Category: Climate Change

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 – A10-0068/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023

    (2024/2052(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Investment Bank Group (‘EIB Group’) 2023 activity report of 1 February 2024 entitled ‘A Blueprint for Sustainable Living’, and to the EIB Group document of 2 February 2023 entitled ‘EIB Group Operational Plan 2023-2025’,–  having regard to the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’, ‘the Bank’) Investment Report 2023/2024 entitled ‘Transforming for competitiveness’, published on 7 February 2024,

     having regard to the EIB document of 8 May 2023 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the EIB Energy Lending Policy’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2023, published on 1 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 27 November 2023 entitled ‘The EIB Group PATH Framework – Version 1.2 of November 2023 – Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement’,

     having regard to the EIB Group and EIB documents of 21 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap’ and of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘EIB Global Strategic Roadmap’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2023, published on 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB information note of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘The European Investment Bank’s approach to human rights’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Report 2023, published on 10 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 14 October 2024 entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’,

     having regard to the EIB publication of 23 September 2024 entitled ‘EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2023’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 15 July 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions 2023’,–  having regard to the EIB report of 19 October 2023 entitled ‘EIB Investment Survey 2023 – European Union overview’,

      having regard to the EIB Group report of 26 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group support for EU businesses: Evidence of impact in addressing market failures’,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

     having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 22/2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 29 December 2023 entitled ‘European Investment Bank Group Risk Management Disclosure Report – June 2023’,

     having regard to the joint communication of 19 March 2025 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0068/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB stands as the world’s largest multilateral development bank; whereas the EIB is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration; whereas the EIB’s key priorities include providing funding for projects to foster European integration and social cohesion; whereas the EIF acts as a dedicated body for supporting the European Union’s policy objectives in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion;

    B. whereas, as a bank owned by the EU Member States, the EIB is governed by a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and a Management Committee, and it maintains robust internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (60 %), the EU (30 %) and financial institutions (10 %) from the Member States, the UK and Türkiye, and is managed by the General Meeting of EIF shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive, with independent internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit, some of which are shared at the Group level;

    C. whereas both the EIB and the EIF operate within a competitive market but are held to high standards of transparency and stakeholder engagement as EU bodies;

    D. whereas the EIB Group promotes EU policies both within and outside the EU and collaborates closely with other EU and national institutions, aligning its financing with the EU’s political priorities; whereas the EIB Group outlined eight strategic priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027: climate action, digital transformation, defence, cohesion, agriculture, social infrastructure, external financing and promoting the Capital Markets Union;

    E. whereas the EIB is also tasked with securing resources through borrowing activities, which are crucial for implementing the EU’s policies;

    F. whereas the European Council’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029 envisages an enhanced role for the EIB Group as a driver of EU defence and security, and emphasises the need to boost EU competitiveness and improve citizens’ economic and social well-being through significant collective investment efforts, leveraging both public and private funding;

    G. whereas the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness[1] proposed numerous ways to expand the EIB’s role in financing EU policies and to enable the EIB to assume more risk;

    H. whereas the EIB Group’s core mission is to bolster Europe’s potential for job creation and economic growth; whereas its investments should tackle inequalities by improving access to jobs, training opportunities, housing and education in order to address poverty and unemployment; whereas it is crucial to overcome barriers to financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps; whereas public lending and guarantee schemes serve as vital countercyclical policy tools, especially during economic downturns, and help mitigate structural market failures;

    I. whereas the EIB is a cornerstone of the European financial architecture for development and the largest multilateral lender in the EU’s neighbouring regions, including the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa; whereas the EIB is expected to help close the gap in productive investment between Europe and its main competitors by increasing investment in innovation, communication technology and intellectual property;

    J. whereas the success of the EU’s policy objectives and their effective implementation increasingly depend on the EIB Group; whereas the depth and quality of Parliament’s oversight of the EIB’s financial operations should therefore be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;

    K. whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency, and robust measures must be implemented and regularly updated to combat financial fraud, corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and both tax evasion and avoidance; whereas the EIB Group has a control framework aimed at preventing and mitigating sanctions risks;

    L. whereas the EIB Group adheres to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s definition of compliance risk, with the aim of preventing the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or damage to reputation; whereas the Bank takes appropriate measures to mitigate such risks by ensuring strict compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks, both at EU and international level;

    Financial operations and performance

    1. Acknowledges that the EIB has operated effectively and efficiently in a landscape marked by significant global challenges, including geopolitical tensions, climate change impacts and other factors influencing the global economy; suggests exploring both the EIB’s effectiveness and efficiency through thoughtful analysis, particularly focusing on the impact on competitiveness and growth;

    2. Recognises that EIB financing is becoming increasingly crucial in the context of high interest rates and constrained public finances; expects the EIB, in the context of a challenging economic outlook and increased global competition, to address constraints to EU competitiveness, such as volatile energy prices, skills shortages in key sectors and insufficient investments in innovation and new technologies;

    3. Notes that the EIB Group achieved strong consolidated results amounting to EUR 2.272 billion in 2023 under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), compared to EUR 2.327 billion in 2022, reflecting a year-on-year decrease of 2.4 %; calls for a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to this decrease, especially since the period was marked by steady economic growth; observes that EIB reserves reached over EUR 56 billion in 2023, up from EUR 53.9 billion in 2022 and EUR 36 billion in 2014;

    4. Notes that the EIB’s total liquidity ratio remained well within internal limits to the end of 2023 and that the EIB’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stood at 33.1 % in 2023, significantly higher than the average ratio of significant institutions supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) at that time; emphasises that maintaining the EIB’s AAA rating with a ‘stable’ outlook is crucial for securing favourable market financing at preferential rates and should be preserved; underlines that the EIB’s high credit standing is key to its successful business model;

    5. Calls on the EIB to maintain its strong capital position and consistently high profits, but notes that the Bank has potential to absorb potential fluctuations in returns without compromising shareholder capital or its credit rating, has the capacity to take on more risk in strategic investments and is well-equipped to invest more in higher-risk innovative projects where private capital remains hesitant;

    6. Highlights that the EIB’s total disbursements reached EUR 54.4 billion in 2023, with EUR 53.4 billion from its own resources, compared to EUR 54.3 billion (EUR 53.3 billion from its own resources) in 2022; observes that the EIF’s disbursements on private equity investments amounted to EUR 139.7 million in 2023, compared to EUR 113.7 million in 2022; notes that, according to an economic model developed jointly by the EIB’s Economics Department and the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the EIB Group’s overall investment within the EU in 2023 is expected to create around 1 460 000 new jobs in the EU-27 by 2027 and boost the EU’s GDP by 1.03 percentage points; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments to maximise their impact across all EU regions, promoting cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the Union, with particular attention to under-represented and less developed areas;

    7. Recalls that the EIB’s Statute mandates geographical balance among its staff and that the selection of staff members must be based on merit, while also considering fair representation of nationals from all Member States; encourages the Bank to continuously monitor geographical balance among its staff and to adjust the recruitment process accordingly, if needed;

    8. Welcomes the fact that the EIB Group upholds a rigorous policy against tax fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorism financing;

    InvestEU, the simplification of the multiannual financial framework, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    9. Welcomes the adoption, on 13 December 2023, of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026, which outlines the priorities and activities for implementing the EIB Group’s strategy over the next three years; calls for adjustments to new market conditions, including simplification and a reduction of bureaucracy to remove barriers to financing for SMEs, which must be significantly increased; acknowledges that increasing higher-risk activities and mandates is crucial for providing effective support to high value-added and innovative sectors;

    10. Recalls that the EIB Group has been allocated 75 % (EUR 19.6 billion) of the EU budgetary guarantee under the InvestEU Regulation[2]; highlights that, in 2023 alone, the EIB approved 30 operations under InvestEU totalling EUR 9.1 billion; believes that in order to stay competitive, significant investments are needed, primarily from the private sector; believes that focusing on innovative projects, start-ups and scale-ups would enhance European competitiveness and growth; notes that this requires mobilising private investments; calls, therefore, on the EIB to play a more significant role in strategic de-risking through guarantees, thereby encouraging private capital investment;

    11. Stresses that, within the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the EIB manages 87 mandates from the Commission, increasing to about 130 if those relating to shared management and assigned by local governments and the Member States are included, and notes that the EIB produces no fewer than 457 reports a year for these; points out that de-bureaucratisation and simplification are deemed necessary to enable better use of resources;

    12. Emphasises that the EIB is managing six Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) mandates in four Member States, signed in 2021 (Greece and Italy), 2022 (Romania) and 2024 (Spain), totalling EUR 8.7 billion; acknowledges that the adoption of ‘financing not linked to costs’ instruments, which have significantly expanded with the RRF, inherently raises the risk of errors and double funding; expresses its concern about the transparency, auditing and monitoring of the implementation of the RRF; calls on the EIB to cooperate with Member States to address government capacity constraints and the lack of technical skills so as to ensure that RRF resources are managed as effectively as possible, in alignment with national structures and complying with all RRF reporting requirements, especially in the implementation of investment projects and reforms; urges the Commission and the EIB, in its advisory role, to refrain from proposing new financing mechanisms based on the RRF model without taking corrective measures, including in the upcoming post-2027 multiannual financial framework; stresses that, while the EIB seeks simplification, it must not compromise the soundness of EU resource management or the ability to maintain oversight and accountability, as mandated by the Treaties;

    Energy security

    13. Notes the EIB’s continued support for security of supply, which mainly takes the form of reinforcing electricity grids and cross-border infrastructure, of reducing energy demand through energy efficiency projects and of fostering low-carbon power generation; commends the fact that the EIB has supported new dimensions of energy security, such as demand response and energy storage, and has promoted the development of a sustainable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) needed for the energy transition; calls for an urgent analysis of the real impact of these projects implemented to date, especially of their impact on the availability and cost of energy and thus on the general competitiveness of European companies;

    14. Reiterates the need to address energy poverty and emphasises the need for a fair and inclusive energy transition; recalls that the energy crisis is exacerbating inflation, increasing food insecurity and straining household budgets; encourages the EIB to leverage the Just Transition Mechanism and the Modernisation Fund to support regions and populations most affected by the energy transition; stresses the importance of using the Just Transition Mechanism to support workers and regions affected by the phase out of fossil fuels, ensuring access to retraining and quality jobs; recognises that numerous sectors are grappling with challenges stemming from the combined effects of adaption to European Green Deal objectives and the repercussions of the energy crisis and inflation; stresses that accelerating the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies requires bringing their costs to a level that is competitive with fossil fuels and adjusting to the ongoing reform of the green policies;

    15. Acknowledges that the REPowerEU plan is a crucial new element in the EU policy response to the energy crisis; notes that, in July 2023, the EIB Group increased the financing targets of the October 2022 commitment from EUR 30.0 billion until 2027 to EUR 45.0 billion (REPowerEU+), in order to scale up its efforts to support the EU’s energy security; calls for a clear overview of potential double funding of energy projects;

    16. Underlines that in 2023, the EIB provided approximately EUR 21.4 billion in financing for energy-related projects, of which around EUR 19.8 billion in the EU and EUR 1.6 billion outside the EU; considers it necessary to increase not only the volume of financing for energy-related projects, but also the efficiency of the investments; underlines, in this regard, the importance of the EIB’s combined offer of competent technical assistance and innovative financial support, and encourages the Bank to expand the range of innovative financing products offered to economic operators, going beyond the standard market offer;

    17. Believes that hydrogen and its derivatives, particularly when sourced from renewable energy, can significantly contribute to the EU’s decarbonisation goals and reduce dependence on fossil fuels; urges the EIB to take a leading role in mobilising private investments, which are essential for scaling up hydrogen production across the EU, while ensuring technological neutrality and supporting a diverse range of innovative solutions for decarbonisation, including further scientific research aimed at enhancing and stabilising the efficiency of hydrogen technology; encourages the Bank to consider the cost-effectiveness of such projects from the perspective of their total life cycle;

    Defence and security policy

    18. Welcomes the significant role that the EIB Group plays in supporting the EU’s defence and security policy by providing funding and leveraging private investment to enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses the importance of the EIB’s investment capabilities, supporting initiatives that contribute to strengthening the EU’s defence industry, advancing cybersecurity infrastructure and promoting innovation in critical defence technologies;

    19. Appreciates that security and defence is set as one of the Bank’s core priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027; highlights that in May 2024, the EIB’s Board of Directors approved the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan, which follows the EIB Group 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology, in order to enhance support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes, with satisfaction, that EIB Group support is provided to SMEs and innovative start-ups within the security and defence sector under the ‘dual-use’ principle, upholding the ‘credible civil use’ criterion, but waiving the revenue test; welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors of 21 March 2025 to expand the Bank’s eligibilities for financing Europe’s security and defence industry and infrastructure, by ensuring that excluded activities are as limited as possible in scope;

    20. Welcomes the EIB’s targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure and emphasises the need for strategic investment in technologies that serve both civilian and defence purposes, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; calls on the EIB Group to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy;

    21. Stresses the importance of SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps in the security and defence industry and in developing a common European market for defence; believes that smaller actors play a crucial role in strengthening the Union’s capacity and autonomy to develop innovative defence products; encourages the EIB to further support cross-border research and development (R&D) cooperation, particularly by paving the way for smaller actors to take part in the defence supply chains; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage investment by commercial banks in the same area and considers it necessary to increase the flexibility of lending to SMEs in this regard;

    22. Notes that the resources allocated to support the defence and security sector mainly come from the European Defence Fund (EDF) (EUR 8 billion), the EIB Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) (EUR 8 billion) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) (EUR 1.5 billion); calls for a dedicated capital allocation on defence and the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments in order to meet the ambitious role of contributing to Europe’s peace and security set by the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 for the EIB Group; welcomes the integration of the EIB’s existing EUR 8 billion SESI into a cross-cutting and permanent public policy goal and the removal of a predefined ceiling for financing in this area; believes that these measures will allow the Bank to respond to the investment needs in security and defence, while safeguarding its operations and strong financial position; believes that the decision by the Board of Governors in June 2024 to increase the gearing ratio of the Bank will enable increased investments in areas of strategic importance, including in security and defence;

    23. Underlines the added value of the innovative measures that the EIB has adopted to accelerate investments in security and defence, and of the ‘one-stop shop’ that acts as the single point of entry for clients and external stakeholders, to whom it offers expert assistance to streamline access and speed up deployment of financing available under the SESI; encourages the EIB to continue developing and implementing agreed upon measures that simplify client procedures and further accelerate investment processes, while ensuring that the AAA rating is preserved;

    24. Notes, with appreciation, that in June 2023, the EIB approved an increase in SESI for security investments in the EU from EUR 6.0 billion to EUR 8.0 billion for the period from 2022 to 2027, also including the space and cybersecurity sectors; encourages the EIB to strengthen institutional partnerships with the EU Agency for the Space Programme and other potentially relevant partners, in accordance with EU competition rules;

    25. Commends the EIB’s cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including Member State governments, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Innovation Fund; appreciates, in particular, the EIB Group’s cooperation with the EDA and welcomes the signing of an update to the memorandum of understanding between the two bodies on 3 October 2024, which will allow them to strengthen strategic partnerships and jointly identify financing needs to better support research, development and innovation (RDI) in the area of security and defence in the Union;

    26. Invites the EIB to further strengthen such collaboration with key stakeholders with a view to increasing impact, synergies and complementarity with EU defence programmes, ensuring that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities; asks the EIB to enhance regional security and resilience, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean through the creation of infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States on defence matters; stresses, furthermore, the importance of exploring cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund in order to improve access to financing for technology start-ups, in parallel to the deployment of the EIF Defence Equity Facility;

    Social infrastructure and housing

    27. Asks the EIB to increase risk-taking for projects providing essential services with long-term clear and measurable benefits; welcomes, in this vein, the EIB Group’s actions and measures in the area of housing and social infrastructure that contribute to affordable housing, social inclusion and regional development, while also supporting sustainability and innovation; calls on the EIB to prioritise its investments towards these goals in order to achieve better economic growth, social inclusion and regional cohesion, while also supporting the EU’s sustainability objectives; invites the Bank to focus on sustainable urban development and inclusive growth by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, more cohesive and prosperous Europe;

    28. Emphasises that housing purchase and rental costs have surged significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and limiting access to housing; stresses that the EIB must play a stronger role in addressing the housing crisis; welcomes the inclusion of support for social infrastructure in the EIB Group’s eight strategic priorities for 2024-2027 and agrees that investments in energy-efficient, sustainable and accessible housing, and education within easy reach are crucial for boosting productivity and fostering strong and resilient societies; encourages the EIB to prioritise investments in housing cooperatives, energy-efficient social housing and renovation projects targeting low-income households; believes that addressing the EU’s major housing investment gaps requires overcoming both financial and non-financial investment barriers and the large-scale mobilisation of resources and capacities;

    29. Welcomes that the EIB, in collaboration with the Commission, has initiated a pan-European investment platform aimed at promoting affordable and sustainable housing, combining advisory services and financing, and encourages the participants to continue this initiative;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to easing the pressure on housing markets in Europe; stresses that housing purchase and rental prices have increased significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and compromising access to these; emphasises that EIB analysis shows that the EU needs about 1.5 million new housing units per year to cope with demand, and that about 75 % of the EU’s building stock needs to be renovated, representing an additional 5 million units per year; welcomes the fact that the EIB supports the reconstruction of existing housing and the construction of new social and affordable accommodation; encourages the EIB to mobilise more funding for affordable housing projects among the Member States;

    31. Calls for the strengthening of technical assistance and financial expertise in support of local and regional authorities, especially in areas with low investment capacity, in order to improve access to EIB funding; believes that cooperation with local authorities, local governments and civil society representatives should foster the development of social housing suitable for all, and especially for the most vulnerable citizens of the concerned Member State; is aware that the effectiveness of the EIB’s action in the housing and social infrastructure sector also depends on the removal of policy and regulatory hurdles;

    32. Notes that, in 2023, the EIB signed EUR 8.3 billion in financial support for energy efficiency operations, of which 65 % was for energy efficiency in buildings; invites the EIB to prioritise long-term affordable and accessible solutions, and sustainable investments, such as energy-efficient renovations and the reuse of vacant buildings;

    33. Believes that the related investments should ensure sufficient durability before any change of destination or use is authorised;

    34. Invites the EIB to build on its long-standing experience as an accelerator of European investments and to also deploy its potential in the education and training and healthcare sectors, including through advisory services; calls on the Bank to strengthen support for healthcare capacities, both within and outside the EU, thus  ensuring a stronger role for Europe in the world;

    Support for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups, scale-ups and businesses in rural and remote areas, the Capital Markets Union and the role of the EIF

    35. Highlights that SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups are vital for the EU’s economy; notes that these businesses encounter significant hurdles in accessing financing, markets and talent, which constrains their growth; asserts that business growth, dynamism and public investment are essential for fostering innovation, competitiveness and productivity; encourages the EIB Group to continue addressing these challenges, notably in the current geopolitical context, through customised financial programmes, risk-sharing mechanisms and targeted financial instruments, while ensuring the additionality of public resources for these purposes and avoiding the crowding out of private capital; notes that different instruments to support lending to businesses can be combined depending on the context, and that different EIB Group instruments target different market failures and firm types; stresses the need to provide technical assistance to SMEs before project approval, in order to improve access to EIB funding;

    36. Notes that the development of a well-functioning securitisation market can be a key first step towards establishing a strong Capital Markets Union (CMU); believes that the CMU will benefit consumers and SMEs by offering high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy and will eventually boost the venture capital market by improving access to diversified funding sources; believes that financing European scale-ups with European capital should be a priority, as exemplified by the European Tech Champions Initiative, which was launched in February 2023 to finance promising European tech companies and prevent the sale of businesses to foreign investors because of the lack of European investment; encourages the EIF to explore establishing the second generation of this initiative; observes that the European Tech Champions Initiative is complemented by the European Scale-up Initiative, which aims to provide crucial financing for Europe’s high-tech companies in their late-stage development; notes that these investments should be in line with policy actions at EU and national level; is aware of the comparative weaknesses of the European venture capital market in respect of other competitors’ markets, and that European start-ups and scale-ups are often obliged to relocate or search for foreign buyers or rely on sources of financing other than venture capital, hence less suited to high-growth;

    37. Acknowledges the mission of the EIF to support access to financing for European micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; believes that the EIF should significantly step up its activities for the development of the European venture capital ecosystem, while maintaining a geographical balance; calls for the EIF’s activities to be strengthened, enabling increased investment in high-growth sectors, enhancing risk-sharing between public and private investors, and promoting innovation throughout Europe; considers it necessary to monitor the rate of increase in support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

    38. Encourages the EIF to further develop its monitoring tools to better track the long-term performance of venture capital funds and SME financing operations, especially in terms of job creation, innovation diffusion and regional impact; stresses also the critical role of large European companies in Europe’s economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe’s global competitiveness;

    39. Praises the support provided by the EIB Group to about 400 000 SMEs and mid-caps in 2023 alone, with EUR 31.1 billion in financing, including loans and guarantees for businesses (of which EUR 14.9 billion was deployed by the EIF), resulting in the mobilisation of over EUR 134 billion, and notes that it teamed up with almost 300 partner institutions across Europe to this end; encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to financing for SMEs, which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage;

    40. Recalls that the deployment of the European Guarantee Fund ended in 2023 and that its disbursements to help SMEs to recover from the adverse impact of the pandemic reached approximately 200 000 SMEs across the EU; recalls the concerns expressed in previous resolutions about the transparency of the decision-making processes and information about final recipients;

