Category: China

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kennedy renews calls to protect Diego Garcia military base ahead of UK PM Starmer’s visit to Washington

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator John Kennedy (Louisiana)

    Watch Kennedy’s comments here.

    WASHINGTON – Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) urged United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer not to move forward with his plan to hand over the Chagos Islands, including the U.S.-U.K. military base on Diego Garcia, to Mauritius in a speech on the Senate floor. Starmer will travel to Washington this week to meet with President Trump.  

    Key excerpts of the speech are below:

    “Now, there is one other thing you need to know. Mauritius is very close to China. Mauritius has a very lucrative trade agreement with China, and you’ll not be surprised to learn that, after all of this has been developing, China all of a sudden is Mauritius’s best friend. Do you know why? Because if Prime Minister Starmer does this, Mauritius is going to own the base. They are going to own the base.”

    . . .

    “I don’t care what Prime Minister Starmer promises you. The only reason he is doing this is because he feels guilty because the United Nations has said that the United Kingdom should be ashamed of its history and ashamed that it at one time owned colonies. 

    “People of the United Kingdom can feel what they want. That is none of my business. But we have got an American military base there, and it is very important to defend the Indian Ocean against China. . . . I am sorry he feels guilty. He needs to go buy an emotional support pony, but he doesn’t need to give away an American military base.”

    Background

    • The U.K. had previously announced on Oct. 3, 2024, that it had reached a deal with Mauritius to cede the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands. This deal between the U.K. and Mauritius would jeopardize the security of a key U.S.-U.K. military base on Deigo Garcia by potentially exposing the island to Chinese espionage efforts, according to a report from the Policy Exchange.
    • Negotiations between the U.K. and Mauritius followed a years-long pressure campaign from the United Nations to get England out of the Chagos Islands. The Biden administration also reportedly pressured the U.K. to enter the deal with Mauritius before the American and Mauritian elections took place—an idea Prime Minister Keir Starmer initially endorsed. 
    • On Oct. 23, 2024, Kennedy wrote to then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken seeking answers about the Biden administration’s involvement in the deal between the U.K. and Mauritius.
    • Kennedy also penned this op-ed in Oct. 2024 arguing that the Biden administration owes the American people an explanation for its decision to allow this deal between the U.K. and Mauritius to move forward.
    • On Jan. 15, 2025, Starmer announced that he wanted President Trump and his administration to weigh in on any deal struck between the U.K. and Mauritius regarding the transfer of the Chagos Islands, including the transfer of the U.S.-U.K. shared military base on the island of Diego Garcia. 
    • Kennedy published this op-ed in Jan. 2025 welcoming the U.K.’s change of heart after Starmer announced that he would include the Trump administration in the ongoing negotiations with Mauritius.
    • As a congressman, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has criticized the Oct. 2024 deal, saying, “Should the U.K. cede control of the Chagos to Mauritius, I have no doubt that China will take advantage of the resulting vacuum.” 
    • As a senator, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has similarly condemned the deal and said it “poses a serious threat to our national security interests in the Indian Ocean and threatens critical U.S. military posture in the region.”

    Watch Kennedy’s full speech here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Coons, colleagues introduce bipartisan, bicameral bill to restore injunctive relief for patent infringement

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.) and Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) today introduced the Realizing Engineering, Science, and Technology Opportunities by Restoring Exclusive (RESTORE) Patent Rights Act of 2025. This bipartisan, bicameral bill would restore the presumption that courts will issue an injunction to stop patent infringers, strengthening protections for U.S. inventors, entrepreneurs, universities, and startups. This legislation was initially introduced in the 118th Congress. Representatives Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas) and Madeleine Dean (D-Pa.) also introduced the House companion bill. 

    “Thanks to a wrongheaded decision from the Supreme Court, there are now companies who steal patented technologies rather than license them from inventors and then justify their actions as simply the cost of doing business. Innovators at universities and startups who lack resources are often unable to stop patent infringement in court and are forced into licensing deals they do not want,” said Senator Coons. “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act will protect innovators across the country, stop the infringe-now, pay-later model in its tracks, and strengthen America’s economic competitiveness for generations to come.”

    “American ingenuity should be rewarded and protected,” said Senator Cotton. “Current patent law fails to protect inventors and leaves them vulnerable to intellectual property theft from adversaries like China. This bipartisan legislation will help solidify America’s edge in technological innovation.”

    For more than two centuries, courts granted injunctive relief in most patent cases upon a finding of infringement, preventing patent infringers from continuing to produce goods that ran afoul of patent laws. However, this practice was upended in 2006 when the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange created a four-factor test to determine whether a permanent injunction is warranted in infringement cases, altering the longstanding remedy for patent infringement.

    Since that decision, obtaining injunctive relief in patent cases has become significantly more difficult and rare. A recent study found that requests for permanent injunctions in patent cases fell by 65% for companies that use their patented technology to manufacture a product; grants of permanent injunctions to those companies fell even more significantly. Requests and grants for licensing patent owners like universities and research clinics dropped even further: Requests fell by 85%, and grants fell by 90%. 

    The RESTORE Patent Rights Act would undo the damage of the eBay decision by returning to patent owners a rebuttable presumption that an injunction is warranted after a court makes a final ruling that their rights are being infringed. This would deter predatory infringers and restore meaning to the right to exclude.

    “American innovation is only as strong as the confidence in knowing ideas cannot be stolen by competitors. In the last two decades, innovators have found it harder to obtain a permanent injunction from U.S. courts, which stops bad actors from stealing their intellectual property (IP). Our legislation will restore the rights of American innovators by ensuring permanent injunctions are accessible from U.S. courts. This bill will provide greater certainty in the protection of IP and prevent cases from being taken overseas to countries like China. When U.S. courts enforce the exclusivity of patent rights, America becomes a world leader in innovation,” said Congressman Moran.  

    “Enforceable patents are vital to our ability to invent, improve and advance – yet today, it is increasingly difficult for patent holders to enforce their rights through permanent injunctions, even after proving infringement in court,” said Congresswoman Dean. “The bipartisan, bicameral RESTORE Act addresses this issue and safeguards American innovation. I’m grateful to be joined by Congressman Moran, Senator Coons, and Senator Cotton in our push to protect patentholders, including universities, research laboratories, and startups.”

    The Innovation Alliance, Council for Innovation Promotion, Association of University Technology Managers, Conservatives for Property Rights, Alliance of U.S. Startups & Inventors for Jobs, The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-USA, Inventors Defense Alliance, and the Medical Device Manufacturers Association have endorsed the RESTORE Patent Rights Act.

    “The Innovation Alliance applauds Senators Coons and Cotton and Representatives Moran and Dean for reintroducing the bipartisan, bicameral RESTORE Patent Rights Act. With a simple, single-sentence clarification of the law, RESTORE will bring balance back to patent law and allow small inventors to stand toe to toe with Big Tech after a court has ruled that Big Tech is stealing their inventions. We urge Congress to pass this vital bill,” said Brian Pomper, Executive Director of the Innovation Alliance.

    “Our nation’s economic success and national security depend on inventors having confidence that their intellectual property will not be unfairly exploited,” said Andrei Iancu, board co-chair of C4IP and former Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and USPTO Director from 2018 to 2021. “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act will provide inventors with the reassurance they need to propel American leadership in critical technology fields.”

    “Now more than ever, it’s critical that our leaders stand up for the startups and entrepreneurs who drive our nation’s economy and create life-changing breakthroughs,” said David Kappos, board co-chair of C4IP and former Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and USPTO Director from 2009 to 2013. “By passing the RESTORE Patent Rights Act, Congress can reinvigorate the U.S. patent system and reaffirm America’s commitment to protecting its innovators.”

    “AUTM thanks Senator Coons and the other co-sponsors for introducing this legislation. Strengthening the ability of patent holders to protect their patents via injunction is crucial to incentivizing innovation. We look forward to working with the committee on this important legislation,” said Steve Susalka, CEO of AUTM. 

    “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act restores meaning to the promised exclusive rights to one’s invention. Without fully enforceable exclusive rights, the inventor’s end of the ‘patent bargain’ is broken. Since 2006, the Supreme Court’s eBay v. MercExchange ruling has made permanent injunction extremely difficult to obtain in patent infringement cases. Courts have thereby turned the right to exclude into a compulsory licensing clause. This is unjust. The RESTORE Patent Rights Act ends the judicially created categorical rule of routinely denying injunctions. It restores the historical remedy of injunctive relief in patent cases, as it is with other forms of property, including other intellectual property,” said James Edwards, Executive Director, Conservatives for Property Rights

    “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act is, perhaps, the most impactful thing that can be done to empower American inventors, entrepreneurs and disruptive startups. The ability to pursue injunctive relief when a competitor infringes on a patented invention was the standard in the United States for over 200 years. The Supreme Court moved the goalposts in 2006 and set up a convoluted test that makes it nearly impossible for a growth tech startup to stop the predatory infringement of their intellectual property by larger competitors. This practice has been perfected by Big Tech companies that now routinely ingest the innovations of disruptive competitors knowing that they cannot be stopped. Patent law and legislation is often complicated. The RESTORE Act is not. It is a clear and unambiguous bill that simply restores balance between large corporations that ingest others’ IP and the startups and entrepreneurs that invent it,” said Chris Israel, Executive Director of The Alliance of U.S. Startups & Inventors for Jobs (USIJ).

    “A functioning IP system must be fair, and as importantly, be perceived to be fair. Nondiscriminatory access to the legal system for enforcing and defending IP property rights is essential for securing the property rights necessary for investment. When innovators are unable to secure the property right embodied in a patent, investment is deterred and commercial activity, innovation and job creation impeded,” said Timothy Lee, IEEE-USA president.

    “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act is a crucial step in safeguarding America’s small businesses, startups, and entrepreneurs from predatory patent infringement. By providing a clear path for justice and injunctive relief, this bill empowers innovators and fosters a more equitable patent system that benefits American inventors and consumers,” said Kristen Osenga, the chief policy counselor at the Inventors Defense Alliance.

    “There unfortunately continues to be ongoing efforts across the world to steal American innovations and intellectual property, and it is critical that Congress establishes new protections so that the United States can remain the global leader in medical technology innovation,” said Mark Leahy, President and CEO, Medical Device Manufacturers Association. “The ‘RESTORE Patent Rights Act’ would help restore a level playing field if enacted, and would codify the presumption that a permanent injunction will be granted after infringement is proven.  MDMA applauds Senators Coons and Cotton and Representatives Moran and Dean for their leadership in helping America’s innovators protect their intellectual property, and we will continue to work closely with them so the medical technology ecosystem can deliver the cures, therapies and diagnostics that patients and providers need.”

    The text of the bill is available here.

    A one-pager is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Why Productivity Matters

    Source: Reserve Bank of Australia

    Introduction

    Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today at the Australian Business Economists’ Annual Forecasting Conference. There has been lots of discussion about productivity in recent years. In some economies this discussion has been about subdued growth in overall productivity, including in Australia since just before the pandemic. There has also been discussion about the outlook for productivity. For example, the extent to which artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other technologies will support future productivity growth. These are important issues that I expect will come up in discussions today.

    In my remarks I’m going to focus on a different question: why does productivity matter? At the central bank we’re not experts in how to improve productivity. But trends in productivity are very important for the macroeconomy. In the context of the Australian economy, I will discuss how stronger productivity growth can support growth in aggregate supply, incomes and aggregate demand. I will then spend some time discussing recent productivity outcomes in Australia and how we’ve been thinking about those in our assessment of economic conditions.

    But first, what is productivity? When we talk about productivity, we’re talking about how much output we get relative to what we put in. At an individual level, I increase my own productivity by making a shopping list before I buy groceries, so I don’t forget anything and avoid multiple trips to the supermarket. At the firm level, productivity might be improved by implementing customer relationship management software to streamline communication with clients and automate routine tasks. At the economy-wide level – which is what matters for the central bank and our dual mandate of full employment and low and stable inflation – productivity reflects a multitude of decisions like these. Ultimately it’s about how efficiently capital and labour are employed across the economy to produce goods and services.

    How do we measure productivity? Economists typically focus on two measures: labour productivity, which measures how much output is produced for every hour worked; and multifactor productivity (MFP), which reflects how efficiently all inputs to production – such as labour, capital, energy and raw materials – are combined to produce output.

    In a simple production function framework where a firm produces output using two inputs – labour and capital – labour productivity depends on two things. The first is how much capital each person has to work with. Providing workers with more or better capital – like machines or faster computers – can increase the amount of output each worker produces. This is referred to as ‘capital deepening’. The second is MFP. Improving MFP involves finding new ways to combine labour and capital to produce more output. For example, by reorganising a production line or using GPS technology to precisely guide machinery for planting, fertilising and harvesting. In this respect, labour productivity is not just about labour efficiency; it depends on firms’ decisions about how much capital to employ and how efficiently labour and capital work together to produce output.

    In thinking about the relationship between productivity and aggregate supply, incomes and demand, I will focus mainly on labour productivity. This is because labour productivity most closely aligns with measures of economic living standards. It’s also easier to measure than MFP.

    As you might sense, productivity is not about working harder, but working smarter. Many of the biggest productivity improvements have come from things that have made our lives easier, like computers, robots, the internet and smartphones – though personally I’m still questioning whether smartphones are productivity enhancing or a productivity sapping distraction.

    Economists talk about productivity a lot. So I’ll now turn to the question of why productivity matters.

    Productivity and supply

    If productivity increases, the economy can produce more goods and services from all the available economic inputs. As such, productivity is a key driver of growth in the supply capacity of the economy, or potential output.

    Productivity in Australia has been volatile in recent years but, looking through the volatility, is around the same level as in the few years before the pandemic. Productivity growth has also been consistently below the RBA’s projections for some time now (Graph 1). This has generated internal discussions about what trend labour productivity growth might look like in the period ahead, and what that means for estimates of potential output growth over the forecast period. The current assumption is that annual labour productivity growth will pick up to around one per cent in the medium term, which is close to its longer run average. This could be consistent with, for example, the rapid adoption of technology across many industries leading to higher productivity outcomes. However, the projected pick-up in productivity growth has not materialised in recent years and staff are currently assessing whether weak productivity outcomes are likely to persist.

    Weak productivity growth in recent years has contributed to slower growth in the supply capacity, or potential output, of the economy than otherwise. Graph 2 shows one of our estimates of potential output, which is based on actual productivity outcomes observed in the data. The graph also shows a counterfactual path where productivity growth in recent years was higher, at its average rate in the two decades prior to the pandemic. This suggests that the size of the economy is a lot smaller than it would have been, had productivity growth been more like in the past (all else equal).

    It’s important to keep in mind that, in this counterfactual world where supply capacity was much higher, incomes and demand would also have been higher too. Let me turn to that now.

    Productivity, incomes and wages

    While productivity growth contributes to growth in the supply capacity of the economy, it also contributes to growth in incomes and demand.

    At times, labour productivity (output per hour worked) and real income per hour track one another closely (Graph 3). Looking through the volatility, both are currently around similar levels as in the period prior to the pandemic.

    Other factors besides productivity can affect growth in incomes per hour. For example, higher prices for Australian exports can generate higher incomes domestically. So the terms of trade – the prices we receive for our exports relative to the prices we pay for our imports – can also be an important driver of incomes in the domestic economy. We can see this in the decade from the early 2000s: despite the slowing in productivity growth, real incomes per hour continued to increase, partly owing to substantial increases in the prices received for Australian exports like iron ore and coal. The surge in demand for our exports, particularly from China, supported profits in the mining industry and related parts of the Australian economy, as well as demand for labour and wages growth.

    Over the longer run, labour productivity and real wages – as measured by average earnings from the national accounts – also tend to move together (Graph 4). Over the inflation targeting period, labour productivity has grown at an average annual rate of 1.1 per cent and real labour earnings have grown at 0.9 per cent. So, higher productivity not only benefits firms, it also benefits workers by increasing their purchasing power. The Productivity Commission has previously pointed to the productivity of bakers as a reason we can consume more bread or spend that extra money elsewhere – in 1901 it took 18 minutes of the average worker’s time to afford a loaf of bread, while today it’s just 4 minutes. There must be a joke in there somewhere about how we spend our dough.

    In the short run, however, growth in real wages and labour productivity can and do diverge as the economy adjusts to economic shocks. For example, and as noted previously, increases in the prices received for Australian exports can have an impact on domestic profits and wages (and without an increase in labour productivity). Ultimately, however, it is very hard for an economy to support real wages growth in the longer run without productivity growth.

    Productivity and consumption

    Productivity growth also tends to support consumption growth. When productivity and incomes are growing more strongly, people are able to spend more and consumption grows more quickly. Weak growth in consumption per capita over recent years has coincided with weak growth in productivity, real incomes and real wages (Graph 5).

    Similar patterns have been evident in other economies, where subdued productivity growth has been associated with slower growth in household incomes and consumption (Graph 6). The exception is the United States, where growth in both productivity and consumption has been relatively strong.

    Recent trends in productivity

    So far I’ve focused on the importance of productivity growth for aggregate supply, incomes and demand over the longer run. I’ll now turn to recent trends in productivity growth in Australia and some potential implications for the near-term economic outlook.

    Discerning recent trends in productivity is difficult because of volatility in the data associated with the pandemic and other supply disruptions. Looking through the volatility, labour productivity growth has been low, averaging 0.2 per cent per year between 2017/18 and 2023/24 (Graph 7).

    Reverting to the simple production function framework that I noted earlier, the slow growth in labour productivity over recent years has reflected slow growth in both MFP and the amount of capital available to each worker.

    MFP growth averaged 0.2 per cent per year between 2017/18 and 2023/24, which was well below its historical average. Some have argued that slower MFP growth could reflect temporary factors. For example, tight labour market conditions over recent years have been associated with large numbers of individuals entering the workforce or changing jobs; this may have weighed on productivity as some individuals were trained or retrained and some firms adapted production processes to accommodate strong employment growth. If this was the case, MFP growth could pick up as the economy adjusts. However, work by some RBA staff finds that temporary factors like these have not been the primary cause of slow MFP growth, suggesting that structural factors could be weighing on productivity growth.

    Slow growth in the amount of capital available for each worker in the Australian economy – or a lack of ‘capital deepening’ – has also contributed to slow growth in labour productivity (Graph 8). Capital per worker was broadly unchanged for around five years leading up to the pandemic and – looking through the volatility in the data during the pandemic – is currently a bit below those levels. In other words, overall investment has not kept pace with the strong growth in employment recently.

    To help understand the recent slow growth in productivity, I’ll look at productivity outcomes in various parts of the economy.

    I’ll start with the non-market sector – which includes the health care, education and public administration industries – where employment growth has been very strong over recent years. The level of measured productivity in some parts of the non-market sector is low relative to the aggregate economy. So, as the non-market sector has become a larger share of the economy in recent years, this has weighed on overall productivity growth in the economy. Our estimates suggest that the rising share of non-market employment lowered the economy-wide measure of labour productivity growth by around 0.3 percentage points per year on average from 2017/18 to 2023/24, as shown by the yellow bars in Graph 9. This compares with around 0.15 percentage points per year over the previous decade, and so the recent effects have been a bit larger than in the past.

    But there is more to the story about productivity and the non-market sector. I have emphasised measured productivity because it is very difficult to measure output – and therefore productivity – in parts of the non-market sector. The central measurement problem is a lack of meaningful prices for some non-market output, such as public hospital services provided to public patients. This makes it very difficult to accurately identify quantities of output, which are needed to measure productivity. For example, research by the Productivity Commission suggests that productivity in the health care industry is higher than official estimates. As such, the drag on productivity from the non-market sector may be overstated.

    Noting the challenges of measuring productivity in the non-market sector, what’s been going on in the rest of the economy? Labour productivity growth in the market sector averaged around 0.6 per cent per year from 2017/18 to 2023/24 – below its average of 1.6 per cent over the previous two decades – though it picked up in 2023/24.

    Table 1: Growth in Labour Productivity

    Average annual growth rates (per cent)(a)

    Sector 1998/99 to 2017/18 2017/18 to 2023/24
    All industries 1.3 0.2
    Non-farm 1.1 0.1
    Market sector 1.6 0.6
    Market sector ex mining 1.4 1.0

    (a) Average growth rates calculated between financial years.

    Sources: ABS; RBA.

    While the level of productivity in the mining industry in Australia is higher than in other industries, productivity growth in that industry has declined over recent years. Excluding mining, productivity growth in the market sector since 2017/18 has averaged 1 per cent per year, though this is still lower than its average over the preceding two decades and well below the rates recorded during the high productivity growth period in the 1990s.

    More generally, a range of explanations have been provided for the slowing in productivity growth globally since the 1990s. A well-documented one for Australia is declining ‘economic dynamism’ – it now takes longer for inputs to production to move to higher productivity firms, and it also takes longer for firms to catch up to the global frontier of performance and technology. Evidence suggests that at least part of the decline in economic dynamism relates to declining competition in the economy. Regulatory barriers also appear to have played a role in Australia, notably in the construction industry. Other explanations include slowing human capital accumulation, declining trade integration, and mismeasurement.

    What does the recent subdued growth in productivity mean for our assessment of economic conditions? While productivity growth is associated with growth in incomes and wages over the longer run, in the short run there can be material divergences between these variables. Over the past year or so, real average hourly earnings in the economy have grown faster than labour productivity. This exerts upward pressure on firms’ unit labour costs and is consistent with our assessment that labour market conditions are still tight, notwithstanding some easing in those conditions over the past couple of years.

    What will happen from here? Our latest forecasts in the Statement on Monetary Policy incorporate a pick-up in productivity growth over the next couple of years, which would add to the economy’s supply capacity and help alleviate cost pressures. But there is considerable uncertainty around this projection. If productivity growth remains weak, the near-term outlook will depend critically on how the economy adjusts. If growth in demand is also weaker and wages adjust quickly to this slower growth in the supply capacity of the economy, there might not be a material impact on cost pressures. But if demand picks up as expected or wages adjust slowly to continued weak productivity outcomes, cost pressures could be higher than we expect. We will continue to monitor these developments carefully, alongside the full range of indicators we use to assess current economic conditions.

    Concluding remarks

    To conclude, productivity matters because it is a key driver of economic living standards. Over the longer run, higher productivity growth expands the supply capacity of the economy and supports growth in incomes, wages and aggregate demand. In the short run, however, there can be meaningful divergences in the growth rates of these important macroeconomic variables. Recent weak growth in productivity has constrained growth in aggregate supply. Whether productivity growth improves from here and how the economy adjusts are important questions for the economic outlook.

    Thank you for your time today. I look forward to your questions.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-Evening Report: DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mimi Zou, Professor, School of Private & Commercial Law, UNSW Sydney

    Dorason/Shutterstock

    When small Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek released a family of extremely efficient and highly competitive AI models last month, it rocked the global tech community. The release revealed China’s growing technological prowess. It also showcased a distinctly Chinese approach to AI advancement.

    This approach is characterised by strategic investment, efficient innovation and careful regulatory oversight. And it’s evident throughout China’s broader AI landscape, of which DeepSeek is just one player.

    In fact, the country has a vast ecosystem of AI companies.

    They may not be globally recognisable names like other AI companies such as DeepSeek, OpenAI and Anthropic. But each has carved out their own speciality and is contributing to the development of this rapidly evolving technology.

    Tech giants and startups

    The giants of China’s technology industry include Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. All these companies are investing heavily in AI development.

    Alibaba CEO Eddie Wu earlier this month said the multibillion dollar company plans to “aggressively invest” in its pursuit of developing AI that is equal to, or more advanced than, human intelligence.

    The company is already working with Apple to incorporate its existing AI models into Chinese iPhones. (Outside China, iPhones offer similar integration with OpenAI’s ChatGPT.)

    But a new generation of smaller, specialised AI companies has also emerged.

    For example, Shanghai-listed Cambricon Technologies focuses on AI chip development. Yitu Technology specialises in healthcare and smart city applications.

    Megvii Technology and CloudWalk Technology have carved out niches in image recognition and computer vision, while iFLYTEK creates voice recognition technology.

    Multibillion dollar Chinese tech company Alibaba plans to aggressively invest in AI.
    testing/Shutterstock

    Innovative paths to success

    Despite United States’ chip sanctions and China’s restricted information environment, these Chinese AI companies have found paths to success.

    US companies such as OpenAI have trained their large language models on the open internet. But Chinese companies have used vast datasets from domestic platforms such as WeChat, Weibo and Zhihu. They also use government-authorised data sources.

    Many Chinese AI companies also embrace open-source development. This means they publish detailed technical papers and release their models for others to build upon. This approach focuses on efficiency and practical application rather than raw computing power.

    The result is a distinctly Chinese approach to AI.

    Importantly, China’s state support for AI development has also been substantial. Besides the central government, local and provincial governments have provided massive funding through venture funds, subsidies and tax incentives.

    China has also established at least 48 data exchanges across different cities in recent years. These are authorised marketplaces where AI companies can purchase massive datasets in a regulated environment.

    By 2028, China also plans to establish more than 100 “trusted data spaces”.

    These are secure, regulated environments designed to standardise data exchanges across sectors and regions. They will form the foundation of a comprehensive national data market, allowing access to and use of diverse datasets within a controlled framework.

    A strong education push

    The growth of the AI industry in China is also tied to a strong AI education push.

    In 2018, China’s Ministry of Education launched an action plan for accelerating AI innovation in universities.

    Publicly available data shows 535 universities have established AI undergraduate majors and some 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes have also been created since 2017. (In comparison, there are at least 14 colleges and universities in the United States offering formal AI undergraduate degrees.)

    Together, these institutions are building an AI talent pipeline in China. This is crucial to Beijing’s ambition of becoming a global AI innovation leader by 2030.

    China’s AI strategy combines extensive state support with targeted regulation. Rather than imposing blanket controls, regulators have developed a targeted approach to managing AI risks.

    The 2023 regulations on generative AI are particularly revealing of Beijing’s approach.

    They impose content-related obligations specifically on public-facing generative AI services, such as ensuring all content created and services provided are lawful, uphold core socialist values and respect intellectual property rights. These obligations, however, exclude generative AI used for enterprise, research and development. This allows for some unrestricted innovation.

    There are 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes in China, including at Renmen University in Beijing.
    humphery/Shutterstock

    International players

    China and the US dominate the global AI landscape. But several significant players are emerging elsewhere.

    For example, France’s Mistral AI has raised over €1 billion (A$1.6 billion) to date to build large language models. In comparison, OpenAI raised US$6.6 billion (A$9.4 billion) in a recent funding round, and is in talks to raise a further US$40 billion.

    Other European companies are focused on specialised applications, specific industries or regional markets. For example, Germany’s Aleph Alpha offers an AI tool that allows companies to customise third-party models for their own purposes

    In the United Kingdom, Graphcore is manufacturing AI chips and Wayve is making autonomous driving AI systems.

    Challenging conventional wisdom

    DeepSeek’s breakthrough last month demonstrated massive computing infrastructure and multibillion dollar budgets aren’t always necessary for the successful development of AI.

    For those invested in the technology’s future, companies that achieve DeepSeek-level efficiencies could significantly influence the trajectory of AI development.

    We may see a global landscape where innovative AI companies elsewhere can achieve breakthroughs, while still operating within ecosystems dominated by American and Chinese advantages in talent, data and investment.

    The future of AI may not be determined solely by who leads the race. Instead, it may be determined by how different approaches shape the technology’s development.

    China’s model offers important lessons for other countries seeking to build their AI capabilities while managing certain risks.

    Mimi Zou has previously received funding from the British Academy. She is affiliated with the Asia Society Australia.

    ref. DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry – https://theconversation.com/deepseek-is-now-a-global-force-but-its-just-one-player-in-chinas-booming-ai-industry-250494

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – A10-0012/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024

    (2024/2081(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

     having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

     having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

     having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

     having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

     having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

     having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

     having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

     having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

     having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006[1],

     having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

     having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe[3],

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

     having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

     having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

     having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

     having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

     having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

     having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[4],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

     having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

     having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

     having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

     having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023[9], and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

     having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    C. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    D. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    E. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    F. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    G. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    H. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    I. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    J. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    K. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    L. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    M. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    N. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    O. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    P. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to RSF, 47 journalists and media workers have been killed, most of them in conflict zones, and 573 have been imprisoned since 1 January 2024;

    Q. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    R. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    S. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and  ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil;

    5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative[10] as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of  Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    17. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    18. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    19. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation;

    20. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk, for instance streamlining visa procedures and promoting harmonisation in the EU’s visa application process;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    21. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012); supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    22. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    23. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    24. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    25. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    26. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    27. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    29. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    30. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    31. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    32. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to urge countries to release political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    33. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    34. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    35. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    36. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    37. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    38. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    39. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    40. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    41. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    42. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    43. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    44. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    45. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU[11], including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    46. Reaffirms that no agreement with a non-EU country designated as a transit country should be concluded without Parliament’s scrutiny, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to include robust human rights clauses, monitoring mechanisms and impact assessments therein; reiterates its call on the Commission to integrate ex ante human rights impact assessments into such agreements;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    47. Deplores the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for  the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    48. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    49. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    50. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    51. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    52. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    53. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    54. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; notes the number of journalists killed in conflict situations in 2023, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, has increased alarmingly – by 85 % – since 2022;

    55. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    56. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; urges the EU to help make reliable news sources available to more people living in countries that restrict press freedom;

    57. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    58. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    59. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    60. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    61. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by articifical intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    62. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market[12] and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    63. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    64. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry[13]; condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    65. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    66. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    67. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

    °

    ° °

    68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Each year, the European Parliament adopts three annual reports on the EU’s foreign, security and defence, and human rights policies.

     

    The three reports are on:

     

     the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the AFET Committee,

     Human Rights and Democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (based on the EU Annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World) – competence of the DROI Subcommittee, and

     the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the SEDE Subcommittee.

     

    These reports monitor and assess the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the EU policy on Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy. They are a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU foreign policy making, most notably in regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is essential that the European Parliament responds to the annual reports issued by other institutions as soon as they are published.

    ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Partnership for Democracy/International Dalit Solidarity Network

    Clean Clothes Campaign

    Protection International

    Race & Equality

    FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights

    International Partnership for Human Rights

    Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

    Front Line Defenders

    Save the Children

    Avocats Sans Frontières

    Center for Reproductive Rights

    Reporters without Borders

    End FGM European Network

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do ), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

     

    COUNTRY

     

    Individual

    BACKGROUND

    ACTION TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

    AFGHANISTAN

     

    Manizha Seddiqi Ahmad Fahim Azimi

    Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee  Ezatullah Zwab

    Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab are human rights defenders who have been detained in Afghanistan.

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, including Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab;

     

    – Calls for victims of violence against women and girls to be released from prison, where they are being held in inhumane conditions to the detriment of their mental and physical health.

     

    ALGERIA

     

    Boualem Sansal

    French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal was detained on 16 November 2024 by the Algerian authorities, his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel; he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, and he is awaiting trial.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

     

    – Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

     

    – Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Ulvi Hasanli Sevinj Vagifgizi

    Nargiz Absalamova

    Hafiz Babali,

    Elnara Gasimova Aziz Orujov

    Rufat Muradli

    Avaz Zeynalli

    Elnur Shukurov

    Alasgar Mammadli

    Farid Ismayilov

     

    Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life.

     

    Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; he is facing up to 12 years in prison.

     

    Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev are political prisoners, and Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov are human rights defenders and journalists.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Political prisoner and 2024 Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest; the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his health condition is critical, requiring hospitalisation and urgent heart surgery.

     

    Civil society leader Anar Mammadli has been in pre-trial detention since April 2024 on bogus charges, with his health deteriorating due to denied healthcare.

     

    In early December 2024, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested MeydanTV journalists Aynur Ganbarova, Aytaj Ahmadova, Khayala Agayeva, Natig Javadli and Aysel Umudova, and journalists Ramin Jabrayilzade and Ahmad Mukhtar; they also arrested Baku Journalism School deputy director Ulvi Tahirov, political leader Azer Gasimli and human rights defender Rufat Safarov; all face unfounded, politically motivated charges.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately end the crackdown on all dissident groups and unconditionally release and drop all charges against human rights defenders, journalists and political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated, politically motivated charges;

     

    – Demands that the authorities immediately lift the travel ban on Ibadoghlu, unconditionally drop all charges against him and allow him to receive urgent treatment abroad; deplores the fact that Ibadoghlu was not allowed to attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony or connect remotely;

     

    – Calls on Azerbaijan to lift undue restrictions on independent media by aligning its laws on the registration and funding of non-governmental groups and media with Venice Commission recommendations; demands that the authorities end the repression of MeydanTV, ToplumTV, Abaz Media and Kanal13;

     

    – Calls for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including Fuad Alasgarov, Vilayat Eyvazov and Ali Naghiyev.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Marina Adamovich, Mikalai Statkevich  Tatsiana Seviarynets, Pavel Seviarynets Daria Losik

    Ihar Losik

    Mikalai Kazlou

    Ryhor Kastusiou Mikalai Statkevich Pavel Seviarynets

    Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich (political prisoner), Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets (political prisoner), and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik (political prisoner), have suffered interrogations and detentions by the KGB. 

     

    Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, all political prisoners, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour.

    In its resolution of 14 December 2023, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;

     

    – Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1 400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Mikola Statkevich

    Ales Bialiatski

    Maria Kalesnikava Siarhei Tsikhanouski Viktar Babaryka Maksim Znak

    Pavel Sevyarynets Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk

    Andrzej Poczobut  Ihar Losik

    Former presidential candidate and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikola Statkevich has been imprisoned on politically motivated charges for 14 years; he is kept in solitary confinement under maximum security; his health is deteriorating and his lawyers and family have been denied information and contact for over 300 days.

     

    Prominent Belarusian political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Pavel Sevyarynets, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik, have been subjected to similar isolation.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate, unconditional release of Mikola Statkevich and all 1 500 political prisoners; calls for the withdrawal of all charges against them, their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damage suffered as a result of being deprived of liberty;

     

    – Insists that the prisoners must receive proper medical assistance and access to lawyers, family, diplomats and international organisations, which can assess their condition and provide aid; regrets the inaction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Belarus;

     

    – Strongly condemns the unjustified, politically motivated sentences and continued repression of Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, clergy, political activists and their family members.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ding Yuande

    Ma Ruimei

     

    On 12 May 2023 Falun Gong practitioners Mr Ding Yuande and his wife Ms Ma Ruimei were arrested without a warrant; Ms Ma was released on bail, but was then intimidated by police because of a rescue campaign launched by their son abroad.

     

    Mr Ding was detained with no family visits for eight months; on 15 December 2023 he was sentenced to three years in prison with a CNY 15 000 fine.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly urges the PRC to immediately end the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Mr Ding and all Falun Gong practitioners in China;

     

    – Calls for the PRC to end domestic and transnational surveillance and control and the suppression of religious freedom; urges the PRC to abide by its obligations under international law and its own constitution to respect and protect human rights.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ilham Tohti

    Gulshan Abbas

    In 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize. Gulshan Abbas has been serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC.

     

     

    Gulshan Abbas, is a Uyghur retired doctor, who was forcibly disappeared in retaliation of her sisters public criticism of the treatment of Uyghurs. She has received a 20-year sentence in 2020, for participating in a terrorist organisation.

     

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;

     

    – Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;

     

    – Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

     

    – Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations.

     

    CUBA

     

    José Daniel Ferrer Garcia

     

    Human rights defender and opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer García was detained on 11 July 2021 in the context of widespread protests in Cuba, and has been held in isolation since 14 August 2021; the Cuban regime has imprisoned, harassed and intimidated him for over a decade for his peaceful political activism; since March 2023, he has been held incommunicado and his family have received no information about his health and have been denied the right to visit him.

    In its resolution of 19 September 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – The Cuban regime holds political prisoners in the most appalling conditions; whereas reports indicate that José Daniel Ferrer is in a critical condition and has been held without access to medical treatment, with inadequate food and in unsanitary conditions, which constitute forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment;

     

    – The human rights situation in Cuba is alarming, particularly for dissidents, who are subjected to worrying levels of surveillance and arbitrary detention; whereas the number of political prisoners is unknown but reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand prisoners, including minors; whereas among the many political prisoners are Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Lizandra Gongora, whose health condition is critical;

     

    – Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release José Daniel Ferrer and all persons politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

     

    – Condemns the torture and inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban authorities against José Daniel Ferrer and the other political prisoners; calls for the families of victims of the regime’s persecution to be granted immediate access to them, pending their release, and for the victims to be given medical care.

     

    CRIMEA

    Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

    Crimean journalist and human rights defender Iryna Danylovych was abducted in 2022, accused of possessing explosives and sentenced to 6 years and 11 months of imprisonment; NGO activist Tofik Abdulhaziiev was arrested in 2019 and sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security prison on trumped-up charges, and since 2023 is being held in a prison some 2 700 km away from Crimea; citizen journalist Amet Suleymanov was sentenced to 12 years of prison in 2021.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns Russia’s continuous targeting of ethnic Ukrainians and systematic persecution of indigenous Crimean Tatars, which aims to erase their identity, heritage and culture, echoing, for the Crimean Tatars, the genocidal deportations of 1944; considers that Crimea’s future is tied to its recognition as the Crimean Tatars’ historic homeland;

     

    – Condemns the persecution of journalists, civil society activists and human rights defenders and the deportation of civilians including political prisoners from Crimea to penitentiary institutions across Russia, contrary to international law;

     

    – Demands the immediate and unconditional release of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov and other political prisoners; calls for immediate medical care to be provided; denounces the upholding of verdicts against seriously ill individuals, which constitutes a blatant violation of international human rights standards; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN to establish the whereabouts of civilian detainees from Crimea.

     

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

     

    Jean-Jacques Wondo

    Jean-Jacques Wondo, a Belgian-Congolese security, military and political expert, was arrested following a failed coup on 19 May 2024, for which he was accused of being the ‘intellectual perpetrator’, on 13 September 2024, Wondo and 36 others were sentenced to death by a military court.

     

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the sentencing to death of Wondo and others and the grave violations of their right to a fair trial;

     

    – Urges the DRC Government to immediately overturn the death sentences, reinstate a moratorium on executions and take steps towards the full abolition of the death penalty;

     

    –  Expresses deep concern about Wondo’s deteriorating health, calls for him to be given immediate access to medical treatment and insists on his immediate release;

     

    – Calls for systemic reforms to be implemented in the DRC to rebuild the judiciary into an independent, fair and efficient institution that guarantees due process and the protection of fundamental rights.

     

    GREECE

     

    George Karaivaz

    George Karaivaz was a journalist who have been murdered on 9 April 2021.

    In its resolution of 7 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Is deeply concerned by the failure of law enforcement and the judicial authorities in Greece to make progress in the investigation into the murder of the Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021; notes that two suspects were arrested in April 2023, but otherwise there has not been any discernible activity in the police investigation; strongly urges the authorities to take all the necessary steps towards conducting a thorough and effective investigation, and to bring those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; urges the authorities to request assistance from Europol.

     

    HONG KONG

     

    Andy Li

    Joseph John

    Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities.

     

    Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists.

     

    HONG KONG/ CHINA

     

    Jimmy Lai

    Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; his trial started in 2023 after various delays; he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him. Jimmy Lai a British national since 1996, is a Hong Kong media tycoon, and a known pro- democracy supporter.  Political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison.

     

    45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

     

    In its resolution of 28 November 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau.

     

    IRAN

     

    Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi

    Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

     

    – Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

     

    – Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates.

     

    KYRGYZSTAN

     

    Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Temirlan Sultanbekov is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party (SDK), he and other party officials have been arrested for vote-buying allegations, with an audiotape of unknown origin serving as the primary evidence, for which the judicial authorisation is unclear and its connection with the detainees unknown.

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to immediately release Mr Sultanbekov and other party officials and adopt alternative measures to detention, while respecting their right to due process in line with the civil and political rights guaranteed under the Kyrgyz constitution and international obligations; calls on the authorities to ensure his safety and well-being;

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz government to halt its campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, independent media outlets and journalists; is concerned by the adoption of the Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to drop all charges against human rights defenders, including Makhabat Tazhibek Kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov and Ayke Beishekeeva, journalists from the Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese channels.

     

    RUSSIA

     

    Alexei Navalny

    Vladimir Kara-Murza

    Yuri Dmitriev

    Ilya Yashin

    Alexei Gorinov

    Lilia Chanysheva Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin

    Daniel Kholodny Vadim Kobzev

    Igor Sergunin

    Alexei Liptser Viktoria Petrova Maria Ponomarenko Alexandra Skochilenko

    Svetlana Petriychuk Evgenia Berkovich Dmitry Ivanov

    Ioann Kurmoyarov Igor Baryshnikov Dmitry Talantov Alexei Moskalev

    Oleg Orlov

    Boris Kagarlitsky

    Ivan Safronov

     

    Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence. He had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns.

     

    Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Liptser, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov are political prisoners.

     

    In its resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

     

    – Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons.

    TAJIKISTAN

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati Daler Imomali Zavqibek Saidamini Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva Khushruz Jumayev Khurshed Fozilov

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov Buzurgmehr Yorov

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati, Daler Imomali, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khushruz Jumayev and Khurshed Fozilov are journalists who have been sentenced to between seven and over 20 years in prison in retaliation for their coverage of social issues and human rights abuses, including in GBAO.

     

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov  are human rights lawyers who have been detained.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites, including the online media outlets Pamir Daily News, New Tajikistan 2 and Akhbor.com;

     

    – Condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them, stop the persecution of lawyers defending government critics and release human rights lawyers Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov;

     

    – Urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.

     

    TÜRKIYE

     

    Bülent Mumay

    Bülent Mumay is a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed.

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists, as well as political opponents, human rights defenders, civil servants and academics;

     

      Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism.

     

    VENEZUELA

     

    Rocío San Miguel

    General Hernández Da Costa 

    Ronald Ojeda

    María Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo Lopez Emil Brandt

     

    Rocío San Miguel is a lawyer and human rights activist with Spanish nationality, who got kidnapped by the Venezuelan regime on 9 February 2024, and sentenced on politically motivated grounds of suspected conspiracy against Nicolás Maduro and his regime; she is currently being detained in El Helicoide prison, which is known for human rights abuses, including torture.

     

    Hernández Da Costa has been a political prisoner since August 2018; on 19 February 2024, he was forcibly transferred to El Rodeo 1 prison, designed to detain political prisoners; an unknown number of prisoners, including some EU citizens, were also transferred; the general suffers from medical ailments that require constant treatment, which he is being denied.

     

    Ronald Ojeda was a former political prisoner who escaped the Maduro regime, and got murdered in Chile.

     

    Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro, Guillermo Lopez and Emil Brandt are four campaign coordinators working for the opposition to the regime’s presidential candidate, and have been detained on political grounds.

     

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, and the full restoration of their rights; exhorts the regime to cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

     

    – Strongly condemns the Maduro regime for imprisoning hundreds of political prisoners;

     

    – Calls on the international community to support a return to democracy in Venezuela, particularly in the light of the upcoming elections, in which the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, must be allowed to fully participate.

    VENEZUELA

     

    Maria Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo López

    Maria Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35 % of the votes in the primary elections. She got a disqualification of 15 years.

     

    For several months, members of María Corina Machado’s campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;

     

    – Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office;

     

    – Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians.

     

     

     

     

    ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

     

    Year of Sakharov Prize award

    Name and surname

    Laureate / Finalist

    Country

    Situation (Detention / house arrest / temporarily released)

    Length of prison sentence

    Start date of detention

    2024

    Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Finalist

    Azerbaijan

    Under travel ban

     

    A court rejected Ibadoglu’s appeal against the travel ban on 3/12/2024

    2021

    Alexei Navalny

    Laureate

     

    Russia

    Deceased in prison on 16/2/2024

     

    3,5 + 9 + 19 years

    Last detained 17/2/21, last sentenced 4/8/23

    2020

    Siarhei Tsikhanouski

     

    Maryia Kalesnikava

     

    Mikola Statkevich

     

     

    Ales Bialiatski

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

     

    Laureate

    Belarus

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

     

    Detention

    18 years

     

    11 years

     

    14 years

     

     

    10 years

     

    Detained 29/5/20, sentenced 14/12/21

    Detained 07/9/20, sentenced 06/9/21

    Last detained 31/5/20, last sentenced 14/12/21

    Last detained 15/7/21, last sentenced 03/03/23

    2020

    Porfirio Sorto Cedillo, José Avelino Cedillo, Orbin Naún Hernández, Kevin Alejandro Romero, Arnold Javier Aleman, Ever Alexander Cedillo, Daniel Marquez and Jeremías Martínez Díaz

    Finalists

    Honduras

    Detention

    Unknown

    1/9/2019, released on 24/2/2022, after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Honduras

    2019

    Ilham Tohti

    Laureate

    China

    Detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2014

    2018

    Nasser Zefzafi

     

    Finalist

    Morocco

    Detention

    20 years

    5/4/2019

    2017

    Dawit Isaak

    Finalist

    Eritrea

    Incommunicado detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2001

    2015

    Raif Badawi

    Laureate

    Saudi Arabia

    Released on 11/3/2022, since then under a 10-year travel ban

     

    10 years

    First sentenced on 17/12/2012, but announced on 30/3/2013

    2012

    Nasrin Sotoudeh

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Jafar Panahi

    Laureate

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Laureate

    Iran

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Iran

    Detention, on temporary medical furlough since July 2021, arrested again 29/10/2023 and released 15/11/2023

     

    Detained in 2022,

    released on 3/2/2023 after hunger strike

    38 years

     

     

     

     

     

     

    6 years

    6/3/2019 (most recent)

     

     

     

     

     

    compelled in July 2022 to serve a 10-years old prison sentence

    2011

    Razan Zaitouneh

    Laureate

    Syria

    Kidnapped in 2013. Presumptions of detention and death.

     

    9/12/2013

    2009

    Memorial – Oleg Orlov

    Laureate

     

     

    Russia

    Released on 1/8/2024 as part of a prisoner exchange with the US and Germany

    2.5 years

    Latest sentence in February 2024. Memorial as legal entity liquidated in January 2022.

     

     

    ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

    List of resolutions adopted by the European Parliament from December 2023 to January 2025 and related directly or indirectly to human rights violations in the world

     

     

    Country/Region

    Date of adoption in plenary

     

    Title

    Africa

     

     

    Algeria

    23.01.2025

    The case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Democratic Republic of the Congo

    23.01.2025

    The case of Jean-Jacques Wondo

     

    Gambia

     

    25.04.2024

    On the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia

    Nigeria

    08.02.2024

    On the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria

    Sudan

    18.01.2024

    On the threat of famine following the spread of the conflict in Sudan

    Tanzania

    14.12.2023

    On the Maasai Communities in Tanzania

    Americas

     

     

    Cuba

    29.02.2024

    On the critical situation in Cuba

    Cuba

    19.09.2024

    The case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba

    Guatemala

    14.12.2023

    On the attempt at a coup d’état in Guatemala

    Venezuela

    08.02.2024

    On further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado

     

    Venezuela

     

    14.03.2024

    On the case of Rocío San Miguel and General Hernández Da Costa, among other political prisoners in Venezuela

    Venezuela

    19.09.2024

    Situation on Venezuela

    Venezuela

    23.01.2025

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Asia

     

     

     

    Afghanistan

     

     

    14.03.2024

    On the repressive environment in Afghanistan, including public executions and violence against women

    Afghanistan

    19.09.2024

    The deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan due to the recent adoption of the law on the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”

     

    Azerbaijan

     

    25.04.2024

    On Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Azerbaijan

    19.12.2024

    Continued repression of civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Cambodia

    28.11.2024

    The shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL

     

    China

     

    18.01.2024

    On the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong in China, notably the case of Mr Ding Yuande

    China

     

    10.10.2024

    The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas

    China/ Taiwan

    24.10.2024

    Misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

     

    Hong Kong

     

    25.04.2024

    On the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John

    Hong Kong/ China

     

    28.11.2024

    Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law

    Kyrgyzstan

    19.12.2024

    Human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Tajikistan

    18.01.2024

    On Tajikistan: state repression against the independent media

     

    Tibet

     

    14.12.2023

    On the abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet

    Middle East

     

     

     

    Iran/Israel

     

    25.04.2024

    On Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response

     

    Iran

     

    08.02.2024

    On the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou

    Iran

    28.11.2024

    The increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran

    Iran

    23.01.2025

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran

    Iraq

    10.10.2024

    Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law

     

    Palestine

     

    18.01.2024

    On the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation

     

    Palestine

     

    14.03.2024

    On the immediate risk of mass starvation in Gaza and the attacks on humanitarian aid deliveries

    Europe and Eastern Partnership countries

     

     

     

    Azerbaijan/Armenia

     

    13.03.2024

    On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia

    Azerbaijan/ Armenia

    24.10.2024

    Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

     

    Belarus

     

    14.12.2023

    On the unknown status of Mikola Statkevich and the recent attacks on Belarusian politicians’ and activists’ family members

     

    Belarus

     

    08.02.2024

    on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members

    Belarus

    19.09.2024

    The severe situation of political prisoners in Belarus

    Belarus

    22.01.2025

    Actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus

    Crimea

    19.12.2024

    11th year of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the deteriorating human rights situation in occupied Crimea, notably the cases of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

     

    Georgia

     

    25.04.2024

    On attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society

    Georgia

    09.10.2024

    The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    Georgia

    28.11.2024

    Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

    Greece

    07.02.2024

    On the rule of law and media freedom in Greece

     

    Hungary

     

    24.04.2024

    On ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications

    Hungary

    18.01.2024

    On the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds

    Moldova

    09.10.2024

    Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

     

    Russia

     

    29.02.2024

    On the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia

     

    Russia

     

    08.02.2024

    On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

     

     

    Russia

     

     

    25.04.2024

    On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

     

    Russia

     

    25.04.2024

    On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

    Russia

     

    14.11.2024

    EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

    Russia

     

    23.01.2025

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Russia/ North Korea

    28.11.2024

    Reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

    Serbia

    08.02.2024

    On the situation in Serbia following the elections

     

    Slovakia

     

    17.01.2024

    On the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications for the rule of law

    Türkiye

    10.10.2024

    European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye

    Cross-cutting issues

     

     

    Children liberty

    13.12.2023

    On the situation of children deprived of liberty in the world

     

    LGBTIQ rights

     

    08.02.2024

    On the implementation of the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025

     

     

    Protection of journalists

     

     

    27.02.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings

     

    Human rights and democracy

     

    28.02.2024

    Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023

    Foreign and security policy

    28.02.2024

    Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023

     

     

    Media freedom

     

     

    13.03.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market

     

     

    Forced labour

     

     

    23.04.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market

    Right of abortion

    11.04.2024

    On including the right to abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter

     

     

    Due diligence

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive

     

    Fundamental rights

     

    18.01.2024

    On the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023

    Hate speech

    18.01.2024

    On extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime

     

     

    Business and human rights

     

     

    18.01.2024

    On shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims

    Freedom of scientific research

    17.01.2024

    On promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU

    Citizens, equality, rights and values

    16.01.2024

    On the implementation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 2021-2027

     

     

    Violence against women

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence

     

    Human beings traffic

     

    23.04.2024

    On preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the assessment of the implementation of Horizon Europe in view of its interim evaluation and recommendations for the 10th Research Framework Programme – A10-0021/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the assessment of the implementation of Horizon Europe in view of its interim evaluation and recommendations for the 10th Research Framework Programme

    (2024/2109(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 179 to 188 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013[2],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/764 of 10 May 2021 establishing the Specific Programme implementing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, and repealing Decision 2013/743/EU[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/819 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 on the European Institute of Innovation and Technology[4],

     having regard to Decision (EU) 2021/820 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 on the Strategic Innovation Agenda of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) 2021-2027: Boosting the Innovation Talent and Capacity of Europe and repealing Decision No 1312/2013/EU[5],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[7],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 entitled ‘A new ERA for Research and Innovation’ (COM(2020)0628),

    _ having regard to the Commission communication of 22 October 2024 entitled ‘Implementation of the European Research Area (ERA) – Strengthening Europe’s Research and Innovation: The ERA’s Journey and Future Directions’ (COM(2024)0490),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2021 on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation Europe’s strategy for international cooperation in a changing world (COM(2021)0252),

     having regard to its resolution of 6 April 2022 on a global approach to research and innovation: Europe’s strategy for international cooperation in a changing world[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the European Innovation Council[9],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 July 2023 entitled ‘EU Missions two years on: assessment of progress and way forward’ (COM(2023)0457),

     having regard to its resolution of 14 December 2023 on young researchers[10],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 with recommendations to the Commission on promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU[11],

     having regard to the European Research and Innovation Area Committee Opinion of 26 June 2024 on Guidance for the next Framework Programme for Research & Innovation,

     having regard to the partnership evaluation reports published in 2024 on eight of the nine Knowledge and Innovation Communities, namely EIT Urban Mobility, EIT Climate-KIC, EIT Food, EIT InnoEnergy, EIT Health, EIT Manufacturing, EIT Raw Materials, and EIT Digital,

     having regard to the Report of the CERIS Expert Group of November 2024 entitled ‘Building resilience in the civil security domain based on research and technology’,

     having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 09/2022 of September 2022 entitled ‘Climate spending in the 2014-2020 EU budget– Not as high as reported’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 January 2016 entitled ‘On the Response to the Report of the High Level Expert Group on the Ex Post Evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme’(COM(2016)0005),

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the report by the Commission Expert Group on the Interim Evaluation of Horizon Europe of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Align, Act, Accelerate: Research, Technology and Innovation to boost European Competitiveness,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0021/2025),

    A. whereas Horizon Europe (HEU) is the EU’s largest centrally managed funding programme and the largest publicly funded research and development (R&D) programme in the world; whereas Parliament initially proposed a budget of EUR 120 billion rather than the EUR 93.4 billion left after the revision of the multiannual financial framework;

    B. whereas investments in R&D are essential for EU competitiveness, societal progress and innovation; whereas the report on the Future of European Competitiveness (the Draghi report) and the report by the Commission Expert Group on the Interim Evaluation of Horizon Europe (the Heitor report) recommended a budget for the 10th Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (FP10) of EUR 200 billion and EUR 220 billion respectively;

    C. whereas the FP must be founded on European values, scientific independence, freedom and excellence, as well as on high European ethical standards and a drive to improve European competitiveness as well as to address societal challenges;

    D. whereas the Draghi report showed that Europe is a world leader in science and innovation with the second highest share of high quality scientific publications and the third highest share of patent applications globally; whereas the Draghi report also concluded that the value chain that goes from research to innovative products that improve citizens’ lives in the EU is less effective compared to the US and China in translating good research into successful businesses providing quality jobs, new products and services to European citizens, as illustrated by the persistent gap between the US and EU in innovation performance, and the closing gap between the EU and China; whereas the Draghi report highlights that Europe lags particularly when it comes to the scaling up of start-ups;

    E. whereas Commissioner Zaharieva, in her hearing with Parliament, committed to fighting for an independent and simplified FP and expressed her support for an increased budget and more expert-driven governance;

    F. whereas the Heitor report outlines that in the first three years of Horizon Europe, 7 474 SMEs (34 % of all participants) were participating in the programme and that more than half of Horizon Europe SMEs are new to EU research, development and innovation programmes; whereas the success rates of SME applications has strongly improved (up to 19.9 % from 12 % in Horizon 2020);

    G. whereas the Letta report proposes the establishment of a ‘fifth freedom’ to encompass research, innovation and education as a new dimension of the single market, as the four original freedoms are fundamentally based on 20th-century theoretical principals;

    H. whereas the Letta report’s ‘freedom to stay’ reiterates the importance of avoiding internal brain drain, and the Heitor report’s ‘Choose Europe’ initiative sets out to foster research careers and turn the current European brain drain into a ‘brain gain’ by 2035;

    General observations on Horizon Europe and Research and Innovation (R&I)

    1 Recalls that we are at a crucial moment for R&I, and that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Europe needs to put ‘research and innovation at the heart of our economy’ during the presentation to Parliament of her programme for her second term as president of the European Commission in July 2024;

    2. Notes that the Draghi, Letta and Heitor reports consider R&I to be of central importance to achieving European competitiveness and stress the urgent need to act not to fall behind; stresses that a strong commitment is needed to achieve a future framework programme that constitutes a crucial contribution to the competitiveness of Europe and its overall welfare;

    3. Recalls that the Draghi and the Heitor reports are a wake-up call for Europe to face global competition and the significant rise of Chinese science in recent years; welcomes the higher success rate of HEU compared to Horizon 2020 (H2020); appreciates HEU’s responsiveness in crises, such as COVID-19 and geopolitical challenges, but regrets not only the lack of additional funding but also the continuous funding cuts, which compromise original priorities;

    4. Regrets that there have been negative experiences with the implementation of HEU because the shift from H2020 to HEU has mostly been experienced as an increase in complexity and bureaucracy; underlines that the success rates in some parts of the programme are still so low as to discourage potentially excellent applications, especially from researchers from research institutions with smaller budgets and SMEs; considers that strategic planning  should lead to more substantial benefits for the quality of the programming and a strengthened commitment of all R&I stakeholders, which so far do not seem to have materialised sufficiently; believes that FP10 should be built on instruments under Horizon Europe that have proven to be effective and efficient;

    5. Highlights the importance of an agile FP; notes that the Heitor report outlines the importance of responding to the fast-changing field of science and innovation and recommends a radical reform in engaging practitioners in the governance  of the  programme, notably through the two proposed new Councils as well as less prescriptive calls; recalls that the Draghi report notes that the current governance of the FP is slow and bureaucratic, that its organisation should be redesigned to be more outcome-based and evaluated by top experts and that the future FP should be governed by people with a proven track record at the frontier of research or innovation; notes that innovative ideas cannot always be predicted and programmed and underlines the need for sufficient funding that is not pre-programmed in order to tap the full potential of developing innovation;

    6. Highlights the importance of having an FP based on excellence in order to ensure the participation of the best researchers in Europe through the whole programme; argues that one of the critical weakness of the EU R&I policy landscape is also linked to the lack of a meaningful, integrated and complementary approach between place-based and excellence-driven R&I activities, in particular between the FP and the R&I window of the cohesion policy, which are of the same order of magnitude in terms of the EU budget; notes that the scale-up and commercialisation of research results remains a big challenge in Europe;

    7. Recalls the recommendation by the Heitor report to foster an attractive and inclusive European research, development and innovation ecosystem; recalls the recommendation by the Letta report to foster the development of a fifth freedom in the single market; recalls the observation of the Draghi report that the fragmentation of the EU innovation ecosystem is one of the root causes of Europe’s weak innovation performance; recalls that the Treaties situate the FP in the development of the European Research Area; is convinced that to maximise the impact of the framework programme, it needs to be embedded in a broader European research policy that ensures that Europe is an attractive location for research activities which attracts global talent, which effectively translates science into economic growth and societal progress, and which effectively addresses the innovation gap within the EU; considers that the upcoming European Research Area Act (ERA Act) should aim at achieving this Europe; recognises that there are still significant obstacles to ‘brain circulation’ among Member States, including the recognition of qualifications;

    8. Insists on the absolute need for that Member States to adopt concrete commitments to reach a target of 3 % of GDP spending on R&D by 2030; notes that the EU is investing significantly less than other global powers, and that it has failed to reach the 3 % target for more than two decades, investing 2.24 % of its GDP in R&D in 2022, for example, compared to 3.5 % in the US; underlines that each year the EU under invests in R&D worsens the situation and deepens the gap with third countries; specifies that major discrepancies exist between the R&D intensity of the 27 EU Member States, with five reaching the 3 % spending target, while some others are below 1 %; recalls that, at less than 7 % of the total[12], the EU budget’s contribution to R&D spending is a very minor share of the overall public spending on R&D in the EU; notes that national spending for research should not be cut in response to  the availability of EU research funding as alternative funding; highlights that a joint effort between European and national funding for research and innovation is needed; underlines as well the important role of private investment in research and innovation in order to complement public funding; regrets that European private investment in research, development and innovation is lagging behind that in China and the US, reaching 1.3 % of GDP in the EU, compared to 2.4 % in the US and 1.9 % in China; insists, therefore, on the vital role of EU intervention as a catalyst for R&D spending, and on the need for further coordination and alignment  between national and EU R&D spending;

