Category: Crime

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 04/23/2025, 14-14 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A10A6B8 (RusGid2P02) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    04/23/2025

    14:14

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 23.04.2025, 14-14 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 123.95) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1303.14 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 10.0%) of the security RU000A10A6B8 (RusGid2P02) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 04/23/2025, 16-37 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A1009A1 (Megafon2P2) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    04/23/2025

    16:37

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 23.04.2025, 16-37 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 95.68) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 992.01 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 8.75%) of the security RU000A1009A1 (Megafon2P2) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 04/23/2025, 18-12 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A104Z71 (BinPharm1P2) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    04/23/2025

    18:12

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 23.04.2025, 18-12 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 107.37) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1122.16 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 11.25%) of the security RU000A104Z71 (BinPharm1P2) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Maryland Man Admits to Leading Drug Trafficking Operation in Eastern Panhandle

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    ELKINS, WEST VIRGINIA – Lenin Erasmo Luna Mota, 52, of Hagerstown, Maryland, has admitted to leading a drug trafficking organization that sold large quantities of fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine in Berkeley County.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, Luna Mota, also known as “Papi,” was one of the leaders of the drug trafficking conspiracy, using his business located in Hagerstown, Maryland, as a central hub for the drug sales.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Lara Omps-Botteicher is prosecuting the case on behalf of the government.

    The FBI; the U.S. Marshals Service; Homeland Security Investigations; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the West Virginia Air National Guard; the Eastern Panhandle Drug Task Force, a HIDTA-funded initiative (agencies included are the West Virginia State Police, Berkeley County Sheriff’s Department, Jefferson County Sherriff’s Department, Ranson Police Department, Charles Town Police Department, and Martinsburg City Police Department); West Virginia State Police; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the Hagerstown Police Department; the National Resources Police Department; FBI-New York Safe Streets Task Force; the New York Police Department; the New Jersey State Police; the Washington County (Maryland) Drug Task Force; the Maryland State Police; the  U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland;  and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Pennsylvania investigated.

    This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

    U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael John Aloi presided.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: High-Ranking Tren de Aragua Member in Custody on Terrorism and International Drug Distribution Charges

    Source: US State of North Dakota

    A five-count superseding indictment has been unsealed today charging a Venezuelan national and alleged high-ranking member of the designated foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA).  

    Jose Enrique Martinez Flores also known as “Chuqui,” 24, is charged in the Southern District of Texas (SDTX) with conspiring to provide and providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization as well as conspiracy and distribution of cocaine in Colombia intended for distribution in the United States.

    “TdA is not a street gang – it is a highly structured terrorist organization that put down roots in our country during the prior administration,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s charges represent an inflection point in how this Department of Justice will prosecute and ultimately dismantle this evil organization, which has destroyed American families and poisoned our communities.”

    “For the past few years, foreign gangs like TdA have more or less been able to enter the country with impunity, coming here to distribute deadly drugs and terrorize American citizens,” said U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei for the SDTX. “That ends now. This Department of Justice is committed to uprooting this terrorist gang, dismantling its criminal operations, and either imprisoning its members or removing them from the country. SDTX is proud to lead this fight.”

    “TdA is a direct threat to our national security, to our communities, and to Americans,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Together with our law enforcement partners, the FBI continues in our pursuit to eliminate this violent terrorist organization from our streets, and today’s announcement makes it clear that these criminals, especially the leaders of these cartels, have no place in our country.”

    “This joint Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)-FBI operation — alongside partners in the United States and Colombia — is further evidence that we must continue to focus our efforts on members of TdA who continue to pump poison into our communities,” said DEA Acting Administrator Derek Maltz. “This is another example of DEA’s tenacity to hunt these networks down, wherever they operate, and crush their evil grip on American lives.”

    Colombian authorities arrested Flores in Colombia March 31 pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant the United States had requested. He remains in custody in Colombia pending further proceedings. 

    A federal grand jury in Houston returned the superseding indictment April 8. 

    According to the allegations, Flores is charged with one count of conspiring to provide material support to TdA in the form of personnel (including himself) and services and one count of providing material support to TdA. The indictment also alleges one count of international drug distribution conspiracy based on his involvement in the distribution of five kilograms of cocaine or more, and two substantive counts of international drug distribution.

    The Department of State designated TdA as a foreign terrorist organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Feb. 20. 

    According to information presented to the court, Flores is a high-ranking TdA leader in Bogota, Colombia, and is part of the inner circle of senior TdA leadership.

    Flores also allegedly caused the delivery of approximately five kilograms or more of cocaine for international distribution, proceeds that were used to further TdA’s criminal goals. 

    If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of life in prison and a $10 million fine. 

    The FBI Houston Field Office and DEA conducted the investigation with the assistance of the Houston Police Department, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, Colombian National Police and the Colombian Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación). The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section’s Office of Judicial Attaché in Bogotá, Colombia, provided significant assistance. 

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Casey N. MacDonald and Anibal J. Alaniz of the SDTX are prosecuting the case along with Deputy Director David C. Smith from the Department of Justice’s Joint Task Force Vulcan (JTFV). 

    JTFV was created in 2019 to eradicate MS-13 and now expanded to target TdA and is comprised of U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country. Those include SDTX; Southern and Eastern Districts of New York; Northern District of Ohio; Districts of New Jersey, Utah, Massachusetts, Nevada and Alaska; Eastern District of Texas; Southern District of Florida; Eastern District of Virginia; Southern District of California; and the District of Columbia, as well as the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division. Additionally, the FBI; DEA; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Forearms and Explosives; U.S. Marshals Service; and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have been essential law enforcement partners with JTFV.

    This case is also a part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

     

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Armed Drug Dealer Receives 10 Years in Federal Prison

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    NEW BERN, N.C. – Eric Harris, 38, of Wilmington, was sentenced today to 10 years in prison for distribution of a quantity of methamphetamine and fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.  Harris pled guilty to the charges on January 16, 2025. 

    According to court documents and other information presented in court, law enforcement received information that Harris had traveled to Charlotte, North Carolina to purchase methamphetamine that he planned to sell in Wilmington.  Between August 20 and September 9, 2024, the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Office made controlled purchases from Harris of more than 3 ounces of methamphetamine and 10 grams of fentanyl at the Campus Edge Apartments in Wilmington.  On September 9, 2024, the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Office arrested Harris following the last controlled purchase and then searched Harris’ Campus Edge apartment.  Law enforcement found an additional two ounces of methamphetamine, nineteen grams of fentanyl, and a loaded firearm in the apartment.

    This is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level drug traffickers, money launders, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations that threaten the United States by using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies against criminal networks.

    Daniel P. Bubar, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina made the announcement after sentencing by U.S. District Judge Louise W. Flanagan. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Office investigated the case and Assistant U.S. Attorney Timothy Severo  prosecuted the case.

    Related court documents and information can be found on the website of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina or on PACER by searching for Case No. 7:24-cr-00092.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: High-Ranking Tren de Aragua Member in Custody on Terrorism and International Drug Distribution Charges

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    A five-count superseding indictment has been unsealed today charging a Venezuelan national and alleged high-ranking member of the designated foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA).  

    Jose Enrique Martinez Flores also known as “Chuqui,” 24, is charged in the Southern District of Texas (SDTX) with conspiring to provide and providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization as well as conspiracy and distribution of cocaine in Colombia intended for distribution in the United States.

    “TdA is not a street gang – it is a highly structured terrorist organization that put down roots in our country during the prior administration,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s charges represent an inflection point in how this Department of Justice will prosecute and ultimately dismantle this evil organization, which has destroyed American families and poisoned our communities.”

    “For the past few years, foreign gangs like TdA have more or less been able to enter the country with impunity, coming here to distribute deadly drugs and terrorize American citizens,” said U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei for the SDTX. “That ends now. This Department of Justice is committed to uprooting this terrorist gang, dismantling its criminal operations, and either imprisoning its members or removing them from the country. SDTX is proud to lead this fight.”

    “TdA is a direct threat to our national security, to our communities, and to Americans,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Together with our law enforcement partners, the FBI continues in our pursuit to eliminate this violent terrorist organization from our streets, and today’s announcement makes it clear that these criminals, especially the leaders of these cartels, have no place in our country.”

    “This joint Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)-FBI operation — alongside partners in the United States and Colombia — is further evidence that we must continue to focus our efforts on members of TdA who continue to pump poison into our communities,” said DEA Acting Administrator Derek Maltz. “This is another example of DEA’s tenacity to hunt these networks down, wherever they operate, and crush their evil grip on American lives.”

    Colombian authorities arrested Flores in Colombia March 31 pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant the United States had requested. He remains in custody in Colombia pending further proceedings. 

    A federal grand jury in Houston returned the superseding indictment April 8. 

    According to the allegations, Flores is charged with one count of conspiring to provide material support to TdA in the form of personnel (including himself) and services and one count of providing material support to TdA. The indictment also alleges one count of international drug distribution conspiracy based on his involvement in the distribution of five kilograms of cocaine or more, and two substantive counts of international drug distribution.

    The Department of State designated TdA as a foreign terrorist organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Feb. 20. 

    According to information presented to the court, Flores is a high-ranking TdA leader in Bogota, Colombia, and is part of the inner circle of senior TdA leadership.

    Flores also allegedly caused the delivery of approximately five kilograms or more of cocaine for international distribution, proceeds that were used to further TdA’s criminal goals. 

    If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of life in prison and a $10 million fine. 

    The FBI Houston Field Office and DEA conducted the investigation with the assistance of the Houston Police Department, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, Colombian National Police and the Colombian Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación). The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section’s Office of Judicial Attaché in Bogotá, Colombia, provided significant assistance. 

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Casey N. MacDonald and Anibal J. Alaniz of the SDTX are prosecuting the case along with Deputy Director David C. Smith from the Department of Justice’s Joint Task Force Vulcan (JTFV). 

    JTFV was created in 2019 to eradicate MS-13 and now expanded to target TdA and is comprised of U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country. Those include SDTX; Southern and Eastern Districts of New York; Northern District of Ohio; Districts of New Jersey, Utah, Massachusetts, Nevada and Alaska; Eastern District of Texas; Southern District of Florida; Eastern District of Virginia; Southern District of California; and the District of Columbia, as well as the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division. Additionally, the FBI; DEA; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Forearms and Explosives; U.S. Marshals Service; and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have been essential law enforcement partners with JTFV.

    This case is also a part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Pontiac Man Pleads Guilty in $4M Identity Theft and Unemployment Fraud Case

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    DETROIT – A Pontiac man has pleaded guilty to committing aggravated identity theft and wire fraud as part of large-scale, multi-state Unemployment Insurance benefit fraud scheme in which he and co-conspirators fraudulently obtained debit cards loaded with more than $4 million in Pandemic Unemployment Assistance funds, Acting United States Attorney Julie A. Beck announced today.

    Joining in the announcement were Megan Howell, Acting Special Agent-in-Charge, Chicago Region, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, Special Agent-in-Charge Cheyvoryea Gibson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detroit Division, Charles Miller, Special Agent-in-Charge, Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigations, Douglas Zloto, Special Agent-in-Charge, U.S. Secret Service, Sean McStravick, Acting Inspector-in-Charge, U.S. Postal Service, Office of Inspector General, and Director Jason Palmer, State of Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency.

    Terrance Calhoun, Jr., 36, of Pontiac, Michigan, pleaded guilty to committing aggravated identity theft, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and to possessing 15 or more unauthorized access devices, all in relation to acts of unemployment insurance fraud.

    According to his plea agreement, Calhoun Jr., and others, used stolen personal identification and filed hundreds of false unemployment claims with state unemployment insurance agencies in Michigan, Arizona, and Maryland over a six-month period in the names of other individuals without their knowledge or consent. Those false claims resulted in hundreds of debit cards loaded with over $4 million in unemployment insurance funds being mailed to addresses controlled by Calhoun Jr. and his co-conspirators. Roughly $1.6 million dollars in purchases and cash withdrawals were then successfully made from the cards.

    As described within a prior complaint, when agents executed search warrants at the principal mailing addresses used for the fraudulent unemployment insurance benefit claims, including the residence of Calhoun Jr., agents seized numerous documents containing the personal identification information of other individuals, multiple debit cards in the names of numerous other individuals, and firearms.

    Calhoun now faces a possible sentence of up to 20-years’ imprisonment for each of the wire fraud counts to which he has pleaded guilty, a possible sentence of up to 10-years’ imprisonment for possessing 15 or more unauthorized access devices, and a mandatorily consecutive 2-year sentence for the aggravated identity theft charge to which he has pleaded guilty.

    Sentencing is set for August 27, 2025 before United States District Court Judge Judith E. Levy.

    “Taxpayer money diverted into the pockets of criminals means less money going to Michiganders who actually need help getting through difficult financial times and who follow the rules when seeking assistance,” said Acting US Attorney Beck.  “These charges reflect our office’s ongoing commitment to the community by investigating such schemes and bringing those who commit these crimes to justice.”

    “Terrance Calhoun Jr and his co-conspirators engaged in a scheme to defraud state workforce agencies in Michigan, Arizona, and Maryland by filing hundreds of fraudulent unemployment insurance (UI) claims.  As a result, Calhoun enriched himself by stealing taxpayer resources intended for unemployed American workers.  We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to protect the integrity of the UI program from those who seek to exploit it,” said Megan Howell, Acting Special Agent-in-Charge, Great Lakes Region, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General.

    “Individuals who commit identity theft and unemployment insurance fraud of this magnitude deserve to be punished to the fullest extent of the law,” said Charles Miller, Special Agent in Charge, Detroit Field Office, IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI).  “Terrance Calhoun, Jr. and Jermaine Arnett demonstrated a blatant disregard of the integrity of the multiple states’ unemployment insurance systems and caused immeasurable hardship to innocent victims. IRS-CI remains committed to the pursuit of identity theft and financial fraud, and together with our partners at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, we will hold those who engage in similar crimes accountable.”

    “The FBI in Michigan, alongside our law enforcement partners, remains steadfast in protecting the community and investigating individuals who violate federal law,” said Cheyvoryea Gibson, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Detroit Field Office. “Today’s guilty plea by Terrance Calhoun, whose involvement in a multi-state fraud scheme, is a clear reminder that bad actors will be stopped, and we will ensure integrity will prevail.”

    The case was jointly investigated by agents from the Department of Labor Office of the Inspector General, the Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigations Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States Secret Service, the United States Postal Service Office of the Inspector General, and the State of Michigan -Unemployment Insurance Agency. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Carl D. Gilmer-Hill and Jessica A. Nathan.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Turns 45 – Dallas Division Reflects on Past Success, Continues Vigilance

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    DALLAS – This week, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) R. Joseph Rothrock is joining FBI offices around the country in marking the 45th anniversary of the FBI’s first Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Formed in New York in 1980, the first JTTF became a model for law enforcement cooperation across the nation.

    JTTFs can be found at each of the FBI’s 55 field offices and many resident agencies—around 280 locations in all. The Dallas Field Office organized the North Texas JTTF in 1995 and it is comprised of dozens of investigative personnel from more than 20 agencies across the Division’s territory.

    JTTFs gather trained investigators, intelligence analysts, linguists, and tactical experts from federal, state, local, territorial, tribal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Task force members share intelligence and investigative leads and respond to threats and incidents.

    “We know from each potential crisis or thwarted attack that we cannot do this job alone,” said SAC Rothrock. “Each member of the North Texas JTTF brings unique skills and specialized resources from their agency to enhance our collective investigative capabilities. We are proud to work side-by-side with our partners in the fight against terrorism, and will continue to vigorously defend the Dallas Division’s territory.”

    The FBI’s JTTF model dates to 1979, when the New York Police Department and the FBI’s New York Field Office created a joint task force to tackle violent bank robberies. They imitated the model in 1980, when terrorist bombings, bomb threats, and other violence plagued the city, and announced the formation of the first JTTF in April 1980.

    “The JTTF has proven to be a world class model of what can be accomplished when law enforcement resources from federal, state, and local agencies converge to combat terrorism and disrupt the plans of evil actors throughout the United States,” said Eastern District of Texas Acting U.S. Attorney Abe McGlothin, Jr. “The JTTF has been called upon to investigate some of the most horrific acts of violence imaginable and we should all be thankful for the work the JTTF does daily to keep communities across the United States safe.”

    After the 9/11 attacks, FBI leadership directed all FBI field offices to establish a JTTF. In addition, the FBI established its National Joint Terrorism Task Force to support the local task forces in June of 2002. The NJTTF, at FBI Headquarters, enhances communication, coordination, and cooperation from partner agencies.

    “This Office depends on the critical work of the JTTF in keeping Americans safe,” said Acting U. S. Attorney Chad E. Meacham. “We applaud the JTTF’s decades of significant efforts in partnership with the USAO-NDTX.”

    Nationally, JTTFs have disrupted dozens of plots in the past four decades. Notable investigations in Dallas’ territory include:

    •    Hosam Maher Husein Smadi: Sentenced to 24 years in prison for his attempted bombing of a downtown Dallas skyscraper in September 2009. According to documents filed, Smadi knowingly took possession of a truck that contained a weapon of mass destruction, and while the bomb was inert when Smadi took possession of it, it was a readily-convertible weapon of mass destruction.

    •    Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari: Sentenced to life in prison for the attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his 2011 purchase of chemicals and equipment necessary to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and his research of potential U.S. targets, including persons and infrastructure.

    •    Omer Kuzu: Pleaded guilty in 2020 to conspiring to provide material support to terrorism. In March 2019, Kuzu was captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces, alongside 1,500 suspected ISIS fighters.  He was handed over to FBI custody, returned to American soil, and charged with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS.  

