NewzIntel.com

Category: China

  • MIL-OSI Russia: US to hold talks with Iran next week – D. Trump

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    THE HAGUE, June 25 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump announced in The Hague, the Netherlands, on Wednesday that the United States will hold talks with Iran next week.

    “We are going to talk to them – to Iran – next week. We can sign an agreement,” D. Trump said at a press conference following the NATO summit.

    Earlier on Wednesday, Trump noted that the ceasefire between Iran and Israel was being observed “very well.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Iran says military commander killed in Israeli airstrike

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, June 25 (Xinhua) — Ali Shadmani, chief of the central staff of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia Armed Forces, has died from wounds sustained in an Israeli air strike, the headquarters said on Wednesday.

    According to the semi-official Tasnim news agency, A. Shadmani, who recently replaced Gholam Ali Rashid as chief of staff, was seriously wounded during Israeli strikes on Iran last week.

    The Jewish state’s army then announced that it had killed A. Shadmani in a nighttime airstrike on a command center located in central Tehran. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: FACT SHEET: Trump’s Rescission Package Would Gut Bipartisan Foreign Policy Investments 

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    Rescissions package that Senate Republicans are debating—and House Republicans passed—would decimate core foreign policy investments made on a bipartisan basis 

    Lifesaving programs like PEPFAR, GAVI, humanitarian assistance; U.S. treaty obligations; investments to advance U.S. interests all on the chopping block  

    Washington, D.C. – Ahead of a hearing on President Trump’s $9.4 billion rescissions request with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Russ Vought, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, released a new fact sheet detailing how the rescission package would devastate core bipartisan foreign policy investments—and breaking down the Trump administration’s misleading talking points on its request. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: This package would simply cut “woke” Biden-era initiatives—or a highly-selective short list of *past* examples of funded projects that the Trump administration finds objectionable.

    FACT: President Trump himself signed most of these funds into law in March—and his administration has flexibility to determine how exactly to fulfill the objectives provided by Congress for the funding. 

    While Congress specifies particular objectives for the foreign assistance it has provided to advance U.S. interests, the Trump administration has discretion over how exactly to execute the funding in compliance with the law—just as any administration does. 

    The Trump administration has trotted out a highly-selective, tiny list of past initiatives funded by these broader pots of money allocated by Congress—but the plain fact is it now is in charge of executing these programs, and most of the funds in the rescission request were signed into law by Trump himself. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The cuts are merely to “wasteful foreign assistance spending” that is “antithetical” to American interests. 

    FACT: Passing the rescission package would gut funding provided for all manner of important, bipartisan foreign policy objectives. 

    Passing this package would: 

    • Rip away $900 million provided for global health programs that save millions of lives and protect Americans from public health threats. The package would cut $400 million from PEPFAR and another $500 million for other global health programs, which address maternal and child health, family planning, and diseases like malaria, TB, and Polio. 
    • Rescind $4.6 billion for economic and development assistance—half of the total amount provided for fiscal year 2025. This funding pot is used to support cybersecurity, the Counter PRC Influence Fund, critical mineral supply chain diversification, support to partners in the Indo-Pacific, food security programs, support for U.S. businesses abroad, efforts to address irregular migration in our hemisphere, and many other bipartisan initiatives. 
    • Zero out $1 billion to meet U.S. treaty obligations and contributions to international organizations. This includes funds to cover dues to the United Nations, support peacekeeping missions, support UNICEF, and more—ceding ground to countries like China to expand their influence and shape the rules of the road without the United States. 
    • Eliminate $1.3 billion provided for humanitarian assistance, leading to needless suffering, promoting instability, and undermining U.S. interests. This includes emergency food needs, shelter, and other commodities that help stabilize conflict and disaster-stricken populations and stabilize partner governments. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The Trump administration has transparently detailed what this package would mean for bipartisan foreign policy objectives long supported by Congress. 

    FACT: The Trump administration has refused to tell Congress or the public how it plans to effectuate the sweeping cuts it seeks, allowing Russ Vought and President Trump to decide what specific initiatives to slash well after Congress debates and passes the package.  

    The Trump administration’s proposed rescissions of a variety of foreign policy priorities only spell out cuts to high-level accounts—not the specific programs and initiatives funded from within those accounts that they will cut if this package passes.

    We do not know which humanitarian responses that Congress intended to support will be reduced. We do not have details on which infectious disease programs or support for maternal and child health will be curtailed. We do not know which economic and development programs are going to be cut off, undermining congressional direction. Will they cut funding to counter the Chinese government, support American farmers—both? We don’t know. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The $400 million cut to PEPFAR funding is surgical, and the package will preserve all life-saving assistance. 

    FACT: The package does not protect lifesaving care, nor does it detail what specifically will be cut or how—the Trump administration retains that discretion and has so far refused to provide details on what it plans to cut. Cutting preventative assistance means cutting lifesaving assistance, too.  

    Without robust prevention efforts, more people will become infected with HIV—costing lives and many more dollars in treatment down the line. Every dollar invested in prevention saves $20 in HIV treatment and care costs. The Trump administration’s decision to curtail support for prevention efforts is already seriously setting back efforts to end the H.I.V. epidemic. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: Rescinding these funds will help “put the Nation’s fiscal house back in order.” 

    FACT: The requested cuts spanning multiple fiscal years represent less than 0.12% of all federal spending in fiscal year 2025. Rescinding these investments will do nothing to meaningfully tackle our debt—but President Trump and Republicans’ “Big Beautiful Bill” would explode it by $4 trillion. 

    While some Republicans insist making these cuts is necessary in the interest of fiscal responsibility, the plain fact is President Trump and congressional Republicans’ “One Big Beautiful Bill,” which Senate Republicans are laboring to pass this week, would add $4 trillion to the national debt over just the next 10 years.  

    While rescinding these investments to advance U.S. interests abroad would do exceptionally little to address the deficit or our national debt, they would decimate core objectives Congress has long supported on a bipartisan basis. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

    – having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

    (2025/2018(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

    – having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

    – having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

    – having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

    – having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    – having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    – having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[4],

    – having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[5],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

    – having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

    – having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

    – having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

    – having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

    – having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

    – having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

    – having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

    – having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

    – having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

    – having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

    – having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

    – having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

    C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

    D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

    E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

    F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

    G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

    H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

    I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

    J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

    K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

    L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

    M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

    2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

    3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

    4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

    5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

    6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

    7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

    8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

    9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

    10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

    11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

    12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

    13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

    14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

    15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

    16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

    17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

    18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

    19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

    21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

    22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

    23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

    24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

    25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

    26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

    27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

    28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

    29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

    30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

    31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

    32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

    33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

    34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

    36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

    37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

    38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

    39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

    40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

    41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

    42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

    43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act[8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act[9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

    44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

    45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

    46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

    47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

    Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

    49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

    50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

    51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

    52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

    53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

    54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

    55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

    56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

    57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

    Socio-economic reforms

    58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

    59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

    60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

    61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

    62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

    63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

    64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

    65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

    66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

    67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive[10], the Birds Directive[11] and the Water Framework Directive[12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

    68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

    69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

    70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

    71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

    72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

    73.  Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

    74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

    °

    ° °

    75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure – A10-0107/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure

    (2025/2007(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 173, 179 and 190 thereof,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025: Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem[1] (the Chips Act),

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union[2] (NIS 2 Directive),

    – having regard to the detailed report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) entitled ‘Foresight Cybersecurity Threats For 2030 – Update 2024’, published in March 2024,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements[3] (the Cyber Resilience Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013[4] (the Cybersecurity Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents[5] (the Cyber Solidarity Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services[6],

    – having regard to the Commission White Paper of 21 February 2024 entitled ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (COM(2024)0081),

    – having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

    – having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2024 entitled ‘State of the Digital Decade 2024’ (COM(2024)0260),

    – having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union[8] (the Interoperable Europe Act),

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast)[9],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[10],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828[11] (the Data Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU[12] (the Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence[13] (the Artificial Intelligence Act),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[14],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240[15],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013[16],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme[17],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027[18],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[19],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488[20],

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1732 of 17 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 as regards a EuroHPC initiative for start-ups in order to boost European leadership in trustworthy artificial intelligence[21],

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (recast)[22],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework[23],

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2020 entitled ‘Secure 5G deployment in the EU – Implementing the EU toolbox’ (COM(2020)0050),

    – having regard to the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, which commits ‘to promote a European way for the digital transformation, putting people at the centre’,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 December 2021 entitled ‘Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) (COM(2021)8481),

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0107/2025),

    A. whereas technological sovereignty should be seen as the whole value chain from excellence in research to creating better competition and achieving greater European sovereignty;

    B. whereas the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80 % of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property;

    C. whereas a few technological companies hold concentrated power over key digital markets and control over underlying internet infrastructure, including operating systems, computing, artificial intelligence (AI), search engines, social media capacity, digital advertising and payment services;

    D. whereas our technological sovereignty will greatly depend on Europe’s ability to create the market conditions needed for European companies to flourish and compete with each other, thereby increasing the quality of their products;

    E. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

    F. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

    G. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

    H. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

    I. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

    J. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

    K. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

    L. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

    M. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

    N. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous  vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

    O. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

    P. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

    Q. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

    R. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

    S. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

    T. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

    U. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

    V. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

    W. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

    X. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

    Y. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

    Z. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

    AA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

    AB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

    AC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

    AD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

    AE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

    AF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

    AG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

    AH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

    AI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

    AJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

    AK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

    AL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

    AM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

    AN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

    AO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

    AP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

    AQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

    AR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;

    AS. whereas 60 % of EU companies report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and clean technologies, posing a significant barrier to innovation, competitiveness and the green and digital transitions;

    AT. whereas current labour market developments, including global lay-offs and political instability outside the EU, create an opportunity to attract high-skilled digital talent to the EU;

    AU. whereas increasing competitiveness and resilience require appropriate funding; whereas public funding can act as a catalyst and private investment and competitive market forces are key for the long-term development of digital infrastructure;

    AV. whereas a robust, agile and excellence-driven research and innovation (R&I) ecosystem is essential to ensure the EU’s global competitiveness and leadership in strategic technologies, such as quantum and AI;

    AW. whereas standardisation is at the core of genuine European digital and technological sovereignty; whereas the importance of standards is growing due to increasing technological competition across the world, particularly with the United States and China;

    AX. whereas the EU is committed to negotiating comprehensive digital trade agreements (DTAs) to promote secure, resilient and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries;

    AY. whereas the Commission has announced landmark DTAs with South Korea and Singapore, setting an important precedent for future agreements;

    AZ. whereas Parliament and the Council have agreed on the ‘EU horizontal provisions on Cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements’, which was endorsed by the Commission and remains an important tool in relation to digital trade and the establishment of new DTAs;

    General introduction

    1. Underlines that European sovereignty is the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, preventing reliance on foreign actors and single service providers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure; calls for the development of a comprehensive risk assessment framework to monitor and address dependencies across the digital value chain; underlines that such a framework should serve as a basis for ensuring EU preparedness and resilience by enhancing European industrial policy and boosting domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities in strategic technologies;