    41. Welcomes that EIF measures on anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and tax avoidance encompass risk assessments for products and transactions, thorough due diligence on counterparties and screening the ownership structures and key individuals against sanctions and adverse media; welcomes the introduction of mandatory staff training and the conclusion of an agreement with the Financial Intelligence Unit of Luxembourg on the reporting of and follow-up on any suspicious transactions detected;

    Key policy areas of cohesion, climate action and environmental sustainability, and digitalisation

    42. Appreciates that in its 2021-2027 Cohesion Orientation, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions; notes that, in 2023, such financing amounted to EUR 29.8 billion, equivalent to 45 % of the Bank’s total signatures in the EU; underlines that the share of EIB financing allocated to less developed regions increased from 24 % in 2022 to 26 % in 2023, totalling EUR 17.2 billion, well above the 21 % target set in the EIB Cohesion Orientation for 2023; reiterates the call for the EIB to continue monitoring, analysing and addressing the shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from fully benefiting from the EIB’s financial support and assistance;

    43. Acknowledges the role played by the EIF in contributing to economic and social cohesion in the Union through a wide range of financial instruments; notes that EIF commitments to credit guarantees, venture capital and private equity investments for cohesion regions in 2023 stood at EUR 6.8 billion, representing 48 % of total EIF commitments in the EU; notes that in 2023, the EIF was especially active in Central and Eastern Europe;

    44. Notes that the EIB Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework includes revised environmental and social policy and standards promoting an integrated approach to impact and risk assessment and management;

    45. Acknowledges that over the past 15 years, EIB Advisory has supported over 1 000 projects in cohesion regions; calls on the Bank to actively promote financing opportunities in less developed and transition regions, including by boosting the presence of advisory services in EIB local offices; considers it necessary to also take into account the geographical distribution of EIB support for increasing social cohesion;

    46. Highlights the EIB’s initiatives in cohesion regions to support the healthcare sector, including the HERA Invest programme, a EUR 100 million guarantee established with the Commission to support research and development in addressing pressing cross-border health threats; encourages the EIB to promote targeted investments in key systemic enablers such as healthcare, education, social housing, digital connectivity and local financing for cities and regions, ensuring a better geographical balance, either through direct lending or financial instruments, and to leverage synergies between EU grants and EIB loans to enhance cross-border rail connectivity, which is crucial for better integration within the EU single market;

    47. Acknowledges the EIB’s strategic orientation since 2019 to be the EU Climate Bank; emphasises that in 2023 alone, the EIB signed EUR 41.8 billion in financing for climate action and EUR 25.1 billion for environmental sustainability (EUR 35.1 billion and EUR 15.9 billion respectively in 2022); notes that EIB financing for climate change adaptation totalled EUR 2.7 billion in 2023, corresponding to 6.4 % of its total climate action (compared to EUR 1.9 billion, or 5.4 %, in 2022); welcomes that climate action and environmental sustainability financing, as a whole, accounted for 60 % of EIB financing in 2023; calls for maintaining technological neutrality in its investment strategy in climate and sustainable financing;

    48. Recalls that the EIB Energy Lending Policy (ELP), adopted in 2019, established a ‘phase out support to energy projects reliant on unabated fossil fuels’ and introduced a transition period during which the Bank could continue to approve projects already under appraisal, but the Board of Directors did not approve any such project after the end of 2021; remarks that, in 2022, the EIB Group introduced a temporary and exceptional extension of the exemptions to the Paris Alignment for Counterparties Framework (so-called PATH) in support of REPowerEU, to cover projects with high innovative content and renewable energy projects and electric vehicle charging infrastructure in the EU; observes that, in 2023, the EIB Group decided to apply the same temporary and exceptional extension also for projects in the spirit of REPowerEU outside the EU; notes that such temporary and exceptional extensions are expected to run until 2027, subject to a Climate Bank roadmap review expected in 2025; recalls its previous resolution[3] and maintains that PATH offers the appropriate framework for supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement objectives; emphasises that the EIB is expected to intensify its engagement with all of its clients to foster the development of their decarbonisation plans;

    49. Notes the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap mid-term review, approved in 2023, which includes a simplified Paris Alignment framework for microenterprises, the revision of the PATH framework’s disclosure requirements for financial intermediaries and a temporary extension of the list of countries in which the EIB can act as a sole financier of climate adaptation projects due to their particular vulnerability to climate change;

    50. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities, but notes that agriculture, fisheries and forestry received only 1.1 % of the EIB’s lending stock in 2023; considers it important for the EIB to programme significant amounts for financing the agricultural sector and through simplified procedures;

    51. Underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas; acknowledges the increasing challenges faced by the agricultural sector and the need for EU farmers to adapt to the European Green Deal objectives, cope with the energy crisis and manage rising inflation; calls on the EIB Group to enhance support and foster innovation for this vital sector, which plays a significant role in ensuring food security, leveraging the EU’s One Health approach by integrating human, animal, plant and environmental health to create sustainable, resilient and productive agri-food systems; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young and small operators, noting that farmers and the enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing;

    52. Stresses that EIB support should have a just transition approach in order to achieve sustainable agriculture that protects the environment, human health and animal welfare, while improving farmers’ livelihoods, in particular for small and medium-sized farms; maintains that supporting rural areas is essential for promoting balanced and inclusive development, generational renewal and equal access to financial opportunities for women and men; reiterates its call on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    53. Appreciates that the EIB Group is one of the key supporters of digitalisation in the EU, particularly in financing digital infrastructure and supporting innovative digital start-ups; encourages the EIB to enhance its support for digital networks strengthening the EU’s technological autonomy and innovation in key technologies;

    54. Believes that reducing digital inequality and preventing social exclusion requires significant public investment in telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in rural areas; encourages the EIB to support European citizens in acquiring adequate digital literacy to fully participate in society, with a special focus on the elderly and those with disabilities;

    55. Recognises the critical role of the cybersecurity sector in protecting businesses and governments from advanced digital threats and foreign influence; welcomes the increase in security investments from EUR 6 billion to EUR 8 billion, financed through the SESI to address security challenges, including those in the New Space industry;

    56. Welcomes the EIB’s focus on gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, resulting in a total of EUR 5.8 billion in investment in this field in 2023 (compared to EUR 5.1 billion in 2022); believes that the EIB could further increase microfinance loans to women-led businesses, which still face discrimination in access to financing;

    57. Highlights that the security of supply of critical raw materials is crucial for both the green and digital transitions, as well as for the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; calls on the EIB to increase investments in the CRM sector to help diversify the supply of both primary and secondary raw materials and to develop circular economy solutions, in particular R&D for alternative materials, such as bio-based materials; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption on 21 March 2025 of a new CRM strategic initiative, with an expected EUR 2 billion in financing for CRM investment in 2025, a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships;

    The EIB’s activities outside the EU

    58. Underlines that in EIB Global’s second year of existence, it provided financing amounting to EUR 8.4 billion (compared to EUR 9.1 billion in 2022); notes that, as EIB Global financing is limited to 50 % of the total cost of a project, investment co-financing with development finance institutions and multilateral development banks is recurring; calls on the EIB and the Commission to invest in internal audit and independent control functions to guarantee the integrity and soundness of all operations;

    59. Recalls that EIB Global is among the key implementing actors of the European Global Gateway and, as such, is expected to apply the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

    60. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap and its commitment to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the projects it supports;

    61. Highlights the importance of ensuring that the EIB Group’s interventions in Ukraine are guided by the priorities for the country’s reconstruction agreed with the EU, and are consistent with the methods and frameworks laid out in the Ukraine Plan and with the provisions of the EU Treaties; notes that the EIB is further enhancing its efforts to address fraud and corruption in relation to the EIB Group projects implemented in Ukraine; calls for the continued application of appropriate conditionality on the financial assistance provided to Ukraine, with a focus on ensuring effective oversight mechanisms, such as access to information and premises, and the monitoring of visits, and calls for conditionality to be extended to all non-EU countries for which it provides financing;

    62. Urges the strengthening of the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities responsible for implementing, monitoring, controlling and supervising funded actions, in particular for the prevention of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities; reiterates that the EIB should have clear and unrestricted oversight at all times;

    63. Believes that a greater role for the EIB will bring added value for both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the enlargement process and for prospective partnerships under the EU’s Global Gateway agenda and neighbourhood policy and in support of the Sustainable Development Goals; encourages the Commission to maximise cooperation with the EIB to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly on energy and raw materials;

    64. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB’s EU for Ukraine (EU4U) initiative and establishes a support mechanism based on EU budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs;

    65. Stresses that, in order to support Ukraine, the EIB has built up a loan portfolio of over EUR 7 billion since the beginning of the conflict with Russia in 2014; underlines that, as of 31 December 2023, the EIB’s exposure (disbursed and not yet disbursed) amounted to EUR 5.750 billion, predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the External Lending Mandate; notes that, in addition, the Bank also granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine, fully covered by EU Comprehensive Guarantees, for a signed amount of EUR 388.7 million at the end of 2023 (compared to EUR 478.8 million at the end of 2022);

    66. Notes the growing financial engagement of the EIB in Ukraine; calls on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;

    67. Underlines the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern EU regions bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly redirect public funds towards security, defence and preparedness, while dealing with severely reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes; calls on the EIB to take this into account in its financing decisions;

    68. Welcomes the significant investments made in Moldova to support economic resilience, improving energy security, enhancing infrastructure and aiding the country’s progress towards EU integration; acknowledges that in the Western Balkans, EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in 2023, plus an additional EUR 700 million to enhance road safety and improve railway networks; welcomes the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in 2024 and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova approved by the European Parliament;

    69. Recognises the role played by the EIB in supporting the Western Balkans on their path to Union membership, in line with the EU’s enlargement policy; observes that EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in the Western Balkans in 2023, mobilising a total of over EUR 6 billion in investments; notes that the majority of the financing was allocated to sustainable connectivity, followed by credit lines for SMEs, infrastructure projects in the healthcare, education and skills sectors, and water supply and sanitation;

    70. Asks the EIB to collaborate with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring added value and long-term, positive impacts;

    EIB accountability architecture

    71. Recalls that internal oversight at the EIB is headed by the Inspectorate General (IG), which comprises three accountability-related divisions – operations evaluation, the complaints mechanism and fraud investigation – that hold complementary roles, contributing to the consistent handling of allegations and complaints;

    72. Observes that the EIB Complaints Mechanism (EIB-CM) handled a total of 104 cases in 2023 (97 in 2022); notes that 60 new complaints were received in 2023 (54 in 2022), of which 44 were considered admissible and 29 were related to EIB-financed projects, of which 27 were located outside Europe;

    73. Notes that the EIB Procurement Complaints Committee is the independent EIB committee handling complaints about project procurement procedures relating to EIB-financed projects outside the EU;

    74. Welcomes the efforts of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) to cooperate and coordinate efforts with the other components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which received 37 % of the referrals made for investigations in 2023 (27 cases out of 74); encourages the IG/IN to strengthen its cooperation with all components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture;

    75. Notes that the IG/IN carries out proactive fraud detection activities using the Fraud and Integrity Risk Scoring Tool and the Corruption Risk In Procurement robot and that, in 2023, 24 reviews identified targets for three full and in-depth proactive integrity reviews; invites the Bank to assess how these digital tools could be further enhanced to support transparency and financial accountability;

    76. Regrets the fact that, despite repeated calls by Parliament, the IG/IN annual report does not provide adequate information about the financial magnitude of the cases it handles, the funds or mandates affected, the kinds of projects concerned, the mitigating measures adopted, the role of the EIB services and of the intermediaries or partners in the cases, or even the Member States concerned; invites the representatives of the IG/IN to increase the level of engagement, interactions and transparency with Parliament, especially regarding the control of the financial activities; reiterates its call to the IG/IN to go beyond providing a mere narrative description of a few case studies, and to periodically report valuable insights into the extent to which financial interests are safeguarded; suggests that the IG/IN adopt a reporting model similar to those used by other investigative bodies, such as EPPO and OLAF, where a proper balance between transparency and duty of confidentiality or of professional secrecy is pursued;

    77. Is aware that the EIB Exclusion Policy provides for an autonomous exclusion process that is not fully equivalent to the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System; observes that in 2023, exclusion proceedings based on IG/IN findings excluded five companies from participating in any EIB-financed activity for a period of five years;

    78. Welcomes the approval, in 2023, of the EIB Group’s Internal Control Framework Policy; acknowledges the results of the group alignment process between the EIB and the EIF insofar as they reflect the different business models and governance structures of the two entities; refers, in particular, to the Audit Committee’s remarks that both internal audit and the internal control framework should evolve to become group functions;

    79. Notes that the EIB’s independent external auditor is the third line of defence; points out that the regular rotation of auditors and assignments allows fresh perspectives, and therefore observes that the EIB external auditor should be rotated periodically, yet its mandate was extended until 2027 and it has been the auditor of the EIB Group since 2009;

    80. Appreciates that the EIB Group Risk Management Framework and EIB Group’s semi-annual Risk Management Disclosure Reports are effective and are aligned with the requirements and technical standards of the European Banking Authority;

    81. Stresses that, in 2023, despite difficult market conditions, the EIB’s portfolio continued to exhibit very low levels of non-performing exposures (NPEs); takes the view that even if a significant portion of the Bank’s loan portfolio benefits from credit enhancements or from EU Member State guarantees, the high quality of the EIB’s portfolio results from the diligent implementation of very effective EIB lending policies;

    82. Highlights that the EIB does not fall within the scope of application of the EU’s legislation applicable to credit institutions, in particular the Capital Requirements Regulation[4] and Directive[5] (CRR, CRD), thus the Bank is entitled to determine its capital and liquidity requirements in a manner that is adequate and appropriate to its activities, its mission and the market conditions; points out that the EIB Group is committed to conform to the best banking and market practices and can determine their applicability in line with the proportionality principle; stresses that the implementation of these norms should not create unwarranted burden; welcomes the fact that the EIB Group voluntarily performed the Review and Evaluation Process; points out that this should be in line with the EIB’s governance structure and mission;

    83. Understands that, in line with the EU’s evolving needs, the EU institutions approved, in 2024, the change in statute proposed by the EIB Board of Governors by amending the statutory limit on its gearing ratio[6] and raising it from 250 % to 290 %, to enable the EIB to invest more without increasing its equity base;

    84. Notes that the amended gearing ratio paves the way for increased risk-taking; acknowledges that investments in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and innovative technologies are crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, but often carry greater risk because of the uncertainty of returns; points out that increased risk-taking may increase the volatility of the EIB’s returns, but observes that the EIB maintains capital buffers that would support expanded risk activities;

    85. Is alarmed by the situation of Northvolt AB, a battery manufacturer considered pivotal in the green transition; stresses that Northvolt has benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site; notes that Northvolt filed for bankruptcy in March 2025; calls on the EIB to provide details about the evaluation and decision-making process to fund Northvolt AB and the causes that led to the failure of the project;

    86. Stresses that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness and was consistent with the EU’s strategies in the sector;

    87. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;

    88. Maintains that the greatest added value of EU support lies in fostering higher-risk investments in innovative projects, scaling up EU strategic goals and enabling long-term transition projects that cannot get funding from the private sector; believes that to effectively pursue its targets in innovation and competitiveness, the InvestEU programme should focus on financing higher-risk and more scale-up investment and that the EIB Group should take on more and larger high-risk projects, which should involve primarily and preferentially European investors, combining a more risk-absorption-oriented deployment of InvestEU resources with an equivalent orientation in the use of the EIB Group’s own financial resources; urges the EIB to introduce stricter conditions to prevent EU public financing from being used to subsidise companies relocating production outside Europe, ensuring that all EIB-funded projects contribute to long-term European industrial resilience;

    89. Is aware that members of the EIB’s Management Committee are often civil servants in their countries of origin before beginning their terms at the EIB, which typically last for two to six years, and that they are therefore entitled to pursue professional development opportunities subject to certain conditions during the cooling-off period (which has been extended to a period of 24 months after the end of their term at the EIB); notes that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval as soon as possible for any negotiations regarding prospective employment;

    90. Strongly echoes Parliament’s repeated calls to strengthen the mechanism to prevent conflicts of interest within the EIB and to improve the handling of such cases, and to better define the terms under which EIB vice-presidents can participate in decisions about operations in their countries of origin, and insists that these matters be addressed in a future revision of the Management Committee code of conduct;

    91. Highlights that on 31 October 2023, the European Ombudsman ruled in Case 611/2022/KR that a former vice-president had participated in approving financing agreements between the EIB and a national promotional bank[7] in his country of origin just weeks before becoming the Chief Executive Officer of that national promotional bank, despite the EIB’s Chief Compliance Officer advising against such actions during the appointment process; understands that this case predates the entry into force of the current Management Committee code of conduct, which now includes specific provisions regarding the prospective employment of its members; notes that, in the future review of the rules applicable to its Ethics and Compliance Committee, the EIB has committed to consider the European Ombudsman recommendation to make public the Committee’s decisions;

    92. Observes that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, are the most common precautionary clauses to be used when handling a revolving-doors case and understands that such measures are implemented and are complied with by the members of the Management Committee, including those recently reported on in the media;

    93. Shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened when it comes to overseeing the intended new jobs of Management Committee members and that it should be able to impose and enforce risk-mitigating measures; understands that the role of the Ethics and Compliance Committee has become more prominent in recent years and that internal discussions are ongoing on how to enhance its efficiency;

    94. Invites the Bank to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the Bank to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility for European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    95. Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation, including at middle and senior management levels, and calls on it to publish an annual breakdown of the gender and nationality for middle and senior management positions;

    Scrutiny, transparency and oversight

    96.  Strongly regrets the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) still lacks full access to all data relating to EIB operations; acknowledges that not all the activities of the EIB are directly financed by the EU and, therefore, not all activities are automatically accessible to the ECA; insists that the ECA should have access to the necessary information to comprehensively and exhaustively assess all EIB operations involving EU funds, including those conducted through financial intermediaries, designed to implement EU policies; calls on the ECA to fully scrutinise, to the best of its abilities, all operations involving the EU budget to any degree;

    97. Observes that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee, which is a fully independent body; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

    98. Notes that the EIB’s Transparency Policy strikes a compromise between the principle of openness and the need to safeguard sensitive information; observes that the policy indicates what information should be published proactively and when – stipulating, for instance, that project summaries should be published at least three weeks before the project’s financing is considered for approval by the EIB Board of Directors – and sets out the relevant derogations; calls for these summaries to provide meaningful information to stakeholders;

    99. Notes that in 2023, 449 projects were approved by the EIB Board of Directors and that almost all (94 %) of the project summaries were published, in the majority (57 %) of cases before approval; observes that all EIB operations conducted through financial intermediaries are published on the EIB’s website and that the EIB provides details on request;

    100. Recalls that all EIB documents are accessible to the public in line with the presumption in favour of disclosure; emphasises that all applicants should be informed in advance about public access to documents, and any refusals should be based solely on specified exceptions; stresses that the EIB should consider publishing, in a timely manner, information regarding the rationale and context for projects and the explanation of their alignment with and contribution to EU policy goals; calls on the EIB to systematically publish audit results of its largest financial operations, ensuring independent scrutiny of its risk management and impact assessments; expects the EIB to limit non-disclosure to the applicable exceptions listed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001[8] and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006[9]; calls for the full implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations issued following its inquiries into EIB disclosure policy and related requests for access to documents;

    101. Recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that final recipients comply with the visibility criteria of the EU’s financial support;

    102. Highlights that the Bank is working to reduce the time needed to bring a product from conception to market availability (time to market) by fully digitising its project cycles; calls for the Bank to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    103 Reiterates its call on the EIB to strengthen and fully implement its policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance, including by refraining from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in such practices;

    104. Reiterates that more structured dialogue between Parliament and the EIB would be enhanced by the adoption of a memorandum of cooperation; praises, in this connection, the EIB’s unprecedented cooperation with Parliament for the preparation of this resolution, noting that it is a tangible expression of openness and transparency;

    Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

    105. Urges the EIB to continue reporting on the status of previous recommendations issued by Parliament, particularly regarding the outcomes achieved and the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, especially as regards:

    (a) impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

    (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

    (c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

    (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

    (e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2024 – A10-0044/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on Banking Union – annual report 2024

    (2024/2055(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023[1],

     having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

     having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

     having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

     having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

     having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)[2] and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)[3], and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)[4],

     having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive[5] and to the Capital Requirements Regulation[6],

     having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk[7],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action[8],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action[9],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency[10],

     having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

     having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

     having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

     having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

     having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

     having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

     having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

     having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

     having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’[11],

     having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

     having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

     having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

     having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

     having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

     having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

     having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

    A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

    B.  whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

    C. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

    D.  whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

    E. whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

    F. whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

    G. whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

    H. whereas the EUR 356.1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988.9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

    I. whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

    J. whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

    K. whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

    L. whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

    M.  whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

    General considerations

    1. Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

    2. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

    3. Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

    4. Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

    5. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

    6. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

    7. Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

    8. Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

    9. Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

    10. Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations[14] could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

    11. Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

    12. Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

    13. Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

    14. Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

    15. Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

    16. Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

    17. Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

    Supervision

    18. Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

    19. Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

    20. Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15.81 %;

    21. Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2.30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159.39 %;

    22. Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

    23. Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

    24. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

    25. Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

    26. Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

    27. Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies[15]; notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

    28. Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

    29. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

    30. Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

    Resolution

    31. Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

    32. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

    33. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

    34. Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

    35. Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

    36. Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

    37. Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

    38. Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

    39. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

    40. Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

    41. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

    42. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

    Deposit insurance

    43. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

    44. Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

    45. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

    °

    ° °

    46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    While the Banking Union – annual reports 2022 and 2023 focused on the war in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, this report focuses more on the challenges for the EU and for the European Parliament, as mirrored in the new mandate of the Commission, namely the EU priorities to foster competitiveness, to strengthen the European single market and to boost economic growth.

