Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Tourist train for seniors departs from China’s Tianjin
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Tourist train for seniors departs from China’s Tianjin
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
First ‘tourist train for seniors’ kicks off 14-day journey in NE China
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Senior Chinese official, former U.S. treasury secretary exchange views on China-U.S. economic, trade relations
BEIJING, March 16 — Senior Chinese official He Lifeng on Sunday met with former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in Beijing, and the two sides exchanged views on both China-U.S. economic and trade relations and the global economy.
Noting that China’s economy is maintaining its recovery momentum, He, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and director of the Office of the Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs, said that China’s innovation-driven development has achieved remarkable results, while market expectations continue to improve, and adding that domestic demand potential and internal circulation space are huge.
China’s new development pattern is taking shape at a faster pace, the fundamentals of the Chinese economy remain unchanged and its prospects remain bright, He said.
Noting that U.S.-China relations are very important and green transformation is the general trend, Paulson said that the Paulson Institute is willing to continue to contribute positively to the stability of U.S.-China relations and green and low-carbon development.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
China will continue to work closely with Jordan to promote common development: ambassador
AMMAN, March 16 — China will continue to work closely with Jordan to promote common development and contribute to regional and global peace, stability, and development, Chinese Ambassador to Jordan Chen Chuandong said here on Sunday.
Chen made the remarks during a press conference held in Amman on the outcome of China’s recently concluded “two sessions” — the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress, China’s national legislature, and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the top political advisory body.
Hailing the “strong complementarity” of both countries in economic structure and calling Jordan a “close partner,” Chen said some of China’s reform and development policies and measures are consistent with Jordan’s modernization drive.
The Chinese ambassador called on Jordan to make use of Chinese exhibitions to promote its products, particularly dates and olive oil, emphasizing the vast opportunities for agricultural cooperation between the two countries.
He stressed that China will uphold global governance based on extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits.
This year, China will continue to offer initiatives and solutions for hot-spot issues, promote the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, and strive for a comprehensive, just, and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue, contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East, he said.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
SHANGHAI, China, March 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Qifu Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: QFIN; HKEx: 3660) (“Qifu Technology” or the “Company”), a leading AI-empowered Credit-Tech platform in China, today announced its unaudited financial results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024 and raised semi-annual dividend.
Fourth Quarter 2024 Business Highlights
1 Refers to cumulative registered users across our platform.
2 “Cumulative users with approved credit lines” refers to the total number of users who had submitted their credit applications and were approved with a credit line at the end of each period.
3 Including 2,799,208 loans across “V-pocket”, and 22,015,715 loans across other products.
4 Refers to the total principal amount of loans facilitated and originated during the given period. Retrospectively excluding the impact of discontinued service, which did not have and is not expected to have a material impact on our overall business, financial condition, and results of operations.
5 “ICE” is an open platform primarily on our “Qifu Jietiao” APP (previously known as “360 Jietiao”), we match borrowers and financial institutions through big data and cloud computing technology on “ICE”, and provide pre-loan investigation report of borrowers. For loans facilitated through “ICE”, the Company does not bear principal risk.
Under total technology solutions, we have been offering end-to-end technology solutions to financial institutions based on on-premise deployment, SaaS or hybrid model since 2023.
6 “Total outstanding loan balance” refers to the total amount of principal outstanding for loans facilitated and originated at the end of each period, excluding loans delinquent for more than 180 days. Retrospectively excluding the impact of discontinued service, which did not have and is not expected to have a material impact on our overall business, financial condition, and results of operations.
7 “90 day+ delinquency rate” refers to the outstanding principal balance of on- and off-balance sheet loans that were 91 to 180 calendar days past due as a percentage of the total outstanding principal balance of on- and off-balance sheet loans across our platform as of a specific date. Loans that are charged-off and loans under “ICE” and total technology solutions are not included in the delinquency rate calculation.
8 “Repeat borrower contribution” for a given period refers to (i) the principal amount of loans borrowed during that period by borrowers who had historically made at least one successful drawdown, divided by (ii) the total loan facilitation and origination volume through our platform during that period.
Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Highlights
9 Non-GAAP income from operations, Non-GAAP net income, Non-GAAP operating margin, Non-GAAP net income margin and Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS are Non-GAAP financial measures. For more information on these Non-GAAP financial measures, please see the section of “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures Statement” and the table captioned “Unaudited Reconciliations of GAAP and Non-GAAP Results” set forth at the end of this press release.
Full Year 2024 Operational Highlights
Full Year 2024 Financial Highlights
Mr. Haisheng Wu, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Qifu Technology, commented, “Although 2024 was a challenging year as macro-economic headwinds persisted, we have made timely adjustments to our operations throughout the year and focused our effort on improving the quality and sustainability of our business. With consistent execution, we closed the year with strong operational and financial results. Throughout 2024, we proactively expanded the scope of our platform services, which makes our business model more resilient and forms a solid foundation for high quality growth in 2025.
Approximately 58% of the year-end loan balance was under the capital-light model, ICE and total technology solutions. The strong contribution from non-credit risk bearing services helped us mitigate some risks in a challenging environment and demonstrated the efficiency of our platform services. In 2024, we further diversified our user acquisition channels and in the fourth quarter, approximately 47% of our new credit line users were acquired through embedded finance channels. Meanwhile, we continued to solidify our relationships with financial institution partners. With record-setting ABS issuance, we further optimized our funding structure.
While we started to see some tentative signs of improvement in user activities late in 2024, we will continue to take a prudent approach in our business planning in 2025. We will remain focused on quality growth and further empower our partners and users through our open platform. With the increasing maturity and efficiency of large language models, we expect to allocate more resources to the application of AI across the credit scenarios in the future. We believe such efforts will enable us to better navigate through the current environment and position us well to capture long-term opportunities through innovative technologies, enhanced products and collaborative models.”
“We are pleased to report another quarter of solid financial results and close the year on a strong note in a still uncertain macro environment. For 2024, total revenue was RMB17.17 billion and Non-GAAP net income was RMB6.42 billion,” Mr. Alex Xu, Chief Financial Officer, commented. “Meanwhile, we generated a record-breaking RMB9.34 billion cash from operations in 2024. Our strong financial positions not only allow us to consistently execute our strategy and support business initiatives, but also enable us to further enhance returns to our shareholders by actively executing 2025 share repurchase plan and significantly raising semi-annual dividends.”
Mr. Yan Zheng, Chief Risk Officer, added, “Despite facing macro uncertainties, we significantly reduced our overall portfolio risks through 2024 by decisively tightening risk standards early in the year. Overall risk performance reached the best level for the year in the fourth quarter. Among key leading indicators, Day-1 delinquency rate*10 was 4.8% in the fourth quarter, and 30-day collection rate*11 was 88.1%. We feel comfortable with current risk levels and expect to see relatively stable risk performance in the coming quarters as we seek growth opportunities in a changing environment in 2025.”
10 “Day-1 delinquency rate” is defined as (i) the total amount of principal that became overdue as of a specified date, divided by (ii) the total amount of principal that was due for repayment as of such specified date.
11 “30-day collection rate” is defined as (i) the amount of principal that was repaid in one month among the total amount of principal that became overdue as of a specified date, divided by (ii) the total amount of principal that became overdue as of such specified date.
Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial Results
Total net revenue was RMB4,482.3 million (US$614.1 million), compared to RMB4,495.5 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB4,370.2 million in the prior quarter.
Net revenue from Credit Driven Services was RMB2,889.5 million (US$395.9 million), compared to RMB3,248.3 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB2,901.0 million in the prior quarter.
Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital heavy were RMB363.0 million (US$49.7 million), compared to RMB481.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB258.7 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes were primarily due to the changes in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.
Financing income*12 was RMB1,667.3 million (US$228.4 million), compared to RMB1,485.4 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,744.1 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to the growth in average outstanding balance of the on-balance-sheet loans.
Revenue from releasing of guarantee liabilities was RMB761.8 million (US$104.4 million), compared to RMB1,211.8 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB794.6 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the decrease in average outstanding balance of off-balance-sheet capital-heavy loans during the period.
Other services fees were RMB97.4 million (US$13.3 million), compared to RMB69.8 million in the same period of 2023, and RMB103.7 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year increase reflected the increase in late payment fees under the credit driven services due to improvement in collection rates of late paid loans.
Net revenue from Platform Services was RMB1,592.8 million (US$218.2 million), compared to RMB1,247.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,469.1 million in the prior quarter.
Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital light were RMB515.1 million (US$70.6 million), compared to RMB697.0 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB574.6 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential decreases were primarily due to the decreases in capital-light loan facilitation volume.
Referral services fees were RMB907.2 million (US$124.3 million), compared to RMB446.5 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB763.1 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential increases were mainly due to the increases in loan facilitation volume through ICE.
Other services fees were RMB170.5 million (US$23.4 million), compared to RMB103.8 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB131.4 million in the prior quarter.
Total operating costs and expenses were RMB2,591.9 million (US$355.1 million), compared to RMB3,215.9 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,081.0 million in the prior quarter.
Facilitation, origination and servicing expenses were RMB734.7 million (US$100.6 million), compared to RMB731.8 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB707.9 million in the prior quarter.
Funding costs were RMB126.8 million (US$17.4 million), compared to RMB161.0 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB146.8 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the lower average costs of ABS and trusts. The sequential decrease was mainly due to the decline in funding from ABS and trusts and lower average costs.
Sales and marketing expenses were RMB523.9 million (US$71.8 million), compared to RMB551.6 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB419.9 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was primarily due to improved efficiency in acquiring new customers. The sequential increase was primarily due to a more proactive customer acquisition effort and seasonal factors.
General and administrative expenses were RMB156.1 million (US$21.4 million), compared to RMB108.0 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB92.0 million in the prior quarter.
Provision for loans receivable was RMB598.4 million (US$82.0 million), compared to RMB639.9 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB477.5 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile and changes in loan origination volume of on-balance-sheet loans.
Provision for financial assets receivable was RMB63.3 million (US$8.7 million), compared to RMB148.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB64.4 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume and reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile. The sequential decrease was mainly due to reversal of prior quarters’ provision in the quarter, offsetting by the increase in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.
Provision for accounts receivable and contract assets was RMB77.5 million (US$10.6 million), compared to RMB91.1 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB108.8 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential decreases reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile.
Provision for contingent liability was RMB311.4 million (US$42.7 million), compared to RMB784.3 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB63.6 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile as well as the changes in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.
Income from operations was RMB1,890.3 million (US$259.0 million), compared to RMB1,279.6 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,289.2 million in the prior quarter.
Non-GAAP income from operations was RMB1,950.0 million (US$267.2 million), compared to RMB1,322.1 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,315.5 million in the prior quarter.
Operating margin was 42.2%. Non-GAAP operating margin was 43.5%.
Income before income tax expense was RMB1,932.7 million (US$264.8 million), compared to RMB1,330.9 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB2,356.9 million in the prior quarter.
Income taxes expense was RMB20.0 million (US$2.7 million), compared to RMB 223.2 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB558.1 million in the prior quarter. The year-over-year and sequential changes were mainly due the writeback of withholding taxes related to the Company’s dividend and share repurchase plans, as the Company became eligible to a lower tax rate in the fourth quarter.
Net income was RMB1,912.7 million (US$262.0 million), compared to RMB1,107.7 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,798.8 million in the prior quarter.
Non-GAAP net income was RMB1,972.4 million (US$270.2 million), compared to RMB1,150.3 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,825.1 million in the prior quarter.
Net income margin was 42.7%. Non-GAAP net income margin was 44.0%.
Net income attributed to the Company was RMB1,916.6 million (US$262.6 million), compared to RMB1,111.7 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,802.9 million in the prior quarter.
Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company was RMB1,976.4 million (US$270.8 million), compared to RMB1,154.3 million in the same period of 2023 and RMB1,829.2 million in the prior quarter.
Net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB13.24 (US$1.82).
Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB13.66 (US$1.87).
Weighted average basic ADS used in calculating GAAP net income per ADS was 142.94 million.
Weighted average diluted ADS used in calculating GAAP and non-GAAP net income per ADS was 144.71 million.
12 “Financing income” is generated from loans facilitated through the Company’s platform funded by the consolidated trusts and Fuzhou Microcredit, which charge fees and interests from borrowers.
Full Year 2024 Financial Results
Total net revenue was RMB17,165.7 million (US$2,351.7 million), compared to RMB16,290.0 million in 2023.
Net revenue from Credit Driven Services was RMB11,719.0 million (US$1,605.5 million), compared to RMB11,738.6 million in 2023.
Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital heavy were RMB1,016.5 million (US$139.3 million), compared to RMB1,667.1 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was primarily due to a decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.
Financing income was RMB6,636.5 million (US$909.2 million), compared to RMB5,109.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to the growth in average outstanding balance of on-balance-sheet loans.
Revenue from releasing of guarantee liabilities was RMB3,695.0 million (US$506.2 million), compared to RMB4,745.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to decrease in average outstanding balance of off-balance-sheet capital-heavy loans during the period.
Other services fees were RMB371.0 million (US$50.8 million), compared to RMB215.6 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was mainly due to an increase in late payment fees in connection with improvement in collection rate of late paid loans under the credit driven services.
Net revenue from Platform Services was RMB5,446.6 million (US$746.2 million), compared to RMB4,551.5 million in 2023.
Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital light were RMB2,116.8 million (US$290.0 million), compared to RMB3,214.0 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was primarily due to a decline in loan facilitation volume under the capital-light model.
Referral services fees were RMB2,842.6 million (US$389.4 million), compared to RMB950.0 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to an increase in the loan facilitation volume through ICE.
Other services fees were RMB487.2 million (US$66.7 million), compared to RMB387.5 million in 2023.
Total operating costs and expenses were RMB9,637.1 million (US$1,320.3 million), compared to RMB11,433.1 million in 2023.
Facilitation, origination and servicing expenses were RMB2,900.7 million (US$397.4 million), compared to RMB2,659.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was primarily due to higher collection fees.
Funding costs were RMB590.9 million (US$81.0 million), compared to RMB645.4 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to the lower average cost of ABS and trusts, partially offset by the growth in funding from ABS and trusts.
Sales and marketing expenses were RMB1,725.9 million (US$236.4 million), compared to RMB1,939.9 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to our prudent customer acquisition approach and lower unit customer acquisition cost.
General and administrative expenses were RMB449.5 million (US$61.6 million), compared to RMB421.1 million in 2023.
Provision for loans receivable was RMB2,773.3 million (US$379.9 million), compared to RMB2,151.0 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase was mainly due to the growth in loan origination volume of on-balance-sheet loans.
Provision for financial assets receivable was RMB296.9 million (US$40.7 million), compared to RMB386.1 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to a decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume.
Provision for accounts receivable and contract assets was RMB421.5 million (US$57.7 million), compared to RMB175.8 million in 2023. The year-over-year increase reflected the Company’s consistent approach in assessing provisions commensurate with its underlying loan profile.
Provision for contingent liability was RMB478.4 million (US$65.5 million), compared to RMB3,053.8 million in 2023. The year-over-year decrease was mainly due to a decline in capital-heavy loan facilitation volume and the reversal of prior provision as loans facilitated in previous period performed better than expected.
Income from operations was RMB7,528.6 million (US$1,031.4 million), compared to RMB4,857.0 million in 2023.
Non-GAAP income from operations was RMB7,696.2 million (US$1,054.4 million), compared to RMB5,042.6 million in 2023.
Operating margin was 43.9%. Non-GAAP operating margin was 44.8%.
Income before income tax expense was RMB7,892.4 million (US$1,081.3 million), compared to RMB5,277.5 million in 2023.
Income taxes expense was RMB1,644.3 million (US$225.3 million). Effective tax rate was 20.4%, compared to 18.5% in 2023. The increase in effective tax rate was mainly due to withholding taxes related to the Company’s dividend and share repurchase plan.