    9. Insists on the vital role of long-term public funding to support excellent basic research, driven by scientific curiosity with the only aim of advancing scientific knowledge and without an obvious nor immediate benefit, sometimes characterised by serendipity;

    10. Highlights recital 72 of the Horizon Europe Regulation, which states that in order to guarantee scientific excellence, and in line with Article 13 of the Charter, the programme should promote the respect of academic freedom in all countries benefiting from its funds; underlines that while several incidents regarding academic freedom took place in several countries benefiting from Horizon Europe funds, the Commission has not used this recital effectively to address specific problems; welcomes the commitment by the Commissioner responsible for start-ups, research and innovation, in her hearing with Parliament, to propose a legislative proposal on the freedom of scientific research; calls on the Commission to present such a legislative proposal in line with Parliament’s resolution of 17 January 2024;

    11. Supports the high levels of climate spending in the first years of Horizon Europe; urges the Commission to stay on course to achieve the overall climate spending target of 35 % over the full lifetime of the programme;

    12. Highlights that Horizon Europe is on track to meet its climate spending targets without, according to the Horizon Europe Programme Guide, considering the Do No Significant Harm principle in the evaluation of proposals, unless it was relevant for the content of the call; underlines that there is no legal obligation or legal basis for the horizontal application of either the Do No Significant Harm principle or the Do No Harm principle; welcomes the commitment by the Commissioner responsible for start-ups, research and innovation, in her hearing with Parliament, to assess the current approach and the new approach to the application of the Do No Significant Harm principle, including the legal basis for its application, and to share the assessment with Parliament; urges the Commission to report to Parliament, before the start of FP10, on the impact of the use of Do No (Significant) Harm under Horizon Europe, including an estimate of the associated costs of its implementation for the Commission and beneficiaries, and its impact on the simplification of project applications;

    13. Considers that during the implementation of Horizon Europe, several major global events put thousands of researchers at risk, including in the EU’s neighbourhood, leading to significant spikes in applications by researchers at risk for an emergency placement in Europe; concludes, however, that under the current programme, the EU does not have sufficient funding available to support researchers at risk and that efforts by some Member States and NGOs are fragmented;

    14. Affirms the importance of international cooperation for the advancement of science; is concerned in this regard that international cooperation has declined under Horizon Europe compared to Horizon 2020; encourages the Commission to seek and conclude other association agreements with third countries, restates[13] and emphasises that Parliament’s ability to give meaningful consent to international agreements specifically concerning the participation of countries referred to in Article 16(1)d of the Horizon Europe Regulation in EU programmes is impeded where such agreements do not provide for a structure that guarantees parliamentary scrutiny under a consent procedure for association to a specific EU programme;

    15. Welcomes in particular the association of the UK and Switzerland to Horizon Europe as it recognises the fact that UK and Swiss science and innovation are an integral part of the European science and innovation ecosystem; restates its concern about the amended Protocol in 2023 and its provisions regarding the automatic rebate for the UK; emphasises that any international agreement on the association of Switzerland to EU programmes should fully respect the prerogative of Parliament to provide meaningful consent in line with its resolution on association agreements for the participation of third countries in Union programmes;

    16. Takes note of the Commission white paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential; considers that nearly all respondents to the public consultation on the white paper rejected option 3; emphasises that many respondents considered that the implications of options 1 and 2 were not clear enough to allow them to determine which option would be preferable; highlights that it is widely recognised that the current constellation requires improvement to ensure the efficient use of public funds and to boost Europe’s technological sovereignty; notes that Commissioner Zaharieva committed, in her hearing with Parliament, to continuing this evaluation, potentially through a new study to ensure the views expressed are representative of all stakeholders;

    17. Notes that significant advances have been made in the framework of Horizon Europe with gender equality plans (GEPs) as an eligibility criterion and the gender dimension in the content of R&I as an award criterion by default across the programme; recognises that recent analyses confirm that the GEP eligibility criterion has had a catalytic effect;

    Observations on competitiveness

    18. Is deeply convinced that EU spending on science, research and innovation is the best investment in our common European future and for increasing competitiveness and societal progress, and successfully closing the innovation gap; agrees with Mr Draghi that all public R&D spending in the EU should be better coordinated at EU level, meaning properly aligning investments with the EU’s strategic priorities, focusing on funding initiatives that achieve relevant impact and create added value, and that a reformed and strengthened FP is crucial to achieving this; underlines that, in order to ensure real added value, R&D spending should also be better coordinated at national level between Member States; reiterates that the reformed fiscal rules exclude national funds used to co-finance EU programmes, and calls for this possibility to be put to full use in order to boost EU research funding;

    19. Underlines the importance of standardisation activities to ensure that European companies can effectively capitalise on the competitive advantage from research and innovation;

    20. Underlines the significant role of research and innovation across different industrial sectors that contributes to creating jobs and increasing European competitiveness compared to third countries;

    21. Emphasises the importance of the European Innovation Council (EIC) for Europe’s competitiveness; highlights in this regard that investments under the EIC are bridging the ‘valley of death’ and lead to innovations of a disruptive nature that have breakthrough and scale-up potential; highlights also the unique proposition of the EIC Accelerator to provide tailor-made support for high-potential, non-bankable start-ups;

    22. Welcomes the fact that 44 % of the Horizon Europe budget to date has contributed to the digital and industrial transitions, most notably by stimulating cooperation for technology development, which are fundamental for European competitiveness;

    23. Strongly believes that, beyond their key role for long-term and sustainable competitiveness, applied research, development and innovation policies are instrumental to avoid, anticipate and cope with the main global and societal challenges;

    Observations on technical implementation

    24. Considers that administrative simplification stagnated under Horizon Europe given that 32 % of participants consider applying to Horizon Europe to be more burdensome than Horizon 2020, while nearly half of participants report no difference[14], is concerned about the ‘exploded cumulative transaction and administrative costs’[15]; notes that on average beneficiaries reported spending 6-10 % of their project budget on administrative costs, with 48 % reporting administrative costs of more than 10 %, including a 10 % share of beneficiaries reporting administrative costs of more than 20 %; deplores the fact that the time-to-grant under Horizon Europe is longer than it was under Horizon 2020, and that it exceeds the target of eight months set by the Commission[16]; insists on further administrative simplification, streamlining of the relevant procedures, cost cutting and a greater focus on applicants, and underlines that simplification must be for the benefit of the applicants, while ensuring that applications contain all the information needed for the evaluation of their excellence;

    25. Recalls that the first full version of the Annotated Model Grant Agreement for Horizon Europe was published only in May 2024, more than three years after the start of the programme; notes that without a full version of this document, beneficiaries are not fully informed of the legal and financial conditions associated with signing a Grant Agreement; recalls that the first version of the Annotated Model Grant Agreement for Horizon 2020 was published before the official start of the programme; notes that the apparent cause of the delayed publication is the corporate approach to Model Grant Agreements which the Commission took for EU programmes under the current multiannual financial framework;

    26. Notes that there are various opinions and experiences among different beneficiaries regarding the functionality of lump sums; recognises that some beneficiaries do not consider the introduction of lump-sum funding to be a simplification for them; underlines that the 2024 assessment of lump sum funding presents unclear data, which leaves important worries and questions unanswered, such as the uncertainty of the impact of an ex-post audit, while confirming other objections, such as the artificial increase of the number of work packages[17]; considers that this assessment confirms that lump-sum funding can be a simplification for some beneficiaries, but not for all[18];

    27. Considers that the simplification offered by lump-sum funding consists of removing all obligations on actual cost reporting by beneficiaries to the Commission and removing financial ex-post audits for projects; welcomes the fact that this results in a lower error rate; underlines, however, that the error rate is a tool to ensure proper spending of public funds and not a goal in itself; warns, in that context, against putting at risk the quality of the spending of a highly successful programme by ramping up the use of lump sums too quickly;

    28. Observes that the average size of consortia in Horizon Europe is significantly larger than in Horizon 2020[19]; considers that consortia foster collaboration and that bigger consortia contribute to broader, and potentially more diverse, collaboration; underlines, however, that managing bigger consortia also requires more time and effort both in the proposal preparation phase and in the project implementation phase, which takes away resources from performing research; considers, furthermore, that more complex consortia are less attractive to join for newcomers, given the complexity and the resources as well as the experience needed to manage them;

    29. Underlines the importance of an open and accessible programme with low thresholds for applying in order to ensure participation of newcomers as well as SMEs; underlines that more than half of SME participants in Horizon Europe are newcomers[20]; considers that administrative burdens, the time investments needed and the complexity of applications risk discouraging SMEs from participating in the programme[21]; notes that the simple, small and fast grants of the SME Instrument under H2020 were a magnet for newcomer SMEs[22];

    30. Considers that the Commission has not succeeded in creating agile but strong management of HEU, which has led to complex implementation; expects that the interim evaluation report should address shortages and possible solutions;

    Observations on Pillar 1

    31. Recognises the importance of Pillar 1 in promoting scientific excellence and attracting highly-skilled research, through the European Research Council (ERC), and programmes such as the Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions (MSCA);

    32. Welcomes the continued success of the ERC; underlines that its success is dependent on the independence of the Scientific Council; stresses that the last few years have shown that the presence of a capable and committed president of the Scientific Council with respected scientific credentials is essential for the functioning and independence of the ERC; notes that the bottom-up calls and independent governance of the ERC Scientific Council have proven highly effective;

    33. Highlights the ability of both the ERC and the MSCA to attract scientific talent to Europe; notes the valuable contribution of the MSCA to European scientific leadership; notes with worry the low success rates in the MSCA;

    34. Underlines that research projects funded under Pillar 1 should adhere to the principle of ‘high risk/high gain’; suggests clarifying evaluation criteria to strictly ensure the realisation of ‘high risk/high gain’ when evaluating research proposals; observes that ‘high risk’ also means employing new research methods;

    35. Emphasises that research infrastructures, in particular digital research infrastructures, provide a vital platform for researchers and innovators across disciplines and sectors to share data, methods and expertise, fostering the development and application of new technologies to strengthen Europe’s technological sovereignty; welcomes, particularly in this regard, the progress made on the European Open Science Cloud and the European Museums Cloud;

    Observations on Pillar 2

    36. Emphasises that collaborative research is at the heart of the European framework programmes; recognises the importance of Pillar 2, which serves as a vital strategic tool, fostering pan-European collaboration by pooling resources and knowledge, and aligning public and private R&I agendas; notes that collaboration would not occur without EU funding at a similar rate, highlighting the unique added value of EU collaboration programmes, in particular for enabling Europe to address complex societal challenges and integrate businesses into critical, continent-wide value chains; considers that Pillar 2 has fostered research collaboration and has in particular been able to support joint research and innovation agendas for technology maturation through the joint undertakings, which contributes to the competitiveness of the EU;

    37. Considers Pillar 2 a strategic tool for enabling pan-European collaboration and pooling of knowledge and resources, attracting private investments, and for bringing together public and private stakeholders across Europe to tackle complex societal challenges; believes it is important to continue support for these collaborations; acknowledges, however, the complexity of Pillar 2; believes that the implementation of this pillar remains too complex and should be improved, simplified and streamlined with a view to targeting results rather than solely addressing expenditure; notes that the number of instruments involved such as a multitude of partnerships, the complex, top-down administrative implementation of missions, and the many budgetary shifts have resulted in unnecessary complexity which discourages applicants, and especially newcomers, from participating; emphasises the importance of the accessibility of these instruments, particularly for SMEs from across all European regions, in order to enable participation for all excellent researchers and innovators as well as to foster the absorption capacities of companies; welcomes the announcement of the rebalancing in Pillar 2 towards a better equilibrium between the different types of R&I activities, from fundamental research to market-oriented innovation, as announced in the second strategic plan for Horizon Europe; notes in that context the conclusion in the European Research and Innovation Area Committee opinion on FP10 that the Cluster structure of Horizon Europe creates an unnecessary obstacle for participants looking for funding, in particular newcomers, as well as the conclusion of the Draghi report that ‘[t]he programme should consolidate the overall fragmented and heterogeneous activities’;

    Observations on Pillar 3

    38. Notes that scaling up and commercialising research outcomes remains Europe’s greatest challenge; recalls the decisive role of entrepreneurship, for instance in the commercial and economic exploitation of excellent applied research into breakthrough innovation;

    39. Highlights that the European Innovation Council is filling a widely recognised investment gap for scale-up finance for break-through innovations[23]; takes note of the very low success rate under the EIC and considers this a confirmation of the relevance of EIC funding as well as a worrying signal of underfunding of the programme; welcomes that fact that the EIC was completed as an instrument by the introduction of transition activities because these complete the innovator’s journey from early idea to scale-up by facilitating technology maturation and validation; underlines the quality and relevance of the advice provided by the EIC Board and recalls in this regard the importance of expert advice to guide the implementation of the framework programme;

    40. Considers that the EIC is a needed and excellent instrument in principle; agrees that streamlining and boosting the EIC, attracting private investments and supporting the commercialisation of research is at the core of Pillar 3, as confirmed by the Heitor report; regrets, however, that the Commission made some implementation decisions that led the EIC away from its intended purpose to help companies scale up; recognises that the EIC should have the flexibility to strategically maximise its potential to support breakthrough technology; firmly believes that the EIC can achieve its full potential if the legal and institutional setting of the programme is clarified and strengthened;

    41. Regrets that not all of Parliament’s recommendations set out in its resolution of 22 November 2022 on the implementation of the European Innovation Council have been implemented, most notably the recommendation that a thorough assessment be made of ways to improve the EIC’s implementation, considering as an option the establishment of an independent EU body under Article 187 TFEU as the main entity responsible for implementing the EIC; regrets, moreover, that its recommendation to ensure the implementation of both the equity and grant components with direct coordination between the two components has been ignored;

    42. Draws attention to the work of the programme managers in the EIC; strongly believes in the approach of strategic intelligence developed by experts with widely recognised expertise in the field to effective programming of strategic challenge-based calls; appreciates, in particular, the work done by programme managers to help projects find and realise added value by bringing together projects with a common interest;

    43. Notes the generally positive assessments (in particular in terms of EU added value) made by independent experts of the Knowledge and Innovation Communities; notes that EIT KICs contribute to strengthening links between higher education and business as well as to closing the ‘skills gap’, and that synergies should be explored with the academies introduced in recent EU legislation (e.g. Net Zero Industry Act, Critical Raw Materials Act, Cybersecurity Package); highlights, moreover, that the EIT regional innovation scheme (RIS) activities contribute to reducing the European innovation capacity divide; recalls that more synergies to bridge the innovation divide should be created between the EIT and other actions such as the EU preparatory action entitled ‘Innovation for place-based transformation’ and believes that the EIT KICs could improve synergies within the framework programme (in pillar 3 activities and between pillars), and establish concrete synergies between excellence-driven and place-based innovation, for instance via the implementation of successors of R&I activities led by the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, such as the Interregional Innovation Investments (I3) instrument;

    44. Regrets to conclude, however, that the relevance of the EIT as a programme is questioned by several stakeholders, including some of its biggest beneficiaries; underlines that in principle the concept of knowledge and innovation communities is appreciated by stakeholders as a useful instrument for effective innovation ecosystem development and integration; considers that the two main concerns raised are the financial self-sustainability requirement for KICs[24] and the central management by the EIT organisation which is too bureaucratic and burdensome, and which creates governance difficulties for the KICs[25]; concludes that for many stakeholders the financial and other costs, including the high burden of participating in a KIC, outweigh the benefits of the relatively little funding support relevant for them;

    45. Regrets that, although some efforts have already been made, synergies between the EIC, the EIT and the ERC are not sufficiently developed;

    Observations on Part 4

    46. Welcomes that participation of entities from widening countries has increased in HEU; acknowledges that the innovation divide persists, notwithstanding a slight decrease in the disparities in innovation performance across Europe, in spite of two decades of widening efforts; underlines, however, that the existence of this innovation gap in Europe has negative consequences for the EU as a whole given that it means available talent is left unused and economic disparities within the EU can be expected to grow; notes that this low participation can be partially explained by structural factors, including inadequate national public investment in R&D, which undermines the effectiveness of the national R&I systems, as reflected by low scores on the European Innovation Scoreboard; notes, furthermore, that there is a link between high levels of FP participation and high levels of national public investment in R&D; is strongly convinced that without national reforms, the innovation gap cannot be closed, regardless of the efforts made at European level, and refers to the European Court of Auditors Special Report 09/2022 on this matter; recognises that new and more effective mechanisms to increase widening are needed, but that financing for these actions should primarily come from the national level and be complemented by cohesion policy funds; calls on the Commission to ensure that the upcoming ERA Act lays down strong obligations for Member States to improve the functioning of their R&I system in order to eliminate subpar performance due to structural challenges;

    47. Underlines the importance of the Seal of Excellence under Horizon Europe; considers that the Seal in part mitigates the persistent issue of underfunding in Horizon Europe, which significantly hampers the ability to adequately support all high-quality proposals; acknowledges furthermore that the Seal can contribute to improving the relative participation of researchers from widening countries; emphasises, however, that the Seal cannot be considered as a substitute for direct financial support, particularly because the Seal is not a guarantee for funding;

    48. Notes that a thriving European innovation ecosystem requires strong and well-connected place-based innovation ecosystems and that a better connected European innovation ecosystem will be essential for enhancing the competitiveness of Europe, its resilience and strategic autonomy; recognises that collaboration among territorial ecosystems enables European regions to leverage their combined strengths to develop innovative solutions more efficiently; underlines that this collaboration also accelerates the commercialisation and scaling of technologies, bolstering the EU’s competitiveness also globally; recognises the vital role of public research organisations, including universities, as drivers of place-based innovation;

    Observations on missions and partnerships

    49. Highlights the science communication role of the missions and the need to strengthen this even further because this will bring research results closer to society and help address the challenge of distrust in R&I, while simultaneously helping gain societal approval for public investments in R&I; recalls that the Commission communication entitled ‘EU Missions two years on: assessment of progress and way forward’ did not constitute a positive assessment of the missions and concluded that missions had failed on core objectives such as crowding in external funding;

    50. Recalls the fundamental role of partnerships in bringing together the Commission and private and/or public partners, and is of the opinion that they must receive continuous support with a defined target and scope; emphasises that public-private partnership governance structures should be streamlined and simplified to avoid unnecessary burdens and enhance focus on key priorities; considers the joint undertakings as very useful instruments to foster better coordination and alignment of research agendas across the EU, as well as to foster co-investment in R&D between the public and private sectors; notes with regret that the Joint Undertakings have not yet resulted in increased R&D spending by European industry overall;

    Recommendations for the remaining part of Horizon Europe

    51. Notes that no significant changes in the implementation of the missions have taken place since the publication of the communication; concludes that the current approach to missions is not sufficiently oriented towards fostering creative novel and R&I ideas to address challenges; believes mission-oriented programming should have objectives that can be reached through R&I, should be implemented through open calls for bottom-up ideas to achieve the mission, and should be managed through a portfolio approach building on the experience of the EIC programme managers; considers that mission-oriented programming should first and foremost be a novel approach to research programming which puts more emphasis on bottom-up research ideas, which fosters interdisciplinarity and in particular creates space for synergies between Social Sciences, Humanities and the Arts (SSHA)-driven and technology-driven activities, to address problems; therefore calls on the Commission to pilot this approach in the remaining years of Horizon Europe by spending the majority of the funds allocated to the missions through openly formulated calls that invite proposals for R&I activities that can contribute to achieving a specific objective; encourages the Commission to consider whether it is appropriate to continue funding each mission under Horizon Europe and to find additional funding and support for the continuation of the missions in other parts of the EU budget and at national as well as regional level, where appropriate;

    52. Supports the proposal in the Heitor report to set up an experimental unit under Horizon Europe to experiment with new implementation methods and instruments in order to foster real simplification for participants and to develop a more agile implementation of the programme; urges the Commission to launch, from 2025, a task force to improve the efficacy of the European Semester, in line with the EU’s share towards the 3 % target, as clearly described in the Draghi and Heitor reports and reiterated by European leaders in the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal;

    53. Insists that the Commission should continue the use of lump-sum funding under HEU, and apply it to beneficiaries for which the assessments show it to be clearly experienced as a simplification, such as SMEs and projects for which there is solid evidence that it is a genuine simplification; underlines in that regard that the intended ramping up of the use of lump sums for the 2026-2027 work programme remains questionable given the existing worries and unknowns regarding the impact of lump sums with regard to the simplification they offer to some beneficiaries and their impact on the quality of the projects funded; calls on the Commission to take all necessary steps to ensure sound and efficient use of EU funds before increasing the share of the Horizon Europe budget spend through lump sums in the last years of Horizon Europe and to explore the further improvement of the system to ensure lump-sum funding leads to genuine simplification for beneficiaries; supports the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors to define the scope of ex-post controls for lump-sum grants;

    54. Supports the Heitor report’s urgent call to introduce a ‘Choose Europe’ co-funding line and to turn the current ‘European brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain’ by 2035, noting that this should be considered a major and unique opportunity for Europe in the current uncertain geopolitical context, in particular following the recent US election, and should therefore be implemented urgently from 2025;

    55. Calls on the Commission to restore EIC autonomy and agility without delay in order to get rid of existing complex processes that lead to lower implementation; believes the EIC transition activities should be open to proposals based on results from any FP project, regardless of which programme part funded that project;

    56. Urges the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, to rely on recital 72 of the Horizon Europe Regulation to enforce more respect for academic freedom in the EU as well as in associated countries, in particular to use it as a basis to openly and directly address blatant violations of academic freedom by national governments;

    57. Recommends that the use of the Do No (Significant) Harm principle should be accompanied by detailed guidance from the Commission on how compliance with the principle will be evaluated in the context of the specific call in which the principle is used;

    Recommendations for the 10th Research Framework Programme (FP10)

    58. Calls for FP10 to be a stand-alone EU programme, in the context of the upcoming discussion of the highly anticipated Competitiveness Fund, as announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her speech of 17 July 2024 in Strasbourg, dedicated to EU research and innovation excellence and strategic technology development, with a substantially higher budget appropriate  for achieving the 3 % GDP spending target and sufficient to fund  at least 75 % of the excellent[26] proposals submitted; recommends that FP10 focus on three core objectives:

    (a) creating a European competition of ideas, and a funnel to accelerate the development from fundamental science to innovation scale-up, providing support for blue-sky and basic research as well as strengthening the deployment and exploitation of innovative solutions,

    (b) supporting strategic research initiatives which require large-scale and European collaboration, as the programme’s ability to prioritise these initiatives will be of utmost importance for Europe’s ability to address the societal challenges it faces as well as for European industry and SMEs, including for technology maturation and fostering of European ecosystems, to address the competitiveness gap with our global competitors, focussing on the development of priority innovative advanced technologies and their translation into concrete applications of innovative products, processes and services,

    (c) advancing the ERA, including by addressing the innovation gap in Europe;

    59. Recommends that the Commission ensure user-oriented, science-led, effective and efficient implementation of the programme, including by:

    (a) implementing an improved governance, inspired by the findings of the Heitor expert group and the Draghi report, addressing the need to improve the programme’s agility, which should:

    i. be oriented towards facilitating the best science, technology development and innovation,

    ii. contribute to EU priorities on the terms of science and innovation,

    iii. be based on the principle of self-governance, through which recognised, independent specialists from the relevant field that act in the public interest can  advise on how research and innovation can best contribute to the achievement of the policy priorities set by policymakers; recommends, as part of implementing this principle, setting up new Councils in line with the Heitor report to deliver expert advice on the strategic priorities of the programme as well as on the formulation of call texts to ensure their quality,

    (b) including positions for programme managers for the EIC, comparable to programme managers at the American ARPA-style agencies, who are experts appointed from outside the Commission with a proven track record in the relevant field, appointed for a predefined period, as special advisers to the Commissioner responsible for research and innovation to ensure their seniority in the Commission, to manage strategic visionary portfolios of projects, fostering collaboration between projects where relevant across the whole programme for their mutual benefit and set out challenges based on strategic intelligence and with a view to fostering global leadership for Europe in specific areas of their field,

    (c) implementing a radical simplification in the administrative work related to the application for and management of FP10 projects, following the proposal of the Heitor report to trust first and check later for the application system as well as keeping the information requested in applications to an absolute minimum – no information which is not absolutely necessary for a good qualitative evaluation of the scientific or innovative quality of a proposal should be included in the proposal stage,

    (d) promoting synergies and coordinated programming and implementation with other programmes and sectoral policies in particular with the future new industrial policy and the next important projects of common European interest dealing with research, development and innovation at national and EU level;

    60. Recommends that the GEPs as eligibility criteria for funding should be maintained in FP10 in their current form as a permanent and integral element of EU research funding requirements;

    61. Recommends that the general objective on advancing the ERA should  lead to the development of an excellent, unified and well-functioning European Research Area that attracts  talent, integrates  newcomers in existing networks and provides access to world leading research and technology infrastructures while remaining open for excellent research proposals irrespective of the supporting research institution and supports joint early research programmes with national funders; underlines that the forthcoming ERA Act needs to ensure increased national investments, national reforms and the elimination of barriers to the free movement of knowledge, technology and researchers, to create the conditions for FP10 to support the achievement of a well-functioning ERA;

    62. Considers that the Research Infrastructures, COST and Teaming programmes should contribute to the achievement of this general objective; is convinced that FP10 should provide for an instrument for strategic investments in technology infrastructures; believes that the MSCA is a crucial instrument for achieving this objective as it facilitates the mobility across the EU and between sectors of the best and the brightest who are selected based on the excellence of their proposal; believes that, to further the integration of the ERA, participation of entities from areas with low research performance should be encouraged in the programme;

    63. Firmly believes that FP10 should include a newly established European fellowship programme for researchers at risk, incorporating the lessons learnt from the ongoing preparatory action, to achieve this general objective;

    64. Continues to support the knowledge triangle approach of the EIT to foster innovation in Europe; believes that a reformed and refocussed EIT should contribute to the achievement of this general objective, given its particular role of integrating the European innovation ecosystem;

    65. Believes that in FP10 an expanded and interlinked ERC and EIC should be the engine for a European competition of ideas and that an increase of their budgets should be prioritised in the FP10 budget; recommends that these programmes be designed so that they create a European, bottom-up funnel for innovation to develop quickly from fundamental science to innovation scale-up;

    66. Considers that the EIC can only succeed if it can (i) offer blended finance as a single project and (ii) act with the same predictability and agility as private actors on the venture capital market through a tailor-made legal entity for its implementation; underlines that the strengthened autonomy and self-governance of both the ERC and the EIC are crucial to achieving this; considers in this regard that new options must be investigated to ensure their independence and long-term stability, such as creating dedicated legal entities;

    67. Considers that the expansion of the EIC and ERC should include increased funding for blue-sky, collaborative and early research projects; recommends this expansion to fund smaller projects and consortia in order to lower the barrier to participation, to increase the success rate and to encourage experimentation with new ideas and collaborations; considers that both the EIC Pathfinder and the ERC Synergy Grants have a role to play in this expanded space for bottom-up collaborative research; underlines that the EIC Pathfinder should continue to fund Challenges, but they should be reformed from Challenge-based calls to ARPA-style Challenges which leave space for bottom-up proposals while securing strategic technology development;

    68. Urges the Commission to design FP10 such that it can effectively support strategic research, technology development and deployment initiatives, focussing on a limited number of priorities to support research-based competitiveness and the resilience of key sectors in the European economy as well as to address societal challenges with 2040 as the time horizon and which require cross-border collaboration due to the scale and complexity of the issue at hand; believes that these initiatives could take the form of (i) societal mission-oriented programmes which address socio-economic and/or ecological challenges, (ii) technology mission-oriented programmes to accelerate the development of strategic technologies in Europe, and (iii) joint undertakings to secure joint investments by the private sector, Member States and the EU;

    69. Is furthermore convinced that a share of the budget of FP10 should remain available for higher Technology Readiness Level collaborative calls to support strategic collaboration not covered in the strategic initiatives, in particular this budget could be used for strategic calls developed by the programme managers to further develop an emerging ecosystem;

    70. Emphasises that mission-oriented programmes under FP10 should be fundamentally differently organised than the current missions in Horizon Europe; calls on the Commission to implement mission-oriented programmes under FP10 that set objectives that can be reached through R&I, implemented through open calls for bottom-up ideas, fostering interdisciplinarity, including between SSHA-driven and technology-driven activities, to achieve the mission, and managed through a portfolio approach building on the experience of the pilot under Horizon Europe; underlines that the successful management of these mission-oriented programmes requires outstanding expertise on the topic of the missions rather than generic expertise;

    71. Underlines that procedures for obtaining support under FP10 must align with companies’ realities; is of the opinion that, to this end, an industry-oriented application procedure, building on the experience of the Fast Track to Innovation from Horizon 2020, should be re-introduced under FP10, in particular where the programme aims to support strategic initiatives;

    72. Is convinced that a strategic approach to international cooperation is more important than ever; believes that global collaboration in science is essential for the knowledge development of humanity, but cannot be pursued in a naive manner; recommends that the Commission develops a clear strategic policy framework for its decisions on international collaboration which includes (i) a clear policy on the association of third countries which recognises that association is a tool for political partnerships, (ii) a structured process for determining how open or closed FP10 projects need to be to foster the best possible research while also considering the strategic interests of the EU, and (iii) a plan to boost global collaboration through the programme;

    73. Underlines the importance of FP10’s compliance with the Council recommendation on research security; calls on the Commission to include in the strategic approach whether the right balance between security and openness can be best achieved at the level of programmes, calls or selected projects; believes as well that, beyond the agility of the framework programme itself, delivering resilience must be mainstreamed to become an integral part of all the applied research, development and innovation activities of the next framework programme, in a differentiated manner depending on the topic and the type of activity; believes in particular that innovation activities close to the market must take into account the risk of increased dependency on third countries stemming from them, and the necessary enhanced strategic autonomy of the EU;

    74. Recommends in principle maintaining the civilian nature of the next framework programme and leaving calls specifically for defence applications to the successor of the European Defence Fund; urges the Commission further to develop options to strengthen the synergies between civilian and defence R&D spending; calls on the Commission in particular to explore how the exploitation of dual-use potential can be maximised, especially through interventions after project selection rather than in call or programme definition; underlines that academic freedom includes the right of researchers to decide to what research and development they wish to contribute;