    The Union is currently at a turning point, which will determine the economic future in the upcoming decades. The 2024 reports of Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi underline that the EU needs a major turnaround to be able to compete with the US or China. Against this background, the Banking Union is a major cornerstone of competitiveness. A strengthened Banking Union will enable the EU to generate the necessary capital to make the European economy fit for the future.

    EU banks play a key role in financing the required investments since bank loans are still the most important source of external financing for companies. However, EU banks suffer from a lower profitability compared to their US counterparts caused by too many regulatory hurdles and by an incomplete Banking Union. A robust and competitive banking sector is necessary to finalise the BU. In the last year, while co-legislators made much progress on crucial legislation for the Banking Union, the EU still has to monitor closely if the EU economy, EU citizens and EU banks benefit from those adopted proposals. This report provides realistic and achievable recommendations, which could help to strengthen further the Banking Union.

    However, not only EU businesses need better access to capital. EU citizens are currently struggling to afford housing or to finance investments in sustainable renovations. It is therefore crucial to boost the profitability of EU banks, since this would in turn allow them to provide private households with better and easier access to affordable loans.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia – A10-0072/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia

    (2025/2022(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

     having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

     having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

     having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

     having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

     having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

     having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

     

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

     having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo[5], and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections[6],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3. Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6. Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8. Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9. Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10. Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11. Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13. Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14. Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15. Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16. Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18. Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19. Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20. Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21. Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22. Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 15 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24. Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25. Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26. Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    28.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    29. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    30. Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    31. Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act[7] and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[8]; encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    32. Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    33. Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    34. Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    35. Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    36. Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    37. Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    38. Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    39.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    40. Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    41. Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    42. Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    43. Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    44. Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    45. Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    46. Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    47. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    48. Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    49. Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    50. Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    51. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    52. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    53. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    54. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    55. Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    56. Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    57. Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    58. Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    59. Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    60. Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    61. Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    62. Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    63. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    64. Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    65. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    66. Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    67. Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    68. Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    69. Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    70. Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU[9], since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    °

    ° °

    71. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion – A10-0066/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion

    (2024/2107(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[1] (Common Provisions Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency[9],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)[10],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE[12],

     having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

     having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

     having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

     having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024[13], and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

     having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

     having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’[14],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report[15],

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

     having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

     having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

     having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024[16],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/XXXX of the European Parliament and of the Council of [INSERT DATE] on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU) [INSERT FOOTNOTE ONCE PUBLISHED IN OJ],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

     having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (XXX),

     having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions[19],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report[20],

     having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management[21],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[22],

     having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States[23],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A. whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B. whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4.4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1.3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU[24];

    C. whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24.6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D. whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions[25], to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E. whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F. whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G. whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H. whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I. whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J. whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K. whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L. whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M. whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N. whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O. whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q. whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R. whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions[26], which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S. whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021[27], meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1. Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2. Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3. Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4. Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5. Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6. Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7. Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8. Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria[28] such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9. Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10. Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12. Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13. Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14. Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15. Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16. Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17. Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18. Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19. Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20. Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid[29], through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22. Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23. Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24. Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25. Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26. Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: What They’re Saying: Support Grows for Hickenlooper’s Bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Colorado John Hickenlooper

    Hickenlooper’s Fix Our Forests Act will help reduce wildfire risk for Colorado communities and speed up mitigation projects while maintaining environmental safeguards and encouraging local involvement

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Hickenlooper, John Curtis, Alex Padilla, and Tim Sheehy announced growing support from state officials, community leaders, and environmental organizations for the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act. The bill works to strengthen wildfire resilience by improving forest management, supporting fire-safe communities, and streamlining approvals for projects that protect communities and ecosystems from extreme wildfires.

    The comprehensive bill reflects months of bipartisan negotiations to find consensus on how to accelerate forest management projects, promote safe and responsible prescribed fire treatments, expand public input in assessments of wildfire resilience needs, and enhance collaboration between federal agencies, states, tribes, and stakeholders.

    The Fix Our Forests Act is supported by Colorado Governor Jared Polis, Utah Governor Spencer Cox, California Governor Gavin Newsom, Colorado Department of Natural Resources, Colorado State Forest Service, ColoradoDivision of Fire Prevention and Control, The Nature Conservancy, Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, National Audubon Society, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, Bipartisan Policy Center Action, International Association of Fire Chiefs, Alliance for Wildfire Resilience, Citizens’ Climate Lobby, Federation of American Scientists, American Property Casualty Insurance Association (APCIA), Association of Firetech Innovation (AFI), Hispanics Enjoying Camping, Hunting, and the Outdoors (HECHO), Wildfire Alliance, Tall Timbers, Rural Voices for Conservation Coalition, The Stewardship Project, Megafire Action, Property and Environment Research Center (PERC), National Association of State Foresters (NASF), Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation, Arnold Ventures, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, American Forests, National Wild Turkey Federation (NWTF), Utah Department of Natural Resources, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), Utah Farm Bureau Federation, California Natural Resources Agency, and Climate & Wildfire Institute.

    WHAT THEY’RE SAYING:

    “I applaud the bipartisan work and leadership of the Senate sponsors of this bill, including Colorado’s Senator Hickenlooper, in crafting a bill that will make Colorado communities safer amidst the urgent and growing wildfire crisis in the West. From supporting responsible and expedited on-the-ground fuel reductions, to bolstering the use and development of the latest wildfire satellite monitoring technology which compliments Colorado’s national leadership in the aerospace sector, and to investing in stewardship practices for local communities to be better prepared for wildfires and reforestation efforts with the state nursery to improve our ability to recover – this bill makes major strides in addressing the country’s wildfire risk and will support Colorado’s continued leadership in wildfire preparedness, response and recovery,” said Colorado Governor Jared Polis.

    “Extreme risk of catastrophic wildfires across the West demands urgent action,” said California Governor Gavin Newsom. “In California, we’re fast-tracking projects by streamlining state requirements and using more fuel breaks and prescribed fire. The Fix Our Forests Act is a step forward that will build on this progress — enabling good projects to happen faster on federal lands. I’m appreciative of Senator Padilla and the bipartisan team of Senators who crafted a balanced solution that will both protect communities and improve the health of our forests.”

    “A century of fire suppression and decades of reduced forest management have left us with overgrown, unhealthy forests that are more vulnerable to disease and catastrophic wildfire,” said Utah Governor Spencer Cox. “The Fix Our Forest Act, along with the tools provided by President Trump’s executive order, will help us actively manage our forests—protecting our watersheds, improving wildlife habitat, reducing wildfire risk, and providing the timber we need to build strong homes and neighborhoods.”

    “We applaud the efforts made by Senator Hickenlooper in the Fix Our Forests Act to provide federal, state, and local partners with the tools needed to address wildfire mitigation in the most vulnerable areas in Colorado. Wildfires do not abide by our political boundaries. But here in Colorado we have built strong coordination among federal, state, local land managers and stakeholders to help reduce the impact of wildfires on our critical infrastructure and landscapes,” said Dan Gibbs, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Natural Resources. “We appreciate that this legislation builds upon this important collaboration and draws on existing agreements, such as Shared Stewardship, which will help strengthen our intergovernmental partnerships as we prepare for the next Colorado mega-fire.”

    “Forests are central to our way of life in Colorado. They support world-class outdoor recreation and a vital water supply that more than 40 million Americans rely upon. I am grateful to Senator John Hickenlooper for his work on the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act,” said Matt McCombs, Colorado State Forester and Director of the Colorado State Forest Service. “This critical legislation will bolster our shared stewardship ethic in Colorado and enhance our ability as a state to improve forest health, protect lives, communities and water supplies from wildfire, and ensure that the forests that define Colorado endure for generations to come.”

    “First of all, thanks to Senators Hickenlooper, Curtis, Sheehy, and Padilla for their leadership in moving all this forward! Having spent so many hours working on the Wildfire Mitigation and Management Commission, it is refreshing to see so many of the recommendations moving forward!” said Mike Morgan, Director of the Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control.“Colorado has taken a very aggressive approach in addressing the wildfire challenges we face and we are pleased to see these efforts at the federal level taking a more holistic look at the challenges we all face and in support of the Commission’s recommendations. This bipartisan effort will serve Colorado and America well! I fully support this effort and I am happy to help in any way that would be helpful.”

    “TNC appreciates the serious undertaking of Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla to build on legislation targeted at preventing more catastrophic wildfires through improved forest and fuels management and expanded use of prescribed fire. TNC has been working to restore beneficial fire and improve the resilience of forest systems on the ground for more than 60 years. Every year, wildfires continue to grow deadlier and more devastating to communities and the environment, and we remain concerned that the significant cuts to the Forest Service workforce will impede work to protect people and nature from these wildfire risks.  We support this legislative effort aimed at improving the forest management process to better address catastrophic wildfires,” said Kameran Onley, managing director of North America policy and government relations, The Nature Conservancy.

    “For many Americans, catastrophic wildfires are a very real and growing threat to their homes and lives,” said Environmental Defense Fund Executive Director Amanda Leland. “The U.S. Forest Service needs new tools and more resources now to prevent and control these wildfires, and with the right funding, this bipartisan proposal will help. Protecting people and nature from catastrophic wildfire requires both a robust, science-based plan of forest management and the resources to implement it.”

    “As the megafire crisis grows larger and more severe with each fire season, we need policy solutions that reflect the urgency and scale of the problem. Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla and Sheehy have negotiated a Senate companion to the Fix Our Forests Act that will move the federal government towards a science-based, strategic approach to addressing megafires. We look forward to working with the sponsors to advance this bill and enact the most transformative wildfire and land management law in a generation—since the Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, if not the National Forest Management Act of 1976,” said Matt Weiner, CEO of Megafire Action.

    “We are thrilled to see the Fix Our Forests Act introduced in the Senate through a bipartisan cooperation between Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla, and Sheehy. The bill greatly expands upon the version that passed the House, adding critical details to support wildfire risk reduction in the built environment and provisions for mitigating the health impacts of smoke to communities while promoting expanded use of prescribed fire,”said Annie Schmidt and Tyson Bertone-Riggs, Managing Directors, Alliance for Wildfire Resilience. “Covering a third of the recommendations of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission, this bill is a significant step forward in wildfire policy and, coupled with sufficient funding and staffing to realize the proposed tools and programs, will make a real difference in our nation’s experience with wildfire.”

    “I thank Senators Hickenlooper, Padilla, Curtis, and Sheehy for introducing this bipartisan legislation,” said Fire Chief Josh Waldo, President and Board Chair of the International Association of Fire Chiefs. “As we saw in January’s fires in Los Angeles, the nation faces a serious and growing risk from fires in the wildland urban interface (WUI). This legislation will enact many of the recommendations of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission. It also will improve coordination of federal wildland fire preparedness efforts; promote the use of prescribed fires and other preventative measures to prevent WUI fires; and promote the development of new technologies to help local fire departments. We look forward to working with the bill’s sponsors to pass this legislation.”

    “Our national forests provide essential wildlife habitat, store carbon, and supply communities across the nation with clean air and water. These vital landscapes are under threat and must be proactively stewarded if they are to survive the changing climate, rapidly intensifying wildfires, and past management missteps. The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act will help increase the pace and scale of evidence-backed forest management, including the use of beneficial prescribed fire and the restoration of white oak forests. But we must have a robust and talented federal workforce in place for it to succeed,” said Abby Tinsley, vice president for conservation policy at the National Wildlife Federation. “We will work with Senators Hickenlooper, Padilla, Sheehy, Curtis, and Chairman Westerman in the House to strengthen and advance this important conversation.”

    “The health of our nation’s forests is dependent on the rivers, streams, and wetlands that sustain them. Actively conserving and restoring these critical aquatic resources is an important tool that can be used to mitigate the impacts of wildfire and drought, among other threats,” said Alicia Marrs, director of western water for the National Wildlife Federation. “We’re encouraged to see language in the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act that recognizes the wildfire benefits of aquatic restoration. We look forward to continuing to work with leaders from both sides of the aisle to elevate these common sense and cost-effective approaches to forest and water management for all Americans.”

    “Wildfires grow more intense and destructive each year, leaving behind immense devastation for our forests, wildlife, and communities,” said Marshall Johnson, chief conservation officer at the National Audubon Society.“The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act represents an important step in reducing wildfire risks across forested landscapes. Audubon thanks Senators Hickenlooper, Curtis, Padilla, and Sheehy for working together to craft a bill that sets the stage for improved forest management, and we urge Congress to dedicate the resources necessary to ensure federal agencies are well-equipped to reduce wildfire risks, steward our forestlands, and protect wildlife habitat.”

    “The growing frequency and severity of wildfires pose a tremendous threat to the health of our forests and the safety of countless communities. The Fix Our Forests Act takes important steps to mitigate wildfires, improve forest health, and protect local communities. We appreciate this thoughtful, bipartisan effort led by Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla to advance this important legislation,” said Jennifer Tyler, VP of Government Affairs at Citizens’ Climate Lobby.

    “The declining health of our National Forests and the fish and wildlife habitat that they provide is a concern for America’s hunters and anglers,”said Joel Pedersen, president and CEO of the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership. “TRCP applauds the leadership of Senators Curtis, Sheehy, Hickenlooper, and Padilla for introducing the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act in the Senate and urges Congress to advance these important forest management provisions and to accompany them with adequate resources and capacity to carry out on-the-ground work.”   

    “HECHO enthusiastically applauds the impressive bipartisan leadership behind the Senate’s Fix Our Forests Act. At a time when cooperation is more important than ever, these Senators are putting forward real, thoughtful solutions to reduce wildfire risk while engaging local and rural communities. This legislation is a critical step toward actively managing our forests to protect public lands, watersheds, and the communities that depend on them. By expediting emergency authorities in high-risk firesheds —and through the creation of the Wildfire Intelligence Center—this effort has the potential to significantly reduce catastrophic wildfires and strengthen prediction and response, particularly in fire-prone states like Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah. It’s a shining example of the kind of balanced, forward-looking leadership we need to protect our natural landscapes and communities,” said Camilla Simon, Executive Director of Hispanics Enjoying Camping, Hunting, and the Outdoors (HECHO).

    “BPC Action applauds the bipartisan leadership of Sens. Curtis (R-UT), Hickenlooper (D-CO), Sheehy (R-MT), and Padilla (D-CA) on the introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act. By streamlining and improving forest and hazardous fuels management activities on public and Tribal lands, this legislation will help reduce wildfire risks, improve forest health, and protect communities in fire-prone areas. The Fix Our Forests Act also delivers substantial economic and environmental benefits by addressing critical needs to enhance the domestic supply chain of seeds and advance biochar commercialization,” said Michele Stockwell, President of Bipartisan Policy Center Action (BPC Action).

    “The Senate’s bipartisan Fix Our Forest Act is a critical step toward restoring forest health and reducing catastrophic wildfire risk. This bipartisan legislation tackles the root causes of catastrophic wildfires by fixing the Cottonwood decision, reforming litigation standards, expanding categorical exclusions up to 10,000 acres, and boosting restoration capacity through long-term stewardship contracts and extended Good Neighbor Authority. Healthy forests require active stewardship—not bureaucratic delay. We thank Senators Hickenlooper, Sheehy, Padilla, and Curtis for bringing forward this bill, and we urge swift passage of this much-needed legislation,” said Brian Yabolnski, CEO of The Property and Environment Research Center (PERC).

    “Wildfires continue to ravage communities igniting homes, businesses, and infrastructure. APCIA commends Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla for their bipartisan leadership of the Fix Our Forests Act. The bill would improve fire assessment and prediction for wildland areas and communities to improve response, reduce hazardous fuels, enable greater vegetation management by utilities in federal rights-of-way to prevent fires, and create a community wildfire risk reduction program to support fire-resistant building methods, codes, and standards, promote ignition-resistant materials, defensible space, and other measures to reduce risk,” said David A. Sampson, President & CEO of APCIA

    “The Fix Our Forests Act streamlines collaboration between the National Wild Turkey Federation, the USDA Forest Service, and other partners, cutting red tape to accelerate urgent forest restoration and management on federal lands,” said Matt Lindler, NWTF Director of Government Affairs. “This bill ensures we can better manage and conserve vital natural resources for wildlife, hunters and anglers. We are grateful to see the Senate introduce this critical piece of legislation and await the signature from the president.”   

    “There is no time to waste in restoring and reforesting the forests that work every day to be the lungs of our nation,” said Brian Kittler, Chief Program Officer-Resilient Forests. “More than ever before successful and timely forest restoration will require strengthened coordination across federal, state, and tribal governments together with non-profit organizations. This bill prioritizes a complementary series of actions that will accelerate wildfire resilience and community resilience including ensuring post-fire reforestation is implemented quickly and with the best available science.”

    “The science is clear: tackling the wildfire crisis requires better forest management, increasing the use of prescribed fire, and investing in and deploying the next generation of wildfire technologies. The Fix Our Forests Act will get this urgently needed work done. Now is the time for the Senate to build on the bipartisan leadership demonstrated by the sponsors and pass this bill,” said James Campbell, Wildfire Policy Specialist at the Federation of American Scientists.

    “CWI commends Senator Curtis, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Sheehy, and Senator Padilla for their bipartisan efforts to meaningfully address the wildfire crisis. The Fix Our Forests Act is an important step towards accelerating proven solutions to reduce catastrophic fire risk, improve forest and ecosystem health, and safeguard our local communities,” said Marissa Christiansen, Executive Director at the Climate and Wildfire Institute.“We are pleased to see many recommendations from the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission Report included in the updated legislation, including a directive to establish the Wildfire Intelligence Center to serve as the national hub for wildfire data, prediction, and response. We look forward to working with the bill’s sponsors to help accelerate solutions to the wildfire crisis by incorporating the best available science, data, and management principles into commonsense policy reform and decision-making.”

    “AFI supports the Fix Our Forests Act and calls on the United States Senate to pass it with the urgency the $100 billion a year wildfire crisis warrants from our elected officials,” said Bill Clerico, Founding Chair of AFI and Managing Partner of Convective Capital. “AFI is particularly supportive of the legislation’s inclusion of a Wildfire Intelligence Center, a long-overdue step to better integrate and coordinate wildfire response efforts and invest in cutting-edge technology. Our country’s wildfire response efforts are antiquated and are leaving us ill-prepared for this growing crisis. FOFA is a critical step to refining our wildfire response efforts and protecting our communities.”

    “State forestry agencies play a lead role not only in managing and protecting over 550 million acres of state and private forests, but also working to improve the health and resiliency of federal lands through cross-boundary partnerships nationwide. State Foresters are also responsible for wildfire protection on more than 1.5 billion acres and, in collaboration with local fire departments, responding to 80 percent of the nation’s wildland fires,” said Jay Farrell, Executive Director of the NASF. “NASF applauds the bipartisan work of Senators Sheehy, Curtis, Hickenlooper, and Padilla to chart a path forward to greatly enhance wildfire management and recovery efforts and stem the tide of disastrous wildfires that threaten our nation’s forests and the livelihood of communities that depend on them. We recognize that many of the improvements made in the Fix Our Forests Act are nuanced and look forward to continuing our work with Congress to ensure its landmark reforms become law.”

    “The poor health of our federal forests exacerbates the wildfires that negatively impact wildlife habitat, sportsmen’s access, and communities across the country, and comprehensive reforms are needed to actively treat hazardous fuels efficiently and at scale to increase forest resiliency to severe wildfires, insects, and disease,” said John Culclasure, Senior Director of Forest Policy at the Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation. “We are grateful for the bipartisan leadership of Congressional Sportsmen’s Caucus Members Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla, and Sheehy for introducing the Fix Our Forests Act to improve forest management through strengthened authorities, collaborative tools, and improved processes. We look forward to working with the bill sponsors to advance the legislation quickly as we approach wildfire season.”

    “Arnold Ventures praises the bipartisan introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act, an evidence-based, constructive proposal to cut red tape and prevent catastrophic forest fires. We applaud Senators John Curtis (R‑UT), John Hickenlooper (D‑CO), Tim Sheehy (R‑MT), and Alex Padilla (D‑CA) for their work to craft and introduce this important and necessary legislation. We encourage all Senators to support and ultimately pass the Fix Our Forests Act,” said Charlie Anderson, Executive Vice President for infrastructure at Arnold Ventures. “AV also thanks Reps. Bruce Westerman (R‑AR) and Scott Peters (D‑CA) for championing this vital work in the House of Representatives. We are heartened by the collaborative work across party lines in both chambers to support thoughtful, bipartisan policy that will save lives and property.”

    “Berkshire Hathaway Energy applauds the Senate introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act and thanks the bipartisan group of Senators who worked together to move it forward. The bill’s provisions would improve forest management activities on federal and tribal lands in common-sense ways, improving their resilience to wildfire,” said Scott Thon, President and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. “Passage and enactment of these provisions would be a step to help prevent catastrophic wildfires and lessen their environmental damage. Berkshire Hathaway Energy recognizes the growing threat of wildfires affects everyone and requires holistic solutions with businesses, governments and key stakeholders working together to design and implement constructive, enduring solutions.”

    Our forests face serious threats, and this bipartisan bill is a vital step forward in addressing complex forest health challenges,” said Joel Ferry, Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural Resources. “It gives land managers the tools to proactively reduce wildfire risk, protect critical watersheds, and restore forest ecosystems through stronger collaboration.”

    “The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act provides much-needed tools that will move the needle and improve our work to mitigate wildfires,” said CAL FIRE Director and Fire Chief Joe Tyler. “This bill will bring California’s use of cutting-edge technology to the rest of the country. The proposed Wildfire Intelligence Center will advance the kind of predictive services, monitoring, and early detection work already happening at California’s Wildfire Forecast and Threat Intelligence Integration Center.”

    “Utah’s farmers and ranchers applaud Senator Curtis’ sponsorship of the ‘Fix Our Forests Act’, which will enhance forest health, reduce wildfire risks, and protect vital watersheds. We are particularly encouraged by provisions promoting locally-led restoration efforts, targeted grazing as a wildfire mitigation tool, and watershed protection strategies,” said ValJay Rigby, Utah Farm Bureau Federation President. “The Utah Farm Bureau appreciates the bill’s emphasis on active forest management and increasing the pace and scale of treatment projects to address catastrophic wildfire risks. The ‘Fix Our Forests Act’ represents a significant step toward healthier forests and safer communities.”

    BACKGROUND:

    The West has long been prone to wildfires, but climate change, prolonged drought, and the buildup of dry fuels have increasingly intensified these fires and extended fire seasons. Wildfires today are more catastrophic – growing larger, spreading faster, and burning more land than ever before.

    Colorado has seen four of the five largest fires in our state’s history since 2018. The 2021 Marshall fire was Colorado’s most destructive on record, burning over 1,000 homes. The Cameron Peak and East Troublesome fires in 2020 together burned more than 400,000 acres, the two largest fires in the state’s history. Nationwide, total acres burned rose from 2.7 million in 2023 to nearly 9 million in 2024, a 231% increase.

    Forest health challenges are also increasing in frequency and severity due to climate stressors like drought and fire, and biological threats like invasive species – all of which the West is particularly vulnerable to. From 2001 to 2019, total U.S. forest area declined by 2.3%, with the Intermountain West experiencing the largest losses by area.

    To address these challenges, the Fix Our Forests Act would:

    • Establish new and updated programs to reduce wildfire risks across large, high-priority “firesheds,” with an emphasis on cross-boundary collaboration.
    • Streamline and expand tools for forest health projects (e.g., stewardship contracting, Good Neighbor Agreements) and provide faster processes for certain hazardous fuels treatments.
    • Create a single interagency program to help communities in the wildland-urban interface build and retrofit with wildfire-resistant measures, while simplifying and consolidating grant applications.
    • Boost reforestation with the inclusion of Hickenlooper’s Reforestation, Nurseries, and Genetic Resources (RNGR) Support Act to support reforestation capacity of state, tribal, and private nurseries.
    • Strengthen coordination efforts across agencies through a new Wildfire Intelligence Center with the inclusion of Hickenlooper’s bipartisan Wildfire Intelligence Collaboration and Coordination Act of 2025, which would streamline federal response and create a whole-of-government approach to combating wildfires.
    • Support prescribed fire activities on both federal and non-federal lands – prioritizing large, cross-boundary projects, strengthening the prescribed fire workforce, and facilitating coordination on air quality protections.
    • Expand research and demonstration initiatives – including biochar projects and the Community Wildfire Defense Research Program – to test and deploy cutting-edge wildfire prevention, detection, and mitigation technologies.
    • Enable watershed protection and restoration projects to include adjacent non-federal lands; establish new programs for white oak restoration; and clarify policies to reduce wildfire-related litigation and expedite forest health treatments.

    A one-pager can be found here, and a section-by-section can be found here.

    The Fix Our Forests Act was originally introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Bruce Westerman and Scott Peters.

    Hickenlooper has been an active supporter of wildfire resilience, including sponsorship of legislation to restore land management agency staffing and pushback on the firings of the federal employees that support wildfire resilience on our public lands. The Fix Our Forests Act provides the tools necessary to accelerate wildfire resilience, which will work alongside Hickenlooper’s sustained efforts for the funding and staffing necessary for land management efforts.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Advancing Clean Energy Solutions on SUNY Campuses

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul today announced that the State University of New York at Oneonta (SUNY Oneonta) is the first SUNY to purchase Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates (REC) from the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority’s (NYSERDA) voluntary sales program. This purchase is a model for energy users — commercial, industrial and institutional utility customers — to replicate across the State and will provide enough locally-sourced clean energy to fully power four, 200-bed residence halls on the SUNY Oneonta campus.

    “New York State continues to demonstrate its commitment to advancing clean energy solutions and sustainability,” Governor Hochul said. “I applaud SUNY Oneonta for powering its campus with clean energy. Not only does this program bring the university one step closer to reaching carbon neutrality, but it also provides a blueprint for other SUNY campuses to follow.”

    Implemented by NYSERDA, the Voluntary Tier 1 REC Presale Program was established in 2023 to create an opportunity for any organization — including commercial, industrial and institutional utility customers — to purchase high-quality New York Tier 1 RECs procured by NYSERDA through a competitive process. Tier 1 RECs represent the environmental attributes of one megawatt hour (MWh) of energy derived from renewable resources such as wind and solar. For this program, the sources must be Renewable Energy Standard (RES)-eligible and come from new renewable energy generators that began operation on or after January 1, 2015. Through its REC purchase, SUNY Oneonta will claim 1,000 MWhs of new, local renewable energy in 2025.

    By participating in NYSERDA’s program, organizations can reduce their carbon footprint and support local, renewable energy projects throughout New York State.

    New York State Energy Research and Development Authority President and CEO Doreen M. Harris said, “Securing locally-sourced renewable energy for all New Yorkers, especially for the many students, faculty and others who live and work on a college campus, is a critical part of New York State’s energy leadership. NYSERDA is proud of its collaboration with SUNY Oneonta and looks forward to working with other energy users, such as higher education institutions, through this program in the future.”

    State University of New York Chancellor John B. King Jr. said, “Through SUNY’s Climate and Sustainability Action Plan, campuses like SUNY Oneonta are making changes today that will have a direct impact on their future energy sustainability and the surrounding communities we serve. We applaud SUNY Oneonta for being the first to join Governor Hochul’s program to purchase Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates, and I look forward to the shared learnings from this initiative so that more of our colleges and universities will understand how RECs can best be incorporated into their clean energy programs.”

    State University of New York at Oneonta President Alberto Cardelle said, “In my role as co-chair of the SUNY Sustainability Council, I have the opportunity to work alongside leaders across the SUNY system to develop the SUNY Climate and Sustainability Action Plan. Buying Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates is one positive action we are taking at SUNY Oneonta to lead the way in addressing climate change and sustainability. Our campus community, from students to faculty and visitors, values sustainability and appreciates that it is one of our core values as an institution.”

    Assemblymember Brian Miller said, “I commend SUNY Oneonta for being a leader amongst SUNY institutions in using locally sourced clean energy. By becoming the first campus to fully power residence halls using NYSERDA’s voluntary sales program through the purchase of Tier 1 Renewable Energy Certificates, they are setting a powerful example of what’s possible when we prioritize sustainability, innovation, and local impact,” said Assemblyman Brian Miller. “This is a model that institutions and energy users across New York can look to as we work toward a cleaner, more resilient future.”

    This purchase is part of SUNY Oneonta’s Clean Energy Master Plan which charts a roadmap for carbon neutrality by 2045. The university converting its campus buildings over to heat pump technology and purchasing these RECs, as well as its onsite solar energy production, will help to offset SUNY Oneonta’s electrical usage.

    NYSERDA is the central administrator of Tier 1 REC purchases and sales in New York and supports a diverse supply of clean energy through its Tier 1 program. Participants in this program can immediately secure the environmental benefits from currently operating projects.

    Additional information about the program is available on NYSERDA’s website.

    New York State’s Climate Agenda
    New York State’s climate agenda calls for an affordable and just transition to a clean energy economy that creates family-sustaining jobs, promotes economic growth through green investments, and directs a minimum of 35 percent of the benefits to disadvantaged communities. New York is advancing a suite of efforts to achieve an emissions-free economy by 2050, including in the energy, buildings, transportation, and waste sectors.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Recruitment starts for Independent Climate Council members23 April 2025 Recruitment has started for the appointment of members of​ Jersey’s newly established Independent Climate Council, which will be funded through the Climate Emergency Fund. The Independent Climate Council… Read more

    Source: Channel Islands – Jersey

    23 April 2025

    Recruitment has started for the appointment of members of​ Jersey’s newly established Independent Climate Council, which will be funded through the Climate Emergency Fund. 

    The Independent Climate Council will play a vital role in ensuring oversight and accountability of the Government of Jersey’s climate actions, as outlined in the Carbon Neutral Roadmap, CNR. The Council will report on progress every four years, aligned with the electoral cycle, and provide independent, science-based analysis on greenhouse gas, GHG, emission reductions and the delivery of climate policy initiatives. 

    Final appointments to the Council will be confirmed jointly by the Minister for the Environment and the Chair of the Environment, Housing and Infrastructure, EHI, Scrutiny Panel, in line with the proposal approved by the States Assembly.

    The recruitment process will be overseen by Jersey Appointments Commission. 

    Minister for the Environment, Deputy Steve Luce, said: “Recruitment for the Independent Climate Council comes at a crucial time, when global climate action is under scrutiny. The Council will provide robust scientific analysis and essential transparency. It will review how effectively the Government of Jersey is delivering the measures set out in the Carbon Neutral Roadmap and progress made towards the Island’s emission reduction targets under the Paris Agreement. In holding the Government to account, the Council will play a vital role in supporting a renewed focus on delivering Jersey’s net zero commitment.

    “Appointment to Jersey’s first Climate Council offers an exceptional opportunity to review our actions and achievements since the Carbon Neutral Roadmap was approved in 2022. The Council’s report and recommendations will be published early next year before final agreement of the priorities for the Roadmap’s second delivery plan running from 2027 to 2030. We welcome applications from suitably qualified and experienced Islanders as well as candidates from further afield. I look forward to supporting the Council’s work when it convenes later this year.” 

    Deputy Hilary Jeune, Chair of the EHI Scrutiny Panel, said: “This initiative stems from an amendment by the EHI Scrutiny Panel to the Carbon Neutral Roadmap, following the recognition that independent oversight was missing. The establishment of this Council is fundamental to maintaining good governance and ensuring Jersey remains on track to meet its climate goals. The four-yearly reports will offer transparent, evidence-based insight to the public, who are central to our collective progress towards becoming a net-zero Island. I’m proud that Scrutiny will continue its role as a constructive and critical friend to Government throughout this process.” 

    The States Assembly declared a climate emergency in May 2019, acknowledging its likely profound effects on Jersey. In response, the Carbon Neutral Roadmap was approved on 29 April 2022, setting out the initial policies to reduce GHG emissions during the 2022–2025 Delivery Plan period.

    The Council’s primary responsibility will be to produce a comprehensive report at the end of each governmental term, assessing Jersey’s progress on GHG emissions reductions and evaluating how effectively the CNR is being delivered. The first report is due to be presented to the States Assembly by the end of Q1 2026. 

    The Independent Climate Council will comprise up to five members, including a Chair elected from within the membership. At least one member must be a full-time Jersey resident. Appointed members will serve a single fixed term and will primarily conduct their work during the final quarter of 2025 and the first quarter of 2026. 

    Council members will bring independent expertise and strategic insight to help guide Jersey’s transition to net zero, evaluating implementation of current policies and advising on how best to apply resources to meet climate objectives. 

    Further details on the recruitment process can be found here: Leading our Island and the candidate brief.​

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scottish Government on road to climate chaos by scrapping car journey targets

    Source: Scottish Greens

    We badly need to cut the cost of public transport if we are to reduce the number of cars on our roads.

    If we are to reduce car use we need to make public transport affordable, accessible and available for all, says Scottish Green MSP Mark Ruskell.

    Mr Ruskell’s comments come as the Scottish government has dropped a nationwide target to cut the number of car journeys taken in Scotland by 20 per cent by 2030.

    Transport is Scotland’s largest carbon emitter, accounting for 29% of total greenhouse gas emissions in 2022.

    Scottish Greens Transport Spokesperson Mark Ruskell MSP said:

    “The lack of ambition from the Scottish Government is disappointing. Dropping this target won’t change the fact that, since the target was set, there has been a serious lack of action from SNP ministers to meet it.

    “Emissions from transport remain the largest source of pollution in Scotland, and private car use makes up a huge share of that. We’ve known for decades that to tackle the climate emergency, we need to cut car use, and while the Scottish Government has been strong with words, their actions have been lacking.

    “We are on the road to climate chaos. We need to make public transport affordable, accessible and available to all if we are to start cutting emissions.

    “The action we need to be taking is exactly what the Scottish Greens have been pushing to introduce for years: cheaper trains and buses, better connections for rural communities and an end to spending on new unnecessary road building schemes.

    “Making public transport cheaper and more accessible makes the choice to leave the car at home easier for many people. Many commuters want to play their part in reducing our carbon emissions but the cost is simply too high for some. It’s time to make trains and buses cheaper across Scotland.”

    Mr Ruskell added:

    “Whilst in Government, the Scottish Greens introduced the free bus pass for young people, which has been used over 200 million times, we scrapped peak rail fares for a period, which led to 10 million more commuter journeys, and we delivered record investment in active travel infrastructure allowing more people than ever to walk, wheel or cycle.

    “This is the kind of ambition needed to reduce carbon emissions in Scotland, but we need to go further. With more Scottish Green MSPs in Holyrood, we can push for real change to tackle the climate emergency and save commuters money, such as a permanent removal of peak rail fares, a nationwide bus fare cap, and radical investment in Scotland’s railways.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Birkin v Wirkin: the backlash against the global elite and their luxury bags – podcast

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Gemma Ware, Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The Conversation

    Tony Neil Thompson/Shutterstock

    The Birkin bag made by French luxury retailer Hermès has become a status symbol for some of the global elite. Notoriously difficult to obtain, a select few obsess over how to get their hands on one.

    But when US retailer Walmart recently launched a much cheaper bag that looked very similar to the Birkin, nicknamed a “Wirkin” by others, it sparked discussions about wealth disparity and the ethics of conspicuous consumption.

    In this episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast, we speak to two sociologists about the Birkin and what it symbolises.

    For the rich housewives of Delhi, the Birkin bag is a must have, says Parul Bhandari. A sociologist at the University of Cambridge in the UK, she’s spent time interviewing wealthy Indian women about their lives and preoccupations. She told us:

     A bag that is carried by rich women of New York, of London, of Paris, is something that you desire as well, so it’s a ticket of entry into the global elite.

    Birkins are also used by some of these rich women as a way to show off their husband’s affection, Bhandari says: “ Not only from the point of view of money, because obviously this bag is extremely expensive, but also because it is difficult to procure.” The harder your husband tries to help you get the bag, the more getting one is a testimony of conjugal love.

    Manufactured scarcity

    Named after the British actress Jane Birkin, Hermès’s signature bag can cost tens of thousands of dollars, or more on the resale market for those made in rare colours or out of rare leathers. But you can’t just walk into any Hermès store to buy one, as Aarushi Bhandari, a sociologist at Davidson College in the US who studies the internet – and is no relation to Parul – explains.

    You need to have a record of spending tens of thousands of dollars even before you’re offered to buy one. But spending that money doesn’t automatically mean you get a bag. You have to develop a relationship with a sales associate at a particular Hermès store and the sales associate really gets to decide, if there’s availability, whether or not you get offered a bag.

    Bhandari became intrigued by online communities where people discuss the best strategies for obtaining an Hermès. So when US retailer Walmart launched a bag in late 2024 that looked very similar to a Birkin, and the internet went wild, Bhandari was fascinated.

    She began to see posts on TikTok discussing the bag. First it was fashion accounts talking it up, but then a backlash began, with some users criticising those who would spend thousands on a real Birkin and praising the “Wirkin” as a way to make an iconic design accessible to regular people. Bhandari sees this as an example of an accelerating form of anti-elitism taking hold within parts of online culture.

    In February, the chief executive of Hermès, Axel Dumas, admitted that he was “irritated” by the Walmart bag and that the company took counterfeiting “very seriously”.

    The Walmart bag quickly sold out and no more were put on sale. It has since entered into a partnership with a secondhand luxury resale platform called Rebag, meaning customers can buy real Birkins secondhand through Walmart’s online marketplace.

    The Conversation approached Hermès for comment on the Walmart bag, and to confirm how the company decides who is eligible to buy a Birkin. Hermès did not respond.

    Listen to the full episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast to hear our conversation with Parul Bhandari and Aarushi Bhandari, plus an introduction from Nick Lehr, arts and culture editor at The Conversation in the US.


    This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written and produced by Katie Flood. Mixing and sound design by Eloise Stevens and theme music by Neeta Sarl.

    TikTok clips in this episode from babydoll2184, chronicallychaotic and pamelawurstvetrini.

    Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here.

    Parul Bhandari and Aarushi Bhandari do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Birkin v Wirkin: the backlash against the global elite and their luxury bags – podcast – https://theconversation.com/birkin-v-wirkin-the-backlash-against-the-global-elite-and-their-luxury-bags-podcast-254723

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: MOFA thanks Saint Christopher and Nevis National Assembly for passing resolution endorsing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    MOFA thanks Saint Christopher and Nevis National Assembly for passing resolution endorsing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations

    Date:2025-04-18
    Data Source:Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs

    April 18, 2025  
    No. 101  

    The National Assembly of Saint Christopher and Nevis on April 17 adopted a resolution proposed by Prime Minister Terrance Drew that endorsed Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sincerely appreciates the staunch and unwavering support and friendship that parliamentarians from governing and opposition parties of Saint Christopher and Nevis have shown toward Taiwan through concrete action. 
     
    The resolution pointed out that Saint Christopher and Nevis parliamentarians, as members of the Formosa Club, cherished their country’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan. It stated that over the years the two nations had built a robust friendship based on shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The resolution lauded Taiwan for its contributions to global public health and recognized Taiwan’s efforts and actions in such fields as renewable energy, climate change adaptation, disaster warning systems, the fight against transnational crime, and the development of international civil aviation. It urged all sectors to support Taiwan’s professional, pragmatic, and constructive participation in the United Nations and other international organizations. 
     
    This marks the third consecutive year that the National Assembly of Saint Christopher and Nevis has passed a Taiwan-friendly resolution, underscoring the close and friendly diplomatic alliance between the two countries. Taiwan will continue to work with Saint Christopher and Nevis and other allies and like-minded nations to make even greater contributions to peace, security, and sustainable development across the globe. (E)

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Global: VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

    South Africa’s 2025-6 budget has been subjected to more comment than usual. This is due to the political tensions generated by a proposed increase in value added tax (VAT).

    South Africa’s choices on how it manages the revenue and expenditure issues in the budget are critical for how the larger issues of the country’s debt and its economic policies are handled. As things stand, the economy is locked into a low-growth trajectory which make the debt, revenue and expenditure issues more difficult to deal with.

    This piece draws on a longer article which explores these issues in greater detail. Here, I focus only on the VAT issue.

    The finance minister originally tabled an increase of 2 percentage points, then changed it to 0.5 percentage points. Still, it is threatening to end the country’s government of national unity, which was set up after elections in 2024.




    Read more:
    South Africa’s finance minister wanted to raise VAT: the pros and cons of a tricky tax


    Most commentators, including the political parties that have opposed the proposal, many academics, and non-governmental organisations claiming to represent low-income groups, have argued that an increase in VAT places an undue burden on low-income groups. This would make it regressive.

    Based on work as an academic economist over the past three decades, I believe that the debate has been based largely on conjecture and ideological opposition to VAT, rather than on the evidence of its impact.

    This is a pity as there is empirical evidence rooted in research that a VAT increase is, in fact, not regressive and is therefore a good policy decision.

    Tax experts usually refer to the three Es in taxes – equity, efficiency and ease of administration – for evaluating tax policy proposals. New taxes should ideally promote equity (they should be progressive and not regressive), be efficient and be easy to administer.

    An increase in VAT in South Africa ticks all these boxes.

    First, contrary to what many commentators have been arguing, VAT isn’t always regressive – it depends on how it’s implemented. As proposed by the finance minister it would not be regressive because, while it would add to the burden of low-income households, most of the VAT would be collected from higher-income households. Added to this is that the proposed expansion of the existing list of zero-rated items would protect the lowest-income households.

    Second, VAT is a very efficient tax. For relatively low increases in the rate, government is able to raise a large amount of revenue.

    Finally, the system is easy to administer and adds very little cost to collection.

    Key to its efficacy is the way VAT is implemented, including the choice of products to zero rate, and the political credibility of government.

    The case for a VAT increase

    VAT is a consumption tax, so it only affects the income that a household consumes.

    According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), VAT is now the mainstay of tax systems in over 160 countries, raising on average one-third of total government revenues.

    In theory, there are good reasons to be concerned about the impact of VAT. First, it can place a high burden on low-income households because they spend a large proportion of their incomes on consumption goods such as food.

    Second, VAT may also place a heavy burden of tax on women. In South Africa and many other countries, women-led households tend to be clustered in the lower end of the income distribution. And women disproportionately take responsibility for feeding and caring for family members.

    So, at least in theory, VAT is a regressive tax. But is it really so in practice?

    Three studies that have explored this issue in some detail have concluded that, in South Africa, VAT is not regressive.

    In 2008, I worked with colleagues in eight countries (South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, India and the United Kingdom) on the gender issues related to tax. In particular we looked at the burden of VAT on low-income and women-headed households.

    Our findings were that, in general, VAT is regressive and discriminates against women, but it depends on how it is implemented.

    In South Africa, the zero-rating of basic consumption goods is very effective, protecting low-income and female-headed households from VAT. It’s an example of a VAT system that is neutral – neither regressive nor progressive.

    A more recent study by South African economist Ingrid Woolard and colleagues reached a similar conclusion in 2018.

    A third study was done in the same year when VAT was increased from 14% to 15%. Following a similar emotive debate, the finance minister appointed an independent committee which I served on and which was chaired by Woolard, to advise on further zero-rating.

    Our conclusion – again – was that zero-rating is highly effective at protecting low-income groups from the deleterious effects of VAT.

    How it’s done matters

    The challenge with zero-rating is that while low-income households benefit, high-income households benefit more (because they spend more, in absolute terms, on zero-rated goods). Large amounts of potential VAT revenue are lost to high-income groups that don’t need protection.

    The trick is to find a basket of goods that low-income households consume a lot of, but which high-income households don’t consume in large quantities. Some typical examples are beans, canned pilchards and cabbage. These are all goods that low-income households consume and high-income households do not.

    National Treasury’s proposals for increasing the basket of goods to be zero-rated are based on solid research.

    A good example of the trade-offs to consider is the case of chicken. Chicken is an important source of protein for low-income households, but also for high-income households. So, if all chicken were zero-rated, this would protect poor households, but a large amount of VAT revenue would be lost.

    In our 2018 zero-rating report, at 2018 prices and consumption patterns, we calculated that zero-rating all chicken products would be equivalent to R1.3 billion (US$67.6 million) but government would lose R4.6 billion (US$244.4 million) to high income households.

    Not a good trade-off.

    However, some chicken products, such as chicken heads and feet, are mostly consumed by low-income groups, and are therefore good candidates for zero-rating.

    The two other Es – efficiency and ease of administration – of taxes are also key to consider.

    On these two considerations, VAT has big advantages.

    It’s very difficult to avoid or evade VAT because it’s collected along the chain of production. There’s evidence that South Africa has very little leakage in the system.

    So it is relatively easy to increase the VAT rate without needing to invest additional resources to collect the tax.

    Credibility is key

    Apart from the economic considerations, tax policy has to be politically credible. People should believe that their tax contributions are being used effectively, and government should be seen to be acting in line with this.

    If people don’t believe in government’s ability to spend wisely, resistance to taxes increases. Then tax avoidance and evasion increases.

    It would be fair to say that, with the high levels of corruption in South Africa’s political system, government’s credibility is low.

    Thus, if VAT is to be increased, government has to do a lot more to improve its credibility and reassure South Africans that the tax revenues will be well spent.

    Imraan Valodia receives funding from a number of foundations and governments that support academic research.

    ref. VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence – https://theconversation.com/vat-hikes-can-raise-tax-without-hurting-the-poor-an-economist-sets-out-the-evidence-254213

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

    South Africa’s 2025-6 budget has been subjected to more comment than usual. This is due to the political tensions generated by a proposed increase in value added tax (VAT).

    South Africa’s choices on how it manages the revenue and expenditure issues in the budget are critical for how the larger issues of the country’s debt and its economic policies are handled. As things stand, the economy is locked into a low-growth trajectory which make the debt, revenue and expenditure issues more difficult to deal with.

    This piece draws on a longer article which explores these issues in greater detail. Here, I focus only on the VAT issue.

    The finance minister originally tabled an increase of 2 percentage points, then changed it to 0.5 percentage points. Still, it is threatening to end the country’s government of national unity, which was set up after elections in 2024.


    Read more: South Africa’s finance minister wanted to raise VAT: the pros and cons of a tricky tax


    Most commentators, including the political parties that have opposed the proposal, many academics, and non-governmental organisations claiming to represent low-income groups, have argued that an increase in VAT places an undue burden on low-income groups. This would make it regressive.

    Based on work as an academic economist over the past three decades, I believe that the debate has been based largely on conjecture and ideological opposition to VAT, rather than on the evidence of its impact.

    This is a pity as there is empirical evidence rooted in research that a VAT increase is, in fact, not regressive and is therefore a good policy decision.

    Tax experts usually refer to the three Es in taxes – equity, efficiency and ease of administration – for evaluating tax policy proposals. New taxes should ideally promote equity (they should be progressive and not regressive), be efficient and be easy to administer.

    An increase in VAT in South Africa ticks all these boxes.

    First, contrary to what many commentators have been arguing, VAT isn’t always regressive – it depends on how it’s implemented. As proposed by the finance minister it would not be regressive because, while it would add to the burden of low-income households, most of the VAT would be collected from higher-income households. Added to this is that the proposed expansion of the existing list of zero-rated items would protect the lowest-income households.

    Second, VAT is a very efficient tax. For relatively low increases in the rate, government is able to raise a large amount of revenue.

    Finally, the system is easy to administer and adds very little cost to collection.

    Key to its efficacy is the way VAT is implemented, including the choice of products to zero rate, and the political credibility of government.

    The case for a VAT increase

    VAT is a consumption tax, so it only affects the income that a household consumes.

    According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), VAT is now the mainstay of tax systems in over 160 countries, raising on average one-third of total government revenues.

    In theory, there are good reasons to be concerned about the impact of VAT. First, it can place a high burden on low-income households because they spend a large proportion of their incomes on consumption goods such as food.

    Second, VAT may also place a heavy burden of tax on women. In South Africa and many other countries, women-led households tend to be clustered in the lower end of the income distribution. And women disproportionately take responsibility for feeding and caring for family members.

    So, at least in theory, VAT is a regressive tax. But is it really so in practice?

    Three studies that have explored this issue in some detail have concluded that, in South Africa, VAT is not regressive.

    In 2008, I worked with colleagues in eight countries (South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, India and the United Kingdom) on the gender issues related to tax. In particular we looked at the burden of VAT on low-income and women-headed households.

    Our findings were that, in general, VAT is regressive and discriminates against women, but it depends on how it is implemented.

    In South Africa, the zero-rating of basic consumption goods is very effective, protecting low-income and female-headed households from VAT. It’s an example of a VAT system that is neutral – neither regressive nor progressive.

    A more recent study by South African economist Ingrid Woolard and colleagues reached a similar conclusion in 2018.

    A third study was done in the same year when VAT was increased from 14% to 15%. Following a similar emotive debate, the finance minister appointed an independent committee which I served on and which was chaired by Woolard, to advise on further zero-rating.

    Our conclusion – again – was that zero-rating is highly effective at protecting low-income groups from the deleterious effects of VAT.

    How it’s done matters

    The challenge with zero-rating is that while low-income households benefit, high-income households benefit more (because they spend more, in absolute terms, on zero-rated goods). Large amounts of potential VAT revenue are lost to high-income groups that don’t need protection.

    The trick is to find a basket of goods that low-income households consume a lot of, but which high-income households don’t consume in large quantities. Some typical examples are beans, canned pilchards and cabbage. These are all goods that low-income households consume and high-income households do not.

    National Treasury’s proposals for increasing the basket of goods to be zero-rated are based on solid research.

    A good example of the trade-offs to consider is the case of chicken. Chicken is an important source of protein for low-income households, but also for high-income households. So, if all chicken were zero-rated, this would protect poor households, but a large amount of VAT revenue would be lost.

    In our 2018 zero-rating report, at 2018 prices and consumption patterns, we calculated that zero-rating all chicken products would be equivalent to R1.3 billion (US$67.6 million) but government would lose R4.6 billion (US$244.4 million) to high income households.

    Not a good trade-off.

    However, some chicken products, such as chicken heads and feet, are mostly consumed by low-income groups, and are therefore good candidates for zero-rating.

    The two other Es – efficiency and ease of administration – of taxes are also key to consider.

    On these two considerations, VAT has big advantages.

    It’s very difficult to avoid or evade VAT because it’s collected along the chain of production. There’s evidence that South Africa has very little leakage in the system.

    So it is relatively easy to increase the VAT rate without needing to invest additional resources to collect the tax.

    Credibility is key

    Apart from the economic considerations, tax policy has to be politically credible. People should believe that their tax contributions are being used effectively, and government should be seen to be acting in line with this.

    If people don’t believe in government’s ability to spend wisely, resistance to taxes increases. Then tax avoidance and evasion increases.

    It would be fair to say that, with the high levels of corruption in South Africa’s political system, government’s credibility is low.

    Thus, if VAT is to be increased, government has to do a lot more to improve its credibility and reassure South Africans that the tax revenues will be well spent.

    – VAT hikes can raise tax without hurting the poor: an economist sets out the evidence
    – https://theconversation.com/vat-hikes-can-raise-tax-without-hurting-the-poor-an-economist-sets-out-the-evidence-254213

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI: Apollo Funds Form $220 Million Community Solar Joint Venture with Bullrock Energy Ventures

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK and SOUTH BURLINGTON, Vt., April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Apollo (NYSE: APO) and Bullrock Energy Ventures (“Bullrock”) today announced that Apollo-managed funds (the “Apollo Funds”) have committed to fund up to $220 million for a new joint venture partnership with Bullrock related to a portfolio of community solar assets located in New York and New England. $100 million of Apollo’s equity commitment will fund the development of Bullrock’s nearly 500 MW pipeline of renewable energy assets.

    Based in Vermont, Bullrock is a high-growth renewable energy company with operations throughout the Northeast. The company’s vertically integrated model includes deal sourcing, underwriting, development, construction, financing and asset management. Bullrock, led by Chairman and Founder Gregg Beldock, alongside partner company NxtGenREA led by Mike Mills, has developed nearly 500 MW of solar projects across New England, New York and the Midwest over the past decade. The projects support local residents and businesses throughout the country with access to affordable clean energy. 

    “We are excited to partner with Gregg and the Bullrock team and invest in this scaled portfolio of solar assets that we believe will offer significant benefits to their surrounding communities,” said Apollo Partner Corinne Still. “Community solar represents an innovative solution to expanding local access to clean, efficient power across the energy grid, benefiting individuals, households and businesses alike. This partnership underscores Apollo’s commitment to serving as a leading capital provider supporting the energy transition, investing in companies and projects that serve the growing demand for diverse sources of power.”

    Bullrock Chairman and Founder Gregg Beldock and Bullrock Managing Partner Amory Beldock stated, “Our partnership with Apollo enhances a leading vertically integrated renewables platform working to meet the growing demand for power while reinforcing American energy security. Our long history in construction and development paired with Apollo’s integrated platform positions us to efficiently scale our portfolio. Community solar lowers energy costs, improves grid resiliency and boosts local economies. Apollo shares our commitment to driving the industry forward and we’re proud to work with them.”

    Over the past five years, Apollo-managed funds and affiliates have committed, deployed or arranged approximately $58 billioni of climate and energy transition-related investments, supporting companies and projects across clean energy and infrastructure.

    Tax Equity for the portfolio is arranged by Mike Mills through his company NxtGenREA.

    Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP served as legal to the Apollo Funds. Brown Rudnick LLP served as legal counsel to Bullrock. 

    i As of December 31, 2024. The firmwide targets (the “Targets”) to deploy, commit, or arrange capital commensurate with Apollo’s proprietary Climate and Transition Investment Framework (the “CTIF”), are (1) $50 billion by 2027 and (2) more than $100 billion by 2030 The CTIF, which is subject to change at any time without notice, sets forth certain activities classified by Apollo as sustainable economic activities (“SEAs”), and the methodologies used to calculate contribution towards the Targets. Only investments determined to be currently contributing to an SEA in accordance with the CTIF are counted toward the Targets. Under the CTIF, Apollo uses different calculation methodologies for different types of investments in equity, debt and real estate. For additional details on the CTIF, please refer to our website here: https://www.apollo.com/strategies/asset-management/real-assets/sustainable-investing-platform.

    About Apollo

    Apollo is a high-growth, global alternative asset manager. In our asset management business, we seek to provide our clients excess return at every point along the risk-reward spectrum from investment grade credit to private equity. For more than three decades, our investing expertise across our fully integrated platform has served the financial return needs of our clients and provided businesses with innovative capital solutions for growth. Through Athene, our retirement services business, we specialize in helping clients achieve financial security by providing a suite of retirement savings products and acting as a solutions provider to institutions. Our patient, creative, and knowledgeable approach to investing aligns our clients, businesses we invest in, our employees, and the communities we impact, to expand opportunity and achieve positive outcomes. As of December 31, 2024, Apollo had approximately $751 billion of assets under management. To learn more, please visit www.apollo.com.

    About Bullrock Energy Ventures

    Bullrock Energy Ventures is a vertically integrated renewable energy investment platform. The company was born out of Bullrock’s long history across renewables, construction, real estate development and healthcare and NxtGenREA’s deep experience in solar development and tax equity financing. Bullrock has developed over 500 MW to date, deployed over $2B in capital across the clean energy space, and is quickly moving to develop its 500 MW pipeline. Our success is a testament to our uniquely integrated model which allows us to build, operate, finance and manage energy assets at scale. We are proud to accelerate the energy transition through our pioneering approach to development while supporting local communities and securing American energy independence. 

    Contacts

    Noah Gunn
    Global Head of Investor Relations
    Apollo Global Management, Inc.
    212-822-0540
    ir@apollo.com 

    Joanna Rose
    Global Head of Corporate Communications
    Apollo Global Management, Inc.
    212-822-0491
    communications@apollo.com 

    For Bullrock Energy Ventures:

    ir@bullrockcorp.com

    For Bullrock Media Contacts:

    Patrick Lenihan
    Gravity Strategic Partners
    patrick@gravitystrat.com
    201-819-9871

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: SPC Apr 23, 2025 Day 4-8 Severe Weather Outlook

    Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

    Day 4-8 Severe Weather Outlook Issued on Apr 23, 2025

    Updated: Wed Apr 23 08:17:02 UTC 2025

     .

    D4
    Sat, Apr 26, 2025 – Sun, Apr 27, 2025
    D7
    Tue, Apr 29, 2025 – Wed, Apr 30, 2025

    D5
    Sun, Apr 27, 2025 – Mon, Apr 28, 2025
    D8
    Wed, Apr 30, 2025 – Thu, May 01, 2025

    D6
    Mon, Apr 28, 2025 – Tue, Apr 29, 2025
    (All days are valid from 12 UTC – 12 UTC the following day)

    Note: A severe weather area depicted in the Day 4-8 period indicates 15%, 30% or higher probability for severe thunderstorms within 25 miles of any point.

    PREDICTABILITY TOO LOW is used to indicate severe storms may be possible based on some model scenarios. However, the location or occurrence of severe storms are in doubt due to: 1) large differences in the deterministic model solutions, 2) large spread in the ensemble guidance, and/or 3) minimal run-to-run continuity.

    POTENTIAL TOO LOW means the threat for a regional area of organized severe storms appears unlikely (i.e., less than 15%) for the forecast day.

     Forecast Discussion

    ZCZC SPCSWOD48 ALL
    ACUS48 KWNS 230815
    SPC AC 230815

    Day 4-8 Convective Outlook
    NWS Storm Prediction Center Norman OK
    0315 AM CDT Wed Apr 23 2025

    Valid 261200Z – 011200Z

    …DISCUSSION…
    …Days 5-7/Sun-Tue — Great Plains to the Midwest…

    Forecast guidance is in good agreement that a deepening upper trough
    over the western states will eject eastward across the Plains and
    Midwest early next week. Beginning Day 5/Sun, the upper trough will
    extend from the central Rockies to the Southwest, with a belt of
    strong southeasterly flow emerging over the central/southern High
    Plains Sunday night. Surface lee low development is forecast over
    the northern/central Plains Sunday afternoon, with the low moving
    into SD/NE by Monday morning. Southerly low-level flow will
    transport ample moisture northward across the Plains and Mid-MO
    Valley on Sunday, with a sharpening dryline extending southward from
    western NE into western TX. Some severe potential could develop
    along the dryline and near the surface low/triple point. However,
    forecast soundings maintain strong capping and any convective
    development could be rather sparse. For now, this will preclude
    severe probabilities for Day 5/Sun.

    On Day 6/Mon, the upper trough will continue eastward, moving into
    the Plains by Tuesday morning. Ahead of the trough, a belt of strong
    southwesterly flow aloft will extend from OK into the Upper Midwest.
    A deepening surface low over SD will shift east/northeast through
    the period, with a trailing cold front shifting east/southeast
    across the Plains. Rich boundary layer moisture within a moderate to
    strongly unstable airmass and favorable shear parameter space will
    support an all-hazards severe weather episode across a fairly broad
    area from OK to MN/WI Monday afternoon into Monday night.

    Severe potential is likely to continue into Day 7/Tue, though some
    differences within medium range guidance with the evolution of the
    upper trough and key surface features does result in a bit more
    uncertainty compared to Monday, especially on the eastward extent of
    severe potential. Nevertheless, strong forcing atop a broad warm
    sector ahead of an eastward advancing cold front will continue to
    support severe potential from northeast Texas into Lower MI.

    ..Leitman.. 04/23/2025

    CLICK TO GET WUUS48 PTSD48 PRODUCT

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: SPC – No MDs are in effect as of Wed Apr 23 12:02:02 UTC 2025

    Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

    Current Mesoscale DiscussionsUpdated:  Wed Apr 23 12:02:07 UTC 2025 No Mesoscale Discussions are currently in effect.

    Notice:  The responsibility for Heavy Rain Mesoscale Discussions has been transferred to the Weather Prediction Center (WPC) on April 9, 2013. Click here for the Service Change Notice.
    Archived Convective ProductsTo view convective products for a previous day, type in the date you wish to retrieve (e.g. 20040529 for May 29, 2004). Data available since January 1, 2004.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: From UConn to the White House: A Conversation with Anita McBride ’81 (CLAS)

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    Anita McBride ’81 (CLAS) has spent decades working alongside some of the most influential women in American government: the first ladies who shaped national conversations both in the spotlight and behind the scenes.

    This spring, McBride returned to UConn to share what she’s learned with students in the College’s Women’s Leadership Collective and First-Generation Mentorship Program, offering candid reflections on leadership, resilience, and public service.

    “Anita McBride’s career reflects the many directions a UConn education can take you,” says Ofer Harel, dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. “Her visit gave students a valuable opportunity to hear how mentorship and public service have shaped her path — and how they might shape their own.”

    A veteran of three presidential administrations, McBride held senior roles under Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush. As chief of staff to First Lady Laura Bush, she directed initiatives in global health, education, literacy, women’s empowerment, and historic preservation, and led diplomatic travel to 67 countries.

    Today, she serves as executive-in-residence at American University’s Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, where she leads the First Ladies Initiative. She is also a founding member of the First Ladies Association for Research and Education and sits on the board of the White House Historical Association.

    McBride is the co-author of the first-ever textbook on first ladies, “U.S. First Ladies: Making History and Leaving Legacies”; its public-market adaptation, “Remember the First Ladies: The Legacies of America’s History-Making Women”; and a recent children’s book she co-wrote with her daughter, “First Ladies Make History.”

    “Anita’s keynote brought lived experience, insight, and a sense of purpose that resonated with everyone in the room,” says Jessica Alexander, associate director of alumni relations for CLAS. “Our mentorship programs create meaningful connections between students and alumni.”

    UConn Today caught up with McBride to discuss her path from UConn to the White House, and what she’s learned from a career at the highest levels of American government.

    What advice do you have for first-generation students navigating college life and what comes after?

    There is no one path — It’s constantly changing and moving. You need to be open to changes.

    I came to UConn knowing exactly what I wanted to do. I was pre-med — until I failed. It was the first time I’d been hit with failure. I went to meet with an advisor, and while I was there, I saw a sign for a new study abroad program in Italy. I grew up in an Italian immigrant household, so I figured this might be a way for me to reset my academic path and also see where my family came from. I applied and was accepted.

    It was the most transformative experience of my life on so many levels. I just gained so much confidence. I’m a big believer in fate, so walking into that building that day and seeing that sign, something about it felt so familiar.

    It’s scary to make a real pivot like that — and it wasn’t the last one I’ve made. When you go into politics, you never know what’s coming from one day to the next. The person you work for can win or lose. You’re in, you’re out. There’s a lot to navigate. What got me through all those changes was the belief that there’s always a new opportunity.

    How did UConn prepare you for success?

    UConn helped me navigate some turns, pivots, and challenges. It was a formative time for me. I built friendships that I still hold close today. It gave me a platform to make choices and changes, and I’ve always appreciated that.

    I’ve never really left my experience at UConn behind — I’ve just carried it with me and have used it in different ways throughout my life.

    You’re considered one of the foremost experts on U.S. first ladies. How did you become interested in this subject?

    I had a front-row seat to history, watching this position up close in three administrations, with Nancy Reagan, Barbara Bush, and Laura Bush. It’s a powerful platform, despite having no official authority, position description, salary, or mention in the Constitution. I really appreciated the impact they could have, and that they’re not required to do anything with the role if they choose not to.

    After I left the White House, the president of American University met with me and expressed interest in developing a program to study the growing influence of first ladies. That conversation led me to launch a conference series on the legacies of first ladies that eventually grew into an established academic initiative at American University. It covers their influence not only on the president, but on the presidency and the White House in general.

    Who, in your opinion, is the most influential first lady?

    Eleanor Roosevelt, bar none. She held the role for 12 years — longer than anyone else — and came in highly educated, politically active, and already in the public eye. She gave paid speeches, had a radio show, and wrote a daily newspaper column before becoming First Lady.

    Her husband didn’t want her to have a public role, but she pushed back. She held press conferences for female reporters, who were excluded from the president’s briefings, and gave them a platform during a critical time for women in journalism.

    She also took controversial stances, especially on civil and human rights. When the Daughters of the American Revolution refused to let [renowned Black opera singer] Marian Anderson perform at Constitution Hall, Roosevelt not only resigned from the group, but she also helped arrange Anderson’s now-historic performance at the Lincoln Memorial.

    These were bold steps. She didn’t get everything right and was controversial, but she set a standard for activism that went unmatched for a long time.

    What inspired you to write a children’s book, and what do you hope young readers will take away from it?

    The children’s book grew out of my academic work. I initially set out to fill a gap in the literature with a textbook, highlighting the contributions of first ladies — often unsung and underappreciated.

    Turning it into a children’s book was an exciting new challenge, especially because I did it with my daughter, who is studying to be an elementary school teacher. She had her own front-row seat to history — watching me work and having some exposure to the White House. Together, we adapted the stories from my book for children and worked with an illustrator. I brought the content, and she helped shape it for a young audience.

    For me, this book is about civic education. If we want people to truly understand and care about our history, we have to start at an earlier age. As divided as we are right now, I still believe this is one of the best systems of government — and it’s up to all of us to be part of it.

    You’ve served several presidential administrations. What’s one thing that sticks with you about that experience?

    I’ve met a lot of people in politics with different views. But one of the most lasting lessons I learned came from Laura Bush, the First Lady to former President George W. Bush, who served from 2001 to 2009 during a very turbulent time. Those eight years included two wars, the Sept. 11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the economic collapse. Her husband faced a lot of criticism, and I’d often ask her how she handled it.

    She never took the political bait. She kept things calm and steady, no matter the pressure. If she was disappointed, you could tell — but she expressed it with quiet resolve, she used her voice but didn’t raise her voice.

    What she taught me was this: In public service, you can’t take criticism personally. She would say, “I know who George is. We know who we are as a family. That’s what gets us through.” That mindset has stayed with me. In politics, you have to realize that not everyone will agree with you.

    It’s a challenging time, both economically and politically. What advice do you have for students on how to succeed through the challenges?

    Be respectful of other people’s opinions. Try and not respond in a way that’s adversarial, even if that’s what you see all around you. You don’t have to be that person.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: MOFA thanks Saint Christopher and Nevis National Assembly for passing resolution endorsing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    MOFA thanks Saint Christopher and Nevis National Assembly for passing resolution endorsing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations

    • Date:2025-04-18
    • Data Source:Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs

    April 18, 2025  

    No. 101  

    The National Assembly of Saint Christopher and Nevis on April 17 adopted a resolution proposed by Prime Minister Terrance Drew that endorsed Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) sincerely appreciates the staunch and unwavering support and friendship that parliamentarians from governing and opposition parties of Saint Christopher and Nevis have shown toward Taiwan through concrete action. 

     

    The resolution pointed out that Saint Christopher and Nevis parliamentarians, as members of the Formosa Club, cherished their country’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan. It stated that over the years the two nations had built a robust friendship based on shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The resolution lauded Taiwan for its contributions to global public health and recognized Taiwan’s efforts and actions in such fields as renewable energy, climate change adaptation, disaster warning systems, the fight against transnational crime, and the development of international civil aviation. It urged all sectors to support Taiwan’s professional, pragmatic, and constructive participation in the United Nations and other international organizations. 

     

    This marks the third consecutive year that the National Assembly of Saint Christopher and Nevis has passed a Taiwan-friendly resolution, underscoring the close and friendly diplomatic alliance between the two countries. Taiwan will continue to work with Saint Christopher and Nevis and other allies and like-minded nations to make even greater contributions to peace, security, and sustainable development across the globe. (E)

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: South Africa braces for heavy rain and cold weather conditions

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Wednesday, April 23, 2025

    Heavy rain and cold weather conditions are expected this week, as a cut-off low weather system sweeps across most parts of the country.

    According to the South African Weather Service (SAWS), a cut-off low system is expected to make landfall over the western interior of South Africa on Wednesday, 23 April 2025, and move slowly eastwards, likely to exit the country by Saturday, 26 April 2025.

    “Scattered to widespread showers and thundershowers are expected over the central and eastern parts of the country, with rainfall accumulations exceeding 50 mm in the eastern regions on Wednesday and Thursday, 23 and 24 April 2025.

    “Severe thunderstorms associated with flooding of roads and settlements, as well as damage or loss of infrastructure, property, vehicles, livelihoods, and livestock, especially over the Free State and North West. There is also a distinct possibility of damaging hail occurring in association with the thunderstorms,” the SAWS said in a statement.

    Snowfalls are also expected over the Drakensberg mountains in Lesotho, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Eastern Cape during this period. 

    In addition, daytime temperatures are expected to drop significantly across most parts of the country from Wednesday, with a gradual recovery from Friday onwards. 

    The South African Weather Service said it will continue to monitor any further developments relating to the weather systems and will issue subsequent updates, as required. 

    Intermediate updates may be followed on X (@SAWeatherServic), Facebook (South African Weather Service) or other SAWS-supported social media platforms. SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Newsom announces appointments 4.22.25

    Source: US State of California 2

    Apr 22, 2025

    SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:

    Claire Cullis, of Carmichael, has been appointed Deputy Secretary of Business and Consumer Relations at the California Business, Consumer Services, and Housing Agency. Cullis has been Chief of Staff to the First Partner in the Governor’s Office since 2021. She was Founder of Claire Cullis Consulting, LLC from 2018 to 2021. Cullis was the Executive Director of the Institute for Democracy and Justice from 2018 to 2021. She was the Director of Dignitary and Speaker Engagement at the Global Climate Action Summit for the United Nations Foundation in 2018. Cullis was a Consultant to the Special Olympics for the Austria Winter World Games in 2017. She held multiple positions at the United States Department of the Treasury from 2013 to 2017, including Director of Scheduling, Advance, and Administration, and Associate Director of Scheduling and Advance for the Treasury Secretary. Cullis was an Advance Associate at The White House from 2013 to 2017. She was Deputy Parade Director at the Presidential Inaugural Committee from 2012 to 2013. Cullis was National Advance Staff for Obama for America in 2012. She was a Senior Associate at the Dewey Square Group from 2006 to 2012. She was a Teacher at the Japanese Exchange and Teaching Program from 2005 to 2006. Cullis was National Advance Staff for the John Kerry presidential campaign in 2004. Cullis earned her Master of Business Administration degree from Virginia Tech, and her Bachelor of the Arts degree in International Studies and Studio Art from the University of Iowa. This position does not require Senate confirmation, and the compensation is $195,564. Cullis is a Democrat.

    Sophia Carrillo, of Santa Monica, has been appointed Assistant General Counsel of Enforcement at the California Environmental Protection Agency. Carrillo was an Assistant United States Attorney at the United States Attorney’s Office, Central District of California from 2023 to 2025. She was a Deputy Attorney General at the California Department of Justice from 2019 to 2023. Carrillo was a Judicial Law Clerk at the United States District Court, Eastern District of California from 2018 to 2019. She was an Associate Director of the Mayor’s Office of Talent and Appointments/D.C. Human Resources at the Executive Office of Mayor Muriel Bowser in 2015. Carrillo is a member of the Latino Community Foundation’s Los Angeles Giving Circle. She earned her Juris Doctor degree from Stanford Law School and a Bachelor of the Arts degree in Political Science and Sociology from the University of San Diego. This position does not require Senate confirmation and compensation is $174,000. Carrillo is a Democrat. 

    Iris “Marlene” De La O, of Berkeley, has been appointed Deputy Secretary of Public Policy at the California Environmental Protection Agency. De La O held several positions at Chemonics International from 2021 to 2025, including Senior Partnerships Manager and Director of Climate Change and Resiliency. She was the Director of Resiliency and Acquisitions at the Department of Housing, Preservation, and Development in 2019. De La O was Deputy Director at the California Strategic Growth Council from 2017 to 2018. She was a Consultant at Inter-American Development Bank from 2015 to 2016. De La O was a Manager and Regional Contracts Specialist at Chemonics International from 2012 to 2015. She earned a Master of Public Policy degree in City Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Bachelor of the Arts degree in Development Studies from the University of California, Berkeley. This position does not require Senate confirmation, and compensation is $175,512. De La O is a Democrat.

    Adam Ebrahim, of Carmichael, has been appointed Chief Deputy Director at the Commission on Teacher Credentialing. Ebrahim has been the Senior Director of Policy and Continuous Improvement at the Commission on Teacher Credentialing since 2024. He was the Principal Consultant at Azimuth Learning Partners from 2016 to 2024. Ebrahim was the Director of Education Strategy at Parsec Education in 2024. He was a Staff Consultant at the California Teachers Association from 2020 to 2024. Ebrahim was the Director of Local Control and Accountability Plan and Continuous Improvement at San Juan Unified School District from 2019 to 2020. He was a Project Director at Californians Dedicated to Education Foundation from 2016 to 2019. Ebrahim was a Staff Consultant at Fresno County Superintendent of Schools from 2015 to 2016. He was a Teacher at Fresno Unified School District from 2010 to 2015. Ebrahim was an Enlisted Soldier and Commissioned Officer at the California Army National Guard from 2007 to 2012. He received his Master of Education degree in United States Education in a Global Context from National University, a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from Washington University in Saint Louis, and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from University of California, Berkeley. This position does not require Senate confirmation, and the compensation is $181,344. Ebrahim is a Democrat.

    Vanessa Ejike, of Cerritos, has been appointed to the State Board of Education. Ejike was a Poll Worker for the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk and an Intern for Assemblymember Sharon Quirk-Silva in the California State Assembly in 2024. She is the National Partnerships Director for the High School Democrats of America, Local Affairs Director for California High School Democrats, Communications Coordinator for the Pacific Coast Coalition of Girl Up USA, Student Representative for the Legislative and Policy Committee at the ABC Unified School District, and Founder and Chair of the Principal’s Advisory Council at Gretchen Whitney High School. This position does not require Senate confirmation, and the compensation is $100 per diem. Ejike is not registered to vote. 

    Niki Woodard, of Sacramento, has been appointed Deputy Director of Communications and External Affairs at the California Energy Commission. Woodard has been the Senior Communications Officer at Resources Legacy Fund since 2019. She was the Deputy Assistant Director at the California Department of Water Resources from 2016 to 2019. Woodard was the Communications and Marketing Director at the Center for Climate Protection from 2015 to 2016. She was Founder and Principal of Spiral-PR from 2011 to 2016. Woodard was the Communications Director at Sequoia Riverlands Trust from 2008 to 2011. She was a Research Associate at the Pew Research Center from 2006 to 2008. Woodard earned a Master of the Arts degree in Communications from Georgetown University and a Bachelor of the Arts degrees in Rhetoric and Economics from the University of California, Berkeley. This position does not require Senate confirmation, and compensation is $160,968. Woodard is a Democrat.

    Lee Herrick, of Fresno, has been reappointed California’s Poet Laureate, where he has served since 2022. Herrick has been an English Professor at Fresno City college since 1997 and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Nevada, Reno at Lake Tahoe since 2012. He was the Poet Laureate of the City of Fresno from 2015 to 2017. Herrick was an Adjunct English Professor at Modesto Junior College from 1995 to 1997. He is the Founder of LitHop and an Advisory Board Member of Terrain.org, Sixteen Rivers Press, and Anacapa review, and a Member of the Association of Writers and Writing Programs. Herrick earned a Master of Arts degree in English, Composition and Rhetoric and a Bachelor of Arts degree in English and American Literature from California State University, Stanislaus. This position requires Senate confirmation, and the California Arts Council provides an annual stipend. Herrick is a Democrat.

    Press Releases, Recent News

    Recent news

    News What you need to know: The Governor and First Partner marked Earth Day at Chico State University with students from the Center for Regenerative Agriculture and Resilient Systems. CHICO –  Governor Gavin Newsom and First Partner Jennifer Siebel Newsom celebrated…

    News What you need to know: Classes resumed in person at Palisades Charter High School today at a new temporary site in Santa Monica. All eight public schools that were damaged in the fires are now back to learning in person. LOS ANGELES – Today, Governor Gavin Newsom…

    News What you need to know: The Cradle-to-Career Data System displays key milestones in students’ experience over time and provides insights about education and career pathways. Sacramento, California – Today, Governor Gavin Newsom unveiled a first-of-its-kind…

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Greece: The EIB Advisory supports Growthfund in strengthening climate resilience of Greek ports

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • EIB Advisory assists Growthfund in assessing climate risks for key ports in Greece.
    • EIB provides targeted advisory services as part of its commitment to sustainable infrastructure investments.
    • Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs) will help ports protect against potential climate-change related hazards.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) will provide advisory support to Growthfund, Greece’s National Investment Fund, to help strengthen the climate resilience of key Greek ports. This initiative will focus on conducting Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs) for the ports of Volos, Alexandroupoli, and Patras, supporting their adaptation to climate change challenges.

    Under the agreement, EIB Advisory will assist the corresponding port authorities in identifying and addressing physical climate risks which could impact port infrastructure and operations, such as coastal flooding, rising sea levels, and extreme weather events.  These assessments will help define specific adaptation measures to enhance long-term sustainability and economic resilience.

    “Ports are critical for Greece’s economy and connectivity, but they face increasing risks due to climate change,” said EIB Vice-President Ioannis Tsakiris. “By working with Growthfund, we aim to provide structured assessments and strategic solutions to protect vital port infrastructure and ensure its long-term viability.”

    Panagiotis Stampoulidis, Deputy CEO of Growthfund, referred to the cooperation between Growthfund and the EIB as the second substantial partnership between the two institutions, which further strengthens their contribution to the development of public infrastructure by making services more competitive and sustainable. “Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, and ports — as critical infrastructure for the Greek economy, society, and the country’s connectivity — are at the forefront of this challenge. Our collaboration with the Advisory Services of the European Investment Bank is fully aligned with Growthfund’s strategic planning to strengthen key public infrastructure.

    Through targeted Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs), we aim to ensure that the ports of Volos, Alexandroupolis, and Patras are better protected against extreme weather events and the broader effects of the climate crisis.

    Growthfund, leveraging its international network, technical expertise, and alignment with European best practices, actively contributes to the creation of a more sustainable and resilient development model for the country.”

     A key step in climate-proofing infrastructure

    The advisory support will be structured around three key tasks:

    • Baseline assessment: analysing climate data and historical extreme weather events affecting the selected ports.
    • Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (CRVA): identifying climate risks, assessing their impact, and proposing adaptation measures.
    • Financial impact assessment: estimating how climate risks could affect operational costs, revenues, and investment needs.

    The project aligns with EU climate policies and best practices, including the European Commission’s Technical Guidance on Climate Proofing Infrastructure and PIANC’s guidelines for climate adaptation in ports and waterways.

    The EIB’s commitment to sustainable development

    The agreement reinforces the EIB’s role as the EU Climate Bank, supporting investments that build resilience and promote sustainable infrastructure. Through its advisory services, the EIB helps public and private stakeholders overcome investment barriers, ensuring that climate-proofing measures are both effective and financially viable.

    Background information

    EIB  

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. 

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.   

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.   

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers.Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Joint Statement at the conclusion of the State Visit of Prime Minister to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 12:44PM by PIB Delhi

    “A Historic Friendship; A Partnership for Progress”

    At the invitation of His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Hon’ble Prime Minister of the Republic of India, Shri Narendra Modi paid a State Visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 22, 2025.

    This was Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s third visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It followed the historic State Visit of HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s visit to India in September 2023 to participate in the G-20 Summit and co-chair the first meeting of the India- Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council.

    His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister, received Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi at Al-Salam Palace, Jeddah.They held official talks, during which they recalled the strong bonds of historically close friendship between the Republic of India and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. India and Saudi Arabia enjoy a strong relationship and close people-to-people ties marked by trust and goodwill. The two sides noted that the solid foundation of the bilateral relationship between the two nations has further strengthened through the strategic partnership covering diverse areas including defense, security, energy, trade, investment, technology, agriculture, culture, health, education, and people-to-people ties. Both sides also exchanged views on current regional and international issues of mutual interest.

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi congratulated HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for Saudi Arabia’s successful bids for World Expo 2030 and FIFA World Cup 2034.

    The two leaders held constructive discussions on ways to strengthen the strategic partnership between India and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The two leaders also co-chaired the second meeting of the India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council (SPC). The two sides reviewed the progress of the Strategic Partnership Council since their last meeting in September 2023. Both leaders expressed their satisfaction with the outcomes of the work of the two Ministerial Committees, namely: (a) the Committee on Political, Security, Social and Cultural Cooperation and their subcommittees and (b) the Committee on Economy and Investment and their Joint Working Groups, in diverse fields. In this context, the Co-Chairs of the Council welcomed the expansion of the Strategic Partnership Council to four Ministerial Committees reflecting the deepening of the Strategic Partnership, by addition of the Ministerial Committees on Defence Cooperation, and Tourism and Cultural Cooperation. The two leaders noted with appreciation the large number of high-level visits across various Ministries that have built trust and mutual understanding on both sides. At the end of the Meeting, the two leaders signed the Minutes of the Second Meeting of the India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council.

    The Indian side expressed its appreciation to the Saudi side for the continuing welfare of around 2.7 million Indian nationals residing in the Kingdom, reflecting the strong people- to-people bonds and immense goodwill that exists between the two nations. The Indian side also congratulated Saudi Arabia for successfully holding the Haj pilgrimage in 2024 and expressed its appreciation for the excellent coordination between the two countries in facilitating Indian Haj and Umrah pilgrims.

    Both sides welcomed the growth of the economic relationship, trade and investment ties between India and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in recent years. The Indian side congratulated the Saudi side for progress achieved on the goals under Vision 2030. Saudi side expressed appreciation for India’s sustained economic growth and the goal of Viksit Bharat or becoming a developed country by 2047. Both sides agreed to work together in areas of mutual interests to fulfill respective national goals and achieve shared prosperity.

    Both Leaders noted with satisfaction the progress made in the discussions under the High-Level Task Force (HLTF), constituted in 2024 for promoting investment flows between the two countries. Building on the endeavor of Saudi Arabia to invest in India in multiple areas including energy, petrochemicals, infrastructure, technology, fintech, digital infrastructure, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing and health, it was noted that the High-Level Task Force came to an understanding in multiple areas which will rapidly promote such investment flows. They noted the agreement in the High-Level Task Force to collaborate on establishing two refineries. The progress made by this Task Force in areas such as taxation was also a major breakthrough for greater cooperation in the future. The two sides affirmed their desire to complete negotiations on the Bilateral Investment Treaty at the earliest. The Indian side appreciated the launch of India Desk at the Public Investment Fund (PIF) to act as the nodal point for investment facilitation by PIF. They observed that work of the High-Level Task Force underscores the growing economic partnership between India and Saudi Arabia focusing on mutual economic growth and collaborative investments.

    The two sides affirmed their commitment to strengthening their direct and indirect investment partnership. They commended the outcomes of the Saudi-India Investment Forum, held in New Delhi in September 2023, and the active cooperation it achieved between the public and private sectors from both countries. They also commended the expansion of investment activities by Indian companies in the Kingdom, and appreciated the role of the private sector in enhancing mutual investments.The two sides valued the activation of the Framework of Cooperation on Enhancing Bilateral Investment between Invest India and Ministry of Investment of Saudi Arabia. Both sides agreed to facilitate enhanced bilateral cooperation in the startup ecosystem, contributing to mutual growth and innovation.

    In the field of Energy, the Indian side agreed to work with the Kingdom to enhance the stability of global oil markets and to balance global energy market dynamics. They emphasized the need to ensure security of supply for all energy sources in global markets. They agreed on the importance of enhancing cooperation in several areas in the energy sector, including the supply of crude oil and its derivatives including LPG, collaboration in India’s Strategic Reserve Program, joint projects across the refining and petrochemical sector, including manufacturing and specialized industries, innovative uses of hydrocarbons, electricity, and renewable energy, including completing the detailed joint study for electrical interconnection between the two countries, exchanging expertise in the fields of grid automation, grid connectivity, electrical grid security and resilience, and renewable energy projects and energy storage technologies, and enhancing the participation of companies from both sides in implementing their projects.

    The two sides emphasized the importance of cooperation in the field of green/clean hydrogen, including stimulating demand, developing hydrogen transport and storage technologies, exchanging expertise and experiences to implement best practices. The two sides also acknowledged the need to work on developing supply chains and projects linked to the energy sector, enabling cooperation between companies, enhancing cooperation in the field of energy efficiency and rationalizing energy consumption in the buildings, industry, and transportation sectors, and raising awareness of its importance.

    With regard to climate change, both sides reaffirmed the importance of adhering to the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, and the need to develop and implement climate agreements with a focus on emissions rather than sources. The Indian side commended the Kingdom’s launch of the “Saudi Green Initiative” and the “Middle East Green Initiative”and expressed its support for the Kingdom’s efforts in the field of climate change. The two sides stressed the importance of joint cooperation to develop applications of the circular carbon economy by promoting policies that use the circular carbon economy as a tool to manage emissions and achieve climate change objectives.The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appreciated India’s contributions to global climate action by pioneering initiatives like International Solar Alliance, One Sun-One World-One Grid, Coalition of Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) and Mission Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) and Global Green Credit Initiative.

    Both sides expressed satisfaction at the steady growth in bilateral trade in recent years with India being the second largest trading partner for Saudi Arabia; and Saudi Arabia being India’s fifth largest trading partner in 2023-2024. Both sides agreed to further enhance co-operation to diversify their bilateral trade. In this regard, both sides agreed on the importance of increasing visits of business and trade delegations, and holding trade and investment events. Both sides reiterated their desire for commencing negotiations on the India-GCC FTA.

    The two sides appreciated the deepening of the defence ties as a key pillar of the Strategic Partnership, and welcomed the creation of a Ministerial Committee on Defence Cooperation under the Strategic Partnership Council. They noted with satisfaction the growth of their joint defence cooperation including numerous ‘firsts’ like the first ever Land Forces exercise SADA TANSEEQ, two rounds of the Naval Exercises AL MOHED AL HINDI, many high-level visits, and training exchanges, towards ensuring the security and stability of the region. They welcomed the outcomes of the 6th meeting of the Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation held in Riyadh in September 2024, noting the initiation of staff-level talks between all three services. Both sides also agreed to enhance defence industry collaboration.

    Noting the continuing cooperation achieved in security fields, both sides highlighted the importance of this cooperation for better security and stability. They also emphasized the importance of furthering cooperation between both sides in the areas of cybersecurity, maritime border security, combating transnational crime, narcotics and drug trafficking.

    Both sides strongly condemned the gruesome terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir on 22 April 2025, which claimed the lives of innocent civilians. In this context, the two sides condemned terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, and emphasized that this remains one of the gravest threats to humanity. They agreed that there cannot be any justification for any act of terror for any reason whatsoever. They rejected any attempt to link terrorism to any particular race, religion or culture. They welcomed the excellent cooperation between the two sides in counter-terrorism and the terror financing. They condemned cross-border terrorism, and called on all States to reject the use of terrorism against other countries, dismantle terrorism infrastructure where it exists, and bring perpetrators of terrorism to justice swiftly. Both sides stressed the need to prevent access to weapons including missiles and drones to commit terrorist acts against other countries.

    The two sides noted the ongoing cooperation in field of health and efforts to combat current and future health risks and health challenges. In this context, they welcomed the signing of the MOU on Cooperation in the Field of Health between the two countries. The Indian side congratulated the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for successfully hosting the Fourth Ministerial Conference on Antimicrobial Resistance in Jeddah in November 2024. Indian side welcomed the initiatives taken by the Saudi Food and Drug Authority to address issues related to reference pricing and fast track registration of Indian drugs in Saudi Arabia. Both sides also welcomed the extension of the MoU on Co-operation in the Field of Medical Products Regulation between Saudi Food and Drug Authority and Central Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO) for a further period of five years.

    Both sides underscored the importance of co-operation in technology including in new and emerging domains such as Artificial Intelligence, cybersecurity, semi-conductors etc. Highlighting the importance of digital governance,both sides agreed to explore collaboration in this area. They also expressed satisfaction on signing of the MOU between Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and Communications, Space and Technology Commission of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for cooperation in regulatory and digital sectors.

    Both sides noted that the MoU on space cooperation signed during this visit will pave the way for enhanced cooperation in the field of space, including utilization of launch vehicles, spacecraft, ground systems; applications of space technology; research and development; academic engagement and entrepreneurship.

    Both sides noted the growth of cultural cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of India through active engagement in key sectors such as heritage, film, literature, and performing and visual arts. The creation of a Ministerial Committee on Tourism and Cultural Cooperation under the Strategic Partnership Council marks a significant step toward deepening this partnership.

    Both sides also agreed to enhance cooperation in tourism including through capacity building and sustainable tourism. They also noted the expansion of various opportunities in media, entertainment, and sports, supported by the strong people-to-people ties between the two countries.

    Both sides appreciated the long-standing cooperation between the two countries in the areas of agriculture and food security, including trade of fertilizers. They agreed to pursue long-term agreements for the security of supply, mutual investments and joint projects towards building long-term strategic cooperation in this area.

    The two sides commended the growing momentum in educational and scientific collaboration between the two countries, underscoring its strategic importance in fostering innovation, capacity building, and sustainable development. The Saudi side welcomes the opportunities for leading Indian universities to have presence in Saudi Arabia.The two sides also stressed the value of expanding cooperation in labour and human resources and identifying opportunities for collaboration.

    Both sides recalled the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor along with other countries in September 2023 during the state visit of HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to India and expressed mutual commitment to work together to realize the vision of connectivity as envisaged in the Corridor, including the development of infrastructure that includes railways and port linkages to increase the passage of goods and services, and boost trade among stakeholders, and enhance data connectivity and electrical grid interconnectivity. In this regard, both sides welcomed the progress under the MoU on Electrical Interconnections, Clean/Green Hydrogen and Supply Chains signed in October 2023. Both sides also expressed satisfaction on the increase in shipping lines between the two countries.

    The two sides stressed the importance of enhancing cooperation and coordination between the two countries in international organizations and forums, including the G20, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, to bolster efforts to address the challenges facing the global economy. They commended the existing cooperation between them within the Common Framework for Debt Treatment Beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which was endorsed by the G20 leaders at the Riyadh Summit 2020. They stressed the importance of enhancing the implementation of the Common Framework as the main and most comprehensive platform for coordination between official creditors (developing country creditors and Paris Club creditors) and the private sector to address the debt of eligible countries.

    The two sides affirmed their full support for the international and regional efforts aimed at reaching a comprehensive political solution to the crisis in Yemen. The Indian side appreciated the Kingdom’s many initiatives aimed at encouraging dialogue between the Yemeni parties, and its role in providing and facilitating access of humanitarian aid to all regions of Yemen. The Saudi side also appreciated the Indian effort in providing humanitarian aid to Yemen.The two sides agreed on the importance of cooperation to promote ways to ensure the security and safety of waterways and freedom of navigation in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    The following MoUs were signed during the visit:

    • MoU between Department of Space, India, and Saudi Space Agency in the field of space activities for peaceful purposes.

    • MoU between Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Republic of India and Ministry of Health, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia & on Cooperation in the Field of Health.

    • Bilateral Agreement between Department of Posts, India and Saudi Post Corporation (SPL) for inward foreign surface parcel.

    • MOU between National Anti-Doping Agency of India (NADA), India, and Saudi Arabia Anti-Doping Committee (SAADC) for cooperation in the field of anti-doping and prevention.

    Both sides agreed to hold the next meeting of the Strategic Partnership Council on a date mutually agreed upon. As the two nations march ahead with economic and social developments in their respective countries, they also decided, that they will continue communication, coordination and cooperation across various sectors.

    At the end of the visit, Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, expressed his sincere thanks and appreciation to His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince and Prime Minister, for the warm reception and generous hospitality extended to him and his accompanying delegation. He also conveyed his best wishes for continued progress and prosperity of the friendly people of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For his part, His Royal Highness extended his sincere wishes to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the friendly people of India for further progress and prosperity.

    ***

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: EV EDUCATION LAUNCHED IN TOP VOCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN SAMOA, ALONG WITH NEW DECARBONIZATION PLANS

    Source:

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    [PRESS RELEASE 08 April 2025] – A significant educational milestone has been reached, with the opening of electric vehicles (EV) automotive workshops in three vocational institutions in Samoa, namely the National University of Samoa, Don Bosco Technical Centre, and Laumua o Puna’oa Technical College.

    These workshops will be supported by the incorporation of an EV mechanics curriculum as a Professional Continuing Training (PCT) programme of these schools, pending the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding soon.

    These will equip students with essential knowledge and skills in EV automotive and electrical fields, preparing them to become certified EV mechanics, and laying the foundation for integrating EV training into national education.

    These were highlighted today at a ceremony at Don Bosco, Alafua, which also celebrated the launch of the Transport and Infrastructure Sector Decarbonization Strategy and Sustainable Land Use and Mobility Plan, with Prime Minister, Fiame Naomi Mata’afa, doing the honours.

    “Transport is a key enabler of connectivity — supporting trade, employment, education, and healthcare. Yet, it is also one of the largest contributors to carbon emissions in Samoa. The importance of these Plans are clear: it ensures that Samoa remains steadfast in its commitment to transitioning to a lower-carbon future. It encompasses new legislation, policy changes, financing initiatives, and interventions to support our transportation needs in a way that minimizes environmental harm while ensuring that future generations benefit from enhanced mobility,” said Olo Fiti Afoa Vaai, Minister for the Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure.

    These new developments have all been made possible under the CAP-IT Project – Climate Action Pathways for Island Transport – which aims to facilitate Samoa’s transition to a more clean and sustainable transport sector.

    The project is funded by the Government of Japan, and jointly implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Government of Samoa through the Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure.

    “Japan is proud to support Samoa’s long-term journey towards a cleaner, more resilient transport sector. By advancing policies, building skills, and providing infrastructure through the CAP-IT project, we are investing in a sustainable future led by Samoa’s youth and powered by innovation,” said Ryotaro Suzuki, Ambassador of Japan to Samoa.

    The Transport Sector Decarbonization Strategy and Sustainable Land Use and Mobility Plan will guide Samoa’s transition from fossil fuel dependency to a decarbonized transport sector. This shift will not only reduce carbon emissions but also improve transport services, ensuring a healthier and more sustainable Samoa.

    “The long-term benefits of these initiatives extend far beyond environmental stewardship. They create jobs, empower our youth, and open new economic opportunities in the burgeoning field of sustainable transport. UNDP remains steadfast in supporting Samoa’s capacity-building efforts, fostering innovation, and implementing policies that drive systemic change in our transport sector,” said Aliona Niculita, UNDP Resident Representative in Samoa.

    The CAP-IT project is a component of the Japan-funded US$36.8 million regional project, ‘Promoting Green Transformation in the Pacific Region towards Net-zero and Climate-Resilient Development’, also supporting Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu in achieving their green transformation ambitions for a more inclusive, climate-resilient future.

    END.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Structural solutions for financing TenneT

    Source: Government of the Netherlands

    The government is going to issue a guarantee to TenneT Nederland. This will enable the high-voltage grid operator to continue investing in the Dutch electricity network through attractive loans. Two options are being considered for the financing of the German branch of TenneT: a private share issue or an initial public offering. This will provide structural solutions for the financing needs of TenneT Netherlands and Germany, as ministers Heinen (Finance) and Hermans (Climate and Green Growth) write in a letter to the Parliament. All financial aspects have been incorporated into the Spring Budget.

    A well-functioning transmission grid and access to electricity are essential for Dutch households and businesses. Expansion and reinforcement of the electricity grid are necessary to meet the growing demand. This requires major investments; TenneT Netherlands is expected to invest some 90 billion euros over the next ten years. The government has decided to issue a guarantee to ensure that TenneT Netherlands can finance this investment. This will enable TenneT Netherlands to take out loans with the same credit rating as the Dutch state (AAA). This means that loans can be obtained on the capital market under better conditions – and therefore more cheaply. This approach means that no additional capital contributions from the state are necessary. The intention to provide a guarantee is included in the Spring Budget 2025. This will be submitted to parliament.

    For TenneT Germany, where substantial investments are also needed in the coming years, the government has chosen private funding. An initial public offering or private share issuance are the two options currently under consideration. Interest among private investors will be explored in the coming months and a decision will be made before the summer which option implemented further.

    The proposed structural solutions changes TenneT’s financing structure. At the moment, TenneT raises its debt through TenneT Holding and lends it to TenneT Netherlands and TenneT Germany. In the future, the debt will be raised separately by TenneT Netherlands and TenneT Germany. All existing bondholders will be asked to agree to the transfer of the debt to TenneT Netherlands in exchange for a one-time compensation. In doing so, TenneT is working on a future-proof financing structure. If there is insufficient interest among private investors in participating in TenneT Germany or the debt restructuring does not succeed, the Dutch state will itself provide the capital needed by TenneT Germany. A reservation has therefore been included in the national budget. The Dutch state is hereby acting as a responsible shareholder.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: “Let us do our jobs” — Major aid groups in Gaza warn aid system is collapsing

    Source: Oxfam –

    After 18 months of war, a staggering toll on civilians and aid workers, and now a six-week total siege, the humanitarian aid system in Gaza is facing total collapse with the CEOs of 12 major aid organisations making an urgent plea: let us do our jobs. 

    A new humanitarian access survey of 43 international and Palestinian aid organisations working in Gaza found nearly all of them – 95% – have had to suspend or dramatically cut services since the ceasefire ended one month ago on 18 March, with widespread and indiscriminate bombing making it extremely dangerous to move around.

    The people of Gaza – particularly women and children – are paying the price. Families are living amongst the rubble of their destroyed homes.  Famine is not just a risk, but likely rapidly unfolding in almost all parts of Gaza. The UN has warned the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is the worst it has been in 18 months.

    Stripped of the means to keep people alive, hospitals have become morgues. More than 51,000 Palestinians have been reported killed. One of the last partially functioning hospitals, Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in northern Gaza, was bombed last Sunday.  

    “This is one of the worst humanitarian failures of our generation. Every single person in Gaza is relying on humanitarian aid to survive. That lifeline has been completely cut off since a blockade on all aid supplies was imposed by Israeli authorities on 2 March.  

    “We have supplies ready. We have trained medical staff. We have the expertise. What we don’t have is the access – or the guarantee by Israeli authorities that our teams can safely do their jobs.  

    “Survival itself is now slipping out of reach and the humanitarian system is at breaking point,” the CEOs of the 12 aid organisations said in their joint statement.  

    Twenty-four of the surveyed organisations reported increased movement restrictions in Gaza, impeding their ability to deliver aid.  Nineteen aid organisations reported having cargo stuck outside Gaza, totaling at least 9,000 pallets of aid supplies.  

    Gaza now holds the disastrous record of being the deadliest place on earth for humanitarian workers. We cannot operate under fire or stay silent while our staff are killed. 

    More than 400 aid workers and over 1,300 health workers have been reported killed in Gaza since October 2023, despite the requirement under international humanitarian law for humanitarian workers to be protected.  

    The recent killing of 15 Palestinian paramedics and rescue workers, whose bodies were found buried in a mass grave triggered global outrage, but many violations and attacks go unreported. 

    Despite hopes that the eight-week pause in hostilities would become a turning point, the violence against civilians and aid workers has only worsened. Since Israeli forces resumed bombardments, at least 14 organisations reported Israeli fire directly or indirectly hitting their staff or aid facilities.  

    Every day, aid workers – the majority of whom are Palestinian – are targeted, detained, obstructed or killed. Just as every day, rules meant to protect civilians in war are ignored with impunity.  When our staff and partners, our convoys, our offices, our warehouses are shelled, the message is loud and clear: even lifesaving aid is no longer protected. 

    This is unacceptable. 

    Meanwhile, Israeli authorities have proposed a new authorisation mechanism for the delivery of aid in Gaza that the UN Secretary-General has described as “limiting aid down to the last calorie and grain of flour.” This mechanism would set a dangerous new global precedent and eliminate any remaining space to deliver aid independent of military and political motivations. New NGO visa and registration rules, based on vague criteria, will censor humanitarian reporting and prevent us from fulfilling our mandate. 

    We call on all parties to guarantee the safety of our staff and to allow the safe, unfettered access of aid into and across Gaza through all entry points, and for world leaders to oppose further restrictions. 

    We call for the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure including hospitals, schools and shelters and the immediate restoration of basic services – water, electricity, and sanitation as required under international law. 

    We call for the release of the hostages. 

    We call for the release of all Palestinians arbitrarily detained. 

    We call, yet again, resoundingly, for an immediate and permanent ceasefire. 

    Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool. Saving lives should not be controversial. Laws of war developed over centuries to govern conduct and protect civilians should not now be discarded. 

    Let us do our jobs.  

    INGER ASHING, CEO, Save the Children International 

    AMITABH BEHAR, Executive Director, Oxfam International 

    SEAN CARROLL, President and CEO, Anera

    STEVE CUTTS, interim Chief Executive Officer, Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP)  

    NICOLAS DOTTA, CEO, Médecins du Monde Spain

    JAN EGELAND, Secretary General, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 

    REENA GHELANI, CEO, Plan International

    MANUEL PATROUILLARD, Managing Director, Humanity & Inclusion – Handicap International  

    MORGANE ROUSSEAU, CEO, Médecins du Monde Switzerland

    REINTJE VAN HAERINGEN, Chair – Executive Committee, CARE International 

    JOEL WEILER, CEO, Médecins du Monde France

    ROB WILLIAMS, CEO, War Child Alliance

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Todos, todos, todos

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    He’ll come back again, I muttered as I declined a friend’s invitation to see Pope Francis when he visited the University of Sto. Tomas in 2015. There was good reason to believe he would. Being one of two predominantly Catholic countries in Asia, the Philippines would certainly be a prime place for a liberal-leaning pope to visit. That confidence was also masked by a certain hubris that I might find myself in Rome one of these days, looking up at St. Peter’s Square. So his sudden death brings more regrets than questions; a certainty that I missed the mark and did not see Christ’s representative in the flesh.

    Having been raised Catholic, the life of the Church was always like a familiar plaza. There was as much friendship as there was gossip, and it was a place to cultivate not only one’s faith but also the sense of community that is so important with the Church. In a sense, I was also brought up in the more traditional track of Catholicism, and this was also reflected in my theological interests during graduate studies. Looking back, it seemed all the more strange that I would refuse an opportunity to see the Pope. Perhaps there was something stirring inside me, a subconscious feeling that made it difficult for me to embrace the Church.

    Francis, in many ways, represented a perceived break—a moment of irruption in the unified vision of the Church. One could remember the fear in his eyes when he was presented to the world for the first time in strikingly simple garb. There was something uncanny about him when he was addressing the crowd. Why couldn’t I shake off the feeling of discomfort? Being Jesuit-educated, I should understand this simplicity, but for some reason, there was what Karl Rahner called “the unsolved remainder” that lingered long after the pomp and excitement of Francis’s election.

    And it became more and more apparent as Francis slowly broke down what I thought was the Church, often in gentle ways. From admitting—to a Haiyan survivor—the failure of human reason amidst unspeakable suffering, to kissing the feet of inmates in Regina Coeli prison in Rome every Maundy Thursday, Francis’s brand of Church-building was one of humility.

    The Franciscan brand of humility was never far away from radical unity. In order for the Church to be truly itself, she had to go back to her roots, a Church that called for the liberation of the oppressed, that swung open the doors of secrecy, that loved everyone—todos, todos, todos—regardless of orientation, belief, background, or status. The roots of the Church, Francis pressed, had to go where there was a real chance it would not grow and then eventually rot away. The fringes and the frontlines where God seemingly has abandoned humanity: among the wastelands of war, famine, and communities flattened by extreme weather, and even in the most personal and intimate encounters of the deafening silence of God.

    Perhaps it was the reaching out to the margins that terrified me, because spiritually, I’ve found myself in those dark corners especially in the last few years. Perhaps I felt seen and heard, and I did not want to be because I refused to admit that all I heard was silence. Because such is the nature of the dark night–it creeps up silently, etching away the facade of one’s faith. It then becomes like an irresistible itch that one unconsciously scratches, preventing any kind of healing. Paradoxically, it is only ever in this kind of darkness and silence that the God of Francis’s teaching fully reveals His power, the power of pure presence, and this presence had a name: mercy.

    That was probably the unsolved remainder: a God that offered no world-changing reason for the problems of humanity, no quick fixes to the climate crisis, no easy answers to the suffering of the innocent. A God that simply announces Himself as Herself in the midst of the world’s brokenness, with the complete honesty that nothing will ever fully address the weight of suffering. Francis represented that simple, honest, and all-embracing mercy, and that disturbed me, because little did I know that I was the one being ministered to.

    Perhaps that was what Francis really tried to teach: to be able to have the confidence to confront even the darkest questions, mustering up the courage to face the world’s problems with nothing more than the quiet assurance that God will never leave. This conviction probably annoyed me because it was easier said than done. It probably angered me too as it didn’t offer the kind of solutions our world has been accustomed to.

    The urgency is much more pressing in a world that is slowly crumbling away from the excesses of the rich and powerful, who continue to prioritize greed and self-interest over the life of the planet, and who foment hate towards those that are not like them. Could you believe that? The “answer” to all these overwhelming problems was to be silent and sit by someone and cry with them?

    Maybe it was less of an answer and more of a signpost towards a starting point. That, to meet and commune with those who have suffered, what was required was to refrain from immediately offering solutions and open oneself up to the simple power of presence. In many ways it is also a slap on my face: working in an environmental NGO, one gets lost in the urgency of the calls, for instance, to make polluters pay, and one forgets the truly essential starting point of mercy. One gets addicted to the thrill of campaigning, and one neglects the unsolved remainder that will always result from the calculus of the climate crisis. Perhaps the starting point in addressing the climate crisis is on the level of fear and trembling with others, where words fail and presence remains the only acceptable response. Much like the silence that envelops a household swept away by a storm surge, and no amount of campaigning will ever repay or repair what was lost. Campaigning involving human suffering always entails acquiescing to the silence of presence, and only then can one build truly merciful and human connections and tackle the climate crisis together with others.

    It took Francis’s death to make me realize that I was being ministered to spiritually and in work, and there is no timeline for when the darkness will be lifted. Now the plaza is less bustling and, at times, flooded. And the floating garbage is like the lingering memories of the moments I wasted neglecting my own faith and conviction for my work. But when I look up, all I see are the forgotten that Francis invited back into the Church, and I realize my own brokenness and darkness too, as I am constantly being invited back to the Church that is equally broken.