Net income attributed to the Company was RMB6,264.3 million (US$858.2 million), compared to RMB4,285.3 million in 2023.
Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company was RMB6,431.9 million (US$881.2 million), compared to RMB4,470.9 million in 2023.
Net income margin was 36.4%. Non-GAAP net income margin was 37.4%.
Net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB41.28 (US$5.66).
Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS was RMB42.39 (US$5.81).
Weighted average basic ADS used in calculating GAAP net income per ADS was 149.01 million.
Weighted average diluted ADS used in calculating GAAP and non-GAAP net income per ADS was 151.72 million.
30 Day+ Delinquency Rate by Vintage and 180 Day+ Delinquency Rate by Vintage
The following charts and tables display the historical cumulative 30 day+ delinquency rates by loan facilitation and origination vintage and 180 day+ delinquency rates by loan facilitation and origination vintage for all loans facilitated and originated through the Company’s platform. Loans under “ICE” and total technology solutions are not included in the 30 day+ charts and the 180 day+ charts:
http://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/2a5d124f-5f90-4a71-a264-908b101a7e87
http://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/95f56823-ce1f-4ade-baf5-cdc0bcf8526c
Semi-Annual Dividend for the Second Half of 2024
The board of directors of the Company (the “Board”) has approved a dividend of US$0.35 per Class A ordinary share, or US$0.70 per ADS for the second half of 2024 to holders of record of Class A ordinary shares and ADSs as of the close of business on April 23, 2025 Hong Kong Time and New York Time, respectively, in accordance with the Company’s dividend policy. For holder of Class A ordinary shares, in order to qualify for the dividend, all valid documents for the transfers of shares accompanied by the relevant share certificates must be lodged for registration with the Company’s Hong Kong branch share registrar, Computershare Hong Kong Investor Services Limited, at Shops 1712-1716, 17th Floor, Hopewell Centre, 183 Queen’s Road East, Hong Kong no later than 4:30 p.m. on April 23, 2025 (Hong Kong Time). The payment date is expected to be on May 28, 2025 for holders of Class A ordinary shares and around June 2, 2025 for holders of ADSs.
Update on Share Repurchase
On March 12, 2024, the Board approved a share repurchase plan (the “2024 Share Repurchase Plan”) whereby the Company is authorized to repurchase its ADSs or Class A ordinary shares with an aggregate value of up to US$350 million during the 12-month period from April 1, 2024.
In the fourth quarter, the Company had in aggregate purchased approximately 3.1 million ADSs in the open market for a total amount of approximately US$107 million (inclusive of commissions) at an average price of US$34.5 per ADS. As of December 30, 2024, the Company had utilized substantially all of the total authorized value for the 2024 Share Repurchase Plan.
On November 19, 2024, the Board approved a new share repurchase plan (the “2025 Share Repurchase Plan”) whereby the Company is authorized to repurchase up to US$450 million worth of its ADSs or Class A ordinary shares over the next 12 months starting from January 1, 2025.
As of March 14, 2025, the Company had in aggregate purchased approximately 2.2 million ADSs in the open market for a total amount of approximately US$86 million (inclusive of commissions) at an average price of US$39.7 per ADS pursuant to the 2025 Share Repurchase Plan.
Business Outlook
As macro-economic uncertainties persist, the Company intends to maintain a prudent approach in its business planning for 2025. Management will continue to focus on enhancing efficiency of the Company’s operations. As such, for the first quarter of 2025, the Company expects to generate a net income between RMB1.75 billion and RMB1.85 billion and a non-GAAP net income*13 between RMB1.80 billion and RMB1.90 billion, representing a year-on-year growth between 49% and 58%. This outlook reflects the Company’s current and preliminary views, which is subject to material changes.
13 Non-GAAP net income represents net income excluding share-based compensation expenses.
Conference Call Preregistration
Qifu Technology’s management team will host an earnings conference call at 7:30 AM U.S. Eastern Time on Monday, March 17, 2025 (7:30 PM Beijing Time on the same day).
All participants wishing to join the conference call must pre-register online using the link provided below.
Registration Link: https://s1.c-conf.com/diamondpass/10045854-hg6t5r.html
Upon registration, each participant will receive details for the conference call, including dial-in numbers and a unique access PIN. Please dial in 10 minutes before the call is scheduled to begin.
Additionally, a live and archived webcast of the conference call will be available on the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website at https://ir.qifu.tech.
About Qifu Technology
Qifu Technology is a leading AI-empowered Credit-Tech platform in China. By leveraging its sophisticated machine learning models and data analytics capabilities, the Company provides a comprehensive suite of technology services to assist financial institutions and consumers and SMEs in the loan lifecycle, ranging from borrower acquisition, preliminary credit assessment, fund matching and post-facilitation services. The Company is dedicated to making credit services more accessible and personalized to consumers and SMEs through Credit-Tech services to financial institutions.
For more information, please visit: https://ir.qifu.tech.
Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures Statement
To supplement our financial results presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP, we use Non-GAAP financial measure, which is adjusted from results based on U.S. GAAP to exclude share-based compensation expenses. Reconciliations of our Non-GAAP financial measures to our U.S. GAAP financial measures are set forth in tables at the end of this earnings release, which provide more details on the Non-GAAP financial measures.
We use Non-GAAP income from operation, Non-GAAP operating margin, Non-GAAP net income, Non-GAAP net income margin, Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company and Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS in evaluating our operating results and for financial and operational decision-making purposes. Non-GAAP income from operation represents income from operation excluding share-based compensation expenses. Non-GAAP operating margin is equal to Non-GAAP income from operation divided by total net revenue. Non-GAAP net income represents net income excluding share-based compensation expenses. Non-GAAP net income margin is equal to Non-GAAP net income divided by total net revenue. Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company represents net income attributed to the Company excluding share-based compensation expenses. Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS represents net income excluding share-based compensation expenses per fully diluted ADS. Such adjustments have no impact on income tax. We believe that Non-GAAP income from operation, Non-GAAP operating margin, Non-GAAP net income, Non-GAAP net income margin, Non-GAAP net income attributed to the Company and Non-GAAP net income per fully diluted ADS help identify underlying trends in our business that could otherwise be distorted by the effect of certain expenses that we include in results based on U.S. GAAP. We believe that Non-GAAP income from operation and Non-GAAP net income provide useful information about our operating results, enhance the overall understanding of our past performance and future prospects and allow for greater visibility with respect to key metrics used by our management in its financial and operational decision-making. Our Non-GAAP financial information should be considered in addition to results prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, but should not be considered a substitute for or superior to U.S. GAAP results. In addition, our calculation of Non-GAAP financial information may be different from the calculation used by other companies, and therefore comparability may be limited.
Exchange Rate Information
This announcement contains translations of certain RMB amounts into U.S. dollars at specified rates solely for the convenience of the reader. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from RMB to U.S. dollars are made at a rate of RMB 7.2993 to US$1.00, the exchange rate set forth in the H.10 statistical release of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as of December 31, 2024.
Safe Harbor Statement
Any forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are made under the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “will,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “future,” “intends,” “plans,” “believes,” “estimates” and similar statements. Among other things, the business outlook and quotations from management in this announcement, as well as the Company’s strategic and operational plans, contain forward-looking statements. Qifu Technology may also make written or oral forward-looking statements in its periodic reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in announcements made on the website of The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (the “Hong Kong Stock Exchange”), in its annual report to shareholders, in press releases and other written materials and in oral statements made by its officers, directors or employees to third parties. Statements that are not historical facts, including the Company’s business outlook, beliefs and expectations, are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties. A number of factors could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statement, which factors include but not limited to the following: the Company’s growth strategies, the Company’s cooperation with 360 Group, changes in laws, rules and regulatory environments, the recognition of the Company’s brand, market acceptance of the Company’s products and services, trends and developments in the credit-tech industry, governmental policies relating to the credit-tech industry, general economic conditions in China and around the globe, and assumptions underlying or related to any of the foregoing. Further information regarding these and other risks and uncertainties is included in Qifu Technology’s filings with the SEC and announcements on the website of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. All information provided in this press release is as of the date of this press release, and Qifu Technology does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statement, except as required under applicable law.
For more information, please contact:
Qifu Technology
E-mail: ir@360shuke.com
| Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets | |||
| (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”) | |||
| except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted) | |||
| December 31, | December 31, | December 31, | |
| 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | |
| RMB | RMB | USD | |
| ASSETS | |||
| Current assets: | |||
| Cash and cash equivalents | 4,177,890 | 4,452,416 | 609,978 |
| Restricted cash | 3,381,107 | 2,353,384 | 322,412 |
| Short term investments | 15,000 | 3,394,073 | 464,987 |
| Security deposit prepaid to third-party guarantee companies | 207,071 | 162,617 | 22,278 |
| Funds receivable from third party payment service providers | 1,603,419 | 462,112 | 63,309 |
| Accounts receivable and contract assets, net | 2,909,245 | 2,214,530 | 303,389 |
| Financial assets receivable, net | 2,522,543 | 1,553,912 | 212,885 |
| Amounts due from related parties | 45,346 | 8,510 | 1,166 |
| Loans receivable, net | 24,604,487 | 26,714,428 | 3,659,862 |
| Prepaid expenses and other assets | 329,920 | 1,464,586 | 200,647 |
| Total current assets | 39,796,028 | 42,780,568 | 5,860,913 |
| Non-current assets: | |||
| Accounts receivable and contract assets, net-noncurrent | 146,995 | 27,132 | 3,717 |
| Financial assets receivable, net-noncurrent | 596,330 | 170,779 | 23,397 |
| Amounts due from related parties | 4,240 | 51 | 7 |
| Loans receivable, net-noncurrent | 2,898,005 | 2,537,749 | 347,670 |
| Property and equipment, net | 231,221 | 362,774 | 49,700 |
| Land use rights,net | 977,461 | 956,738 | 131,073 |
| Intangible assets | 13,443 | 11,818 | 1,619 |
| Goodwill | 41,210 | 42,414 | 5,811 |
| Deferred tax assets | 1,067,738 | 1,206,325 | 165,266 |
| Other non-current assets | 45,901 | 36,270 | 4,969 |
| Total non-current assets | 6,022,544 | 5,352,050 | 733,229 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 45,818,572 | 48,132,618 | 6,594,142 |
| LIABILITIES AND EQUITY | |||
| Current liabilities: | |||
| Payable to investors of the consolidated trusts-current | 8,942,291 | 8,188,454 | 1,121,814 |
| Accrued expenses and other current liabilities | 2,016,039 | 2,492,921 | 341,529 |
| Amounts due to related parties | 80,376 | 67,495 | 9,247 |
| Short term loans | 798,586 | 1,369,939 | 187,681 |
| Guarantee liabilities-stand ready | 3,949,601 | 2,383,202 | 326,497 |
| Guarantee liabilities-contingent | 3,207,264 | 1,820,350 | 249,387 |
| Income tax payable | 742,210 | 1,040,687 | 142,574 |
| Other tax payable | 163,252 | 109,161 | 14,955 |
| Total current liabilities | 19,899,619 | 17,472,209 | 2,393,684 |
| Non-current liabilities: | |||
| Deferred tax liabilities | 224,823 | 439,435 | 60,202 |
| Payable to investors of the consolidated trusts-noncurrent | 3,581,800 | 5,719,600 | 783,582 |
| Other long-term liabilities | 102,473 | 255,155 | 34,956 |
| Total non-current liabilities | 3,909,096 | 6,414,190 | 878,740 |
| TOTAL LIABILITIES | 23,808,715 | 23,886,399 | 3,272,424 |
| TOTAL QIFU TECHNOLOGY INC EQUITY | 21,937,483 | 24,190,043 | 3,314,022 |
| Noncontrolling interests | 72,374 | 56,176 | 7,696 |
| TOTAL EQUITY | 22,009,857 | 24,246,219 | 3,321,718 |
| TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY | 45,818,572 | 48,132,618 | 6,594,142 |
| Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations | |||||||||||||
| (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”) | |||||||||||||
| except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted) | |||||||||||||
| Three months ended December 31, | Year ended December 31, | ||||||||||||
| 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | ||||||||
| RMB | RMB | USD | RMB | RMB | USD | ||||||||
| Credit driven services | 3,248,263 | 2,889,500 | 395,860 | 11,738,560 | 11,719,027 | 1,605,500 | |||||||
| Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital heavy | 481,195 | 362,958 | 49,725 | 1,667,119 | 1,016,514 | 139,262 | |||||||
| Financing income | 1,485,446 | 1,667,340 | 228,425 | 5,109,921 | 6,636,511 | 909,198 | |||||||
| Revenue from releasing of guarantee liabilities | 1,211,787 | 761,827 | 104,370 | 4,745,898 | 3,695,017 | 506,215 | |||||||
| Other services fees | 69,835 | 97,375 | 13,340 | 215,622 | 370,985 | 50,825 | |||||||
| Platform services | 1,247,240 | 1,592,752 | 218,206 | 4,551,467 | 5,446,629 | 746,185 | |||||||
| Loan facilitation and servicing fees-capital light | 696,985 | 515,062 | 70,563 | 3,213,955 | 2,116,797 | 290,000 | |||||||
| Referral services fees | 446,486 | 907,207 | 124,287 | 950,016 | 2,842,637 | 389,440 | |||||||
| Other services fees | 103,769 | 170,483 | 23,356 | 387,496 | 487,195 | 66,745 | |||||||
| Total net revenue | 4,495,503 | 4,482,252 | 614,066 | 16,290,027 | 17,165,656 | 2,351,685 | |||||||
| Facilitation, origination and servicing | 731,787 | 734,659 | 100,648 | 2,659,912 | 2,900,704 | 397,395 | |||||||
| Funding costs | 161,016 | 126,841 | 17,377 | 645,445 | 590,935 | 80,958 | |||||||
| Sales and marketing | 551,590 | 523,936 | 71,779 | 1,939,885 | 1,725,877 | 236,444 | |||||||
| General and administrative | 108,037 | 156,061 | 21,380 | 421,076 | 449,505 | 61,582 | |||||||
| Provision for loans receivable | 639,886 | 598,353 | 81,974 | 2,151,046 | 2,773,323 | 379,944 | |||||||
| Provision for financial assets receivable | 148,198 | 63,251 | 8,665 | 386,090 | 296,857 | 40,669 | |||||||
| Provision for accounts receivable and contract assets | 91,105 | 77,450 | 10,611 | 175,799 | 421,481 | 57,743 | |||||||
| Provision for contingent liabilities | 784,323 | 311,372 | 42,658 | 3,053,810 | 478,404 | 65,541 | |||||||
| Total operating costs and expenses | 3,215,942 | 2,591,923 | 355,092 | 11,433,063 | 9,637,086 | 1,320,276 | |||||||
| Income from operations | 1,279,561 | 1,890,329 | 258,974 | 4,856,964 | 7,528,570 | 1,031,409 | |||||||
| Interest income, net | 46,970 | 74,951 | 10,268 | 217,307 | 237,015 | 32,471 | |||||||
| Foreign exchange (loss) gain | (815 | ) | 2,680 | 367 | 2,356 | 1,512 | 207 | ||||||
| Other income, net | 5,209 | (35,251 | ) | (4,829 | ) | 230,936 | 125,325 | 17,169 | |||||
| Investment loss | – | – | – | (30,112 | ) | – | – | ||||||
| Income before income tax expense | 1,330,925 | 1,932,709 | 264,780 | 5,277,451 | 7,892,422 | 1,081,256 | |||||||
| Income taxes expense | (223,237 | ) | (20,042 | ) | (2,746 | ) | (1,008,874 | ) | (1,644,306 | ) | (225,269 | ) | |
| Net income | 1,107,688 | 1,912,667 | 262,034 | 4,268,577 | 6,248,116 | 855,987 | |||||||
| Net loss attributable to noncontrolling interests | 4,052 | 3,970 | 544 | 16,759 | 16,198 | 2,219 | |||||||
| Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of the Company | 1,111,740 | 1,916,637 | 262,578 | 4,285,336 | 6,264,314 | 858,206 | |||||||
| Net income per ordinary share attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. | |||||||||||||
| Basic | 3.51 | 6.70 | 0.92 | 13.36 | 21.02 | 2.88 | |||||||