    75. Recommends that the programme should recognise the role of interdisciplinary research in addressing societal challenges, also including a better integration of SSHA; reiterates the need for sufficient funding for research projects that address societal challenges and that fall within the area of SSHA;

    76. Recommends the introduction of research actions in order to foster and encourage more lower Technology Readiness Level research and basic research;

    77. Notes that the allocation of at least 35 % of Horizon Europe expenditure to climate objectives served the general EU objective of mainstreaming climate actions into its sectoral policies and funds; considers this an ambitious target to ensure that FP10 adequately funds science, research and innovation that support the EU climate objectives;

    78. Underlines that any potential application of the Do No (Significant) Harm principle under FP10 should, in line with Article 33(2)d of the Financial Regulation, be set out in the FP10 legislation;

    79. Recommends that the central role of standardisation in driving innovation, enhancing competitiveness, and ensuring impactful, market-ready solutions be recognised in FP10 by ensuring that costs associated with standardisation activities, where relevant in projects, are clearly recognised as eligible for reimbursement under the programme as well as by offering support to researchers in their standardisation activities;

    80. Insists that rules regarding the association of third countries to FP10 should require that these associations can only be concluded through international agreements, which requires the consent of the Parliament for each specific association to a specific EU programme, including for the scope of that association;

    81. Notes that FP10 should take into account the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a way to foster European research and development while identifying specific risks that may arise form an abusive use of AI in the scientific environment and the corresponding mitigation measures;

    °

    ° °

    82. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Remarks by FS at Budget press conference (with photos/video)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Remarks by FS at Budget press conference
    Remarks by FS at Budget press conference
    ****************************************

         Following are the remarks by the Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan; the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Christopher Hui; the Permanent Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (Treasury), Mr Andrew Lai; and the Government Economist, Mr Adolph Leung, at the Budget press conference at Central Government Offices, Tamar, today (February 26): Reporter: Good afternoon, Mr Chan. Some English questions. Firstly, could the Government provide further details on the legalisation of basketball betting? What is the time frame for this, and how much money would the Government expect to gain from this measure? Secondly, what is your opinion on the suggestions of some observers that the Government would need to explore new forms of revenue in the long term to solve the Government’s deficit? Would it consider something like a sales tax or other forms of increasing revenue to better balance its books? Thank you. Financial Secretary: Thank you. First, about basketball betting, we are aware of the fact that there is a certain degree of illegal betting activities going on, so it is better to properly regulate it. On this, we have invited the Hong Kong Jockey Club to study the matter and give a proposal to the Government for consideration. Currently, according to rough estimates, depending on the final scheme, every year, if we are going to introduce betting duty to regulate basketball betting, that will give us about HK$1.5 to HK$2 billion in terms of revenue.         As to your question about the possibility of introducing a new form of tax, our guiding principle is that, in considering any revenue measures, particularly tax-related measures, we have to pay due regard to the following considerations: one is the competitiveness of Hong Kong in terms of attracting investment and talent; second, if we are to increase revenue, we try to minimise the impact on the average residents. At the moment, we have no intention to introduce any form of GST (goods and services tax) or sales tax. We think that we have put up a very credible fiscal consolidation plan. On the one hand, we increase revenue; the measures would not impair our competitiveness. And more importantly, we try to cut the expenditure growth of the Government as the major means to achieve fiscal balance. That is why in the coming few years, up to 2027-2028, cumulatively we will be able to reduce public government expenditure by about 7 per cent, and also cut the establishment. We have a plan and specific steps to move to achieve balance. Thank you. Reporter: Good afternoon, some English questions from RTHK. First, how likely all the measures to make savings will help the Government’s coffer to return to black? And will these measures block future development of Hong Kong? The second question, are you worried that the proposed pay freeze on civil servants will affect morale and any likelihood public services will be affected as well? Thank you. Financial Secretary: I will invite Mr Andrew Lai to give you a reply. Permanent Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (Treasury): Thank you, FS. In terms of the expenditure cut programme and the enhanced fiscal consolidation programme, we are going to reduce government expenditure 2 per cent each year in the coming three years. That will give rise to an annual saving of about $10 billion to nearly $25 billion in the coming three years. It will contribute towards our saving programme and help bureaux and departments to redeploy these resources to other more important areas, and it is one of the important measures for us to restore the balance in our operating account.      And regarding your question about civil service pay, being a civil servant, I think we understand the sentiment in the community. We are willing to work hard together with the members of the public and also all sectors to promote the economic development of Hong Kong. Reporter: Good afternoon. My first question is with the adjustments in monetary policy by major central banks, what influence do you think this will have on Hong Kong economy and financial markets? And my second question is, in the face of increasing uncertainty worldwide, what steps should Hong Kong take to mitigate external risks? Thank you. Financial Secretary: Thank you. The central banks around the world are going to loosen their monetary policy, and so the liquidity in the market will be quickly enhanced. We are of the view that the capital market, given this more relaxed monetary situation, would see support. Of course, the capital market is influenced by a range of other factors, such as geopolitics affecting capital flow. So for us, I think the most fundamental matter is to enhance the competitiveness of our capital market, so that despite external uncertainties, we will be able to attract the best companies to come to Hong Kong for listing. And with quality companies being listed here, they will attract investments and investors from all over the world.      With regard to your second question, in order to mitigate the impact of geopolitics on capital flow and investment sentiment, we need to open up new markets, as well as new investor and capital sources. Our strategy is that, on the one hand, we will continue to engage developed economies, including the United States and Europe, to solidify the relationship and to secure investments. At the same time, we need to direct our efforts to new markets like the Middle East and Southeast Asia, to attract more investors and more quality issuers to Hong Kong. That is our response. Meanwhile, companies on the Mainland are going global. In this process, we would be able to serve as the best platform for their internationalisation. We will invite Mainland companies to set up their regional or international headquarters in Hong Kong and use this platform for trade finance, supply chain management and other high value-added services. Thank you. Reporter: First, how have the rising China-US (United States) tensions and the possibility of a trade war been factored into Hong Kong’s growth target in the coming year, and also in the medium-range forecast? My second question is, revenue from land premiums last year is the lowest in two decades, and also for multiple years in a row it missed the estimates. With today’s new estimate, is it an indication that land sales revival is unlikely, and how confident is the Government to hit that estimate? And finally, this may be the first year since 1998 that Hong Kong’s Budget does not have a satisfaction rating from a reputable public poll. How will the Government assess whether the public supports the Budget? Financial Secretary: Let me invite our Government Economist to respond to your first two questions. Government Economist: On the issue of rising trade tension between China and the US (United States), of course it will have some sort of negative impact. But according to what we have done to adjust to the situation, like lowering our share of exports to the US, we believe that it should be manageable, and we should be able to manage the situation gradually and better and better. But at the same time, although there are some sort of rising trade tension between the two countries, there are also other favourable factors supporting the Hong Kong economy like the shifting of the global economic gravity to Asia, particularly to China. And the Central Government has now introduced a number of measures to support both the long-term growth and also the short-term growth. In the short run, they have a more proactive fiscal policy and also a more accommodative monetary policy. In the long run, it is rigorously promoting the growth of new quality productive force and developing high-quality growth. And these will all support Hong Kong’s economic growth in the medium term from the demand side. And on the supply side, over the past few years, we have been doing a lot to expand our productive capacity, enhance our competitiveness and also develop new growth areas. And these efforts are all bearing fruit and will gradually contribute to Hong Kong’s economic growth in the coming years. Financial Secretary: Yes, we have introduced a fiscal consolidation programme in this Budget. So on the one hand, we try our best to diversify and grow our economy. But at the same time, it is a belt-tightening Budget, and so the community would contribute to this effort. We are trying to do the best we can in minimising the impact on our people. And I hope they will understand.      As to the land premium, we have been adopting a very conservative estimate. The land revenue for this year and the following year are based on the land sale programme, which have taken into account the market condition at the moment. As to the land income for the following three years, meaning for the rest of the medium-term period, on the basis of gradually increasing to about some 2 per cent of our GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and this percentage, compared with our historical average, which is about 3.3 per cent, is very conservative. But we do think that at the current economic situation, it would be responsible on the part of the Government to adopt a relatively conservative estimate about land income in the Budget that would be giving the market more confidence in the sense that, despite perhaps a slower rebound in the property market, overall, the financial position of the Government remains robust and strong. Thank you. (Please also refer to the Chinese portion of the remarks.)

     
    Ends/Wednesday, February 26, 2025Issued at HKT 23:56

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Director-General of Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises Concludes Visit to Hangzhou and Shenzhen (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Director-General of Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises Concludes Visit to Hangzhou and Shenzhen (with photos)
    Director-General of Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises Concludes Visit to Hangzhou and Shenzhen (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

         The Director-General of Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises (OASES), Mr Peter Yan, today (February 26) concluded his visit to Hangzhou and Shenzhen. The visit was aimed to foster collaboration and communication between Hong Kong with the enterprises in innovation and technology (I&T) sector in the two cities, and attract potential strategic enterprises to establish their presence in Hong Kong.     Hangzhou has been actively developing I&T sector, as well as the cultural and creative sector that integrated I&T over recent years. Several enterprises have rapidly emerged as influential leaders in these fields. In addition to the recently globally-discussed large language model AI enterprises, these leading companies also include tech-driven creative enterprises, which have produced globally successful online games and animated films based on Chinese mythology, creating a new wave of enthusiasm.          During the trip to Hangzhou, Mr Yan visited these leading enterprises and met with their founders and representatives. They discussed development trends in the industries of AI, tech-driven creative, robotics and spatial intelligence. They also explored on how enterprises in these industries could utilise Hong Kong as a base to expedite and enhance their efforts to expand overseas business. Mr Yan mentioned Hong Kong’s various advantages, including the Government’s commitment to I&T development, and its talent pool. As a global city, Hong Kong aligns with international standards and practices, thereby positioning itself as a connector and value-adder for mainland companies seeking to expand overseas. Strengthening cooperation between Hong Kong and I&T enterprises in Hangzhou is expected to facilitate industrial upgrading and technological innovation.          The Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan, mentioned today (February 26) in his 2025-26 Budget that in addition to the current four strategic sectors, including AI and data science, life and health technology, advanced manufacturing and new energy technology, and financial technology, the OASES will strategically attract to Hong Kong more cultural and creative enterprises that integrate I&T into their work. By leveraging Hong Kong’s unique advantage as a convergence point of eastern and western cultures, these creative technology enterprises will be able to go globalised, thereby infusing the local creative industry with more technological innovation and fostering its robust development.     ???Mr Yan also visited the Hanggang Technology Building, known as “China’s Silicon Valley,” to gain further insights into Hangzhou’s technology development.     During his visit to Shenzhen, Mr Yan visited a local AI enterprise to understand the role of AI and data science in smart city development. He also discussed with them their intentions and plans for setting up or expanding business in Hong Kong.     Mr Yan concluded his official visit to Shenzhen this evening and returned to Hong Kong.

     
    Ends/Wednesday, February 26, 2025Issued at HKT 23:09

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Sydney ETO holds Chinese New Year reception in Auckland to celebrate Year of Snake (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Sydney ETO holds Chinese New Year reception in Auckland to celebrate Year of Snake (with photos)
    Sydney ETO holds Chinese New Year reception in Auckland to celebrate Year of Snake (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

         The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, Sydney (Sydney ETO) hosted a Chinese New Year reception in Auckland, New Zealand, yesterday (February 25) to celebrate the Year of the Snake.           Over 150 guests from various sectors, including political and business circles, media, academia, community groups and government representatives, attended the reception. Among them were the Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Auckland, Mr Chen Shijie; the Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Forestry, Minister for Trade and Investment and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand, Mr Todd McClay; and the Mayor of Auckland, Mr Wayne Brown.           The Director of the Sydney ETO, Mr Ricky Chong, said in his welcoming remarks that Hong Kong and New Zealand share a long-standing and dynamic trade partnership built on a mutual commitment to open markets and free trade. Notably, New Zealand was the first foreign country to secure a free trade agreement with Hong Kong, reinforcing the depth of economic ties. The Hong Kong, China – New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in 2010 and in force since 2011, offers New Zealand exporters a competitive advantage and expands opportunities in the region.     “In Hong Kong, we are investing heavily to enhance our world-class infrastructure. A prime example is our new state-of-the-art Kai Tak Sports Park, set to open next month. With its 50 000-seat main stadium, the sports park will firmly put Hong Kong on the map as a global hub for major international sports and entertainment events. The world’s famous Hong Kong Sevens will also be held at the new Kai Tak Stadium from March 28 to 30,” Mr Chong added.     To promote Hong Kong’s pop culture, a music performance featuring Hong Kong teenagers in New Zealand was staged at the reception.       In addition to the reception in Auckland, the Sydney ETO also hosted Chinese New Year receptions in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide in Australia to celebrate the Year of the Snake with the communities. 

     
    Ends/Wednesday, February 26, 2025Issued at HKT 20:45

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Province Asks Federal Government to Investigate Tire Imports

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Premier Tim Houston is asking the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to urgently investigate imports of passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China, Cambodia and Vietnam.

    In a letter to federal Public Safety Minister David McGuinty, Premier Houston says it is imperative that the CBSA act now based on strong evidence that suggests tire manufacturers from these countries are flooding the Canadian market.

    “I am committed to standing up for Nova Scotians and businesses, and it is clear to me that these imports are putting jobs at risk and undermining the stability of our domestic tire industry,” said Premier Houston. “The global trade market is facing immense uncertainty right now, and we have to focus on the things we can control – defending ourselves against industries with unfair trade practices that threaten our economy and job security is absolutely within our control.”

    Nova Scotia has been conducting extensive consultations with industry stakeholders as part of its response to remove internal trade barriers and respond to the threat of U.S. tariffs. Through this analysis and a review of import data, the Province believes the threshold has been met for the CBSA to self-initiate an anti-dumping investigation into import tires from these countries.

    Under the Special Import Measures Act, the CBSA has authority to launch an investigation without the need for a formal industry complaint if there is clear evidence of unfair trade harming Canadian industries.


    Quick Facts:

    • Michelin is one of Nova Scotia’s largest employers with nearly 4,000 direct employees, and the company’s exports account for nearly one per cent of Nova Scotia’s provincial gross domestic product
    • between 2022 and 2024, imports of passenger vehicle and truck tires from China, Cambodia and Vietnam increased by nearly 30 per cent

    Additional Resources:

    News release – Legislation to Remove Barriers to Trade: https://news.novascotia.ca/en/2025/02/25/legislation-remove-barriers-trade


    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cortez Masto, Rounds Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Promote American Businesses in Competition with China

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Nevada Cortez Masto
    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.) and Mike Rounds (R-S.D.) introduced bipartisan legislation to help American businesses compete with Communist China. The Strengthening Exports Against China Act would incentivize economic growth by eliminating barriers for American businesses competing directly with China in emerging industries like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Companion legislation has been introduced in the House by Representatives Young Kim (R-Calif.) and Joyce Beatty (D-Ohio).
    “The Chinese Communist Party provides massive subsidies and financing for businesses in emerging industries. To remain competitive, the United States needs to do more to support innovative businesses here at home,” said Senator Cortez Masto. “My bipartisan legislation will support more American businesses directly competing with China to help them make breakthroughs in AI, critical mineral mining and processing, and other transformational areas.”
    “It’s time for fair competition on the global stage,” said Senator Rounds. “We must level the playing field for U.S. exporters when they’re up against firms backed by the Chinese Communist Party’s opaque financing. The Strengthening Exports Against China Act would allow the Export Import Bank to increase export financing and insurance support to U.S. firms that export products in direct competition with China.”
    The Export-Import Bank (EXIM) creates American jobs by promoting and financing exports. The China and Transformational Exports Program (CTEP) was established on a bipartisan basis in 2019 to counter Chinese export subsidies and financing while advancing U.S. innovation and export competitiveness in 10 Transformation Export Areas, including AI, 5G, energy efficiency, and semiconductors. Unfortunately, the CTEP is struggling to scale up due to the rules governing EXIM financing. Under current law, if EXIM projects reach or exceed a two percent default rate, the Bank must immediately freeze all lending. This default rate cap poses a significant challenge to EXIM’s ability to support U.S. exporters in emerging, less established fields. The Strengthening Exports Against China Act would eliminate the default rate cap for exporters covered by the CTEP program to help them better compete directly with PRC rivals.
    The full text of the legislation can be found here.
    Senator Cortez Masto has led efforts in Congress to strengthen our national security and supply chains. She has consistently blocked burdensome taxes on mining and wrote important provisions of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to bolster Nevada’s critical mineral supply chain. She’s also introduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the domestic supply chain for rare-earth magnets, which are critical components of cell phones, computers, defense systems, and electric vehicles, but are almost exclusively made in China.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: We should care more about emerging infectious diseases, and the tools we need to fight them

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Idowu Olawoye, Postdoctoral Associate, Microbiology & Immunology, Western University

    A patient undergoing infusion therapy. Treatment failure can happen when a disease adapts to become resistant to antibiotics. (Unsplash/Olga Kononenko)

    Throughout human history, disease outbreaks have emerged and re-emerged. What’s different now is that with global travel, outbreaks can move quickly among and between populations.

    A familiar example would be the COVID-19 pandemic and how it disrupted the world as we know it today. During this period, a lot of technological advancements were achieved during a short time such as vaccine roll-out and also tracking of variants globally.

    Since this pandemic, we have been constantly reminded of the threat that emerging infectious diseases pose, as well as new strains of existing microbes, and even infections that may eventually become untreatable. This should also serve as a constant reminder of the need to continue developing the tools and technology to fight them.

    Infectious disease outbreaks since COVID-19

    In 2022, shortly after the worst of the devastating COVID-19 pandemic had passed, the world was rocked by another infectious disease outbreak, which was soon classified as a public health emergency of international concern.

    The culprit was mpox, then known as the monkeypox virus.

    Unlike SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19, this was not a novel virus but had been identified in laboratory monkeys in Denmark as far back as 1958. The first human cases were documented in 1970 among children in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

    Since then, there have been multiple reported outbreaks of mpox, the majority of them limited to Africa. This includes a 2022 global outbreak that caused about 250 deaths, representing a fatality rate of 0.2 per cent.

    An ongoing outbreak started in 2023 in Central Africa, claiming about 900 lives with a fatality rate of five per cent.

    According to the World Health Organization, the two most recent mpox outbreaks were primarily driven by sexual transmission or body contact. There is currently no treatment approved by the FDA for mpox.

    In early 2024, an avian influenza outbreak resurfaced in the United States when the viral infection that typically affects birds was detected in dairy cows for the first time. It has since spread to about 973 cattle in 17 states, and there have been about 70 human cases among people associated with farm animals.

    Recently, a respiratory outbreak known as hMPV has been overwhelming hospitals in Northern China, with children, adolescents and senior citizens being at most risk. The origin of this outbreak is not yet known.

    Untreatable sexually transmitted infection

    Microscopic image of the bacteria that causes gonorrhea.
    (NIAID), CC BY

    Gonorrhoea is a widely known sexually transmitted infection (STI). Approximately 80 million people were infected by this bacterium in 2020. Though most cases remain treatable, an untreatable form of gonorrhoea is becoming more prevalent, threatening victims with infertility or even cancer.

    Treatment failure can happen when a disease adapts to become resistant to antibiotics. Antibiotic resistance has significant implications for global health, including massive financial implications for health care.

    An emerging STI threat

    Other, uncommon but difficult to treat STIs are emerging. One is called Mycoplasma genitalium, the causative agent for non-gonococcal urethritis — a typically painful infection of the tube that carries urine from the bladder.




    Read more:
    Antimicrobial resistance now hits lower-income countries the hardest, but superbugs are a global threat we must all fight


    With symptoms similar to gonorrhoea, it can lead to infertility, increased susceptibility to HIV, failed pregnancy, cancer of the cervix and more. Yet, it is often misdiagnosed due to it being understudied and its complexity.

    This understudied bacterium is naturally resistant to many antibiotics due to its unique structure, making it notoriously difficult to treat.

    The WHO works to control the spread of gonorrhoea infections that are resistant to antibiotics through surveillance. My own research is adopting a similar strategy for M. genitalium, by using genomic surveillance to improve our knowledge of the infection and the improved ability to detect antibiotic resistance.

    What is genomic surveillance?

    Genomic surveillance uses next-generation sequencing technology to identify specific strains of pathogens circulating during an outbreak. This can also determine what genetic characteristics makes some strains more aggressive than others.

    This technique was used effectively during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic and helped identify variants quickly.

    Genomic surveillance can help us understand what we are facing, allowing us to tackle emerging threats more quickly and efficiently. It can help us develop sensitive, rapid diagnostic tools to detect drug resistance, especially for bacteria that are difficult to study in the lab, such as Mycoplasma genitalium, which is an extremely slow-growing and challenging bacteria.

    With the continuing emergence of untreatable infections and new disease outbreaks, genomic sequencing can help meet emerging threats even in regions that lack adequate infrastructure where these tend to occur frequently.

    This can be achieved through implementing affordable, user friendly diagnostic tools or developing effective vaccines for endemic regions. An example is the COVID-19 self-test kit that can be used at home. This is one of the key areas my research is also trying to accomplish: improving diagnostics in health care and making them accessible.

    Pathogens are constantly evolving to become resistant to treatment in the perpetual battle between humans and infectious diseases.

    To get the upper hand, we need to continue developing technology, including rapid and sensitive tools for identifying resistant bacteria and innovative methods for halting the spread of untreatable infections before they become serious pandemics.

    Idowu Olawoye receives funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and Western Research at the University of Western Ontario.

    ref. We should care more about emerging infectious diseases, and the tools we need to fight them – https://theconversation.com/we-should-care-more-about-emerging-infectious-diseases-and-the-tools-we-need-to-fight-them-248427

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 02/26/2025 Blackburn, Schatz Introduce Bill to Strengthen U.S.-Taiwan Partnership, Safeguard U.S. from Communist China’s Security Threats

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii) introduced the Taiwan Travel and Tourism Coordination Act to keep Americans safer by establishing robust security screenings for those traveling to the U.S. from Asia, open new markets for American industry, and strengthen the economic partnership between the U.S. and Taiwan:  
    “Not only does the Chinese Communist Party present a threat to Taiwan, but Communist China’s campaign for global dominance also presents a clear threat to U.S. interests,” said Senator Blackburn. “We need to secure our homeland by requiring Customs and Border Protection officers to inspect those who are traveling to the U.S. from airports in Asia, and the Taiwan Travel and Tourism Coordination Act would move us one step closer to achieving enhanced security at foreign airports. This legislation would also help identify opportunities to strengthen our economic partnership with Taiwan and increase collaboration between our two countries.”
    “Taiwan is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific, and boosting our ties strengthens both Taiwan and the United States. This bill would help unlock more economic opportunities for the people of Taiwan, Hawai‘i, and our entire country,” said Senator Schatz, a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
    BACKGROUND
    Taiwan is the United States’ vital trading partner and ally in the Indo-Pacific region and is increasingly under threat from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To combat this threat to our interests, we must assist our allies in stabilizing their economies and growing their national industries.
    Travel and tourism play a crucial role in a nation’s economic security, yet this sector in Taiwan faces pressure and coercion from the CCP. With strategic efforts proposed in this bill, the United States and Taiwan can turn these challenges into opportunities to strengthen our relations and our tourism industries.
    The CCP’s campaign for global dominance presents a clear threat to both Taiwan and U.S. interests as well. To secure our homeland, we must establish “pre-clearance” facilities in Asia. Pre-clearance is the strategic stationing of Customs and Border Protection personnel at designated foreign airports to inspect travelers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights, and it is incredibly important to enhance security, increase collaboration, and streamline travel. Notably, there is no pre-clearance facility in Asia, despite there being an annual average of over 4 million travelers from the continent.
    TAIWAN TRAVEL AND TOURISM COORDINATION ACT
    Specifically, the Taiwan Travel and Tourism Coordination Act would require the federal government to:
    Identify opportunities for enhanced travel between the U.S. and Taiwan;
    Facilitate events and coordination between the travel and tourism industry partners in the United States and Taiwan;
    Coordinate with Taiwan and other agencies on the safety and security of international visitors both at home and abroad; and
    Conduct a feasibility study on establishing a pre-clearance facility in Taiwan. 
    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: WENDEL: 2024 Full-Year Results: a very active year, a dual model in place, strong value creation & a growing return to shareholders

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

          

    2024 Full-Year Results: a very active year, a dual model in place, strong value creation & a growing return to shareholders

    Fully diluted1 Net Asset Value per share of €185.7,
    representing a +16.9% year-over-year value creation, adjusted for the dividend paid

    Dividend boosted at €4.7 per share, up +17.5% year-over-year

    Strong portfolio rotation: more than €2 billion of capital reallocation

    Significant expansion of the Asset Management platform in Europe and US, and development of our dual business model towards more recurring cash flows and growth

    Fully diluted Net Asset Value2as of December 31, 2024: €185.7 per share, up +14.4%

    • Value creation of +16.9%3 over 2024, adjusted for the €4 dividend paid in May 2024 reflecting:
      • The increase in Bureau Veritas’ share price (+28.3% YoY) on the back of the quality of its LEAP | 28 strategic plan
      • The changes in the valuation of unlisted assets, on a like-for-like basis, in line with their respective operating performances and multiples, and active management of private principal investments to create long term value through repositioning and accretive bolt-ons (Stahl, Scalian, and CPI).
      • The strong growth of IK Partners’ FRE to €69.9 million, above estimates (€60 million). IK Partners’ AuM up +24% in 2024, totaling €13.8 billion, with €3.4 billion raised.

    Delivering strong and recurring returns to shareholders, in line with the strategic roadmap published in 2023

    • Ordinary dividend of €4.70 per share for 2024, up +17.5% compared to 2023, to be proposed at the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting on May 15, 2025, representing slightly above 2.5%4 of NAV and a 4.8%5 yield vs share price as of February 21, 2025. This dividend level takes into account the first partial integration of Asset management activities into Wendel in 2024, which will be mechanically higher in 2025.
    • €100 million share buyback launched in October 2023 completed in July 2024. €92.5 million share bought back in 2024.

    Very active investment activity & capital allocation

    • Principal Investments:
      • €2.3 billion proceeds and value crystallization
      • €0.7 billion invested including €0.6 billion in Globeducate
    • Asset Management:
      • €0.4 billion invested for the acquisition of 51% of IK Partners
      • $1.13 billion will be invested in equity to acquire 75% of Monroe Capital, as announced on October 22, 2024 (closing expected in the first quarter of 2025)

    Strong financial structure and committed to remain Investment Grade

    • Debt maturity of 3.6 years with an average cost of 2.4%
    • LTV ratio at 7.2%6 as of December 31, 2024, and 22.9%7 on a pro forma basis taking into account future investment commitments in IK Partners funds and the acquisition of Monroe Capital.
    • Pro forma total liquidity of €1.28 billion as of December 31, 2024, including €0.4 billion in cash and €875 million in committed credit facility (fully undrawn)

    Reappointment of Wendel’s Executive Board

    • On February 26, 2025, Wendel’s Supervisory Board decided to reappoint the members of the Executive Board.   Laurent Mignon has been reappointed Chairman of the Executive Board and David Darmon, Member of the Executive Board, Deputy CEO, for a period of four years ending to April 6, 2029

    Net income, Group share at €293.9 million, showing a strong increase

    • The net income from operations rose from €711 million to €753.7 million, up 6%.
    • Net income, group share, at €293.9 million in 2024, compared with €142.4 in 2023, due to the disposal of Constantia Flexibles in 2024.
    Laurent Mignon, Wendel Group CEO, commented:

    “2024 was a very active year for Wendel and its portfolio companies. Fully diluted net asset value growth, adjusted for the €4 dividend paid in 2024, was 16.9%, driven in particular by the good share price and operational performance of Bureau Veritas and the strong growth of our new third-party asset management business.

    We continued to execute our strategic plan, as detailed in 2023, with determination, rigour and financial discipline.

    In 2024, we further improved our cash flow generation and value creation profile, notably with the announced acquisition of Monroe Capital, which will give us critical mass to develop our third-party asset management platform. We also focused on premium assets in our principal investments activites, highlighted by the acquisition of Globeducate in October 2024.

    These value-creating and recurring cash flow generating transformations now enable us to propose a dividend that is 17.5% higher than last year, reaching 4.70 euros for the financial year 2024.Our transition to a dual model is now well grounded, with top partners in asset management such as IK Partners in private equity and Monroe Capital in private credit, bringing third-party assets under management to more than 33 billion euros.The priorities of Wendel’s teams are to create value on existing assets, to successfully build the private asset management platform around IK Partners and Monroe Capital, and to maintain a solid financial structure.

    I would like to thank the members of the Supervisory Board for their renewed full support, as well as the Wendel teams who are skillfully accompanying our value-creating transformation.

    In 2025, Wendel’s teams will pursue the roadmap defined two years ago, supporting our principal investments companies in their value creation process, building the third-party asset management platform through the successful integration of Monroe Capital, the continued development of IK Partners as well as the implementation of commercial synergies between the two entities, and continuing to have an agile management of our balance sheet to seize the right opportunities, while maintaining a solid financial structure. We are confident that the development of this dual model will continue to create more value and more recurring returns for our shareholders.”

    Wendel’s net asset value as of December 31, 2024: €185.7 per share on a fully diluted basis

    Wendel’s Net Asset Value (NAV) as of December 31, 2024, was prepared by Wendel to the best of its knowledge and on the basis of market data available at this date and in compliance with its methodology.

    Fully diluted Net Asset Value was €185.7 per share as of December 31, 2024 (see detail in the table below), as compared to €162.3 on December 31, 2023, representing an increase of +14.4% since the start of the year and + 16.9% restated from the dividend paid in 2024. Compared to the last 20-day average share price as of December 31, the discount to the December 31, 2024, fully diluted NAV per share was -49.6%.

    Bureau Veritas contributed very positively to Net Asset Value, as end of December 2024, its 20-day average share price was up strongly YTD (+32.5%). IHS Towers (-28.0%) and Tarkett (+15.4%) share price impacts were negligible given the weight of Bureau Veritas in NAV. Total value creation per share of listed assets was therefore +€25.9 on a fully diluted basis over the course of 2024.