    Maybe this is what it means to be a Church now: to acknowledge our brokenness and how we have become used to or even addicted to it. To use this as a starting point to see each other as each other and cultivate the kind of courageous presence that breaks down the powerful. Until everyone, everyone, and everyone is embraced without measure.

    You might want to check out Greenpeace Philippines’ petition called Courage for Climate, a drive in support of real policy and legal solutions in the pursuit of climate justice.

    Courage for Climate

    The climate crisis may seem hopeless, but now is the time for courage, not despair. Join Filipino communities taking bold action for our planet.

    Make an Act of Courage Today!


    Jefferson Chua is a Greenpeace Campaigner working on climate, based in the Philippines.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Planning reforms to slash a year off infrastructure delivery

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    Planning reforms to slash a year off infrastructure delivery

    Clean energy projects, reservoirs, railway lines, and other major infrastructure to be built faster, under changes to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill

    Clean energy projects, public transport links, and other major infrastructure will on average be delivered at least a year faster, as the government accelerates planning reforms to unleash growth and restore Britain’s rightful place as a world leader in building.

    Burdensome statutory consultation requirements unique to major infrastructure projects will be scrapped, through amendments to the pro-growth Planning and Infrastructure Bill, cutting down the average two-year statutory pre-consultation period by half and paving the way for new roads, railways, and windfarms that will bolster the country’s connectivity and energy security.

    Developers currently spend significant time and money on long, technical documents resulting in communities feeling fatigued and confused, which is a direct result of overly complex planning rules that are leaving working people deprived of the things their areas need to thrive. It also disincentivises developers making improvements to projects for fear of having to re-consult, even if in the community’s best interest.

    Recognising community voices remain vital, the government will bring this process in line with planning applications for major housing schemes, and set out new statutory guidance to promote meaningful local engagement without repeating these flaws. This will allow changes to be made dynamically based on community feedback, reducing delays and potentially saving over £1 billion for industry and taxpayers this Parliament. These changes will help ensure Britain is open for business, attracting billions of pounds of new private investment.

    This will go even further in streamlining infrastructure delivery through the government’s landmark Planning and Infrastructure Bill, as part of the Plan for Change to power and heat homes with clean energy, raise living standards, create well-paying jobs, and put more money into the pockets of working people and families. The reforms will also boost the government’s efforts to build 1.5 million homes by making it easier to deliver the roads, reservoirs and energy generation needed so we can restore the dream of homeownership to families across the country.

    Deputy Prime Minister and Housing Secretary Angela Rayner said: 

    “Critical national infrastructure is key to Britain’s future and security – so we can’t afford to have projects held up by tiresome requirements and uncertainty, caused by a system that is not working for communities or developers and holding back our true potential.

    “We are strengthening the Planning and Infrastructure Bill to make sure we can lead the world again with new roads, railways, and energy infrastructure as part of the Plan for Change, whilst ensuring local people still have a say in our journey to get Britain building.”

    Alongside statutory guidance for developers on applications, the Planning Inspectorate will maintain high standards for accepting projects – informed by community engagement. Local authorities will also be made aware of proposed applications so that they can continue to play an important role informing and advising on developments, as well as advocating for local interests.

    As a result, local people can still object and share their views but in a more effective way, with developers given the flexibility to adapt their schemes as needed without restarting the process: reducing delays and costs for projects, including datacentres, reservoirs, and solar farms, while ensuring local people’s voices are heard.

    Meanwhile the government is already taking action – consenting more nationally significant solar projects since the start of the Parliament compared to the whole of the previous one, including the Mallard Pass Solar Project in Lincolnshire, and making the largest ever investment in offshore wind, as we deliver our Plan for Change milestone of 150 decisions on major infrastructure projects by the end of the Parliament.

    Examples of delays under current system:   

    • Fens Reservoir: Over 1,000 days in pre-application due to a number of issues including around consultation requirements, expected submission in December 2026, supplying 250,000 homes with water.   
    • National Grid – Bramford to Twinstead: 717 days in pre-application for 29km of overhead lines and underground cables.   
    • Hinkley Point C: Three years in pre-application consultation; Sizewell C spent around seven-and-a-half years at this stage.  

    Wider reforms in the Bill will streamline and speed up planning decisions, remove blockers to major infrastructure and housing delivery, and support environmental goals through the new Nature Restoration Fund to achieve win-win outcomes for both nature and the economy.

    These changes build on the recent OBR forecast confirming the government’s planning overhaul, through an updated National Planning Policy Framework, will drive UK housebuilding to its highest level in over 40 years and boost the economy by £6.8 billion by 2029/30.

    Notes to editors:

    Carl Trowell, President of Strategic Infrastructure, National Grid, said:

    “Consulting with communities and stakeholders will always be a fundamental part of the way we at National Grid develop and shape our projects. We welcome the Government’s proposal today which will ensure that consultation and engagement can be more effective and targeted. This will accelerate the path to delivering critical infrastructure while continuing to ensure the views of local communities are heard.”

    Benj Sykes, UK Country Manager, Ørsted said:

    “Ørsted welcomes the ongoing work of the Government to reform the planning system, including these changes to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. Engaging and working with communities and other stakeholders in the pre-application stage has always been central to our work developing new energy projects and will remain so; the changes being introduced will allow everyone involved in these engagements to focus on the issues that matter to stakeholders and local communities, and to our developments.”

    James Robottom, Head of Policy, Renewable UK said:

    “This announcement represents a significant step forward for the renewable energy industry, as it will enable us to speed up the delivery of vital infrastructure projects to boost the UK’s energy security, grow the economy and help us to reach the Government’s target of clean power by 2030.  The industry has a long track record of engaging early and closely with local communities and a wide range of environmental stakeholders, and this will continue as we want to carry on building projects with local support by giving communities a clear voice in the decision-making process. We look forward to feeding into the new guidance that will enable us to spend more time engaging with key stakeholders on the most important issues for each new project on a case by case basis and lead to even higher quality engagement and positive outcomes for nature.” 

    Sam Richards, CEO of pro-growth campaign group Britain Remade, said:

    “Today’s bold reforms to cut red tape and get vital infrastructure delivered faster are a big step toward unlocking clean energy, better transport, and the homes Britain desperately needs. Too often consultation is a long and expensive box ticking exercise. By slashing delays and encouraging real community engagement, the government is backing growth, investment, and the kind of national renewal we all want to see.”

    Adam Berman, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Energy UK said:

    “Energy UK is fully behind the Government’s mission to speed up the planning system, unlocking the investment in clean energy we need to secure our future power needs. More targeted engagement with statutory consultees will result in faster and more appropriate applications, allowing relevant public bodies to focus on planning applications that matter most to them.”

    Richard Greer, Fellow, Climate & Sustainability Services, Arup:

    “Building on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill with further legislative improvements will be essential to delivering the Government’s ten-year Infrastructure Strategy and its pipeline of projects across transport, energy, water, and the new economy sector (such as data centres).  A step-change in infrastructure delivery requires a comprehensive package of reforms that streamlines the entire project lifecycle.”

    Updates to this page

    Published 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: MATSUI, NEGUSE, COHEN, MCCLELLAN LEAD RESOLUTION TO CELEBRATE EARTH DAY

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Doris Matsui (D-CA)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Congresswoman Doris Matsui (CA-07), co-chair of the House Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition (SEEC), Assistant Democratic Leader Joe Neguse (CO-02), and Reps. Steve Cohen (TN-09), and Jennifer McClellan (VA-04) led a group of 48 lawmakers in introducing a resolution to commemorate Earth Day 2025. The resolution celebrates recent historic environmental actions that have improved the health and wellbeing of our planet, while also reaffirming the work that still needs to be done to secure a livable future for the next generation. 

    “Since the first declaration of Earth Day fifty-five years ago, we have made incredible progress towards protecting and restoring the natural world that we rely on and enjoy,” said Congresswoman Matsui. “However, in less than 100 days, President Trump has worked to erase decades of progress, dismantling climate science, weakening critical environmental agencies, and launching an all-out assault on clean air and clean water. This unprecedented assault on clean air and clean water is a stark reminder that Earth Day remains as important and revolutionary today as it was in 1970. This Earth Day, I am honored to join my colleagues in reaffirming and celebrating our shared responsibility to protect and preserve our planet for future generations, and I will never stop fighting to uphold these ideals at every level of government.”

    “On Earth Day, communities across the country reaffirm their commitment to protecting the environment and our treasured public lands,” said Congressman Neguse. “And for me, as a proud Coloradan, the fight to ensure future generations can enjoy the outdoors the same way we have is deeply personal. Which is why I’m proud to join my colleagues in continuing to charge forward in Congress with efforts that prioritize protecting our planet.” 

    “Fifty-five years after the first Earth Day, our commitment to environmental protection must be stronger than ever,” said Congressman Cohen. “The Trump administration is once again doing the bidding of polluters—rolling back clean air and clean water standards, halting enforcement of environmental safeguards, and illegally freezing congressionally authorized funding meant to combat climate change, reduce pollution, and protect public health. Climate change is accelerating. Our air, water, and communities are under threat. Earth Day is not just a reminder of what’s at stake—it’s a call to rededicate ourselves to the fight for a cleaner, healthier, and more sustainable planet for the next generation.”

    “Our children deserve a future where clean air, safe water, and a stable climate are not luxuries, but guarantees,” said Congresswoman McClellan. “This Earth Day, we must reaffirm our commitment to climate action and environmental justice. We are not just responding to a crisis today — we are building a better, more just world that our children will inherit tomorrow.”

    Congresswoman Matsui has long been a champion of strong environmental protections, life-saving pollution regulations, and bold climate action. In Congress, she has led efforts to strengthen vehicle and power plant pollution standards and supported energy efficiency programs that save American families money. As Co-Chair of the SEEC Lands, Waters, and Nature Task Force, Congresswoman Matsui also coordinates the coalition’s work to preserve the environment, protect public lands and critical habitat, and advance nature-based approaches to addressing climate change. 

    Read the full resolution HERE.

                                                   

    # # #

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Flooding incidents in Ghana’s capital are on the rise. Researchers chase the cause

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

    Urban flooding is a major problem in the global south. In west and central Africa, more than 4 million people were affected by flooding in 2024. In Ghana, cities suffer damage from flooding every year.

    Ghana’s president, John Dramani Mahama, has established a task force to find ways of improving flood resilience in the country. This is partly driven by an increase in flooding incidents in cities such as Accra and Kumasi in the last decade.

    We are urban planning and sustainability scholars. In a recent paper we analysed whether flooding in Accra, Ghana’s capital, was caused by climate change or poor land use planning.

    We conclude from our analysis that flooding is caused by poor and uncoordinated land use planning rather than climate change. We recommend that the physical planning department and other regulatory agencies are equipped to ensure the effective enforcement the relevant land use regulations.

    Mixed push factors

    The Accra metropolitan area is one of the 29 administrative units of Ghana’s Greater Accra region. It is the most populous region in Ghana, with over five million residents, according to the 2021 Housing and Population Census.

    We interviewed 100 households living in areas such as Kaneshie, Adabraka and Kwame Nkrumah Circle. These areas experience a high incidence of floods. Representatives of agencies such as the Physical Planning Department of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, the National Disaster Management Organisation and the Environmental Protection Agency were interviewed too, about:

    • the nature and areas most prone to flooding in the study area

    • the frequency of flooding

    • land use planning and regulations and their influence on flooding.

    About 40% of the people we interviewed attributed flooding to both weak enforcement of land use regulation and changes in rainfall patterns. Most of the households (52%) said floods in Accra were the result of weak enforcement of land use regulations, while 8% blamed changes in land use regulations.

    We also analysed recorded data on flood incidence and rainfall. We found no correlation between increased rainfall and flooding. For example in 2017 there was a decrease in rainfall, but an increase in flooding.

    This finding points to the fact that rainfall isn’t the only factor contributing to flooding in the city.

    The agencies and city residents reported that between 2008 and 2018, they could see that more people were encroaching on the city’s wetlands by building homes and commercial infrastructure. This has changed the natural flow of water bodies. The Greater Accra Metropolitan and its environs has major wetlands such as Densu Delta, Sakumo Lagoon and Songor Lagoon.

    Interview respondents noted that the siting of unauthorised buildings and the encroachment on buffer zones of water bodies in the city could have been averted. They blamed political interference in the enforcement of land use regulation. The government makes the situation worse in two ways, they said:

    • planning standards and regulations are neglected in the development process. The processes involved in acquiring development permits are cumbersome and expensive, so people go ahead and develop without permits.

    • regulatory institutions and authorities are ineffective. This is clear from the fact that planning happens chaotically. No attention is given to the ecological infrastructure that’s needed.

    The way forward

    We conclude that land use malpractices remain the dominant causes of flooding in Accra. They include:

    • poor disposal of solid waste, which eventually blocks drains and results in water overflow during heavy rains

    • building on wetlands as a result of non-compliance or non-enforcement of land use regulations.

    There is an urgent need for Ghana’s cities to adopt best practices in waste management. These include recycling of plastic waste and composting for urban agriculture. An environmental excise tax was introduced in 2011 to fund plastic waste recycling and support waste management agencies.

    The increasing encroachment on wetlands should be addressed through the strict enforcement of buffer regulations. Planning authorities and the judiciary can collaborate on this. The city must also encourage green infrastructure, like rain gardens, green roofs, permeable pavement, street trees and rain harvesting systems. Research has shown these to be environmentally sustainable and cost-effective approaches to managing storm water.

    Another suggested approach is the introduction of the polluter pays principle in city management. This is a system where city residents who are involved in the pollution of the environment are made to pay for the cost of mitigating the impact. Residents who dispose of waste indiscriminately and encroach on wetlands would be made to pay for the cost of the environmental degradation. Cities such as Barcelona and Helsinki have applied this principle in the management of their industrial discharge and contaminated waste.

    Finally, there should be incentives for city residents to promote environmental sustainability. For example, a deposit refund system has been introduced in several states in the US and Australia. In this system, consumers are made to pay a deposit after purchasing items that can be recycled, such as plastic bottles, and the deposit is reimbursed to the consumer after the return of the empty bottles to a retail store.

    – Flooding incidents in Ghana’s capital are on the rise. Researchers chase the cause
    – https://theconversation.com/flooding-incidents-in-ghanas-capital-are-on-the-rise-researchers-chase-the-cause-254000

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: The global economy needs institutions like the IMF | Guest contribution by Joachim Nagel in the Börsen-Zeitung

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    As finance ministers and central bank governors from around the world gather in Washington, DC for the IMF Spring Meetings, international economic relations are more strained than most of us have probably ever experienced.
    At a time when the rules-based global order is under imminent threat, it is up to all of us to defend this global order and the institutions upon which it is built. I see an urgent need for policymakers to clearly articulate the benefits that these institutions and a stable international monetary system deliver for all countries.
    The IMF ranks among the most important international organisations. It helps preserve the stability of the global monetary and financial system by providing its member countries with policy advice or, if necessary, financial assistance to prevent and overcome economic and financial crises. The IMF is a cornerstone of the rules-based international monetary system that is so vital for our prosperity.
    One enduring feature of the IMF is its strong ability to adapt to evolving global economic conditions, in part because it regularly evaluates the design of its frameworks and policies. Indeed, the IMF is planning to review two fundamental areas – the conduct of surveillance and the design of its lending programmes, including conditionality – in the near future.
    Surveillance is the IMF’s key crisis prevention tool. Given the current challenges, it is crucial to keep our understanding of international spillover effects up to date at all times. Significant progress has been made since the global financial crisis, but we still need to improve what we know about how economic developments are transmitted from one country to another. Despite signs of fragmentation, our world is still very much interconnected and the economic linkages have grown in complexity in recent years. Needless to say, changing trade patterns are a factor in this. But enhanced analyses are also needed for the financial sector. That’s a task the IMF is uniquely placed to perform.
    Furthermore, factors like artificial intelligence, digital money and the move towards a more multipolar world will significantly affect our economies. We need to know more about their impact on global monetary and financial stability. Climate-related risks such as floods, droughts and storms can take their toll on banks’ and insurers’ balance sheets. Political uncertainty and geoeconomic fragmentation will also affect the financial sector and real economy. By understanding the systemic implications of these trends, we will be better equipped to overcome the challenges that lie ahead.
    Unfortunately, though, crisis prevention is only part of the story. When crises do occur, IMF lending plays a hugely important role. To make sure the funds are used effectively, they are granted subject to conditions as a way of ensuring that a crisis can be overcome.
    Currently, in some programmes, funds are disbursed early, while policy actions only need to be implemented later. I would suggest – where feasible – bringing policy actions forward and pushing back disbursements. This would enhance programme effectiveness and help make more efficient use of the funds. In addition, including contingency measures more often could help programmes respond more flexibly to unforeseen events.
    The global economy needs global institutions like the IMF. It is a cornerstone of the global monetary and financial system, and thus also of our collective well-being. Let me be clear: the Bundesbank and I are committed to the IMF as an important player in promoting economic and financial stability and thus also our prosperity.

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Flooding incidents in Ghana’s capital are on the rise. Researchers chase the cause

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

    Urban flooding is a major problem in the global south. In west and central Africa, more than 4 million people were affected by flooding in 2024. In Ghana, cities suffer damage from flooding every year.

    Ghana’s president, John Dramani Mahama, has established a task force to find ways of improving flood resilience in the country. This is partly driven by an increase in flooding incidents in cities such as Accra and Kumasi in the last decade.

    We are urban planning and sustainability scholars. In a recent paper we analysed whether flooding in Accra, Ghana’s capital, was caused by climate change or poor land use planning.

    We conclude from our analysis that flooding is caused by poor and uncoordinated land use planning rather than climate change. We recommend that the physical planning department and other regulatory agencies are equipped to ensure the effective enforcement the relevant land use regulations.

    Mixed push factors

    The Accra metropolitan area is one of the 29 administrative units of Ghana’s Greater Accra region. It is the most populous region in Ghana, with over five million residents, according to the 2021 Housing and Population Census.

    We interviewed 100 households living in areas such as Kaneshie, Adabraka and Kwame Nkrumah Circle. These areas experience a high incidence of floods. Representatives of agencies such as the Physical Planning Department of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, the National Disaster Management Organisation and the Environmental Protection Agency were interviewed too, about:

    • the nature and areas most prone to flooding in the study area

    • the frequency of flooding

    • land use planning and regulations and their influence on flooding.

    About 40% of the people we interviewed attributed flooding to both weak enforcement of land use regulation and changes in rainfall patterns. Most of the households (52%) said floods in Accra were the result of weak enforcement of land use regulations, while 8% blamed changes in land use regulations.

    We also analysed recorded data on flood incidence and rainfall. We found no correlation between increased rainfall and flooding. For example in 2017 there was a decrease in rainfall, but an increase in flooding.

    This finding points to the fact that rainfall isn’t the only factor contributing to flooding in the city.

    The agencies and city residents reported that between 2008 and 2018, they could see that more people were encroaching on the city’s wetlands by building homes and commercial infrastructure. This has changed the natural flow of water bodies. The Greater Accra Metropolitan and its environs has major wetlands such as Densu Delta, Sakumo Lagoon and Songor Lagoon.

    Interview respondents noted that the siting of unauthorised buildings and the encroachment on buffer zones of water bodies in the city could have been averted. They blamed political interference in the enforcement of land use regulation. The government makes the situation worse in two ways, they said:

    • planning standards and regulations are neglected in the development process. The processes involved in acquiring development permits are cumbersome and expensive, so people go ahead and develop without permits.

    • regulatory institutions and authorities are ineffective. This is clear from the fact that planning happens chaotically. No attention is given to the ecological infrastructure that’s needed.

    The way forward

    We conclude that land use malpractices remain the dominant causes of flooding in Accra. They include:

    • poor disposal of solid waste, which eventually blocks drains and results in water overflow during heavy rains

    • building on wetlands as a result of non-compliance or non-enforcement of land use regulations.

    There is an urgent need for Ghana’s cities to adopt best practices in waste management. These include recycling of plastic waste and composting for urban agriculture. An environmental excise tax was introduced in 2011 to fund plastic waste recycling and support waste management agencies.

    The increasing encroachment on wetlands should be addressed through the strict enforcement of buffer regulations. Planning authorities and the judiciary can collaborate on this. The city must also encourage green infrastructure, like rain gardens, green roofs, permeable pavement, street trees and rain harvesting systems.
    Research has shown these to be environmentally sustainable and cost-effective approaches to managing storm water.

    Another suggested approach is the introduction of the polluter pays principle in city management. This is a system where city residents who are involved in the pollution of the environment are made to pay for the cost of mitigating the impact. Residents who dispose of waste indiscriminately and encroach on wetlands would be made to pay for the cost of the environmental degradation. Cities such as Barcelona and Helsinki have applied this principle in the management of their industrial discharge and contaminated waste.

    Finally, there should be incentives for city residents to promote environmental sustainability. For example, a deposit refund system has been introduced in several states in the US and Australia. In this system, consumers are made to pay a deposit after purchasing items that can be recycled, such as plastic bottles, and the deposit is reimbursed to the consumer after the return of the empty bottles to a retail store.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Flooding incidents in Ghana’s capital are on the rise. Researchers chase the cause – https://theconversation.com/flooding-incidents-in-ghanas-capital-are-on-the-rise-researchers-chase-the-cause-254000

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz