which has announced £50 million in humanitarian aid for the country and its refugees. This seems like a good sign for Syria’s future – even more so because of the signal it sends to foreign investors.

    Specific domestic policies that encourage FDI and build stronger institutions will be necessary to secure investment in the longer term. Syria will need to demonstrate its commitment to the rule of law and property rights, while creating a stable environment for investment.

    However, if the pledged aid materialises – and if more countries chip in – this could lead to substantial economic benefits for Syria.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Will multinational companies flock to Syria? Maybe, if foreign aid arrives first – https://theconversation.com/will-multinational-companies-flock-to-syria-maybe-if-foreign-aid-arrives-first-248406

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New partnerships with financial sector to unlock growth in UK and overseas

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    UK Minister for Development announces funding and partnerships to deliver Sustainable Development Goals and domestic growth, in speech at London Stock Exchange.

    • Government to partner with UK financial sector to deliver on the Plan for Change by tackling climate change and driving growth at home.
    • Minister for Development Anneliese Dodds pays tribute to the UK financial services sector, which “powers jobs and growth across the UK”.
    • New funding and partnerships will unlock investment opportunities, as part of a new development approach supporting sustainable economic growth overseas.

    Efforts to address the climate crisis and boost growth in the Global South and at home will be enhanced under a partnership approach between the government and the UK financial sector, the UK’s Minister for Development Anneliese Dodds announced today (Monday 3 February).

    Speaking at the London Stock Exchange, Minister Dodds praised the “expertise, experience and dynamism” of the UK’s financial services sector, and pledged to put this expertise “at the heart of how we meet the opportunities and challenges of our time”, including accelerating delivery of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These seek to address global challenges, including poverty, inequality, and climate change, to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all, by 2030.

    Minister Dodds set out how investment in the Global South is an opportunity for UK financial services “to marry investment in the economies and technologies of the future, with the experience and expertise of the City of London”, adding that the government will hold up its end of the bargain by working internationally to reform the global financial system to provide greater opportunity and stability.

    Minister for Development Anneliese Dodds said:

    With businesses and the government working hand in hand to drive investment in the Global South, we can unlock growth, jobs, trade, investment, and pride in our economy overseas and here at home.

    This government is enabling the financial services sector to flourish and use its expertise and depth of capital to invest in the markets and technologies of the future.

    Through partnerships like this, we will deliver on the Plan for Change, drive domestic growth, and create a world free from poverty on a liveable planet.

    The Minister announced up to £100 million for the UK’s flagship public markets programme MOBILIST. This programme will provide businesses focused on delivering the SDGs with the anchor funding and expert advice they need to list on stock exchanges around the world, including in London, allowing them to attract significant sums of additional private investment. 

    This is expected to generate between £400 million and £600 million of new investments in businesses across emerging markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These investments will support economic growth, sustainable development, and climate action in local markets.

    She also celebrated the issuance of the first Climate Investment Fund (CIF) Capital Markets Mechanism (CCMM) bond last month, which raised $500 million (approximately £400 million) for energy and clean technology projects in low- and middle-income countries. The CCMM, launched by the Prime Minister at COP29, is a new financial mechanism to leverage future loan repayments by issuing bonds on capital markets.

    As today’s announcements demonstrate, this government’s modern approach to development focuses on harnessing the power of the private sector in mobilising the finance emerging markets need to grow. This will create future export markets for the UK and new overseas investment opportunities, supporting domestic growth and delivering on the government’s Plan for Change. It will also make the UK safer and more stable by tackling the drivers of conflict, climate crises and economic decline in partner countries.

    UK Climate Minister Kerry McCarthy said: 

    This is a historic moment for tackling the climate crisis, with the first bond raising $500 million to accelerate the global clean energy transition and support the flow of climate finance to developing countries.

    Public finance alone cannot tackle the scale of this challenge, and this mechanism will help leverage the private finance needed to support those on the frontline of a changing climate.

    Its listing in the UK positions London as a green finance capital. By working with partners such as the World Bank the UK can drive the action needed to grow the economy and reap the rewards of net zero.

    Minister Dodds made the announcements during a speech to the UK financial sector, including pension funds, insurers, banks, and development finance organisations, after joining a market opening ceremony at the London Stock Exchange.

    Julia Hoggett, CEO of the London Stock Exchange, added:

    Flows of investment are vital to generating sustainable growth both in the UK and around the world. London’s capital markets have long played a leading role in driving flows of capital to where they need to go, and we welcome the focus on fuelling growth and supporting the just transition to net zero.

    As part of these efforts, we are proud to celebrate the listing of the Climate Investment Funds’ Capital Markets Mechanism on the London Stock Exchange. This pioneering bond issuance programme not only brings a new financing tool to our market but is facilitating critical investment in sustainable and clean assets.

    As part of the speech, the Minister also welcomed a first-of-its-kind report from UK institutional investors, co-led by Mercer, Aviva Investors and the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) and supported by the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), on scaling private capital for climate action in emerging markets, and announced a new taskforce to take its recommendations forward.

    The speech comes a week after British International Investment (BII), which is funded by the FCDO, launched a call for institutional investors to work with them to develop solutions that will boost the flow of private capital into emerging markets, which are often considered too risky by global investors, but can offer attractive investment opportunities for growth, diversification and impact for the climate transition. 

    Tariye Gbadegesin, Chief Executive Officer, Climate Investment Funds, said:

    The UK has long recognized that to transform our energy systems at the scale and speed required, we must deploy public money smartly. That means putting climate finance to work where it’s most needed: investing in promising new technologies and enabling new clean energy markets, to spur private sector interest at scale.

    As a founding member of the Climate Investment Funds and a proud partner in the launch of our next-generation CIF Capital Markets Mechanism today, the UK is demonstrating its commitment to bold new models of public-private partnership for both people and planet.

    Benoit Hudon, Mercer’s UK President and CEO said:

    UK institutional investors, as part of the wider financial and professional services ecosystem are uniquely placed to help finance development projects in emerging markets and developing economies, which will also support UK growth. The report published today, co-led by Mercer, sets out a range of measures the UK Government and finance industry can take to secure the UK’s position as the world’s leading destination for transition finance.

    Background

    The Minister’s full speech will be made available on gov.uk following the event: Search – GOV.UK

    Photos to be available on FCDO Flickr later today.

    About MOBILIST 

    A flagship UK government programme, MOBILIST (Mobilising Institutional Capital Through Listed Product Structures) identifies and invests in scalable, replicable transactions on public markets that help deliver the climate transition and the Sustainable Development Goals. MOBILIST invests capital on commercial terms, delivers technical assistance, conducts research, and builds partnerships to catalyse investment in newly listed products. Since its inception, MOBILIST has invested £87 million in equity and equity commitments, directly mobilising £247.5 million in private capital.

    Examples of initiatives supported by MOBILIST include:

    • Citicore Renewable Energy Company: in June 2024, MOBILIST supported the Philippines in its transition to renewable energy through a £9.9 million local currency investment in the initial public offering (IPO) of Citicore Renewable Energy Corporation (CREC) on the Philippines Stock Exchange, Inc. (PSE), helping to decarbonise the Philippines power generation fleet by rapidly rolling out wind and solar, adding 2.3GW by the end of 2025 and 5GW by 2028. MOBILIST’s investment supported £63.7 million of private investment, a mobilisation ratio of 6.25.
    • Bayfront Infrastructure Capital IV: MOBILIST’s £4 million equity investment in September 2023 into a $410 million securitisation vehicle that listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange and enabled the greening of bank balance sheets in Southeast Asia and attracted international investors into developing countries’ infrastructure. MOBILIST’s investment supported £90.5 million in private investment, a mobilisation ratio of 22.9.