    Unlisted asset contribution to NAV was negative over the course of the year with a total change per share of -€4.9 reflecting selective assets’ operational performances offsetting the good performance from CPI.

    Asset management activities were consolidated and accounted in the NAV for the first time at the end of June following the acquisition of IK Partners. There is no sponsor money included in the NAV yet, as no capital has been called. IK Partners’ valuation is up by €6.0 per share, driven by strong performance and positive market multiples evolution.

    Cash operating costs, Net Financing Results and Other items impacted NAV by -€1.0, as Wendel benefits from a positive carry. The impact of year-to-date share buyback activity would be +€1.4 per share as of December 31, 2024.

    Total Net Asset Value creation per share amounted to €27.4 in 2024.

    Fully diluted NAV per share of €185.7 as of December 31, 2024

    (in millions of euros)     12/31/2024 12/31/2023
    Listed investments Number of shares Share price (1) 3,793 3,867
    Bureau Veritas 120.3m/160.8m €29.5/€22.2 3,544 3,575
    IHS 63.0m/63.0m $3.2/$4.4 192 251
    Tarkett   €10.5/€9.1 57 40
    Investment in unlisted assets (2) 3,612 4,360
    Asset Management Activities (3) 616
    Other assets and liabilities of Wendel and holding companies (4) 174 6
    Net cash position & financial assets (5) 2,407 1,286
    Gross asset value     10,603 9,518
    Wendel bond debt     -2,401 -2,401
    IK Partners transaction deferred payment -131
    Net Asset Value     8,071 7,118
    Of which net debt     -124 -1,115
    Number of shares     44,461,997 44,430,554
    Net Asset Value per share 181.5 €160.2
    Wendel’s 20 days share price average   €93.5 €79.9
    Premium (discount) on NAV -48.5% -50.1%
    Number of shares – fully diluted 42,466,569 43,302,016
    Fully diluted Net Asset Value, per share 185.7 €162.3
    Premium (discount) on fully diluted NAV -49.6% -50.7%

    (1)   Last 20 trading days average as of December 31, 2024, and December 31, 2023.
    (2)   Investments in unlisted companies (Globeducate, Stahl, Crisis Prevention Institute, ACAMS, Scalian and Wendel Growth as of December 31, 2024. As of Dec 31,2023 also included Constantia Flexibles and excluded Globeducate). Aggregates retained for the calculation exclude the impact of IFRS16.
    (3)   IK Partners’ activity, no sponsor money at this stage.
    (4)   Of which 1,995,428 treasury shares as of December 31, 2024, and 1,128,538 treasury shares as of December 31, 2023
    (5)   Cash position and financial assets of Wendel & holdings.

    Assets and liabilities denominated in currencies other than the euro have been converted at exchange rates prevailing on the date of the NAV calculation.
    If co-investment and managements LTIP conditions are realized, subsequent dilutive effects on Wendel’s economic ownership are accounted for in NAV calculations. See page 246 of the 2023 Registration Document.

    Wendel’s Principal Investments’ portfolio rotation

    In 2024, Wendel has realized a total of €2.3 billion in disposals for its own account and has invested c.€0.7 billion, reflecting the acceleration of the diversification of its investment portfolio, in line with the strategy announced a few months ago:

    • Wendel announced on January 4, 2024, that it had completed the sale of Constantia Flexibles, generating total net proceeds9 for Wendel of €1,121 million for its shares, i.e. a valuation over 10% higher than the latest NAV on record before the announcement of the transaction (as at March 31, 2023).
    • Wendel announced on April 5, 2024, that it had successfully completed the sale of 40.5 million shares in Bureau Veritas, representing c.9% of the Company’s share capital, for total proceeds of approximately €1.1 billion. The transaction was carried out at a price of €27.127, or a discount of 3% from the previous day’s share price.
    • Wendel Growth realized its investment in Preligens, a leader in artificial intelligence (AI) for aerospace and defence, generating net proceeds to Wendel of c.€14.6 million, translating into a gross IRR of 28%10. In addition, Wendel Growth announced on June 11, 2024, the acquisition of a minority stake in YesWeHack through an equity investment of €14.5 million.
    • Wendel reinvested €43.7m in Scalian upon the acquisition of Mannarino on June 21, 2024. This Canadian company is a leading engineering services specialist for advanced technology R&D for the aviation sector, primarily in North America, with recognized expertise in safety-critical embedded software and systems.
    • On October 16, 2024, Wendel completed the acquisition of c.50% of Globeducate, one of the world’s leading bilingual K-12 education groups, from Providence Equity Partners. Wendel invested €607 million of equity, at an Enterprise Value of c.€2 billion11, to join Providence, and both firms will now own c.50% of the group.

    Wendel’s Asset Management platform evolution

    Acquisition of Monroe Capital dramatically expands Wendel’s Asset Management platform and rebalances its business model towards more recurring cash flows and growth

    Wendel announced on October 22, 2024 that it had entered into a definitive partnership agreement including the acquisition of 75% of Monroe Capital LLC (“Monroe Capital” or “the Company”) for $1.13 billion, and a sponsoring program of $800 million to accelerate Monroe Capital’s growth, and will invest in GP commitment for up to $200 million.

    For Wendel, the acquisition of a controlling stake in Monroe Capital, a private credit market leader focused on the U.S. lower middle market that has established an outstanding track record, would represent a significant and transformational advancement of the strategy it announced in March 2023 to develop its third-party asset management platform to complement its longstanding Principal Investment business.

    With IK Partners and Monroe Capital, Wendel’s third party asset management platform will reach more than €33 billion in AUM12, and should generate, on a full year basis, c.€ 455 million revenues, c.€160 million pre-tax FRE (c.€100 million in pre-tax FRE (Wendel share) in 2025. Wendel’s objective is to reach €150 million (Wendel share) in pre-tax FRE in 2027.

    Third Party Asset Management value creation and performance

    2024 performance

    Over 2024, IK Partners had particularly strong activity, generating a total of €163.3 million in revenue, up 31% YoY, and a strong growth of FRE to €69.9 million. Total Assets under Management (€13.8 billion, of which €3 billion of Dry Powder13) grew by 24% since the beginning of the year, and FPAuM14 (€10.1 billion) by 33%. Over the period, €3.4 billion of new funds were raised (IK X, IK PF III, IK SC IV and IK CV I) and 11 exits have been announced, for over €1.6 billion.

    Sponsor money invested by Wendel

    Wendel committed €500 million in IK Partners funds, of which €300 million in IK X. These commitments have not yet been called as of December 31, 2024.

    Principal Investment companies’ value creation and performance

    Figures post IFRS 16 unless otherwise specified.

    Listed Assets: 36% of Gross Asset Value

    Bureau Veritas’ LEAP | 28 strategy delivers outstanding results in 2024; Confident 2025 outlook

    (full consolidation)

    Revenue in 2024 amounted to €6,240.9 million, a 6.4% increase year-on-year. The organic increase was 10.2% (including 9.6% in the fourth quarter) benefiting from robust underlying trends across businesses and geographies.

    Adjusted operating profit increased by 7.1% to €996.2 million. This represents an adjusted operating margin of 16.0% up 11bps on a reported basis and up 38 bps at constant currency.

    Bureau Veritas posted a record free cash flow of €843.3 million (+27.9% year-on year). As of December 31, 2024, adjusted net financial debt was €1,226.3 million, i.e. 1.06x EBITDA, compared with 0.92x at December 31, 2023.

    In line with LEAP I 28 plan focused portfolio strategy and through active portfolio management, in 2024 Bureau Veritas completed: i) the acquisition of 10 bolt-on companies for a total annualized revenue of c. €180 million; ii) the divestment of its Food testing business and of a technical supervision business on construction projects in China (c. € 165 million in annualized combined revenue). Bureau Veritas ended the year with its inclusion in the CAC 40, the benchmark index of the Paris stock exchange. This achievement underscores the Group’s consistent operational success and marks a significant milestone in Bureau Veritas’ remarkable journey.

    2025 outlook

    Building on a strong 2024 momentum, a robust opportunities pipeline, a solid backlog, and a strong underlying market growth, and in line with LEAP | 28 financial ambitions, Bureau Veritas expects to deliver for the full year 2025:

    • Mid-to-high single-digit organic revenue growth;
    • Improvement in adjusted operating margin at constant exchange rates;
    • Strong cash flow, with a cash conversion15 above 90%.

    For further details: group.bureauveritas.com

    IHS Towers – IHS Towers will report its FY 2024 results in March 2025

    Tarkett reported its annual results on February 20, 2025

    For more information: https://www.tarkett-group.com/en/investors/

    Unlisted Assets: 34% of Gross Asset Value

    (in millions) Sales EBITDA Net debt
      2023 2024 2023 including IFRS 16 2024     including IFRS 16 Δ End of December including IFRS 16
    Stahl €913.5 €930.2 €204.0 €206.9 +1.4% €383.8
    CPI $138.4 $150.1 $68.6 $74.0 +7.8% $378.2
    ACAMS $102.9 $102.1 $24.6 $25.1 +2.0% $165.0
    Scalian €539.9 €533.4 €63.9 €59.8 -6,3% €345.6
    Globeducate(1) na €352.2 na €84.2 na na

    (1)   Globeducate acquisition was completed on October 16th, 2024. Globeducate fiscal year ends in August, and figures shown are last twelve months at the end of August 2024. Indian operations are deconsolidated and accounted for by the equity method due to the absence of audited figures for the year ending in August-24.

    Stahl – Total sales up +1.8% in 2024 despite market challenges in the automotive and luxury goods end-markets. Strong EBITDA margin of 22.2%. In 2024, Stahl completed its transformation into a pure-play specialty coatings formulator for flexible materials.

    (Full consolidation) 

    Stahl, the world leader in specialty coatings for flexible materials, posted total sales of €930.2 million in the full year of 2024, representing a total increase of +1.8% versus 2023.

    Organically, sales were slightly down -1.1%, in a context of tougher markets in automotive and luxury goods, while FX contributed -1.5%. Acquisitions contributed positively (+4.4%) to total sales variation.

    Full Year 2024 EBITDA16 amounted to €206.9 million (+1.4% vs. 2023), translating into a strong EBITDA margin of 22.2%, thanks to a disciplined margin and fixed costs management, as well as a good diversification across geographies and segments.

    Net debt as of December 31st, 2024, was €383.8 million17, versus €329 million at the end of 2023 and leverage stood at 1.7x18.

    On November 18, 2024, Stahl announced the sale of its Wet-end leather chemicals division, that marks an important step in the Group’s strategic journey. The proposed sale completes Stahl’s transformation into a pure-play specialty coatings formulator for flexible materials. The transaction is subject to customary closing conditions and is expected to close in H1 2025.

    Pro forma for the sale of the Wet-end leather chemicals business and the acquisition of Weilburger Graphics GmbH, 2024 sales would amount to c.€ 759 million, EBITDA to c.€180 million (i.e., a 23.7% margin) and leverage would stand at an estimated 1.6x. These transactions strengthen Stahl’s growth profile, with the company now better positioned for faster growth, and have an accretive impact on its EBITDA margin.

    Crisis Prevention Institute reports +8.5% revenue and +7.8% EBITDA growth

    (Full consolidation)

    CPI recorded 2024 revenues of $150.1 million, up +8.5% compared to 2023, or +8.4% organically (FX impact was +0.1%), resulting from strong growth in the consumption of training materials, signifying active training of broader staff throughout the Company’s primary customers in educational, healthcare and human services settings. In addition, the Company benefitted from continued growth in its Enterprise segment, a core strategic focus targeting large health systems.

    Full Year 2024 EBITDA was $74.0 million19, reflecting a margin of 49.3%. EBITDA was up +7.8% vs. last year while margins are stable (49.6% in 2023), despite investments to scale in International markets.

    As of December 31, 2024, net debt totaled $378.2 million20, or 4.6x EBITDA as defined in CPI’s credit agreement, following the c. $100 million dividend payment to Wendel in April of 2024. Given current leverage, CPI repriced its Term Loan and received a 50bps interest rate stepdown, or a c. $1.4 million annual savings.

    On January 21st, 2025, CPI announced the acquisition of Verge, a Norwegian leader in behaviour intervention and training. This acquisition extends CPI’s presence in the Nordics, and enhances CPI’s ability to support professionals worldwide, leveraging Verge’s innovative techniques to address challenging behaviours, aggression and violence.

    ACAMS – Total sales stable and improved 24.6% margin amid strong transformation momentum

    (full consolidation)

    ACAMS, the global leader in training and certifications for anti-money laundering and financial crime prevention professionals, generated 2024 revenue of $102.1 million, down 0.8% vs. 2023. The results for 2024 reflected continued growth and market expansion in North America and Europe, largely offset by soft sales in the Asia-Pacific region and from exhibition spend at certain conferences early in the year, slower sales to non-banking customers at consultancies and governments.

    EBITDA21 in 2024 was $25.1 million, up 2% vs. 2023, and reflecting a margin of 24.6%, up 70 bps year-over -year.

    As of December 31, 2024, net debt totaled $165.0 million22, slightly up from $155.8 million at the end of 2023, which represents 6.7x EBITDA leverage as defined in ACAMS’ credit agreement, with ample room relative to the 9.5x covenant level.

    This past year has been pivotal in the Company’s transformation, with the addition of CEO Neil Sternthal who joined from Thomson Reuters in early 2024 and subsequently made several additions to the senior leadership team, and shifted focus to core growth with large enterprise customers, product and market expansion including the introduction of its Certified Anti-Fraud Specialist certification (CAFS), and key investments in the technology platform. These critical investments are all geared toward advancing the impact of the Company’s mission of combating financial crime, accelerating its strategy and further developing its position as a technology-enabled provider of trusted information, data and analytics for the anti-financial crime (AFC) community.

    Management expects the significant changes will, over time, create a more robust platform for the global AFC community and a more scalable, consistent business model with accelerated growth for ACAMS.

    ACAMS anticipates modest growth in 2025 as the recent changes take hold with improved growth toward the end of the year and into 2026.

    Scalian – Slight decrease of total sales of -1.2% in 2024, in the context of continued market growth slowdown. EBITDA margin rate at 11.2%, down c. 60 bps, mainly due to lower utilization rate and the marked slowdown in certain sectors (automotive in Germany and civil aeronautics). Acquisition of Dulin in January 2024 and Mannarino in June 2024.

    (Full consolidation since July 2023.)  

    Scalian, a European leader in digital transformation, project management and operational performance consulting, reported total sales of €533.4 million as of December 31, 2024, a -1.2% decrease vs. 2023. The slowdown is spread across several sectors, particularly automotive in Europe and Aeronautics (supply chain disruptions). Sales are down -4.0% organically and benefited from a positive scope effect of +2.8%.

    Scalian generated an EBITDA23 of €59.8 million in 2024. The EBITDA margin rate stood at 11.2%, down c. 60 bps vs. 2023, mainly explained by lower utilization rate, partially offset by strict SG&A control.

    As of December 31, 2024, net debt24 stood at €345.6 million (leverage of 6.46x25 EBITDA).

    In 2024, Scalian announced the acquisition of Dulin Technology in January, a Spanish-based consulting firm specializing in cybersecurity for the financial sector, and Manarinno in June, a Canadian-based company that is a leading engineering services specialist with a unique know-how in advanced technology R&D for the aviation sector.

    Globeducate – Total sales up +10%26over LTM as of August 2024 Year-end. Strong EBITDA margin at 23.9%27in line with expectations.

    (Accounted for by the equity method. Globeducate acquisition was completed on October 16th, 2024. Globeducate fiscal year ends in August, and figures shown below are last twelve months at the end of August 2024 and first 3 months of the Globeducate year (September – November). Indian operations are deconsolidated and accounted for by the equity method due to the absence of audited figures for the year ending in August-24).

    Globeducate, one of the world’s leading bilingual K-12 education groups, posted total sales of €352.2 million1 for the full year ending in August 2024, representing a total increase of +10% year on year.

    EBITDA2 for the year ending in August amounted to €84.2 million, translating into a strong EBITDA margin of 23.9%, in line with expectations. This solid financial performance was fueled by a combination of organic and external growth.

    Over the first quarter of Globeducate’s fiscal year (September – November), Globeducate completed 3 acquisitions: Olympion School in Cyprus, and Ecole des Petits and Battersea in the UK.

    Net debt as of November 30th, 2024, was €490 million28 and leverage3 stood at 6.2x.

    Consolidated Accounts

    On February 26, 2025, Wendel’s Supervisory Board met under the chairmanship of Nicolas ver Hulst and reviewed Wendel’s consolidated financial statements, as approved by the Executive Board on February 21, 2025. The audit procedures by the statutory auditors on the consolidated financial statements are underway. The audit report would be released mid-March 2025. 

    Wendel Group’s consolidated net sales29 totaled €8,063.5 million, up +13.1% overall and up +8.4% organically. FX contribution is -3.9% and scope effect is +8.6%.

    The overall contribution of Group portfolio companies to net income from operations, Group share amounted to €274.1 million, down -24.3% year on year impacted by the disposal of Constantia and the sale of 25% of the stake in Bureau Veritas. Net income from operation, Group share, was €232.7 million, down -5.8%.

    Financial expenses, operating expenses and taxes at Wendel SE level totaled €63.0 million (of which €22.4 million non-cash), down -45.4% from the €115.3 million (of which €25.3 million non-cash) reported in 2023. Operating expenses are slightly down and financial expenses are positive with a positive carry of cash generating €35.6 million. 2024 is impacted by a goodwill depreciation of €188.2 million, mainly related to Scalian and the Stahl’s wet-end division, which is in the process of being sold.

    Net income Group share €293.9 million strongly up vs.€142.4 million in 2023, reflecting a €418.6 million capital gain group share from the disposal of Constantia Flexibles in H1 2024.  

    ESG achievements

    Non-financial ratings: Wendel improves its CSA rating from S&P, confirms its inclusion in the DJSI World and Europe.

    For the sixth year in a row, Wendel has been included in the Dow Jones Best-in-Class (previously Dow Jones Sustainability Indices) World and Europe indices, making it one of the top 10% of companies in terms of sustainability in the Diversified Financials category. With a score of 76/100 in its category, Wendel is well above the average for its sector (26/100). This rating places Wendel in the top 1% of its sector “FBN Diversified Financial Services and Capital Markets”

    Through the review of the Corporate Sustainability Assessment questionnaire, S&P Global assesses the ESG (Environment, Social, Governance) performance of listed companies in different industries since 1999. The top 10% of companies with the best performance in terms of sustainability, according to criteria defined for each industry, are included in the Dow Jones Best-in-Class Indices (previously Dow Jones Sustainability Indices).

    New ESG roadmap 2024-2027

    In 2024, Wendel defined a new ESG roadmap, approved by the Supervisory Board and the Executive Board, notably to take into account the Group’s recent strategic developments, including the new third-party asset management activity (IK Partners and Monroe Capital acquisitions).
    This roadmap includes five priorities: Governance & Business Ethics, Reliability of extra-financial information, Health & Safety, Climate change & adaptation, Parity.

    These five priorities will apply to all Wendel’ investment activities, encompassing both principal investment and third-party asset management. The detailed policies and action plans of the roadmap will be presented in the sustainability report included in the Group’s 2024 Universal Registration Document.

    Renewal of the Executive Board of Wendel

    On 26 February 2025, the Supervisory Board of Wendel decided to renew the appointments of Laurent Mignon and David Darmon as Chairman of the Executive Board of Wendel and Member of the Executive Board and Group Deputy CEO of Wendel, respectively, for a period of four years until 6 April 2029, with effect from 7 April 2025.

    Renewal of the appointments of members of the Supervisory Board

    At the General Meeting of 15 May 2025, it will be proposed to the shareholders that Nicolas ver Hulst, Priscilla de Moustier, Bénédicte Coste and François de Mitry be reappointed as members of the Supervisory Board for a further four-year term. If the renewal of their mandate is approved, Nicolas Ver Hulst will remain chairman of the Supervisory Board, Priscilla de Moustier and Bénédicte Coste will continue their roles on the Governance and Sustainable Development Committee, and François de Mitry will continue his role on the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee.

    Agenda

    Thursday, April 24, 2025

    Q1 2025 Trading update – Publication of NAV as of March 31, 2025 (post-market release)

    Thursday, May 15, 2025

    Annual General Meeting

    Wednesday, July 30, 2025

    H1 2025 results – Publication of NAV as of June 30, 2025, and condensed Half-Year consolidated financial statements (post-market release)

    Thursday, October 23, 2025

    Q3 2025 Trading update – Publication of NAV as of September 30, 2025 (post-market release)

    Wednesday, December 10, 2025

    2025 Investor Day.

    About Wendel

    Wendel is one of Europe’s leading listed investment firms. Regarding its principal investment strategy, the Group invests in companies which are leaders in their field, such as ACAMS, Bureau Veritas, Crisis Prevention Institute, Globeducate, IHS Towers, Scalian, Stahl and Tarkett. In 2023, Wendel initiated a strategic shift into third-party asset management of private assets, alongside its historical principal investment activities. In May 2024, Wendel completed the acquisition of a 51% stake in IK Partners, a major step in the deployment of its strategic expansion in third-party private asset management and also announced in October 2024 the acquisition of 75% of Monroe Capital. Pro forma of Monroe Capital, Wendel manages more than 33 billion euros on behalf of third-party investors, and c.7.4 billion euros invested in its principal investments activity.

    Wendel is listed on Eurolist by Euronext Paris.

    Standard & Poor’s ratings: Long-term: BBB, stable outlook – Short-term: A-2 since January 25, 2019

    Wendel is the Founding Sponsor of Centre Pompidou-Metz. In recognition of its long-term patronage of the arts, Wendel received the distinction of “Grand Mécène de la Culture” in 2012.

    For more information: wendelgroup.com

    Follow us on LinkedIn @Wendel 

    Appendix 1: 2024 Consolidated sales and results

    2024 consolidated net sales

    (in millions of euros) 2023 2024 Δ Organic Δ
    Bureau Veritas 5,867.8 6,240.9 +6.4% +10.2%
    Stahl(1) 913.5 930.2 +1.8% -1.1%
    Scalian(2) 126.8 533.4 n.a. n.a.
    CPI 128.0 138.8 +8.4% +8.4%
    ACAMS(3) 91.6 93.7 +2.4% -0.6%
    IK Partners(4) n.a. 126.5 n.a. n.a.
    Consolidated sales 7,127.6 8,063.5 +13.1% +8.4%

    (1) Acquisition of ICP Industrial Solutions Group (ISG) since March 2023 (sales’ contribution of €89.7M vs €89.1M in 2023) and acquisition of Weilburger since September 2024 (sales’ contribution of €18.2M).                                                                        

    (2) Scalian, which had a different reporting date to Wendel (refer to 2023 consolidated financial statements – Note 2 – 1.” Changes in scope of consolidation in 2023″), realigns its closing date with Wendel group. Consequently, 2024 sale’s contribution correponds to 12 months’ sales between January 1st 2024 and December 31st 2024. Last year’s contribution corresponds to 3 months’ sales between July 1st 2023 and September 30 2023.

    (3) The sales include a PPA restatement for an impact of -€0.6M (vs -€3.4M as of 12M 2023). Excluding this restatement,the sales amount to €94.2M vs. €95.2M as of 12M 2023. The total growth of +2.4% include a PPA effect of +3,3%.                                         

    (4) Contribution of eight months of sales        

    2024 net sales of equity-accounted companies

    (in millions of euros) 2023 2024 Δ Organic Δ
    Tarkett (5) 3,363.1 3,331.9 -0.9% -0.4%
    Sales (Equity method) (6) 3,363.1 3,331.9 -0.9% -0.4%

    (5)Selling price adjustments in the CIS countries are historically intended to offset currency movements and are therefore excluded from the 
    “organic growth” indicator

    (6) Due to the recent acquisition date of the Globeducate group, its contribution is not yet included in Group sales.

    2024 consolidated results

    (in millions of euros) 2023 2024
    Contribution from asset management 42.3
    Consolidated subsidiaries 826.3 774.4
    Financing, operating expenses and taxes -115.3 -63.0
    Net income from operations(1) 711.0 753.7
    Net income from operations, Group share 246.9 232.7
    Non-recurring income/loss -60.4 532.3
    Impact of goodwill allocation -120.4 -107.9
    Impairment 0.7 -188.2
    Total net income(2) 530.9 989.9
    Net income, Group share 142.4 293.9

    (1) Net income before goodwill allocation entries and non-recurring items.

    (2) -€85.2M of change in fair value for IHS recognized through OCI and €784M of capital gain on the Bureau Veritas bloc accounted for through equity.

    2024 net income from operations

    (in millions of euros) 2023 2024 Change
    Total contribution from asset management: IK Partners n/a 42.3 n/a
    Bureau Veritas 594.0 643.3 +8.3%
    Stahl 90.3 100.2 +11.0%
    Constantia Flexibles 115.2 n/a
    CPI 20.7 22.2 +7.2%
    ACAMS 0.0 -0.7 n/a
    Scalian -2,8 -6.2 n/a
    Tarkett (equity accounted) 8.8 15.6 +76.2%
    Total contribution from Group companies 826.3 774.4 -6.3%
    of which Group share 362.1 274.1 -24.3%
    Operating expenses net of management fees -72.5 -72.2 -0.4%
    Taxes -1.5 -4.0 +169.8%
    Financial expenses -15,9 35.6 n/a
    Non-cash operating expenses -25.3 -22.4 -11.4%
    Net income from operations 711.0 753.7 +6.0%
    of which Group share 246.9 232.7 -5.8%

    Appendix 2: Fully diluted Net Asset Value bridge over 2024

    Appendix 3: Conversion from accounting presentation to economic presentation

    Please refer to table 7.1 of the consolidated statements.

    Appendix 4: Glossary

    • AUM (Assets under Management): Corresponding – for a given fund – to total investors’ commitment (during the fund’s investment period) or total invested amount (post investment period)
    • FRE (Fee-Related Earnings) : Earnings generated by recurring fee revenues (mainly management fees). It excludes earnings generated by more volatile performance-related revenues.
    • GP (General Partner): Entity in charge of the overall management, administration and investment of the funds. The GP is paid by management fees charged on assets under management (AuM)

    1 Fully-diluted NAV per share assumes all treasury shares are cancelled and a complementary liability is booked to account for all LTIP related securities in the money as of the valuation date.

    2 Fully diluted of share buybacks and treasury shares.

    3 Including the €4.0 per share dividend paid in 2024.

    4 Dividend payout calculated on the basis of fully-diluted NAV at the end of December 2024.

    5 Based on Wendel’s share price of €97.15 as of February 21, 2025.

    6 Including sponsor money commitment in IK (€-500m).

    7 Including sponsor money commitment in IK (€500m) and proforma of IK Partners transaction deferred payment (€-131m), Monroe Capital 100% acquisition (including estimated earnout and put on 25% of residual capital, i.e €-1.6bn) and GP commitments in Monroe Capital ($-200m for 2025).

    8 €2.4bn of cash as of December 31, 2024, restated from sponsor money commitment in IK (€-500m), IK Partners transaction deferred payment (€-131m), Monroe Capital 100% acquisition (including estimated earnout and put on 25% of residual capital, i.e €1.6bn) and GP commitments in Monroe Capital’s new strategies (c. $-200m for 2025).

    9 Net proceeds after ticking fees, financial debt, dilution to the benefit of the Company’s minority investors, transaction costs and other debt-like adjustments.
    10 Gross IRR of 28%. Net IRR of 26%.
    11 EV including IFRS 16 impacts. Excluding IFRS 16, EV stands at c.€1.86 billion.
    12 As of end of December 2024

    13 Commitments not yet invested

    14 Fee Paying AuM

    15 (Net cash generated from operating activities – lease payments + corporate tax)/adjusted operating profit

    16 EBITDA including IFRS 16 impacts, EBITDA excluding IFRS 16 stands at €201.0m.

    17 Including IFRS 16 impacts. Net debt excluding the impact of IFRS 16 was €364.4m.

    18 Leverage as per credit documentation definition.

    19 Recurring EBITDA post IFRS 16. Recurring EBITDA pre IFRS 16 was $72.8m

    20 Post IFRS 16 impact. Net debt pre IFRS 16 impact was $375.2m.

    21 EBITDA including IFRS 16. EBITDA excluding IFRS16 stands at $24.0m

    22 Including IFRS 16 impacts. Net debt excluding the impact of IFRS 16 was $164.2m.

    23 EBITDA including IFRS 16 impact. Excluding IFRS 16, EBITDA stands at €50.9 m. Mannarino taken into account for 6 months.

    24 Net debt including IFRS 16 impact. Excluding IFRS 16, net debt stands at €314.9 m.

    25 As per credit documentation (pre IFRS 16)

    26 Excluding Indian activities. Indian estimated revenue stands at €25 m.

    27 EBITDA including IFRS 16 impacts and excluding Indian activities. Indian estimated EBITDA stands at €9.8 m.

    28 As per credit documentation definition.

    29 Consolidated sales will be published only for Full Year and Interim results. For Q1 & Q3, sales by companies/activities will continue to be commented on an individual basis

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Trump the ‘master deal-maker’ failed when it came to negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Philip A. Berry, Visiting Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

    News that Ukraine may be ready to sign a deal granting the US joint development rights to its minerals in the hope of a future security guarantee may be seen as a win by Donald Trump’s supporters who criticised Joe Biden’s unconditional support for Ukraine. After all, whether and how this agreement will actually protect Ukraine from continuing Russian aggression remains unclear.

    But Kyiv will be well aware that Trump’s track record as an international deal broker is less than stellar, despite the US president’s regular boast that he is a master deal-maker.

    Trump’s self-belief was encapsulated in his ghostwritten memoir, The Art of the Deal, which laid out his tactics to negotiate business transactions. One important tip was: “The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have.”

    Last week, Trump left Zelensky, and European nations reeling when he cut them out of talks with Russia over the war in Ukraine. In doing so, the president had arguably forgotten his own advice: to deal from strength and to use leverage in negotiations.

    Trump may have extracted a concession from Ukraine in the form of the mineral deal – although far less than the US$500 billion (£394 billion) of revenue he initially demanded – but in doing so he significantly weakened the US position towards Russia.

    Trump not only shattered the western position on Ukraine, but he also unilaterally ended Russia’s three-year isolation without securing any concessions from the Kremlin before inviting them to the negotiating table.