| Diluted | 3.44 | 6.62 | 0.91 | 13.04 | 20.64 | 2.83 | |||||||
| Net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. | |||||||||||||
| Basic | 7.02 | 13.40 | 1.84 | 26.72 | 42.04 | 5.76 | |||||||
| Diluted | 6.88 | 13.24 | 1.82 | 26.08 | 41.28 | 5.66 | |||||||
| Weighted average shares used in calculating net income per ordinary share | |||||||||||||
| Basic | 316,325,750 | 285,872,913 | 285,872,913 | 320,749,805 | 298,012,150 | 298,012,150 | |||||||
| Diluted | 323,305,948 | 289,427,077 | 289,427,077 | 328,508,945 | 303,449,864 | 303,449,864 | |||||||
| Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows | |||||||||||||
| (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”) | |||||||||||||
| except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted) | |||||||||||||
| Three months ended December 31, | Year ended December 31, | ||||||||||||
| 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | ||||||||
| RMB | RMB | USD | RMB | RMB | USD | ||||||||
| Net cash provided by operating activities | 2,351,791 | 3,051,606 | 418,067 | 7,118,350 | 9,343,311 | 1,280,027 | |||||||
| Net cash used in investing activities | (1,885,694 | ) | (945,611 | ) | (129,548 | ) | (11,147,789 | ) | (7,994,081 | ) | (1,095,184 | ) | |
| Net cash (used in) provided by financing activities | (911,621 | ) | (1,873,516 | ) | (256,671 | ) | 1,066,458 | (2,114,463 | ) | (289,680 | ) | ||
| Effect of foreign exchange rate changes | (877 | ) | 31,464 | 4,311 | 9,615 | 12,036 | 1,649 | ||||||
| Net (decrease) increase in cash and cash equivalents | (446,401 | ) | 263,943 | 36,159 | (2,953,366 | ) | (753,197 | ) | (103,188 | ) | |||
| Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash, beginning of period | 8,005,398 | 6,541,857 | 896,231 | 10,512,363 | 7,558,997 | 1,035,578 | |||||||
| Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash, end of period | 7,558,997 | 6,805,800 | 932,390 | 7,558,997 | 6,805,800 | 932,390 | |||||||
| Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive (Loss)/Income | ||||
| (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”) | ||||
| except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted) | ||||
| Three months ended December 31, | ||||
| 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | ||
| RMB | RMB | USD | ||
| Net income | 1,107,688 | 1,912,667 | 262,034 | |
| Other comprehensive income, net of tax of nil: | ||||
| Foreign currency translation adjustment | (3,606 | ) | 145,610 | 19,948 |
| Other comprehensive (loss) income | (3,606 | ) | 145,610 | 19,948 |
| Total comprehensive income | 1,104,082 | 2,058,277 | 281,982 | |
| Comprehensive loss attributable to noncontrolling interests | 4,052 | 3,970 | 544 | |
| Comprehensive income attributable to ordinary shareholders | 1,108,134 | 2,062,247 | 282,526 | |
| Year ended December 31, | ||||
| 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | ||
| RMB | RMB | USD | ||
| Net income | 4,268,577 | 6,248,116 | 855,987 | |
| Other comprehensive income, net of tax of nil: | ||||
| Foreign currency translation adjustment | 17,118 | 46,534 | 6,375 | |
| Other comprehensive income | 17,118 | 46,534 | 6,375 | |
| Total comprehensive income | 4,285,695 | 6,294,650 | 862,362 | |
| Comprehensive loss attributable to noncontrolling interests | 16,759 | 16,198 | 2,219 | |
| Comprehensive income attributable to ordinary shareholders | 4,302,454 | 6,310,848 | 864,581 | |
| Unaudited Reconciliations of GAAP and Non-GAAP Results | |||||
| (Amounts in thousands of Renminbi (“RMB”) and U.S. dollars (“USD”) | |||||
| except for number of shares and per share data, or otherwise noted) | |||||
| Three months ended December 31, | |||||
| 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | |||
| RMB | RMB | USD | |||
| Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Net Income to Net Income | |||||
| Net income | 1,107,688 | 1,912,667 | 262,034 | ||
| Add: Share-based compensation expenses | 42,572 | 59,720 | 8,182 | ||
| Non-GAAP net income | 1,150,260 | 1,972,387 | 270,216 | ||
| GAAP net income margin | 24.6 | % | 42.7 | % | |
| Non-GAAP net income margin | 25.6 | % | 44.0 | % | |
| Net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. | 1,111,740 | 1,916,637 | 262,578 | ||
| Add: Share-based compensation expenses | 42,572 | 59,720 | 8,182 | ||
| Non-GAAP net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. | 1,154,312 | 1,976,357 | 270,760 | ||
| Weighted average ADS used in calculating net income per ordinary share for both GAAP and non-GAAP EPS -diluted | 161,652,974 | 144,713,538 | 144,713,538 | ||
| Net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted | 6.88 | 13.24 | 1.82 | ||
| Non-GAAP net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted | 7.14 | 13.66 | 1.87 | ||
| Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Income from operations to Income from operations | |||||
| Income from operations | 1,279,561 | 1,890,329 | 258,974 | ||
| Add: Share-based compensation expenses | 42,572 | 59,720 | 8,182 | ||
| Non-GAAP Income from operations | 1,322,133 | 1,950,049 | 267,156 | ||
| GAAP operating margin | 28.5 | % | 42.2 | % | |
| Non-GAAP operating margin | 29.4 | % | 43.5 | % | |
| Year ended December 31, | |||||
| 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | |||
| RMB | RMB | USD | |||
| Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Net Income to Net Income | |||||
| Net income | 4,268,577 | 6,248,116 | 855,987 | ||
| Add: Share-based compensation expenses | 185,604 | 167,613 | 22,963 | ||
| Non-GAAP net income | 4,454,181 | 6,415,729 | 878,950 | ||
| GAAP net income margin | 26.2 | % | 36.4 | % | |
| Non-GAAP net income margin | 27.3 | % | 37.4 | % | |
| Net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. | 4,285,336 | 6,264,314 | 858,206 | ||
| Add: Share-based compensation expenses | 185,604 | 167,613 | 22,963 | ||
| Non-GAAP net income attributable to shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. | 4,470,940 | 6,431,927 | 881,169 | ||
| Weighted average ADS used in calculating net income per ordinary share for both GAAP and non-GAAP EPS -diluted | 164,254,473 | 151,724,932 | 151,724,932 | ||
| Net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted | 26.08 | 41.28 | 5.66 | ||
| Non-GAAP net income per ADS attributable to ordinary shareholders of Qifu Technology, Inc. -diluted | 27.22 | 42.39 | 5.81 | ||
| Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Income from operations to Income from operations | |||||
| Income from operations | 4,856,964 | 7,528,570 | 1,031,409 | ||
| Add: Share-based compensation expenses | 185,604 | 167,613 | 22,963 | ||
| Non-GAAP Income from operations | 5,042,568 | 7,696,183 | 1,054,372 | ||
| GAAP operating margin | 29.8 | % | 43.9 | % | |
| Non-GAAP operating margin | 31.0 | % | 44.8 | % | |
Source: University of South Australia
17 March 2025
Pork accounts for at least 60% of all meat eaten in China, but its popularity exacts a heavy toll on the environment that has proven tricky to resolve until now.
A new study by Chinese and Australian researchers has identified a sustainable solution to mitigating excessive amounts of copper found in the 3.8 billion tons of pig manure turned into organic fertiliser to increase crop yields.
Although an essential nutrient in small doses, high concentrations of copper – added to pig feed to promote growth – is toxic to plants, soil, water and humans.
Researchers from China’s Fujian Normal University and the University of South Australia have demonstrated that adding green-synthesised iron nanoparticles (G-nFe) to pig manure neutralises the amount of bioavailable copper in piggery effluent, reducing the environmental risks.
China has regulations limiting the amount of copper allowed in pig feed, but the scale of livestock farming keeps increasing to feed a population of 1.4 billion people, making it difficult to control the huge amount of manure and sewage released into the environment.
Experiments undertaken by researchers showed that adding G-nFe to pig manure compost reduced exchangeable cooper by 66.8%, carbonate-bound copper by 47.5%, and iron-manganese oxide-bound copper by 15.4%.
“This process was able to convert free copper into a less bioavailable form, reducing the potential for uptake by plants,” according to UniSA environmental chemist, Associate Professor Gary Owens, who was part of the study.
Residual copper levels initially increased by a third in the first five days before declining by over 60.9% over the full composting period.
The study findings have recently been published in the journal Science of the Total Environment.
China processes approximately 628 million pigs annually, making it the world’s largest pork producer.
Nearly half of the 3.8 billion tons of the resulting pig manure is inadequately treated, researchers say, and the heavy metal and organic pollutants are causing widespread environmental contamination.
While pig manure has traditionally been valued s an inexpensive organic fertiliser for Chinese farmers, it is increasingly posing a serious problem due to the heavy metal contamination, posing a challenge for both government and researchers seeking economically viable solutions.
Green synthesised iron nanoparticles have been widely used to remediate water and soil contamination due to its cost-effectiveness, low toxicity, and strong absorption rates.
However, this is the first study to explore its use in organic compost to remediate heavy metal pollution.
“This research presents a significant step forward in addressing heavy metal contamination in agricultural waste,” according to Assoc Prof Owens.
“By using green-synthesised iron nanoparticles, we can not only improve the safety of composted pig manure, but also contribute to more sustainable farming practices.”
The researchers plan to test G-nFe’s efficiency in larger composting systems using fresh pig manure, hoping to encourage stakeholders in the livestock and composting sectors to adopt the process.
A video explaining the research is available at https://youtu.be/CoEz82qlSq8
Notes for editors
“Enhanced Copper Passivation in Pig Manure Composting through Iron Nanoparticle Amendment” is authored by researchers from Fujian Polytechnic Normal University, Fujian Key Laboratory of Pollution Control & Resource Reuse, and the University of South Australia. DOI: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2024.177950
The University of South Australia and the University of Adelaide are joining forces to become Australia’s new major university – Adelaide University. Building on the strengths, legacies and resources of two leading universities, Adelaide University will deliver globally relevant research at scale, innovative, industry-informed teaching and an outstanding student experience. Adelaide University will open its doors in January 2026. Find out more on the Adelaide University website.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Media contact: Candy Gibson M: +61 434 605 142 E: candy.gibson@unisa.edu.au
Researcher contact: Associate Professor Gary Owens E: gary.owens@unisa.edu.au
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Janet Davey, PhD Candidate, Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian National University
Including pronouns in introductions, your email signature or your social media bio may seem like a minor detail. Pronouns are just small words we use in place of names all the time. But, like names, pronouns have personal significance. They say something about who we are.
Trans, nonbinary and gender-diverse people face many issues more pressing than pronouns, including health and educational disparities and disproportionately higher rates of abuse, violence and discrimination. Getting pronouns right is a simple thing everyone can do to show respect.
Linguistic shifts towards gender inclusivity are occurring worldwide, and the use of gender-neutral or inclusive pronouns is not a new nor exclusively Western phenomenon.
Chinese, one of the world’s oldest languages and spoken by more than one billion people, illustrates how languages adapt to reflect shifting understanding of gender. Its pronoun system may be on the cusp of significant change.
In my newly published research, I’ve explored what is happening with Chinese third-person pronouns.
The modern Chinese pronoun system is fascinating for two reasons.
First, gendered pronouns have only been part of the Chinese language for 100 years: the feminine pronoun 她 (she) was only adopted in the 1920s.
Second, although there are now distinct Chinese characters for “he”, 他, and “she”, 她, these are both pronounced tā in Mandarin. You can have a whole conversation about someone without revealing their gender.
The lack of gender-distinct pronouns in spoken Mandarin has prompted calls for written Chinese to follow suit. Queer Chinese speakers have proposed several gender-inclusive pronouns that would be pronounced tā, just like 他 (he) and 她 (she).
These include the romanised form “TA” and new Chinese characters 「⿰无也」 and 「⿰㐅也」. These new characters might look strange: they are written like this to clarify that they should be read as one Chinese character. Currently, they take up the space of two Chinese characters because they are not yet in Unicode and cannot be typed properly.
Other people hope to see the now-masculine 他 regain its original function as an ungendered pronoun.
To understand how Chinese pronouns are changing, I surveyed more than 100 queer Chinese speakers across 12 countries. I asked survey respondents, a third of whom were nonbinary or otherwise gender-diverse, about their pronoun preferences and perceptions. I also analysed how pronouns are used in a large database of contemporary Chinese texts.
My research found gender-inclusive pronouns accounted for about a quarter of first-choice pronouns, and nearly half of all pronouns used by survey respondents. TA was overwhelmingly preferred by gender-diverse individuals (70%), with the English “they” (20%) the next most popular option.
While cisgender and transgender men almost exclusively used masculine pronouns, cis and trans women showed significant openness to using gender-inclusive pronouns alongside feminine ones. After 她 (she), TA was the second most common pronoun for women (40%) and second most common overall (17%).
Notably, 他 (he) was not used by any women or gender-diverse people, except one who considered it gender-neutral. This suggests reviving its original ungendered usage may be difficult.
TA emerged as the most recognised gender-inclusive pronoun, with nearly all respondents (97%) familiar with it regardless of their age, gender, region or language background. In contrast, fewer than 8% had encountered the new character-based pronouns 「⿰无也」 or「⿰㐅也」 and no one reported using them.
Survey participants were overwhelmingly positive about TA, with 63% expressing favourable views. As one respondent explained:
The look and feel is good, it suits people’s everyday pronunciation habits, and doesn’t create issues with having to specify someone’s gender.
TA functions similarly to English singular “they”. It works in two ways: as a gender-neutral pronoun when gender is unknown (like saying “someone left their umbrella”), and as a gender-inclusive pronoun specifically including gender-diverse people.
Many survey respondents called TA “respectful” and “inclusive” but also simply “convenient”.
However, some respondents were concerned TA is “untraditional” and “pollutes the Chinese language”.
Practical considerations for using emerging Chinese pronouns also extend to the technical challenges of typing new Chinese characters. Before a new character can be typed on computers or phones, it needs to be officially encoded in Unicode, the global standard for digital text.
My research shows this requirement is strongly influencing which emerging Chinese pronouns can gain traction.
While some survey respondents hoped to see a gender-inclusive Chinese character adopted, they weren’t optimistic about 「⿰无也」or 「⿰㐅也」 becoming mainstream.
As one noted:
「⿰无也」is good, but it’s hard to type and it takes a long time to explain.
TA is currently the most popular emerging Chinese gender-inclusive pronoun, crucially because it mimics how people use tā in spoken Mandarin.
It is already part of people’s vocabulary, and already used (at least as a gender-neutral pronoun) by mainstream Chinese media and on online platforms.
Unlike other recently proposed pronouns, TA is versatile, user-friendly and easily understandable for queer and non-queer Chinese speakers alike. This makes TA a strong contender for widespread adoption into contemporary Chinese.
Like the introduction of a Chinese feminine pronoun 她 (she) in the 1920s, the emergence of TA as a gender-inclusive pronoun in the 2020s is about recognising a wider spectrum of identities.
Pronouns are not a political statement, just a personal statement. When you use someone’s correct pronouns, you’re saying, “I see you, and I respect who you are”. That’s something worth talking about, in any language.
Janet Davey is supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.
– ref. Chinese only introduced a feminine pronoun in the 1920s. Now, it might adopt a gender-inclusive one – https://theconversation.com/chinese-only-introduced-a-feminine-pronoun-in-the-1920s-now-it-might-adopt-a-gender-inclusive-one-221013
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olga Boichak, Senior Lecturer in Digital Cultures, Australian Research Council DECRA fellow, University of Sydney
More than three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a 30-day ceasefire between the two warring countries may be imminent. But much more needs to happen before a just and lasting peace is achieved.