    About the CIF & CCMM

    The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) were launched in 2008 to invest in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) climate projects. To date, the CIF has leveraged over $64bn from $12.3bn of donor contributions, supporting over 400 projects in over 80 countries. The UK (led by DESNZ) is a leading donor and chairs its Joint Trust Fund Committee.

    The CIF Capital Markets Mechanism (CCMM) was launched by the Prime Minister at COP29, and the bonds were issued on the London Stock Exchange in January 2025. It is a new financial mechanism to leverage future loan repayments (reflows) from previous investments made under the CIF’s Clean Technology Fund (CTF), by issuing bonds on capital markets. 

    Examples of investments made by the CTF include:

    • In South Africa, CTF invested $430.9 million (with co-financing of $2.28 billion). Key achievements include supporting Sub-Saharan Africa’s first large-scale battery storage project and increasing clean energy share in the power grid. This has led to a reduction of 1 million tons of CO2 annually. Notable projects include the KaXu, Xina, and Khi solar plants and the 2023 launch of Africa’s largest battery energy storage system.
    • In Thailand, CTF invested $85.7 million (with co-financing of $1.1 billion). This funding supported over 480MW of solar and wind capacity, reducing 160,000 tons of CO2 annually. Over eight years, wind capacity increased seven-fold, and solar capacity more than doubled. CTF also helped finance the Theppana Wind Power Project and kickstarted the Solar Power Company Group to develop solar farms across northeastern Thailand.

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 3 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Address of the Holy Father to the participants in the World Leaders Summit on Children’s Rights

    Source: The Holy See

    Address of the Holy Father to the participants in the World Leaders Summit on Children’s Rights, 03.02.2025
    This morning, in the Vatican Apostolic Palace, the World Leaders Summit on Children’s Rights took place. Entitled “Love them and protect them”, the Summit was organized by the Pontifical Committee for World Children’s Day.
    The following is the address delivered by the Pope to the participants in the Summit at its inauguration:

    Address of the Holy Father
    Your Majesty,Dear brothers and sisters, good morning!
    I greet the Secretary of State, the Cardinals and the distinguished participants in this World Leaders Summit on Children’s Rights, entitled “Love them and Protect them”.  I thank you for accepting the invitation and I am confident that, by pooling your experience and expertise, you can open new avenues to assist and protect the children whose rights are daily trampled upon and ignored.
    Even today, too often the lives of millions of children are marked by poverty, war, lack of schooling, injustice and exploitation. Children and adolescents in poorer countries, or those torn apart by tragic conflicts, are forced to endure terrible trials. Nor is the more resource-rich world immune from injustice. Where, thank God, people do not suffer from war or hunger, there are problematic peripheries, where little ones are not infrequently vulnerable and suffer from problems that we cannot underestimate. In fact, to a much greater extent than in the past, schools and health services have to deal with children already tested by many difficulties, with anxious or depressed youngsters, and adolescents drawn to forms of aggression or self-harm. Moreover, a culture of efficiency looks upon childhood itself, like old age, as a “periphery” of existence.
    Increasingly, those who have their whole life ahead of them are unable to approach it with optimism and confidence. It is precisely young people, who are the signs of hope in every society, who struggle to find hope in themselves. This is sad and troubling.  Indeed, “it is sad to see young people who are without hope, who face an uncertain and unpromising future, who lack employment or job security, or realistic prospects after finishing school. Without the hope that their dreams can come true, they will inevitably grow discouraged and listless” (Bull Spes Non Confundit, 12).
    What we have tragically seen almost every day in recent times, namely children dying beneath bombs, sacrificed to the idols of power, ideology, and nationalistic interests, is unacceptable. In truth, nothing is worth the life of a child. To kill children is to deny the future. In some cases, minors themselves are forced to fight under the effect of drugs. Even in countries without war, violence between criminal gangs becomes just as deadly for children, and often leaves them orphaned and marginalized.
    The pathological individualism of developed countries is also detrimental to children.  Sometimes they are mistreated or even put to death by the very people who should be protecting and nurturing them. They fall victim to quarrelling, social or mental distress and parental addictions.
    Many children die as migrants at sea, in the desert or along the many routes of journeys undertaken out of desperate hope. Countless others succumb to a lack of medical care or various types of exploitation. All these situations are different, but they raise the same question: How is it possible that a child’s life should end like this?
    Surely this is unacceptable, and we must guard against becoming inured to this reality. A childhood denied is a silent scream condemning the wrongness of the economic system, the criminal nature of wars, the lack of adequate medical care and schooling. The burden of these injustices weighs most heavily on the least and the most defenceless of our brothers and sisters. At the level of international organizations, this is called a “global moral crisis”.
    We are here today to say that we do not want this to become the new normal. We refuse to get used to it. Certain practices in the media tend to make us insensitive, leading to a general hardening of hearts. Indeed, we risk losing what is noblest in the human heart: mercy and compassion. More than once, I have shared this concern with some of you who represent various religious communities.
    Today, more than forty million children have been displaced by conflict and about a hundred million are homeless. There is also the tragedy of child slavery: some one hundred and sixty million children are victims of forced labour, trafficking, abuse and exploitation of all kinds, including compulsory marriages. There are millions of migrant children, sometimes with families but often alone. This phenomenon of unaccompanied minors is increasingly frequent and serious.
    Many other minors live in “limbo” because they were not registered at birth. An estimated one hundred and fifty million “invisible” children have no legal existence.  This is an obstacle to their accessing education or health care, yet worse still, since they do not enjoy legal protection, they can easily be abused or sold as slaves. This actually happens! We can think of the young Rohingya children, who often struggle to get registered, or the “undocumented” children at the border of the United States, those first victims of that exodus of despair and hope made by the thousands of people coming from the South towards the United States of America, and many others.
    Sadly, this history of oppression of children is constantly repeated. If we ask the elderly, our grandparents, about the war they experienced when they were young, the tragedy emerges from their memories: the darkness – everything is dark during the war, colours practically disappear – and the stench, the cold, the hunger, the dirt, the fear, the scavenging, the loss of parents and homes, abandonment and all kinds of violence. I grew up with the stories of the First World War told by my grandfather, and this opened my eyes and heart to the horror of war.
    Seeing things through the eyes of those who have lived through war is the best way to understand the inestimable value of life. Yet also listening to those children who today live in violence, exploitation or injustice serves to strengthen our “no” to war, to the throwaway culture of waste and profit, in which everything is bought and sold without respect or care for life, especially when that life is small and defenceless. In the name of this throwaway mentality, in which the human being becomes all-powerful, unborn life is sacrificed through the murderous practice of abortion.  Abortion suppresses the life of children and cuts off the source of hope for the whole of society.
    Sisters and brothers, how important it is to listen, for we need to realize that young children understand, remember and speak to us. And with their looks and their silences, too, they speak to us. So let us listen to them!
    Dear friends, I thank you and encourage you, with God’s grace, to make the most of the opportunities afforded by this meeting.  I pray that your contributions will help to build a better world for children, and consequently for everyone!  For me, it is a source of hope that we are all here together, to put children, their rights, their dreams, and their demand for a future at the centre of our concern. Thanks to all of you, and God bless you!

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Group of Experts on Measuring Poverty and Inequality

    Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

    28 – 29 November 2024

    Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland

    General

    68812 _ Report _ 398101 _ English _ 773 _ 430040 _ pdf

    A. Social policies, social transfers, and data

    B. Intra-household poverty

    C. Assets-based poverty and inequality

    D. Data sources and methods to complement surveys

    E. Energy poverty

    F. Inequality in consumption

    G. Hard-to-reach population groups

    H. Panel discussion – Drivers for change in poverty statistics

    I. Communicating statistics on poverty and inequality

    J. Work under the Conference of European Statisticians

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Whether Biden Or Trump, US’ Latin American Policy Will Be Contemptible

    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs –

    By John Perry and Roger D. Harris

    Migration, Drugs, and Tariffs.