    2. Believes that technological sovereignty is the capacity to design, develop and scale up digital technologies needed for the competitiveness of our economy, the welfare of our citizens and the EU’s open strategic autonomy in a globalised world; believes that this includes ensuring the EU’s ability to make autonomous decisions, engaging with trusted non-EU countries and entities, diversifying and strengthening supply chains and promoting the concept of openness and interoperability to ensure that Europe remains an attractive hub for investment;

    3. Recognises the increasing concentration of power in non-EU companies, which constrains Europe’s ability to innovate, compete and maintain control over its digital economy, society and democracy; is concerned by excessive dependencies on non-EU actors in critical areas such as cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity – where market concentration and foreign control threaten to undermine Europe’s competitiveness, democratic resilience and security;

    4. Believes that the EU’s industrial tech ambitions should focus on the key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductor technologies or quantum, that contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and are essential for our green, digital and defence transitions;

    5. Recognises the shift in the geopolitical landscape and the resulting opportunity for market demand for European products and services; sees this as a window of opportunity to position Europe as a global leader in trusted and secure digital solutions;

    6. Underlines the need to foster a supportive regulatory environment that encourages innovation, investment and the development of cutting-edge technologies in Europe, while protecting EU end users from the consequences of extraterritoriality;

    7. Recognises the need for a comprehensive European industrial policy for the digital ecosystem, integrating all relevant policy domains such as market access, standardisation, R&D, investment, trade and international cooperation; calls on the Commission to develop this comprehensive policy with the aim of reducing harmful strategic dependencies, strengthening domestic value chains and ensuring a secure, trustworthy and innovation-driven digital ecosystem that adheres to European values;

    8. Recalls that the high-tech product and digital services markets depend heavily on external supply chains, posing risks to sovereignty and resilience; stresses the importance of boosting industrial capacity and technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies to support the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

    9. Emphasises that boosting Europe’s technological sovereignty in the era of rapid technological development requires enhancing innovation and commercialisation in order to build the necessary capabilities; highlights that Europe must transform itself into a globally attractive and agile business environment by reducing bureaucracy, enhancing regulatory predictability and fostering entrepreneurship and risk-taking;

    10. Recognises that open strategic autonomy and democratic resilience must be at the core of the Commission’s agenda and that a comprehensive approach must integrate procurement, funding and long-term institutional frameworks to establish sovereign digital infrastructure in critical domains;

    11. Calls on the Commission to analyse and establish a comprehensive list of critical dependencies in digital infrastructure and technologies, assessing, at minimum, storage services, identity and payment systems, communication platforms, as well as the software, protocols and standards that support them, and to propose measures to promote market access for products and services with a strong positive impact on the EU’s technological sovereignty, resilience and sustainability; believes, in that regard, that the use of specific award criteria in public procurement may be promoted in areas where such critical dependencies exist; believes that such criteria can help incentivise competition and strengthen European technological sovereignty by facilitating the procurement of European digital products and services, where possible;

    Digital public infrastructure

    12. Strongly believes that digital infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and that there should therefore be a base layer of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that ensures sovereignty and a competition-friendly market environment; observes that the market has not developed this base layer in many important areas, which has resulted in monopolies and reliance on foreign actors; underlines that in order to fill this gap, the EU should take the lead in creating a strong foundation for DPI by creating layers of digital technologies consisting of semiconductors, connectivity solutions, cloud infrastructure, software, data and AI; believes that European DPI should be founded on fair and competitive economic models and also use governance models where neither private companies nor governments maintain centralised control; is of the opinion that it should be built on common and open standards, embrace interoperability and interconnectedness, so as to prevent user and vendor ‘lock-ins’, and spur innovation by facilitating new market entrants, and that it should also ensure privacy and security by default;

    13. Believes that the deployment of DPI should be focused on areas where critical dependencies exist, as identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list; calls on the Commission to prepare a detailed and comprehensive plan for establishing European DPI by identifying technologies that are best suited to European action, and urges the Commission and the Member States to dedicate appropriate resources to deploying European DPI;

    14. Stresses that European DPI should be stimulated by coordinated action at EU level to ensure the presence and competitiveness of European providers as well as a competitive market environment; underlines that these objectives will not be achieved through regulation alone and will require significant public investment; recognises that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF) should therefore include additional funding for this purpose, focusing on EU added value and financing the base layer of European DPI;

    15. Recognises that as part of the forthcoming MFF, the EU must commit to increased spending to achieve technological sovereignty; underlines that this should include a dedicated envelope for the development and deployment of the DPI layers identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list, as well as additional funds to ensure a competition-friendly market environment in other digital areas;

    16. Believes that the funding under the forthcoming MFF should prioritise active capacity-building in key hardware, software and service areas, including high-performance computing, quantum computing, encryption and communication, connectivity, cloud, data, web and AI ecosystems, and digital libraries;

    17. Is of the opinion that European DPI should be based on EU values and remain open to like-minded non-EU partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sustain their efforts and add more impetus to the process with the UN Development Programme on DPI;

    18. Recognises e-government services as a key enabler of efficient, secure and accessible public service delivery, which should be designed to facilitate digital identification, government data sharing and public sector payments without distorting markets or undermining existing private sector solutions; emphasises that the EU’s approach to e-government services should focus on strengthening digital government-to-citizen and government-to-business interactions, while ensuring trust, interoperability and accessibility; believes, therefore, that secure and seamless access to public services requires a trustworthy e-identification framework and welcomes the announcement of a ‘business wallet’ aimed at significantly simplifying the interconnection between businesses and public authorities;

    19. Calls on the Commission to further develop public interest data platforms, enabling secure cross-border data sharing between public and private entities for use cases, in particular, in healthcare, urban planning and environmental monitoring; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to promote interoperability between public interest and industry-specific data platforms, ensuring the seamless flow of data while minimising administrative burdens; notes that this could be achieved by leveraging existing market-driven solutions that foster innovation, maintain trust and uphold privacy and security standards;

    20. Recognises that under the current legal framework, European citizens have the right to control their personal data and that data generated within the EU must be processed in accordance with EU law; stresses that safeguarding privacy and personal data is essential for building trust in the digital economy, allowing European consumers to engage with confidence, regardless of where their data is processed; highlights that European companies – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – must be able to make use of data in a lawful, ethical and secure manner to drive sustainable growth and competitiveness;

    Digital infrastructure

    21. Highlights that digital infrastructure is the backbone of Europe’s economy and society and that its importance will continue to grow; calls on the Commission to include in the requested list of critical dependencies a comprehensive assessment of the composition of European digital infrastructure in order to adequately analyse the state of play, assess risks and coordinate action;

    22. Believes that in order to strengthen digital infrastructure, it is essential to implement capacity-building initiatives in critical areas at EU level; considers that these initiatives should focus on developing a base layer of public infrastructure, such as a network of AI gigafactories and a European web index model; is of the opinion that this base layer will empower companies to develop their business models and boost technological sovereignty; points to the digital solutions created by the EU, such as the EU digital identity, that can offer innovative infrastructure for the EU’s digital economy;

    23. Recognises the strategic importance of critical digital infrastructure and the need to strengthen their security and resilience; understands that critical digital infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, cables (terrestrial and submarine), cellular network towers, satellite communication systems, spectrum and radio equipment, cloud servers that contain sensitive information and data centres that process sensitive information, as well as certain software elements, including security software that protects critical networks and data centres;

    24. Highlights the need to ensure that this infrastructure falls under EU jurisdiction, meaning that it fully adheres to EU law; stresses the importance of privacy and security-by-design; calls on the Commission. therefore, to introduce legislation to mitigate risks posed by high-risk vendors from non-EU countries, including risks posed by foreign-controlled energy resource providers;

    25. Calls on the Commission, while preparing future legislative proposals and the forthcoming MFF, to concentrate efforts on deepening the single market, in line with the recommendations made in Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in Mario Draghi’s report on ‘The future of European competitiveness’, with the aim of unlocking the potential of the digital single market;

    26. Takes note of the recommendations laid down in these two reports that the EU needs a paradigm shift from promoting connectivity in the EU to establishing a single market for electronic communications and connectivity; supports a simplified, harmonised and innovation-friendly telecommunications framework that ensures fair competition and the accessibility of infrastructure;

    27. Welcomes the Commission’s white paper on how to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs, which outlines three pillars: creating the ‘3C Network’ – ‘Connected Collaborative Computing’, completing the digital single market, and secure and resilient digital infrastructure for Europe;

    28. Views the white paper and the subsequent consultation process as part of the preparation of the legislative initiatives planned for this term, including the Digital Networks Act; calls on the Commission to take a more holistic view of digital infrastructure throughout this process and to acknowledge that digital infrastructure comprises many elements beyond mere connectivity; underlines the need to accompany any new digital policy measure with an impact assessment;

    29. Urges the Commission to simplify and harmonise telecommunications rules as part of the forthcoming Digital Networks Act and the broader Digital Package;

    30. Calls on the Commission to introduce an EU cloud and AI development act to strengthen European data infrastructure and the promotion of European cloud providers; underlines that this act should aim to actively build a European single market for cloud and AI;

    31. Acknowledges that deploying cutting-edge digital infrastructure across the EU requires substantial investment and recognises that both public and private funding are essential for achieving this goal; expresses concern over the persistent shortage of venture capital and investment financing in Europe, which undermines technological sovereignty; calls on the Commission to significantly scale up public-private investment instruments, including venture capital, strategic platforms and dedicated funding tools for start-ups and scale-ups in critical technology sectors; highlights the importance of leveraging public procurement to support the deployment and scaling of open and interoperable digital solutions and of ensuring that private capital, competition and innovation become the main drivers of Europe’s digital transformation over the medium and long term;

    High-speed connectivity

    32. Is of the opinion that the upcoming Digital Networks Act must support the objective of providing all EU consumers with high-quality connectivity by 2030, especially in remote and rural areas, as well as removing administrative barriers for the roll-out of 5G, 6G and secure, high-speed broadband;

    33. Recognises the increasing convergence of telecommunications infrastructure with cloud and edge technologies, and sees the potential of open radio access networks to deliver advanced technological solutions, reduce costs and enhance the interoperability of connectivity; believes that the future of connectivity lies in the complementarity of diverse technologies such as 5G/6G, Wi-Fi and satellite, where seamless integration benefits both businesses and consumers;

    34. Recognises that with cloud and edge services at the core of their transformation, connectivity networks are evolving rapidly into platforms for innovation and will increasingly depend on cloud computing, AI, virtualisation and other technologies;

    35. Calls for ambitious targets in the development and innovation of wireless communication networks, acknowledging the need for a broad-based approach that includes cloud computing, AI, edge computing and quantum computing; emphasises that the innovation ecosystem for electronic communications, especially for vertically integrated telecoms, should remain market-driven, and insists that future regulatory measures be based on thorough, knowledge-based impact assessments of existing regulations;

    36. Recognises that competition between operators of all sizes remains a key driver of investment in connectivity networks; calls on the Member States to ensure that copper networks are switched off progressively in favour of fibre-optic or 5G technologies, in particular where regular maintenance or updates of the network are needed, thus ensuring that the shift is carried out in an attainable manner and allowing providers to plan logistically and financially in advance;

    37. Stresses that all consumers in the EU should have access to adequate quality, reliable and affordable connectivity, thus contributing to increased demand for connectivity services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand and upgrade digital networks, especially in rural areas, and to support public-private investments in broadband and 5G/6G deployment, while maintaining cybersecurity standards and secure-by-design principles;