    Instead, it was the US that gave leverage away by sidelining Ukraine from the talks, rejecting the country’s desire for Nato membership and conceding that Ukraine was unlikely to restore its pre-2014 borders.

    Trump further undermined Zelensky by promoting the false claim that Ukraine started the war and calling him a “dictator”. This week, the US even voted with Russia and China at the United Nations security council over the conflict.

    Trump’s criticism of an ally and conciliatory overtures to a country that illegally invaded its neighbour marks a dramatic swing in US policy. The previous US administration provided Ukraine with military and diplomatic support, while imposing economic sanctions on Russia.

    A key question being asked in Kyiv and western capitals is what else Trump will concede to secure a deal with the Kremlin. While the contexts between the US’s involvement in Afghanistan and support for Ukraine are very different, Trump’s early strategy for the latter has some hallmarks of the US’s disastrous deal with the Taliban.

    Trump’s deal with the Taliban

    In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. The allies quickly deposed the repressive Taliban regime and installed a western-backed government.

    But by the time that Trump came to office in 2017, the war was at a stalemate. To make matters worse for the president, the US was spending US$27 billion (£21.3 billion) annually on military expenditure. Given this, Trump’s reflex was to withdraw from Afghanistan as quickly as possible.

    However, the president’s national security team – largely comprised of former and current military generals who did not owe personal loyalty to Trump – persuaded him to increase the US’s commitment to Afghanistan. The new strategy also set the conditions for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.

    The following year, angered by the lack of progress, Trump argued that the US should “get out” of Afghanistan as the strategy had been a “total failure”.

    By this time, the US had talked directly to the Taliban, without the Afghan government in the room – a key Taliban demand. While the talks were designed to lead to intra-Afghan negotiations, it resulted in the Afghan republic being sidelined from the process.

    Throughout these talks, Trump frequently threatened to withdraw from Afghanistan. US officials referred to this constant threat as the “Tweet of Damocles” – meaning at any point, the president would announce on Twitter that the US was departing Afghanistan.

    The secretary of state at the time, Mike Pompeo – a diehard Trump loyalist – knew the president could pull the plug on the talks at any time. He therefore instructed lead US negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad, to secure a deal at all costs.

    As a former senior Pentagon official who was present at the talks told me, it became clear Pompeo and Khalilzad had “no red lines” as both believed that “any deal was better than no deal”.

    Khalilzad abandoned the original Afghan-led process and worked to secure an agreement with the Taliban, which inevitably caused dismay within the sidelined Afghan government. Trump also largely refused to consult the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, about his plans.

    Compounding matters, the US president made several public statements about his desire to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan. This weakened Khalilzad’s position and encouraged the Taliban to remain resolute in negotiations.

    The US-Taliban agreement, which was signed in Doha in February 2020, favoured the insurgents and damaged the Afghan government. Khalilzad had conceded to the Taliban’s key demand: the withdrawal of all US and coalition troops from the country, which was scheduled over 14 months.

    In return, the Taliban promised to prevent terrorist groups from basing themselves in Afghanistan and agreed to hold talks with the Afghan government. If the Taliban did not adhere to these conditions, the US would – in theory – halt reducing its troop numbers.

    “This was a terrible deal. It was deeply injurious to US interests, let alone ruinous to Afghan interests,” the former Pentagon official told me.

    In the end, the Taliban failed to honour its counterterrorism commitments, and only half-heartedly pursued intra-Afghan talks.

    The deal set the conditions for the insurgents to retake Kabul by force, although the disastrous withdrawal overseen by the administration of Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, in 2021 proved fatal for the Afghan government.

    Trump’s Taliban deal excluded the US’s ally, conceded too much to an adversary, and was partly motivated by the perception of wasting American dollars in a far-off land. Unfortunately, these hallmarks are all too evident in the president’s stance on Ukraine.

    The early signs of Trump’s approach to talks with Russia do not augur well for Ukraine or the western alliance. If Trump does secure a peace deal with Russia that mirrors the accord struck with the Taliban, not only will Ukraine lose out, but Russia may be emboldened to again pursue its expansionist agenda.

    Philip A. Berry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How Trump the ‘master deal-maker’ failed when it came to negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan – https://theconversation.com/how-trump-the-master-deal-maker-failed-when-it-came-to-negotiating-with-the-taliban-in-afghanistan-250835

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hawley Reintroduces Bill Blocking Agencies from Partnering with Pro-CCP Consulting Firms

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo)

    Wednesday, February 26, 2025

     Today, U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) reintroduced his legislation to prohibit the Department of Defense and other federal agencies from contracting with consulting firms, like McKinsey & Company, which provides services to the Chinese government or its affiliates while being contracted by the United States government. The Time to Choose Act would force these firms to choose whether to stand with the U.S. in its efforts to protect America against China’s global ambitions, or forfeit U.S. government contracts entirely.

    This bipartisan legislation passed the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee with strong bipartisan support in the 118th Congress. Senator Gary Peters (D-Mich.) and Senator Rick Scott (R-Fla.) are both original cosponsors. 

    “For too long, these companies have basked in the financial security of government contracts while actively undermining our own national security,” said Senator Hawley. “It is unconscionable that we’ve allowed them to sell us out to the Chinese Communist Party by advancing their agenda rather than putting America’s interests first. My bill would bring that to an end.” 

    “The Chinese Communist Party is actively working to undermine our country at every turn,” said Senator Peters. “This commonsense, bipartisan bill would prohibit companies that are providing consulting services to the Chinese government from receiving highly competitive government contracts, paid for by American taxpayers, to protect both our national security and our competitive edge in the global economy.”

    “Any firm who wants to help, support or represent Communist China’s best interests clearly is choosing to work against America’s best interests and choosing to forfeit access to federal tax dollars. It’s a clear conflict of interest,” said Senator Scott. “The Chinese Communist Party is one of our greatest adversaries, hellbent on destroying our way of life, crippling our industries and spying on our citizens. Our bill, the Time to Choose Act, requires firms to make a choice: support the freedom-loving United States or support the regime in Communist China. There’s no in between.”

    The Time to Choose Act would:

    • Prohibit federal agencies from contracting with consulting firms that hold a contract with the Chinese government and other foreign adversaries.
    • Impose penalties on consulting firms that intentionally hide or misrepresent contracts with the Chinese government and other foreign adversaries, including:
      • Terminating affected federal contracts.
      • Debarring relevant firms from future work with the federal government.
      • Requiring relevant firms to pay damages equivalent to three times the amount spent by the U.S. government on the contracts.

    Read the full bill text here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Last Chance’ to Achieve Two-State Solution, UN Mediator Tells Security Council, as Speakers Highlight Need to Sustain Gaza Ceasefire

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    This may be “the last chance” to achieve a two-State solution — the creation of independent Israel and Palestine coexisting peacefully side by side — a United Nations mediator told the Security Council today, as it considered the fragile ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the first phase of which is set to expire on 1 March.

    While welcoming the implementation of this initial phase, including the release of 34 hostages, Sigrid Kaag, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process ad interim, added:  “None of us will forget the harrowing pictures of the coffins of the Bibas children taken hostage with their mother and killed while in captivity.” Condemning Hamas’ public parading of hostages, she also noted the release of 1,135 Palestinian prisoners and detainees, and reports of the ill treatment and humiliation they experienced.

    In Gaza, far more remains to be done to address over 15 months of deprivation of basic human necessities and “above all, a loss of human dignity”, she said, while noting some improvements in humanitarian aid access.  “Palestinians must be able to resume their lives, to rebuild and to construct their future in Gaza,” she stressed, adding that there can be no question of forced displacement.  Gaza must remain an integral part of a future Palestinian State, and the Strip must be unified with the West Bank including East Jerusalem, “politically, economically and administratively”, she said, calling on the Council to ensure continued support for the full realization of the ceasefire deal, urgent de-escalation in West Bank and support for Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction — which would cost $53 billion.

    Also briefing the Council today was Daniel Levy, President of the US/Middle East Project, who stressed that Israelis and Palestinians both deserve security, while acknowledging the “power asymmetry” between a colonizing State and a colonized people.  Recalling the Israeli ambassador’s “gimmick” of shredding the UN Charter at the General Assembly podium, he said:  “When a State like Israel conducts itself in ways that render the Charter meaningless and which assault [international] conventions, including on genocide […] then that is a challenge that cannot be allowed to pass.”

    Calling for a full ceasefire, the release of all Israeli hostages and a surge in humanitarian assistance, he cautioned:  “There is good reason to fear that this could collapse.”  In that vein, he warned against the attempt to permanently depopulate the north of Gaza, adding:  “Hamas non-governance in Gaza is achievable, the movement itself has said so.”  But, there will be resistance if the structural violence of occupation and apartheid continue.  He also cautioned against zero-sum thinking, also stressing that the unlawful forced displacement of Palestinians must not be endorsed or encouraged by any State, let alone, one of the permanent five.

    Testimony from Ex-Hostage

    “I was kidnapped by Hamas terrorists on 7 October 2023 from the Nova music festival with my partner,” recalled Noa Argamani, who also addressed the Council today.  She added that she was taken by force into Gaza and “held in total fear, living in a nightmare”.  Noting that she was rescued by Israeli soldiers after eight months in captivity, she said:  “Being here today is a miracle, but I’m here today to tell you we have no time.” There are still 63 hostages in captivity — 24 believed to still be alive — “the [ceasefire] deal must go on, in full”, she urged.

    Recalling that her captors murdered her friend, she underscored:  “Every second in captivity is dangerous.”  The Council must “not let the darkness take over”, she warned, stating that she came to the Council so that the international community understands that “the hostages are in hell” and deserve to return home immediately.

    Determined to Eradicate Hamas

    “This is the story of every hostage and every family shattered by Hamas’ terror,” said Israel’s delegate, urging the Council to adopt a resolution condemning the group — a move he argued the 15-member organ could have taken 16 months ago.  Stressing that the tragedy will not end “until each one of them is back home”, he continued: “The question now is whether this Council will help write that ending, or continue to look away.”

    “No matter what happens, our commitment to freeing all the hostages and completely eradicating Hamas is unshakeable,” he underscored. Turning to the humanitarian situation, he pointed to thousands of trucks entering Gaza every week to deliver aid and stressed:  “The only starved people in Gaza are the hostages.”  He added that “it is time to think beyond the frameworks of the past and build a new reality — one where terrorists do not hold entire communities hostage and where life is sacred once more”.

    Recordings of Gunfire at Family 

    Riyad H. Mansour, Permanent Observer for the State of Palestine, said while “nothing justifies” what happened to the Bibas family, Palestinian children are “not any less deserving of your outrage for their killing”.  He went on to play recordings of the calls made to emergency services by 15-year-old Layan Hamadeh and her 6-year-old cousin Hind Rajab — both found dead later — after their family members were shot dead while evacuating Gaza City by car. He also remembered the Palestinian parents who had to collect “what remained of their children’s bodies in plastic bags”.

    “Did you see the images of our released prisoners, often starved, with marks and scars on their bodies?”, he asked, noting that Israel subjects them to beatings and humiliating treatments.  “How many hostages were released by military actions and how many hundreds of Palestinians have perished in these military attacks that were supposed to rescue the hostages but led to the death of many of them?”, he asked, adding:  “Ceasefire works.”  The next few days is a test of Israel’s true priorities, he said.

    Support for Ceasefire’s Second Phase

    Council members stressed the need to uphold the ceasefire and reach an agreement on the second phase, which aims to establish a permanent truce.  Under this phase, Israel would fully withdraw from Gaza, while Hamas would release all remaining hostages in exchange for additional detainees.

    The representative of Sierra Leone, voiced a “renewed sense of relief and optimism” despite “the uncertainty that still looms”.  The representative of the Republic of Korea noted that the agreement shows “what firm political will can bring to the region” as Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners reunite with their families.  The ceasefire is also saving lives, Denmark’s delegate said, adding that it is vital that it moves to its second phase.  Georgios Gerapetritis, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, added that the ceasefire will “allow planning for a more prosperous and secure ‘day after’ for the whole region”.

    The representative of France said that his country has deployed specialized personnel within the framework of the European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point to support the ceasefire.  He also noted that his country and Saudi Arabia will co-chair an international conference for the implementation of a two-State solution in June.

    The Russian Federation’s delegate expressed concern about the “opaque monitoring mechanism”, highlighting accusations from both sides about the other side’s bad faith in the implementation of individual steps.  Somalia’s delegate said that the continued attacks, illegal arrests, settlement-expansion and excessive use of force “undermine the spirit of the ceasefire deal” and that “mediation efforts will not succeed if the aggression continues unchecked”.  If the ceasefire fails, Panama’s delegate warned, “then the human toll will be incalculable and prospects for regional peace and stability will fade further”.

    The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed improved aid supplies since the ceasefire agreement as having “demonstrated the central role of the UN and humanitarian actors, including UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East]”.  She also expressed concern over tightening humanitarian space, as well as the expansion of Israel’s operations killing and displacing civilians in the West Bank.

    Gaza’s Future without Hamas

    The representative of the United States expressed support for Israel’s “sovereign decision” to close UNRWA offices in Jerusalem, adding:  “UNRWA is not and never has been the only option for providing humanitarian assistance in Gaza”.  Her country stands with all hostages, she said, adding that the desecration of the remains of Shiri Bibas shows “the depth of Hamas’s cruelty”.  President Donald J. Trump has made clear that the future of Gaza must look different, she said, adding that Hamas must be fully removed from power and held accountable for its 7 October 2023 terrorist massacre.

    Save West Bank from Becoming Next Gaza

    Other speakers, however, highlighted the impact of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, and the escalation of settlements and violence in the West Bank.  “Israel is not trying to return to calm,” said Kuwait’s delegate, speaking for the Arab Group.  Asking the Council if it is waiting for a repeat of the Gaza tragedy, he called on the international community to help end the occupying Power’s aggression in the West Bank and its attacks on Christian and Muslim holy sites in the Aqsa Mosque compound.

    Algeria’s delegate drew attention to the Israeli Finance Minister’s declaration that the “goal for 2025 is to demolish more than what Palestinian are building in the West Bank”.  Stressing the need to support UNRWA and empower the Palestinian Authority, he added that weakening the Authority is a deliberate strategy by the Israeli occupying Power which dreams “of a land free of Palestinians”, from the river to the sea.  Five newborn babies froze to death yesterday in a hospital in Gaza City, he noted, adding “we have no more time to waste”.  The ceasefire agreement should serve as a foundation for a durable peace plan.

    Slovenia’s delegate stressed:  “Gaza belongs to Gazans and it is an integral part of the Palestinian State.”  Pointing to the “many more steps” needed for lasting peace to persist in the Middle East, he observed:  “While peace seems to be a big word, it essentially boils down to everyday decisions to work for it.”

    “The cumulative effect of Israel’s violent occupation of Palestinian territories has entrapped the Palestinian people in a cycle of violence and poverty,” Guyana’s delegate noted.  Pakistan’s representative pointed to the forcible displacement, military raids, settler violence and illegal land annexations Israel is conducting, describing these as “ethnic cleansing in real time”.

    The representative of China, Council President for February, speaking in his national capacity, urged the international community to support the parties in moving ahead with negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire and called on Israel to cease its military and settler activity in the West Bank, underscoring:  “The West Bank must not become the next Gaza.”

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI China: China to speed up airport customs clearance of high-tech, medical goods

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, Feb. 26 — Chinese authorities announced Wednesday that the country would accelerate airport customs clearance for special goods, such as high-tech equipment and raw materials, certain medicines, medical devices and biological products.

    The move aims to further boost international air transport development and facilitate trade and personnel exchanges, according to a joint statement from the General Administration of Customs, the National Immigration Administration, and the Civil Aviation Administration of China.

    It said that eligible airports are encouraged to set up “green channels” to expedite clearance.

    The document outlined 16 measures targeting improvements in goods clearance, passenger processing, public services, logistic costs, and the capacity of key airports.

    Cross-border e-commerce will benefit from air transport support, with eligible goods to be sorted in bonded zones for export. Policies for overseas visitors will also ease regarding visas and connecting flights.

    It said that airlines are encouraged to expand all-cargo aircraft use, increase regular international cargo routes, and boost international air cargo capacity.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: New Zealand and China Foreign Ministers meet in Beijing

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing today (26 February), concluding a substantive visit to China over the past two days.

     

    “We were pleased to re-connect with Foreign Minister Wang. We have known each other for many years, and today we continued our wide-ranging and constructive dialogue,” Mr Peters says. 

     

    Today’s discussion took place a year on from Foreign Minister Wang’s most recent visit to New Zealand, and during Mr Peters’ sixth official visit to Beijing. Mr Peters first visited Beijing in 1997, and he has previously visited a number of other cities across China.

     

    “The New Zealand-China relationship is very significant,” Mr Peters says.

     

    “China is New Zealand’s largest trading partner, and our long-standing relationship has been shaped over many years by strong connections between our people.

     

    “Befitting this comprehensive relationship, we discussed ongoing bilateral cooperation, a broad range of regional and global issues, as well as areas where we have differences.”

     

    The Ministers discussed key issues confronting both countries, as well as recent developments, including the Chinese naval deployment to the Tasman Sea. 

     

    “We also discussed our strong relationships with Pacific countries, including New Zealand’s special constitutional relationships with its Realm partners, in particular the Cook Islands,” Mr Peters says.

     

    “We also made clear New Zealand’s support for Pacific priorities and institutions, and Pacific-led responses to address the issues we face in our region, including on defence and security issues.

     

    “Our region and the world are facing a myriad of challenges, including increased tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

     

    “We raised the importance New Zealand places on international rules, norms, and institutions, including those that have long underpinned the stability and success of the Indo-Pacific. We also highlighted the constructive role China can play in responding to regional and international security challenges, including on Russia’s war on Ukraine, and in the Middle East.

     

    “New Zealand acknowledged the importance of further high-level visits to China to continue to build mutual understanding, and discussed the significance of dialogue between New Zealand and China this year across the relationship, including on trade, agriculture, Antarctic issues, climate change, consular issues, human rights, foreign affairs, and the Pacific.”

     

    While in Beijing, Minister Peters also held constructive dialogues with other Chinese leaders: Vice President Han Zheng and Head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party Minister Liu Jianchao. He also held engagements with Ambassadors to Pacific Island countries based in Beijing, and with Chinese alumni of New Zealand universities.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI China: World’s largest ice-and-snow park concludes with record-breaking 3.56 million tourist visits

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    World’s largest ice-and-snow park concludes with record-breaking 3.56 million tourist visits

    HARBIN, Feb. 26 — Harbin Ice-Snow World, the world’s largest ice-and-snow theme park, officially closed its 26th edition on Wednesday evening in the city of Harbin, capital of China’s northernmost Heilongjiang Province, attracting a record-breaking 3.56 million tourist visits, said the park’s operator.

    This year’s attendance surpassed the previous edition by 31.4 percent, jumping from 2.71 million visits, according to data from the Harbin Ice and Snow World Co., Ltd.

    Known as China’s “Ice City,” Harbin is the cradle of the country’s modern winter sports and boasts a history of ice-and-snow artistry dating back over six decades.

    The Harbin Ice-Snow World has captivated audiences for years with its elaborate ice and snow sculptures and immersive winter entertainment lineup.

    The 26th edition opened on Dec 21, 2024, and lasted 68 days. It is the edition with the largest scale in the park’s history. Spanning over 1 million square meters, the edition utilized 300,000 cubic meters of ice and snow to create the attraction.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: 26th Harbin Ice-Snow World closes

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    26th Harbin Ice-Snow World closes

    Updated: February 26, 2025 20:34 Xinhua
    An aerial drone photo taken on Feb. 25, 2025 shows tourists visiting the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province. The 26th Harbin Ice-Snow World officially closed on Wednesday as temperatures rise. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Tourists pose for photos at the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province, Feb. 25, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A girl poses for photos at the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province, Feb. 25, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on Feb. 25, 2025 shows a view of the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on Feb. 25, 2025 shows tourists visiting the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A girl visits the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province, Feb. 25, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Tourists take photos at the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province, Feb. 25, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken in the early morning of Feb. 26, 2025 shows a view of the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken in the early morning of Feb. 26, 2025 shows a view of the Harbin Ice-Snow World in Harbin, northeast China’s Heilongjiang Province. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ6: Commemorative activities for 80th anniversary of victory in War of Resistance

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    LCQ6: Commemorative activities for 80th anniversary of victory in War of Resistance
    LCQ6: Commemorative activities for 80th anniversary of victory in War of Resistance
    ***********************************************************************************

         Following is a question by the Hon Chan Yung and a written reply by the Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, Mr Erick Tsang Kwok-wai, in the Legislative Council today (February 26): Question:      This year marks the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance, and it is learnt that the Government will host a series of commemorative activities. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council: (1) whether it will set up a “Preparatory Committee for commemorative activities for the 80th anniversary of Hong Kong’s victory in the War ‍of Resistance” led by the Working Group on Patriotic Education, and extensively invite the participation of representatives of community organisations to co-ordinate the relevant activities; if so, of the expected time to commence such work; (2) of the key activities to be hosted to commemorate the 80th ‍anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance, so as to strengthen the sense of patriotism among the public while disseminating the message of peace; (3) how it will take the opportunity to make good use of the rich resources of the history of the War of Resistance in Hong Kong to promote the development of red tourism; and (4) how it will collaborate with the relevant Central authorities and other cities in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in jointly commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance? Reply: President,      Having consulted the relevant bureaux, a consolidated reply in response to the questions raised by the Hon Chan Yung is as follows:           This year marks the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance. The Chief Executive announced in the 2024 Policy Address that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government will host commemorative activities to strengthen the sense of patriotism. In terms of implementation, the Working Group on Patriotic Education led by the Chief Secretary for Administration will co-ordinate relevant bureaux and departments in launching a series of commemorative activities, including: (a) The HKSAR Government will host a solemn official ceremony at the Hong Kong City Hall Memorial Garden on September 3, the Victory Day of the War of Resistance, to honour the occasion. The commemoration will feature a rendition of the national anthem, ceremonial flag raising, a Rifle Volley by the Police Rifle Squad, an observation of silence, and bowing in tribute. The attendance at the ceremony will include the Chief Executive and senior government officials, representatives of the organs of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong, former Chief Executives, members of the Executive Council, members of the Legislative Council, representatives of war veterans’ groups, HKSAR deputies to the National People’s Congress, HKSAR members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, representatives of District Councils, representatives of Heung Yee Kuk, representatives of district organisations, members of uniformed groups and youth groups, etc; (b) With the funding and support from the Home Affairs Department, three major associations, namely the Hong Kong Island Federation, the Kowloon Federation of Associations and the New Territories Association of Societies, will organise activities on September 3 to commemorate the victory of the War of Resistance. Examples of these activities include a talk by veterans to recount their experiences during the War and a film show about the War, with a view to deepening the understanding among members of the public about the historical events of the War of Resistance on the Mainland and in Hong Kong and fostering their sense of patriotism; (c) The Hong Kong Museum of History (HKMH) under the Leisure and Cultural Services Department (LCSD) is currently liaising closely with the National Museum of China on co-organising a large-scale thematic exhibition scheduled to launch in early September for a period of about three months. The exhibition will mainly feature our country’s unyielding spirit of resistance during the War, as well as contents on Hong Kong people’s support for the Mainland compatriots, and the three years and eight months of Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, with a view to giving Hong Kong citizens (particularly the younger generation) a better understanding of the War of Resistance; (d) The Hong Kong Museum of the War of Resistance and Coastal Defence (MWRCD) is planning to collaborate with the Guangdong Museum of Revolutionary History to jointly organise a thematic exhibition on the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance. The exhibition will focus on an overview of the anti war activities of the Chinese Communist Party in Guangdong Province and Hong Kong during the War of Resistance. Through the display of valuable exhibits, historical photographs and multi-media programmes, the exhibition aims to enlighten the public about the history of the War, thereby promoting and inheriting the spirit of patriotic education; (e) The LCSD museums will also organise a diverse array of public and educational programmes, including thematic talks, workshops, field trips, and film screenings to raise public awareness of the history of the War of Resistance; (f) The LCSD will, from August to December, organise a thematic talk “Reapproaching the Japanese Occupation of Hong Kong from interactive map, 1941-1945” and a book display “Days of War” at the Hong Kong Central Library, as well as book displays, photo exhibitions and thematic talks at public libraries in different districts to introduce relevant collections and information, so as to enable citizens to learn about the history of the War of Resistance as well as the unity and resilience of the Chinese people in the fight for peace. These include the thematic talk cum roving exhibition “War of Resistance in Hong Kong: Sai Kung” to be held in Sai Kung District, guided tours of the Hong Kong Sha Tau Kok Anti-war Memorial Hall to be held in North District, and thematic talk series “Wartime Sham Shui Po” to be held in Sham Shui Po District, etc; (g) In terms of teachers and students, the Education Bureau (EDB) has always attached great emphasis on the education about the history of the War of Resistance, and continuously organises relevant activities for teachers and students to help them understand the history of the War and the heroic deeds of the martyrs, experience the indomitable spirit of the Chinese nation, learn to cherish peace through remembering history, as well as cultivate their sense of identity, belonging, responsibility and patriotic spirit. On teacher training activities, the EDB plans to organise an academic seminar on the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance, lecture on the contributions of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Independent Brigade of the East River Column, visits to places such as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison Exhibition Center at Ngong Shuen Chau Barracks, the Hong Kong Sha Tau Kok Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall, and the Wu Kau Tang Martyrs Memorial Garden, as well as a study tour for teachers in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area themed on the footprints in relation to the War of Resistance. On student activities, the EDB plans to roll out the “Visual Narrative of the War of Resistance: Territory-wide Creative Competition”, the History e-Reading Award Scheme themed on the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance, the second “Learn from Museums – Novice Curator Training Programme” co-organised with the Hong Kong Museum of the War of Resistance and Coastal Defence, as well as field study activities related to the history of the War of Resistance in both the local region and the Mainland; and (h) The Information Services Department is actively planning to collaborate with relevant government organisations on programme production under the theme of “Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of Victory in the War of Resistance”, so as to promote patriotic education through storytelling in a vivid manner.      To make good use of the abundant resources relating to the history of the War of Resistance in Hong Kong to promoting characteristic tourism, the Tourism Commission, in collaboration with the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD), has been taking forward the Enhancement of Hiking Trails (the Project) since 2018 to enhance the tourism supporting facilities of 20 hiking trails in country parks which are popular and with tourism potential. The Project covers hiking trails relating to war history, namely Lion Rock Historic Walk, Shing Mun War Relics Trail and Luk Keng War Relics Trail. The AFCD completed the enhancement works at Lion Rock Historic Walk in December 2023, whereas those at Shing Mun War Relics Trail and Luk Keng War Relics Trail are expected to be completed progressively in 2026. In addition, the AFCD installed at the Robin’s Nest Country Park interpretation panels about its war relics and the deeds of nearby villagers at the War of Resistance, and produced a video for broadcasting on social media platforms, thereby showcasing the history of the War of Resistance at the Robin’s Nest Country Park. The HKSAR Government will continue to encourage the trade to make better use of the abundant resources relating to the history of the War of Resistance to develop more unique tourism products covering different themes of in-depth tours.           Besides, to preserve the history of the War of Resistance in Hong Kong, the MWRCD has commenced relevant historical research with a view to providing related historical information for the War of Resistance heritage trails to be set up by responsible government departments in the future. The information will offer the public an insight into the history of the War of Resistance, and enrich their travel experience.

     
    Ends/Wednesday, February 26, 2025Issued at HKT 15:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ16: Developing family-friendly tourism

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Following is a question by the Hon Nixie Lam and a written reply by the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Miss Rosanna Law, in the Legislative Council today (February 26):
     
    Question:
     
         It has been reported that the family-friendly tourism market has been developing gradually in recent years, and family travel has become a popular choice. There are views pointing out that while Hong Kong has various family-friendly tourism resources, such as theme parks, playgrounds, museums and country parks, the overall resources have not been consolidated, the planning of which is rather fragmented, and there is a lack of systematic ancillary facilities for family-friendly tourism. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
     
    (1) whether it has plans to consolidate the family-friendly tourism resources in Hong Kong, introduce a clear and user-friendly map of family-friendly tourism resources to centrally display various types of facilities (e.g. theme parks, playgrounds, museums, country parks and outdoor activity venues), and provide one-stop information services for family tourists, with a view to helping parents plan their trips more conveniently; if so, of the mode to be adopted (e.g.‍ whether mobile applications or online platforms will be included), the implementation details and the timetable; if not, the reasons for that;
     
    (2) whether it will further improve the family-friendly ancillary facilities (including family-friendly toilets, lactation rooms and child-safe facilities) in the family-friendly attractions, as well as the transport links between the attractions, so as to provide a convenient and comfortable experience for family tourists; and
     
    (3) as there are views that the potential of Hong Kong’s family-friendly tourism market has not yet been fully realised, how the Government will enhance the quality of existing facilities and introduce innovative family-friendly tourism products (e.g. organising more interactive exhibitions and parent-child activities combining education and entertainment, and providing more suitable indoor and outdoor children’s spaces); whether it will introduce preferential policies or subsidies in support of family-friendly tourism, so as to attract more family tourists to choose Hong Kong as their vacation destination?
     
    Reply:
     
    President,
     
         As an international city and a tourism hub with diverse culture, Hong Kong has world-class resources in the areas of culture, sports, tourism, ecology, etc. and has long been one of the most popular tourism destinations in the world attracting many family visitors every year. Hong Kong has the edge to further develop family tourism in terms of tourism products and facilities. Strengthening Hong Kong’s status as the premier tourism destination for family visitors is one of the strategies under the Development Blueprint for Hong Kong’s Tourism Industry 2.0 promulgated by the Culture, Sports and Tourism Bureau (CSTB) last year.

         In respect of the questions raised by the Hon Nixie Lam, the consolidated reply is as follows:

         In terms of tourism products, there are various family-friendly itineraries and products available in the market, such as theme parks, family hiking trails, beaches in close proximity to the city, a variety of cultural and historical experience centres, museums. The Government has also been encouraging and facilitating the tourism industry to develop more family-friendly itineraries and products to showcase the unique characteristics of Hong Kong with a view to attracting more family visitors to Hong Kong. The two theme parks in Hong Kong, i.e. Ocean Park (OP) and Hong Kong Disneyland Resort (HKDL), constantly provide family visitors with offers of discount tickets and hotel packages, and introduce a wide range of suitable activities to provide family visitors with unique travel experiences. The gifting of another two giant pandas, An An and Ke Ke, by the Central Government last year, together with Ying Ying, Le Le and their twin cubs, has made Hong Kong home to the largest number of giant pandas outside Mainland China at present. Our promotion of panda tourism as a priority is particularly appealing to family visitors. Besides, this year marks the 20th anniversary of HKDL, and there will be a year-long celebration which will be highly attractive to family visitors. Additionally, the Government encourages different organisations to launch diversified activities targeting at family visitors. For example, the Leisure and Cultural Services Department (LCSD) offers a variety of family-friendly facilities, including innovative play spaces for children and places to learn about plants and animals, which are highly sought after among parents and children. Examples include Hong Kong Park, Kowloon Park, Hong Kong Zoological and Botanical Gardens, Sham Shui Po Park, Cha Kwo Ling Promenade, Tuen Mun Park. The LCSD also organises The International Arts Carnival and “Summer Family Cine Fest” from July to August every year, as well as Fun@Museum Carnival and fun days during Muse Fest HK every November. Further to the Adventure Night @HKPM: Family Sleepover and various family workshops held in the Hong Kong Palace Museum and M+ respectively last year, the West Kowloon Cultural District Authority (WKCDA) will roll out a family arts event WestK FunFest 2025 from March to April this year.

         In terms of information dissemination, to facilitate itinerary planning by family visitors, the Hong Kong Tourism Board (HKTB) has listed on its one-stop travel information platform, DiscoverHongKong.com, various points of interest that are suitable for family visitors, including the dedicated page, “Hong Kong attractions for families of all ages”, which consolidates various attractions suitable to family visitors like theme parks, Hong Kong Wetland Park (HKWP), on an interactive map; and featured articles recommending itineraries for family travel, providing transportation guide and offering recommendations on indoor family activities such as playgrounds, malls, workshops. The dedicated webpage also covers “12 museums for family days out in Hong Kong” and “Best family-friendly picnic spots in Hong Kong” to offer unique travel experiences to family visitors.

         In the meantime, the HKTB will continue to enhance its one-stop travel information platform to consolidate other important travel-related websites and applications (covering, for example, information relating to leisure and cultural facilities of the Government, hiking trails and camping), with a view to providing family visitors with more comprehensive, reliable, and up-to-date travel information and citywide offers. The HKTB will develop Live Travel Map and the Smart Itinerary Planner, which will provide visitors with real-time recommendations of nearby attractions, activities, offers, personalised itinerary suggestions that cater for their interests and preferences, and thereby providing them with unique travel experiences. These smart tourism initiatives are conducive to facilitating and enhancing the experiences of all visitors, including family visitors. 

         In terms of supporting facilities, the Government has all along been encouraging the hotel industry and various tourist attractions to continuously improve their supporting facilities, including family-friendly facilities such as hotel rooms with family elements and themed on giant pandas and kids. Some hotels are already equipped with family-friendly facilities such as playgrounds, kids clubs and toy rooms.

         Moreover, various tourist attractions are well-equipped with family-friendly facilities and services. For example, OP and Water World, HKDL, HKWP, different LCSD venues, the two museums in West Kowloon Cultural District, Ngong Ping Village, provide visitors with family-friendly facilities such as family toilets, changing rooms, nursery rooms. Some attractions also offer strollers and baby carriages rental service. Different attractions will continue to enhance their family-friendly facilities and services having regard to the preferences and needs of family visitors.

         The CSTB will, together with the HKTB, relevant bureaux and departments as well as the trade, continue to explore means to further promote the development of family tourism, develop and promote itineraries and products with unique Hong Kong characteristics, as well as provide suitable accommodation, supporting facilities and tailor-made travel experiences. We will target at not only family visitors but also MICE (Meetings, Incentives, Conventions, and Exhibitions) and business travellers attracting them to visit Hong Kong with their families, with a view to developing Hong Kong into a premier tourism destination for family visitors.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ12: Reinforcing Hong Kong’s status as an offshore Renminbi business hub

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Following is a question by the Hon Adrian Ho and a written reply by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Christopher Hui, in the Legislative Council today (February 26):
     
    Question:
     
         The Chief Executive has proposed in the 2024 Policy Address that the Government will continue to enhance the mutual market access regime and reinforce Hong Kong’s status as the world’s largest offshore Renminbi (RMB) business hub, contributing to the internationalisation of RMB. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
     
    (1) given that the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) launched the “Hong Kong Dollar-Renminbi Dual Counter Model” (dual-counter model) in June 2023 to provide investors with a variety of trading currency options and more investment opportunities, and investors’ holdings in Hong Kong Dollar and RMB counters of the same security can be seamlessly switched, of the total transaction amount recorded since the implementation of the dual-‍counter model and its proportion in the securities market;
     
    (2) whether it has assessed the operation and effectiveness of the dual-‍counter model based on the figures in (1); of the policies to be implemented in the future to enhance promotion, so as to encourage more listed companies and investors to adopt the dual counter model;
     
    (3) given that the HKEX has announced earlier the launch of a Single Tranche Multiple Counter this year to optimise the settlement procedures for Multi-‍counter Eligible Securities (including dual-‍counter securities) within the Central Clearing and Settlement System, of the progress of implementing such arrangement; and
     
    (4) given that the Government has indicated that it, in co-ordination with the regulators and the HKEX, will continue to make efforts in promoting offshore RMB business and strengthening product ecosystem at various levels, of the policies and measures in place to further enrich the RMB investment product suite in Hong Kong (e.g. incentivising more institutions to issue RMB-denominated exchange-traded funds and other products), so as to consolidate Hong ‍Kong’s position as an offshore RMB hub?
     
    Reply:
     
    President,
     
         Hong Kong is a premier global offshore Renminbi (RMB) business hub which possesses the world’s largest offshore pool of RMB funds, and operates the largest offshore RMB foreign exchange and over-the-counter interest rate derivatives market. Hong Kong also provides a diversified range of RMB products and services. With the support of the Central People’s Government, the Government, regulators and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX) have all along been leveraging the unique advantages under “one country, two systems” to continuously enhance the mutual market access mechanism, further strengthening Hong Kong’s function as a global offshore RMB business hub while promoting the progress of RMB internationalisation.
     
         In consultation with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the HKEX, my reply to the four parts of the question is as follows:
     
    (1) and (2) To meet the increasing demand from global investors for allocating RMB assets, the Government, regulators and the HKEX actively promote the issuance and trading of RMB securities in Hong Kong. To this end, the HKEX launched the “Hong Kong Dollar (HKD)-RMB Dual Counter Model” (dual-counter model) in 2023 to provide investors with more diversified trading options and flexibility to trade securities in HKD or RMB according to their needs. The HKEX also introduced the “Dual Counter Market Maker” (DCMM) regime, under which buy and sell quotes are offered through the RMB counter to promote liquidity of RMB-denominated stocks. To create favorable conditions for market makers to conduct market making and liquidity providing activities at lower transaction costs, the Government has made legislative amendments to exempt the stamp duty of specific transactions by DCMMs.
     
         Since implementation, the dual-counter model and the DCMM regime have been operating smoothly. Currently, a total of 24 issuers have adopted the dual-counter model to provide HKD and RMB securities trading. Meanwhile, 12 exchange participants have been designated as DCMMs to conduct market making and liquidity providing activities. Since the launch of the regime in June 2023 until mid-February 2025, the total trading volume of the HKD counter and RMB counter of dual-counter securities reached approximately HKD16.5 trillion and RMB42 billion respectively, accounting for about 31 per cent of the total turnover of the cash securities market in total. Under the dual-counter model, the HKEX and market participants (including listed companies, investors, brokers, banks and market makers) have accumulated considerable practical experience in issuing, trading, settling and converting the same stocks, especially the highly liquid ones, in different currencies. This helps consolidate readiness for further developing the RMB securities market.
     
         With the sustained growth of RMB cross-boundary payment and its share in global payment, we believe that the number of offshore investors holding RMB will gradually increase. Meanwhile, the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced in 2024 its support for the inclusion of RMB stock trading counter under Southbound trading of Stock Connect. The regulators and exchanges of the two places are conducting relevant technical preparations at full speed, so as to enable Mainland investors to trade Hong Kong stocks in RMB as soon as possible. The Government and the HKEX will also continue to expand and deepen the coverage of listed and potential issuers through various channels such as key promotional activities, roadshow events, thematic speeches and forum exchanges, and introduce in detail the advantages of the dual-counter model in Hong Kong with a view to gradually attracting more listed companies to adopt it.
     
    (3) To improve the efficiency and scalability of trading and settlement of multi-counter securities (such as dual-counter securities and exchange-traded products), the HKEX has announced the upcoming launch of the single tranche multiple counter arrangement to optimise the settlement procedures for multi-counter eligible securities within the Central Clearing and Settlement System. Under the enhanced arrangement, trading under different trading counters of securities will be reflected under the domain settlement counter for clearing and settlement purposes. It will spare clearing participants from inter-counter transfer, obviating the need for separate clearing and settlement for individual trading counters. Moreover, a “same stock netting” procedure will be added to allow offsetting the position of one currency counter against the position with opposite direction of another currency counter of the same securities.
     
         The enhanced measures will better utilise the characteristics of multi-counter securities as a single security and improve settlement efficiency. Relevant information including launch arrangements, technical documents, sample reports and data files, and frequently asked questions have been uploaded to the HKEX’s dedicated website (Note). To facilitate market participants to familiarise with the operation of the single tranche multiple counter arrangement, the HKEX will hold practice sessions in the second quarter of this year. Relevant details will be announced in due course. Subject to technical preparations and regulatory approval, the enhanced arrangement is targeted for implementation by the end of June this year.
     
    (4) The Government, in collaboration with the regulators and the HKEX, have been committed to promoting the development of Hong Kong’s offshore RMB business and enriching the RMB product ecosystem. Apart from stock trading, we have been supporting Mainland institutions to issue more offshore RMB bonds and promoting more institutions to issue RMB denominated exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and other products, etc.
     
         The Ministry of Finance has issued RMB sovereign bonds in Hong Kong for 17 consecutive years since 2009. The cumulative issuance amount reached RMB366 billion as of end-2024. Earlier this month, it further issued five series of RMB sovereign bonds totalling RMB12.5 billion.
     
         Over the past year, various measures have been introduced to enrich and support offshore RMB business. The eligible product scope of equity ETFs under Stock Connect was further expanded in July 2024, including 91 new ETFs in total. The Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds arrangement has been enhanced with effect from January this year. The measures, including relaxation of sales restriction, will significantly enhance the scale of funds. On the other hand, OTC Clearing Hong Kong Limited has allowed offshore investors to use Mainland Government Bonds and Policy Bank Bonds held through Bond Connect as margin collateral for Northbound Swap Connect, providing greater flexibility to international investors and enhancing their capital efficiency, which are conducive to further attracting participation of overseas investors.
     
         In addition, the Hong Kong and Mainland regulators announced in January new measures to deepen financial co-operation between the two places. Notably, the extension of settlement time under the Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) and supporting of settlement of multi-currency bonds through the CSDs linkage under Southbound Bond Connect were implemented in January this year, while expansion of the scope of eligible Mainland investors will be taken forward in due course. Offshore RMB repurchase business using Northbound Bond Connect bonds as collateral was also implemented smoothly on February 10, with multiple repurchase transactions completed on the first day of implementation. The RMB Trade Financing Liquidity Facility arrangement will be launched on February 28, with a view to facilitating banks in providing RMB trade finance services to corporates. The total facility size is RMB100 billion.
     
         In terms of insurance, the insurance industry has been developing RMB-denominated policies, and has recently introduced multi-currency insurance products including those in RMB to meet market needs.
     
         We will continue to spare no efforts in building the offshore RMB ecosystem, taking forward mutual market access measures that are supported by regulators of the two places, including the inclusion of real estate investment trusts under Stock Connect, and exploring new initiatives with the Mainland regulators. We will also continue to support Hong Kong financial institutions to further expand the suite of attractive investment products for providing more investment opportunities for domestic and overseas investors and consolidating Hong Kong’s status as an offshore RMB business centre.
     
    Note 1: The HKEX’s dedicated website: www.hkex.com.hk/Services/Clearing/Securities/What_s-New/Enhancement-of-Settlement-Arrangement-for-Multi-counter-Eligible-Securities?sc_lang=en

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ3: Enhancing prevention of potential non-refoulement claimants at source

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Following is a question by the Hon Carmen Kan and a written reply by the Secretary for Security, Mr Tang Ping-keung, in the Legislative Council today (February 26):

    Question:

         The Immigration Department officially launched the Advance Passenger Information (API) System on September 3 last year to prevent undesirables, including potential non-refoulement claimants, from boarding flights heading to Hong Kong. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

    (1) whether the authorities have, since the launch of the API System, compiled statistics and kept information on the number of undesirables prevented from boarding flights heading to Hong Kong each month, the distribution of their nationalities, points of embarkation, and the airlines they chose; if so, of the details (set out in a table); if not, the reasons for that;

    (2) of the number and names of aircraft operators which have connected to the API System since its launch, and their percentage in the total number of aircraft operators operating inbound flights to Hong Kong (set out in a table); among the aircraft operators which have connected to the API System, of the number of those which have successfully prevented undesirables from entering Hong Kong by providing API, and the reasons why some aircraft operators have not yet connected to the API System;

    (3) as there are views that the authorities should take the opportunity to review the entire mechanism of preventing undesirables from boarding flights heading to Hong Kong by the time when all aircraft operators are required to connect to the API System after the 12-‍month transitional period, whether the authorities have, in the light of the operational experience gained during the transitional period, reviewed the direction of optimising the aforesaid mechanism; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

    (4) given that the API System can only prevent undesirables from coming to Hong Kong by flights, whether the authorities have stepped up efforts to prevent entry of such persons through other channels; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

    (5) given that as stated in the 2024 Policy Address, the Government has since October 16, 2024 relaxed the criteria for nationals of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar applying for multiple-entry visas for travel and business, and extended the validity period of multiple-entry visas from two years to three years for these countries (as well as Vietnam which has enjoyed the relaxation since 2023), of the number of undesirables from these four countries coming to Hong Kong each month since the implementation of the relaxation, and whether there is a rising trend;

    (6) as there are views that with the relaxation of the visa-free entry policies by the Mainland earlier on, undesirables may possibly come to Hong Kong via the Mainland (including by legal and illegal means), how the authorities step up co-operation with the Mainland in preventing entry of such persons to Hong Kong via the Mainland; and

    (7) as there are views that there are signs of an increasing number of foreign domestic helpers (FDHs) who prematurely terminate their employment contracts and subsequently lodge non-refoulement claims in order to extend their stay in Hong Kong for the purpose of applying for government subsidies or engaging in illegal employment, etc., of the number of such cases in each of the past five years, the nationalities of the FDHs involved, and the average number of days of their extended stay in Hong Kong (with a tabulated breakdown by quarter); of the measures put in place by the authorities to prevent and curb the abuse of the non-refoulement claim mechanism by such individuals?

    Reply:

    President,

         To meet the aviation security requirements of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and to align Hong Kong with other aviation hubs worldwide, as well as to enable the Immigration Department (ImmD) to further enhance its passenger clearance and enforcement capabilities to prevent undesirables, including potential non-refoulement claimants, from boarding flights heading to Hong Kong, the ImmD has implemented the Advance Passenger Information (API) system since September 3, 2024, requiring aircraft operators to comply with the Immigration (Advance Passenger Information) Regulation (Cap. 115Q) (the Regulation) by transmitting advance information to the ImmD about flights and passengers heading to Hong Kong.

         To allow sufficient time for aircraft operators to connect to the API system and to ensure the system will run in a smooth and orderly manner, the rollout has been carried out in phases. A transitional period of around 12 months was also adopted. The offences and defences, and the miscellaneous provisions under Part 4 and 5 of the Regulation will come into effect after the transitional period, starting from September 1, 2025.

         In consultation with the ImmD and the Labour Department (LD), my reply to the various parts of the question raised by the Hon Carmen Kan is as follows:

    (1) to (3) Since the rollout in phases of the API system on September 3, 2024, as at February 21, 2025, 82 airline operators have been connected to the system, including Hong Kong-based airline operators, such as the Cathay Pacific Airways, the Hong Kong Airlines, the Greater Bay Airlines and the Hong Kong Express Airways, etc. As for the nearly 70 remaining airline operators, the ImmD will continue to maintain close communication with them with a view to ensuring that relevant system connection works will be completed in an orderly manner before September 1, 2025. The list and number of airline operators connected to the API system, and the percentage out of the total number of relevant airline operators are at Annex.

         In just a few months of operation, the API system has been effective in successfully identifying and denying boarding of flights by ineligible persons, including persons who had lodged non-refoulement claims in Hong Kong but were eventually rejected and repatriated to their places of origin. As regards the relevant figures, as well as the nationality distribution, the places of departure and the airlines chosen for the cases concerned, it is considered not suitable to disclose such information due to security reasons as sensitive internal procedures are involved.

         The ImmD will make reference to the operational experience of the API system during the transitional period and maintain close communication with the airline operators and relevant stakeholders, with a view to continuously reviewing and optimising the system and the related operational procedures.

    (4) and (6) In addition to the API system, the ImmD will continue to examine arriving passengers in a stringent manner at all control points and enhance intelligence exchanges with law enforcement agencies in Hong Kong and other places through various channels to prevent the entry of undesirable persons into Hong Kong. 

         On the other hand, the Government will also continue to spare no efforts in preventing entry of illegal immigrants (IIs) into Hong Kong. In view of the general resumption of international flights on the Mainland after the pandemic, the Mainland visa-issuing authorities abroad have resumed issuing visas to Mainland China to foreigners since March 2023. Coupled with rumours inducing IIs to come to Hong Kong, the number of non-ethnic Chinese (NEC) IIs intercepted had once increased in the second half of 2023. The Mainland and local law enforcement agencies have worked together to strengthen intelligence exchange; tighten the issuance of visas to Mainland China and control over the entry of NEC tourists into the Mainland; investigate syndicates organising cross-boundary illegal immigration; conduct interception at black spots in the Mainland and joint patrols at sea to deter NEC IIs from entering Hong Kong.

         With the concerted efforts of various parties, the number of NEC IIs intercepted in Hong Kong dropped significantly by 84 per cent from the peak of 364 in October 2023 to a monthly average of 57 in 2024, and the number of NEC IIs intercepted further reduced to 37 in January 2025. The ImmD will continue to maintain intelligence exchange with the law enforcement agencies in Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao through the established anti-smuggling collaborative mechanism, and timely conduct joint enforcement operations to deter NEC IIs smuggling into Hong Kong on all fronts.

    (5) Following the relaxation of criteria for Vietnamese nationals applying for multiple-entry visas for travel or business on October 25, 2023, to foster closer ties with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ImmD has extended the relaxation to include nationals of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar starting from October 16, 2024. Meanwhile, the validity period of multiple-entry visas for nationals of these four ASEAN countries has also been extended from two years to three years. Since the commencement of relevant measures and up to end-January 2025, the ImmD has issued some 4 700 multiple-entry visas to applicants from those four countries. The ImmD does not maintain the number of persons refused entry by nationality.

         The ImmD has all along been playing a stringent gatekeeping role to ensure that only applicants meeting the relevant requirements will be granted visas. During immigration examination on arrival, in addition to considering whether the visitor possesses a valid travel document (including visas (if necessary)) and meets normal immigration requirements, the ImmD also decides whether to allow entry of relevant visitor with due consideration to the actual circumstances, having regard to the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and prevailing immigration policies.

    (7) Over the past five years, the number of non-refoulement claims raised by former foreign domestic helpers (FDHs) are tabulated below, with breakdown by nationality and quarter:
     

    Year
    Indonesian
    Filipino
    Others
    Total

    2020
    1st quarter
    13
    13
    8
    34

    2nd quarter
    28
    15
    8
    51

    3rd quarter
    22
    11
    6
    39

    4th quarter
    52
    35
    23
    110

    Full Year
    115
    74
    45
    234

    2021
    1st quarter
    161
    47
    37
    245

    2nd quarter
    305
    109
    79
    493

    3rd quarter
    86
    41
    27
    154

    4th quarter
    106
    30
    13
    149

    Full Year
    658
    227
    156
    1 041

    2022
    1st quarter
    41
    13
    3
    57

    2nd quarter
    134
    36
    16
    186

    3rd quarter
    186
    46
    21
    253

    4th quarter
    157
    52
    22
    231

    Full Year
    518
    147
    62
    727

    2023
    1st quarter
    133
    45
    21
    199

    2nd quarter
    139
    25
    10
    174

    3rd quarter
    134
    26
    21
    181

    4th quarter
    135
    31
    16
    182

    Full Year
    541
    127
    68
    736

    2024
    1st quarter
    128
    32
    13
    173

    2nd quarter
    89
    23
    15
    127

    3rd quarter
    101
    31
    14
    146

    4th quarter
    111
    38
    19
    168

    Full Year
    429
    124
    61
    614

         â€‹The Government actively combats the abuse of premature termination of employment contracts by FDHs to change employers (commonly known as job-hopping), including stringently vetting employment visa applications from FDHs who have frequently changed employers. In May 2024, the LD also promulgated a revised Code of Practice for Employment Agencies to request employment agencies to clearly brief FDH job seekers on the relevant immigration regulations, and not to adopt business practices such as providing monetary incentives to induce FDHs in employment to prematurely terminate their employment contracts. The Government has also all along been maintaining close communication and co-operation with Consulates-General of the major source countries of FDHs. The relevant Consulates-General agreed to step up efforts in providing correct information to their nationals about the non-refoulement claim mechanism and the fact that illegal employment is a serious offence liable to imprisonment in Hong Kong.

         Under the Government’s multi-pronged strategy in handling the relevant issue, the situation of former FDHs raising claims has improved. The number of claims raised by former FDHs in 2024 was reduced by 41 per cent compared to the peak in 2021, while the portion to the total claims received in the respective year also dropped from 41 per cent to 22 per cent. The Government will continue to actively co-operate with relevant stakeholders and step up publicity and education. The ImmD does not maintain the breakdown of other statistics mentioned in this question.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (12)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Bond Issuance250. In the coming years, projects related to the NM will be rolled out progressively. Together with other important infrastructure works projects aimed at improving people’s livelihood, the capital works expenditure of the Government will start reaching its peak. In the MRF, capital works expenditure is expected to increase from the previously estimated $90 billion per annum on average to about $120 billion per annum on average in future. 251. To ensure that these strategic infrastructure works projects can proceed on schedule and deliver early benefits to the economy and the public, we will leverage market resources more flexibly, including adopting more diverse development models to take forward the relevant projects, such as more public-private partnerships, in-situ land exchanges, pilot areas for large-scale land disposal, etc. We will also raise capital by issuing government bonds, with a view to ensuring that the progress of projects crucial to the future development of Hong Kong will not be impeded by the fiscal position. 252. Issuing government bonds is one of the public financial management tools. Issuing bonds to support infrastructure development is a common practice worldwide. As long as the amount of bonds issuance is contained at a level that ensures fiscal prudence, capital can be utilised flexibly and for investing in future economic development, bringing greater returns and benefits to the society.253. Hong Kong has the prerequisite and capability to suitably increase bond issuance, thereby effectively utilising market resources. With the increase in capital works expenditure, I will expand the scale of bond issuance accordingly. It is expected that during the five-year period from 2025-26 to 2029-30, a total of about $150 billion to $195 billion worth of bonds will be issued under the Government Sustainable Bond Programme and the Infrastructure Bond Programme every year. About 56 per cent of the bonds issued will be used for re-financing short-term debts.254. We expect the borrowing ceiling of the above two bond programmes to increase from the existing level of $500 billion to $700 billion in the MRF period. The ratio of government debt to GDP will stay at 12 to 16.5 per cent, which is a prudent and manageable level, and is much lower than most of the advanced economies.255. I emphasise that proceeds from bond issuance will be used to invest in infrastructure, but not to fund government recurrent expenditure, which is the fiscal discipline that we have been strictly adhering to. Apart from leveraging market capital to support infrastructure works projects, the Government issues bonds with the aim of fostering the development of the bond market. On the other hand, economic activities and development of industries driven by infrastructure investments will generate new development opportunities and revenues to Hong Kong. Issuing longer-term bonds to support longer-term projects could also align cash flow with project requirements. Medium Range Forecast256. The MRF projects, mainly from a macro perspective, the revenue and expenditure as well as financial position of the Government. It has fully reflected the impact of the measures under the reinforced fiscal consolidation programme. For 2025-26, a real economic growth rate of two to three per cent is adopted, and that for 2026-27 to 2029-30 is about 2.9 per cent per annum.257. During the above period, the average annual capital works expenditure will be about $120 billion, while recurrent government expenditure will grow at a rate of 3.5 per cent per annum. The ratio of total government expenditure to GDP will gradually fall from about 24.4 per cent for 2025-26 to about 20.9 per cent for 2029-30.258. Regarding revenue from land premium, the forecast is made at a conservative level. For 2026-27 and onwards, it is assumed to be progressively rising to two per cent of GDP, which is lower than the 20-year average ratio of 3.3 per cent. I also assume that the growth rate of revenue from profits tax and other taxes will correspond to the economic growth rate in the next few years. Overall, the ratio of government revenue to GDP will maintain at about 20 per cent starting from 2025-26.259. In addition, the MRF reflects the proceeds from the annual issuance of government sustainable bonds and infrastructure bonds worth about $150 billion to $195 billion in total.260. Based on the above assumptions and arrangements, the deficits in the Operating Account and Capital Account in the next five years will gradually reduce every year. The Operating Account is estimated to return to a surplus from 2026-27 onwards, while the deficit in the Capital Account will fall progressively from $159.8 billion in 2025-26 to $87.6 billion in 2029-30. After taking account of net proceeds from the issuance of bonds, the Consolidated Account will return to a surplus starting from 2028-29. The above forecast has not taken into account any tax concessions or relief measures that the Government may implement after 2025-26.261. Fiscal reserves are estimated at $579.1 billion by the end of March 2030, representing 13.9 per cent of GDP, or equivalent to about eight months of government expenditure. Concluding Remarks262. Mr President, over the past year, the steady progress of our economy, along with a sustained growth momentum, has created favourable conditions for our future development.263. In the face of pressure on public finances, we have proactively taken a package of measures to strengthen fiscal management. We have every confidence and determination to overcome the challenges.264. Riding on the wave of technology transformation, we stay bold in taking forward reform and ready to embrace innovation. This will enable us to make the most of the breakthroughs brought about by technology innovation to accelerate the high quality development of Hong Kong and contribute to our country.265. We have to start with the system, removing the constraints and bottlenecks in the course of our development, while overcoming the challenges arising from imbalanced development and uneven share of the fruits of advancement. This reinforces our belief that we must respond to challenges with transformation, drive development with innovation, and lead the future with technology. 266. I have full confidence in and high expectation for the future of Hong Kong. I am confident because Hong Kong people are intelligent, creative and tireless in contributing to our economic development. More importantly, it is due to the staunch and unwavering support we receive from our country. I also owe my confidence to Hong Kong people’s profound insight into the major development trend of the future, as well as the city’s enviable and advantageous position.267. The colour of the cover of this year’s Budget is lake blue, which symbolises a blue ocean of limitless potential for future development. It also represents the deep reserves of strength and promising prospects of high-quality economic development, which resemble the deep waters that contain enormous vitality and infinite possibilities.268. Together, we can shape our future with actions, break boundaries with innovation, and pitch in to create a more prosperous, caring, diverse and international Hong Kong, unravelling a new chapter exclusively for this city and contributing to the building of China into a great country through Chinese modernisation!

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ1: Promoting development of aviation industry

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Following is a question by the Hon Holden Chow and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Logistics, Ms Mable Chan, in the Legislative Council today (February 26):Question:     It has been reported that Hong Kong’s aviation industry has started to recover in terms of, among others, passenger volume and cargo handling capacity, after being hard hit by the epidemic, and Hong Kong-based airlines have been actively expanding their aviation business. There are views that with the recovery of the tourism industry and the commissioning of the Three-‍Runway System at Hong Kong International Airport (Airport), the passenger and cargo throughput of the Airport will increase substantially. Regarding the promotion of the development of the aviation industry, will the Government inform this Council:(1) whether it has compiled statistics on the number of direct flights between Hong Kong and overseas places in each of the past two years, with a tabulated breakdown by companies operating such flights;(2) whether it knows if there is a situation in which air routes between Hong Kong and the rest of the world (excluding the Mainland) have been granted air traffic rights but not yet commenced service; if there is, of the number of destinations for which local airlines (i) have been granted air traffic rights and their flight quotas and, among them, the number of those for which (ii) air traffic rights and flight quotas have not yet been utilised, with a tabulated breakdown by airlines;(3) of the measures the authorities have put in place to encourage the local airlines mentioned in (2) to fully utilise their air traffic rights or flight quotas, so as to operate more flights between Hong Kong and overseas places;(4) of the authorities’ specific expectations and requirements regarding the social responsibilities to be shouldered by Hong Kong-based aviation enterprises; the measures the authorities have adopted or will adopt to effectively enable such enterprises to better fulfil their social responsibilities and play the role of helping Hong Kong consolidate its status as an international aviation hub; and(5) whether the authorities have examined if there is a situation in which the supply of flight quotas for air routes between Hong Kong and overseas places which have been granted air traffic rights falls short of demand and hence a quota increase is required; if there is, of the relevant measures the authorities will adopt to solve the relevant problem?Reply:President,     Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) continued to demonstrate strong recovery momentum in 2024, with significant growth recorded in air traffic data. In the recent month of January 2025, HKIA reached another post-pandemic high in both flight movements and passenger throughput, representing a full recovery of passenger traffic peak to the pre-pandemic level. Compared to the same month last year, all passenger segments, including Hong Kong residents, visitors and transfer/transit passengers, experienced double-digit increase. Traffic to and from Southeast Asia, Mainland China and Japan recorded the most significant increase during the month. Meanwhile, cargo throughput continued to gain momentum, with positive growth recorded across all cargo sectors. Cargo traffic to and from the Middle East, Europe and Australasia grew the most among key trading regions during the month. In consultation with the Civil Aviation Department, the reply to the question raised by the Hon Chow is as follows:(1) In 2024, the number of direct scheduled flights (including both passenger and cargo flights) between HKIA and overseas destinations (excluding Mainland and Taiwan) increased significantly by approximately 30 per cent compared to 2023. Additionally, the number of airlines operating these flights in 2024 also recorded a notable increase, rising by approximately 20 per cent compared to 2023. Details are provided in the Annex.(2) and (5) With a view to further expanding the passenger and cargo air transport capacity and connectivity of HKIA so to meet the market demand for air services, the Government has been making good use of Hong Kong’s unique civil aviation status under “one country, two systems” to conduct air services negotiations with our aviation partners under the authorisation of the Central People’s Government. As of the end of January 2025, we have signed 80 bilateral air services documents. Over the past two years, Hong Kong has expanded bilateral air services arrangements with multiple aviation partners, increasing the capacity limits for relevant passenger and cargo services by at least 60 per cent. This allows airlines to readily increase passenger and cargo services in response to market demand.     The overriding principle for traffic rights allocation is that public resources can be fully utilised to consolidate or enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s aviation industry and meet future needs. The Transport and Logistics Bureau (TLB) will take into account a range of factors, including encouraging healthy competition, maintaining Hong Kong’s status as an international aviation hub, and promoting the overall development of Hong Kong’s aviation industry, in considering the allocation of traffic rights to local airlines, with a view to promoting the overall interests of Hong Kong.     As for the specific details of traffic rights allocation, since the traffic rights negotiated between the Government and other countries or regions are recorded in the form of bilateral Confidential Memoranda of Understanding, which contain sensitive information such as details of bilateral negotiations, we are not in a position to disclose more of the relevant information to third parties. The TLB will continue to closely monitor the utilisation of traffic rights by local airlines to ensure that these precious traffic rights are put to good use, and will adopt a more forward-looking perspective in expanding traffic rights with our aviation partners.(3) When launching new routes or increasing flight frequencies, airlines will consider factors such as market demand and the allocation of company resources. In addition, the Government has all along encouraged local airlines to launch and increase flights to support Hong Kong’s overall development. Local airlines have responded positively. Following the launch of direct passenger services to Vientiane (Laos), Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), Sendai and Yonago (Japan), as well as Cairns and Gold Coast (Australia) last year and earlier this year, they will gradually commence direct flights to Dallas (the United States of America), Hyderabad (India), Munich (Germany), Brussels (Belgium), and Rome (Italy) later this year. They will also increase the frequency of flights between Hong Kong and North America.     At the same time, the Airport Authority Hong Kong has implemented several related measures, such as the Airport Network Development Programme launched in June 2024, which provides financial incentives to encourage airlines to open new routes and increase flight frequencies on existing routes. To date, the Programme has attracted 24 airlines, covering 53 destinations.(4) The Government maintains a regular communication mechanism with local airlines to monitor their operations and ensure the healthy development of the aviation industry.     With the commissioning of the Three-Runway System, the passenger and cargo handling capacity of HKIA will increase significantly. The Government will continue to maintain close communication with local airlines to ensure that they enhance their service quality continuously, providing stable and reliable services that deliver an excellent experience to passengers. At the same time, the Government has requested that local airlines’ network planning should support the Government’s strategy to enhance Hong Kong’s position as an international aviation hub and to meet Hong Kong’s strategic development needs.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (5)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Strengthening Industries with Competitive Edge

    72. It is imperative for Hong Kong to leverage on its strategic positioning as the “three centres and a hub” and make good use of the advantages of “one country, two systems”. With the resolute support of our country, we must consolidate and strengthen industries with clear advantages whilst actively nurturing and developing new industries, injecting new impetus to Hong Kong’s economy such that Hong Kong could contribute to the Chinese path to modernisation while realising faster and better development.

    International Financial Centre

    73. Last year, Hong Kong ranked among the top three international financial centres (IFC) and the top four initial public offering markets in the world. The Hong Kong stock market has been buoyant since the beginning of this year. Total assets under management amounted to over $31 trillion, with over half of the funding sourced from investors outside. The offshore Renminbi (RMB) liquidity pool has expanded to approximately RMB1.1 trillion.

    74. The key to consolidating and enhancing the strengths of Hong Kong as an IFC lies in institutional innovation, product innovation, a critical mass of enterprises and financial connectivity. Over the past few years, institutional reforms to the capital market, including establishing listing avenues for new economy and technology enterprises with weighted voting rights structures, facilitating fundraising by overseas issuers, etc., coupled with the Government’s active efforts in attracting new capital overseas and expanding new markets, have injected impetus to the Hong Kong market and improved its liquidity. We are pressing ahead with high-quality development of Hong Kong’s international financial market to create more new growth areas.

    Securities and derivatives market

    Facilitating financing of overseas enterprises and specific products

    75. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an important economic region that continues to grow. A number of enterprises from ASEAN are seeking to apply for listing in Hong Kong, covering businesses in areas such as biotechnology, integrated logistics, mining, etc.

    76. HKEX will step up its promotion in ASEAN and the Middle East, and actively explore areas of co-operation with countries in the region, including the listing of exchange-traded funds, to enrich the investment product choices in mutual markets and promote two-way capital flows. HKEX will also strive to increase the number of overseas recognised exchanges to facilitate more overseas companies’ secondary listing in Hong Kong.

    77. In order to facilitate more private equity funds to list in Hong Kong, SFC has clarified the relevant regulatory requirements to encourage sizeable alternative asset funds with regular income streams to raise funds. In addition, HKEX will put forward recommendations to enhance the issuance mechanism of structured products with a view to providing greater flexibility for product listing and trading.

    Improving trading and risk management efficiency

    78. We will continue to advance reforms to the trading mechanism. HKEX will gradually introduce new functions to its post-trade system from the middle of this year and conduct system upgrades to ensure technical compatibility with the T+1 settlement cycle by the end of this year, and complete advance preparations for shortening the settlement cycle.

    79. Riding on the reduction in minimum price spreads to be implemented in the middle of this year, HKEX is reviewing with the SFC the trading unit system, or the so-called “board lot” system, and will put forward proposed enhancements this year, so that trading arrangements can better meet liquidity characteristics of shares of different sizes and investment needs, as well as facilitate trading and improve efficiency.

    80. We have submitted the subsidiary legislation with regard to the implementation of the uncertificated securities market regime to LegCo. The SFC and HKEX are working closely with the industry to carry out system upgrades and technical preparations, with a view to implementing the regime early next year.

    81. To meet the risk management needs of investors, the SFC will consult the market on the proposal to increase the position limits for key index derivatives, so as to enhance flexibility for investors to use the relevant derivatives while safeguarding financial safety.

    Taking forward reforms to the listing regime

    82. To dovetail with the latest economic trends and corporate needs, we will review listing requirements and post-listing ongoing obligations, evaluate listing-related regulations and arrangements to improve the vetting process, optimise the thresholds for dual primary listing and secondary listing, and review the market structure, including exploring the establishment of a post-delisting over-the-counter trading mechanism.

    Fixed Income and Currency Hub

    83. The SFC and the HKMA have set up a task force to formulate a roadmap, covering the development of primary and secondary bond markets and foreign exchange markets, as well as infrastructural enhancement. We will also organise a flagship forum in the second half of this year to promote Hong Kong’s strengths in this regard.

    84. The Government will conduct research into the current legal and regulatory regime related to the issuance and transactions of digital bonds and explore enhancement measures to promote the wider adoption of tokenisation in Hong Kong’s bond market.

    85. The Government will regularise the issuance of tokenised bonds. The HKMA is preparing for issuing the third tranche of tokenised bonds, and will continue to encourage digital bonds issuances through the Digital Bond Grant Scheme, while actively exploring tokenising traditional bonds issued.

    Asset and Wealth Management Centre

    86. We have been striving to foster the development of the asset and wealth management industries. Measures implemented include enhancements to the Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect in the GBA, Exchange-traded Fund (ETF) Connect, and the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds arrangement.

    87. We will formulate proposals on the preferential tax regimes for funds, single family offices and carried interest this year, including expanding the scope of “fund” under the tax exemption regime, increasing the types of qualifying transactions eligible for tax concessions for funds and single family offices, enhancing the tax concession arrangement on the distribution of carried interest by private equity funds, etc.

    88. We will continue to attract global capital to Hong Kong and develop a vibrant ecosystem for family offices. InvestHK has assisted over 160 family offices in setting up operations or expanding their businesses in Hong Kong. We will be hosting the third edition of the Wealth for Good in Hong Kong Summit shortly under the theme “Hong Kong of the world, for the world”, showcasing Hong Kong’s strengths as a global hub for family offices.

    Offshore RMB Business Centre

    89. With the prudent and steady progress of RMB internationalisation, Hong Kong, as an offshore RMB business hub, will continue to enhance offshore RMB liquidity, improve the relevant infrastructure, and provide more investment products and risk-management tools.

    90. The Government promotes the formation of the offshore RMB yield curve by regularly issuing RMB bonds of different tenors. The Hong Kong RMB Clearing Bank has been offering 24-hour cross-border clearing service since last year, bringing convenience to banks and customers in different time zones.

    91. The current size of the Currency Swap Agreement between the HKMA and the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) is RMB800 billion. The HKMA will launch an RMB Trade Financing Liquidity Facility for banks as a stable source of relatively lower-cost funds, so as to support banks in providing RMB trade finance services to their corporate customers. The new facility has a total size of RMB100 billion. 

    92. To promote trading of more stocks in RMB and improve market liquidity, both places are conducting technical preparations at full speed to implement the inclusion of RMB trading counter under Southbound trading of Stock Connect. In addition, HKEX is taking forward the single tranche multiple counter arrangement, including adopting the same International Securities Identification Number for dual-counter stocks, so as to enhance settlement efficiency. The Government has also been conducting preparatory work to allow the stamp duty payable on the transfer of stocks at RMB counters to be paid in RMB, with a view to putting forward a legislative proposal next year.

    Mutual market access and co-development with the Mainland

    93. We will enhance the mutual market access mechanism with the Mainland, including the issuance of offshore Mainland government bond futures in Hong Kong, and implementing block trading of stocks and inclusion of real estate investment trusts under the mutual access as soon as possible. We will also actively explore opportunities to introduce further expansion initiatives, extend the Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect Scheme in the GBA, improve market liquidity, and enrich the risk management toolbox.

    94. The Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, together with OASES and the HKTDC, will host the inaugural Hong Kong Global Financial and Industry Summit this year, which will pool together global enterprises, funds and technologies through financial empowerment, thereby elevating the level of international co-operation of industries. It will also attract more leading companies in advanced industries, domestic as well as overseas enterprises and investors to establish a foothold in Hong Kong.

    95. To promote the connection of e-payment between the Mainland and Hong Kong, the PBoC and the HKMA are working closely to implement the linkage of faster payment systems of both places, with a view to providing round-the-clock real-time, small-value cross-boundary remittance service for residents in both places. The service is expected to be launched in the middle of this year at the soonest.

    96. According to the “Second Agreement Concerning Amendment to the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement Agreement on Trade in Services”, the restriction for the Mainland branches of Hong Kong banks to conduct bank card business will be lifted starting from next month. This will facilitate them in expanding their businesses in the Mainland.

    Fintech and Financial Innovation

    Virtual Asset Development

    97. We have been actively developing the virtual asset ecosystem in Hong Kong in recent years, and have been at the forefront by establishing a framework that balances regulation and market development.

    98. “Consensus”, an annual flagship event of the sector, was successfully held in Hong Kong recently, bringing together a few thousands of industry elites and companies from across the world in virtual assets, blockchain, Web3 and fintech, etc. This is a manifestation of global confidence in Hong Kong’s vibrant development in this area. During the event, the SFC also announced a roadmap on the virtual asset market.

    99. We will soon promulgate a second policy statement on the development of virtual assets to explore how to leverage the advantages of traditional financial services and innovative technologies in the area of virtual assets, enhance security and flexibility of real economy activities, and encourage local and international companies to explore the innovation and application of virtual asset technologies. The Government will conduct consultation on the licensing regimes of virtual asset over-the-counter trading services and custodian services this year.

    100. We have introduced into LegCo a bill to put in place a regulatory regime for issuers of fiat-referenced stablecoins. Upon the passage of the Bill, the HKMA will expedite the vetting of licence applications.

    Gold and Commodities

    101. The Working Group on Promoting Gold Market Development will formulate a plan this year, covering measures to enhance storage facilities, optimise trading and regulatory mechanisms, expand exchange products, and conduct market promotion. The measures will be implemented gradually.

    102. London Metal Exchange, a subsidiary of HKEX, has included Hong Kong as its approved delivery point in January this year. Local warehouse operators have expressed interest in becoming its accredited warehouses. Relevant discussion is actively underway.

    Non-traditional risk transfer

    103. As an international risk management centre, Hong Kong has been providing diversified risk management tools. We are proactively promoting the development of insurance-linked securities by establishing a dedicated regulatory regime and launching a pilot grant scheme. To date, we have facilitated the issuance of six catastrophe bonds in Hong Kong, with issuance amount totalling over $5.8 billion. The industry responded favourably to the pilot scheme, and we will extend it for three years.

    MPF “Full Portability”

    104. The Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority will consult the public on specific proposals of MPF “Full Portability” this year and submit recommendations to the Government thereafter, such that MPF “Full Portability” can be launched soon after full implementation of the eMPF Platform.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (1)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (1)
    Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (1)
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         Following is the full text of the Speech on the 2025-26 Budget delivered by the Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan, to the Legislative Council today (February 26): Mr President, Honourable Members and fellow citizens,      I move that the Appropriation Bill 2025 be read a second time. Introduction 2.   The Budget is presented at the halfway stage of the current-term Government. 3.   Over the past year, we have seen a number of positive developments in Hong Kong. Our economy has grown for two consecutive years. The employment market has been stable, while inflation remains moderate. Our efforts to attract talent and enterprises have been remarkably successful. The successive staging of large scale international mega events has been coupled with a notable increase in visitor arrivals. And sentiment in the stock market continues to improve alongside a generally buoyant atmosphere across the city. 4.   Nevertheless, Hong Kong has also experienced a lot of challenges. The international geopolitical landscape has caused disruptions to trade, supply chain, cash flow and sentiment in the investment market. Local asset prices are contained under a relatively high interest rate environment, whereas the retail and catering markets are still troubled by changes in the consumption pattern of visitors and our residents. 5.   While putting Hong Kong’s economic resilience to the test, these challenges signify to us the necessity to reform, innovate and relentlessly improve in the process of economic development. Although the large-scale, counter-cyclical measures launched over the last few years in response to the pandemic have helped us achieve our goal of “supporting enterprises, safeguarding jobs, stabilising the economy and easing the burden on people”, we have experienced fiscal deficits these few years as a result. Last year, revenue related to the asset market was far lower than expected due to a host of internal and external factors, and we continue to record a higher deficit this year. 6.   In this Budget, I propose a “reinforced version” of the fiscal consolidation programme, including a cumulative reduction of government recurrent expenditure by seven per cent from now through 2027-28. Strictly containing public expenditure is a must, but we should proceed in a steady and prudent manner and be careful to find a balance among the various impacts that may arise in the process. While laying a sustainable fiscal foundation for future development, this approach represents our all-out effort to minimise the impact on public services and people’s livelihood. It gives us a clear pathway towards the goal of restoring fiscal balance in the Operating Account, in a planned and progressive manner, within the current term of the Government. 7.   To seize the opportunities brought about by the rapid advancement of innovation and technology, we must accelerate the development of the Northern Metropolis (NM). It is an investment in our future. Given our prerequisites and capabilities, we can suitably expand the size of bond issuance on the premise of maintaining healthy public finances and use the funds raised in a proper and flexible manner to invest in Hong Kong’s future and create value for our society. 8.   In the midst of global changes, technological innovation is our core engine. We must expedite our economic development, in particular boosting new economic driving forces while enhancing the competitive edge of traditional industries at an accelerated pace. Technology reform and artificial intelligence (AI) development are remolding the global landscape, leading to the emergence of new industries, new forms of business, new products and new services. We have to seize the opportunity to make the most out of this critical window to speed up our development, establishing the new before abolishing the old. Transformation and innovation will lead our way into the future, and we are poised to fast-track the high quality development of Hong Kong’s economy. I will elaborate on this a little later. Economic Situation in 2024 9.   Last year, Hong Kong’s economy progressed steadily amid a complicated and changing environment. The unstable international geopolitical situation, escalated trade conflicts and elevated global interest rates exerted adverse impact on local economic activities and confidence. Nevertheless, our country’s economy is making steady progress and has rolled out measures benefitting Hong Kong one by one. Together with the Government’s initiatives to boost the economy and interest rate cuts by the US since mid-September, they all provided support to different economic segments in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s economy recorded moderate growth of 2.5 per cent last year. 10.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the global economy grew by 3.2 per cent last year. Supported by the continuing expansion of external demand, Hong Kong’s total exports of goods grew by 4.7 per cent in real terms. 11.  As a result of our country’s various measures benefitting Hong Kong, together with a large number of mega events organised throughout the year and the recovery of our air traffic capacity, the number of visitors increased by about 30 per cent to approximately 45 million last year, boosting the travel and transport services. Other cross-boundary economic activities also improved. Total exports of services grew by 4.8 per cent for the year. 12.  As the economy grew and the Government took forward infrastructure projects, overall investment expenditure rose by 2.4 per cent. Private consumption expenditure, however, slightly declined by 0.6 per cent for the year, as a result of changes in the consumption pattern of local residents. 13.  The labour market remained tight. The latest unemployment rate stayed low at 3.1 per cent. The median monthly employment earnings of full-time employees grew by a solid 4.8 per cent, year-on-year, in the fourth quarter of last year. 14.  Inflation was mild in overall terms. Netting out the effects of the Government’s one-off measures, the underlying consumer price inflation rate was 1.1 per cent last year. 15.  Sentiment in the asset markets improved during the year, benefitting from a series of measures of the Central Government to support Hong Kong’s capital market, as well as the rate-cut cycle of the US. The stock market saw increases in both prices and turnover volume. The Hang Seng Index rose by 18 per cent for the year, and the average daily turnover increased by 26 per cent. Funds raised by new listings increased to $88 billion. 16.  The residential property market continued to adjust in the first three quarters of last year. But it stabilised after the interest rate cuts. For the year, the number of transactions increased by 23 per cent to about 53 000, while property prices fell by seven per cent. The non-residential property market remained stagnant. Economic Outlook for 2025 and the Medium Term 17.  The Hong Kong economy still faces a very challenging external environment, but there are quite a few positive factors at the same time. 18.  Trade protectionism affects global trade and capital flows, dampens investment and consumer confidence, and weighs on global economic growth. It is encouraging that the Mainland economy continues to grow steadily. Our country’s domestic and international circulation, expansion of high-standard opening-up, global setup of industry chains and supply chains by Mainland enterprises, etc. benefit the steady development of external trade. In addition, the Mainland economy is resilient and has a solid foundation. The Central Government’s implementation of a more proactive fiscal policy and a moderately accommodative monetary policy, along with its efforts to expand domestic demand, add momentum to economic growth. 19.  The gradual easing of monetary policies by major central banks should support their economic growth. However, the economic and trade policies of the US have brought uncertainties to the pace of rate cuts this year. The European Central Bank also indicated that it would lower interest rates further if inflation broadly trends towards its target level. According to the IMF’s latest projections, the global economy will grow by 3.3 per cent this year, slightly higher than last year. 20.  Against the above backdrop, Hong Kong’s exports are expected to see steady performance this year. Moreover, riding on various policies and good momentum of last year, visitor arrivals should continue to increase. Together with the recovery of other cross-boundary economic activities, these should drive continuing growth in services exports. 21.  On domestic demand, investors may be more cautious due to uncertainties in the external environment. However, the expected relaxing of the global financial conditions will bode well for fixed asset investment. After last year’s adjustment, private consumption showed stabilising signs towards the end of the year. A sustained increase in residents’ income and steady development of the asset markets would boost consumption further. 22.  Based on the above considerations, we forecast that Hong Kong’s economy will continue to grow moderately this year, rising by two to three per cent in real terms for the year. 23.  As for prices, it is expected that domestic cost pressures might increase as the economy continues to grow. External price pressures should remain broadly in check, though geopolitical situation might bring risks. We forecast the underlying inflation rate and headline inflation rate this year to be 1.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively. 24.  In the medium term, monetary policy normalisation will help sustain solid growth in the global economy. The “Global South”, in particular the Mainland, will continue to be an important driver of global economic growth. 25.  Geopolitics will still bring challenges to Hong Kong’s economy. However, the Mainland is promoting high-quality development through scientific and technological innovation, comprehensively deepening reform, and expanding high-standard opening-up. Hong Kong is also making every effort to promote market diversification and open up new growth areas, and the economy is expected to grow steadily. 26.  Under “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is the only place in the world that combines the global advantage and the China advantage. The current term Government has been vigorously expanding economic capacity and enhancing competitiveness, and achieved considerable results. As long as we actively integrate into our country’s development and proactively align with national development strategies, we will definitely continue to seize new opportunities arising from the economic development of our country and the world, creating a bright future. 27.  We forecast that Hong Kong’s economy will grow, on average, by 2.9 per cent a year in real terms from 2026 to 2029. The underlying inflation rate is forecast to be on average 2.5 per cent a year.

     
    Ends/Wednesday, February 26, 2025Issued at HKT 11:13

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  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary (2)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Strengthening Foundation to Accelerate Development

    28. Hong Kong’s economy has recorded moderate growth for two consecutive years. The Government has been active in promoting innovation and technology (I&T) development, while striving to attract more enterprises, capital and investment institutions through diversified business promotion activities. Recently, Hong Kong has made continuous improvement in a number of economic segments. The Government’s efforts to build a vibrant economy and compete for enterprises and talents have yielded considerable results:

    (a) Buoyant Stock Market: The sentiment and trading performance of the local stock market improved last year. Since the beginning of this year, trading has been even more active, with average daily turnover exceeding $200 billion recently, up by more than 50 per cent over last year’s average. Total market capitalisation reached $40 trillion;

    (b) Vibrant Initial Public Offering (IPO) Activities: Enterprises are increasingly confident about Hong Kong’s financing prospects. Funds raised from new listings in Hong Kong amounted to $88 billion last year, a year-on-year increase of nearly 90 per cent and ranking fourth globally. Over 100 new IPO applications are being processed by the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEX);

    (c) Excellence in Wealth Management: Hong Kong is Asia’s largest hedge fund centre and the second largest centre for private equity management after the Mainland. There are more than 470 open ended fund companies in Hong Kong, double that of a year ago, and over 1 050 registered limited partnership funds, a year on year increase of about 40 per cent. Hong Kong is expected to become the world’s largest cross boundary wealth management centre by 2028; and

    (d) Attract Enterprises, Capital and Talents on All Fronts

    Attract enterprises: Since its establishment, the Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises (OASES) has attracted 66 strategic enterprises, 80 per cent of which have established or planned to establish their global or regional headquarters in Hong Kong. Many are I&T enterprises with a market valuation of over $10 billion and engaging in cutting-edge technologies. In addition, Invest Hong Kong (InvestHK) successfully attracted over 500 Mainland and overseas enterprises to set up or expand their businesses in Hong Kong last year, representing an increase of over 40 per cent. These enterprises are expected to bring in direct investment of over $67.7 billion.

    Attract capital: As at the end of last year, total deposits in Hong Kong amounted to more than $17 trillion, a year on year increase of seven per cent. On attracting capital from emerging markets, two exchange-traded funds tracking Hong Kong stocks were listed on the Saudi Exchange last year, with asset size exceeding $13 billion.

    Trawl for talents: As at the end of last year, various talent admission schemes have received a total of over 430 000 applications and approved more than 270 000, bringing some 180 000 talents to Hong Kong.

    29. We are proactively introducing additional measures to attract more enterprises or organisations to establish their presence in Hong Kong, bringing more mega-events and visitors to the city:

    (a) OASES will announce a new batch of more than 10 strategic enterprises next month. Together with those previously announced, they will invest a total of about $50 billion in Hong Kong and create more than 20 000 jobs over the next few years;

    (b) we strive to attract enterprises from the Mainland and around the world to set up headquarters or corporate divisions in Hong Kong. We have submitted a bill to the Legislative Council (LegCo) for the introduction of a company re domiciliation mechanism to provide facilitation for companies domiciled overseas to re domicile in Hong Kong;

    (c) the headquarters of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) will open by the end of this year at the earliest. As the first international inter governmental organisation to set up its headquarters in Hong Kong, IOMed is also the first of its kind in the world that specialises in resolving international disputes by means of mediation. It is conducive to affirming the positioning of Hong Kong as the capital for international mediation;

    (d) Kai Tak Sports Park, set to open officially in three days, provides a world class venue for hosting international mega events, taking forward the development of culture, sports and tourism as an industry in Hong Kong. It is also one of the event venues of the National Games; and

    (e) the World Tourism Cities Federation (WTCF)’s 2025 WTCF Fragrant Hills Tourism Summit will be held in Hong Kong for the first time in April. The Summit is expected to attract representatives from some 40 countries and regions.

    30. A full range of mega events that will boost economic growth and attract more visitors to Hong Kong will be held this year. I will elaborate on the details in the relevant sections.
     
    Upholding Principles and Innovation, and Cultivating New Quality Productive Forces

    31. Hong Kong is facing a rather complicated international environment amid changes unseen in a century around the world. The rise of protectionism and unilateralism has resulted in a fragmented global political and economic landscape. The future is trending towards co-operation among economies sharing mutual interests and formation of different regional segments.

    32. The vigorous development of AI is reshaping the medium- to long-term global economic landscape. In particular, its development is no longer confined to a single technology domain, but penetrating into each and every industry in the form of AI+. As the global value chain undergoes profound restructuring, product design and manufacturing are moving towards further intelligentisation and digitalisation. This wave of technological reform not only revolutionises traditional production, business and consumption models, but also redefines the core competitiveness of various economies, industries and enterprises.

    33. Hong Kong finds itself at a critical juncture of its development in the face of the changing global landscape and technological transformation. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC Central Committee) has affirmed the positioning of scientific and technological innovation as a core area of development and stressed the importance of accelerating the realisation of self-reliance on high standard technology. This points out a clear direction for Hong Kong to leverage its strength as an international platform for stepping up the development of the AI industry.

    34. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee has stated that the country has to deepen reform comprehensively, advance high standard opening-up and speed up the formation of a new development landscape. We must also cultivate new quality productive forces tailored to local circumstances and promote high quality development. To achieve this, we have to stay bold in reform, dare to break new ground and innovate continuously, and unleash the innovative and economic potential through institutional reform. Through technological innovation, we can catalyse new modes and new impetus to accelerate the nurturing of new industries and to transform and upgrade traditional industries. At the same time, we must nurture and attract talent by better means to promote the integrated development of education, technology and talent, which in turn provides staunch support for reform and innovation.

    35. We have to leverage the advantages under “one country, two systems” to better integrate into the national development and participate in the joint development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA) in a proactive manner. We have to reinforce our connectivity with both the Mainland and the world, while leveraging synergies with overseas markets, especially those emerging in the Global South. It is by doing so that we fulfil our roles as “super connector” and “super value-adder”.
     
    Innovation and Technology

    Artificial Intelligence

    36. AI is at the core of developing new quality productive forces. We will leverage the edge of “one country, two systems” and our internationalised characteristic to develop Hong Kong into an international exchange and co-operation hub for the AI industry. Through frontier research and real-world application, we will endeavour to develop AI as a core industry and empower traditional industries in their upgrading and transformation.

    AI as a Core Industry

    AI Supercomputing Centre

    37. We have been proactively enhancing the strategy and planning on AI development. The first-phase facility of Cyberport’s AI Supercomputing Centre has just commenced operation, and the computing power will be ramped up gradually to 3 000 petaFLOPS this year. This is equivalent to the processing capacity of nearly 10 billion images in an hour.

    Hong Kong Microelectronics Research and Development Institute

    38. Hong Kong Microelectronics Research and Development Institute, established last September, spearheads collaboration among universities, research and development (R&D) centres and the industry on the R&D of third generation semiconductor core technology. The Institute leverages the GBA’s well developed manufacturing industry chain and enormous market, and promotes the “1 to N” transformation of R&D outcomes and industry development. Two pilot lines will be set up at the Microelectronics Centre in Yuen Long this year and start operating next year.

    Hong Kong AI Research and Development Institute

    39. To spearhead and support Hong Kong’s innovative R&D as well as industrial application of AI, I have set aside $1 billion for the establishment of the Hong Kong AI Research and Development Institute. The Digital Policy Office (DPO) will formulate the establishment arrangements of the institute and its specific goals, focusing on facilitating upstream R&D, midstream and downstream transformation of R&D outcomes and expanding application scenarios.

    AI Subsidy Scheme

    40. Since its launch in October last year, the AI Subsidy Scheme has approved five projects led by local universities, research institutions, etc, to accelerate local R&D work relating to big language models, new materials, large synthetic biology models, etc.

    Fostering International Exchanges and Collaboration

    41. To bring together top talents in the industry to study the development and application of AI, the Hong Kong Investment Corporation Limited (HKIC) will be hosting the first International Young Scientist Forum on Artificial Intelligence to promote research of AI technology and its development as an industry, including Open Source technology, in particular the design and application of the open source chip architecture RISC V.

    Financial and Tax Support

    42. To further assist specialist technology and biotechnology companies, especially those listed in the Mainland, in raising funds and expanding business, the HKEX is actively taking forward the establishment of a dedicated “technology enterprises channel” (TECH) to facilitate the relevant companies in preparing for listing applications. The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) will also support to enable a smoother application process.

    43. Intellectual property (IP) is an important foundation for the development of emerging industries. In addition to obtaining IP rights through local research and development, enterprises will also purchase related rights to use IP. In this connection, we will review the relevant tax deduction arrangements for various expenditures, including the lump sum licensing fees for acquiring the rights to use IP, and related expenses incurred on purchase of IP or the rights to use IP from associates, so as to accelerate the development of IP-intensive industries and promote the development of IP trading in Hong Kong.

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