    With Donald Trump as the new US president, pundits are speculating about how US policy towards Latin America might change.

    In this article, we look at some of the speculation, then address three specific instances of how the US’s policy priorities may be viewed from a progressive, Latin American perspective. This leads us to a wider argument: that the way these issues are dealt with is symptomatic of Washington’s paramount objective of sustaining the US’s hegemonic position. In this overriding preoccupation, its policy towards Latin America is only one element, of course, but always of significance because the US hegemon still treats the region as its “backyard.”

    First, some examples of what the pundits are saying. In Foreign Affairs, Brian Winter argues that Trump’s return signals a shift away from Biden’s neglect of the region. “The reason is straightforward,” he says. “Trump’s top domestic priorities of cracking down on unauthorized immigration, stopping the smuggling of fentanyl and other illicit drugs, and reducing the influx of Chinese goods into the United States all depend heavily on policy toward Latin America.”

    Ryan Berg, who is with the thinktank, Center for Strategic and International Studies, funded by the US defense industry, is also hopeful. Trump will “focus U.S. policy more intently on the Western Hemisphere,” he argues, “and in so doing, also shore up its own security and prosperity at home.”

    According to blogger James Bosworth, Biden’s “benign neglect” could be replaced by an “aggressive Monroe Doctrine – deportations, tariff wars, militaristic security policies, demands of fealty towards the US, and a rejection of China.” However, notwithstanding the attention of Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, Bosworth thinks there is still a good chance of policy lapsing into benign neglect as the new administration focuses elsewhere.

    The wrong end of the telescope

    What these and similar analyses share is a concern with problems of importance to the US, including domestic ones, and how they might be tackled by shifts in policy towards Latin America. They view the region from the end of a US-mounted telescope.

    Trump’s approach may be the more brazen “America first!,” but the basic stance is much the same as these pundits. The different scenarios will be worked out in Washington, with Latin America’s future seen as shaped by how it handles US policy changes over which it has little influence. Analyses by these supposed experts are constrained by their adopting the same one-dimensional perspective as Washington’s, instead of questioning it.

    Here’s one example. The word “neglect” is superficial because it hides the immense involvement of the US in Latin America even when it is “neglecting” it: from deep commercial ties to a massive military presence. It is also superficial because, in a real sense, the US constantly neglects the problems that concern most Latin Americans: low wages, inequality, being safe in the streets, the damaging effects of climate change, and many more. “Neglect” would be seen very differently on the streets of a Latin American city than it is inside the Washington beltway.

    Who has the “drug problem”?

    The vacuum in US thinking is nowhere more apparent than in responses to the drug problem. Trump threatens to declare Mexican drug cartels to be terrorist organizations and to invade Mexico to attack them.

    But, as academic Carlos Pérez-Ricart told El Pais: “This is a problem that does not originate in Mexico. The source, the demand, and the vectors are not Mexican. It is them.” Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum also points out that it is consumption in the US that drives drug production and trafficking in Mexico.

    Trump could easily make the same mistake as his predecessor Clinton did two decades ago. Back then, billions were poured into “Plan Colombia” but still failed to solve the “drug problem,” while vastly augmenting violence and human rights violations in the target country.

    A foretaste of what might happen, if Trump carries out his threat, occurred last July, when Biden’s administration captured Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. That caused an all-out war between cartels in the Mexican state of Sinaloa.

    Sheinbaum rightly turns questions about drug production and consumption back onto the US. Rhetorically, she asks: “Do you believe that fentanyl is not manufactured in the United States?…. Where are the drug cartels in the United States that distribute fentanyl in US cities? Where does the money from the sale of that fentanyl go in the United States?”

    If Trump launches a war on cartels, he will not be the first US president to the treat drug consumption as a foreign issue rather than a concomitantly domestic one.

    Where does the “migration problem” originate?

    Trump is also not the first president to be obsessed by migration. Like drugs, it is seen as a problem to be solved by the countries where the migrants originate, while both the “push” and “pull” factors under US control receive less attention.

    Exploitation of migrant labor, complex asylum procedures, and schemes such as “humanitarian parole” to encourage migration are downplayed as reasons. Biden intensified US sanctions on various Latin American countries, which have been shown conclusively to provoke massive emigration. Meanwhile Trump threatens to do the same.

    Many Latin American countries have been made unsafe by crime linked to drugs or other problems in which the US is implicated. About 392,000 Mexicans were displaced as a result of conflict in 2023 alone, their problem aggravated by the massive, often illegal, export of firearms from the US to Mexico.

    Costa Rica, historically a safe country, had a record 880 homicides in 2023, many of which were related to drug trafficking. In Brazil and other countries, US-trained security forces contribute directly to the violence, rather than reducing it.

    Mass deportations from the US, promised by Trump, could worsen these problems, as happened in El Salvador in the late 1990s. They would also affect remittances sent home by migrant workers, exacerbating regional poverty. The threatened use of tariffs on exports to the US could also have serious consequences if Latin America does not stand up to Trump’s threats. Economist Michael Hudson argues that countries will have to jointly retaliate by refusing to pay dollar-based debts to bond holders if export earnings from the US are summarily cut.

    China in the US “backyard”

    Trump also joins the Washington consensus in its preoccupation with China’s influence in Latin America. Monica de Bolle is with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a thinktank partly funded by Pentagon contractors. She told the BBC: “You have got the backyard of America engaging directly with China. That’s going to be problematic.”

    Recently retired US Southern Command general, Laura Richardson, was probably the most senior frequent visitor on Washington’s behalf to Latin American capitals, during the Biden administration. She accused China of “playing the ‘long game’ with its development of dual-use sites and facilities throughout the region, “adding that those sites could serve as “points of future multi-domain access for the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] and strategic naval chokepoints.”

    As Foreign Affairs points out, Latin America’s trade with China has “exploded” from $18 billion in 2002 to $480 billion in 2023. China is also investing in huge infrastructure projects, and seemingly its only political condition is a preference for a country to recognize China diplomatically (not Taiwan). Even here, China is not absolute as with Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay, which still recognize Taiwan. China still has direct investments in those holdouts, though relatively more modest than with regional countries that fully embrace its one-China policy.

    Peru, currently a close US ally, has a new, Chinese-funded megaport at Chancay, opened in November by President Xi Jinping himself. Even right-wing Argentinian president Milei said of China, “They do not demand anything [in return].”

    What does the US offer instead? While Antony Blinken proudly displayed old railcars that were gifted to Peru, the reality is that most US “aid” to Latin America is either aimed at “promoting democracy” (i.e. Washington’s political agenda) or is conditional or exploitative in other ways.

    The BBC cites “seasoned observers” who believe that Washington is paying the price for “years of indifference” towards the region’s needs. Where the US sees a loss of strategic influence to China and to a lesser extent to Russia, Iran, and others, Latin American countries see opportunities for development and economic progress.

    Remember the Monroe Doctrine

    Those calling for a more “benign” policy are forgetting that, in the two centuries since President James Monroe announced the “doctrine,” later given his name, US policy towards Latin America has been aggressively self-interested.

    Its troops have intervened thousands of times in the region and have occupied its countries on numerous occasions. Just since World War II, there have been around 50 significant interventions or coup attempts, beginning with Guatemala in 1954. The US has 76 military bases across the region, while other major powers like China and Russia have none.

    The doctrine is very much alive. In Foreign Affairs, Brian Winter warns: “Many Republicans perceive these linkages [with China], and the growing Chinese presence in Latin America more broadly, as unacceptable violations of the Monroe Doctrine, the 201-year-old edict that the Western Hemisphere should be free of interference from outside powers.”

    Bosworth adds that Trump wants Latin America to decisively choose a side in the US vs China scrimmage, not merely underplay the role of China in the hemisphere. Any country courting Trump, he suggests, “needs to show some anti-China vibes.”

    Will Freeman is with the Council on Foreign Relations, whose major sponsors are also Pentagon contractors. He thinks that a new Monroe Doctrine and what he calls Trump’s “hardball” diplomacy may partially work, but only with northern Latin America countries, which are more dependent on US trade and other links.

    Trump has two imperatives: while one is stifling China’s influence (e.g. by taking possession of the Panama Canal), another is gaining control of mineral resources (a reason for his wanting to acquire Greenland). The desire for mineral resources is not new, either. General Richardson gave an interview in 2023 to another defense-industry-funded thinktank in which she strongly insinuated that Latin American minerals rightly belong to the US.

    Maintaining hegemonic power against the threat of multipolarity

    Neoconservative Charles Krauthammer, writing 20 years ago for yet another thinktank funded by the  defense industry, openly endorsed the US’s status as the dominant hegemonic power and decried multilateralism, at least when not in US interests. “Multipolarity, yes, when there is no alternative,” he said. “But not when there is. Not when we have the unique imbalance of power that we enjoy today.”

    Norwegian commentator Glen Diesen, writing in 2024, contends that the US is still fighting a battle – although perhaps now a losing one – against multipolarity and to retain its predominant status. Trump’s “America first!” is merely a more blatant expression of sentiments held by his other presidential predecessors for clinging on to Washington’s contested hegemony.

    The irony of Biden’s presidency was that his pursuit of the Ukraine war has led to warmer relations between his two rivals, Russia and China. In this context, the growth of BRICS has been fostered – an explicitly multipolar, non-hegemonic partnership. As Glen Diesen says, “The war intensified the global decoupling from the West.”

    Other steps to maintain US hegemony – its support for Israel’s genocide in Gaza, the regime-change operation in Syria and the breakdown of order in Haiti – suggest that, in Washington’s view, according to Diesen, “chaos is the only alternative to US global dominance.” Time and again, Yankee “beneficence” has meant ruination, not development.

    These have further strengthened desires in the global south for alternatives to US dominance, not least in Latin America. Many of its countries (especially those vulnerable to tightening US sanctions) now want to follow the alternative of BRICS.

    Unsurprisingly, Trump has been highly critical of this perceived erosion of hegemonic power on Biden’s watch. Thomas Fazi argues in UnHerd that this is realism on Trump’s part; he knows the Ukraine war cannot be conclusively won, and that China’s power is difficult to contain. Accordingly, this is leading to a “recalibrating of US priorities toward a more manageable ‘continental’ strategy — a new Monroe Doctrine — aimed at reasserting full hegemony over what it deems to be its natural sphere of influence, the Americas and the northern Atlantic,” stretching from Greenland and the Arctic to Tierra del Fuego and Antarctica.

    The pundits may not agree on quite what Trump’s approach towards Latin America will be, but they concur with Winter’s judgment that the region “is about to become a priority for US foreign policy.” His appointment of Marco Rubio is a signal of this. The new secretary of state is a hawk, just like Blinken, but one with a dangerous focus on Latin America.

    However, the mere fact that such pundits hark back to the Monroe Doctrine indicates that this is only, so to speak, old wine in new bottles. Even in the recent past, an aggressive application of the 201-year-old Monroe Doctrine has never seen a hiatus.

    Recall US-backed coups that deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya (2009) and Bolivian Evo Morales (2019), plus the failed coup against Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2018), along with the parliamentary coup that ousted Paraguayan Fernando Lugo (2012). To these, US-backed regime change by “lawfare” included Dilma Rousseff in Brazil (2016) and Pedro Castillo in Peru (2023). Currently presidential elections have simply been suspended in Haiti and Peru with US backing.

    Even if Trump is more blatant than his predecessors in making clear that his policymaking is based entirely on what he perceives to be US interests, rather than those of Latin Americans, this is not new.

    As commentator Caitlin Johnstone points out, the main difference between Trump and his predecessors is that he “makes the US empire much more transparent and unhidden.” From the other end of the political spectrum, a former John McCain adviser echoes the same assessment: “there will likely be far more continuity between the two administrations than meets the eye.”

    Regardless, Latin America will continue to struggle to set its own destiny, patchily and with setbacks, and this will likely draw it away from the hegemon, whatever the US does.

    Nicaragua-based John Perry is with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition and writes for the London Review of Books, FAIR, and CovertAction.

    Roger D. Harris is with the Task Force on the Americas, the US Peace Council, and the Venezuela Solidarity Network

    Featured image courtesy of Cornell University/Wikimedia Commons

    First published by Popular Resistance: https://popularresistance.org/whether-biden-or-trump-us-latin-american-policy-will-still-be-contemptible/

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Statement by Minister Hussen on International Development Week: Building a Better World Together

    Source: Government of Canada News

    “In our increasingly complex and interconnected world, Canada has a responsibility do our part to build a brighter future for everyone. From tackling climate change to strengthening health systems, international assistance is an investment that will create stronger communities for generations to come. When people have the tools to lift themselves out of poverty and strengthen local economies, it not only impacts individuals and their communities, it also benefits the global economy and our security and prosperity here at home.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1711 – E-000316/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000316/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nicolás González Casares (S&D)

    The deadline for the transposition of a large part of Directive (EU) 2024/1711 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design expired on 17 January 2025. This Directive, which was drawn up in response to the energy price crisis and agreed a year ago, includes measures to achieve more stable electricity prices and provide consumers with greater transparency, agency and protection. An example of this is protection against disconnection from the electricity supply for vulnerable people or those subject to energy poverty.

    With this in mind, I would like to ask:

    • 1.Can the Commission report on the degree of transposition?
    • 2.Is the Commission evaluating measures to expedite matters in the event of problems with the transposition into national law? If so, what are these measures?
    • 3.Does the Commission intend to put in place additional measures to help transpose this directive through the announced Citizens Energy Package?

    Submitted: 24.1.2025

    Last updated: 3 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Maxwell Frost Accepts Bruce F. Vento Award from National Homelessness Law Center for Leadership in Housing Justice

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Maxwell Frost Florida (10th District)

    November 19, 2024

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — Yesterday, Congressman Maxwell Alejandro Frost (D-FL) accepted the Bruce F. Vento Award at the National Homelessness Law Center’s 2024 Annual Human Rights to Housing Awards. This award recognizes individuals and institutions with proven leadership in the fight to end homelessness and poverty. It celebrates the legacy of the late Congressman Bruce F. Vento, whose advocacy left a positive impact in the fight to help Americans experiencing homelessness.

    Earlier this year, Congressman Frost also received the National Low Income Housing Coalition’s 50th Anniversary Emerging Leader Award for his trailblazing work in Congress and his efforts to advance legislation promoting racial equity and housing justice for all. 

    “I came to Congress with a mission to fight for a nation where housing is not just a commodity but a fundamental human right, and to receive this recognition within my first term is both humbling and a reminder of the work still ahead,” said Congressman Frost. “Thank you to the National Homelessness Law Center for this honor and your unwavering commitment to this cause. Now more than ever, the work we are doing to build a future where no one is left behind, where no one is punished for their poverty, and where housing is a reality for all—not just a privilege for some, is more important than ever.”

     

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: ADB Appoints Leah Gutierrez as Director General For New Sectors Department 3

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    MANILA, PHILIPPINES (3 February 2025) — The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has appointed Leah Gutierrez as Director General for a newly-formed department within the bank.

    Ms. Gutierrez assumed the leadership of Sectors Department 3, which will manage operations for finance, human and social development, and public sector management and governance.

    “The bank aims to deliver on the ambitious development goals of its corporate strategy and help meet the rapidly evolving needs of its member countries,” said Ms. Gutierrez. “ADB will continue to collaborate and innovate as client demands grow.”

    Ms. Gutierrez has over 35 years of professional experience, including 24 years at ADB. Prior to her appointment, Ms. Gutierrez was the Director General of the Pacific Department where she led the planning, implementation, and supervision of the department’s work to support the Pacific region. She has also held senior positions in ADB’s Strategy, Policy, and Partnerships Department, Southeast Asia Department, and Office of the Secretary.

    A national of the Philippines, she holds a PhD in Economics from University of Pennsylvania, USA, and a bachelor’s degree in Business Economics from the University of the Philippines.

    ADB introduced a new operating model in 2022 to better serve the rapidly changing needs of its developing member countries. To support this mandate, the Sectors Group was restructured into three distinct Sector Departments, ensuring a balanced spread of responsibilities. The realignment will enhance managerial oversight, improve operational efficiency, and ensure more effective leadership across all functions.

    ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 69 members—49 from the region.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Hideaki Iwasaki Appointed as Director General for New Sectors Department 1

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    MANILA, PHILIPPINES (3 February 2025) — The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has appointed Hideaki Iwasaki as Director General for a newly-formed department, Sectors Department 1, which will manage operations for the energy and transport sectors.

    “Being appointed to this role is an honor for me personally, and more importantly an opportunity to create lasting positive impacts for our member countries across our operational sectors,” said Mr. Iwasaki. “My team will work hard to ensure the most efficient and effective support for key challenges facing Asia and the Pacific, as envisaged by the Midterm Review of ADB’s Strategy 2030 focus areas.”

    Mr. Iwasaki has more than 34 years of professional work experience, including more than 22 years in ADB. Prior to his appointment, he served as Deputy Director General for the Pacific Department where he provided guidance and advice to project teams on managing implementation risks and transaction costs, and guided the North Pacific team. He was formerly Country Director to Thailand and had senior roles in the Southeast Asia and Central and West Asia departments.

    He is a national of Japan and holds a master’s degree in Civil Engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, USA, and master’s and bachelor’s degrees in Urban Engineering from the University of Tokyo, Japan.

    ADB introduced a new operating model in 2022 to better serve the rapidly changing needs of its developing member countries. To support this mandate, the Sectors Group was restructured into three distinct Sector Departments, ensuring a balanced spread of responsibilities. The realignment will enhance managerial oversight, improve operational efficiency, and ensure more effective leadership across all functions.

    ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 69 members—49 from the region.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: ADB Appoints Emma Veve as Director General for Pacific

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    MANILA, PHILIPPINES (3 February 2025) — The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has appointed Emma Veve as Director General of its Pacific Department (PARD), where she will be responsible for the department’s vision and strategy in the subregion.

    Beginning her new role today, Ms. Veve will lead the delivery of the forthcoming Pacific Approach 2026–2030, which will serve as ADB’s overall country partnership strategy for 12 of its 14 Pacific developing members: Cook Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. She will also lead the implementation of ADB’s individual country partnership strategies for Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

    “I am delighted to be back working in the Pacific, and I’m deeply committed to helping shape the new Pacific Approach, which will serve as ADB’s guide to assisting the Pacific developing members achieve their development goals,” said Ms. Veve. “In keeping with ADB’s role as Asia and the Pacific’s climate bank, we will remain focused on combatting climate change and its impacts using innovation, knowledge, and collaboration.”

    Prior to her appointment as Director General for the Pacific, Emma was Deputy Director General with ADB’s Southeast Asia Department. She also served as the Deputy Director General of the Pacific Department where she supported the Director General in the delivery of ADB operations across the 14 Pacific developing member countries. Ms. Veve has also held other senior roles within ADB’s economic, social, and urban sectors in the Pacific Department. 

    Before joining ADB in 2005, Emma was the Economic Advisor with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in Suva, Fiji and held various positions in the Australian commonwealth public service. She is a national of Australia, holds a double degree in agricultural science and economics from the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia; and holds a master’s degree in economics from the University of New England, Armidale, Australia.

    ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 69 members—49 from the region.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: NEXT FIVE YEARS PRESENT A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO REALIZE ‘SABKA VIKAS’; UNION BUDGET 2025-26

    Source: Government of India (2)

    NEXT FIVE YEARS PRESENT A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO REALIZE ‘SABKA VIKAS’; UNION BUDGET 2025-26

    AGRICULTURE, MSME, INVESTMENT, AND EXPORTS TO BE FOUR POWERFUL ENGINES IN JOURNEY OF DEVELOPMENT

    FOCUS ON GARIB, YOUTH, ANNADATA AND NARI IN THE BUDGET

    Posted On: 01 FEB 2025 1:01PM by PIB Delhi

    Next five years is seen as a unique opportunity to realize ‘Sabka Vikas’, said the Union Minister for Finance & Corporate Affairs, Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman while presenting the Union Budget 2025-26 in Parliament today. In her budget speech, the Union Finance Minister emphasized on stimulating balanced growth of all regions.

    The Minister highlighted that our economy is the fastest-growing among all major global economies. Our development track record of the past 10 years and structural reforms have drawn global attention. Confidence in India’s capability and potential has only grown in this period, the Minister added.

    The Union Budget 2025-26 highlights Government’s efforts to accelerate growth, secure inclusive development, invigorate private sector investments, uplift household sentiments, and enhance spending power of India’s rising middle class.

    Specifying Agriculture, MSME, Investment, and Exports to be four powerful engines in journey of development, the Minister underlined that this budget aims to initiate transformative reforms across six domains. During the next five years, the domains of Taxation, Power Sector, Urban Development, Mining, Financial Sector and Regulatory Reforms will augment our growth potential and global competitiveness. The Finance Minister said that in the journey of development, “Our Reforms” is the fuel; where, “Inclusivity” is a guiding spirit; and the “Viksit Bharat” is the destination.

    Focussing on Garib, Youth, Annadata and Nari in her Union Budget 2025-26 speech, the Union Finance Minister underscored on proposed development measures spanning ten broad areas. These are namely, Spurring Agricultural Growth and Productivity; Building Rural Prosperity and Resilience; Taking Everyone Together on an Inclusive Growth path; Boosting Manufacturing and Furthering Make in India; Supporting MSMEs; Enabling Employment-led Development; Investing in people, economy and innovation; Securing Energy Supplies; Promoting Exports; and Nurturing Innovation.

    The Union Minister observed that “Viksit Bharat” encompasses zero-poverty; hundred per cent good quality school education; access to high-quality, affordable, and comprehensive healthcare; hundred per cent skilled labour with meaningful employment; seventy per cent women in economic activities; and farmers making our country the ‘food basket of the world’.

    ***

    NB/SB/RY

    (Release ID: 2098370) Visitor Counter : 34

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SUMMARY OF UNION BUDGET 2025-26

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 01 FEB 2025 12:36PM by PIB Delhi

    NO INCOME TAX ON AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME OF UPTO RS 1 LAKH; TO BOOST MIDDLE CLASS HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS & CONSUMPTION

    SALARIED CLASS TO PAY NIL INCOME TAX UPTO ₹ 12.75 LAKH PER ANNUM IN NEW TAX REGIME

    UNION BUDGET RECOGNISES 4 ENGINES OF DEVELOPMENT – AGRICULTURE, MSME, INVESTMENT AND EXPORTS

    BENEFITTING 1.7 CRORE FARMERS, ‘PRIME MINISTER DHAN-DHAANYA KRISHI YOJANA’ TO COVER 100 LOW AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY DISTRICTS

    “MISSION FOR AATMANIRBHARTA IN PULSES” WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON TUR, URAD AND MASOOR TO BE LAUNCHED

    LOANS UPTO Rs. 5 LAKHS THROUGH KCC UNDER MODIFIED INTEREST SUBVENTION SCHEME

    FY-25 ESTIMATED TO END WITH FISCAL DEFICIT OF 4.8%, TARGET TO BRING IT DOWN TO 4.4% IN FY-26

    SIGNIFICANT ENHANCEMENT OF CREDIT WITH GUARANTEE COVER TO MSMEs FROM ₹ 5 CR TO ₹ 10 CR

    A NATIONAL MANUFACTURING MISSION COVERING SMALL, MEDIUM AND LARGE INDUSTRIES FOR FURTHERING “MAKE IN INDIA”

    50,000 ATAL TINKERING LABS IN GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS IN NEXT 5 YEARS

    CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR EDUCATION, WITH A TOTAL OUTLAY OF ₹ 500 CRORE

    PM SVANIDHI WITH ENHANCED LOANS FROM BANKS, AND UPI LINKED CREDIT CARDS WITH ₹ 30,000 LIMIT

    GIG WORKERS TO GET IDENTITY CARDS, REGISTRATION ON E-SHRAM PORTAL &  HEALTHCARE UNDER PM JAN AROGYA YOJANA

    ₹ 1 LAKH CRORE URBAN CHALLENGE FUND FOR ‘CITIES AS GROWTH HUBS’

    NUCLEAR ENERGY MISSION FOR R&D OF SMALL MODULAR REACTORS WITH AN OUTLAY OF ₹ 20,000 CRORE

    MODIFIED UDAN SCHEME TO ENHANCE REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY TO 120 NEW DESTINATIONS

    ₹ 15,000 CRORE SWAMIH FUND TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR EXPEDITIOUS COMPLETION OF ANOTHER 1 LAKH STRESSED HOUSING UNITS

    ₹ 20,000 CRORE ALLOCATED FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DRIVEN RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION INITIATIVES

    GYAN BHARATAM MISSION FOR SURVEYAND CONSERVATION OF MANUSCRIPTS TO COVER MORE THAN ONE CRORE MANUSCRIPTS

    FDI LIMIT ENHANCED FOR INSURANCE FROM 74 TO 100 PER CENT

    JAN VISHWAS BILL 2.0 TO BE INTRODUCED FOR DECRIMINALISING MORE THAN 100 PROVISIONS IN VARIOUS LAWS

    UPDATED INCOME TAX RETURNS TIME LIMIT INCREASED FROM TWO TO FOUR YEARS

    DELAY IN TCS PAYMENT DECRIMINALISED

    TDS ON RENT INCREASED FROM ₹ 2.4 LAKH TO ₹ 6 LAKH

    BCD EXEMPTED ON 36 LIFESAVING DRUGS AND MEDICINES FOR TREATING CANCER, RARE AND CHRONIC DISEASES

    BCD ON IFPD INCREASED TO 20% AND ON OPEN CELLS REDUCED TO 5%

    BCD ON PARTS OF OPEN CELLS EXEMPTED TO PROMOTE DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING

    TO BOOST BATTERY PRODUCTION, ADDITIONAL CAPITAL GOODS FOR EV AND MOBILE BATTERY MANUFACTURING EXEMPTED

    BCD EXEMPTED FOR 10 YEARS ON RAW MATERIALS & COMPONENTS USED FOR SHIP BUILDING

    BCD REDUCED FROM 30% TO 5% ON FROZEN FISH PASTE AND 15% TO 5% ON FISH HYDROLYSATE

     

    Union Minister of Finance and Corporate Affairs Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman presented the Union Budget 2025-26 in Parliament today. Here is the summary of her budget speech;

    PART A

     

    Quoting Telugu poet and playwright Shri Gurajada Appa Rao’s famous saying, ‘A country is not just its soil; a country is its people.’ – the Finance Minister presented the Union Budget 2025-26 with the theme “Sabka Vikas” stimulating balanced growth of all regions.

    In line with this theme, the Finance Minister outlined the broad Principles of Viksit Bharat to encompass the following:

    a) Zero-poverty;

     b) Hundred per cent good quality school education;

    c) Access to high-quality, affordable, and comprehensive healthcare;

    d) Hundred per cent skilled labour with meaningful employment;

    e) Seventy per cent women in economic activities; and

    f) Farmers making our country the ‘food basket of the world’.

    The Union Budget 2025-2026 promises to continue Government’s efforts to accelerate growth, secure inclusive development, invigorate private sector investments, uplift household sentiments, and enhance spending power of India’s rising middle class. The Budget proposes development measures focusing on poor (Garib), Youth, farmer (Annadata) and women (Nari).

    The Budget aims to initiate transformative reforms in Taxation, Power Sector, Urban Development, Mining, Financial Sector, and Regulatory Reforms to augment India’s growth potential and global competitiveness.

    Union Budget highlights that Agriculture, MSME, Investment, and Exports are engines in the journey to Viksit Bharat using reforms as fuel, guided by the spirit of inclusivity.

     

    1st Engine: Agriculture

    Budget announced ‘Prime Minister Dhan-Dhaanya Krishi Yojana’ in partnership with states covering 100 districts to increase productivity, adopt crop diversification, augment post-harvest storage, improve irrigation facilities, and facilitate availability of long-term and short-term credit.

    A comprehensive multi-sectoral ‘Rural Prosperity and Resilience’ programme will be launched in partnership with states to address underemployment in agriculture through skilling, investment, technology, and invigorating the rural economy. The goal is to generate ample opportunities in rural areas, with focus on rural women, young farmers, rural youth, marginal and small farmers, and landless families.

    Union Finance Minister announced that Government will launch a 6-year “Mission for Aatmanirbharta in Pulses” with special focus on Tur, Urad and Masoor. Central agencies (NAFED and NCCF) will be ready to procure these 3 pulses, as much as offered during the next 4 years from farmers.

    The Budget has outlined measures to Comprehensive Programme for Vegetables & Fruits, National Mission on High Yielding Seeds, and a five year Mission for Cotton Productivity amongst other measures to promote agriculture and allied activities in a major way.

    Smt. Sitharaman announced the increase in loan limits from Rs. 3 lakh to Rs. 5 lakh for loans taken through Kisan Credit Cards under modified interest subvention scheme.

     

    2nd Engine: MSMEs

    Finance Minister described MSMEs as the second power engine for development as they constitute for 45% of our exports. To help MSMEs achieve higher efficiencies of scale, technological upgradation and better access to capital, the investment and turnover limits for classification of all MSMEs enhanced to 2.5 and 2 times, respectively. Further, steps to enhance credit availability with guarantee cover have also been announced.

    The Finance Minister also announced the launch of a new scheme for 5 lakh women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes first-time entrepreneurs. This will provide term loans up to Rs. 2 crore during the next 5 years.

    Smt. Sitharaman announced that the Government will also implement a scheme to make India a global hub for toys representing the ‘Made in India’ brand. She added that the Government will set up a National Manufacturing Mission covering small, medium and large industries for furthering “Make in India”.

    3rd Engine: Investment

    Defining Investment as the third engine of growth, the Union Minister prioritized investment in people, economy and innovation. 

    Under the investment in people, she announced that 50,000 Atal Tinkering Labs will be set up in Government schools in next 5 years.

    Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman announced that broadband connectivity will be provided to all Government secondary schools and primary health centres in rural areas under the Bharatnet project.

    She said Bharatiya Bhasha Pustak Scheme will be implemented to provide digital-form Indian language books for school and higher education.

    Five National Centres of Excellence for skilling will be set up with global expertise and partnerships to equip our youth with the skills required for “Make for India, Make for the World” manufacturing.

    A Centre of Excellence in Artificial Intelligence for education will be set up with a total outlay of 500 crore.

    Budget announced that Government will arrange for Gig workers’ identity cards, their registration on the e-Shram portal and healthcare under PM Jan Arogya Yojana.

    Under the investment in Economy, Smt Sitharaman said Infrastructure-related ministries will come up with a 3-year pipeline of projects in PPP mode.

    She added that an outlay of Rs 1.5 lakh crore was proposed for the 50-year interest free loans to states for capital expenditure and incentives for reforms.

    She also announced the second Asset Monetization Plan 2025-30 to plough back capital of Rs 10 lakh crore in new projects.

    The Jal Jeevan Mission was extended till 2028 with focus on the quality of infrastructure and Operation & Maintenance of rural piped water supply schemes through “Jan Bhagidhari”.

    Government will set up an Urban Challenge Fund of Rs.1 lakh crore to implement the proposals for ‘Cities as Growth Hubs’, ‘Creative Redevelopment of Cities’ and ‘Water and Sanitation’.

    Under the investment in Innovation, an allocation of ₹20,000 crore is announced to implement private sector driven Research, Development and Innovation initiative.

    Finance Minister proposed National Geospatial Mission to develop foundational geospatial infrastructure and data which will benefit urban planning.

    Budget proposes Gyan Bharatam Mission, for survey, documentation and conservation of  more than 1 crore manuscripts with academic institutions, museums, libraries and private collectors. A National Digital Repository of Indian knowledge systems for knowledge sharing is also proposed.

    4th Engine: Exports

    Smt. Sitharaman defined Exports as the fourth engine of growth and said that jointly driven by the Ministries of Commerce, MSME, and Finance; Export Promotion Mission will help MSMEs tap into the export market. She added that a digital public infrastructure, ‘BharatTradeNet’ (BTN) for international trade was proposed as a unified platform for trade documentation and financing solutions.

    The Finance Minister mentioned that support will be provided to develop domestic manufacturing capacities for our economy’s integration with global supply chains. She also announced that government will support the domestic electronic equipment industry for leveraging the opportunities related to Industry 4.0. A National Framework has also been proposed for promoting Global Capability Centres in emerging tier 2 cities.

    The government will facilitate upgradation of infrastructure and warehousing for air cargo including high value perishable horticulture produce.

    Reforms as the Fuel

    Defining Reforms as the fuel to the engine, Smt. Sitharaman said that over the past 10 years, the Government had implemented several reforms for convenience of tax payers, such as faceless assessment, tax payers charter, faster returns, almost 99 per cent returns being on self-assessment, and Vivad se Vishwas scheme. Continuing with these efforts, she reaffirmed the commitment of the tax department to “trust first, scrutinize later”.

    Financial Sector Reforms and Development

    In a demonstrated steadfast commitment of the Government towards ‘Ease of Doing Business’, the Union Finance Minister proposed changes across the length and breadth of the financial landscape in India to ease compliance, expand services, build strong regulatory environment, promote international and domestic investment, and decriminalisation of archaic legal provisions.

    The Union Finance Minister proposed to raise the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) limit for the insurance from 74 to 100 per cent, to be available for those companies that invest the entire premium in India.

    Smt. Sitharaman proposed a light-touch regulatory framework based on principles and trust to unleash productivity and employment. She proposed four specific measures to develop this modern, flexible, people-friendly, and trust-based regulatory framework for the 21st first century, viz.:

    1. High Level Committee for Regulatory Reforms
    • To review all non-financial sector regulations, certifications, licenses, and permissions.
    • To strengthen trust-based economic governance and take transformational measures to enhance ‘ease of doing business’, especially in matters of inspections and compliances
    • To make recommendations within a year
    • States will be encouraged to be onboarded

     

    1. Investment Friendliness Index of States
    • An Investment Friendliness Index of States will be launched in 2025 to further the spirit of competitive cooperative federalism.

     

    1. Mechanism under the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC)
    • Mechanism to evaluate impact of the current financial regulations and subsidiary instructions.
    • Formulate a framework to enhance their responsiveness and development of the financial sector.

     

    1. Jan Vishwas Bill 2.0
    • To decriminalise more than 100 provisions in various laws.

    Fiscal Consolidation

    Reiterating the commitment to stay the course for fiscal consolidation, the Union Finance Minister stated that the Government endeavours to keep the fiscal deficit each year such that the Central Government debt remains on a declining path as a percentage of the GDP and the detailed roadmap for the next 6 years has been detailed in the FRBM statement. Smt. Sitharaman stated that the Revised Estimate 2024-25 of fiscal deficit is 4.8 per cent of GDP, while the Budget Estimates 2025-26 is estimated to be 4.4 per cent of GDP.

    Revised Estimates 2024-25

    The Minister said that the Revised Estimate of the total receipts other than borrowings is ₹31.47 lakh crore, of which the net tax receipts are ₹25.57 lakh crore. She added that the Revised Estimate of the total expenditure is ₹47.16 lakh crore, of which the capital expenditure is about ₹10.18 lakh crore.

    Budget Estimates 2025-26

    For FY 2025-26, the Union Finance Minister stated that the total receipts other than borrowings and the total expenditure are estimated at ₹34.96 lakh crore and ₹50.65 lakh crore respectively. The net tax receipts are estimated at ₹28.37 lakh crore.

    PART B

    Reposing faith on middle class in nation building, the Union Budget 2025-26 proposes new direct tax slabs and rates under the new income tax regime so that no income tax is needed to be paid for total income upto ₹ 12 Lakh per annum, i.e. average income of Rs 1 Lakh per month, other than special rate income such as Capital Gain. Salaried individuals earning upto ₹ 12.75 Lakh per annum will pay NIL tax, due to standard deduction of ₹ 75,000. Towards the new tax structure and other direct tax proposals, Government is set to lose revenue of about ₹ 1 lakh crore.

    Under the guidance of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, the Government has taken steps to understand the needs voiced by the people. The direct tax proposals include personal income tax reform with special focus on middle class, TDS/TCS rationalization, encouragement to voluntary compliances along with reduction of compliance burden, ease of doing business and incentivizing employment and investment.

    The Budget proposes revised tax rate structure under the new tax regime as follows;

    Total Income per annum

    Rate of Tax

    ₹ 0 – 4 Lakh

    NIL

     ₹ 4 – 8 Lakh

    5%

    ₹ 8 – 12 Lakh

    10%

    ₹ 12 – 16 Lakh

    15%

    ₹ 16 – 20 Lakh

    20%

    ₹ 20 – 24 Lakh

    25%

    Above ₹ 24 Lakh

    30%

    To rationalize TDS/TCS, Budget doubles limit for tax deduction on interest earned by senior citizens from the present ₹ 50,000 to ₹ 1 Lakh. Further, TDS threshold on rent has been increased to ₹ 6 Lakh from ₹ 2.4 Lakh per annum. Other measures include, increasing of threshold to collect TCS to ₹ 10 Lakh and continuing with higher TDS deductions only in non-PAN cases. After the decriminalization of delay in payment of TDS, delay in TCS payments has now been decriminalized.

    Encouraging voluntary compliance, Budget extends time-limit to file updated returns for any assessment year, from the current limit of two years, to four years. Over 90 Lakh taxpayers paid additional tax to update their income. Small charitable trusts/institutions have been given the benefit by increasing their period of registration from 5 to 10 years, reducing compliance burden. Further, tax payers can now claim annual value of two self-occupied properties as NIL, without any condition. Last budget’s Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme has received a great response, with nearly 33,000 tax payers having availed the scheme to settle their disputes. Giving benefits to senior and very senior citizens, withdrawals made from National Savings Scheme Accounts on or after 29th of August, 2024 have been exempted. NPS Vatsalya accounts also to get similar benefits.

    For ease of doing business, Budget introduces a scheme for determining arm’s length price of international transaction for a block period of three years. This is in line with global best practices. Further, self harbor rules are being expanded to provide certainty in international taxation.

    To promote employment and investment, a presumptive taxation regime is envisaged for non-residents who provide services to a resident company that is establishing or operating an electronics manufacturing facility. Further, benefits of existing tonnage tax scheme are proposed to be extended to inland vessels. To promote start-up ecosystem, period of incorporation has been extended for a period of 5 years. To promote investment in the infrastructure sector, Budget extends the date of making investment in Sovereign Wealth Funds and Pension Funds by five more years, to 31st March, 2030.

    As part of rationalization of Customs tariffs of industrial goods, Budget proposes to; (i) Remove seven tariffs, (ii) apply appropriate cess to maintain effective duty incidence, and (iii) levy not more than one cess or surcharge.

    As relief on import of Drugs/Medicines, 36 lifesaving drugs and medicines for treating cancer, rare diseases and chronic diseases have been fully exempted from Basic Customs Duty (BCD). Further, 37 medicines along with 13 new drugs and medicines under Patient Assistance Programmes have been exempted from Basic Customs Duty (BCD), if supplied free to patients.

    To support Domestic Manufacturing and Value Addition, BCD on 25 critical minerals, that were not domestically available, were exempted in July 2024. The Budget 2025-26 fully exempts cobalt powder and waste, scrap of lithium-ion battery, Lead, Zinc and 12 more critical minerals. To promote domestic textile production, two more types of shuttle-less looms added to fully exempted textile machinery. Further, BCD on knitted fabrics covering nine tariff lines from “10% to 20%” revised to “20% or ₹ 115 kg, whichever is higher”.

    To rectify inverted duty structure and promote “Make in India”, BCD on Interactive Flat Panel Display (IFPD) increased to 20% and on Open cells reduced to 5%. Further to promote manufacture of Open cells, BCD on parts of Open Cells stands exempted.

    To boost manufacturing of Lithion-ion battery in the country, 35 additional capital goods for EV battery manufacturing, and 28 additional capital goods for mobile phone battery manufacturing added to the list of exempted capital goods. Union Budget 2025-26 also continues exemption on BCD on raw materials, components, consumables or parts for ship building for another ten years. Budget also reduced BCD from 20% to 10% on Carrier Grade ethernet switches to make it at par with Non-Carrier Grade ethernet switches.

    For export promotion, Budget 2025-26 facilitates exports of handicrafts, fully exempts BCD on Wet Blue leather for value addition and employment, reduce BCD from 30% to 5% on Frozen Fish Paste and reduce BCD from 15% to 5% on fish hydrolysate for manufacture of fish and shrimp feeds.

    Union Minister of Finance and Corporate Affairs Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman said that Democracy, Demography and Demand are key pillars of Viksit Bharat journey. She said that the middle class gives strength of India’s growth and the Government has periodically hiked the ‘Nil tax’ slab in recognition to their contribution. She said the proposed new tax structure will substantially boost consumption, savings and investment, by putting more money in the hands of the middle class.

    *****

    NB/RC/VV/SR

    (Release ID: 2098352) Visitor Counter : 657

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Empowering Rural Communities

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 01 FEB 2025 4:07PM by PIB Delhi

    Flagship Schemes Driving Growth

     

    The Government of India has launched several flagship schemes aimed at fostering inclusive rural development, poverty alleviation, and livelihood enhancement. These initiatives, implemented under the Ministry of Rural Development and other key departments, address critical areas such as employment generation, housing, infrastructure, skill development, and social welfare.

    Mahatma Gandhi NREGA

    The vision of Mahatma Gandhi NREGA is to enhance the livelihood security of rural households across the country by providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in a financial year to every rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. Mahatma Gandhi NREGA recognizes the importance of strengthening the livelihood resource base of the poor by reaching the most vulnerable sections of rural areas, including Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women-headed households, and other marginalized groups.

    Mission Antyodaya

    Adopted in Union Budget 2017-18, Mission Antyodaya is a convergence and accountability framework aiming to bring optimum use and management of resources allocated by 26 Ministries / Department of the Government of India under various programmes for the development of rural areas. It is envisaged as state-led initiative with Gram Panchayats as focal points of convergence efforts.

    Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana – National Rural Livelihoods Mission

    The DAY-NRLM scheme is a comprehensive initiative designed to empower rural women and enhance their livelihoods by fostering community institutions that provide crucial financial, technical, and marketing resources. It emphasizes social inclusion through Social Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC) and facilitates access to government schemes like Swachh Bharat Mission and Poshan Abhiyan, ensuring multi-sectoral convergence. 

     

     

    Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana –Gramin

    The Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana Gramin was launched on 20th November 2016, aiming to provide housing for the poorest segments of society. Beneficiaries are selected through a rigorous three-stage validation process that includes the Socio-Economic Caste Census (SECC 2011) and Awaas+ (2018) surveys, Gram Sabha approvals, and geo-tagging. This ensures that aid reaches the most deserving individuals.

    Sl. No.

    Key Parameter Indicators

    Status as on 31.01.25

    1

    Target

    3,79,37,139

    2

    Beneficiaries Registered

    3,70,94,350

    4

    House Sanctioned

    3,31,96,085

    5

    House Completed

    2,69,47,215

    PMAY-G Progress

    Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)

    The Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), was launched by the Govt. of India to provide connectivity to unconnected Habitations as part of a poverty reduction strategy. Govt. of India is endeavoring to set high and uniform technical and management standards and facilitating policy development and planning at State level in order to ensure sustainable management of the rural roads network.

    PMGSY Progress

    National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP)

    The National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) is a welfare programme being administered by the Ministry of Rural Development. This programme is being implemented in rural areas as well as urban areas. NSAP represents a significant step towards the fulfilment of the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in the Constitution of India which enjoin upon the State to undertake within its means a number of welfare measures. These are intended to secure for the citizens adequate means of livelihood, raise the standard of living, improve public health, provide free and compulsory education for children etc.

     

    Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (DDU-GKY)

    The Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) announced the Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (DDU-GKY) on Antyodaya Diwas – 25th September 2014. DDU-GKY is a part of the National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM), tasked with the dual objectives of adding diversity to the incomes of rural poor families and cater to the career aspirations of rural youth.

    Cumulative progress till 2024-25

    Rural Self Employment Training Institutes (RSETIs)

    RSETIs are managed by Banks with active co-operation from the Government of India and State Government. These are Dedicated institutions designed as to ensure necessary skill training and skill up gradation of the rural BPL youth to mitigate the unemployment problem. After successful completion of the training, they will be provided with credit linkage assistance by the banks to start their own entrepreneurial ventures.

    Namo Drone Didi

    On 15th August, 2023, the Hon’ble Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi announced the launch of the “Namo Drone Didi” Yojana which aimed to empower women by hand holding them into a sustainable business model where they can increase their income by more than Rs 1 Lakh, and transforming the modern farming ecosystem with drone technology.

    Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan (RGSA)

    The scheme was approved by the Union Cabinet on 21.04.2018 for implementation from Financial Year 2018-19 to 2021-22. The primary aim of RGSA was to strengthen PRIs for achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with main thrust on convergence with Mission Antyodaya and emphasis on strengthening PRIs in 117 Aspirational districts.

    The Government of India’s flagship rural development schemes have played a transformative role in enhancing livelihoods, improving infrastructure, and fostering socio-economic inclusion. By prioritizing employment generation, housing, skill development, and financial empowerment, these initiatives have significantly contributed to rural prosperity.

    References

    https://nreganarep.nic.in/netnrega/MISreport4.aspx

    https://dashboard.rural.nic.in/dashboardnew/ddugky.aspx

    https://nsap.nic.in/

    https://omms.nic.in/dbweb

    https://namodronedidi.php-staging.com/about-scheme

    Click here for pdf file 

    *****

    Santosh Kumar/ Sarla Meena/ Madiha Iqbal

    (Release ID: 2098540) Visitor Counter : 54

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News