The Russian-Ukraine war is one of the most visible, analysed and documented wars in human history. Since the night of February 24 2022, millions of Ukrainian citizens, military personnel, journalists, officials and civil society activists have shared first-hand eyewitness accounts, updates, commentaries and opinions on the war.
Around the world, many online communities have also sprung into action to counter Russian propaganda and raise awareness of what is happening inside Ukraine.
We have been studying these communities for the past three years, conducting hours of interviews with members and observing their activity on social media. To conduct much of this research and connect with members, we had to join some of these communities – a common requirement for researchers working in online settings.
Our work reveals a range of skills and strategies activists use in the online fight against Russia. More broadly, it shows how social media users can mobilise during times of war and other international crises and have a material impact offline.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by online disinformation and propaganda campaigns. The aims of these campaigns are to sow discord, distrust and dismay among both Ukrainian and international audiences by, for example, depicting Ukraine as a failed state ruled by Nazis.
Ukraine responded by launching its own information operations to counter Russian propaganda, appeal for help from the world and maintain the security of its defensive operations.
In some cases, social media platforms have aided the Russian cause. At the same time, they have suppressed evidence of war crimes.
For example, in the first year of the Russian invasion, independent investigative journalism organisations such as Disclose documented thousands of war crimes committed by Russian soldiers against Ukrainian civilians. These crimes included murder, torture, physical and sexual violence, forced relocation, looting, and damage to civilian infrastructure such as schools and hospitals.
Much of this content included graphic imagery, violence and offensive language. As a result, it was permanently removed from platforms such as Instagram and YouTube.
On the other hand, content containing disinformation evaded moderation. For example, a 2023 investigation by the BBC revealed thousands of fake TikTok accounts created as part of a Russian propaganda campaign spreading lies about Ukrainian officials.
This often led to a distorted information environment online. Russian disinformation was visible, while the true extent of Russian violence against Ukrainians was hidden.
In this context, thousands of internet users formed online communities to creatively support Ukraine without attracting the attention of content moderators.
This isn’t new or unique to the war in Ukraine. For example, in 2019, US TikToker Feroza Aziz shared a makeup tutorial in which she subtly raised awareness of China’s treatment of the Uyghurs – a topic that is often suppressed on the Chinese-owned platform.
One of the most prominent and well-known online communities that emerged following Russia’s invasion was the North Atlantic Fella Organisation.
It started in May 2022 when a young man with the online name Kama mashed up a Reddit meme of a Shiba Inu dog nicknamed Cheems and a picture of a dilapidated Russian tank. This was a celebration of a Ukrainian battlefront victory. It was only intended to mock Russia.
But as Kama changed his profile picture to the meme, the trend started spreading quickly to his followers on X (formerly Twitter). They quickly grew into an online collective dedicated to fighting Russia online. Members – or “fellas”, as they are known – from many regions around the world were brought together by its rituals using internet and popular culture memes.
In many similar posts across Facebook, X and TikTok, users share selfies or other images to achieve high visibility while calling followers to action. In most cases, this involves raising funds for urgent military or humanitarian efforts to benefit Ukraine.
Another common strategy is storytelling. Some users share amusing or ridiculous anecdotes from their lives before closing with a donation request.
These requests often have a clear target and beneficiary. They are also often time-sensitive. For example, they may be aimed at purchasing a particular model of a drone for a particular brigade of Ukraine’s armed forces that will be delivered to the battlefront within days.
Through collaborations with Ukraine’s official fundraising platform, the North Atlantic Fella Organisation has collected more than US$700,000 towards Ukraine’s defence.
Members of the North Atlantic Fella Organisation also try to combat Russian propaganda and disinformation.
Instead of arguing in good faith with highly visible disinformation-spreading accounts (often controlled by the Russian government), members try to derail the disinformation campaigns. They highlight their ridiculousness by responding with memes and jokes. They call this practice “shitposting”.
People spreading Russian disinformation often find themselves annoyed by the swarms of “meme dogs” in their replies. This has led some to respond aggressively. In turn, this has allowed North Atlantic Fella Organisation members to report them for violation of X’s terms of service and have their accounts suspended, as our forthcoming research documents.
However, from late 2022 onward, North Atlantic Fella Organisation members we interviewed as a part of our research reported decreased effectiveness of X’s response to problematic user conduct. This was soon after tech billionaire Elon Musk bought the social media platform.
Despite this, members continue to support each other and develop playful tactics to ensure they remain visible on the platform.
It seems war will continue online for as long as Russia wages its war on Ukraine’s territory.
Olga Boichak has received funding from the Australian Research Council. She is a director of the Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia and an executive committee member of the Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia and New Zealand. She has been a member of the North Atlantic Fella Organisation since 2022 for research purposes.
Kateryna Kasianenko has been a member of the North Atlantic Fella Organisation since 2022 for research purposes.
– ref. Three years after Russia’s invasion, a global online army is still fighting for Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/three-years-after-russias-invasion-a-global-online-army-is-still-fighting-for-ukraine-251480
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Aisha Ahmad, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Toronto
Prime Minister Mark Carney has vowed Canada will never be a 51st American state and has called on Canada to present a united front to defend against United States President Donald Trump’s escalating attacks on Canada’s economy and sovereignty.
Most Canadians are already on board. Provincial premiers have committed to defending against tariffs, and recent polling data shows 85 per cent of Canadians resolutely reject Trump’s threats of annexation.
Yet, despite this widespread patriotism, some Canadians may have a relative or friend in the contrarian 10 per cent of citizens who welcome annexation.
Why do these people support Trump?
The answer has less to do with politics or economic frustration than it does psychology. The reason some Canadians are reacting positively to Trump’s threats is because cognitive biases often prevent human beings from accurately assessing shocks to their security environment.
Psychological biases are well-researched in international security scholarship, and I have witnessed their consequences first-hand in my work in conflict zones.
From peacekeepers to politicians to ordinary civilians, I have seen how cognitive biases can cause rational, intelligent people to ignore valuable evidence, even at great peril.
Humans often react to unsettling evidence by denying, minimizing or re-interpreting the information to restore their cognitive ease. Everyone in a conflict-prone part of the world experiences cognitive distortions and denial at some point. Psychological security often overrides physical security.
But these biases are dangerous. They undermine decision-making, slow down reaction times and cause people to believe dangerous things that make them unsafe.
The tricky part is that challenging a person’s denial can provoke defensiveness, even rage. But allowing denial to persist leaves them dangerously unprepared to face real-world threats.
On balance, the safer choice is to rip off these psychological Band-aids.
Except for a small percentage of extremists, the 10 per cent who are in favour of American annexation are ordinary Canadians. What makes them different are two interrelated cognitive biases: confirmation bias and belief perseverance.
For Canadians who hold Trump in high esteem, acknowledging his threats creates cognitive dissonance. Some people find dissonance so distressing that it feels easier to reject or reinterpret the contrary information in a way that protects prior-held ideas and restores cognitive ease.
These confirmation biases allow the 10 per cent to redefine the word “annexation” to mean something else, such as peaceful political unification. That imagined definition turns Trump’s threat into a friendly proposal leading to greater prosperity and security.
That reinterpretation may reduce psychological distress, but it’s delusional.
Political unification is a non-coercive and consent-based process, wherein parties agree to incorporation through referendum, typically producing an all new government. Trump is proposing unilateral annexation, which is the hostile and illegal seizure of a sovereign state’s territory and the subjugation of its population.
Annexation is not marriage. It’s rape.
Unilateral annexation is so inherently violent that its prohibition in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is considered the legal cornerstone of the post-Second World War international order.
As Trump, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping each champion annexing nearby sovereign nations in the name of greatness, that international order is now crumbling. If the laws, norms and institutions preventing annexation collapse, it opens the door to invasions, insurgencies and even global war.
Read more:
Why annexing Canada would destroy the United States
Many of the 10 per cent are simply unaware of what “annexation” truly means, and could rationally change their position once they understand the facts. But a smaller subset of that group may reject the evidence entirely.
Belief perseverance causes some people to aggressively hold their original position, even when presented with disconfirming evidence.
While denial helps them feel safe in the moment, it also makes them dangerously unprepared to deal with real threats.
Patriotic “elbows up” Canadians must also be wary of denial. For them, the issue is not identifying the threats, but comprehending their full implications.
Even among informed citizens, NATO, NORAD and the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance are not easy to relate to. Trade wars show up on grocery bills, but these defence organizations keep peace in the background, which is harder to notice.
Canadians may intellectually understand that North American security is deteriorating, but that crisis may not seem as real as tariffs.
This is called “normalcy bias,” a psychological tendency to minimize the probability of threats or the dangers they pose, which delays protective action. Normalcy and optimism biases are why many people fail to evacuate quickly when they are forewarned about wildfires, hurricanes, earthquakes and even wars.
Slow reactions are not caused by stupidity or laziness. Research shows that the majority people respond inefficiently to warnings of forthcoming disasters. I have witnessed this bias in conflict zones and even experienced its effects myself. I can run 10 kilometres in about an hour, but when the Taliban attacked a bazaar less than 10 kilometres from my flat, it still felt far away.
Why? Because security threats don’t feel close until your windows start to shake.
While a military invasion is not imminent, Trump’s threats are so extreme that they warrant immediate action to improve Canadian defence. The time to take protective action is before windows start shaking.
For the majority of Canadians who already take Trump’s threats seriously, the first step in countering the normalcy bias is to pay attention to new risks and fractures in existing security co-operation.
With that evidence, they can initiate a national conversation about how to reduce vulnerabilities and improve resilience and defence.
There is no time to argue with people who remain cognitively confused. The majority of Canadians are ready to have a laser-focused discussion about the real security challenges on the horizon.
The good news is that Canada can fortify its security and deter threats in this perilous new world.
The range of options may not be as comfortable as the bygone era of friendly alliances and NATO supremacy. But through intelligent debate, Canadians can develop realistic new approaches to national defence, and quickly.
Acceptance and adaptation are the keys to survival.
Aisha Ahmad receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
– ref. Why some Canadians are in denial about Donald Trump – https://theconversation.com/why-some-canadians-are-in-denial-about-donald-trump-251893
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Donrich Thaldar, Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal
In the digital economy, data is more than just information – it is an asset with immense economic and strategic value. Yet, despite its significance, a fundamental legal question remains unresolved: Can data be owned? While privacy laws worldwide focus on protecting individuals’ rights over their personal data, they often sidestep the issue of ownership. This has led to legal uncertainty, particularly in South Africa, where the Protection of Personal Information Act (Popia) grants data subjects various rights over their personal information but does not explicitly address ownership.
This gap in legal clarity raises pressing questions: If personal data – such as private health information – exists within a vast and ever-growing digital landscape, can it be owned? And if so, who holds the rightful claim?
Legal academic Donrich Thaldar, whose research focuses on data governance, explores these questions in a recent academic article. He unpacks his findings for The Conversation Africa.
In today’s digital economy, data is the most valuable asset – it’s often referred to as “the new oil”. Whether in commerce, research, or social interactions, the ability to generate, use and trade with data is central to economic competitiveness.
If data ownership is not clearly established, it could stifle innovation and investment. Companies require legal certainty to operate effectively in a knowledge-driven economy.
Countries have taken different legal approaches to tackling the question of who owns data. China, for instance, formally recognises the proprietary rights of data generators, meaning that businesses and individuals who generate data have legally defined rights over its use and commercialisation. This provides legal support for the country’s digital industries.
In the past, the South African Information Regulator has taken the position that personal information is automatically owned by the data subject – the person to whom the data relates – rather than by the entity generating the data. In this view, the rights created by Popia imply that data subjects themselves are the owners of their personal data, and nobody else.
I suggest that this stance is legally flawed, as it conflates two different branches of the law: privacy law and property law. Moreover, it could severely disrupt the digital economy. The digital economy depends on data as a tradeable asset – it must be capable of being sold, licensed and commercialised like any other economic object. If ownership must always be with data subjects, businesses face uncertainty in using and monetising data. Uncertainty stifles innovation, discourages investment, and undermines South Africa’s digital competitiveness.
Ownership is a concept in property law, not privacy law. Therefore, to answer the data ownership question, we need to look for answers in property law.
Property law governs the relationship between subjects (legal persons) and objects (things external to the body, whether physical or not). Ownership is about the rights that a subject has over an object. For an object to be capable of being owned, it must be valuable, useful, and – importantly – capable of human control. A bottle of water meets these criteria, but the vast oceans do not, as they are not within human control.
Personal data in the abstract is like the water in the ocean – vast, uncontained, and beyond individual control. However, a digital instance of personal data, such as a computer file, is more like a bottled version of that water – defined and subject to human control. Just like digital money and other valuable digital assets, a specific instance of personal data meets all the requirements under South African common law for private ownership. Thus, in this sense personal data can be owned.
At first glance this might seem so, but no, not necessarily. The reason that it might seem so, is because some of the privacy rights created by Popia resemble ownership rights. For example, an owner’s agreement is required before someone else can use the owned object (e.g., loan for use and rent). Similarly, a data subject’s consent is in most cases required before personal data can be processed. Furthermore, the owner of a thing has the right to destroy it; similarly, a data subject typically has the right to have personal data deleted.
Do these privacy rights mean that data subjects actually own their personal data? I suggest not. Wearing a feather in one’s hat does not make one a bird. In the same way, privacy rights that resemble ownership rights do not mean that they constitute ownership. Ownership is acquired by following the rules of property law.
Because a newly created personal data instance has no antecedent legal object – in other words, it is not created out of another legal object – it initially belongs to no one. It is res nullius. Ownership of res nullius is acquired through appropriation, which requires two elements: control and the intention to own.
This means that the entity generating the data, such as a company or university collecting and recording it, is best positioned to acquire ownership. Since it already has control over the data, the only remaining requirement is simply the intention to be the owner.
If an entity like a university generates data and intends to own it, then – provided it is in control of that data – it will legally become the owner. This in principle allows the entity to use, license and trade the data as an economic asset. Indeed, it is prudent for data-generating entities, such as universities, to explicitly assert ownership over the data they produce. This not only establishes their legal rights with clarity but also serves as a safeguard against unauthorised access and misuse by malicious actors.
No, it should not. Ownership is always limited by other legal rules. For example, while I might own a car, I cannot drive it in any way I like – I must obey the rules of the road. Similarly, ownership of personal data is subject to strict limitations, particularly the privacy rights of data subjects under Popia.
However, it is also important to understand that privacy rights apply only to personal data. If personal data is de-identified, meaning that it can no longer be linked to the data subjects, privacy rights cease to apply. What remains are the ownership rights in the data itself. It can be a fully tradeable asset.
Recognising that a digital instance of personal data can be owned – and that the rightful owner is typically the data generator – does not undermine the privacy protections of Popia. Rather, it clarifies the legal landscape, ensuring that the rights of both data subjects and data generators are recognised and protected.
– Who owns digital data about you? South African legal scholar weighs up property and privacy rights
– https://theconversation.com/who-owns-digital-data-about-you-south-african-legal-scholar-weighs-up-property-and-privacy-rights-249741
Source: China State Council Information Office
This photo taken by a mobile phone shows smoke rising after an airstrike in Sanaa, Yemen, on March 15, 2025. (Photo by Mohammed Mohammed/Xinhua)
The death toll from U.S. overnight airstrikes on Houthi sites across northern Yemen has risen to 31, with at least 101 others wounded, Al Jazeera reported Sunday.
The death toll is expected to rise further as U.S. airstrikes continue across Yemen.
The casualties were reported across multiple locations, including the capital Sanaa, the northern province of Saada, a Houthi stronghold, as well as other Houthi-controlled Yemeni provinces.
The military campaign, which started Saturday evening, struck the Al-Jarraf residential neighborhood in northern Sanaa, followed by several bombardments on the Shoab residential area in eastern Sanaa, Houthi-run al-Masirah TV reported.
Later in the evening, fresh strikes hit sites in the northern part of the province’s namesake central city Saada, the group’s northern main stronghold.
According to local residents, the strikes in Sanna targeted ammunition and rocket depots near the Houthi-controlled state television station in the Al-Jarraf neighborhood. A white smoke plume could be seen rising from the neighborhood, and a series of explosions were triggered following the airstrikes, witnesses said.
This is the first military operation conducted by the U.S. military against the Houthi sites since U.S. President Donald Trump assumed office in January and redesignated the group as a “foreign terrorist organization.”
Trump posted on social media Truth Social that the aerial attacks on the “terrorists’ bases, leaders, and missile defenses were to protect American shipping, air and naval assets, and to restore navigational freedom.”
He also warned the Houthis that if they do not stop their attacks “starting today … hell will rain down upon you like nothing you have ever seen before.”
In the meantime, the U.S. Central Command posted footage on X showing warplanes taking off a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Red Sea, saying that it “initiated a series of operations consisting of precision strikes against Iran-backed Houthi targets across Yemen to defend American interests, deter enemies, and restore freedom of navigation.”
Following the U.S. airstrikes, the Houthis vowed to launch retaliatory attacks, saying “this aggression will not pass without a response,” and that the group is “fully prepared to confront escalation with escalation,” the Houthis’ political bureau said in a statement aired by al-Masirah TV.
On Tuesday, the Houthi group announced that it would resume launching attacks against any Israeli ship in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait until the Gaza Strip’s crossings are reopened and aid allowed in.
From November 2023 to Jan. 19, the Houthi group, which currently controls much of northern Yemen including the capital Sanaa, had launched dozens of drone and rocket attacks against Israel-linked ships and Israeli cities to show solidarity with Palestinians amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. The Houthis stopped their attacks on Jan. 19, when the Gaza ceasefire deal took effect.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Donrich Thaldar, Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal
In the digital economy, data is more than just information – it is an asset with immense economic and strategic value. Yet, despite its significance, a fundamental legal question remains unresolved: Can data be owned? While privacy laws worldwide focus on protecting individuals’ rights over their personal data, they often sidestep the issue of ownership. This has led to legal uncertainty, particularly in South Africa, where the Protection of Personal Information Act (Popia) grants data subjects various rights over their personal information but does not explicitly address ownership.
This gap in legal clarity raises pressing questions: If personal data – such as private health information – exists within a vast and ever-growing digital landscape, can it be owned? And if so, who holds the rightful claim?
Legal academic Donrich Thaldar, whose research focuses on data governance, explores these questions in a recent academic article. He unpacks his findings for The Conversation Africa.
In today’s digital economy, data is the most valuable asset – it’s often referred to as “the new oil”. Whether in commerce, research, or social interactions, the ability to generate, use and trade with data is central to economic competitiveness.
If data ownership is not clearly established, it could stifle innovation and investment. Companies require legal certainty to operate effectively in a knowledge-driven economy.
Countries have taken different legal approaches to tackling the question of who owns data. China, for instance, formally recognises the proprietary rights of data generators, meaning that businesses and individuals who generate data have legally defined rights over its use and commercialisation. This provides legal support for the country’s digital industries.
In the past, the South African Information Regulator has taken the position that personal information is automatically owned by the data subject – the person to whom the data relates – rather than by the entity generating the data. In this view, the rights created by Popia imply that data subjects themselves are the owners of their personal data, and nobody else.
I suggest that this stance is legally flawed, as it conflates two different branches of the law: privacy law and property law. Moreover, it could severely disrupt the digital economy. The digital economy depends on data as a tradeable asset – it must be capable of being sold, licensed and commercialised like any other economic object. If ownership must always be with data subjects, businesses face uncertainty in using and monetising data. Uncertainty stifles innovation, discourages investment, and undermines South Africa’s digital competitiveness.
Ownership is a concept in property law, not privacy law. Therefore, to answer the data ownership question, we need to look for answers in property law.
Property law governs the relationship between subjects (legal persons) and objects (things external to the body, whether physical or not). Ownership is about the rights that a subject has over an object. For an object to be capable of being owned, it must be valuable, useful, and – importantly – capable of human control. A bottle of water meets these criteria, but the vast oceans do not, as they are not within human control.
Personal data in the abstract is like the water in the ocean – vast, uncontained, and beyond individual control. However, a digital instance of personal data, such as a computer file, is more like a bottled version of that water – defined and subject to human control. Just like digital money and other valuable digital assets, a specific instance of personal data meets all the requirements under South African common law for private ownership. Thus, in this sense personal data can be owned.
At first glance this might seem so, but no, not necessarily. The reason that it might seem so, is because some of the privacy rights created by Popia resemble ownership rights. For example, an owner’s agreement is required before someone else can use the owned object (e.g., loan for use and rent). Similarly, a data subject’s consent is in most cases required before personal data can be processed. Furthermore, the owner of a thing has the right to destroy it; similarly, a data subject typically has the right to have personal data deleted.
Do these privacy rights mean that data subjects actually own their personal data? I suggest not. Wearing a feather in one’s hat does not make one a bird. In the same way, privacy rights that resemble ownership rights do not mean that they constitute ownership. Ownership is acquired by following the rules of property law.
Because a newly created personal data instance has no antecedent legal object – in other words, it is not created out of another legal object – it initially belongs to no one. It is res nullius. Ownership of res nullius is acquired through appropriation, which requires two elements: control and the intention to own.
This means that the entity generating the data, such as a company or university collecting and recording it, is best positioned to acquire ownership. Since it already has control over the data, the only remaining requirement is simply the intention to be the owner.
If an entity like a university generates data and intends to own it, then – provided it is in control of that data – it will legally become the owner. This in principle allows the entity to use, license and trade the data as an economic asset. Indeed, it is prudent for data-generating entities, such as universities, to explicitly assert ownership over the data they produce. This not only establishes their legal rights with clarity but also serves as a safeguard against unauthorised access and misuse by malicious actors.
No, it should not. Ownership is always limited by other legal rules. For example, while I might own a car, I cannot drive it in any way I like – I must obey the rules of the road. Similarly, ownership of personal data is subject to strict limitations, particularly the privacy rights of data subjects under Popia.
However, it is also important to understand that privacy rights apply only to personal data. If personal data is de-identified, meaning that it can no longer be linked to the data subjects, privacy rights cease to apply. What remains are the ownership rights in the data itself. It can be a fully tradeable asset.
Recognising that a digital instance of personal data can be owned – and that the rightful owner is typically the data generator – does not undermine the privacy protections of Popia. Rather, it clarifies the legal landscape, ensuring that the rights of both data subjects and data generators are recognised and protected.
Donrich Thaldar receives funding from the NIH.
– ref. Who owns digital data about you? South African legal scholar weighs up property and privacy rights – https://theconversation.com/who-owns-digital-data-about-you-south-african-legal-scholar-weighs-up-property-and-privacy-rights-249741
Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense
Maintenance members assigned to a transport brigade with the air force under the Chinese PLA Northern Theater Command conduct pre-flight inspection on a helicopter before a nighttime search and rescue training exercise on March 3, 2025. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Yang Pan)
loading…
Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense
A water tanker and a troopship attached to a naval service group under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command practice alongside replenishment-at-sea during a recent multi-subject training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Xiang Guoliang and Wu Huanqing)
loading…
Source: China State Council Information Office 3
Myanmar authorities have seized 30.8 kg of heroin and 154,000 stimulant tablets in central Myanmar’s Mandalay region, the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) said on Saturday.
Acting on a tip-off, anti-narcotics police searched a vehicle in Pyigyitagon township of Mandalay region on March 9 and confiscated the narcotics, and arrested three suspects.
Three other suspects in connection with the case were later arrested.
The seized narcotics are approximately worth over 1 billion kyats (about 476,190 U.S. dollars).
The suspects have been charged under the country’s Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law, and further investigations were ongoing.
Source: China State Council Information Office 3
This photo taken by a mobile phone shows smoke rising after an airstrike in Sanaa, Yemen, on March 15, 2025. The U.S. warplanes on Saturday night launched airstrikes on several Houthi sites in Yemen’s capital Sanna and the northern province of Saada, killing at least 13, Houthi-run al-Masirah TV reported. (Photo by Mohammed Mohammed/Xinhua)
The U.S. warplanes on Saturday night launched airstrikes on several Houthi sites in Yemen’s capital Sanna and the northern province of Saada, killing at least 13, Houthi-run al-Masirah TV reported.
“This is an initial toll as the number of death could increase,” the TV cited the Houthi-run health ministry as saying, adding that at least nine others were injured.
The Houthi TV reported four airstrikes in the Al-Jarraf residential neighborhood in northern Sanaa and several other airstrikes on the Shoab residential neighborhood in eastern Sanaa.
Later in the evening, fresh strikes hit sites in the northern part of the province’s namesake central city Saada, the group’s northern main stronghold. No further details were provided by the television.
According to local residents, the strikes in Sanna targeted ammunition and rocket depots near the Houthi-controlled state television station in the Al-Jarraf neighborhood. White smoke plume could be seen rising from the neighborhood, and a series of explosions were triggered following the airstrikes, witnesses added.
Osama Sari, a Houthi official, wrote on X that the strikes on Al-Jarraf neighborhood also damaged parts of the Specialized Modern University near the Airport Road.
Another Houthi source told Xinhua that the airstrikes also targeted two houses of key Houthi leaders.
This is the first military operation conducted by the U.S. military against the Houthi sites since U.S. President Donald Trump assumed power in January and redesigned the group as a “foreign terrorist organization.”
Trump posted on social media Truth Social that the aerial attacks on the “terrorists’ bases, leaders, and missile defenses were to protect American shipping, air, and naval assets, and to restore navigational freedom.”
He also warned Houthis that if they do not stop their attacks “starting today… Hell will rain down upon you like nothing you have ever seen before.”
In the meantime, the U.S. Central Command posted footage on X showing warplanes taking off a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Red Sea, saying that it “initiated a series of operations consisting of precision strikes against Iran-backed Houthi targets across Yemen to defend American interests, deter enemies, and restore freedom of navigation.”
Following the U.S. airstrikes, the Houthis vowed to launch retaliatory attacks, saying “this aggression will not pass without a response,” and that the group is “fully prepared to confront escalation with escalation,” the Houthis’ political bureau said in a statement aired by al-Masirah TV.
On Tuesday, the Houthi group announced that it would resume launching attacks against any Israeli ship in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait until the crossings of Gaza Strip are reopened and aid allowed in.
From November 2023 to Jan. 19, the Houthi group, which currently controls much of northern Yemen including the capital Sanaa, had launched dozens of drone and rocket attacks against Israel-linked ships and the Israeli cities to show solidarity with Palestinians amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. The Houthis stopped their attacks on Jan. 19, when the Gaza ceasefire deal took effect.
Source: Minister for Trade
Andrew Clennell: The Trade Minister, Don Farrell, joins me now from Adelaide. Don Farrell, thanks for your time. You’re due to talk to the US Trade Ambassador tomorrow.
Minister for Trade: Pleased to be with you.
Andrew Clennell: And you spoke at two o’clock Friday morning to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. How did your chat with Mr Lutnick go and what are you hoping to achieve with Mr Greer?
Minister for Trade: Look, Andrew, I did speak with Commerce Secretary Lutnick. That’s the second contact we’ve had with one another since he just recently was appointed to that position. I obviously expressed my disappointment that we had not been able to reach an agreement over the suspension of tariffs on steel and aluminium. But I did say that there’s obviously a further review, and you’ve talked about some of the issues that potentially arise, that the U.S. Government is undertaking by the early part of April. I indicated to him that we want to continue to talk with them. I find that discussion is the best way to resolve these issues. Not retaliatory tariffs, but discussion. What we need to do, Andrew, is find out what it is that the Americans want in terms of this relationship between Australia and the United States and then make President Trump an offer he can’t refuse.
Andrew Clennell: And did Howard Lutnick give you any indication of what they might be after? Because obviously you offered them some form of critical minerals deal. Did he give any, any ray of light you had a chance? I mean, I think you’ve said that President Trump allowed Australia or the Prime Minister to believe there was a chance when there wasn’t. Has he given you any suggestion there’s a chance, or was he holding the line and saying, look, this is our America First policy, that’s it.
Minister for Trade: Look, it wasn’t a pessimistic conversation, I’m pleased to say, Andrew. but look, he gave, you know, no assurances about what might happen in the next round of negotiations. Our job is to sit down and continue to talk. I think the important thing here to understand, Andrew, is that when President Trump, in his first iteration, gave Australia an exemption to Prime Minister Turnbull, it was one of over 30 exemptions that the United States gave to a range of countries around the world. So, more than 30 countries, including most of our competitors in the American market, were able to get an exemption. On this occasion, not one country, not one country got an exemption on either steel or aluminium. Now, that’s obviously, we think that’s bad news. We think it’s bad news, obviously, for the companies that trade in Australia with the United States. It’s also bad news for the Americans because what that has done is simply pushed up the price of steel and aluminium in the US market and that has to have an impact both on, on inflation and on jobs. So, part of my job is to continue to put the arguments to the Americans that in fact, this is the wrong policy to adopt. We should actually be doing the opposite. We should be making more free trade, more fair trade, rather than less trade.
And of course, one of the things that we’ve done in government is diversify our trading relationship. So, we have new agreements with the United Kingdom, we’ve got new agreements with India. I think we’re just about to get another offer from the Indians to even expand our trading relationship with India. We’ve signed a new agreement with the United Arab Emirates. This is like dealing with the Woolies warehouse of the Middle East. If you can get your products into the United Arab Emirates, then you can get it all around the Middle East. On Tuesday night, I spoke with my Korean counterpart, Mr. Ahn, and we’ve got identical problems with the United States. Of course, they sell a lot more steel into the United States than we do. But we are talking about how we can expand our relationship with Korea so that we can sell more product into Korea.
So, it’s a two-pronged approach. Andrew, we are continuing the discussions with the United States. We’ll continue to discuss. We’re not going down the track of some countries in applying retaliatory tariffs. I don’t think that will work, it hasn’t worked for any other country, why would it work for us? We want to explain our position and we want to get those exemptions for Australian companies because it’s good for prosperity in the United States, but it’s also good for prosperity in Australia.
Andrew Clennell: Well, I think you’ve got Buckley’s chance of arguing free and fair trade to the Trump administration, to be frank Minister, but what’s the worst-case scenario here? What’s the worst-case scenario? $30 billion, our exports to the U.S. Could we lose it all?
Minister for Trade: Look, I don’t believe so, Andrew. And just on that first point you made, Buckley’s chance. When I came to this job three years ago, we had $20 billion worth of trade bans in China. People told me, look, you will never, never, ever get that trade back. At the end of last year, the last of the products that had been subject to those trade impediments, namely crayfish, we got back into China. And since then, in the first month of that new trade, we got $188 million of crayfish sold into China. You can reverse these decisions, Andrew, so, don’t give up on us just yet. You can get countries to realise. You can get countries if you keep talking to them and you keep making your arguments, which is exactly what I intend to do. If you keep making your arguments, you can in fact convince countries that the policies that they are adopting are in fact counterproductive, just as they were with China.
Andrew Clennell: Okay, but what’s the worst-case scenario? What’s the worst-case scenario here?
Minister for Trade: Look, I wish I could tell you exactly what the American Government is finally going to do. To be honest with you, I suspect they don’t even know themselves right now. They’re conducting this review. They’re conducting the review in respect of every single trade agreement they have. It’s not just Australia, it’s every country. And my job in the discussions that go on in this coming week and in the weeks ahead is to get the best result for Australian producers, and that’s what I intend to do. And it’ll only be by reaching out, by having discussions, by putting our point of view that we’re going to get an acceptable outcome here.
Andrew Clennell: In any of these discussions, do you talk about the prospect of a phone call between Prime Minister Albanese and President Trump?
Minister for Trade: Oh, that’s way above my pay grade, I’m afraid, Andrew.
Andrew Clennell: Is it though? Kevin Rudd asks.
Minister for Trade: Well, he’s the ambassador, of course he asks, and that’s the job of the ambassador to do that representation on behalf of the Australian Prime Minister.
Andrew Clennell: How many times has he asked, do you know?
Minister for Trade: No, I don’t know the answer to that question, Andrew. But you know, we were amongst the first countries to ring President Trump when he was elected and congratulated him. The Prime Minister did that. And we of course got a second phone call with him to express our concerns about the direction that he was taking in respect of tariffs.
To the best of my knowledge, we were the only country in the world where he said, I’m going to give some consideration to not applying these tariffs to you. Now, I know we didn’t get the exemption in the end, but we were the only country that at least got him to say, look, we’re going to give some consideration to this. Ultimately, the consideration was that they would not do it.
As I’ve said on Sky previously, the people around President Trump, particularly Mr. Navarro, I think, were determined that they weren’t going to go down the track that they went down last time. So, I mentioned before over 30 countries got exemptions for steel and aluminium. They were determined, the people around President Trump were determined not to go down that track again. They were going to apply the tariffs, the 25 per cent tariffs, and no country was going to get an exemption. But look, we will continue to talk. As I said, I’ve spoken to Commerce Secretary Lutnick on Friday morning, tomorrow US time, so, Tuesday morning, I think 7:30, I’m going to have my conversation with Jamieson Greer. We’re going to work out firstly what it is that the Americans want out of this arrangement, because it’s still not clear to me what it is that they are seeking. But once we find that out, we’ll work through this issue and we’ll work through it in Australia’s national interest.
Andrew Clennell: Why haven’t you been to the US, yourself?
Minister for Trade: Look, can I say this, Andrew, modern communications these days, a telephone call, a video conference, which is what I’ll be doing with Jamieson Greer, Ambassador Greer, on Tuesday, we’re getting our message across. After that first conversation between President Trump and Prime Minister Albanese, we embarked on a course of action which was determined in consultation with the officials in the United States about how best to progress our concerns about the introduction or the reintroduction of tariffs. We followed that. We followed that course of action and we followed it until last Wednesday when it became clear that the Americans were not going to give us an exemption. So, we had a plan. We had a plan for how we deal with this issue. We were hopeful, certainly based on early discussions, that we would get a successful result here. In the event that that didn’t happen. But we’re not giving up. We’re continuing the talks. And in fact, in lots of ways, the talks will be beefed up in the weeks and the months ahead as we try and resolve all of these issues, but these are not easy issues, Andrew.
Andrew Clennell: No, they’re not. But Peter Dutton says you haven’t got the relationships. He’s pointed the finger at Kevin Rudd. The suggestion is Albanese, the Prime Minister, was seen as too close to Joe Biden. Penny Wong found out from the media that this had occurred. What do you say to all that? I mean, his contention as we go into an election campaign is their government would have better luck with the US Administration. What do you say to that?
Minister for Trade: Look, Peter Dutton couldn’t go two rounds with a revolving door Andrew. What happened? When we came to government, there were $20 billion worth of tariffs and trade impediments with the Chinese. If Peter Dutton’s so good at building relationships and solving problems, they didn’t get a cent, they didn’t get a cent or a single tariff removed in that previous three years in government. We got the best result or the best response of any country in the world. We got a consideration by the President to review these tariffs. Now ok, it didn’t ultimately result in us getting the tariffs removed and we accept that. We accept that situation. I’d ask your listeners, who do you think is going to be better to negotiate with the United States? Somebody with a proven record of getting results or somebody, when they had the opportunity to get some results, did nothing. Did nothing. They did nothing.
Andrew Clennell: What would a tariff do to the beef industry?
Minister for Trade: It would certainly have a clearly a negative impact. The United States I think is, if it’s not the largest export market for our beef industry, it would have a significant impact. We are expanding our beef exports, our beef exports right now thanks to the Albanese Labor Government, are the best that they’ve ever been. We’re exporting more beef than we ever have. The significance, of course to the United States about our beef exports is that most of it goes into McDonald’s hamburgers. And if you push up the price of those beef exports by 25 per cent or 10 per cent or whatever the figure is, then you simply push up the price of hamburgers in the United States. It doesn’t make any sense, Andrew. It doesn’t make any sense at all.
Andrew Clennell: Sure.
Minister for Trade: You want to be pushing prices down. You don’t want to be pushing them up.
Andrew Clennell: Indeed. There’s also speculation the trade war could harm the PBS somehow and cause pharmaceutical prices to go up. How would that occur and what do you make of that speculation?
Minister for Trade: Well, it simply is speculation. That’s all it is, Andrew. I’ve not heard one comment from any person in the United States that refers to the PBS. We’ve got a terrific health system. We’re continuing to improve all the time. Minister Butler is always coming up with new ideas to improve our health system. The PBS is an essential part of our health system and there will be absolutely nothing that the Americans can do to impact on our health system or the PBS system. And we certainly, we certainly would not contemplate doing anything at any stage that makes our health system more expensive. We want to put downward pressure on the cost of health and we’re going to continue to do that, especially if we get re-elected in a few weeks’ time.
Andrew Clennell: It’s been reported the deal that Australia put on the table was access to our critical minerals like lithium, manganese, what’s the nature of that deal? Presumably America would still have to pay for the minerals. Would they get the minerals at a cheaper rate? Would they have the first right of refusal on the minerals? What are the minerals to be used for? Making mobile phones, electric cars and the like?
Minister for Trade: Yeah, look, Australia is very fortunate in the sense that we have either the largest or the second largest reserves of all critical minerals and rare earths in the world. Now, critical minerals are different from other minerals. If you go up to the Pilbara, you can see iron ore as far as the eye can see, Andrew. Critical minerals tend to be in much smaller deposits and they’re much deeper down. Two things about that. They are more expensive to extract and they take longer to dig out of the ground and they don’t last as long so you’ve got to keep finding new resources. What this means for what we were proposing to the Americans was continued and improved investment in getting access to those critical minerals. We’ve got some of the most sophisticated miners in Australia, Andrew. We’ve got a very sophisticated mining operation here, much more sophisticated than the Americans. But the thing we often don’t have is access to capital. So, the offer to the Americans was, look, we’ll work with you. You want these critical minerals, you want them for electric batteries in cars, you’ve mentioned some of the other things, mobile phones, all of these sorts of things. But the process of extraction is expensive, we need capital. We want to work with other countries. We want to particularly work, for instance, with the Europeans. We’ve made them some offers in this regard. It’s not about cheaper prices, it’s not about preferred access. It’s about ensuring that they’ve got a reliable supply chain to ensure that when they need these critical minerals, you’ve got a reliable country like Australia who can provide them.
Andrew Clennell: So, would that be Australian money or American money? When you talk about increased investment –
Minister for Trade: Both. Both.
Andrew Clennell: Okay. So, an Australian financial offer was put on the table?
Minister for Trade: No, it wasn’t a financial offer in that sense. It was a way forward to try and get support both in Australia and in the United States for extracting these critical minerals. So, if we’re going to go down the track of decarbonising our economies, this is the way we need to go. But it’s going to require investment, significant investment. The Australian Government is already making significant investments in this area. But to get to where we want to get to in terms of that net zero project, then we need more investment and –
Andrew Clennell: Do you see the hand of Elon Musk? Do you see the hand of Elon Musk in any of this? The keenness of the Americans for these critical minerals.
Minister for Trade: Well, look, they didn’t accept our offer. So, if Mr Musk was involved in this, then he doesn’t appear to have influenced the result, if that was what he was after. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Musk was not involved in any of these discussions that I –
Andrew Clennell: All right, no worries. We’re nearly out of time. Overnight, the PM reiterated in a meeting with European leaders he would consider sending peacekeepers to Ukraine if there was peace. That’ll be controversial with a lot of Australians because it’s not our region. We know Peter Dutton doesn’t support this. Is the PM trying to muscle up here after Peter Dutton has continually called him weak? What’s the motivation to get involved in this conflict?
Minister for Trade: Andrew, for the last 80 years, in other words, since the end of World War II, Australia has been involved in peacekeeping missions all the way around the world. We’ve come out right from day one, Prime Minister Albanese has been very clear and very strong on this, we support Ukraine. Ukraine’s fight for democracy. Ukraine’s fight for its sovereignty is Australia’s fight. It’s Australia’s fight. We’ve made significant financial contributions to Ukraine to ensure that they can defend themselves from this illegal and immoral monster, Putin, and we’ll continue to do that. And if Prime Minister Starmer says, look, will you contribute to peacekeeping? I think that’s the right thing to do. Look, it’s not all about popularity and so forth, but it’s the right thing to do. We want to see peace around the world. The best thing that Australia can do in terms of any international relationship is to support peace. And if we can make a contribution to that peacekeeping effort, then I think we should. And I think Mr. Dutton is completely on the wrong track here. Australians support the Ukrainian fight. I was on the steps of Parliament House just a couple of weeks ago with Premier Malinauskas. His background is Lithuanian. He knows exactly what happens if you don’t stand up to bullies like Putin. It’s in our interest to defend democracy in Ukraine. It’s in our interest to be part of a peacekeeping force when there’s peace.
Andrew Clennell: Finally, and briefly, there was something of a blow to the government late last week with the default market offer out, that Australians face price rises of up to 10 per cent on their power bills. Will the government’s electricity subsidy be extended and increased in the budget?
Minister for Trade: Well, you know the answer to that question, Andrew. You’ll have to ask the Treasurer, and you’ve only got a few more sleeps to find out what’s going to be in the next budget.
Andrew Clennell: Well, I might ask him on the show next week. Thanks very much, Don Farrell.
Minister for Trade: Nice talking with you Andrew.
Source: China State Council Information Office
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Saturday signed an order on the makeup of a delegation tasked with interacting with international partners on peace efforts.
According to the order published online, Andriy Yermak, head of Zelensky’s office, has been appointed to lead the delegation.
The team also includes Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Deputy Head of the President’s Office Pavlo Palisa.
Zelensky authorized Yermak to modify the delegation with Sybiha’s approval.
Earlier this week, Yermak, Sybiha, Umerov and Palisa had a meeting with a U.S. delegation in Saudi Arabia.
Source: China State Council Information Office
Hundreds of staffers at Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe and other outlets received a weekend email that they will be barred from their offices and should surrender press passes and equipment, local media reported Saturday.
The cuts followed an executive order by U.S. President Donald Trump on Friday, which listed U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), as part of “unnecessary” federal bureaucracy.
USAGM, VOA’s parent agency, employs about 3,500 staff and has an 886 million-U.S. dollar budget for 2024, according to its latest report to Congress.
The agency has severed all contracts for the privately incorporated international broadcasters it funds, including Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia, local media reported.
VOA director Michael Abramowitz said on social media that nearly his entire staff of 1,300 journalists, producers and assistants had been put on administrative leave.
The White House said the cuts would ensure “taxpayers are no longer on the hook for radical propaganda.”
Reports indicated that the decision is expected to face challenges, as Congress, not the president, has the constitutional power of the purse.
Source: China State Council Information Office 3
Audience enter the cinema for the Indonesian premiere of Chinese animated film Ne Zha 2 at CGV Grand Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia, March 15, 2025. (Xinhua/Xu Qin)
Chinese animated blockbuster “Ne Zha 2,” the highest-grossing animated film of all time, premiered in Jakarta, Indonesia, on Saturday, with a packed theater of eager moviegoers.
Throughout the screening, Indonesian moviegoers were fully immersed in the movie, responding with laughter, gasp, and applause. Notably, the audience was moved and hailed spontaneously, showing their excitement and appreciation.
After the screening, many young viewers gathered near the “Ne Zha 2” posters to film videos, eagerly recommending the movie to others.
Oscar Prajnaphalla, head of marketing at Warner Bros. Indonesia, the movie’s local distributor, expressed his admiration. “This is the first Chinese movie we have distributed, and I must say, ‘Ne Zha 2’ left a strong impression. The animation is top-notch, the production quality is outstanding, and the story is deeply engaging. It’s a film that truly captivates the audience.”
“Seeing today’s response, it’s clear that viewers were highly impressed by the animation and storytelling. I do not doubt that through word-of-mouth, ‘Ne Zha 2’ will attract even more moviegoers. We look forward to bringing more exceptional Chinese films to the Indonesian market in the future,” he added.
For many Indonesians, “Ne Zha 2” marks their first experience with Chinese animated movies. Local moviegoer Syarah Prasetyo described it as a visually stunning film that kept her engaged throughout.
“The plot twists kept me engaged, and the depiction of parental love resonated deeply with our culture, making it easy to connect with. The humor and emotional moments were well-balanced, making the entire viewing experience incredibly enjoyable. I genuinely look forward to seeing more outstanding Chinese movies at Indonesian cinemas,” she said.
“Ne Zha 2” will officially hit screens in Indonesia on March 21.
Source: China State Council Information Office 3
Participants pose for a group photo after a forum during the 2024 Tsinghua International Conference on Art & Design Education (ICADE 2024) in Milan, Nov. 16, 2024. [Photo courtesy of AADTHU]
Tsinghua University ranked No. 1 in Asia and No. 14 globally for arts and design, and No. 2 in Asia and No. 3 worldwide for art history in the 15th edition of the QS World University Rankings by Subject, released on March 12 by global higher education analytics firm Quacquarelli Symonds.
Both disciplines are part of the Academy of Arts & Design, Tsinghua University (AADTHU). Notably, the art and design discipline rose 10 places in the global rankings, while the art history climbed 2 places.
In its largest-ever subject rankings, Quacquarelli Symonds compared over 21,000 academic programs, taken by students at more than 1,700 universities across 100 countries and regions, spanning 55 subjects and five faculty areas. The Chinese mainland ranked third globally with 1,230 subjects listed, trailing only the United States and the United Kingdom.
According to AADTHU’s official website, the academy’s achievements are deeply rooted in its strong commitment to constructing an integrated interdisciplinary system and to pioneering internationalized education.
By leading the reform of global art education, AADTHU is crafting a new professional development blueprint with an open approach. It is deepening its strategy of integrating art and science, advancing the development of interdisciplinary talent, and fostering innovation in technology and design, cultivating professionals with expertise in both the sciences and humanities.
In 2024, the academy invited 44 professors from prestigious global institutions, alongside artists, designers and industry leaders, for short-term programs. These initiatives featured 30 lectures, eight courses and two workshops, drawing over 1,000 faculty and student participants. Beyond this, the academy hosted 42 distinguished international experts as keynote speakers at conferences it either organized or co-hosted.
Notable events from 2024 include an opening forum on the integration of art design and industry innovation in the era of artificial intelligence (AI) at Milan Academic Week in Milan, Italy, in January, as well as the 6th Art and Science International Symposium held in Beijing in March. Meanwhile, the 2024 Tsinghua International Conference on Art & Design Education (ICADE 2024), themed “New Dimensions: Imagination Beyond the Horizon,” and the exhibition “From the Seine to Guanghua Road: Modernization of Art Deco” were successfully held in Milan and Beijing, respectively, in November.
Further highlights from last year include the “Arts and Crafts Artworks Exhibition of AADTHU” held in Wakayama prefecture, Japan, and a special exhibition and international symposium on Dunhuang art research, which opened at the China-France Fashion Week in Paris, France. “Brilliance of Cooperation: The Olympic Art Exhibition of Tsinghua University” was also held in Lausanne, Switzerland, in October.
Additionally, Tsinghua University’s doctoral degree authorization points for the first-level disciplines of both art studies and design studies successfully passed an on-site evaluation in October by experts from peer higher education institutions. Earlier this year in January, the China Scientometrics and Bibliometrics Research Center of CNKI also named 11 faculty members from AADTHU as “2024 CNKI Highly Cited Scholars.” CNKI stands for China National Knowledge Infrastructure, a leading online academic database.
AADTHU offers a diverse range of disciplines across 10 departments, including textile and fashion design, ceramic design, visual communication design, environmental art design, industrial design, information art & design, painting, sculpture, arts and crafts, and art history. The academy also features specialized offices for research, international exchanges, and art galleries.
The academy’s website also showed in recent years, AADTHU has continued to enhance its international standards, strengthen global academic exchanges, and expand its influence in international art education. Its art and design discipline, among the earliest in China to grant master’s and doctoral degrees, consistently ranks first nationally, emphasizing interdisciplinary, innovative, and globally competent talent development. AADTHU’s Department of Art History has also ranked among the top in national evaluations, with over half of its graduates securing positions at universities, museums, and research institutions.
AADTHU pledges to use its expertise to support a global community with a shared future. Guided by the principle of “art for life, design for livelihood,” it is contributing to addressing rural revitalization, livelihood development and global issues, making art a force for progress and contributing Tsinghua’s wisdom to world civilization.
Source: China State Council Information Office 3
Cultural creative products of Chinese animated film Ne Zha 2 are pictured in a toy store in Chengdu, southwest China’s Sichuan Province, March 4, 2025. (Xinhua/Lu Youyi)
Chinese animated blockbuster “Ne Zha 2” has soared past Disney’s “Star Wars: The Force Awakens” to claim the fifth spot on the all-time global box office charts, further solidifying its status as both a cultural and commercial phenomenon.
According to data from ticketing platform Maoyan as of Saturday, the film’s global earnings — including presales — have surpassed 15.019 billion yuan (about 2.09 billion U.S. dollars), a milestone reached just 45 days after its release during the Chinese New Year on Jan. 29.
This latest feat adds to an impressive list of records for the film, which became the first film to gross 1 billion U.S. dollars in a single market, the first non-Hollywood title to enter the billion-dollar club, and the highest-grossing animated movie of all time worldwide.
MILESTONE FOR CHINESE CINEMA
Directed by Yang Yu, known as Jiaozi, the sequel to 2019’s “Ne Zha” — which grossed 5 billion yuan and topped the Chinese box office that year — has redefined the ceiling for single-film earnings in Chinese cinema. Over 98 percent of its revenue has come from the Chinese mainland, according to Maoyan data.
“This success has not only boosted the confidence of creators but also showcased the resilience and immense growth potential of the Chinese market,” said Lai Li, a Maoyan analyst.
The film’s roots run deep in Chinese mythology, continuing the story of the boy god Nezha as he and his ally Aobing struggle to rebuild their physical forms. With the help of the immortal Taiyi Zhenren, they navigate a journey of self-discovery, fate and defiance.
The story’s rich mythology, dazzling animation and universal themes have struck a chord with audiences. “‘Ne Zha 2’ is a miracle and a peak in Chinese cinema, a record that may remain unbroken for a long time,” said Chen Xuguang, director of the Institute of Film, Television and Theatre at Peking University.
EXPANDING GLOBAL REACH WITH ACCLAIM
The film’s technical achievements are just as remarkable. With nearly 2,000 visual effects shots and contributions from 138 animation studios, “Ne Zha 2” exemplifies the growing strength of China’s creative industry.
Since its international rollout began on Feb. 13 in Australia and New Zealand, “Ne Zha 2” has steadily expanded its global footprint. It opened in North America the following day, shattering the region’s 20-year-old opening weekend record for a Chinese-language film.
Sheila Sofian, a professor at the University of Southern California and a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, praised the film’s production design, sound design, and music, calling it “mind-blowing” in a video interview shared by China Media Group.
After debuting in Singapore on March 6, “Ne Zha 2” launched this week in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, with further Southeast Asian rollouts planned in the coming weeks.
Its European expansion is also underway. On Friday, the film held preview screenings in Britain and Ireland ahead of its official March 21 release in both countries, with further European rollouts to follow.
Cedric Behrel, managing director of Trinity CineAsia, which holds theatrical distribution rights for “Ne Zha 2” across 37 territories, including the UK, Ireland, Germany, France and Spain, described the film’s European launch as “unprecedented in scope.”
INDUSTRY-WIDE, CULTURAL IMPACT
“Ne Zha 2” has struck a deep emotional chord with audiences. One Maoyan user reflected on the film’s themes of prejudice and resilience, writing, “The line ‘prejudice in people’s hearts is like an unmovable mountain’ rings true… Even I, from a humble background, used to judge others based on their family background.”
Another viewer, a high school student preparing for China’s tough college entrance exams, found personal inspiration: “With 100 days left until the exam, ‘Ne Zha 2’ reminded me that my potential is limitless. If there’s no path ahead, I’ll carve one out myself!”
Largely driven by “Ne Zha 2,” China’s box office revenue during the 2025 Spring Festival holiday hit a record high, injecting much-needed optimism into the country’s film industry, which saw earnings fall by 23 percent in 2024 compared to 2023, and by 34 percent from the pre-pandemic peak in 2019.
Dong Wenxin, a film critic and manager of a cinema in Jinan, Shandong Province, emphasized the film’s industry-wide impact. “‘Ne Zha 2’ hasn’t drained the market but expanded it. More people are paying attention to theatrical releases and are willing to support quality content,” she told Xinhua. “We owe a lot to ‘Ne Zha 2’ — it’s proof that great commercial blockbusters can sustain a healthy market cycle.”
Beyond its domestic success, “Ne Zha 2” is poised to serve as a cultural bridge, offering global audiences a window into China’s rich mythology and traditions.
Yin Hong, vice chairman of the China Film Association and a professor at Tsinghua University, told Xinhua that the success of “Ne Zha 2” reflects the dynamism of China’s creative industries, the enduring appeal of its traditional culture, and the potential for Chinese stories to captivate audiences all over the world.
In a video interview, Jiaozi reflected on the personal journey the “Ne Zha” films have taken him on, revealing how the series has evolved from his own passion into a broad cultural phenomenon. “The first step was creating something I loved, and domestic audiences loved it too,” he said. “Over time, I’ve worked to improve it, to refine my craft. I believe that one day, new ideas, deeper meanings, and a new soul will emerge from it, and the whole world will be able to appreciate it.”
Source: China State Council Information Office
The upcoming Global Summit of Women, set to take place in Beijing in the latter half of this year, holds great significance for advancing the spirit of the 1995 World Conference on Women, a Chinese official has said.
Huang Xiaowei, deputy head of the National Working Committee on Children and Women of the State Council, made the remarks on Monday at the ongoing 69th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW69) at the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York.
Marking the 30th anniversary of the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, China will co-host the Global Summit of Women with UN Women later this year, Huang told the CSW69.
“This is not only a tribute to and continuation of history, but also a commitment to and innovation for the future,” she said, highlighting the summit’s crucial role in fostering global solidarity, carrying forward the legacy of the 1995 conference, and accelerating the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action to build a community with a shared future for mankind.
Huang noted that as the host country of the 1995 conference, China has consistently honored its commitments to promoting the synchronized development of women alongside economic and social progress.
Huang underscored the historic achievements of Chinese women, sharing insights into the country’s efforts to advance gender equality. She also outlined China’s comprehensive policy framework and implementation strategies, which focus on strengthening institutional support, increasing investment and empowering women.
Over the past 30 years, China has made remarkable strides in poverty alleviation, healthcare, education, and other key areas concerning women’s well-being, reflecting the rapid progress of women’s development in the modern era.
During discussions at the UN session, representatives from various countries expressed confidence that the upcoming Global Summit of Women will help forge consensus, accelerate tangible action, and inject fresh momentum into global efforts for women’s advancement.
They also voiced hope that China would continue to play a leadership role, particularly as the global push for gender equality faces mounting challenges.
Beyond her participation in multilateral activities, including a general debate, a ministerial roundtable, thematic side events and a Chinese-hosted reception, Huang also held several meetings with Sima Bahous, UN under-secretary-general and executive director of UN Women, as well as senior officials from various countries.
CSW69, the UN’s largest annual event dedicated to gender equality and women’s empowerment, is expected to conclude on March 21.
Source: China State Council Information Office 2
Li Cuili was regarded as kind of a “weirdo” when she decided to open a library at her convenience store providing books for villagers to read for free in 2008.
While others were busy making a living, Li, a farmer who later opened a store in Lishi village, Neihuang county, Anyang, Henan province, thought bigger and wanted to improve the cultural atmosphere in the village through the power of books.
That wish initially came from a mother’s love for her child. That year, she watched a performance at her village with her son. To her surprise, the show was vulgar and unsuitable for children.
Feeling anxious that children would grow up and be exposed to such an environment, she wanted to change the situation and began to offer books for villagers, because, she believes, “books are mostly beneficial”.
From feeling doubtful to offering support, villagers have seen Li’s Weiguang Library grow from a small space that managed to survive with only 200 books to a village cultural activity center, with a collection of 5,000-6,000 books. Through her efforts, she saw reading gradually taking shape at her hometown. Now 45 years old, she has also been elected as a deputy to the 14th National People’s Congress and president of Lishi village’s women’s federation.
The library’s name Weiguang means “dim light”.
“I named it Weiguang because it is only about putting several books on the shelves of a village store. It was initially a modest endeavor. Yet, no matter how faint the light, it has the power to keep the fire burning,” says Li.
At the very beginning, due to the lack of a reading or literary culture, no villager came forward to borrow her books, although she offered them for free. Li decided to attract children first. She offered sugar to children who came to read, borrow books and write book reviews. In this way, more and more children were attracted to the library.
Their parents were surprised to discover children behaved much better than before, as they stopped rushing to play on the streets after school but went to Li’s library to read. Then villagers began to speak highly of Li’s efforts and offer support, and many of them began to borrow books as well and worked as volunteers at the library in their free time.
With the growing popularity, Li encountered new but pleasant problems as she could not get enough books to meet demand.
“Besides my books, all those I could get from relatives and friends were put in the library. But since people borrowed books for free, many of them didn’t return them. Some damaged books also needed to be removed from circulation. Therefore, the number of books declined significantly,” says Li.
As a result, she had to get more. Other than the necessary family expenses, she spent all her money buying books, but they were not enough. Since she could not afford so many new books, she tried every means to get more, like buying from secondhand stores and waste stations in the county and asking people to donate books online.
For a while, she rode a trishaw in the county, with introductions to her library on it, as a way of publicity to rent or get more books. Some people pointed at her and made snide remarks.
“There’s the weirdo coming”, or words in that vein were often uttered within earshot.
One winter some years ago, she rode the trishaw to a county institute to collect books that had been promised to her. She left home at 5 am and rode for 40 minutes braving the cold because she was happy to get more books. But when she arrived, she was informed by staff that the books had been considered worthless and sold to a waste station.
Walking out of the door of the institute, she was greeted by the rising sun. She faced the sun and cried out of tiredness and frustration.
Besides the difficulties caused by her expenditure, she felt a creeping doubt as to whether what she was doing was worthwhile.
But her readers encouraged her.
Li was impressed by a girl named Liu Caijin. About a decade ago, the girl often came to her library to read. A primary school student, she was too short to reach the bookshelves, so she’d move wooden stools to reach up.
One day, Li asked her what she wanted to become in the future. To her surprise, Liu said, “I also want to open a store which has a library, providing books for people to read for free.”
“Now she is at a university, and I know she will not open a store. But I’m still moved when I remember her words. As the saying goes, it takes 10 years to grow a tree yet 100 years to bring up a person. Cultivating people is never something that can be done in a short time. I have often questioned if my library is meaningful, because it’s so small. But at that moment, her words of affirmation consolidated my resolution to persist,” says Li.
Many children who read books at the library have now grown up and as adults they support Li in their own ways. For example, some of them donate books to Li, some work as volunteers and others hold activities in the library.
With the growing popularity of her library, more support from society was offered to her work. With donations from nonprofit organizations, the library was renovated several times, tackling problems like water leakage. Book donations have continued to pour in.
“Now the pressure to run the library does not feel so heavy. Weiguang Library can continue to play a role today because many people have poured their love into it,” says Li.
She has also worked to build the library into a cultural activity center, encouraging villagers to give lectures and participate in manual courses and scientific experiments. This has turned the library into an additional classroom for the villagers.
“I was impressed by Peking University Professor Wang Zizhou’s words — ‘a school in a library can be much more important than a library in a school’. I hope people not only read books, but also ‘read’ films, music and even a broader world here,” says Li.
Jin Yan, a 24-year-old animal husbandry professional, says Li’s library has been an indispensable part of her life as she grew up. She often went to the library to read when in primary school, borrowed books regularly when she was a middle school student and worked as a volunteer helping to organize activities when she attended vocational high school.
“I was very introverted in childhood, but through organizing and participating in activities at the Weiguang Library, I opened up to people more. That changed my character,” she says.
Now, working as an NPC deputy, Li pays a lot of attention to nationwide reading, which encourages more such activity among the public across the country from this year’s Government Work Report. Li says villagers reading books is an important part of realizing the goal.
“Villages often lag behind cities in development. Therefore, we need to accelerate efforts in encouraging reading. The country’s nationwide reading initiative not only advocates more reading, but also leads to appreciating films, dramas, and understanding daily events and even people,” says Li.
“For example, it’s almost impossible to persuade senior villagers to read books, since many of them have difficulty reading. But the old people themselves are just like books, who can share their stories with younger people, making young people feel like reading books. In the process, the old people are also reading their own books,” says Li.
Li believes cultural construction is an important part of rural vitalization, since lack of education and ignorance is behind many problems in villages. Therefore, she suggests more guidance and supervision on rural cultural markets and more social forces participating in shaping rural culture.
“It must be a long-term goal, requiring continuous efforts infusing cultural vitality into villages. I’m optimistic about its future,” says Li.
By Mar-Vic Cagurangan in Hagatna, Guam
Debate on Guam’s future as a US territory has intensified with its legislature due to vote on a non-binding resolution to become a US state amid mounting Pacific geostrategic tensions and expansionist declarations by the Trump administration.
Located closer to Beijing than Hawai’i, Guam serves as a key US strategic asset, known as the “tip of the spear,” with 10,000 military personnel, an air base for F-35 fighters and B-2 bombers and home port for Virginia-class nuclear submarines.
The small US territory of 166,000 people is also listed by the UN for decolonisation and last year became an associate member at the Pacific Islands Forum.
Local Senator William A. Parkinson introduced the resolution to the legislature last Wednesday and called for Guam to be fully integrated into the American union, possibly as the 51st state.
“We are standing in a moment of history where two great empires are standing face-to-face with each other, about to go to war,” Parkinson said at a press conference on Thursday.
“We have to be real about what’s going on in this part of the world. We are a tiny island but we are too strategically important to be left alone. Stay with America or do we let ourselves be absorbed by China?”
His resolution states the decision “must be built upon the informed consent of the people of Guam through a referendum”.
Trump’s expansionist policies
Parkinson’s resolution comes as US President Donald Trump advocates territorially expansionist policies, particularly towards the strategically located Danish-ruled autonomous territory of Greenland and America’s northern neighbour, Canada.
“This one moment in time, this one moment in history, the stars are aligning so that the geopolitics of the United States favour statehood for Guam,” Parkinson said. “This is an opportunity we cannot pass up.”
As a territory, Guam residents are American citizens but they cannot vote for the US president and their lone delegate to the Congress has no voting power on the floor.
The US acquired Guam, along with Puerto Rico, in 1898 after winning the Spanish-American War, and both remain unincorporated territories to this day.
Independence advocates and representatives from the Guam Commission on Decolonisation regularly testify at the UN’s Decolonisation Committee, where the island has been listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory since 1946.
Commission on Decolonisation executive director Melvin Won Pat-Borja said he was not opposed to statehood but is concerned if any decision on Guam’s status was left to the US.
“Decolonisation is the right of the colonised,” he said while attending Parkinson’s press conference, the Pacific Daily News reported.
‘Hands of our coloniser’
“It’s counterintuitive to say that, ‘we’re seeking a path forward, a path out of this inequity,’ and then turn around and put it right back in the hands of our coloniser.
“No matter what status any of us prefer, ultimately that is not for any one of us to decide, but it is up to a collective decision that we have to come to, and the only way to do it is via referendum,” he said, reports Kuam News.
With the geostrategic competition between the US and China in the Pacific, Guam has become increasingly significant in supporting American naval and air operations, especially in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.
The two US bases have seen Guam’s economy become heavily reliant on military investments and tourism.
The Defence Department holds about 25 percent of Guam’s land and is preparing to spend billions to upgrade the island’s military infrastructure as another 5000 American marines relocate there from Japan’s Okinawa islands.
Guam is also within range of Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles and the US has trialed a defence system, with the first tests held in December.
The “moment in history” for statehood may also be defined by the Trump administration spending cuts, Guam Governor Lou Leon Guerrero warned in her “state of the island” address on Wednesday.
Military presence leveraged
The island has in recent years leveraged the increased military presence to demand federal assistance and the territory’s treasury relies on at least US$0.5 billion in annual funding.
“Let us be clear about this: Guam cannot be the linchpin of American security in the Asian-Pacific if nearly 14,000 of our residents are without shelter, because housing aid to Guam is cut, or if 36,000 of our people lose access to Medicaid and Medicare coverage keeping them healthy, alive and out of poverty,” Guerrero said.
Parkinson’s proposed legislative resolution calls for an end to 125-plus years of US colonial uncertainty.
“The people of Guam, as the rightful stewards of their homeland, must assert their inalienable right to self-determination,” states the resolution, including that there be a “full examination of statehood or enhanced autonomous status for Guam.”
“Granting Guam equal political status would signal unequivocally that Guam is an integral part of the United States, deterring adversaries who might otherwise perceive Guam as a mere expendable outpost.”
If adopted by the Guam legislature, the non-binding resolution would be transmitted to the White House.
A local statute enacted in 2000 for a political status plebiscite on statehood, independence or free association has become bogged down in US courts.
‘Reject colonial status quo’
Neil Weare, a former Guam resident and co-director of Right to Democracy, said the self-determination process must be centred on what the people of Guam want, “not just what’s best for US national security”.
“Right to Democracy does not take a position on political status, other than to reject the undemocratic and colonial status quo,” Weare said on behalf of the nonprofit organisation that advocates for rights and self-determination in US territories.
“People can have different views on what is the best solution to this problem, but we should all be in agreement that the continued undemocratic rule of millions of people in US territories is wrong and needs to end.”
He said the 250th anniversary of the US Declaration of Independence next year can open a new venue for a conversation about key concepts — such as the “consent of the governed” — involving Guam and other US territories.
Republished from BenarNews with permission.
Source: China State Council Information Office 2
Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te recently unveiled 17 strategies to counter so-called “threats” from the Chinese mainland facing the island. The latest move once again revealed the authoritarian nature behind his “Taiwan independence” attempts and his stance against cross-Strait communication, peace and democracy.
Such remarks, together with other separatist attempts by Lai and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities, would lead to nothing but a bubble that will undoubtedly burst.
It is worth noting that during his campaign for Taiwan’s leadership, Lai repeatedly claimed that he does not oppose healthy and orderly exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.
However, his latest statements, oozing with clear malice, tell a totally different story — an evident intent to expand restrictions or even close the door on cross-Strait exchanges.
By referring to the mainland as a “hostile external force,” Taiwan authorities led by Lai are making an unscrupulous provocation. This raises questions about how it could be possible for him to define the mainland as a “hostile force” and still maintain peace across the Strait.
This move further testifies that the Lai-led authorities are an out-and-out troublemaker and saboteur for cross-Strait peace. If left unchecked, it could only push Taiwan to the perilous brink of war.
Since its inception, the DPP has portrayed itself as “democratic” to reap electoral benefits. However, with this latest move, the DPP’s hypocritical disguise was eventually stripped away by Lai himself, exposing its anti-democratic and authoritarian nature to the world, making many in the island doubt whether Taiwan is stepping toward a state of “quasi-martial law.”
The public in Taiwan mocked the DPP-claimed “democratic rule” is actually the Democratic Progressive Party’s autocracy.
Looking back on the years of cross-Strait relations, despite the DPP’s regressive attempts, the momentum of the forward-moving waves of cross-Strait ties has never been stopped, and any temporary turbulence, like Lai’s hysterical “Taiwan independence” farce, will ultimately burst and dissipate like bubbles.
Source: China State Council Information Office 2
Generous childcare subsidies have been reported across China as part of the country’s holistic efforts to boost birth rates, making news headlines and sparking heated discussions.
The latest news came from Hohhot, capital of north China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The city announced this week that it will offer a one-time subsidy of 10,000 yuan (about 1,394 U.S. dollars) to couples having their first child. A second child will receive 10,000 yuan per year until he/she reaches five years old.
For the third child or more, the annual subsidy is 10,000 yuan until the child turns 10, with the total amount reaching 100,000 yuan, a relatively high amount compared with other cities and roughly twice the annual income of local citizens.
Official statistics show that the per capita disposable income in Hohhot stood at 49,200 yuan in 2024. The generous cash reward is believed to become a relief for couples who are hesitant to have children due to financial concerns.
“The policy made us more assured in making our mind to having a second child. The subsidies can reduce the financial costs, especially for maternity and childcare,” said Yang Lixin, 30, who works at a private firm in Hohhot and already has a five-year-old.
The policy came on the heels of the recent conclusion of the annual national legislative session, during which the government work report was adopted and, for the first time, vowed to “provide childcare subsidies.”
“We will formulate policies on boosting birth rates, provide childcare subsidies, vigorously develop integrated nursery and childcare services, and increase public-interest childcare services,” the report reads.
Also during the legislative session, Director of the National Health Commission (NHC) Lei Haichao said that the commission was working with relevant departments to draft a childcare subsidy operational plan, and the public would see direct, beneficiary measures and corresponding policy arrangements in due course.
The inclusion of childcare subsidies in the government work report signals China’s commitment to supporting fertility intentions with tangible financial assistance, said political advisor Ni Bangwen. He called for further efforts to issue comprehensive measures to support childbearing families.
Local governments have put into action. More than 20 provincial-level regions in China had explored offering childcare subsidies at different levels, according to earlier data from the NHC.
For instance, Shenyang, the capital of northeast China’s Liaoning Province, provided a monthly subsidy of 500 yuan to local families for their third child until the child turns three, according to a document issued in 2023.
Many Chinese people have expressed their expectation for such policies to be expanded to their hometowns. “Hope it can be spread across the country as soon as possible,” a netizen from south China’s Guangdong Province commented.
The birth incentives have proved feasible and effective in Tianmen, a fifth-tier city with a population of 1.6 million in Hubei Province. Since the city implemented birth-boosting measures, which include childbirth and childcare subsidies, housing rewards as well as maternal leave allowances, the number of newborns rose by 17 percent last year after declining for eight consecutive years.
As one of the world’s most populous countries, China faces profound demographic challenges due to a dwindling number of newborns and a growing aging population. The country’s birth rate and number of newborns both dropped for seven consecutive years before reporting rises in 2024, while the population aged 60 and above reached 310 million last year.
To boost its birth rate, China has implemented a slew of supportive policies in recent years. It phased out its one-child policy by allowing married couples to have two children in 2016 and announced support for couples looking to have a third child in 2021.
In addition to financial support, other incentive measures include increased childcare services, extended maternity leave, and strengthened support in education, housing and employment, all aimed at fostering a birth-friendly society.
Childcare services have been improved nationwide to create better situations for parents. In Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, community-based childcare centers launched full-day care, half-day care, temporary care, and hourly care for infants and children, providing convenient and reliable childcare options for residents.
Moreover, maternity leave in China has been generally extended to over 158 days, along with spousal paternity leave and parental leave, making new mothers feel increasingly supported.
Longer maternity leave as well as additional spousal leave and parental leave could enhance family cohesion and alleviate caregiving burdens. Meanwhile, economic subsidies eased the financial pressure on families raising children, thereby boosting their willingness to have more children, said Mi Hong, director of the Institute for Population and Development Studies at Zhejiang University.
Providing childcare subsidies is also relevant to enterprises. “A significant portion of our key employees are of childbearing age. Childcare subsidies will help retain talent and enable the company’s sustainable development,” said Sheng Jing, the human resources chief of a data-tech company in north China’s Tianjin Municipality.
“Enterprises should provide heartfelt support to employees who raise children and explore a new way to balance working and child-rearing,” said Wang Zhen, a lawmaker and entrepreneur of Inner Mongolia.
Source: China State Council Information Office 2
A symposium held in Beijing on Friday to mark the 20th anniversary of the enforcement of China’s Anti-Secession Law has drawn significant attention from Taiwan.
Multiple media outlets in Taiwan reported that the symposium highlighted the Chinese mainland’s stance on opposing “Taiwan independence” and punishing separatist forces, emphasizing its complete control and initiative in handling cross-Strait relations.
In an article published Saturday, the Taipei-based China Times highlighted the call made at the symposium that compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must work together to overcome interference, break down obstacles, and promote exchanges and cooperation across the Strait.
The United Daily News, in an article published on the same day, mentioned the guidelines issued by the Chinese mainland last June on imposing criminal punishments on diehard “Taiwan independence” separatists. It noted that the rollout of further measures depends on whether Lai Ching-te chooses confrontation with the mainland or cooperation.
The Chinese mainland’s red line is clear, with a firm resolve to oppose, curb, and punish “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, and its capability to do so continues to strengthen, according to a commentary on Taiwan-based website China Review.
The symposium signaled the mainland’s strengthened efforts in leveraging legal tools to punish “Taiwan independence,” said Chang Wu-ueh, director of the Center for Cross-Strait Relations at Tamkang University.
Chao Chien-min, a professor at the Chinese Culture University in Taiwan, noted that the Anti-Secession Law not only opposes “Taiwan independence” but also promotes reunification, viewing the two as closely interconnected.
Source: China State Council Information Office 2
With an extensive coastline, China is turning to the vast ocean to bolster food security by building modern marine ranches.
The construction of marine ranches, dubbed “blue granaries” in the vast blue ocean, highlights the nation’s efforts to diversify food supplies. With more investment and innovative technologies, China’s marine ranching industry is playing a role in strengthening food security.
This file photo shows a marine ranch with eight giant aquaculture cages located 42 nautical miles off the coast of Yantai in east China’s Shandong Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
FOOD SECURITY
Chinese leaders have underscored the importance of utilizing both land and sea resources to enhance food production to feed a population of over 1.4 billion.
This year’s “No. 1 central document” stresses that work must be done to build a diversified food supply system and adopt an all-encompassing approach to agriculture and food.
It says that efforts will be made to expand food resources through multiple channels, including promoting the high-quality development of fisheries and supporting the development of deep-sea and far-sea aquaculture and the construction of marine ranches.
An aerial drone photo taken on March 13, 2025 shows fishers driving boats to the fish farming area at a marine ranch in Rongcheng City, east China’s Shandong Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
In recent years, marine ranching has gained momentum along China’s coast. In 2024, the city of Shanwei, in the southern province of Guangdong, invested more than 2 billion yuan (about 279 million U.S. dollars) to build eight marine ranches as well as cold chain and sales facilities.
To date, China has built more than 180 national-level marine ranches. The eastern province of Shandong ranked top with 71 national-level marine ranches, accounting for 38 percent of the country’s total, said Zhang Jiandong, head of the Oceanic Administration of Shandong Province.
SMART AQUACULTURE
The technological advances, including automated feeding and underwater imaging systems, have transformed the aquaculture industry.
As the spring aquatic farming season started recently, Liu Yulei started his work on a marine ranch with eight giant aquaculture cages located 42 nautical miles off the coast of Yantai.
An aerial drone photo taken on March 13, 2025 shows fishers driving boats to the fish farming area at a marine ranch in Rongcheng City, east China’s Shandong Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
Each cage, 68 meters long and wide, could enclose 94,000 cubic meters of seawater, providing an optimal environment for 1 million fish with an annual fish catch of 1,000 tonnes.
“The fish farm is built here with Class I water quality and suitable temperature and salinity,” Liu said. “With strong currents moving at 1.5 meters per second, the water in the cage could be completely refreshed within dozens of seconds, much more frequently than in traditional aquaculture facilities.”
Modern technology has made fish farming more efficient. “Work on the marine ranch is busy but far easier than traditional fish farming. Only four workers can oversee a cage,” Liu added.
Each giant cage is equipped with advanced sonar, lidar and binocular vision systems that allow workers to monitor the fish population, distribution and health, equipment, water quality, hydrology, and meteorological conditions in real time.
This file photo shows a marine ranch with eight giant aquaculture cages located 42 nautical miles off the coast of Yantai in east China’s Shandong Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
“We used to lack proper feeding knowledge, which led to excessive food waste accumulating on the seabed. Now, with scientific breeding, we have significantly improved both quality and output while also protecting the marine environment,” said Luan Jianguo from another marine ranch off Changdao Island of Yantai.
A local fishing company purchases juvenile fish of certain sizes from local seafood farmers. The partnership means a faster return on investment, lower financial risks, and a larger seafood production with better quality.
NEW OPPORTUNITIES
Marine ranching also creates new business opportunities as some ranches offer travel services to tap into the consumer market better.
Off the coast of Yantai’s Laishan District, the “Genghai No. 1” ecological marine ranch complex integrates aquaculture and tourism facilities to generate additional revenues.
On weekends, tourists visit the complex for an immersive marine experience. On the main deck, visitors can engage in interactive activities such as a “deep-sea elevator” simulation using VR and AR devices. They can also participate in recreational fishing and enjoy the sea view.
“We provide 71 sea-view hotel rooms, and guests can also enjoy freshly caught seafood at our canteen,” said Yan Haidong, deputy general manager of Shandong Ocean Harvest Corporation, which operates the complex.
Low carbon is also at the core of the complex’s operation. “Our total installed solar and wind power capacity is 426 kW, with power generation of approximately 500,000 kWh annually,” Yan added.
Source: China State Council Information Office
Chinese car brands have become key players in Türkiye’s automotive market with their competitive prices and long-term dedication to investment, an Istanbul-based industry veteran said recently.
Semih Eryukseldi, a professional with over 15 years of experience in Türkiye’s automotive sector and currently working for Otobit, an online automobile auction platform, told Xinhua in an interview on Friday that Chinese car brands such as Chery, MG, and BYD have achieved long-term success in Türkiye with continued investment for sustainable growth.
Eryukseldi made the remarks in response to a report published on March 4 by Türkiye’s Automotive Distributors’ and Mobility Association (ODMD), which showed that Chinese car brands made significant sales growth in 2024.
According to the ODMD report, Chery sold 57,047 vehicles in Türkiye last year, up by 40.54 percent year-on-year, boosted by its competitively priced Tiggo series that appeal to a wide range of consumers.
Chery quickly gained a strong foothold in the Turkish market and “sold a significant number of vehicles” by offering highly available vehicles “with its price advantage,” outpacing other brands struggling with availability, Eryukseldi said.
MG, known for its electric and hybrid models, sold 17,162 vehicles in Türkiye in 2024, an 18.70-percent increase compared to the figures in 2023, the report showed.
“MG made a very quick entry into Türkiye starting in 2021 and quickly reached a wide customer base with various models, including electric, gasoline, and hybrid cars, across different segments,” Eryukseldi noted.
According to the ODMD report, BYD saw the largest percentage increase in sales last year, up by 892.97 percent from 2023 to reach 8,331 vehicles in 2024.
Notably, the brand sold 5,341 vehicles in the first two months of 2025, up by more than 10 times compared to the same period in 2024, showed the report.
This surge, driven by BYD’s investment commitment in Türkiye, “has boosted BYD’s impact in the Turkish market,” Eryukseldi said.