    Report suspicious activity to 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324). You can also submit a tip online at tips.fbi.gov tips.fbi.gov.
     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Over 500 Justice and Behavioral Health Professionals Attend 2025 Criminal Justice Conference Emphasizing Collaboration and Resiliency

    Source: US State of Pennsylvania

    April 23, 2025State College, PA

    Over 500 Justice and Behavioral Health Professionals Attend 2025 Criminal Justice Conference Emphasizing Collaboration and Resiliency

    The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) kicked off the 2025 Criminal Justice Advisory Board (CJAB) Conference in State College. The two-day event brought together over 530 criminal justice and behavioral health professionals from across the Commonwealth, the largest gathering since the conference’s inception in 2007. Throughout the conference, participants engaged in discussions on new and reemerging issues impacting the criminal justice and behavioral health systems and innovative solutions to address evolving trends.

    Under the Shapiro-Davis Administration, the Commonwealth has achieved notable improvements in public safety. According to data released by CeaseFirePA, Pennsylvania has seen a 42% decrease in total victims of gun violence statewide, and a 38% drop in gun deaths by firearm since 2022. These outcomes reflect the impact of intentional, cross-system collaboration among law enforcement, behavioral health and criminal justice professionals, community-based organizations, courts, and policymakers.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Randolph County Man Sentenced for Methamphetamine Trafficking

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CLARKSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA – William Durnal, 60, of Elkins, West Virginia, was sentenced today to 100 months in federal prison for methamphetamine possession and distribution.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, Durnal was part of a drug trafficking organization that was distributing large amounts of methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine in Morgantown, West Virginia. A search of his home recovered hundreds of grams of methamphetamine. Durnal has a criminal history that includes theft, forgery, burglary, battery, and passing counterfeit money.

    Durnal will serve three years of supervised release following his prison sentence.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Zelda Wesley and Stephen Warner prosecuted the case on behalf of the government.

    Investigative agencies include the Mon Metro Drug Task Force and the Mountain Region Task Force, both HIDTA-funded initiatives.

    This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

    Chief U.S. District Judge Thomas S. Kleeh presided.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Convicted Sex Offender Indicted for Distributing Child Sexual Abuse Material

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    MINNEAPOLIS – Nicholas Lugo of Chaska, Minnesota, has been charged with distribution of child sexual abuse material (CSAM), announced Acting U.S. Attorney Lisa D. Kirkpatrick.

    According to court documents, on July 3, 2024, Nicholas Richard Lugo, 25, distributed multiple CSAM videos over the internet. Lugo has a 2021 conviction in Hennepin County for first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a minor.

    “Lugo is a child predator. He was convicted of sexually abusing a child.  And then—like so many sexual predators—went on to offend again,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Lisa D. Kirkpatrick.  “Minnesotans should have no tolerance for serial child sex offenders in our midst. The U.S. Attorney’s Office certainly doesn’t.  Defendants like Lugo who repeatedly prey on children should expect to see federal charges and do federal prison time.”

    Lugo is charged with one count of distribution child pornography.  At his arraignment hearing, Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster ordered that he remain in custody pending further court proceedings.

    This case is the result of an investigation by the Chaska Police Department, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, and the FBI. It was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit Justice.gov/PSC.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Evan B. Gilead is prosecuting the case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation, and the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Jury convicts illegal alien for unlawfully being in United States

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    HOUSTON – A Guatemalan national has been found guilty of illegally reentering the country without authorization, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei.

    The jury deliberated for less than one hour before finding Leonardo Fernando Batz guilty as charged following a three-day trial.

    On Nov. 23, 2023, authorities found Batz in Harris County. At that time, the investigation revealed he was not a citizen of the United States and had a previous removal order from an immigration judge.

    Testimony revealed Batz had been previously removed in 2007 and in 2020.

    The jury heard from a Border Patrol agent who described his encounter with Batz in the Rio Grande Valley in September 2019. Batz had illegally entered the United States by raft on the Rio Grande River and subsequently pleaded guilty.

    A deportation officer also described how he rode with Batz when he was removed via plane from the United States to Guatemala in 2020.

    The jury saw evidence including Batz’s Guatemalan passport, a travel pass the Guatemalan consulate had issued and various other documents from Batz’s alien file. A fingerprint expert also identified Batz as the same person documented in various deportation materials.  

    The defense attempted to question the trustworthiness of the government’s evidence. The jury did not believe those claims and found Batz guilty as charged. 

    U.S. District Judge Kenneth Hoyt presided over trial and set sentencing for May 1, 2025. At that time, Batz faces up to two years in federal prison and a possible $250,000 maximum fine.

    He will remain in custody pending that hearing. 

    Immigration Customs Enforcement – Homeland Security Investigations conducted the investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Lauren Valenti and Carrie Law prosecuted the case.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: April Federal Grand Jury 2024-B Indictments Announced

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    United States Attorney Clint Johnson today announced the results of the April Federal Grand Jury 2024-B Indictments.

    The following individuals have been charged with violations of United States law in indictments returned by the Grand Jury. The return of an indictment is a method of informing a defendant of alleged violations of federal law, which must be proven in a court of law beyond a reasonable doubt to overcome a defendant’s presumption of innocence.

    Jose Alvizo-Ramirez. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien; Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. Alvizo-Ramirez, 38, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in May 2022. He is further charged with knowingly failing to register as a sex offender from January 6, 2025, to on or about March 26, 2025. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney William Dill is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-143

    Richard Glenn Bexfield. Drug Conspiracy; Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition; Destruction and Removal of Property to Prevent Seizure; Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. Bexfield, 32, of Tulsa, is charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine from Jan. 2025 through Apr. 2025. He knowingly destroyed and disposed of property in an effort to prevent law enforcement from seizing the property. Further, Bexfield is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of felonies and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Drug Enforcement Administration Tulsa Resident Office, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Attila Bogdan is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-136

    Cesar Castorena-Dondiego. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien. Castorena-Dondiego, 44, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in Sep. 2018. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tara Heign is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-145

    Clint Allen Hubble. Attempted Coercion and Enticement of a Minor. Hubble, 46, of Afton, is charged with attempting to persuade and entice a minor child to engage in sexually explicit activity. The Homeland Security Investigations and the Owasso Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Kate Brandon is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-146

    Wilber Martinez-Bonilla. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien. Martinez-Bonilla, 39, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in May 2014. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney Augustus Forster is prosecuting the case. 
    25-CR-147

    Paul Eugene McClain. Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition. McClain, 56, of Tulsa, is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of several felonies. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Ihler is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-148

    Aaron Wilkie Murphy; Hong Thoa Thi Nguyen; Joshua Clay Murphy; Toymeka Louise Shackleford. Continuing Criminal Enterprise (Count 1); Drug Conspiracy (Count 2); Possession of Fentanyl with Intent to Distribute (Count 3); Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute (Count 4); Maintaining a Drug-Involved Premises (Counts 5 & 6); International Travel to Promote, Manage, Establish, Carry On, and Facilitate Drug Conspiracy (Count 7) (superseding). Aaron Murphy, 51, of Broken Arrow, is charged with organizing, leading, and profiting from the distribution of methamphetamine and fentanyl. He knowingly conspired with several others to possess and distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, while maintaining a residence for the purpose of drug distribution, and traveled to Mexico to manage and further promote his enterprise drug conspiracy. Nguyen, 45, of Tulsa, Joshua Murphy, 47, of Milfay, Shackleford, 49, of Tulsa, are charged with conspiring to possess and distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl from Mar. 2022 through Feb. 2025. Nguyen is additionally charged with maintaining a residence for the purpose of narcotics distribution. The Drug Enforcement Administration Tulsa Resident Office, the U.S. Marshal Service Tulsa Field Office, and the Tulsa Police Department are investigating the case. The DEA Mexico City Country Office, along with the Hermosillo Mexico Resident Office, the U.S. Marshal Service Mexico City Field Office, Mexican Marines, and the Mexico Federal Police, assisted in the arrest and return of Aaron Murphy and Nguyen. Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam Bailey is prosecuting the case. 23-CR-199

    Roberto Perez-Cruz. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien. Perez-Cruz, 21, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in Oct. 2021. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tyson McCoy is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-149

    Carlos Alberto Vazquez Parra. Possession of Fentanyl with Intent to Distribute. Vazquez Parra, 33, of Tulsa, is charged with knowingly possessing more than 40 grams of fentanyl with intent to distribute. The Drug Enforcement Administration Tulsa Resident Office and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tyson McCoy is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-150

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy, Grassley, Colleagues Reintroduce Legislation to Combat Organized Retail Theft

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy
    WASHINGTON — U.S. Senators Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), and colleagues reintroduced the Combating Organized Retail Crime Act to crack down on flash mob robberies and intricate retail theft schemes, establish a coordinated multi-agency response, and create new tools to tackle evolving trends in organized retail theft.
    “If we can do anything to help law enforcement, we should,” said Dr. Cassidy. “Organized crime always looks to expand its territory. Let’s fight back.”
    The Combating Organized Retail Crime Actwould:
    Establish an Organized Retail and Supply Chain Crime Coordination Center within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that combines expertise from state and local law enforcement agencies and retail industry representatives.
    Create new tools to assist in federal investigation and prosecution of organized retail crime and help recapture lost goods and proceeds.
    Cassidy and Grassley were joined by U.S. Senators Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), James Risch (R-ID), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Ted Budd (R-NC), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Bill Hagerty (R-TN), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Steve Daines (R-MT), Katie Britt (R-AL), and Ted Cruz (R-TX) in introducing the legislation.
    Background
    According to the National Retail Federation (NRF), more than 84 percent of retailers report that violence and aggression from criminal activities has become more of a concern since 2022, resulting in injuries and deaths among employees, customers, security officers, and law enforcement personnel. NRF also estimates that larceny incidents increased by 93 percent in 2023 compared to 2019. In recent years, criminal organizations have increasingly turned to retail crime to generate illicit profits, using internet-based tools to organize flash mobs, sell stolen goods, and move money.  
    The Combating Organized Retail Crime Actis supported by the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, the Major County Sheriffs of America, the National Retail Federation, the Retail Industry Leaders Association, the Reusable Packaging Association, the Association of American Railroads, the American Trucking Association, UPS, DHL, the U.S. Dairy Export Council, the National Milk Producers Foundation, the Intermodal Association of North America, the Transportation Intermediaries Association, the PASS (Protect America’s Small Sellers) Coalition, the International Downtown Association, Amazon, the World Shipping Council, Pirate Ship, the National Shooting Sports Foundation, Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC), National District Attorneys Association (NDAA), World Shipping Council, and the Home Depot.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Newsom’s investment to prevent and prosecute organized retail crime yields 14,133 prosecution case referrals

    Source: US State of California 2

    Apr 23, 2025

    What you need to know: 14,133 cases have been referred to district attorneys’ offices through a community grant investment proposed by Governor Gavin Newsom to root out organized retail crime and hold bad actors accountable.

    Sacramento, CaliforniaMarking a significant accomplishment of the law enforcement community in battling organized retail theft, Governor Gavin Newsom today announced 14,133 referrals for prosecution in the first year of the state’s organized retail theft and vertical prosecution grants. 

    Proposed by Governor Newsom and distributed by the Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) from October 2023 to December 2024, this grant funding of $267 million to 55 communities has enabled cities and counties to hire more police and secure more felony charges against suspects.

    As we continue investing in public safety, we keep seeing strong, positive results – more officers, more crime deterrents and more case prosecutions. Our commitment to our neighborhoods is paying off.

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    According to program participants, of the 14,133 case referrals for prosecution, 10,932 were for organized retail theft, 3,161 were for motor vehicle theft and 40 were for cargo theft. Of the 1,150 people convicted of theft-related property crimes, a total of 373 of those related to organized retail theft. Of those organized retail theft convictions, 88% were felonies.

    The funding is split between two grant programs with unique applicants for each. The prevention program grantees compile arrest and referral data, while prosecution grant participants record charges, convictions and sentencing. Future reporting may include updates on charges, convictions and sentencing as they move through the criminal justice legal system. 

    “The ORT grants are enabling our law enforcement partners to transform their approach in combating organized retail theft,” said BSCC Board Chair Linda Penner. “The impact is broad and successful.”

    Dedicated prevention and prosecution programs

    The organized retail theft grant program is made up of two separate, competitive three-year grants: prevention and vertical prosecution. The prevention grant provided 38 law enforcement agencies with over $242 million in funding for purchasing new equipment, launching enhanced enforcement operations, hiring new staff, and establishing partnerships with the retail community. 

    “The ORT Grant has led to phenomenal results in Fresno.  We have been able to build relationships and trust with our retailers, and work closely with our partner law enforcement agencies – we are now sharing intelligence across the entire Central Valley,” said Fresno Police Department Deputy Chief Michael Landon. “When you are able to give talented people the resources they need to get the job done, it’s a real game-changer in solving crime.”

    Notable highlights include: 

    • Recovery of $1.2 million of stolen property and $400,000 seized by the Fresno Police Department. The Department also credits the grant funding with lowering their auto theft rate by 38%. License plate reader equipment purchased through grant funding assisted police in locating a suspect in a carjacking incident that included the safe recovery of a three-year old child sitting in the vehicle when it was stolen.
    • San Francisco Police Department arrested eight individuals suspected of participating in 23 organized retail theft incidents, responsible for the theft of $84,000 of stolen goods from various Walgreens locations.
    • San Ramon Police Department conducted targeted investigations that led to warrants for two individuals responsible for over $42,000 in thefts from ULTA Beauty and Sephora stores, as well as three people connected to over $100,000 in losses at multiple ULTA locations.

    The vertical prosecution grant funded an effective prosecution model that allows a prosecutor to focus on a case from beginning to end, providing victims and law enforcement a single point of contact. Over $24 million was provided to 13 district attorneys’ offices.

    “The Vertical Prosecution Grant has been a catalyst for enhancing communication and empowering our community, from retailers to law enforcement,” said Sonoma County Chief Deputy District Attorney Scott Jamar. “It has allowed us to concentrate our efforts using technologically assisted analytics to identify suspects, often in real-time, and build prosecutable cases.  This is smart law enforcement.”

    Notable highlights include: 

    • Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office identified multiple organized retail theft suspects as a direct result of working with retailers and the Santa Rosa Police Department through grant-funded technology, resulting in the arrests of two suspects for jewelry theft and recovering $16,000 worth of jewelry in less than 96 hours.  The county now has monthly “blitz” operations.
    • Yolo County District Attorney’s Office launched a new innovative Direct-to-DA retailer reporting program designed to dramatically expedite the investigation and prosecution of retail crimes. The “FastPass to Prosecution” program was launched in the Fall of 2023 and led to successful prosecution of organized retail theft crimes. 
    • Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office developed a successful public education strategy, along with a single point of contact for retailers and law enforcement agencies with bi-monthly meetings. The stronger partnership has led to an increase in the number of arrests for theft, with some retailers reporting 90% reductions in losses, in addition to improved employee morale.

    In addition to the first-year report, the BSCC also launched online dashboards displaying data for both grant programs

    New data suggests violent and property crime went down in 2024. According to an analysis of Real Time Crime Index data by the Public Policy Institute of California, property crime dropped by 8.5% and violent crime dropped by 4.6% in 2024, compared to 2023. Burglary and larceny also went down by 13.6% and 18.6%, respectively, compared to pre-pandemic levels. 

    Cracking down on retail theft 

    The BSCC recently released $127 million to continue funding mental health services, substance-use disorder treatment and diversion programs in local communities. Potential applicants for this funding include drug and mental health treatment programs eligible under both Proposition 47 and Proposition 36.  Although Proposition 36 did not include a funding mechanism to support its related programs, the BSCC has discretion to use funding from Proposition 47 for this purpose.

    Citing ongoing progress to takedown organized retail crime statewide, Governor Newsom recently announced the state’s Organized Retail Crime Task Force has been involved in over 3,700 investigations, leading to the arrest of approximately 4,200 suspects and the recovery of over 1.3 million stolen goods valued at more than $56 million.

    Last August, Governor Newsom signed into law the most significant bipartisan legislation to crack down on property crime in modern California history. Building on the state’s robust laws and record public safety funding, these bipartisan bills offer new tools to bolster ongoing efforts to hold criminals accountable for smash-and-grab robberies, property crime, retail theft, and auto burglaries. While California’s crime rate remains at near historic lows, these laws help California adapt to evolving criminal tactics to ensure perpetrators are effectively held accountable.

    California law provides existing robust tools for law enforcement and prosecutors to arrest and charge suspects involved in organized retail crime — including up to three years of jail time for organized retail theft. The state has the 10th toughest threshold nationally for prosecutors to charge suspects with a felony, $950. 40 other states — including Texas ($2,500), Alabama ($1,500), and Mississippi ($1,000) — require higher dollar amounts for suspects to be charged with a felony.

    Saturating key areas 

    Working collaboratively to heighten public safety, the Governor tasked the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to work with local law enforcement areas in key areas to saturate high-crime areas, aiming to reduce roadway violence and criminal activity in the area, specifically vehicle theft and organized retail crime. Since the inception of this regional initiative, there have been nearly 6,000 arrests, about 4,500 stolen vehicles recovered, and nearly 300 firearms confiscated across Bakersfield, San Bernardino and Oakland.

    Stronger enforcement. Serious penalties. Real consequences.

    California has invested $1.1 billion since 2019 to fight crime, help local governments hire more police, and improve public safety. In 2023, as part of California’s Public Safety Plan, the Governor announced the largest-ever investment to combat organized retail crime in state history, an annual 310% increase in proactive operations targeting organized retail crime, and special operations across the state to fight crime and improve public safety.

    Recent news

    News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:Claire Cullis, of Carmichael, has been appointed Deputy Secretary of Business and Consumer Relations at the California Business, Consumer Services, and Housing Agency. Cullis has been…

    News What you need to know: The Governor and First Partner marked Earth Day at Chico State University with students from the Center for Regenerative Agriculture and Resilient Systems. CHICO –  Governor Gavin Newsom and First Partner Jennifer Siebel Newsom celebrated…

    News What you need to know: Classes resumed in person at Palisades Charter High School today at a new temporary site in Santa Monica. All eight public schools that were damaged in the fires are now back to learning in person. LOS ANGELES – Today, Governor Gavin Newsom…

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: SCHUMER, GILLIBRAND DEMAND ANSWERS ON BRUTAL IMPACTS OF DOGE’S SOCIAL SECURITY CUTS ON NEW YORKERS; SENATORS CALL ON INDEPENDENT IG TO IMMEDIATELY REPORT SHORTFALLS, CONSEQUENCES, AND RAMIFICATIONS…

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Charles E Schumer
    In The Wake of Waves Of Aggressive Trump-DOGE Attacks on Social Security, Services Are Breaking Down Across Country For Those Rely On Monthly Checks To Live – With Websites Crashing, Hours-Long Wait Times, ‘DOGE’ Firing 7,000+ SSA Workers And Plans To Close Regional Office, Senators Say This Assault Would Create Disaster
    Schumer, Gillibrand: ‘DOGE’ Cabal Needs To Get Their Hands Off NY Seniors’ & Families’ Social Security Checks
    Today, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer and U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand lead Senate Democrats in a letter to the Acting Inspector General of Social Security, Michelle Anderson, calling for a complete and thorough report into how the recent damaging DOGE cuts to the Social Security Administration – including executing mass layoffs, pressuring staff to retire, and closing regional offices – will, and have, adversely affected New Yorkers and others across America who rely on Social Security.
    “Trump and ‘DOGE’ needs to get their hands off New Yorkers’ Social Security checks and stop systematically attacking and undermining the agency that runs this most vital program. Experts and Social Security workers have been screaming from the rooftops if ‘DOGE’ continues to cut Social Security operations to the bone, the system soon won’t be able to function. ‘DOGE’ has yet to produce one shred of credible evidence on how slashing the workforce and closing offices is going to do anything but delay seniors and the disabled getting their benefits. That is why we are demanding answers and a complete and thorough independent report on the impacts of the Trump-‘DOGE’ undermining of Social Security,” said Senator Schumer. “Right now, Trump and Musk, two billionaires, are trying to take a chainsaw to your Social Security benefits by closing offices, firing staff, and adding burdensome bureaucratic rules for seniors, people with disabilities and their families. It’s outrageous. These billionaires may not understand how a senior citizen depends on Social Security payments to buy food and pay rent, or what would happen if a check was late one month, but New Yorkers do. Social Security is not a ‘ponzi scheme’ or ‘government waste’; it is a program millions of Americans spent a lifetime paying into so they can have a secure retirement. It is lifeline for hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers.”
    “Social Security is a critical lifeline that helps seniors in New York and across the country pay rent, buy food, and retire with dignity,” said Senator Gillibrand. “By firing staff and closing SSA offices, the Trump administration is trying to steamroll Social Security, depriving Americans of the benefits they’ve paid into their entire lives. Millions of New Yorkers will be harmed if President Trump gets his way, and I will fight to ensure Social Security benefits remain secure and accessible.”
    The senators said that the so-called “Department of Government Efficiency” – helmed by unelected billionaire Elon Musk – has claimed to get rid of the fraud and abuse in the federal government. But, instead of producing credible instances of either, DOGE has taken a chainsaw to essential programs, such as Social Security, and reports from across America have linked these reduced staff, closed regional offices, and skyrocketed phone wait times.
    A Social Security worker from Upstate NY recently testified before Congress on the impact people are already seeing in their local offices. The NYT reported staff cuts, hurting the SSA that was already at were already at 50-year lows,  and rushed changes have already created backlogs and major issues for the workforce. Simultaneously, the Washington Post and many other outlet have detailed how repeated website crashes and hours long wait times on the phone have caused the system to start to break down. ‘DOGE’ has also reportedly pushed to defy court orders and access American’s private Social Security data.
    Elon Musk has targeted Social Security, calling it a “ponzi scheme” and saying that Social Security is “the big one to eliminate”. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik said his mother wouldn’t call and complain if she didn’t receive her Social Security benefits. Schumer said rather than making the government more efficient, these cuts will reduce government efficiency by making it more difficult for Social Security beneficiaries to receive their hard-earned benefits. Former Social Security Administrator Martin O’Malley said these cuts will crush our seniors and most vulnerable, and the system could collapse within a month, interrupting benefits.
    The senators said it is clear – this delay in benefits is a cut by another name. It is vital that the Social Security Inspector General is aware of how these cruel and disastrous decisions by DOGE affect the timeliness in which seniors receive their benefits or in which the Social Security Administration is able to attend to customer service complaints, or process and hear decisions.
    The letter can be found here and below:
    Acting Inspector General Anderson:
    We are writing to express deep concern regarding recent developments at the Social Security Administration (SSA) that will drastically disrupt—if not reduce—Americans’ earned benefits. In just the last month, SSA has rapidly shuttered offices, slashed thousands of its employees, and abruptly changed (and then reversed) long-standing customer service practices, with little transparency or consideration on its impact to its customers. In the past two months, SSA has dramatically restructured the agency and slashed its workforce, including:
    Announcing plans to dramatically reduce staff by at least 7,000, from 57,000 employees to 50,000, with additional layoffs reportedly under consideration;
    Executing mass layoffs to “non-mission critical” positions in retirement and policy, research, customer service, human resources, IT support, and civil rights;
    Pressuring employees to resign, retire, or reassign to a front-line position;
    Eliminating over half of the agency’s regional offices, which provide technical assistance to field offices and liaise with state and local community organizations who support individuals file for Social Security benefits;
    Reducing staff in the agency’s congressional and casework liaison office to three employees; and
    Dissolving other offices essential in proper administration of the Social Security programs.
    These actions have already created a chilling effect among the agency’s workforce, with several senior SSA officials with centuries’ worth of institutional knowledge and experience having already left the agency. We are concerned that this hostile environment will foster burnout, low morale, higher attrition, and worse productivity among employees. Collectively, this will undoubtedly lead to disruption in benefit payments and increasing barriers for Americans to access their Social Security benefits.
    We request SSA OIG review the agency’s actions to drastically reorganize its organizational structure, close numerous offices, and significantly reduce its workforce to determine whether it has affected the agency’s ability to provide quality customer service. Specifically, we ask the office to review:
    Whether SSA conducted any qualitative or quantitative analyses to evaluate the impact of these changes on SSA’s ability to administer the programs and on SSA’s beneficiaries since January 20, 2025, which may include Service Delivery Assessments (SDAs) or Service Area Reviews (SARs);
    Whether reducing regional offices from ten to four and reducing regional office staff contributed to improved customer service;
    Whether incentivizing field office employees to retire or resign improved customer service in the field offices;
    Whether incentivizing hearing office employees to retire or resign improved the agency’s ability to timely process disability appeals hearings;
    Whether incentivizing appeals council employees to retire or resign improved the agency’s ability to timely process appeals council decisions;
    Whether incentivizing staff in Social Security Card Centers to retire or resign improved customer service in Social Security Card Centers;
    Whether incentivizing teleservice center employees to retire or resign improved the agency’s ability to provide timely assistance to beneficiaries using the 1-800 service; and
    Whether incentivizing staff in program centers to retire or resign improved the agency’s ability to timely process clearances.
    We further ask that your office provide us quarterly updates of the impact of the agency reorganization and any future workforce reductions has had on customer service.
    Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Fight against arms trafficking, especially of assault rifles – E-000710/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The investigation into the incident in Brussels on 5 February 2025 is under the competence of Belgian authorities. The Commission has not received official confirmation on the firearms used, their illegal acquisition, or their origin.

    The Commission adopted an EU Action plan on firearms trafficking[1] in 2020 which outlines four key priorities, including enhancing international cooperation. The Plan includes specific actions for South-East Europe including the Western Balkans region, where the Commission works closely with partner countries.

    All these actions are embedded in the goals of a regional Roadmap which was agreed among Western Balkans countries. The Roadmap was supported and funded by the EU[2] with a view to enhancing cooperation, improving information sharing, and strengthening law enforcement capabilities to address this serious issue.

    At operational level, the Commission actively participates in different actions on firearms within the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats[3], a Member State-led platform that brings together Member States, EU agencies and institutions and is funded by the Commission. The multidisciplinary cooperation also targets the Western Balkans. This comprehensive approach demonstrates the Commission’s commitment to addressing the serious issue of firearms trafficking.

    In 2025, the Commission will propose common criminal law standards on illicit firearms trafficking, as well as a new EU Action Plan against firearms trafficking, which will focus on safeguarding the licit market, curtailing criminal activities, based on better intelligence and strengthening of international cooperation with a particular focus on Ukraine and the Western Balkans.

    • [1] COM(2020) 608 final.
    • [2] Council Decision (CFSP) 1788/2018.
    • [3] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fighting-crime-together_en
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Ensuring a level playing field for European businesses by tackling imports of counterfeit goods – E-000400/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission published a communication on e-commerce[1] highlighting the need for joint enforcement actions to combat counterfeiting, including in the next European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats cycle 2026-2029[2].

    The Commission adopted a recommendation to combat counterfeiting[3] and is working with the EU Intellectual Property (IP) Office Observatory[4] on monitoring its effects before assessing it by March 2027.

    The small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) fund offers the ‘IP scan’ enforcement service which provides general IP advice to EU-based SMEs on how to enforce their IP in case of infringements and how to avoid infringing the IP rights of others[5].

    2. A positive impact has been observed in the reduction of counterfeit listings, collaboration and information sharing with law enforcement authorities, and the development of proactive measures among the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signatories[6], who are currently considering a modernisation of the MoU with the aim of updating and adapting it to the changes in legislative framework (Digital Services Act, DSA[7]) and new counterfeiting practices.

    The Commission is conducting a study on the implementation and application of certain aspects of Directive 2004/48/EC[8] to provide evidence on potential new challenges and discrepancies in implementation. The Commission has launched a full evaluation of the functioning of Regulation (EU) No 608/2013[9] to assess if the measures in place are still fit for purpose.

    Additionally, the Commission is enforcing the DSA[10], together with national competent authorities and has launched several investigations against some of the very large online platforms to assess whether they may have breached the DSA obligations.

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/e-commerce-communication-comprehensive-eu-toolbox-safe-and-sustainable-e-commerce
    • [2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fighting-crime-together_en
    • [3] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-recommendation-measures-combat-counterfeiting-and-enhance-enforcement-intellectual_en
    • [4] https://www.euipo.europa.eu/en/observatory
    • [5] Further information available at https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/launch-2025-sme-fund-help-smes-protect-intellectual-property-2025-02-03_en
    • [6] https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/42701
    • [7] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065
    • [8] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0048R%2801%29
    • [9] Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/608/oj/eng
    • [10] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-enforcement
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Urgent need to fight the organised crime of smugglers – P-001576/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-001576/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Fredis Beleris (PPE)

    On 12 April 2025, a Greek patrol vessel was informed that irregular migrants were being disembarked from a Turkish fishing boat near Agios Fokas, in the south of the island of Lesvos. Upon approaching the boat, the patrol vessel was shot at by one of the four smugglers on board. We are once again witnessing the aggression of the trafficking networks in the Aegean Sea. New EU actions are based on data from the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU-SOCTA). It is therefore all the more evident that there is an urgent need, as reflected in the new European Internal Security Strategy, to strengthen the resources at the EU’s disposal to guard European borders and combat organised crime.

    In view of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Does it intend to further strengthen the relevant European agencies, especially Frontex and Europol, in the fight against organised crime of traffickers?
    • 2.Does it intend to increase funding for protection and deterrence instruments at the external borders in the revision of the current MFF and the new (post-2027) MFF?

    Submitted: 17.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2024 – A10-0044/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on Banking Union – annual report 2024

    (2024/2055(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023[1],

     having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

     having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

     having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

     having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

     having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)[2] and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)[3], and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)[4],

     having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive[5] and to the Capital Requirements Regulation[6],

     having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk[7],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action[8],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action[9],

     having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency[10],

     having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

     having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

     having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

     having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

     having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

     having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

     having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

     having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

     having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’[11],

     having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

     having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

     having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

     having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

     having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

     having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

     having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

    A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

    B.  whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

    C. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

    D.  whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

    E. whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

    F. whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

    G. whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

    H. whereas the EUR 356.1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988.9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

    I. whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

    J. whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

    K. whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

    L. whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

    M.  whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

    General considerations

    1. Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

    2. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

    3. Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

    4. Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

    5. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

    6. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

    7. Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

    8. Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

    9. Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

    10. Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations[14] could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

    11. Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

    12. Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

    13. Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

    14. Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

    15. Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

    16. Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

    17. Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

    Supervision

    18. Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

    19. Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

    20. Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15.81 %;

    21. Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2.30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159.39 %;

    22. Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

    23. Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

    24. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

    25. Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

    26. Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

    27. Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies[15]; notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

    28. Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

    29. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

    30. Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

    Resolution

    31. Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

    32. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

    33. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

    34. Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

    35. Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

    36. Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

    37. Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

    38. Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

    39. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

    40. Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

    41. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

    42. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

    Deposit insurance

    43. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

    44. Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

    45. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

    °

    ° °

    46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    While the Banking Union – annual reports 2022 and 2023 focused on the war in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, this report focuses more on the challenges for the EU and for the European Parliament, as mirrored in the new mandate of the Commission, namely the EU priorities to foster competitiveness, to strengthen the European single market and to boost economic growth.

    The Union is currently at a turning point, which will determine the economic future in the upcoming decades. The 2024 reports of Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi underline that the EU needs a major turnaround to be able to compete with the US or China. Against this background, the Banking Union is a major cornerstone of competitiveness. A strengthened Banking Union will enable the EU to generate the necessary capital to make the European economy fit for the future.

    EU banks play a key role in financing the required investments since bank loans are still the most important source of external financing for companies. However, EU banks suffer from a lower profitability compared to their US counterparts caused by too many regulatory hurdles and by an incomplete Banking Union. A robust and competitive banking sector is necessary to finalise the BU. In the last year, while co-legislators made much progress on crucial legislation for the Banking Union, the EU still has to monitor closely if the EU economy, EU citizens and EU banks benefit from those adopted proposals. This report provides realistic and achievable recommendations, which could help to strengthen further the Banking Union.

    However, not only EU businesses need better access to capital. EU citizens are currently struggling to afford housing or to finance investments in sustainable renovations. It is therefore crucial to boost the profitability of EU banks, since this would in turn allow them to provide private households with better and easier access to affordable loans.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council – A10-0052/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council

    (2024/2021(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council,

     having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0052/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget;

    C. whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

    D. whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

    E. whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council (the ‘Secretariat’), and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

    F. whereas, over the course of more than twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

    G. whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

    H. whereas, since the 2009 budget discharge, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

    I. whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

    J. whereas Article 15(3) TFEU requires the EU institutions to ensure in their Rules of Procedure that their proceedings are transparent, while in several of its inquiries and decisions Ombudsman has criticised the Council for its lack of transparency suggesting that the Council has failed fully to grasp the critical link between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

    K. whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21[7], De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

    1. Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4% of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,6 billion represents approximately 5,2% of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2. Welcomes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 examined a sample of 70 transactions under Administration, 10 more than were examined in 2022; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4. Notes that the Court, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023, made an observation on the duration of a building maintenance framework contract awarded by the Council; notes that the Court did not identify any quantifiable errors in the four payments examined concerning the Council;

    State of play of the discharge procedure

    5. Deeply regrets that, since 2009, and again for the financial year 2022, Parliament has had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget;

    6. Notes that, on 20 September 2024, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 90 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with detailed answers to all the questions;

    7. Regrets that, on 23 September 2024, the Secretariat informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing organised on 12 November 2024 as part of the discharge process and in which all other invited institutions participated;

    8. Reiterates Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

    9. Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

    10. Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of more than twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the European Council and Council; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure and implementation of the EU budget should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament to preserve the compliance of the principle of sound financial management;

    11. Stresses that the current situation implies that Parliament can only check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website due to the Council’s persistent lack of cooperation with Parliament; underlines that this lack of cooperation undermines Parliament’s ability to effectively fulfil its oversight role and to make an informed decision on granting discharge;

    12. Deplores that the Council, for more than a decade, has shown that it does not have any political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and has damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability it expects from other Union institutions;

    13. Reiterates that the Council’s continued refusal to engage in the discharge procedure is an unacceptable breach of democratic accountability. Calls for legal and procedural amendments to withhold budgetary appropriations to any Union institution that fails to comply with transparency obligations;

    14. Recalls that the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure and insists on the full application of article 14 (&) TEU;

    15. Calls on the Council to  resume negotiations with Parliament without undue delay and to actively engage with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible involving the Secretaries-General and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and  resolve the long-standing discharge impasse, while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency, credibility and proper democratic control of budget implementation; requests that Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

    16. Stresses that, while the current situation needs to be improved through better inter-institutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; stresses, however, that pending such a review, the current situation must be improved through enhanced inter-institutional cooperation; urges in this sense the Council to actively engage with the Parliament;

    17. Notes that despite the Council being unwilling to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, stresses some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report;

    18. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in the following sections primarily rely on aggregated information publicly available, which provides limited detail;

    Political priorities

    19. Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies without taking into account the views of the interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

    20. Notes the Council’s tradition of not questioning the appointments of individual Member States for most positions;

    21. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court of Auditors, in accordance with proposals made by each Member State, after consultation with Parliament; recalls that, on the basis of this prerequisite, Parliament delivers an opinion on the candidates; regrets that the Council has repeatedly disregarded Parliament’s recommendations in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court; recalls that although Parliament’s opinion is non-binding on the Council, candidates who received an unfavourable opinion withdrew their candidatures by accepting Parliament’s decision, thereby recognising the role of  Parliament as the democratic supervisory authority linked to the safeguarding of the Union budget; calls on the Council to recognise Parliament’s role by cooperating in the discharge procedure;

    22. Recalls that the judges and advocates-general of the Court of Justice of the European Union are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member states after consultation of a panel responsible for giving an opinion on prospective candidates’ suitability to perform the duties concerned;

    23. Calls on the rotating Council Presidencies to stop using corporate sponsorship to contribute to covering their expenses as this runs the risk of creating conflicts of interest, in line with the conclusions of the workshop held by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control on 27 June 2023; notes that, in her decision of 9 September 2024 on the strategic initiative on sponsorship of the presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Ombudsman encouraged the Council to take stock of how the non-binding rules adopted by the Council for the use of sponsorship by its presidency (the Guidance) have been implemented and to explore other possible measures that could help mitigate the risks associated with the use of sponsorship; reiterates its call on the Council to provide a budget for the Council Presidencies to ensure adequate and uniform standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the work in the Council in general;

    24. Expresses deep concern over the Hungarian government’s misuse of its role in the EU Presidency to pursue bilateral engagements that contradict the Union’s core values, such as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite Union sanctions and the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against the latter for war crimes; notes with alarm similar engagements with other authoritarian leaders, undermining the EU’s credibility; calls on the Council to firmly condemn such actions and to take all necessary measures to ensure that Member States holding the Presidency act in alignment with EU principles, safeguarding the Union’s integrity and values;

    Budgetary and financial management

    25. Regrets that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to get reliable information regarding its costs; stresses the importance of reliable data for objective control; calls on the compliance with the recommendation of the discharge authority;

    26. Notes that the Council’s budget was EUR 647 908 757 for 2023, representing an increase of 6 % compared to 2022, which is higher than the increase of 2,3 % between 2021 and 2022; notes that this increase is mainly related to the revision of salary update parameters due to inflation;

    27. Notes that the overall implementation rate of the Council’s budget in 2023 was 97,0 %; notes that almost EUR 20 million in appropriations were cancelled at the end of 2023, half of which originated from the staff expenditure budget line;

    28. Notes that, in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, the Council carried out 41 budgetary transfers in 2023 for a cumulated amount of EUR 6,5 million; notes further that three of those transfers required that the budgetary authority be informed in accordance with Article 29(2), for the purpose of reinforcing various budget lines including “Fitting-out and installation work”, “Water, gas, electricity and heating”, “Acquisition of equipment and software” and “Cost of renting, maintenance and repair of service cars”;

    29. Calls on the Council to publish an annual breakdown of travel and representation expenses of senior officials, including the President of the European Council, the High Representative, and the General Secretariat, in a user-friendly format accessible to the public;

    30. Notes that appropriations carried over from 2023 to 2024 totalled EUR 85,5 million covering mainly computer systems, cost of interpretation provided in 2023, for which invoices have not been yet agreed with the European Commission services at the time of the closure, buildings, information and communication, audio-visual and conference equipment, other staff expenditure: and transport;

    31. Expresses concern over insufficient control mechanisms regarding the Council’s use of consultancy services and external contractors; calls for full disclosure of all contracts exceeding EUR 50,000, detailing the scope, deliverables, and awarded entities, to prevent potential misuse of public funds;

    32. Notes that the average time for payments of invoices decreased from 18 to 13 days from 2022 to 2023, well below the maximum time-limit of 30 days, thus avoiding interest on late payments;

    33. Notes that mission expenses, comprising both mission expenses from the Secretariat and mission expenses of staff related to the European Council, increased by 25 % between 2022 and 2023, and that travel expenses of delegations incurred by Presidencies and national delegations increased by 36,6 % during the same period; calls on the Council to assess this significant increase in mission expenditure; in the absence of access to detailed information, encourages the Council to use these resources in the spirit of sound financial management;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    34. Notes that the Council laid down objectives for the performance of its budget in 2023, namely to ensure ongoing decision-making in the European Council and the Council; to ensure continuous support for the European Council and the Council through the effective and efficient use of financial resources, particularly in view of the persistent pressure of inflation and the resulting price increases due to contract indexation and to further proceed with the process of administrative digital modernisation with the objective of enhancing the quality of the Secretariat’s organisation and the appropriate use of resources;

    35. Notes that, in order to ensure the efficient use of its budget in 2023, the Secretariat continued to improve its financial management processes, notably based on the recommendations of a number of internal task forces; welcomes, in particular, the new performance tools, such as the inclusion of human resources and skills elements in the integrated management planning exercise, the full digitalisation of the financial workflows and the introduction of the electronic signature;

    36. Welcomes the greater use of data in decision-making, notably based on the monthly financial dashboard, showing key performance indicators across the Secretariat services and the Managers’ dashboard with key insights from HR data in order to facilitate daily management and decisions in the area of human resources;

    37. Notes that the Secretariat organised 4 429 meetings in 2023, which was relatively stable compared to 2022; notes further that the number of physical meetings increased by 11 % compared to 2022, while the number of meetings held by videoconference or in hybrid mode decreased substantially, by more than 60 %;

    38. Notes the Secretariat launched 17 open procurement procedures, 12 new negotiated procedures, as well as 21 inter-institutional procedures (any value) with the Council not in the lead; notes that, by the end of 2023, 41 contracts were signed, compared to 42 in 2022, and 47 Lots (any category) were being worked on; notes that contracts were awarded for a total amount of EUR 124,1 million in 2023, which corresponds to 19,15 % of the Council’s annual budget; notes, that out of the total contracted amount, 0,5 % was committed in low and middle value contracts, 58 % in specific contracts under framework contracts where Council is the sole contracting authority and 69,5 % in specific contracts awarded under inter-institutional framework contracts;

    39. Notes that the Council transmitted its annual report on internal audits carried out in 2023 to the discharge authority, in accordance with Article 118 of the financial regulation; notes that, at the end of 2023, 81 % of the recommendations issued during the years 2020-2022 had been implemented, 18 % were still open and for 1 %, risk had been accepted by management or the recommendations were no longer applicable; notes that four internal audits planned in the 2023 work programme were concluded during the year and two were still ongoing at the end of 2023; notes that the internal auditor issued high priority recommendations in three audits of the 2023 work programme related to transport services, IOLAN servers and core services and IOLAN endpoint systems;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    40. Notes that, out of 3 116 members of staff at the end of 2023, 79 % were permanent staff, 12,8% were temporary staff, 7,2% were contractual agents and 1% were seconded national experts; notes that the repartition of permanent and temporary staff between job categories remained stable with 1 474,25 administrators (AD), 1 159 assistants (AST) and 230 secretaries (AST-SC) in 2023,  compared to 1 519, 1 284 and 190 in 2022; notes that the occupation rate of the establishment plan was 97,4 % at the end of 2023;

    41. Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in this section primarily rely on aggregated information published on the Council’s website which provides limited detail;

    42. Notes the other initiatives taken by the Secretariat to become a more diverse and inclusive workplace; welcomes that the Council received the 2023 Ombudsman’s award for Good Administration in the category ‘Excellence in diversity and inclusion’ for its Positive Action Programme for Trainees with Disabilities which meant that 6 trainees with disabilities were hosted in the Secretariat in 2023;

    43. Regrets the lack of publicly available information concerning the gender and geographical distribution of staff in the Secretariat; calls on the Council to provide information to Parliament on gender balance, geographical distribution and disabilities of its members of staff and on the related internal policies; encourages the Council to promote geographical balance of its staff by offering a wider pool of candidates from underrepresented Member States;

    44. Welcomes the Secretariat’s efforts in 2023 to attract and retain a qualified and younger workforce through various initiatives such as the recruitment of eight junior policy administrators under the new Junior Policy Team programme, the revision of the internal mobility rules and the participation of 41 of the Secretariat’s members of staff in an Interinstitutional Job Shadowing Exercise; emphasizes that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 on Quality Traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in Europe to be paid; regrets the lack of information on the implementation of the Council’s Employer Branding Action Plan prepared in 2023;

    45. Notes that, in 2023, the 2020-2023 Psychosocial Risk Prevention plan was the subject of a review, the results of which have been taken into account in preparing a new Risk Prevention plan and updating the Psychosocial Intervention Plan as part of the Council’s initiatives to promote staff wellbeing, both individually and as teams or units; notes that several forms of support and courses were offered to members of staff and managers of the Secretariat, such as a dedicated management training session on psychological safety, Guidance for Managers on mental health, specific workshops on psychosocial risk prevention organised on demand and stress management workshops for the Spanish and Belgian Council Presidencies;

    46. Notes that the Secretariat completed the New Ways of Working (NWOW) pilot project, which was launched in 2018, and conducted an evaluation providing valuable insights especially in terms of change communication, user involvement and staff engagement in change processes; notes that the Council shared the results of the pilot project with other organisations conducting similar programmes; calls on the Council to also share the lessons learned with the discharge authority;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    47. Regrets that two key components of the ethical framework of the Council, the ‘Guide to Ethics and Conduct’ for Secretariat staff and the ‘Code of Conduct for the President of the European Council’, are available on the Council’s website without further guidance or date of publication; criticises that, despite several requests by Parliament, the code of conduct for the President of the European Council has not been brought in line with those of Parliament and the Commission, in particular in terms of post term-of-office activities; calls on forthwith rectification of foregoing deficiencies;

    48. Reiterates that ethical conduct contributes to sound financial management and increases public trust and that, as stressed by the Court in its Special Report No 13/2019, there is scope for improvement in the ethical frameworks of the Union institutions; recalls in particular the recommendation issued by the Court with regard to improving the Council’s ethical framework; expresses concern about the lack of a common Union ethical framework governing the work of the representatives of Member States in the Council as identified by the Court;

    49. Notes that, as part of the implementation of the Secretary-General’s Decision 23/2021 concerning psychological and sexual harassment at work, several actions were taken in 2023 such as the publication on the Secretariat’s intranet of the Guide to preventing harassment in the workplace, awareness-raising activities for newcomers regarding the zero tolerance approach of the Council and the organisation of compulsory trainings on anti-harassment and inappropriate behaviour for new managers and staff with management responsibilities;

    50. Notes that the Secretariat publishes an annual report with information regarding the occupational activities of former senior officials of the Secretariat after leaving the service in accordance with Article 16, third and fourth paragraphs, of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Union; notes that, according to the report concerning 2023, one former senior official declared their intention to engage in occupational activities less than 12 months after they left and was granted permission from the Appointing Authority to engage in one activity subject to a certain condition which was aimed at respecting the mitigation period of the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Staff Regulations;

    51. Urges the Council to establish stricter post-term employment rules for senior officials, including an extended cooling-off period and mandatory public disclosure of private-sector affiliations; calls on the Council to make the participation of Member States’ Permanent Representations in the EU Transparency Register mandatory;

    52. Regrets the fact that the participation of the Member States’ Permanent Representatives in the mandatory transparency register, set up by the interinstitutional agreement of 20 May 2021 between Parliament, the Council and the Commission, is completely voluntary as the application of the conditionality principle is left to the discretion of each Member State’s Permanent Representation; notes that only eight Member States and the Union institutions abide by the best practice of applying a mandatory broad-scope definition of lobbyist in their regulatory framework and insists that all Permanent Representations should take an active part in the mandatory transparency register before, during and after their Member State’s presidency of the Council; calls for stronger and harmonized ethics rules on conflicts of interest, revolving doors, and lobbying transparency; regrets that the Council does not fully use the mandatory transparency register or accept proposals to improve it; reiterates its call on the Council to refrain from engaging with unregistered lobbyists;

    53. Regrets that the Council does not fully utilise the mandatory transparency register beyond its current limitations, rejecting any recommendation for improvements; reiterates its call on the Council to refuse to meet with unregistered lobbyists;

    54. Urges the Council to mandate that all high-ranking officials, including Permanent Representatives and Heads of Delegation, publicly disclose their meetings with interest groups and lobbyists in a standardised transparency register, similar to the obligations imposed on Members of the European Parliament and the European Commission;

    55. Strongly regrets that the Council continues to systematically withhold or delay access to legislative documents and the decision-making process in the Council is still far from fully transparent, thereby hindering public scrutiny of its decision-making, negatively affecting citizens’ trust in the Union as a transparent entity and jeopardising the reputation of the Union as a whole; recalls and supports the recommendations of the European Ombudsman regarding the transparency of the Council legislative process in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE; urges the Council to take all the measures necessary to implement the recommendations of the Ombudsman and the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union without undue delay; recalls that the Court of Justice of the European Union, in its judgement in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, underlined that clearer legislative transparency is needed from the Council in order to ensure access to legislative documents, corresponding to the Council’s obligation in terms of public scrutiny and accountability of the co-legislators as the basis of any democratic legitimacy;

    56. Is concerned that, in 2023, the European Ombudsman once again called on the Council to make legislative documents available at a time that would allow the public to participate effectively in the discussions; notes that the European Ombudsman also called on the Council to continue its efforts with regard to informing the public adequately about the restrictive measures adopted against Russia, to the greatest extent possible; welcomes the strategic enquiry launched by the European Ombudsman in 2023 on how the institutions handle requests for public access to legislative documents, based in particular on six recent complaints to the Ombudsman concerning public access to Union legislative documents handled by the Council;

    57. Notes that the Access to Documents team reported that they received and replied to an unusually high number of requests for public access to documents in 2023, 3 732 initial requests for access to documents and 40 confirmatory applications, which required the analysis of 13 912 documents; notes that, among the initial requests for access, full access was granted to 10 908 documents (78,4 %) and partial access to 1 600 documents (11,5 %) while access was refused to 1 404 documents (10,1 %); notes that for the confirmatory applications, full access was granted to 53 documents and partial access to 45 documents, while access was refused to 48 documents; notes that initial requests were processed, on average, in 16 working days and confirmatory applications in 32 working days;

    58. Welcomes that, according to the publicly available annual reports, no cases of fraud or irregularity were brought to the attention of the responsible authorising officers by delegation during 2023, nor were such cases subject to the competence of the panel (Article 143 of the Financial Regulation) or OLAF;

    Digitalisation

    59. Notes that, in 2023, the Secretariat continued to pursue its goal of digital transformation, in line with its Digital Strategy priorities for 2022-2025; notes, that out of 113 digitalisation projects in the annual work plan, concerning, in particular, the areas of shared services, policy, legal  and IT, 37 % were completed at the end of the year while 8 % were cancelled or merged and 38% were still ongoing; notes that more diversified training courses were organised, including specific courses for the electronic signature of contracts and to promote FIORI, the new user experience of SAP;

    60. Urges the Council to accelerate the implementation of secure digital voting and document-sharing systems to enhance efficiency, accountability, and reduce unnecessary paper-based processes;

    61. Welcomes that, in 2023, 97 % of invoices were submitted electronically, the same as in 2022; acknowledges that, with between 30 and 40 % of purchase orders and contracts being signed electronically each month in 2023, significant progress was made towards the full digitalisation of the financial workflow, from launching procurement procedures to paying invoices electronically;

    62. Notes that, in 2023, the Council took steps in favour of greater digital accessibility, in particular through the publication of a Digital Accessibility Guide;

    Cybersecurity and data protection

    63. Notes that, in 2023, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) issued a Supervisory Opinion in accordance with Article 57(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 relating to the need to conduct a data protection impact assessment concerning the project of the Secretariat regarding the use of centralised human resource analytics and reporting services and the establishment a data warehouse; notes that the EDPS did not report any investigation or complaint concerning the Council in 2023;

    64. Expresses concern over the lack of robust safeguards against surveillance and data collection by third parties; calls for enhanced security measures, including mandatory data encryption and regular security audits of all digital communication systems used by the Council;

    65. Notes that, in order to improve the cybersecurity awareness and preparedness of its staff, the Secretariat designed and launched several new training courses related to information security, counterespionage, and cybersecurity in 2023; notes further that awareness-raising events about cybersecurity and information security were organised during Cybersecurity Month in October 2023;

    Buildings

    66. Notes that budget line 2011 for “Water, gas, electricity and heating” was reinforced by 33 % through a budgetary transfer in 2023; notes that the Secretariat continued to reduce its energy consumption, through methods such as reducing the building heating and replacing the boilers in the Justus Lipsius building;

    67. Notes that key building projects were executed in 2023, such as the renovation of some meeting rooms in the LEX and Justus Lipsius buildings, the continuous renovation of office corridors in the Justus Lipsius building, improvements of facilities and infrastructure for bikes in the Council’s premises and the modernisation of the Justus Lipsius reception desks;

    68. Regrets that the Council has still not implemented a simplified accreditation procedure to facilitate the access of the other Union institutions’ staff to Council’s premises; calls on the Council to implement this measure;

    Environment and sustainability

    69. Notes that, further to an external audit performed in 2023, the EcoManagement and Audit Scheme was maintained and that Energy Performance of Buildings certificates were renewed;

    70. Notes that, as part of the continuing priority efforts for sustainable mobility, facilities and infrastructures for bikes in the Secretariat premises were improved and tailored and videoconferencing facilities in the form of “meet anywhere rooms” were renovated or put in place; notes further that efforts to on-board staff and managers in the green transformation were deployed through training and awareness-raising actions;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    71. Stresses the need for Article 319 TFEU to be revised in order to explicitly stipulate that Parliament, besides granting discharge to the Commission, also grants discharge to other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in respect of the implementation of their sections of the budget or of their budgets; invites the Council to overcome the inter-institutional conflict and to resume talks with the European Parliament in order to reach a common agreement for a smooth resumption of the discharge procedure;

    Communication

    72. Notes that, in 2023, the overall budget for communication implemented in the course of the year, taking transfers into account, was EUR 11 871 300, i.e. 3,54 % higher than the 2022 budget;

    73. Notes that the Secretariat provides communication services to the President of the European Council, whose web presence was fundamentally revamped in 2022, the President of the Eurogroup, the rotating presidency, the High Representative-Vice President, Member States and the Secretariat; notes that 2023 saw a marked increase in collaboration between the Secretariat’s digital team and the presidencies, in particular, close editorial coordination led to increased synergies in terms of content reuse and better complementarity, which maximised the overall communication impact;

    74. Notes that, according to an online survey conducted in the last quarter of 2023, 67 % of users were satisfied with their overall experience with the Council’s website, which had over 23 million visits in 2023, a 1 % increase compared to 2022, and 57 900 subscribers, compared to 51 600 in 2022.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia – A10-0072/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia

    (2025/2022(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

     having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

     having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

     having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

     having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

     having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

     having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

     

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

     having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo[5], and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections[6],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3. Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6. Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8. Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9. Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10. Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11. Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13. Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14. Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15. Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16. Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18. Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19. Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20. Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21. Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22. Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 15 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24. Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25. Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26. Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    28.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    29. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    30. Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    31. Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act[7] and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[8]; encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    32. Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    33. Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    34. Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    35. Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    36. Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    37. Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    38. Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    39.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    40. Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    41. Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    42. Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    43. Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    44. Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    45. Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    46. Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    47. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    48. Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    49. Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    50. Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    51. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    52. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    53. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    54. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    55. Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    56. Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    57. Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    58. Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    59. Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    60. Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    61. Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    62. Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    63. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    64. Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    65. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    66. Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    67. Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    68. Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    69. Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    70. Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU[9], since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    °

    ° °

    71. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023 – A10-0049/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023

    (2024/2083(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the Commission report of 25 July 2024 entitled ‘35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – 2023’ (COM(2024)0318) (2023 PIF Report),

     having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 2023 annual report[1] and the Activity report of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF – 2023[2],

     having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2023 Annual Report published on 1 March 2024,

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (the Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law [4] (the Whistleblower Directive) and to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on its implementation and application (COM(2024)0269),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2023 entitled ‘2023 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2023)0800), and to the European Parliament resolution of 28 February2024 entitled ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[5],

     having regard to the Commission’s decision of 16 December 2024 not to lift the measure imposed in application of Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary,

     having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21[6] and C-157/21[7] and to Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, all of which refer to the Conditionality Regulation,

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[8] (the Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624[9], Regulation (EU) 2024/1620[10] and Directive (EU) 2024/1640[11], all of the European Parliament and of the Council, all adopted on 31 May 2024 and all concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, including through the establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law[12] (the PIF Directive),

     having regard to the Commission report of 16 September 2022 entitled ‘Second report on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law’ (COM(2022)0466),

     having regard to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on the implementation and application of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (COM(2024)0269),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[13] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

     having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against organised crime: Assessing the legislative framework’, published in December 2022[14],

     having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against corruption: assessing the legislative and policy framework’, published in January 2023[15],

     having regard to the study entitled ‘Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)’ and its extension, both published in December 2023[16],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012) and to the Commission proposal of 3 May 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2023)0234),

     having regard to the joint Europol-OLAF report of 6 June 2023 entitled ‘Assessing the Threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’,

     having regard to the European Ombudsman’s closing note of 12 September 2023 on the Strategic Initiative concerning the transparency and accountability of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in relation to Case SI/6/2021/PVV, opened on 24 February 2022,

     having regard to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report entitled ‘Our activities in 2023’, published on 9 October 2024,

     having regard to ECA Review 04/2023 of 6 July 2023 entitled ‘Digitalising the management of EU funds’,

     having regard to Special Eurobarometer 534 entitled ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’[17],

     having regard to ECA special report 06/2023 of 13 March 2023 entitled ‘Conflict of interest in EU cohesion and agricultural spending – Framework in place but gaps in transparency and detection measures’,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2022[19],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0049/2025),

    A. whereas, in line with the obligation laid down in Article 325(5) TFEU, each year, the Commission submits to the European Parliament and to the Council a report drafted in cooperation with the Member States on the measures taken for the implementation of this article (known as PIF reports);

    B. whereas PIF reports are based mainly on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, via the Irregularity Management System (IMS), and on data extracted from the Commission’s accounting system (ABAC);

    C. whereas effective measures to protect the EU’s financial interests at EU level have to be implemented on the basis of data-based knowledge of the specific situation in each Member State, particularly in cases involving complex criminal activity;

    D. whereas the number of irregularities detected and reported demonstrates the results of Member States’ efforts to counter illegal activities in this area and is not to be interpreted, by itself, as an indication of the level of mismanagement or fraud in the Member States;

    E. whereas the links between irregularities’ occurrence, their detection and the reporting level require a wider overall assessment;

    F. whereas sound management of public resources and protecting the EU’s financial interests across all EU policies should be key to increasing citizens’ confidence by ensuring the proper and effective use of taxpayers’ money;

    G. whereas protecting the EU budget involves multiple actors at various levels who can only achieve their mandate through a structured network of relationships and coordination within the anti-fraud architecture (AFA)[20];

    H. whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States and their varying levels of digitalisation need to be adequately addressed with the creation of more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU in order to effectively prevent and counter fraud, corruption, irregularities and other infringements;

    I. whereas solid cooperation between authorities conducting administrative investigations and those conducting criminal investigations at both EU and Member State levels should be encouraged;

    J. whereas the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) and ARACHNE are effective tools to protect the EU budget from risks of insolvency, negligence, fraud or irregularity committed by private actors, in the case of the EDES, and via a data-mining and risk-scoring approach, in the case of ARACHNE;

    K. whereas criminal networks operating in the EU are fully embracing the entire range of cutting-edge information technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), to facilitate their criminal activities, posing an even more complex threat to the EU budget and a new challenge for law enforcement and requiring the AFA to fast-track its exploration of AI use in the fight against fraud;

    L. whereas respect for the values on which the EU is founded and for fundamental rights, as well as compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are prerequisites for accessing EU funding;

    M. whereas the rule of law conditionality mechanism applies across the entire EU budget as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds and allows measures to be taken in cases of breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the EU’s financial interests;

    N. whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[21] (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

    General remarks on PIF reporting and on major threats

    1. Welcomes the 2023 PIF Report and its analyses on the relevant findings, and endorses its recommendations;

    2. Shares the view that effective protection of the Union’s financial interests requires the acceleration of the digitalisation that facilitates knowledge sharing, data accessibility and data processing and that would enhance the governance of the overall AFA; maintains that both the EU and national authorities should intensify the use of digital tools with a view to facilitating cooperation;

    3. Reiterates that a more measurable and results-oriented governance of the activities of the AFA’s many components is key both to effectively protecting the Union’s financial interests and to assessing the AFA’s efficiency;

    4. Recalls that solid cooperation between the administrative and judicial authorities conducting investigations at both EU and Member State levels is essential; reiterates its concerns over the still suboptimal situation, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of suspected fraud and irregularities and their follow-up, in which there are marked differences between Member States; encourages the Member States, therefore, to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union’s financial interests and to enhance the exchange of information between their national authorities and with EU bodies and agencies, including in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner; underlines the fact that the fight against fraud requires a holistic and comprehensive approach, covering all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and reflecting the multiple, interconnected and interdependent actors and processes in place for the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    5. Notes that the overall number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities increased significantly, by 9 %, in 2023 (13 563) compared to 2022 (12 455); regrets the fact that this is an all-time high and is the continuation of a growing trend over the last five years; observes, further, that the overall financing concerned in relation to these cases in 2023 (EUR 1.90 billion) was markedly higher than in 2022 (EUR 1.77 billion), having increased by 7.3 %; acknowledges that the multiannual cycle of implementation of numerous programmes makes comparisons based on a five-year average more appropriate than year-to-year comparisons for identifying real-time situations and obtaining reliable analysis of trends and patterns; appreciates, accordingly, that the 2023 PIF Report refers to the results of the 2019-2023 period; observes that the rise in the number of irregularities and in funding that achieves no positive results highlights the need to correlate budgets with the performance indicators of the competent institutions;

    6. Is concerned by the overall scenario depicted by the multiannual analysis in the 2023 PIF Report; emphasises that the current situation justifies the efforts made to ensure more effective deployment of adequate resources and their more efficient use, which requires better governance and cooperation; underlines that fraud, corruption and violations of democracy, justice and the rule of law are deeply interconnected and cannot be tackled in isolation; calls on the Commissioners on budget, fraud and public administration and on democracy, justice and the rule of law to work closely and immediately on launching initiatives to make the actions and the results of the AFA measurable and more tangible and to present them to Parliament, in line with the commitment made at the confirmation hearings; suggests that stronger synergies be created between the Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget and other Commission directorates-general working on the rule of law and the protection of other EU values, particularly the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, to ensure that all the departments work together, rather than in silos, to address these systemic challenges more effectively;

    7. Reiterates the call for a holistic approach in PIF reports, which are also considered an AFA governance tool, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the synergies between all the relevant actors, identify best practices and address shortcomings; is aware that, as emphasised in the 2023 PIF Report, the operational protection of the Union’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO, and welcomes the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings in the 2023 PIF Report; asks for a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components, and for the introduction of measures to increase the efficiency of the competent institutions with a view to reducing fraud and irregularities; calls for the further improvement of this holistic approach to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels;

    8. Welcomes OLAF’s investigative performance, in particular the increased number of recommendations issued (309 compared to 275 in 2022) and the overall amount recommended for financial recovery (EUR 1 043.8 million compared to EUR 426.8 million in 2022) against a stable number of cases opened (190 in 2023 and 192 in 2022) and concluded (265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022); points out, in particular, that over the 2019-2023 period, more than 88 % of the irregularities identified as potentially fraudulent and related to expenditure disbursed under direct management were detected following OLAF investigations; regrets that the long duration of the investigations can have a negative impact regarding the consequential late launching of remedial measures; reiterates its request to receive comprehensive and adequately detailed figures on the amounts effectively recovered by the Commission on the grounds of the financial recommendations issued by OLAF; calls on the Commission also to integrate in the next PIF reports ad hoc sections on OLAF in order to develop a more granular analysis and reporting of its activities and of the financial recoveries carried out;

    9. Welcomes the way in which the EPPO, operationally active since June 2021, has developed and increased its activities, which is well-reflected in the numbers of opened investigations (1 371 compared to 865 in 2022), of overall currently active investigations (1 927 compared to 1 117 in 2022) and of indictments (139 compared to 87 in 2022); appreciates the level of detail in EPPO reporting, which offers relevant information on many trends and on the situation in the participating Member States; calls for greater EPPO efficiency, with this being reflected in the amounts recovered and not just in the number of investigations;

    10. Stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF in 2023 too; reiterates its call for all relevant EU actors involved in the fight against fraud to be guaranteed adequate resources and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud action returns to the EU budget;

    11. Is concerned that the substantial financial loss of value added tax (VAT) fraud reported by the EPPO is having a detrimental effect on the national budgets of the Member States while simultaneously threatening fair taxation and fair competition between businesses in the single market; underlines the fact that VAT is an important resource for the Union’s budget too; deems it appropriate to take into account the complexity of the underlying provisions on the system of own resources of the Union when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activities[22]; points out the concerning number of investigations into the recovery and resilience programmes (233) and the estimated financial loss (EUR 1.86 billion); calls, therefore, for adequate measures to be taken at both national and EU levels;

    12. Calls on the Commission to develop and implement solutions allowing a follow-up to OLAF recommendations and EPPO prosecutions, their analysis and the measurability of the actual impact of their actions on the protection of the Union’s budget in terms of recovery of both mismanaged funds and of uncollected resources, with a view to providing additional justification for results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to notify Parliament of the outcomes of EPPO prosecutions;

    13. States that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; underlines the central role played by the media and investigative journalism in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of public funds; considers that it is essential to safeguard the media from political pressure and influence to protect its independence and its role as a watchdog of democracy and the sound management of public funds;

    14. Underlines that transparency plays an important role in the management of public funds; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries;

    15. Underlines the importance of the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture with regard to fraud and states that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the private sector, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; encourages the Commission to provide support to these relevant actors in the form of training programmes, funding and any other measures required to ensure their independence from external influence and from unlawful state surveillance, intimidation and attempts to undermine their legitimacy, in line with EU fundamental rights and the rule of law; invites the Commission to launch an EU-wide public awareness campaign on the risks of fake news, misinformation and deepfake content in fraud cases affecting EU-funded projects;

    16. Is concerned about the EPPO’s and Europol’s clear warning on the increasing presence of groups of organised criminals behind the most relevant cases of cross-border fraud; notes that the EPPO’s annual report indicates 209 investigated offences concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up to the end of 2023; understands that organised crime affects Union resources substantially and that the scale of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union, in particular on the revenue side of the budget, can only be explained by the heavy involvement of serious organised criminal groups; is aware that the current analysis and reporting tools do not allow its quantification in a way that is satisfactory for evaluating the effectiveness or the shortcomings of the measures and policies in place; calls on the Commission to swiftly launch all necessary actions to address the analysis and reporting issue;

    17. Maintains that the fact that the relevant EU legislation has not been transposed efficiently into the national legislation of many Member States and the fact that the Member States’ national laws are not harmonised give organised criminal groups opportunities to conduct a number of illegal cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime[23] and for the introduction of a new common definition of organised crime, taking into account, in particular, the use of corruption, violence, threat or intimidation to obtain control of economic activities or procurement;

    18. Points out the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer survey on ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’, showing that corruption is a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses in the EU; maintains that high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, not only affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, but also undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, both in the EU and in the Member States; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly using corruption to infiltrate public administrations and gain economic advantages;

    19. Points out that, in relation to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 131 investigated offences up to the end of 2023 (there were 87 cases in 2022) and that, over the years 2019-2023, 65 cases were reported to the Commission via IMS[24] by 11 countries, and that the reported irregular amounts linked to such cases come to about EUR 50.5 million; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO inform Parliament of how much of that EUR 50.5 million has been recovered;

    20. Acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States; calls for an evaluation and a periodical revision of these strategies; emphasises the importance of taking into account and fully addressing country-specific recommendations relating to the fight against corruption;

    21. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to prevent and address cases of conflict of interest in the management of the Union’s financial resources; observes that, in the 2019-2023 period, 419 cases were reported via the IMS related to conflict of interest (there were 375 in 2018-2022), involving in total about EUR 112 million; stresses that the ECA has indicated in its audit work[25] that the main source of information on conflict of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of the data recorded in the IMS varies between Member States; underlines that where Member States consider a conflict of interest to be a minor component in a wider fraud case, they do not report such cases as relating to conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to adopt initiatives necessary to ensure consistent and adequately detailed reporting in the IMS of the above situations; calls for the provisions on conflicts of interest to be applied in a way that ensures legal certainty, be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow practical application by the competent authorities;

    Revenue

    22. Observes that, in 2023, the overall number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities related to traditional own resources (TOR) (5 118 compared to 4 661 in 2022) was 10 % higher than the five-year average (2019-2023), but that the amount involved decreased by 12 % to EUR 478 million (compared to EUR 783 million bat the end of2022); regrets that while the data show improved recovery for non-fraudulent cases (82 %), the recovery rate for fraudulent cases remains unchanged at 25 %, which is still low and is distributed unevenly across the Member States;

    23. Points out that, in 2023, the Commission considered that in only five of the new write-off reports submitted to it by the Member States had it been satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to the Member States in question and that the latter were not financially responsible for the loss; notes, by contrast, that in 81 cases, amounting to almost EUR 69 million, the Commission considered that the Member States had not satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to them and that they were therefore financially responsible for the loss; concludes, therefore, that there is actionable room for improvement in the collection of TOR by the Member States;

    24  Underlines that it is essential for Member States to live up to their responsibility to collect TOR in order to ensure that the burden of financing EU expenditure is shared fairly among the Member States and maintain a level playing field for economic actors in the single market; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to improve the effectiveness of their national administrations’ activity in the field of recovery, following the detection of irregularities and fraud relating to VAT, in order to increase the amount of TOR made available to the EU budget; acknowledges that the VAT compliance gap relates to more than just fraud and evasion, but also covers VAT lost as a result of insolvencies, bankruptcies, administrative errors and legal tax optimisation; believes, however, that VAT fraud, such as missing trader intra-Community fraud, contributes meaningfully to VAT non-compliance and reiterates its call for the issue to be addressed through digital means, the fraud-proofing of VAT rules and stronger cooperation between national tax authorities and the competent EU investigative bodies;

    25. Acknowledges the current legal framework relating to cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and Eurofisc; calls on the Commission to speed up the process of revising the current legal framework to provide a clear legal basis for direct cooperation between Eurofisc and the EPPO; encourages OLAF to maximise the possibilities offered by mutual administrative assistance practices to detect and identify customs fraud and related VAT fraud, as well as to report such cases to the EPPO without delay; stresses that, in 2023, the EPPO identified VAT fraud in about 20 % of its active cases (873 cases), making this the second most frequent type of crime after non-procurement expenditure fraud (1 586 cases); is concerned by the increasing participation of groups of organised criminals in VAT fraud operations and by the identified connections between this kind of fraud and other kinds of very serious crimes, such as money laundering;

    26. Reiterates its call on the Commission to reconsider the threshold of EUR 10 million set in the PIF Directive, which has a major impact on the EPPO’s activities in VAT fraud cases; maintains that different interpretations of the methodologies for calculating this threshold make the situation unclear; emphasises that the current threshold limits deterrence and allows perpetrators to seek out the weakest jurisdiction to elude the EPPO’s intervention; believes that the revision of the PIF Directive should either remove the threshold or substantially lower it; calls on the Commission, in the meantime, to provide adequate guidance on the calculation method for cases prior to the amendment of the PIF Directive;

    27. Stresses the importance of effective and efficient cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO in this specific revenue sector and maintains that adequate detection and data transmission by OLAF to the EPPO could increase the collection of VAT and customs revenue for the EU budget, and would help avoid any overlap between the activities of the two offices;

    Expenditure

    28. Is concerned by the high levels of fraud and irregularities detected, both in 2023 and in 2022, under the common agricultural policy, both in rural development and in support for agriculture; remarks that the data confirm patterns and risks identified in previous years; observes that, during the 2019-2023 period, fraudulent irregularities reported for rural development increased, mainly owing to a rising number of irregularities detected for the 2014-2020 programming period; notes that during the 2019-2023 period, the number of non-fraudulent rural development irregularities continuously increased in line with the implementation of the programmes;

    29. Observes that in cohesion policy the number and financial amounts of non-fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period are much lower than those reported during the first 10 years of implementation of the 2007-2013 programming period; points out that the fraud detection rate[26] (0.53 %) for the 2014-2020 programming period is similar to the rate for the 2007-2013 programming period, while the irregularity detection rate (0.67 %) is much lower than the rate recorded for the 2007-2013 programming period (2.5 %); notes that individual irregularities involving large financial amounts have a substantial impact on the fraud detection rate; calls for further clarification of the correlation between the fraud detection rate and the occurrence of fraud;

    30. Welcomes OLAF’s analytical report entitled ‘Fraud and irregularities by areas of the cohesion policy – comparing risks’, which refers to information from Member States for the 2014-2020 programming period up until December 2023 and identifies areas particularly exposed to fraud risk (such as investments for the environment, climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy, research, development and innovation); remarks that the largest financial amounts in fraud cases were in environmental protection and research, technology development and innovation;

    31. Reiterates its concern over the lengthy administrative procedures for dealing with the fraudulent cases reported; points out that, on average, during the 2019-2023 period, under the common agricultural policy, nearly four years were required from the start of an irregularity to arrive at a suspicion of fraudulent activity, and nearly three more years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; highlights that, for cohesion, on average and during the 2014-2020 period, it took about a year and a half to arrive at a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and more than two years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; asks the Commission to intensify dialogue with, and provide advice to, the Member State authorities to reduce the length of administrative procedures;

    32. Observes that, for direct management between 2019 and 2023, OLAF was mentioned as the source of detection of fraudulent irregularities for 88.4 % of recovery items, corresponding to 92.1 % of total recovery amounts; asks the Commission to provide clear information on the data and on the actions taken to enhance swift recovery, including data on overall recovery levels for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities;

    33. Emphasises that when, despite preventive measures, fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities are detected, recovery is the measure that protects the Union’s financial interests, allowing for the correct implementation of EU policies and for the refunding of disbursed expenditure that is non-compliant with the funding requirements; stresses the findings of ECA special report 7/2024[27] when referring to the 2014-2020 period, for which the reported irregular expenditure was EUR 14 billion, which is to be refunded via recovery; stresses the need to speed up the recovery process by establishing clear deadlines and imposing penalties for delays, so that funds are returned to the EU budget as quickly as possible; calls on the Commission to propose adequate measures to provide complete information on irregular expenditure and the associated corrective measures taken;

    34. Stresses the importance of follow-up measures after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, with a view to learning from cases of fraud and improving procedures to prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; considers it important, in this regard, that the Member States thoroughly follow up on cases by analysing the enabling factors behind fraud and assessing the need to revise their management and control systems accordingly;

    35. Understands that, following a lack of support in the Council for its initiatives in 2004 and 2014, the Commission is not willing to put forward another legislative proposal for mutual administrative assistance in the areas of EU spending that do not currently provide for this practice; encourages the Commission to take advantage of the revision of the OLAF Regulation[28], which already provides OLAF with an enhanced mandate for the coordination of Member States’ actions in order to further develop the current provisions with a view to filling this gap;

    36. Notes that civil society organisations are an essential component of a vibrant democratic society, ensuring the broad coverage of diverse views in public debates; recognises that these organisations may receive Union funds to support their work in contributing to democratic dialogue and public engagement; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with EU institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability; stresses that lobbying should be transparent, with full disclosure of all parties involved; takes notes of the allegations that the Commission subsidises NGOs to influence Members of the European Parliament; stresses that, if their existence is confirmed, such practices could distort policy discussions and contravene the principle of separation of powers and should therefore be ended; calls on the ECA to audit the programmes concerned and give its recommendations; expects the future ECA report to bring clarity on these issues; recalls that the ECA asked, in special report 05/2024[29], for more efforts to be made to improve checks on the ground; notes with concern the ECA’s observation that lobbyists can choose to which category they belong, regardless of their legal form, to avoid disclosing financial information; notes that the EU is one of the largest global funders of civil society organisations; underlines the need for the EU Transparency Register Secretariat to enhance its systematic checks of the self-declarations of entities declaring themselves to be ‘NGOs, platforms, networks and similar’; observes that such systematic checks could be based on a set of criteria, including non-profit status, objectives relating to public benefit, and independence, to strengthen the trust in all entities registered in the EU Transparency Register, and should be supported by robust requirements for accountability and transparency;

    37. Considers that when assessing delivery models for EU expenditure, the susceptibility of the various options to fraud and other misuse should be taken into account; calls on the Commission to ensure that the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of the RRF, including the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA and Parliament, are taken into account in future EU funding instruments, notably the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF); underlines that the shortcomings identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud, double funding, and lack of transparency, must serve as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; opposes any replication of the RRF model in its current form and stresses that any future performance-based funding must be accompanied by significantly stronger safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms to ensure the sound management of EU funds;

    NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    38. Appreciates the efforts made by the Commission in the revision of the 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) to adjust to the energy market disruptions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; notes that the integration into the RRPs of REPowerEU is expected to contribute to reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels and increasing European self-sufficiency;

    39. Recalls, nevertheless, that delays can be observed in the implementation of the RRF and calls on the Commission to remain vigilant, in particular towards the end of the RRF life cycle, in order to ensure that Member States adequately protect the financial interests of the EU and that EU taxpayers’ money is spent appropriately;

    40. Underlines the importance of robust management and control systems in preventing fraud as they have the effect of deterring criminals from attempting to defraud public authorities; expresses concerns about the ECA’s repeated observations pointing to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member State control systems, as this poses risks to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the EU’s financial interests; regrets that in several Member States, the control systems were not fully functional when the national RRPs started to be implemented, and underlines that such issues pose risks to the regularity of RRF payments and to the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States remedy the inadequacies identified in their control frameworks without delay, including by implementing the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA;

    41. Observes that the Commission’s control framework for the RRF relies primarily on the responsibility of the Member States to protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to maintain a high level of attention to the fulfilment by the Member States of the specific audit and control milestones added to those RRPs which had lacked robustness and to continue efforts to close accountability gaps; takes notes of the actions launched by the Commission following the ECA’s recommendations on the identifiable weaknesses of some Member States’ control and reporting systems; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    42. Notes with grave concern that ECA special report 14/2024 found that the climate impact of green spending under the RRF could have been overestimated by up to EUR 34.5 billion, with some projects having minimal impact on the energy transition or even causing environmental harm while also increasing the risk of fraud;

    43. Calls for the establishment of clear, measurable criteria for green investments under the EU budget and the RRF to ensure that only projects with significant and proven environmental and economic benefits receive funding, thereby enhancing accountability and long-term sustainability while reducing the risk of fraud;

    44. Observes that, for the RRF in 2023, the 2023 PIF Report indicates the number of cases of suspected fraud reported by the Commission (15) and the number of audits (13, compared with 16 carried out in 2022), but it does not include the concerningly high number of EPPO investigations (233 investigations referred to recovery and resilience programmes, with an estimated financial loss of EUR 1.86 billion); is concerned by a possible increase in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years and urges the Commission and the Member States to act swiftly in order to ensure the sound management and fair distribution of RRF funds;

    45. Calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases, ensuring that irregularities and fraud affecting RRF funds are systematically recorded and monitored; notes with concern the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations;

    46. Asks OLAF to continue its risk analysis, which, in 2023, was made available to Member States along with an updated version of the ‘RRF risk framework’, and with the training and seminars for Member State authorities; endorses the use of the IMS for reporting RRF irregularities; reiterates its call on the Commission, on the specialised EU agencies and bodies, as well as on Member States, to actively cooperate and interact to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests when implementing the NGEU;

    47. Observes that, as part of the Guidance on RRPs, the Commission has adopted[30] Annex IV on the framework for reduction and recoveries under the RRF; understands that the reduction of a payment is feasible when there are still payments to be effected; recalls that the RRF ends in 2026; points out that recovery is only to be launched whenever no further instalments remain; is concerned by the fact that this recovery procedure, borrowed from the model for implementing cohesion funds, has proved to be extremely ineffective and was abandoned in the current MFF; strongly regrets the fact that by the end of 2023 there were no recovery orders in ABAC concerning the RRF, and that there is still no obligation for Member States to report irregularities related to the RRF via the IMS;

    48. Reiterates that transparency plays a vital role in exposing fraudulent schemes and discouraging fraudsters; reiterates its dissatisfaction with the interpretation endorsed by the Commission of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF; rejects the Commission’s incomplete and misleading interpretation[31]; remarks that, even according to the Commission guidelines[32], the ‘final recipient’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, and that any initial or intermediary recipient of funding, such as ministries or agencies operating merely as distributors of the funds, should not be considered to be the ‘last entity’; asks the Commission again to request that the Member States provide information on the ‘final recipient’ or ‘last entity’ and not to accept from Member States any information on ‘second-level recipients’ that is not in line with the agreement between the co-legislators; calls on the Commission to review its guidance by providing cases and examples that can clarify the provision and be a solid term of reference for the national authorities, in such a way as to endorse an adequate transparency level and a homogeneous interpretation across all the Member States; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance;

    49. Is concerned by the ECA’s opinion[33] on the increasing risk of EU funds being spent twice on the same measure and handed out twice for the same action; understands that corresponding measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, are financed from both the EU budget and the RRF, because the EU’s pandemic recovery fund finances actions similar to those covered by standard EU programmes; acknowledges that complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments is allowed, but observes that this could result in delivering milestones that are fully financed by funds other than the RRF, because the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs effectively incurred, but rather rewards the fulfilment of milestones and targets; emphasises that the several layers of governance, the fragmented IT landscape and the limited exchanges of data or use of data-mining tools such as ARACHNE, prevent the detection of double funding, and therefore the control mechanisms in place may be insufficient to properly mitigate this increased risk; maintains that the absence of direct access to the full list of RRF final recipients limits the Commission’s capacity to detect potential cases of double funding; believes that the precaution adopted by some Member States of avoiding combining the RRF with other EU instruments contributes to mitigating the risk of double funding; calls on the Commission to increase its controls in this regard;

    50. Observes that Member States may include measures in their RRPs with no estimated costs or estimated costs of zero[34]; points out also that these ‘cost-free’ milestones are the main term of reference for assessing the correct use of RRF resources for their intended purposes; understands that the payments for these ‘cost-free’ or ‘zero-cost’ milestones are released following the milestones’ achievement, irrespective of the cost sustained, in line with the ‘financing not linked to cost’ approach under the RRF; observes, however, that such milestones make it impossible to verify the sound management of paid RRF resources, because such resources are disbursed in connection with a milestone for which they have not been deployed; calls on the Commission to reconsider its assumption that a ‘zero-cost’ measure cannot induce double funding, irrespective of whether other EU funds are used to implement it; strongly calls on the Commission to strengthen controls on ‘zero-cost’ measures and to give guidance to the Member States on how to address the financial design of the measures concerned in order to prevent such risk;

    51. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled;

    52. Follows up on the Ombudsman’s strategic initiative, launched in February 2022 and closed in September 2023, conducted on the transparency and accountability of the RRF, whose results it fully endorses; welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Commission and the Ombudsman to address the suboptimal situations detected, in particular concerning the scoreboard and the proactive publication of documents related to the RRF;

    Digitalisation and transparency to enhance the fight against fraud

    53. Welcomes the political agreement reached on the proposed recast text of the Financial Regulation; believes that extending the scope of EDES to include shared management, and the adoption of a legal basis to use ARACHNE as a model for an EU-wide data-mining and risk-scoring tool, will strengthen the protection of the EU’s financial interests; recalls the calls made in previous reports to ensure that all Member States make use of data-mining tools, especially ARACHNE, to ensure timely and diligent reporting standards;

    54. Shares the view that the IMS, the system through which Member States report to the Commission on irregularities and fraud affecting the EU budget, has potential for greater interoperability with other corporate tools of the Commission, such as ARACHNE and EDES, and with digital tools in Member States; asks to be informed, following the recast of the Financial Regulation, on the progress of the EDES-IMS interface and about the possible use of IMS data within the data-mining and risk-scoring tool (ARACHNE);

    55. Reiterates its call for increased interoperability between data systems and for the harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the Union; is aware of the crosscutting nature of interoperability and appreciates the adoption of the Interoperable Europe Act[35];

    56. Underlines the findings of ECA Review 4/2023 of 6 July 2023 on digitalising the management of EU funds; recalls the positive effects of digitalisation on prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities, as well as on the management, control and auditing of EU funds, by allowing easier and quicker access to data and remote cross-checks, thereby limiting costs by reducing the need for controls and on-the-spot checks;

    57. Recognises that taking advantage of a real-time and data-driven economy has significant benefits for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, while reducing the administrative burden on public authorities and businesses operating and trading across borders within the EU; calls for the EU and the Member States to improve the effectiveness of data sharing by creating a digital ecosystem allowing for the seamless, real-time and secure movement of standardised, structured and machine-readable data between businesses and public authorities, in particular national tax administrations, with a view to limiting possibilities for committing fraud and tax evasion;

    58. Shares the view that digitalisation should be at the core of every anti-fraud strategy, and in particular that it should be integrated into national anti-fraud strategies to allow coordination between its constituent parts and for the threats posed by new technologies to be factored in;

    59. Believes that digitalisation offers opportunities for tangible improvements to the governance of the anti-fraud network and that by facilitating communication and accessibility it helps to improve reporting, thereby allowing for a better understanding of the obstacles that persist and a more timely and comprehensive response by decision-makers and co-legislators; welcomes the fact that over half of the Member States have taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitalisation, in particular a lack of information and access to data on digitalisation; encourages the Member States and actors in the AFA to continue addressing skills gaps through measures involving, inter alia, knowledge sharing, training and the broadening of know-how and skills in the field of digitalisation;

    60. Welcomes the efforts of many components of the AFA in assessing and further developing the options offered by AI and machine learning in identifying and detecting irregularities and pursuing efficiency gains in both analysis and classic administrative tasks; reiterates that human assessment must remain the pivotal characteristic of every process; adds that AI has the potential to be a game changer in the fight against fraud, allowing the rapid analysis of large data sets, as well as enhancing fraud detection and identification of fraud patterns; recalls that the successful use of AI relies on effective collaboration between all stakeholders and on the availability of high quality data, underpinned by the effective use of ARACHNE; urges the Commission to work towards developing AI in Europe so as to uphold data sovereignty and ensure robust data protection, aligning with the principles outlined in the AI Act[36] and the General Data Protection Regulation[37] (GDPR); calls on all anti-fraud actors to strengthen their cooperation to leverage the use of AI effectively and responsibly in the fight against fraud;

    61. Recognises the growing risk of AI-generated content being used to manipulate procurement processes, financial transactions and evidence in fraud investigations; calls on the Commission to prioritise research and policy measures to combat fraudulent activities enabled by artificial intelligence, including deepfake technology and AI-driven disinformation campaigns that could compromise financial and anti-fraud mechanisms; calls on the Commission to propose stricter legal provisions and penalties for entities found to be using AI to commit or facilitate financial fraud, including AI-driven money laundering schemes, falsification of contracts, and digital identity theft in procurement processes;

    62.  Acknowledges the importance of the use of AI to make improvements in the quality and completeness of data exchanged with Member States; welcomes, in this regard, OLAF’s actions, including recommendations in the annual PIF reports, structured bilateral dialogues with Member States, the revision of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan, and interinstitutional exchanges focusing on these matters;

    63. Further calls for a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms within OLAF, the EPPO, and Europol, to increase efficiency in tracking and preventing financial crimes against the EU budget; recommends the establishment of an EU-wide task force composed of representatives from OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and national anti-fraud units, with a dedicated focus on digital fraud threats, including deepfake technology, AI-generated fake documents and synthetic identity fraud; underlines that this task force should develop and share best practices with the Member States;

    64. Stresses the need for increased cross-border cooperation and data-sharing mechanisms between Member States to combat AI-enabled fraud, particularly in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and financial aid distribution; encourages the creation of a joint EU intelligence hub to track fraudulent AI activity in real time; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards;

    65. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement strict transparency and audit measures in AI-based fraud detection tools to prevent bias, algorithmic manipulation and misuse in financial oversight systems; urges the development of AI ethics guidelines for anti-fraud institutions to ensure accountability;

    66. Calls for a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

    The internal layer of the EU’s AFA – 2023 key measures at EU level

    67. Underlines the fact that the EU’s AFA is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multi-layered network of cooperation in which the first layer (OLAF, the EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, AMLA, the Commission, the ECA and the European Investment Bank (EIB)) is grounded on horizontal cooperation between the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations; points out that the AFA has evolved over the years through a series of separate decisions that have led to an innovative network of entities; underlines that their coordinated activities in recent years have generated valuable experience that should be considered in the future revision of the relevant regulations; stresses that with the creation of the EPPO, the first European prosecutorial authority was established, enabling prompt and direct criminal law investigations and prosecutions, and that the lessons learnt in the first years of its operational activity need to be adequately integrated in the legislative framework to be able to take full advantage of the available tools and resources; stresses the importance of clear mandates between the various EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in order to minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication and thereby ensure the efficiency of the functioning of the AFA;

    68. Appreciates the integration in the 2023 PIF Report of the main administrative and judicial results achieved by OLAF and the EPPO, respectively, which follows the many calls from Parliament for more comprehensive reporting of the actions carried out by the components of the AFA; considers, however, that the differences in nature, scope and granularity between the two reports should be addressed and that the areas of cooperation should be indicated clearly; deems the differences in the figures provided by OLAF, the EPPO and the 2023 PIF Report to be justified in the current circumstances; highlights that reporting bodies in the Member States may report on criminal investigations only when the relevant judicial authorities grant the authorisation for them to do so, and this implies that while the EPPO and OLAF report data on active investigations, the reporting bodies are often unable to enter these details in the IMS database because of the need to protect confidentiality and ensure the proper conduct of investigations; understands that these cases result in a divergence in the data (‘delta’) that can only be eliminated when the investigations are completed and the relevant data are included in the reporting to the Commission so they can be included in a future PIF Report;

    69. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission, in May 2023, of a package of anti-corruption measures which encompasses a proposal for a directive on combating corruption; believes that prevention and prosecution of corruption need to be stepped up and calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of the enforcement of measures in the Member States;

    70. Welcomes the establishment of a network against corruption, which met for the first time on 20 September 2023, believes that the mapping of areas at a high-risk of corruption could contribute effectively to the further development of the EU anti-corruption strategy;

    71. Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect rule of law principles; reiterates its deep concern regarding the situation concerning the rule of law in certain Member States, which is deeply worrying in its own right and can lead to serious losses for the Union budget; calls on the Commission to ensure the strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach rule of law principles and when this affects, or risks affecting, EU financial interests; further insists on the need for coherence across various instruments when assessing the rule of law situation in Member States;

    72. Notes that the fourth Commission Report 2023 on the rule of law, adopted in February 2024, provides a follow-up to the recommendations issued in the previous year’s Rule of Law Report; acknowledges that, in the fight against corruption, various Member States have updated or launched a revision of their national strategies and/or action plans, while others have reformed criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption; observes that for many Member States the main obstacle to the fight against corruption is the limited resources of prosecution services; calls on the Commission to continue encouraging and supporting the efforts of Member States to reform and improve the efficacy of criminal proceedings and addressing the other challenges identified in the report; reminds the Commission of the effective tools at its disposal to safeguard the rule of law, such as infringement procedures, funding conditionality and the Article 7 TEU procedures, and expects it to make full use of them all; highlights, in this regard, that the new Financial Regulation introduces conditionality linked to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and calls on the Commission to start applying it, particularly in cases where infringement procedures have already been launched against a Member State for violations of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as this constitutes a clear recognition of an ongoing breach that could also impact the sound financial management of the Union budget;

    73. Takes note of the Commission’s decision not to lift the measure under Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary[38]; expects the Commission and the Council to lift the adopted measures only where evidence is collected that the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government have proven effective in practice and, in particular, that no regression has been detected on already adopted measures; condemns the threats, such as espionage, to which EU institution staff are exposed, such as OLAF staff during their investigative missions in Hungary; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of the EU institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard EU institution staff on missions; calls on the Hungarian authorities to take immediate and concrete steps to safeguard judicial independence, uphold media freedom and fully implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Rule of Law Report to restore democratic checks and balances; urges the Council to continue the Article 7 TEU procedure against the Hungarian Government;

    74. Emphasises that respect for the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, is a key determinant of the single market environment that fosters investment, growth, jobs and innovation, and protects small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and economic operators operating across borders; stresses that the Commission is accountable for rigorous verification, as a condition for disbursing funding, of the fulfilment of the rule of law-related milestones integrated in the various Member State RRPs; recalls that the Commissioner for democracy, justice and rule of law, working in close coordination with the recently appointed Commissioner on budget, anti-fraud and public administration, holds primary responsibility for the full application of the general regime of conditionality; calls on the Commission not to use ‘dialogue’ with Member States or the ‘pilot’ procedure as an open-ended means to avoid launching actual infringement procedures; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to prioritise horizontally infringements affecting the EU’s financial interests, in particular regarding the PIF Directive and the EPPO Regulation[39]; welcomes the statement in the Commission Political Guidelines on the importance of the rule of law for EU funds and the commitment by the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration to introduce strong safeguards on the rule of law in the next MFF;

    75. Considers that the protection of the common EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU currently included in the Common Provisions Regulation needs to be further strengthened; calls on the Commission to explore how a mechanism equivalent to the horizontal enabling conditions could be developed as a general feature in all areas of the EU budget, with a view to linking a wider range of policies to all the values set out in Article 2 TEU; calls on the Commission to explore means of linking funding to rule of law conditions and the completion of necessary reforms in order to ensure a comprehensive approach, applied horizontally to all EU funds; calls on the Commission to pursue a comprehensive approach and to put forward proposals for further strengthening the Union’s rule of law toolbox as a priority, including strengthened rule of law conditionality for funds deployed in the current programming period;

    76. Maintains that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering, and that money laundering is one of the most important enablers of illegal activities by organised criminals, as it allows them to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; recognises that the heterogeneous national legal systems and fragmented application of the Union’s anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and counter money laundering; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the ambitious legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which will unify national rules and thus enhance the collective fight against money laundering across the Union; welcomes the establishment of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA); considers that the new agency will play a central role in the new anti-money laundering framework through its coordinating and supervisory responsibilities; recalls that money laundering and terrorist financing are intrinsically linked and calls for the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA to have a stronger role in countering these phenomena;

    77. Shares the view that the protection of the EU’s financial interests has been strengthened by the recast Financial Regulation; points out that the scope of EDES has been extended to encompass shared and direct management and provide new grounds for exclusion; welcomes the introduction of a legal basis for a risk-scoring and data-mining tool to be used by all Member States and in all management modes; regrets that both these measures will enter into force only in 2028 and only from the next MFF, resulting in several more years without comprehensive transparency regarding the final recipients of EU funds and missing a crucial opportunity to use these data to strengthen safeguards against corruption and fraud;

    78. Appreciates the adoption of an updated action plan[40] for the 2019 Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy; notes that it includes 44 actions distributed over seven themes covering, in particular, digitalisation, cooperation, the RRF, customs fraud, and awareness-raising in ethical and anti-fraud culture matters;

    79. Points out that the EU’s anti-fraud programme (UAFP) is the only spending programme specifically dedicated to fighting fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests and that it provides relevant support to all Member States’ authorities as components of the external layer of the AFA, in order to strengthen the fight against fraud; observes that the UAFP has the flexibility needed to adapt to the constantly changing anti-fraud landscape and is aligned with the seven-year period (2021-2027) of the current MFF; notes that, so far, 55 % of the total implementation of the UAFP has contributed to the digital transition;

    80. Calls on the Commission to build on the success of the UAFP and encourages the Commissioner on budget and anti-fraud to consider the UAFP as a model to be extended in the next MFF, in line with the task, indicated in the mission letter, of securing support for Member States’ efforts to protect the Union’s financial interests;

    81. Welcomes the first UAFP association request received in 2023 from a non-EU country, namely Ukraine, with which an association agreement covering its participation in the programme has been negotiated and was adopted in March 2024;

    82. Expresses concern that the Commission’s latest interim evaluation of Hercule III found aspects that may have hampered the programme’s effectiveness, notably that certain Member States’ administrations lacked the resources to enable them to cope with the programme’s administrative requirements;

    83. Takes note of the reiterated calls from the EPPO to bolster the detection capacity of the relevant components of the AFA, and recalls that, in line with the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy, emphasis is to be given to data analysis as a tool for detecting fraud; highlights, in this regard, the importance of harmonising definitions in order to obtain comparable data across the EU; encourages the Commission to strengthen the use of the IMS as a tool to support auditors’ risk analysis when preparing audit activities; invites OLAF to increase its training offer to Commission staff, including auditors and relevant actors in the financial flow circuit;

    84. Is aware that the decentralised structure of the EPPO entails an interplay between national law and EU law and between national authorities and the EPPO; understands that the EPPO operates based on the directly applicable EU regulations but that it also requires adequate implementing measures to be adopted via national legislation transposing the PIF Directive and other relevant Union acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that national legislation is fully in line with the EPPO Regulation and the PIF Directive, launch infringement proceedings and propose the revision of these legal acts in order to make the EPPO more effective in the exercise of its mandate;

    85. Notes the results of the Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to the EPPO Regulation[41], which was presented in September 2023; regrets that many situations are still suboptimal and need to be addressed because they weaken the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal investigations; refers, in particular, to the attribution of competence between national prosecution services and the EPPO; stresses also that the EPPO Regulation stipulates the reporting of possible EPPO cases directly and without undue delay; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor Member States’ full compliance with the EPPO Regulation and their prompt reporting of suspicions of fraud in areas within the EPPO’s competence directly to it;

    86. Is concerned that in many Member States the designated national authority deciding on disagreements between the EPPO and national authorities on the competence for prosecuting a case is not a ‘court’ or a ‘tribunal’; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor whether Member States are fully complying with Article 25(6) and Article 42(2)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, which requires the possibility of an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against a decision by a national authority on the attribution of competence;

    87. Stresses that the current control by national authorities over the ‘necessary’ resources and equipment of the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) and the need to refer to the national authorities’ provisions for ‘adequate arrangements’ on social security, pensions and insurance coverage could constrain the autonomy and independence of the EPPO’s actions; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation;

    88. Points out that the transposition of the PIF Directive differs between Member States, which, in some cases, affects the cross-border exercise of EPPO competences; calls on the Commission to ensure proper implementation of the PIF Directive and to propose its revision, based on the experience gathered;

    89. Underlines that Article 25(3) of the EPPO Regulation, which elaborates on the exercise of the EPPO’s competence in the event of non-PIF offences inextricably linked to PIF offences, raises legal and practical questions and requires further streamlining in order to make effective use of the EPPO’s legal framework; calls on the Commission to propose suitable solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation in order to reinforce the EPPO’s ability to investigate cross-border organised crime;

    90. Reiterates[42] that the EPPO has an important role in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union, and encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in the rule of law reports; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO; notes with approval Ireland’s recent announcement of its intention to participate; calls on the Government of Hungary, the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls that broad public support for Hungary’s accession has been demonstrated by the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

    91. Reiterates its call for the launch of an exchange of views on the possible clarification of the competence of the EPPO within its mandate, as defined in the Treaty, as regards protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    92. Notes that in 2023, cooperation between the relevant actors increased, with the EPPO and Eurojust cooperating on 26 ongoing cases at the end of 2023; observes that also in 2023 the EPPO and Europol cooperated efficiently on various operational matters, and understands that this cooperation almost doubled in 2023, with Europol providing support on 47 cases upon the EPPO’s request; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO and Eurojust specify the efficiency criteria on the basis of which they conduct their activities;

    93. Welcomes the efforts by OLAF and the EPPO to strengthen their cooperation; understands that information is being exchanged between the two offices in order to avoid parallel investigations into the same matters, and that, in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO; is aware that the synergies resulting from the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) are suboptimal; calls on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing its regulations;

    94. Is concerned about the lack of analysis and accurate information on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union’s budget that should follow both OLAF and EPPO investigations; is aware that the impact of the AFA on the security of citizens and on the enforcement of the rule of law in the Union goes beyond the quantification of financial recoveries alone; stresses, however, that the results of the efforts made to create the AFA should tend towards measurability and be tangible at least as regards the budgetary aspects; emphasises that the impact of the activities implemented for the protection of the Union’s financial interests should be assessed and taken into consideration in the allocation of resources and definition of mandates;

    95. Understands that the Commission has yet to provide data on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union budget following the EPPO activities reported to the Commission, as provided by Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, and that this matter is included in the mission letter of the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration; observes that the freezing of assets is essential to combat crime affecting the EU budget and that a certain amount of time is needed for freezing to be converted into actual confiscations and recoveries; highlights that the amount confiscated is not expected to return by default to the Union’s budget; notes that, in line with Article 38 of the EPPO Regulation, the potential revenue resulting from seizure and confiscation measures taken by EDPs in Member States should flow back into the EU budget and could be accounted for in the EU budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow these sums to enter the EU budget;

    96. Points out that data on effective recoveries following OLAF financial recommendations are not published in the OLAF Annual Report or in any other official report from the Commission; regrets that only aggregated data are made available and they refer to 2 299 financial recommendations issued by OLAF between 2012 and 2023 for an overall amount of about EUR 9 billion; remarks that the analysis of the available figures suggests considerable room for improvement; observes that a large gap exists between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered; is concerned by the low recovery rates for undue expenditure (for activities implemented under shared and indirect management modes the rate is 34 % and 11 %, respectively, and for recovery under direct management only 22 %); calls on the Commission to provide data with adequate granularity on recovery and to assess the reasons behind the recovery gap; stresses the need for OLAF and the Commission to agree upon, and apply consistently, common evaluation criteria that ensure greater convergence and clarity, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial recovery assessment; emphasises that recovery following an OLAF recommendation and the EPPO’s investigations is an important measurement of the efficiency of the AFA and calls for more transparency in this regard;

    The external layer of the EU’s AFA – key measures at national level in 2023

    97. Understands that the overall level of implementation by the Member States of the Commission’s recommendations issued in the 2022 PIF Report is considered satisfactory; highlights, however, that significant differences between Member States persist; is concerned, in particular, by the cases of inadequate reporting of irregularities by some Member States via the IMS; recalls that reporting is mandatory under the current regulations and encourages OLAF to strengthen its oversight and monitoring actions with a view to achieving uniform reporting across the Union;

    98. Calls on the Commission to monitor the comprehensiveness of the reporting in IMS by countries benefiting from pre-accession assistance and welcomes the initiatives of the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations to enforce candidate countries’ obligations to report irregularities in the IMS on a regular basis;

    99. Encourages the Member States to report in the IMS the irregularities related to the RRF, in line with the ECA recommendations; calls on the Commission to facilitate such use of the IMS by the Member States by providing support in the form of training, seminars and exchange of best practices;

    100. Welcomes the participation of Sweden and Poland in the EPPO, decided on in 2024, as well as the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; insists that Member States that are not yet participating must do so without delay and calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;

    101. Reiterates that Member States’ ineffective, untimely or lack of cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitute grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to take into due consideration all information from the EPPO and OLAF on situations where Member States fail to comply with their obligations;

    102. Maintains that National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS) are the most effective tool for coordination between the various national, regional and sectoral authorities and the many local entities entrusted with the tasks into which the anti-fraud cycle is organised; notes that, in 2023, 21 out of 27 Member States reported having an anti-fraud strategy; observes that out of 21, only 10 Member States had a full national anti-fraud strategy[43] while 11 Member States had only sectoral rather than national anti-fraud strategies in place; recognises that the approach taken by Member States in their anti-fraud strategies today varies widely; regrets that six Member States do not have any anti-fraud strategy at all; strongly regrets this highly unsatisfactory situation, which compromises the integrity of EU spending and undermines citizens’ trust in EU institutions;

    103. Maintains that Member States would benefit from a periodic evaluation of their anti-fraud frameworks; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to run independent or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks to enhance consistency and pursue high standards;

    104. Encourages the Commission to propose enforceable initiatives to clarify the relationship and consider establishing a link between the adoption of NAFS by the Member States and the level of financial support they receive;

    105. Asks the Commission to launch, in preparation for the revision of the OLAF Regulation, a monitoring exercise on the state of play of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) established in the Member States; encourages the Commission to plan for the update and redesign of their structure, role, responsibilities and mandate; regrets the suboptimal staffing level across the majority of the AFCOS in the Member States; underlines the need to ensure sufficient levels of expertise among staff in national anti-fraud coordinating structures; calls on the Commission to encourage and support Member States in addressing these issues as a matter of priority, including in the context of the European Semester cycle;

    106. Underlines the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of funds do not occur in the first place; recalls that the correct transposition of the PIF Directive, adopted on 5 July 2017, is crucial for the protection of the Union budget, for the implementation of all the EU policies for which EU money is used, including in the context of RRF deployment, and for establishing the scope of investigations and prosecutions by the EPPO, whose competence is established by reference to the PIF Directive, as implemented by national law; expects national authorities, including governments, in all Member States unequivocally to condemn fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and any other misuse of public funds, taking a proactive approach in protecting the financial interests of the Union through effective measures in areas including risk assessment, communication and information sharing, and training of staff; calls on the Commission to intervene in a timely manner through infringement procedures to ensure the consistent transposition of the PIF Directive and the effective liability of – and sanctions for – legal and natural persons;

    107. Reiterates that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection, investigation and prosecution; understands that, by the end of 2023, 24 Member States had adopted national legislation to transpose the Whistleblower Directive and declared their transposition complete; regrets, however, that in March 2023, after analysis of the national measures adopted, the Commission was obliged to refer six Member States to the CJEU for their failure to transpose the Directive and failure to notify transposition measures, asking the Court to impose financial sanctions; is concerned by the further infringement proceedings[44] ongoing against six other Member States; calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of national transposition measures and report to Parliament accordingly; stresses that Parliament itself must also urgently ensure the proper transposition of the Directive, as confirmed by the CJEU ruling of 11 September 2024, which found that Parliament’s current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation; calls for Parliament to immediately adopt robust rules in line with the Directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers;

    108. Notes that the Investigative Division of the European Investment Bank (EIB IG/IN) had made 10 referrals to the EPPO and 17 to OLAF by the end of 2023; is aware that entities which have been found by EIB IG/IN to engage in prohibited practices may be excluded, in other words declared ineligible, for a stated period, from being awarded any contracts or entering into any relationship with the EIB; observes that, in 2023, these exclusion proceedings resulted in the exclusion of five economic operators for a minimum duration of three years, while five other companies reached settlement agreements applying conditionality to their eligibility;

    External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

    109. Welcomes the Commission’s reaction to its call to increase the monitoring of, and control over, the funds under the Global Europe, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for assistance to non-EU countries, as well as via the joint communication with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy[45]; appreciates the Commission’s continuous efforts to ensure that anti-corruption measures are mainstreamed into EU external action instruments; reiterates its recommendation to suspend budgetary support and de-commit funds to non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, without compromising support for the civil population; emphasises that respect for and commitment to promoting EU values is an essential precondition for all partners aspiring to join the Union; reiterates that accession to the EU is a merit-based process whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria; considers that when applying the revised enlargement methodology there should be a particular focus on fundamental reforms, and that fair and rigorous conditionality should be applied as well as reversibility where setbacks occur; considers that appropriate tools must be used to ensure that candidate countries show concrete and sustainable compliance with the rule of law, democratic principles and fundamental rights, both before and after joining the Union;

    110. Observes that in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine will continue to require substantial support in the current and next MFF and, in the perspective of a fair and sustainable peace agreement, Ukraine will need support for post-war reconstruction, including for central government services and reforms;

    111. Considers that the three pillars of the Ukraine Facility could be reshaped accordingly and that reconstruction should align with pre-accession requirements; emphasises the importance of close coordination and cooperation with the Ukraine coordination mechanism established by the G7; calls for the EU and all Member States to increase their support for Ukraine, while putting appropriate measures in place to protect the financial interests of the EU through the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities in the use of Union funds, including by performing more thorough checks, in order to ensure that EU funds sent to Ukraine and to its neighbouring countries are adequately monitored and controlled and end up benefiting those most in need;

    112. Stresses that the unprecedented volume of financial support received by Ukraine from the EU in recent years, and deployed in the extremely adverse conditions imposed by the ongoing war, imply the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that such resources are employed as intended, in particular where they are aimed at benefiting infrastructure and people in need;

    113. Appreciates the work carried out by OLAF and the EPPO in protecting the financial interests of the Union by providing training to increase administrative capacity and autonomy, carrying out investigations in Ukraine and agreeing on the working arrangement with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine to facilitate cooperation in the investigation of corruption; invites the competent EU offices to continue their cooperation with and support for the Ukrainian authorities;

    114. Acknowledges, in this regard, the progress made by Ukraine in advancing reforms related to judicial independence, accountability, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering, despite the difficult conditions caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; encourages Ukraine to continue on the path of reform, including with regard to the influence of oligarchs in politics;

    115. Welcomes the enhanced sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia so far, encompassing the banning of Russian nationals and entities from participating in public procurement contracts in the EU and restrictions on EU funding for Russian publicly owned or controlled entities; recognises, however, that despite the current measures, individuals and entities subject to the sanctions against Russia can still find ways to circumvent the sanctions and calls, therefore, for the EU and the Member States to maintain, reinforce and extend the scope and effectiveness of the sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus;

    116. Recognises that the Member States and their relevant competent authorities are responsible for the effective implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, as well as for identifying breaches and imposing appropriate penalties; underlines the role played by customs authorities and the importance of their close cooperation in strengthening the uniform enforcement of sanctions; welcomes, in this regard, the Baltic Customs Initiative;

    117. Underlines that the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to Palestinian refugees; stresses that the Union budget must continue to provide support to build peace and stability in the Middle East region, combat terrorism, hate, fundamentalism and disinformation, as well as promote human rights, fight impunity and strengthen adherence to the rule of law; emphasises, accordingly, that EU budgets must not support, under any circumstances, activities that go against these objectives; notes that, following the heinous terror attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas and allegations of misuse of EU funds for terrorism, a funding review has been conducted by the Commission, which, although concluding that no evidence has been found, to date, that money had been diverted for unintended purposes (including for support for incarcerated terrorists) and reporting that the safeguards in place worked well, still called for certain additional measures that were deemed necessary; recalls that all hostages taken by Hamas have to be released; emphasises the importance of ensuring that EU funds are effectively allocated and managed in order to achieve their intended goals, even via scrutiny by the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA where appropriate; recalls the ongoing issue of the destruction of EU-funded projects in Gaza and the West Bank and calls for greater accountability and safeguards in this context;

    118. Stresses that suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, is an appropriate measure in the event of failure to take genuine action against widespread corruption; expects priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations, with capacity building via the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies; asks the Commission to ensure, also in cases where funding is suspended, assistance for civil populations, where possible through alternative channels;

    119. Underlines the importance of cooperation with international organisations in combating fraud; regrets the lack of cooperation by some international organisations in providing the ECA with complete, unlimited and timely access to the documents necessary to carry out its tasks; notes that the Commission has stepped up communication with international organisations and calls on it to further intensify efforts to ensure access to all requested documentation;

     

    °

    ° °

    120. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Hamas sympathisers – E-001443/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001443/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Moritz Körner (Renew)

    • 1.Does the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator have an estimate of how many Hamas sympathisers are currently residing in the EU? If so, how many are there, and if not, why not?
    • 2.Since Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, there have been pro-Palestinian demonstrations in many EU Member States. Does the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator know where the financial support for these demonstrations stems from? If not, why not?

    Submitted: 9.4.2025

    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI’s 2024 Internet Crime Complaint Center Report Released

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

    EXINGTON, SC—The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has released its latest annual report. The 2024 Internet Crime Report combines information from 859,532 complaints of suspected Internet crime and details reported losses exceeding $16 billion—a 33% increase in losses from 2023.

    According to the 2024 report, South Carolina ranked 22 out of all states in the number of complaints received by the public. South Carolinians reported $146 million in losses, a $27 million increase from the prior year. As a group, people 60 and older submitted the greatest number of complaints and suffered the most severe financial losses at $58.5 million.

    The top three cyber crimes in South Carolina, by number of complaints, reported by victims in 2024 were: Extortion (1,384), phishing/spoofing (1,259), and personal data breaches (924).

    The top three cyber crimes in South Carolina reported by financial losses were: Business e-mail compromises ($40.8 million), up from $30.6 million in 2023; investment fraud ($38.4 million), down from $42.5 million the previous year; and confidence/romance scams ($15.1 million), up from $11.3 million in 2023.

    “Cyber crime remains a serious and growing threat to South Carolinians, with victims losing millions of dollars annually,” said Reid Davis, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Columbia field office. “The FBI is fully committed to identifying and bringing cybercriminals to justice and empowering the public with the critical tools and awareness. One effort is our outreach to South Carolina seniors where we engage with groups about current online threats and provide them with security measures they can take to stay ahead of the evolving cyber landscape.”

    To promote public awareness, the IC3 produces an annual report to aggregate and highlight the data provided by the public. The quality of the data is a direct reflection of the information the public provides through the IC3 website. The IC3 standardizes the data by categorizing each complaint and analyzes the data to identify and forecast trends in Internet crime. The annual report helps the FBI develop effective relationships with industry partners and share information for investigative and intelligence purposes for law enforcement and public awareness.

    The IC3, which was established in May 2000, houses nine million complaints from the public in its database and continues to encourage anyone who thinks they’ve been the victim of a cyber-enabled crime, regardless of dollar loss, to file a complaint through the IC3 website. The more comprehensive complaints the FBI receives, the more effective it will be in helping law enforcement gain a more accurate picture of the extent and nature of Internet-facilitated crimes.

    The FBI recommends that everyone frequently review consumer and industry alerts published by the IC3. If you or your business are a victim of an Internet crime, immediately notify all financial institutions involved in the relevant transactions, submit a complaint to www.ic3.gov, contact your nearest FBI field office, and contact local law enforcement.

    Learn more about the history of IC3 by listening to this previously released podcast: FBI podcast episode “Inside the FBI: IC3 Turns 20.”

    The full 2024 Internet Crime Report can be found here

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Marystown — Arrest warrant issued for Bradley Stacey

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    Marystown RCMP is looking to arrest wanted man, 43-year-old Bradley Melvin Stacey, who is actively evading police. Stacey is known to frequent St. John’s and was last seen in Marystown.

    Stacey is wanted in relation the following charges:

    • Possession of property obtained by crime – two counts
    • Possession of a forged document – two counts

    No photo is currently available of Stacey.

    Anyone having information about the current location of Bradley Stacey is asked to contact Marystown RCMP at 709-279-3001. To remain anonymous, contact Crime Stoppers: #SayItHere 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), visit www.nlcrimestoppers.com or use the P3Tips app.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: 04.23.2025 Texas Chosen for Groundbreaking Aviation Center After Cruz Push

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas Ted Cruz
    DALLAS, TX – U.S. Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Ted Cruz (R-Texas) today applauded Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy’s announcement that the Texas A&M System will lead a new Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies (CAAT) with laboratory and testing locations in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex and across the Lone Star State.
    Sen. Cruz authored and championed a provision in the bipartisan FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 authorizing the creation of a new federal research and testing center for emerging aviation technologies like drones, air taxis, and supersonic and hypersonic aircraft. With its thriving aviation sector, strong business environment, and robust state university system, Texas was the logical home for such a center. Under the Texas A&M System’s leadership, a consortium of Texas universities, private organizations, and the FAA will advance the research, development, and integration of innovative aviation technologies.
    Upon the announcement, Sen. Cruz said, “When I authored the bipartisan FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, I wrote the language creating the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies with the express intention of bringing that Center to the Dallas-Fort Worth area because of the groundbreaking innovation occurring there. I’m confident this new research and testing center will help the private sector create thousands of high-paying jobs and grow the Texas economy through billions in new investments. I am thankful to Secretary Duffy for recognizing the value of placing the new center in Texas, and I’m grateful to see the Texas A&M System leading this initiative and cultivating the next generation of aviation leaders. This is a significant win for Texas that will impact communities across our state, and I will continue to pursue policies that create new jobs and ensure the Lone Star State continues to lead the way in innovation and the manufacturing of emerging aviation technologies.”
    Secretary Duffy said, “Texas is the perfect place for our new Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies. Under Senator Cruz’s leadership, the state has already established itself as a leader in commercial drone safety testing. From drones delivering your packages to powered lift technologies like air taxis, we are at the cusp of an aviation revolution. The CAAT will ensure we make that dream a reality and unleash American innovation safely.” 
    Texas A&M University System Chancellor John Sharp said, “We’re thrilled the Department of Transportation has selected The Texas A&M University System to lead the Center for Advanced Aviation Technologies in Fort Worth. The Texas A&M System will support DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration to facilitate the integration of advanced air mobility and drive innovation of cutting-edge aviation technologies. And we will do it by harnessing the power and expertise of A&M System members — such as Texas A&M-Corpus Christi’s Autonomy Research Institute, the Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station and George H.W. Bush Combat Development Complex — and leveraging partnerships throughout the country. We thank Chairman Cruz for his vision in establishing this Center.”
    BACKGROUND
    The CAAT Laboratory will be located at Texas A&M Fort Worth and led by Texas A&M Corpus Christi utilizing their Autonomy Research Institute (ARI), which was designated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) test site.
     As an FAA-designated UAS test site, ARI is allowed to test UAS technologies, better known as drones, in a controlled environment, including those not permitted for general use. ARI also benefits from expedited access to Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COAs) for experimental and developmental purposes. These COAs, along with proposed Demonstration Zones at the University of North Texas (UNT), will increase available airspace for testing the integration of new technologies, particularly autonomous aircraft, into the nation’s airspace.
     The program will bring together all 19 members and institutions of the Texas A&M System, as well as University of North Texas (UNT), Southern Methodist University (SMU), University of Texas at Dallas (UTD), University of Texas Arlington (UTA), Virginia Tech’s Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP), Louisiana State University (LSU), and a consortium of private organizations and government entities.
    Last year, Sen. Cruz hosted a roundtable discussion featuring leaders from the ARI at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi and various representatives from across the aviation industry to advocate for Texas to be chosen as the center’s location.  
    To learn more about the project from the Department of Transportation’s announcement, click HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Hawaii Man Convicted of Sex Trafficking Three Adult Women and One Minor

    Source: United States Attorneys General 12

    Isaiah McCoy, 38, of Honolulu, Hawaii, was convicted yesterday of multiple counts of sex trafficking by a federal jury in the District of Hawaii. Specifically, the jury convicted McCoy of four counts of sex trafficking three adults and one minor, two counts of obstructing a sex trafficking investigation, seven counts of interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises, and one count of interstate travel for prostitution purposes.

    “This successful conviction represents this Justice Department’s commitment to putting those who prey on the innocent behind bars,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Human trafficking — which flourished under the prior administration — is a scourge on our country that the Trump Administration will eradicate.”

    “Today’s conviction vindicates the rights of multiple women and girls who the defendant terrorized over several years within the District of Hawaii,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. “The defendant specifically targeted each victim’s unique vulnerabilities and used false promises, brute physical force, and psychological manipulation to compel the victims to engage in commercial sex for his own profit. There is no place in a civilized society for the defendant’s atrocious conduct, and the Justice Department is committed to standing up for vulnerable human trafficking victims and holding their traffickers accountable.”

    “The conviction of Mr. McCoy is a testament to HSI’s zero tolerance for those who engage in sex trafficking in Hawaii,” said Special Agent in Charge Lucy Cabral-DeArmas of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Hawaii. “McCoy is a predator who left countless victims in his path while he sought to enrich himself at their expense. HSI will aggressively pursue those, like McCoy, who seek to exploit vulnerable women and girls and mute their voices while believing they will not be held accountable.”

    The evidence presented at the 12-day trial demonstrated that McCoy compelled victims to commit hundreds of commercial sex acts between 2019 and 2021. McCoy made promises of a romantic relationship, a luxurious lifestyle, and financial security to women and girls struggling with low self-esteem, a difficult upbringing, or financial trouble. McCoy’s promises ended up hollow and false, designed to provide him with the opportunity to learn about a victim’s vulnerabilities while misrepresenting himself as caring and empathetic. McCoy’s feigned romantic interest and claimed wealth led him to emotionally manipulate his victims.

    After luring the victims into his orbit with his false promises, McCoy turned violent and abusive if the victims did not provide him with enough money or otherwise violated one of his many rules. The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that some of McCoy’s rules included requiring the victims to call him “Daddy” or “Zeus,” requiring the victims to share their cell phone location, and requiring the victims to provide him an update on the amount of money earned through commercial sex work. McCoy required his victims to work all hours of the day and night even when they were sick, hungry, or did not want to engage in commercial sex acts. If not, McCoy would physically assault his victims and leave them battered and bruised.

    Evidence presented in court detailed the extensive violence to which McCoy subjected his victims. For example, McCoy repeatedly burned one of the victims with cigar butts when she did not provide him with enough money. On other occasions, McCoy threw victims to the ground before repeatedly stomping on their head, stomach, or hands with his feet. McCoy even smashed a victim’s head against a car door before carrying her unconscious body through a hotel lobby and into an elevator. McCoy inflicted violence against multiple victims that caused them to seek treatment at local hospitals. All of McCoy’s actions contributed to the creation of a climate of fear where the victims felt they had no way out because McCoy promised them that he had eyes and ears everywhere monitoring the victims’ every move.

    McCoy required the victims to turn over all the proceeds from his commercial sex business to himself because he felt that the money belonged to him. McCoy then spent the money on high-end designer shoes, belts, clothing, and other accessories. In contrast, although McCoy would intermittently buy designer items for the victims as “rewards,” the victims were ultimately left with nothing.

    A sentencing hearing is scheduled for Aug. 18. McCoy faces a minimum penalty of 15 years in prison and a maximum penalty of life in prison as well as mandatory restitution. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    HSI investigated the case, with assistance from the Honolulu Police Department.

    Trial Attorneys Maryam Zhuravitsky and Elizabeth Hutson of the Civil Rights Division’s Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit are prosecuting the case.

    Anyone who has information about human trafficking should report that information to the National Human Trafficking Hotline toll-free at 1-888-373-7888, which is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. For more information about human trafficking, please visit www.humantraffickinghotline.org. Information on the Justice Department’s efforts to combat human trafficking can be found at www.justice.gov/humantrafficking.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Mexican National Arrested in Catoosa After Being Deported for Killing His Baby

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    TULSA, Okla. – A Mexican national who was residing in Catoosa was indicted for unlawfully reentering the United States, announced U.S. Attorney Clint Johnson.

    Carlos Ambriz Estrada, 53, is charged with Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien after having been previously removed in January 2006.

    “After serving time in prison for killing his 38-day-old son, Ambriz Estrada was deported. That did not stop him from unlawfully returning to the United States and living in our community,” said U.S. Attorney Clint Johnson. “Prosecutors are working in coordinated efforts with law enforcement to help keep the citizens in the Northern District safe from violent criminals like Ambriz Estrada.”

    “This subject’s criminal record underscores the significant danger he represents to our community, particularly with the serious charge and conviction for killing his own child,” said ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office acting Director Josh Johnson. “Our officers remain committed to enhancing public safety by apprehending and removing criminal aliens who violate immigration laws.”

    According to court documents, in March, the Fugitive Operations Team with Immigration Customs Enforcement began investigating Ambriz Estrada due to his prior conviction of deliberate homicide in Montana and the possibility of him being present in the United States unlawfully. Law enforcement discovered that Ambriz Estrada was unlawfully living in Catoosa and that he did not have permission to re-enter the United States after being removed.

    In 1994, Ambriz Estrada pleaded guilty to deliberate homicide. Montana law enforcement was dispatched to the hospital to investigate apparent child abuse. Ambriz Estrada and his wife brought their 36-day-old baby to the hospital for treatment.

    The detective spoke with a doctor who confirmed that the baby had five broken ribs, detached retinas in both eyes, swelling of the head, bruises on the neck and abdomen, consistent with strangulation. The doctor reported that they believed the baby was strangled and without oxygen for some time, likely causing severe brain damage.

    When being interviewed, Ambriz Estrada admitted that he was angry with his wife and took it out on the baby. That while the baby was crying, he squeezed the child’s throat for 15 to 20 minutes, until the baby lost consciousness. Afterward, he put the baby in a crib. The baby woke up crying one hour later, and Ambriz Estrada admitted to picking up the baby and shaking him. Ambriz Estrada told detectives the baby’s breathing was irregular and appeared to have a seizure.

    After two days in intensive care, the baby had no brain activity and was declared brain dead at 38 days old.

    Ambriz Estrada was ordered to 40 years imprisonment and served nearly 10 years. After being released in 2006, Ambriz Estrada was deported.

    The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations and the Homeland Security Investigations are investigating the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Ammon Brisolara is prosecuting the case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation, and the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    MIL Security OSI