    38. Is convinced that, as digital connectivity infrastructure such as fibre, 5G and 6G will be crucial for future industrial competitiveness, the forthcoming MFF should include funds for the large-scale deployment of network infrastructure, bridging the existing deployment gap to achieve the 2030 Digital Decade targets, creating pan-European 5G coverage for citizens’ use and ensuring the successful deployment of Industry 4.0 tools;

    Fibre

    39. Stresses the importance of accelerating the deployment of fibre-optic networks and modern wireless communications systems that can deliver fast, secure and reliable digital services;

    40. Recognises that the need to prioritise direct fibre connections for homes, businesses and public institutions is crucial to ensure ultra-fast and reliable connectivity, in addition to network roll-outs with public works, such as roads, water and electricity, to streamline fibre roll-out;

    41. Welcomes the introduction of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, which responds to the growing needs for faster, reliable and data-intensive connectivity; recognises the importance of the shared use of ducts and poles for deploying very high capacity networks to optimise resources and reduce costs; urges the Member States to streamline permitting processes and harmonise regulations to lower financial and administrative barriers to the expansion of fibre infrastructure;

    5G and 6G

    42. Believes that private investments are essential for deployment of electronic communication networks, 5G and 6G that are advanced enough in terms of transmission, speed, storage capacity, edge computing power and interoperability;

    43. Stresses that the enforcement and implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act is further necessary for the creation of a one-stop shop for permits and a centralised digital permitting process to reduce delays in infrastructure deployment and to ensure uniform rules for infrastructure access, pricing and environmental impact assessments; calls, in this regard, for strong efforts in this area;

    44. Takes the view that the EU needs strong cybersecurity protection in all critical infrastructure sectors, with stricter measures to de-risk high-risk vendors in 5G and 6G networks, ensuring dense deployment of small cells and macro towers, particularly in urban and rural areas with inconsistent coverage, and ensuring the sustainability and energy efficiency of the infrastructure so as to support Europe’s global competitiveness in the digital economy;

    Spectrum

    45. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards enhanced coordination of spectrum allocations, in particular through earlier identification and the harmonisation of the release of new frequencies, starting with 6 GHz frequencies; calls for a radio spectrum policy that promotes investment in Europe, including through the harmonisation of spectrum assignment policies across the Member States to accelerate 5G deployment based on best practices, the promotion of longer license durations and access to new spectrum such as the upper 6 GHz band in order to meet future demand and enable 6G; believes that a shared effort from public and private entities is necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of Europe and not lag behind the fastest growing networks in the world, i.e. in China and South Korea;

    Satellites and satellite communication systems

    46. Underlines the importance of satellite-based communications in developing EU digital infrastructure, increasing its resilience, strengthening the capabilities of EU actors, and reducing dependence on non-EU providers, particularly in the area of defence; highlights the need to provide alternative connectivity solutions for consumers in remote and rural areas;

    47. Highlights the strategic role of the EU space programme, as one of the pillars of EU sovereignty, in providing state-of-the-art and secure positioning, navigation and timing services for Galileo and EGNOS and cost-effective satellite communication services for GOVSATCOM; notes that this allows the EU and its Member States to have greater sovereignty in their satellite capabilities, including geopositioning, earth observation, space surveillance and connectivity; welcomes, in particular, the EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 programmes, which aim to ensure the short- and long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

    48. Deplores the strong dependence on non-EU data for the tracking and surveillance of space objects; stresses the need for Europe to urgently reinforce its own capabilities and infrastructure in space situational awareness (SSA) to ensure open strategic autonomy and security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase investment in EU-owned surveillance and tracking assets, and to develop effective mechanisms for information-sharing among the Member States, enabling Europe to independently monitor and protect its critical space infrastructure;

    49. Stresses the importance of private sector involvement in launcher technologies to further accelerate the deployment of IRIS2; stresses the importance of fostering a robust and competitive European space launch sector through greater private sector involvement and support for upstream and downstream industries; calls on the Commission to promote a European space industrial policy that strengthens sovereignty in space technologies and services by reducing strategic dependencies and improving the operational governance of European space programmes;

    50. Calls, to this end, for concrete measures to facilitate the provision of satellite services throughout Europe, including by defining common procedures and conditions; calls, in parallel, for fair competition, with clear and enforceable rules for all satellite constellations accessing the EU market;

    51. Notes that there are currently several issues with latency in satellite networks and recognises that the integration of satellite networks with 5G and, in the future, 6G technologies is pivotal in extending the reach and reliability of terrestrial networks;

    High-performance computing (HPC) systems

    52. Recognises the progress made in recent years in enhancing HPC; calls on the Commission to continuously integrate and enhance the computing power at EU HPC centres, in particular, enhancing the training of AI models and preparing for future advancements in supercomputing;

    53. Calls on the Commission to develop a coordinated strategy to bridge the gap between Europe’s cutting-edge HPC technology and its practical, scalable deployment across industries, including by creating a public network for supercomputing; notes that this strategy should foster collaboration between public institutions and private sector partners, including SMEs, to ensure that Europe’s HPC capabilities become a key driver of economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty;

    54. Highlights that HPC centres must ensure accessibility for developers and deployers of AI foundation models, generative AI and applied AI; notes that EuroHPC Centres should be available for these use cases and particularly for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; emphasises that this must be seamlessly complemented by initiatives to enable the development and deployment of AI in the EU;

    55. Welcomes the creation of new AI factories; underlines that AI factories will upgrade EuroHPC supercomputers to deliver computing capacity for AI and support start-ups and scale-ups in the training and large-scale development of general-purpose and trustworthy AI models;

    Hardware for computing: semiconductors, chips and quantum chips

    56. Believes that urgent action is needed to boost EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, improving supply chain resilience by forming strategic global partnerships, encouraging start-ups and innovation, fostering cross-border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development and providing financial incentives, regulatory support and market access;

    57. Emphasises the need for legal certainty to support semiconductor development, ensuring secure supply chains for critical raw materials and avoiding disruptions caused by investment uncertainties;

    58. Urges to give utmost political importance to ensuring a sufficient supply of AI chips in the EU and to make it a focal point of EU digital industry policies; notes the increase in demand for AI chips driven by expanding applications in cloud computing, edge devices, autonomous systems and generative AI;

    59. Calls on the Commission to react to the new geopolitical realities and the use of digital supply chains as pressure tools; urges the Commission to find a negotiated solution to the US ban on the export of AI chips to 16 EU Member States;

    60. Calls on the Commission to put advanced AI chips, including their design and production, at the core of the revision of the Chips Act; calls on the Commission to present the revision this year, featuring a long-term strategy rooted in current geopolitical realities that builds European strategic indispensability through technological leadership, adequate production capabilities and a strong R&D ecosystem, which will be essential to secure European sovereignty in increasingly troubled times; believes that it is crucial to strengthen the interactions among research, training, suppliers and robust public infrastructure to accelerate the path from research, development, testing and finally full-load production;

    61. Believes that the EU should enhance its efforts on quantum chip development if it intends to accelerate the time-to-market for EU industrial innovation in quantum technology;

    62. Calls on the Commission to support the manufacturing within the EU of widely used chips e.g., for electronic devices and cars; calls for support for the development of chips that reduce the energy consumption of the digital sector;

    63. Underlines the need to support the performance of the circular economy and recalls that information and communications technology products and other electronics are part of the priority product groups in the working plan to be adopted by April 2025 under Regulation (EU) 2024/1781[24];

    64. Believes that additional funding under the forthcoming MFF must be allocated to the development of semiconductor production capacities and other next-generation semiconductor technologies and processes (e.g. photonic chips, wide-bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging) within the EU;

    Cloud services

    65. Recognises that there is a market need for sovereign solutions that offer enhanced levels of control over data for certain categories of sensitive data and acknowledges the risks associated with reliance on single dominant providers; calls for a strategy for reducing reliance on foreign cloud providers, while fostering European alternatives;

    66. Notes that the discussions on the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services have not brought any results; points out that there are sovereignty considerations, in particular related to the extraterritoriality of binding legal regimes, that cannot be solved through technical discussions; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned cloud and AI development act;

    67. Notes the need to secure data storage and computational power, and distributed computing infrastructure; calls on the Commission to ensure that cloud users have the ability to choose solutions that meet their needs by urgently removing barriers to switching and diversifying providers through multi-cloud strategies, and by fostering a competitive European cloud market, thereby reducing reliance on single providers and enhancing digital sovereignty;

    68. Calls on the Commission to leverage initiatives such as 8ra and IPCEI CIS to advance decentralised cloud and edge infrastructure, which are enablers of sovereignty and contribute to reducing reliance on foreign providers and ensuring resilience while enhancing operational flexibility within Europe;

    AI systems

    69. Welcomes the InvestAI initiative, including the AI gigafactories; emphasises the need for Europe to position itself as a global leader in AI model training, scientific research and quantum computing advancements; is committed to further supporting AI development by launching initiatives such as AI factories to provide computing power for start-ups, scale-ups and researchers;

    70. Calls on the Commission to further support the design and development of European AI and to adopt policies and measures that will enable European industrial sectors to benefit from their data and AI deployment;

    71. Emphasises that the delayed deployment of AI-driven innovations hinders technological progress, market competitiveness and digital transformation within the EU;

    72. Expects that the public-private financing model will unlock unprecedented private investment in AI that will open up access to supercomputers for start-ups and industry to supercomputers;

    Quantum

    73. Recognises the urgent need to define a clear roadmap for quantum technology development, including quantum computing and quantum encryption, ensuring that public and private investments lead to tangible commercial applications;

    74. Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment of existing national quantum sandbox frameworks and how existing legislation applies to them in order to prevent market fragmentation; welcomes the announcement of the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass;

    75. Urges the Commission to ensure that the Quantum Act, accompanied by an impact assessment, positions Europe as the leading region for quantum excellence and innovation by investing in R&D and innovation, mobilising funding to scale up the European quantum ecosystem, capabilities and production, and ensuring Europe’s leading quantum research is commercialised in Europe; underlines that it should deliver tangible technological applications by fostering policies that accelerate technological maturity and facilitate the transition from research to commercial success;

    76. Calls for targeted investments, industry collaboration and regulatory frameworks that support the development, scaling and market adoption of quantum technologies across key sectors;

    77. Calls for a coordinated EU strategy for post-quantum cryptography to protect data from future cyberthreats;

    Data centres

    78. Calls on the Commission to support ecosystems for sharing industry-specific data within industrial sectors, fostering collaboration and driving innovation, while maintaining data sovereignty and ensuring compliance with EU regulations, as outlined in the Data Act; urges the Commission for strong enforcement to ensure that dominant market players do not impose unfair terms on SMEs and mid-sized enterprises when accessing and sharing data;

    79. Believes that there is a need to ensure interconnected infrastructure that would allow data centres to work together efficiently under common standards with high-speed connectivity, while flexibility, security and scalability would be maintained; believes this interconnected system would help in ensuring distributed redundancy so that data and services remain available even in the event of a data centre failure;

    80. Calls on the Commission to prioritise interoperability across platforms, enabling the seamless integration of data across businesses and sectors, in alignment with the requirements of the Data Act, which mandate data portability and interoperability obligations for cloud and edge services; stresses the need for the robust enforcement of these provisions to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure that European industrial ecosystems can leverage data-driven innovation without technical or contractual barriers;

    81. Recalls the Commission’s plan to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by 2030; sees the need to improve the integration of data centres with the energy system, focusing on heat reuse and providing flexibility services to the electricity grid needs; recognises the need to incentivise research for cooling and energy-efficient processors, while special attention should be given to supporting EU data centres; urges the Commission to ensure clear and consistent implementation of existing legal requirements for data centre operators across EU legislation and the Member States;

    82. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase and target public investment and to incentivise private investment in digital infrastructure to enable the growth and modernisation of data centres;

    Submarine cables

    83. Calls on the Commission to take coordinated action to protect submarine cables and reinforce cable security and repair capabilities; stresses the need for continued investment in the construction of new submarine cables to ensure redundancy; welcomes the EU’s role in co-financing such projects to enhance digital infrastructure and connectivity across the Member States; calls on the Commission to explore potential synergies between the maintenance of undersea digital and energy infrastructure;

    84. Emphasises the importance of improving EU and Member State repair capabilities and response mechanisms to handle submarine cable disruptions, which are essential for maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications; underlines the importance of international cooperation in repairing sabotaged cables and facilitating the necessary investments, and calls for the establishment of an EU-based rapid-response repair fleet to ensure swift recovery and operational continuity in the event of disruptions; calls on the Commission to carry out an assessment of regulatory measures to ensure fair access and security, regardless of whether the infrastructure is privately or publicly owned;

    85. Welcomes the adoption of the action plan on cable security, which will be organised around four pillars: prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence; highlights the importance of its full and timely implementation; urges, in the current geopolitical context, increased investment in technologies to strengthen the security and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure;

    86. Calls on the Commission to promote R&I to enable advanced technological innovations in cable security, including early warning systems and AI-driven threat assessments;

    87. Urges the Commission to review available instruments designed to better leverage private investments in support of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs); calls on the Commission to include submarine cable projects in the list of IPCEIs; recognises the need to streamline and simplify the application and administrative process governing IPCEIs;

    Cybersecurity

    88. Recalls the legislative work carried out over the previous legislative term aimed at significantly improving cybersecurity in the EU; welcomes, in particular, the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act and the NIS2 Directive; stresses the need for the harmonised and timely implementation and enforcement of these measures;

    89. Calls on the Commission to present an evaluation report on the Cybersecurity Act and to propose a legislative act to review it in order to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity framework, with a particular focus on the interplay between sovereignty and security; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to enhance the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure and prevent foreign interference from entities subject to extraterritorial legislation, as well as accelerating the adoption process for EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls for ENISA’s mandate to be strengthened to coordinate crisis response, oversee cybersecurity certification for critical infrastructure and ensure uniform implementation of cybersecurity standards across the single market;

    90. Emphasises the importance of the upcoming European internal security strategy in strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection;

    91. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement any restrictions on high-risk suppliers, posing significant security vulnerabilities; calls for the full implementation of the EU toolbox for 5G security in order to reduce reliance on high-risk vendors; calls on the Commission to make the toolbox binding, specifically with regard to high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure;

    Simplification

    92. Notes that to achieve true technological sovereignty, the EU must have viable commercial alternatives; stresses that the EU must urgently pursue a comprehensive agenda of simplification and bureaucracy reduction to foster an innovation-friendly environment capable of supporting competitive European alternatives to dominant global digital players; underlines that excessive administrative burdens, fragmented regulatory frameworks, an incomplete digital single market and overly complex compliance procedures disproportionately impact European start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs, limiting their capacity to compete at global level; recognises that the EU should therefore prioritise regulatory streamlining and the deepening of the digital single market, ensuring that legislation is proportionate, innovation-driven and does not stifle the development of European technological solutions;

    93. Emphasises the need for new legislative proposals to be aligned with better regulation principles, ensuring that any new digital policy measure that affects competitiveness is accompanied by an impact assessment, including a competitiveness, SME and small mid-cap check that evaluates whether a given legislative instrument is necessary, proportionate and does not create unnecessary burdens for businesses, especially SMEs, and thus its effects on competitiveness, investment prospects and consumer welfare;

    94. Highlights that the simplification of EU legislation must not endanger any of the fundamental rights of citizens and businesses and thus jeopardise regulatory certainty; believes that any simplification proposal should not be rushed or proposed without proper consideration, consultation and an impact assessment;

    95. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to fully implement the principle of burden reduction for companies in EU legislation; calls on the Commission, therefore, to enhance its efforts by aiming to remove more cost and administrative burdens for businesses compared to the benefits that would be derived from any new regulatory requirements introduced at EU level in the same policy area, so that barriers to market entry are removed to help European companies to scale and grow;

    96. Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent simplification, implementation and enforcement of EU digital legislation through the Digital Package, streamlining definitions and reporting procedures, assessing ways to alleviate reporting obligations and reducing the gap between industry and government;

    97. Believes that supporting companies and innovators to stay in Europe by developing the EU as an attractive and agile business environment is key to enhancing technological sovereignty; emphasises, in that regard, that excessive regulation and administrative burdens should be avoided and that EU rules should be clear, consistent, predictable, proportionate and technologically neutral, thus maintaining a globally competitive regulatory environment; believes that new public procurement methods and the development of regulatory sandboxes and test beds should also contribute to an innovation-friendly framework;

    98. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of a 28th legal regime, recognising that a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules will be a game changer for digital investment and innovation; believes that reducing regulatory fragmentation across 27 national legal regimes will boost private investment, lower compliance costs and accelerate the deployment of next-generation digital infrastructure, products and services; encourages the Commission to ensure that this framework specifically addresses regulatory barriers in the digital sector, such as permitting and cross-border data flows, in order to create a true digital single market;

    99. Urges the Commission to create a single point of contact to simplify the application process for private-sector access to EU funding mechanisms, ensuring that private companies, SMEs and start-ups can more easily participate in digital investment programmes;

    Energy

    100. Emphasises that data centres will put additional pressure on electricity grids, making it imperative to reinforce them through anticipatory investments; stresses that data centres can also help stabilise the grid by participating in demand-side flexibility; calls for measures to incentivise such contributions based on the implementation of the revision of the European electricity market reform;

    101. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to propose and implement instruments that ensure orderly planning of the escalating energy demand from data centres, facilitating their strategic placement near available energy sources and thus minimising reliance on the broader grid infrastructure;

    102. Recognises that fibre is more energy efficient than traditional copper networks; acknowledges the importance of reducing energy consumption in data transmission and ensuring long-term stability and efficiency;

    103. Calls on the Commission to ensure a reliable and sufficient clean energy and net-zero technology supply to support the digital infrastructure of the future;

    Skills

    104. Recognises the urgent need for more skilled professionals in digital fields to meet the EU’s strategic objectives; calls on the Member States to develop national strategies and incentives to retain European talent and attract the world’s best digital professionals, thereby strengthening the EU’s innovation capacity and technological leadership;

    105. Stresses the importance of closing the digital and STEM skills gap to enhance technological resilience, innovation capacity and open strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to strengthen investments in digital education, upskilling and reskilling, particularly in areas essential for the green and digital transitions; supports prioritising investments that address digital skills shortages, particularly in AI, cybersecurity, data analysis and clean technologies, in order to support innovation and technological sovereignty;

    106. Calls for coordinated strategies at national level to improve access to high-quality STEM education, promote lifelong learning and attract talent to ICT and related fields; encourages partnerships between public institutions, industry and educational providers to ensure alignment between curricula and evolving market needs;

    107. Calls for intensified efforts to improve digital literacy and skills across all demographics, focusing on early STEM education, vocational education and training, and lifelong learning in digital technologies; recommends aligning national education and training strategies with the EU Digital Decade goal of 80 % of the population possessing basic digital skills by 2030, with a focus on gender-inclusive policies to increase women’s participation in ICT and STEM fields; calls on the EU institutions to take concrete steps to uphold the commitments referred to in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, both within the EU framework as in the Union’s cooperation with third countries;

    108. Supports the establishment of a common EU certification framework for digital and technical skills to improve the recognition and portability of qualifications among the Member States;

    109. Encourages the European Investment Bank and national development institutions to support digital talent retention by co-investing in European deep-tech start-ups, ensuring that EU-funded innovation remains within the region and contributes to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

    Research and innovation

    110. Recognises the importance of bridging the gap between research and commercialisation and calls on the Commission to enhance the valorisation of innovation within the EU;

    111. Believes that Europe’s ability to transform research into market-ready solutions is critical for building necessary capabilities and reducing reliance on non-EU technologies;

    112. Emphasises that funding needs to be strategically allocated to accelerate the development and market introduction of solutions that strengthen Europe’s technological resilience and drive innovation; underlines the importance of a more agile, excellence-based funding structure, particularly in improving the translation of research into industrial applications; calls for increased investment in R&I to strengthen Europe’s knowledge and technological capabilities and insists that EU research, development and innovation (RDI) funding be based on open competition and excellence;

    113. Highlights the need for policies that support industrial innovation, including targeted investment in key strategic technologies where Europe can lead globally, such as quantum computing, in order to build an innovation ecosystem;

    114. Believes that private investment in RDI is of utmost importance and calls for the EU to create incentives that effectively leverage private funding for the development of critical technologies, including through public-private partnerships;

    115. Stresses the urgent need for stronger incentives to mobilise private sector capital for technology-driven innovation; encourages the Member States to introduce targeted fiscal incentives, regulatory simplification and risk-sharing instruments designed to attract private equity to the technology and digital sectors; highlights the need to streamline cross-border capital flows within the single market to facilitate access to finance for innovative European start-ups;

    Standards

    116. Strongly believes that promoting interoperability and EU standards is paramount to fostering competitiveness in the technology sector, as it ensures that products can be connected and work with each other, thus fostering innovation and open markets; recalls that both interoperability and common technological standards pave the way for the functioning of the single market;

    117. Underlines that the Commission must increase its engagement in existing global standardisation structures and focus on the international uptake of European standards through a bottom-up approach, avoiding centralisation;

    Partnerships

    118. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to negotiating DTAs that facilitate secure and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries; encourages the Commission to increase efforts in negotiating DTAs with additional partner countries;

    119. Calls on the Commission to accelerate technical cooperation in multilateral forums such as the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to develop global standards for digital governance, AI regulation, cross-border data flows and emerging technologies;

    120. Urges the Commission to advance negotiations on a permanent solution to the WTO moratorium on e-commerce to prevent the introduction of digital tariffs, ensuring international digital trade remains open, predictable and conducive to innovation;

    °

    ° °

    121. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

    (2025/2017(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

    – having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

    – having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

    – having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

    – having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

    – having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    – having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

    – having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

    – having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    – having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

    – having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

    – having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

     

    A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

    C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

    D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

    E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

    F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

    G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

    H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

    I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

    K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

    1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

    2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

    3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

    4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

    5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

    6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region; 

    7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

    Democratic institutions, media and civil society

    8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

    9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

    10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of  Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

    11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

    12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

    13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

    14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets  that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act[4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

    15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

    16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

    17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

    18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

    19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

    Fundamental rights

    20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

    21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

    22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

    23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens; 

     

    24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

    25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

    26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

    27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

    28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

    Rule of law

    29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

    30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern  shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

    31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

    32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority;  urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

    33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

    34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

    35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

    36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

    37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

    Socio-economic reforms

    38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

    39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

    40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

    41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

    42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

    43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

    44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive[5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

    45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

    46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

    47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

    Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

    49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment[6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment[7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

    50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

    51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

    52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

    53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

    54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

    Regional cooperation and foreign policy

    55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

    56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

    57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

    58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

    59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

    60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

    °

    ° °

    61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caleb H. Wheeler, Senior Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University

    The recent US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites has prompted renewed questions about whether the UN charter’s prohibition on the use of force is meaningful.

    Considered one of the keystones of international law, article 2(4) of the charter specifically forbids member states from using force – or threatening to do so – against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.

    A significant amount of commentary exists about what the prohibition entails. This tries to clarify ambiguities around the terms “force”, “threats of force”, “territorial integrity” and “political independence”. Although no absolute consensus has been reached, it is commonly thought that member states are prohibited from launching armed attacks against other states, or threatening to do so, unless acting in self-defence or with the authorisation of the UN security council.

    Other exceptions have been suggested. These include use of force as part of a larger humanitarian intervention operation. There’s also a question of whether it’s permissible when a state is rescuing its nationals abroad. But the legality of either of these situations is contentious and remains unsettled.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Early in its existence, the UN made concerted efforts to protect and respect article 2(4) and to comply with its provisions. In 1950, the security council authorised UN member states to provide South Korea with the assistance necessary to repel the armed attack launched by North Korea, triggering the increased internationalisation of the Korean war.

    While article 2(4) was not explicitly mentioned in resolution 83, it was alluded to through repeated references to North Korea’s “armed attack” against South Korea. As such, it can be interpreted as an effort by the security council to use its authority to address a violation of article 2(4), even if it did not clearly frame it in those terms.

    The security council also authorised member states in 2011 to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the member states may have exceeded their authority in Libya and carried out acts that could themselves be construed as violations of the UN charter.

    Rather than just protecting civilians, as the security council resolution instructed, legal experts were concerned they had effectively intervened in a civil war. Any possible violations went unpunished by the security council.

    Security council actions taken with regard to Korea were, in many ways, the high watermark for the prohibition of the use of force, given the scale of the conflict. There are two reasons for that. First, a significant proportion of the wars taking place after 1945 have been domestic and not subject to the provisions of article 2(4). The prohibition specifically applies to a member state’s international relations so is not inapplicable when a member state attacks a group within its own borders.

    Second, the UN has failed to address many of the acts occurring after 1945 that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4). The reason for this inaction lies primarily in the flawed structure on which the UN is built.

    Chapter VII of the charter makes the security council responsible for addressing acts of aggression that would constitute uses of force under article 2(4). But it has repeatedly failed to fill that role, allowing states to commit these acts without meaningful response.

    The UN veto problem

    UN security council decisions can only be enacted when at least nine members vote in favour. This must also include the affirmative vote or abstention of all five of the permanent members: the US, Russia, China, the UK and France. This essentially gives each of the permanent members the right to veto security council resolutions.

    Permanent members have commonly used the threat of their veto in their own political interests. This can be seen in a variety of instances, most notably the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both situations clearly involved uses of force prohibited by article 2(4), and in both situations the security council was prevented from acting by some of its permanent members.

    This inaction is consistent with the UN’s failure to address many other acts that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4), including US involvement in south-east Asia in the 1960s and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

    The security council’s failure to adequately perform its role has caused some to try and find a workaround. The Council of Europe, disappointed at the lack of accountability for Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine, has entered into an agreement with Ukraine to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

    In the special tribunal’s draft statute, an act of aggression is defined to almost exactly mirror the type of conduct that would constitute a use of force under the UN charter.

    Bombing Iran

    Which brings us to the current situation in Iran. There is little question that the US violated article 2(4) when it bombed Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan on the evening of Saturday June 21. This is a clear use of force against the territory of another state.

    But even if the attacks themselves were not enough to establish a violation, they were also accompanied by US president Donald Trump’s suggestion that a regime change in Iran might be appropriate. These comments, coming immediately after the initial attack, could be construed as a threat of further force against Iran’s political independence should such a change not occur.

    Under the UN charter, such threats and uses of force should elicit a response from the security council. But just as with Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine in 2022, none will probably be forthcoming as the US will block any efforts to hold it to account.

    But equally chilling is the lack of condemnation of the US actions by its allies. German chancellor Friedrich Merz saw “no reason to criticise” the bombings, and Nato secretary general Mark Rutte insisted that the bombings did not violate international law.

    As the respected Dutch scholar of international law André Nollkaemper suggests, this refusal to condemn a clear violation of the prohibition of the use of force creates a real danger that the bar for when a state can legally use force will be lowered.

    Should that be allowed to happen it could further hollow out the prohibition, effectively making it less likely that states will be held to account for violating international law. Further, it could also lead to the return of a world where “might makes right”. This would undo more than a century of legal evolution.

    Caleb H. Wheeler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed? – https://theconversation.com/bombing-iran-has-the-un-charter-failed-259751

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese Premier Attends Symposium with Industry and Business Representatives as Part of Summer Davos 2025

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TIANJIN, June 25 (Xinhua) — Chinese Premier Li Qiang attended a symposium with industry and business leaders at the 16th annual meeting of emerging global leaders of the World Economic Forum, also known as “Summer Davos,” in north China’s Tianjin Municipality.

    After listening to the speeches, Li Qiang noted that the current international situation is undergoing profound and complex changes, creating serious challenges for the economic development of all countries.

    The symposium was attended by about 160 business representatives from more than 30 countries and regions.

    As the head of the Chinese government stated, the Chinese economy maintains the dynamics of stable growth, which is due not only to steadily improving basic indicators and active macroeconomic policy, but also to increased attention to the use of the potential of the market and enterprises. Companies with foreign capital also make an important contribution to this, Li Qiang added.

    China, the Premier of the State Council continued, offers broad opportunities for the development of enterprises with foreign capital.

    Li Qiang pointed out that in a chaotic and unstable world, it is necessary to act in accordance with the trends of the times, actively and effectively confront various challenges and uncertainties, and create a favorable environment for the development of enterprises.

    Against the backdrop of the profound restructuring of the global industrial chain architecture, the quality and efficiency of the industrial complex are particularly important, the Premier of the State Council noted. He added that China has strong industrial complex potential, and its industrial and supply chains are constantly being optimized.

    Stressing the importance of the speed of industrial adoption of new technologies and the capacity for incremental technological upgrading, Li Qiang pointed to China’s large initial user base of various products and services, which facilitates effective interaction between scientific and technological innovation and industrial innovation.

    The Premier stressed that there is ample space and great opportunities for foreign enterprises to participate in scientific and technological cooperation and joint innovation in China.

    Noting that a stable environment for business development is of utmost importance, Li Qiang said that China’s economy has demonstrated stability that can withstand external shocks and maintain its own momentum. This stability, he added, is also reflected in China’s unwavering commitment to opening up, allowing multinational enterprises to achieve greater success and make greater progress in China.

    The Premier expressed the hope that enterprises from various countries will supply more high-quality products and services to the Chinese market, strengthen scientific, technological and industrial cooperation with Chinese companies, more effectively match supply and demand for mutual benefit and win-win results, and jointly promote technological progress and enhance industrial competitiveness.

    The Chinese side will, as before, encourage foreign enterprises to invest in China and establish business here, the head of the Chinese government assured.

    The symposium participants stressed that they remain confident in China’s economic prospects and open cooperation. They expressed their willingness to increase investment in scientific and technological innovation and ensure the smooth operation of industrial and supply chains, thereby achieving greater progress for enterprises in integrating into China’s high-quality development. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The meeting of the chairman and vice-chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee considered draft amendments and resolutions

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 25 (Xinhua) — The 46th meeting of the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) of China was held at the Great Hall of the People on Wednesday to discuss draft amendments to the Law on Punishment for Disrupting Public Order and the Law on Combating Unfair Competition, as well as a draft decision on ratifying the Convention Establishing the International Mediation Organization.

    In addition, a draft resolution on the approval of the financial report on the execution of the central government budget for 2024 was considered.

    At the meeting, chaired by NPC Standing Committee Chairman Zhao Leji, it was decided to submit the above-mentioned documents for consideration at the ongoing 16th session of the 14th NPC Standing Committee.

    In addition, the meeting heard reports on the powers of individual deputies and on personnel changes. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Promoting the establishment of the International Day of Dialogue Among Civilizations has become China’s important contribution to promoting peace and development around the world – Chinese Ambassador to Belarus Zhang Wenchuan

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    MINSK, June 25 (Xinhua) — Promoting the establishment of the International Day of Dialogue Among Civilizations has become a successful practical step by China in implementing the Global Civilization Initiative put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping, as well as an important contribution to stimulating exchanges and dialogue among civilizations and promoting peace and development throughout the world, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to Belarus Zhang Wenchuan said in an article published in the Belarusian newspaper Zvyazda.

    The ambassador recalled that in June 2024, the 78th session of the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution proposed by China jointly with more than 80 countries to establish June 10 as the International Day of Dialogue among Civilizations.

    “Over the year, China has worked with various parties to actively implement the spirit of the General Assembly resolution on the establishment of the International Day of Dialogue among Civilizations. China has made efforts to build platforms for dialogue among civilizations, from the SCO Dialogue of Civilizations in 2024 to the BRICS Dialogue of Civilizations, from the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Dialogue of Civilizations in 2024 to the 4th China-Africa Dialogue of Civilizations. China has always been the driving force for exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations,” Zhang Wenchuan said.

    He noted that, in general, the Global Civilization Initiative has already found a broad response throughout the world. As the ambassador pointed out, this happened because, firstly, it calls for replacing coercion and pressure with dialogue and consultations. The initiative rejects the approach to inter-civilization interaction as a confrontation between “us” and “them,” emphasizing the need to create regular and specialized mechanisms for global dialogue between civilizations.

    “Secondly, it calls for replacing the zero-sum game with win-win cooperation. Sustainable development of the world is not the exclusive prosperity of a handful of countries or the dominance of one civilization, but the lush flowering of the entire garden of world civilizations. The initiative emphasizes the need to overcome differences in ideologies and social systems, adheres to the concept of a community with a shared destiny for mankind, and, guided by the principles of common benefit and win-win, promotes harmonious interaction and common prosperity of various civilizations,” the Chinese diplomat noted.

    Third, according to Zhang Wenchuan, the Global Civilization Initiative calls for replacing insularity and exclusivity with openness and inclusiveness. “The Global Civilization Initiative advocates that, based on respect for the diversity of civilizations, we properly address the differences among ourselves, learn from each other’s strengths to fill our own gaps, and adopt the best through exchange and mutual learning to achieve positive interactions among civilizations,” the ambassador added. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Zelensky met with D. Trump on the sidelines of the NATO summit

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KYIV, June 25 /Xinhua/ — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague /Netherlands/ on Wednesday, the Ukrainian leader’s Telegram channel reported.

    V. Zelensky noted that “all truly significant issues” were raised at the meeting. In particular, according to him, the parties discussed ways to establish peace in Ukraine and protect Ukrainian citizens from Russian attacks.

    V. Zelensky stressed that Ukraine appreciates the attention of the United States and its readiness to help end the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: MINEX Central Asia 2025 forum held in Tashkent

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Tashkent, June 25 (Xinhua) — The MINEX Central Asia 2025 forum on “Enhancing the Role of Central Asia in Ensuring the Security of Critical Mineral Resources” was held in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, from June 24 to 25.

    The event was initiated by the Ministry of Mining and Geology of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek Technological Metals Plant.

    The forum discussed legislative reforms in the mining sector and incentives established for investors in Uzbekistan in recent years. In addition, it considered how governments and financial institutions can reduce investment risks, adapt the regulatory system to international standards, strengthen institutional capacity and increase investor confidence through open, consistent and reliable processes.

    The forum participants paid special attention to issues of regional cooperation, financing of infrastructure projects and creation of added value at the local level. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Presidents of Belarus and Cuba Discussed Trade and Economic Cooperation in Minsk

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    MINSK, June 25 (Xinhua) — Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel in Minsk on Wednesday, the press service of the Belarusian head of state reported.

    During the meeting, the leaders of the two countries discussed ways to strengthen bilateral dialogue with an emphasis on developing trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The parties also considered issues on the global and regional agenda, and the interaction of the two states on multilateral platforms.

    A. Lukashenko noted that Belarus offers Cuba not only the export of goods and services, but also active participation in the work to develop all mutually beneficial areas and directions based on a comprehensive and strategic partnership. “We are ready to introduce modern scientific achievements and technologies into the Cuban economy for the successful implementation of joint projects designed for a long-term economic and, above all, social effect,” the Belarusian president said.

    M. Diaz-Canel, in turn, pointed out that Cuba has the political will to give impetus to bilateral relations with Belarus in all areas, especially in the trade and economic sphere. “We are interested in stimulating and encouraging trade in goods. We strive for Belarusian companies to participate more in the implementation of the national plan for the socio-economic development of Cuba until 2030,” the President of Cuba emphasized. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: SBA Relief Still Available to California Small Businesses and Private Nonprofits Affected by the Chinatown Apartment Complex Fire

    Source: United States Small Business Administration

    SACRAMENTO, Calif. – The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) is reminding small businesses  and private nonprofit (PNP) organizations in California of the July 25, 2025 deadline to apply for low interest federal disaster loans to offset economic losses caused by the Chinatown Apartment Complex Fire occurring Sept. 13, 2024.

    The disaster declaration covers the California counties of Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino and Ventura.

    Under this declaration, SBA’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program is available to small businesses, small agricultural cooperatives, nurseries, and PNPs impacted by financial losses directly related to the disaster. The SBA is unable to provide disaster loans to agricultural producers, farmers, or ranchers, except for small aquaculture enterprises.

    EIDLs are available for working capital needs caused by the disaster and are available even if the small business did not suffer any physical damage. The loans may be used to pay fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable, and other bills not paid due to the disaster.

    “SBA loans help eligible small businesses and private nonprofits cover operating expenses after a disaster, which is crucial for their recovery,” said Chris Stallings, associate administrator of the Office of Disaster Recovery and Resilience at the SBA. “These loans not only help business owners get back on their feet but also play a key role in sustaining local economies in the aftermath of a disaster.”

    The loan amount can be up to $2 million with interest rates as low as 4% for small businesses and 3.25% for PNPs with terms up to 30 years. Interest does not accrue, and payments are not due until 12 months from the date of the first loan disbursement. The SBA sets loan amounts and terms based on each applicant’s financial condition.

    To apply online, visit sba.gov/disaster. Applicants may also call SBA’s Customer Service Center at (800) 659-2955 or email disastercustomerservice@sba.gov for more information on SBA disaster assistance. For people who are deaf, hard of hearing, or have a speech disability, please dial 7-1-1 to access telecommunications relay services.

    Submit completed loan applications to the SBA no later than July 25.

    ###

    About the U.S. Small Business Administration

    The U.S. Small Business Administration helps power the American dream of business ownership. As the only go-to resource and voice for small businesses backed by the strength of the federal government, the SBA empowers entrepreneurs and small business owners with the resources and support they need to start, grow, expand their businesses, or recover from a declared disaster. It delivers services through an extensive network of SBA field offices and partnerships with public and private organizations. To learn more, visit www.sba.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: CADDXFPV: The Innovation Leader in FPV Drone Technology

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Shenzhen, China, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In the fast-evolving landscape of technology, where drone innovators shine like stars, CADDXFPV stands out as a heavyweight in first-person view (FPV) drone technology and video transmission systems. Founded on August 7, 2017, in Longgang, Shenzhen, this Chinese tech firm has anchored itself in the FPV domain since day one, embarking on a passionate journey of technological deep-diving.

    Encouraging Development in FPV Ecosystem Expansion

    With technology as its anchor, CADDXFPV has built a global R&D network spanning Shenzhen, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Eighty percent of its 100+ R&D team hail from top universities like Harbin Institute of Technology and Fudan University, infusing academic wisdom into product DNA and making technological breakthroughs the norm:

    2018: Partner of Drone Racing Association, stepping onto the international stage.

    2019: Co-launched the Vista system with DJI, gaining global recognition through technical prowess.

    2020: Entered the lightweight market with nano-sized FPV cameras, filling a niche gap.

    2021–2023: Released the Polar night-vision camera, and joined industry associations—advancing technology and ecosystem development in parallel.

    2024: Partner of FAI World Drone Racing Championship , and participation in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area “Fly Valley” initiative—deepening its reach from hardware to ecosystem.

    Notably, CADDXFPV has invested six consecutive years (2019–2024) in global racing events. This isn’t just a brand-building move; it’s a way to refine technology in extreme scenarios, keeping products at the forefront in core metrics like “racing-level stability” and “low latency.”

    Today, CADDXFPV products reach over 100 countries, supported by a network of 400+ dealers and used by 500,000 users worldwide, all witnessing technological iterations firsthand.

    Full Industrial Chain Technology Matrix

    Unlike single-product players, CADDXFPV has constructed a full industrial chain matrix of “digital video transmission systems – intelligent imaging – complete drone solutions,” leveraging technical synergy to serve diverse scenarios from racing to aerial photography and industrial inspection.

    1. FPV Digital Transmission Systems: Redefining “HD & Low Latency”

    CADDX Vista: A benchmark collaboration with DJI, achieving triple breakthroughs in “low latency + HD transmission + ecosystem compatibility “—crafting a “plug-and-play” experience for entry-level pilots.

    Walksnail Avatar: An in-house “industry disruptor” with 1080P/60FPS resolution, 10–50 km transmission range, and cutting-edge tech like HD video transmission SOC chips, low-latency coding algorithms, and multi-sensor fusion navigation—rewriting industry transmission standards.

    Walksnail’s air units offer series like 1S, V2, V3, HD PRO, Moonlight, and GT, covering all scenarios from indoor flying to racing freestyle, night vision, and long-range voyages. Their ultimate video transmission efficiency and HD quality have propelled users from the “analog flight” era to “digital HD.”

    2. Walksnail Ground Units: Crafting “Immersive Flight Terminals”

    Goggles L: A budget-friendly breakthrough with “high cost-performance + strong interactivity”—4.5-inch LCD for clarity, head tracking enabling “look-to-zoom,” directional antennas for signal optimization, and multi-device compatibility, elevating “economy goggles” to flagship experience.

    Goggles X: featuring OLED screens for 1080P/100fps output, HDMI/AV ports, diopter adjustment, and modular design—leaving room for tech upgrades and evolving users from “product buyers” to “ecosystem players.”

    Walksnail VRX: It is compatible with analog goggles and provides real – time signals for converting from analog to digital HD.. 

    3. FPV Intelligent Imaging: All-Scenario Image “Enhancers”

    Tailored for diverse environments, CADDXFPV’s imaging matrix covers “dim light – no light – full color”:

    Ratel Camera: The go-to for night and low-light scenarios, with blacklight sensor + WDR tech, capturing clear details in pitch darkness.

    Infra Series: Designed for security and industrial monitoring, using AI image enhancement boxes to break through “total darkness”—applying FPV tech to professional inspection.

    Ant Camera: The “eyes” of racing pilots, with 1/3 inch CMOS + 165° FOV, balancing clarity and wide view for extreme maneuvers.

    Gazer Camera: Full-color night vision + 3x zoom, with AI enhancement for day details and night clarity.

    Farsight Camera: Merging optics, digital tech, and AI algorithms for 8x intelligent zoom—upgrading FPV shooting from “recording” to “creation.”

    4. FPV Drone: Gofilm 20—The “Night Eye” for Aerial Photographers

    A flagship for low-light aerial photography: 4K starlight camera + 4K DVR, enabling 4K/60FPS recording; 5mg dynamic balance precision + intelligent hovering + vibration isolation tech eliminate “shaky focus” and “frame cropping,” delivering cinematic shots even in dim light.

    Committed to In-House R&D, Constantly Disrupting

    In R&D, over 110 patents stand as testimony—from transmission algorithms to image enhancement, flight control logic to hardware design, CADDXFPV continues to fill FPV technology gaps, making “Chinese R&D” a benchmark for industry innovation.

    In the market, the global FPV sector’s $450 million scale in 2023 and projected $1.206 billion by 2030 validates its potential. Against giants like DJI, CADDXFPV charts a differentiated path: full industrial chain layout for technical synergy, deep engagement in events to hone extreme-scenario performance, and niche-scenario focus to fill multiple gaps.

    Today, it’s no longer just a “product manufacturer” but a “tech ecosystem builder,” pioneering new frontiers in the FPV blue ocean. With the “Fly Valley” initiative and innovation park on the horizon, CADDXFPV will continue driving forward with “tech innovation + ecosystem collaboration,” upgrading global users’ experience from “flight” to “creation”—transforming FPV from a sport into an “aerial perspective” lifestyle.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: SEC Office of the Investor Advocate Delivers to Congress Report on Objectives for Fiscal Year 2026

    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission

    The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of the Investor Advocate today delivered its Report to Congress on the office’s objectives for fiscal year 2026.

    As detailed in the report, the Investor Advocate’s priorities for fiscal year 2026 include:

    • Investor research and testing on existing and proposed disclosures to retail investors.
    • Informing SEC activities and policy priorities through data collected from nationally representative surveys.
    • Addressing and advocating for the priorities and concerns of retail investors affected by financial fraud, including through the Interagency Securities Council.
    • Private market investments in retirement accounts.
    • China-based variable interest entities listed on U.S. exchanges.

    “As detailed in this report, our office continues to research and listen to all investors’ concerns and act as a constructive liaison between those investors and the Commission,” said Cristina Martin Firvida, the SEC’s Investor Advocate.

    The Office of the Investor Advocate is an independent office that was established by Congress to: assist retail investors in resolving problems with the Commission and self-regulatory organizations (SROs); identify areas where investors would benefit from changes in SEC and SRO rules and regulations; identify investor problems with financial service providers and investment products; analyze the potential impact on investors of proposed regulations and rules of the SEC and SROs; and propose regulatory or legislative changes to the Commission and to Congress that might mitigate investor problems and promote investor interests.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to G7 reiterating importance of peace and stability across Taiwan Strait

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA response to G7 reiterating importance of peace and stability across Taiwan Strait

    • Date：2025-06-18
    • Data Source：Department of North American Affairs

    June 18, 2025 

    The 2025 G7 leaders’ summit was held in Kananaskis, Canada, from June 15 to 17. The chair’s summary published following the summit emphasized G7 members’ ongoing and serious concerns about China’s destabilizing actions in the East and South China Seas and the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung welcomes and highly appreciates these remarks.

     

    The summary once again clearly underlined G7 members’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on the international rule of law. In addition, G7 leaders expressed concern over China’s use of such comprehensive nonmarket policies and actions as market distortion and overcapacity.

     

    Minister Lin sincerely appreciates that G7 members, following joint statements by G7 foreign ministers in March and April, once again conveyed support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which highlights the international consensus on this matter. Maintaining the cross-strait status quo is indispensable to global security and prosperity. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will continue to work with global society to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to UK naval vessel transiting Taiwan Strait

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA response to UK naval vessel transiting Taiwan Strait

    • Date：2025-06-19
    • Data Source：Department of European Affairs

    June 19, 2025  

    On June 18, the UK Royal Navy patrol vessel HMS Spey transited the Taiwan Strait. Through this concrete action, the United Kingdom further defended freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and demonstrated its firm position that the strait constitutes international waters. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes and affirms the transit.

     

    MOFA continues to encourage the United Kingdom and other like-minded countries to jointly safeguard cross-strait peace and stability, promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and maintain the rules-based international order. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to false claims regarding Taiwan in joint statement between Central Asian nations and China

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA response to false claims regarding Taiwan in joint statement between Central Asian nations and China

    • Date：2025-06-19
    • Data Source：Department of West Asian and African Affairs

    June 19, 2025  

    Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan from June 16 to 18 at the second China-Central Asia Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. Following the summit, these nations and China jointly issued the Astana Declaration, which contains the spurious claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs solemnly refutes this statement and sternly protests against the Chinese communist regime for its repeated use of meetings with other nations’ leaders to publicly undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty as well as central Asian nations for uncritically accepting China’s statements that run contrary to the facts in downgrading Taiwan’s sovereignty.

     

    MOFA reiterates that neither the Republic of China (Taiwan) nor the People’s Republic of China is subordinate to the other, that the Chinese communist regime has never governed Taiwan, and that no nation has the right or power to deny Taiwan’s existence via so-called joint statements. MOFA calls on Kazakhstan and other central Asian nations not to support false statements and endorse China’s aggressive intentions to disrupt regional peace and stability. 

     

    Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to its people, and it is the people of Taiwan who will determine Taiwan’s future. Moreover, peace, stability, and prosperity must be jointly upheld by all nations of the world. Taiwan is a force for good in the international community and will continue to staunchly defend the values of freedom and democracy as it strengthens collaboration with democratic nations to halt authoritarian expansionism, defend cross-strait peace and security, and maintain a free and stable Indo-Pacific region. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: House Passes Bipartisan Bill to Cement U.S. Leadership in Blockchain Innovation

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Kat Cammack (R-FL-03)

    Washington, D.C. – This week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Deploying American Blockchains Act of 2025, bipartisan legislation that positions the United States as a global leader in blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLT). Sponsored by Representatives Kat Cammack (R-FL-03) and Darren Soto (D-FL-09), the bill directs the Department of Commerce to develop a comprehensive framework to safely and responsibly deploy blockchain technology nationwide– ensuring America remains at the forefront of innovation, cybersecurity, and economic competitiveness.

    “Blockchain is more than cryptocurrency; it’s a next-generation infrastructure that can transform how we secure our supply chains, protect sensitive data, and support rural innovation,” said Congresswoman Cammack. “The United States cannot afford to sit on the sidelines while China and other adversaries race to set the global rules of the road. I am proud to lead this legislation alongside Congressman Soto to ensure American innovation leads the way in blockchain development.”

    “Blockchain technology is transforming the way we do business, secure data, and power innovation across the globe. With the passage of the Deploying American Blockchains Act, we’re making sure the United States leads—not follows—on this critical frontier,” said Congressman Soto. “This bipartisan effort will strengthen our economy, enhance cybersecurity, and ensure that the development of blockchain technologies reflects American values of transparency, inclusion, and trust.”

    Background: 

    This legislation establishes a Blockchain Deployment Program to coordinate federal efforts, build public-private partnerships, and support responsible innovation across key sectors. It includes key provisions to designate a lead agency, enhance coordination between federal agencies, and incorporate input from industry leaders, academia, consumer advocates, and rural communities to guide the development of standards and best practices.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: House Passes Bipartisan Bill to Cement U.S. Leadership in Blockchain Innovation

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Kat Cammack (R-FL-03)

    Washington, D.C. – This week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Deploying American Blockchains Act of 2025, bipartisan legislation that positions the United States as a global leader in blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLT). Sponsored by Representatives Kat Cammack (R-FL-03) and Darren Soto (D-FL-09), the bill directs the Department of Commerce to develop a comprehensive framework to safely and responsibly deploy blockchain technology nationwide– ensuring America remains at the forefront of innovation, cybersecurity, and economic competitiveness.

    “Blockchain is more than cryptocurrency; it’s a next-generation infrastructure that can transform how we secure our supply chains, protect sensitive data, and support rural innovation,” said Congresswoman Cammack. “The United States cannot afford to sit on the sidelines while China and other adversaries race to set the global rules of the road. I am proud to lead this legislation alongside Congressman Soto to ensure American innovation leads the way in blockchain development.”

    “Blockchain technology is transforming the way we do business, secure data, and power innovation across the globe. With the passage of the Deploying American Blockchains Act, we’re making sure the United States leads—not follows—on this critical frontier,” said Congressman Soto. “This bipartisan effort will strengthen our economy, enhance cybersecurity, and ensure that the development of blockchain technologies reflects American values of transparency, inclusion, and trust.”

    Background: 

    This legislation establishes a Blockchain Deployment Program to coordinate federal efforts, build public-private partnerships, and support responsible innovation across key sectors. It includes key provisions to designate a lead agency, enhance coordination between federal agencies, and incorporate input from industry leaders, academia, consumer advocates, and rural communities to guide the development of standards and best practices.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Mainland China warns against sending wrong signals to separatist forces pushing for ‘Taiwan independence’

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 25 (Xinhua) — State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian on Wednesday called on individual countries to abide by the one-China principle in practice and refrain from sending wrong signals to separatist forces advocating “Taiwan independence.”

    Zhu Fenglian made the call at a briefing, commenting on statements by participants at the recent Group of Seven (G7) summit, who noted the “importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”

    “We firmly oppose relevant countries making irresponsible statements on the Taiwan question and grossly interfering in China’s internal affairs,” Zhu Fenglian said, stressing that the Taiwan question is an exclusively internal matter for China and does not tolerate interference from any external forces.

    She called on the relevant states to recognize the danger and harmfulness of provocative actions aimed at achieving “Taiwan independence.”

    The spokeswoman also warned the island’s administration, led by Lai Qingde, that any such provocation would be met with harsh countermeasures, and that any attempts to collude with outside forces in pursuit of “independence” were doomed to failure.

    Zhu Fenglian also answered questions from media representatives regarding recent actions and statements by the United States, including the House Appropriations Committee’s passage of a defense spending bill that allocates US$500 million for the “Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative.”

    The official representative called on the US side to actually fulfill its political commitments to China on the Taiwan issue, adhere to the one-China principle and the provisions of the three China-US joint communiqués, and approach the Taiwan issue with the utmost caution. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Record 769 arrests and USD 65 million in illicit pharmaceuticals seized in global bust

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    25 June 2025

    Operation reveals growing demand for semaglutides and peptides as ‘lifestyle enhancers’

    SINGAPORE – An INTERPOL-coordinated operation across 90 countries has resulted in the seizure of 50.4 million doses of illicit pharmaceuticals worth USD 65 million, highlighting the alarming scale of the global trade in unapproved and counterfeit medicines.

    Operation Pangea XVII, which took place from December 2024 to May 2025, saw the arrest of 769 suspects and the dismantling of 123 criminal groups worldwide.

    The seizures and arrests are the largest in the operation’s 17-year history.

    Nervous system agents, including psychostimulants, anti-anxiety drugs, and medications for Parkinson’s disease, topped the list as the most seized product type, with erectile dysfunction medicines, the second highest.

    Other commonly seized product types include anabolic steroids, anti-diabetic medicines, anti-smoking products, dermatological agents, health supplements, herbal products and psychotherapeutic agents.

    David Caunter, Director pro tempore of Organized and Emerging Crime at INTERPOL, said:

    “Fake and unapproved medications are a serious risk to public health. They can include dangerous or illegal ingredients potentially resulting in severe illness, or even death.

    “The rapid growth of online platforms has made it easier for these unsafe drugs to reach people as well as opening new opportunities for criminal networks to exploit.

    “Working together through Operation Pangea, countries are taking action to protect people’s health and keep healthcare systems safe.”

    Ethiopian authorities discovered illicit pharmaceuticals hidden inside a container.

    Seizures of anti-diabetic medication in Northern Ireland, United Kingdom.

    Customs inspection at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia.

    Inspection at a warehouse in Malaysia.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals seized in Türkiye.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals seized in Malaysia.

     

    Growing demand for anti-diabetic medications and peptide supplements

    The operation revealed growing demand for anti-diabetic drugs and peptide supplements, driven by increasing self-medication, among other factors.

    This trend is being driven by the widespread promotion and availability of these medicines across social media and online marketplaces, creating lucrative and relatively low-risk opportunities for criminal networks selling low-quality or counterfeit products.

    Data from participating countries indicate increasing circulation of illicit anti-diabetic medicines globally due to their off-label weight loss effects, with unapproved and potentially fake drugs seized in the Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America.

    Estimates suggest that a single semaglutide pen may sell for several hundred US dollars on the secondary market.

    The seizures corroborate recent alerts from the World Health Organization and various national health regulatory agencies warning of emerging risks associated with GLP-1-related injectable drugs.

    Operation Pangea XVII revealed another emerging trend – growing demand for peptide supplements for their perceived cosmetic and performance-enhancing benefits, especially in high-income countries across Europe, North America and Oceania.

    These supplements, such as BPC-157, ipamorelin, and melanotan, remain unapproved in many regions due to potential health risks and the lack of sufficient human trials, and until recently, seizures of such peptide-based biologically active substances were rare.

    Ethiopian authorities discovered illicit pharmaceuticals hidden inside a container.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals seized in Argentina.

    Unapproved pregabalin medicines seized in Northern Ireland, United Kingdom.

    Suspected counterfeit tramadol and other medicines seized in Gabon.

    Illicit pharmaceuticals found in a clandestine clinic in Mozambique.

    Illicit erectile dysfunction medicines seized in Bulgaria.

    Operational highlights

    In total, law enforcement agencies worldwide launched 1,728 investigations and issued 847 search warrants targeting criminal networks engaged in the illicit distribution of pharmaceutical products.

    93 per cent of the illicit pharmaceuticals seized lacked regulatory approvals from national health authorities.

    Such products may contain counterfeit, substandard or falsified substances which have not been identified.

    The remaining seven per cent were confirmed as either counterfeit, diverted, or misbranded products.

    Australia recorded the largest seizures globally, with psychostimulants such as modafinil and armodafinil being the most common category seized nationally. This was followed by anti-smoking pouches and erectile dysfunction medicines.

    Professor Tony Lawler, Head of Australia’s Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) said:

    “During this operation, the TGA assessed over 9,500 imports referred by the Australian Border Force and facilitated the seizure of over 5.2 million units of unlawfully imported therapeutic goods, including products that were found to be substandard or falsified.

    This operational partnership represents a significant disruption of dangerous medicines from entering our community, and diversion of profits from those that would usually benefit from the illegal sale and supply.”

    Large seizures of various illicit pharmaceuticals were similarly reported in Canada, Ireland, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, among other countries. 

    Operation Pangea XVII also saw the shutdown of approximately 13,000 criminal-linked websites, social media pages, channels, and bots used to market and sell illegal or falsified medicines.

    Malaysia removed the greatest number of online listings (7,000), followed by Russia, Ireland, Singapore and Iran. The five countries collectively accounted for 96 per cent of all listings taken down.

    In Burkina Faso, 816,000 tablets including analgesics and anti-inflammatories were discovered hidden in vehicles.

    In Mexico, authorities intercepted 27,000 clonazepam tablets and 20,000 alprazolam tablets passing through a courier facility in Tijuana.

    In Portugal, anabolic steroids were discovered in eight prisons across the country, unveiling evidence of a criminal network smuggling illicit substances into correctional facilities.

    Notes to Editor

    Operation Pangea is an annual INTERPOL operation targeting the online sale of illicit pharmaceuticals. The 17th edition of the operation marked a departure from previous iterations with enforcement action taking place over six months instead of the traditional one week. This extended duration allowed for a more comprehensive and sustained effort to disrupt criminal networks.

    Additional support was provided by national health regulatory agencies, Europol, the International Narcotics Control Board, the Pharmaceutical Security Institute, the Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Universal Postal Union, the World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization.

    The following countries participated in Operation Pangea XVII: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Curacao, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Democratic Rep. of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Guyana, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland (United Kingdom), Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep San Marino, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, St Lucia, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA welcomes Philippine announcement concerning visa-free treatment for Taiwanese nationals

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA welcomes Philippine announcement concerning visa-free treatment for Taiwanese nationals

    • Date：2025-06-19
    • Data Source：Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

    June 19, 2025
    No. 214

    The Philippine government indicated on June 19 that Taiwanese passport holders would be granted visa-free entry to the Philippines for stays of up to 14 days beginning July 1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sincerely welcomes this announcement.

    Improving the convenience of Taiwanese nationals traveling overseas for business or tourism and promoting interactions and exchanges between Taiwan and friendly countries are among the key priorities for MOFA and Taiwan’s overseas missions. At a reception to mark Philippine Independence Day on June 13, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung announced on behalf of the Taiwan government that visa-free treatment for Philippine nationals would again be extended for an additional year. The Philippines will now grant visa-free entry to Taiwanese nationals on the principle of reciprocity, facilitating the deepening of exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and the Philippines in such domains as the economy, trade, investment, and tourism.

    This fruitful outcome follows years of active coordination and negotiation between both governments and was made possible through the joint efforts of relevant government departments, the people of Taiwan, and MOFA’s concrete implementation of integrated diplomacy. Minister Lin recognizes the Philippine government’s pragmatic promotion of Taiwan-Philippines relations.

    MOFA reminds Taiwanese nationals to abide by local laws and regulations while in the Philippines and to be mindful of personal safety. In case of an emergency, Taiwanese nationals can call the emergency hotline of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines at +63-917-819-4597 or ask friends or relatives in Taiwan to call MOFA’s emergency hotline at 0800-085-095. (E)

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Foreign Minister Lin accompanies European press delegation to experience Taiwan’s culture, promotes Taiwan Cultural Year in Europe

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    Foreign Minister Lin accompanies European press delegation to experience Taiwan’s culture, promotes Taiwan Cultural Year in Europe

    • Date：2025-06-20
    • Data Source：Department of European Affairs

    June 20, 2025  

    No. 216  

    On the afternoon of June 19, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung took a delegation of journalists from the Czech Republic, France, Germany, and the Netherlands to visit the cast of Zeelandia, a Taiwan original musical. Minister Lin spoke about Taiwan’s leading technology and rich culture and expressed hope that the cultural activities being held as part of the 2025 Taiwan Cultural Year in Europe would help the nations of Europe see a side of Taiwan other than technology.

     

    In his remarks, Minister Lin said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had partnered with the Ministry of Culture and the National Palace Museum (NPM) to put together the Taiwan Cultural Year in Europe. In September and November, pieces from the NPM collection would be exhibited in the Czech Republic and France, respectively, he stated, while other performing arts activities would be held across Europe. Minister Lin continued by expressing hope that this would help European nations better understand Taiwan’s rich culture. He stressed that while Taiwan was a technology island, it was also a culture island that married cultural assets with a creative spirit, which would be highlighted by the Taiwan Cultural Year in Europe. 

     

    The minister then explained that the events were being held under the banner “From Tech to Culture, Taiwan Leads the Future,” while the logo for the event was inspired by Roman columns and bore the word Taiwan symbolizing an IC design. Minister Lin said that this was an expression of how Taiwan and Europe were inextricably linked via cultural exchanges. 

     

    Musical cast members then led Minister Lin and the visiting journalists in singing a traditional Siraya song to experience for themselves the beauty of Taiwan’s culture. The musical Zeelandia takes as its backdrop Fort Zeelandia in the 17th century. The performance tells the story of how the cultures of Han, Siraya, and Dutch people came together, underscoring the unbreakable cultural and historical bonds linking Taiwan and Europe. The musical is being performed from June 20 to 29 at the Taipei Performing Arts Center. 

     

    In the future, MOFA will continue to promote cultural diplomacy to highlight Taiwan’s core values of freedom, openness, and inclusion. It will use culture as a bridge linking Taiwan to the world’s democracies, so as to jointly encourage the greater cultural flowering of free and democratic societies. (E) 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA welcomes Brunei Darussalam announcement concerning visa-free treatment for Taiwanese nationals

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA welcomes Brunei Darussalam announcement concerning visa-free treatment for Taiwanese nationals

    • Date：2025-06-24
    • Data Source：Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

    June 24, 2025
    No.218

    The government of Brunei Darussalam indicated on June 23 that, beginning that day, holders of a Taiwan passport valid for six months or longer would be granted visa-free entry into Brunei Darussalam for stays of up to 14 days. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sincerely welcomes this announcement.

    Brunei Darussalam’s visa-free treatment for Taiwanese nationals will further deepen bilateral cooperation and exchanges in such fields as tourism, trade, culture, and education. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung expresses appreciation for the Brunei Darussalam government’s pragmatic measures to enhance Taiwan-Brunei Darussalam relations.

    Since August 2016, Taiwan has been endeavoring to offer visa-free entry to travelers from Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam and actively seeking to secure similar treatment from these three New Southbound Policy partner countries based on the principle of reciprocity. Following a sustained campaign by MOFA and its missions abroad, Thailand (from July 15 last year), the Philippines (from July 1 this year), and Brunei Darussalam (from June 23 this year) have now accorded visa-free entry to Taiwanese nationals. These achievements can be attributed to the combined efforts of relevant government departments and the people, as well as Taiwan’s active implementation of integrated diplomacy. 

    Improving the convenience of overseas travel for Taiwanese businesspeople and tourists is a key goal of MOFA and its overseas missions. Looking ahead, MOFA will continue to strive to obtain visa-free treatment from even more countries. In the meantime, MOFA reminds Taiwanese nationals traveling in Brunei Darussalam to respect local customs and culture, abide by local laws and regulations, and be mindful of personal safety. In case of an emergency, Taiwanese nationals can call the emergency hotline of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Brunei Darussalam at +673-895-6338 or ask friends or relatives in Taiwan to call MOFA’s emergency hotline at 0800-085-095. (E)

     

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to EU-Canada summit joint statement stressing importance of cross-strait peace and stability

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA response to EU-Canada summit joint statement stressing importance of cross-strait peace and stability

    • Date：2025-06-24
    • Data Source：Department of European Affairs

    June 24, 2025  

    President of the European Council António Costa and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen met with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on June 23 in Brussels for the 20th European Union-Canada summit. In a joint statement released afterward, the two sides declared that security in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions was increasingly interconnected and reaffirmed a shared interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, including in the East and South China Seas and across the Taiwan Strait. The two sides added that they would continue working with regional partners to uphold a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific region. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung welcomes and affirms this expression of staunch support for cross-strait security and stability by the European Union and Canada. 

     

    This follows on the release of joint statements after the G7 foreign ministers meeting and G7 leaders’ summit in March and June, respectively. These statements also expressed support for cross-strait peace, thus demonstrating that maintaining a peaceful, stable Taiwan Strait is an international consensus. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will continue to work with like-minded partners around the world to defend the rules-based international order and ensure the peace, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and Taiwan Strait.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA response to UK National Security Strategy 2025 conveying concern over peace and stability across Taiwan Strait

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA response to UK National Security Strategy 2025 conveying concern over peace and stability across Taiwan Strait

    • Date：2025-06-25
    • Data Source：Department of European Affairs

    June 25, 2025  

    The UK Cabinet Office issued National Security Strategy 2025 on June 24 following a comprehensive review of relevant issues, including the China audit, that was launched by the Labour government after it assumed office. The strategy noted the centrality of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait in global trade and supply chains and underscored the importance of regional stability to the United Kingdom. It also indicated that there was a risk of escalation around Taiwan and reiterated that issues regarding Taiwan should be resolved peacefully through constructive dialogue, without the threat or use of force or coercion. It further stated that the United Kingdom did not support any unilateral attempts to change the status quo and that the United Kingdom would continue to strengthen its cooperative relationship with Taiwan in a wide range of areas based on shared democratic values.

     

    The day the national security strategy was issued, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy briefed the House of Commons on the China audit and the government’s China policy, emphasizing that the United Kingdom’s long-standing position on Taiwan remained unchanged and that it would continue to deepen its vibrant ties with Taiwan in such domains as trade, education, and innovation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes these statements.

     

    Following the release of the Strategic Defence Review on June 2, the national security strategy serves as another integrated policy document of the UK government. In addition to reaffirming the United Kingdom’s staunch position on peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, the strategy once again highlighted the fact that there is a high degree of international consensus on cross-strait peace and stability and that Taiwan plays an indispensable role in the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and the world.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: MOFA response to G7 reiterating importance of peace and stability across Taiwan Strait

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    MOFA response to G7 reiterating importance of peace and stability across Taiwan Strait

    Date：2025-06-18
    Data Source：Department of North American Affairs

    June 18, 2025 

    The 2025 G7 leaders’ summit was held in Kananaskis, Canada, from June 15 to 17. The chair’s summary published following the summit emphasized G7 members’ ongoing and serious concerns about China’s destabilizing actions in the East and South China Seas and the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung welcomes and highly appreciates these remarks.
     
    The summary once again clearly underlined G7 members’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on the international rule of law. In addition, G7 leaders expressed concern over China’s use of such comprehensive nonmarket policies and actions as market distortion and overcapacity.
     
    Minister Lin sincerely appreciates that G7 members, following joint statements by G7 foreign ministers in March and April, once again conveyed support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which highlights the international consensus on this matter. Maintaining the cross-strait status quo is indispensable to global security and prosperity. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will continue to work with global society to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –