Category: Crime

MIL-OSI Global: The secret to Ukraine’s battlefield successes against Russia – it knows wars are never won in the past
Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

The iconoclastic American general Douglas Macarthur once said that “wars are never won in the past”.

That sentiment certainly seemed to ring true following Ukraine’s recent audacious attack on Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, using small, cheap drones housed in wooden pods and transported near Russian airfields in trucks.

The synchronised operation targeted Russian Air Force planes as far away as Irkutsk – more than 5,000 kilometres from Ukraine. Early reports suggest around a third of Russia’s long-range bombers were either destroyed or badly damaged. Russian military bloggers have put the estimated losses lower, but agree the attack was catastrophic for the Russian Air Force, which has struggled to adapt to Ukrainian tactics.

This particular attack was reportedly 18 months in the making. To keep it secret was an extraordinary feat. Notably, Kyiv did not inform the United States that the attack was in the offing. The Ukrainians judged – perhaps understandably – that sharing intelligence on their plans could have alerted the Kremlin in relatively short order.

Ukraine’s success once again demonstrates that its armed forces and intelligence services are the modern masters of battlefield innovation and operational security.

Finding new solutions

Western military planners have been carefully studying Ukraine’s successes ever since its forces managed to blunt Russia’s initial onslaught deep into its territory in early 2022, and then launched a stunning counteroffensive that drove the Russian invaders back towards their original starting positions.

There have been other lessons, too, about how the apparently weak can stand up to the strong. These include:
- attacks on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vanity project, the Kerch Bridge, linking the Russian mainland to occupied Crimea (the last assault occurred just days ago)
- the relentless targeting of Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure with drones
- attacks against targets in Moscow to remind the Russian populace about the war, and
- its incursion into the Kursk region, which saw Ukrainian forces capture around 1,000 square kilometres of Russian territory.
On each occasion, Western defence analysts have questioned the wisdom of Kyiv’s moves.

Why invade Russia using your best troops when Moscow’s forces continue laying waste to cities in Ukraine?

Why hit Russia’s energy infrastructure if it doesn’t markedly impede the battlefield mobility of Russian forces?

And why attack symbolic targets like bridges when it could provoke Putin into dangerous “escalation”?

The answer to this is the key to effective innovation during wartime. Ukraine’s defence and security planners have interpreted their missions – and their best possible outcomes – far more accurately than conventional wisdom would have thought.

Above all, they have focused on winning the war they are in, rather than those of the past. This means:
- using technological advancements to force the Russians to change their tactics
- shaping the information environment to promote their narratives and keep vital Western aid flowing, and
- deploying surprise attacks not just as ways to boost public morale, but also to impose disproportionate costs on the Russian state.
The impact of Ukraine’s drone attack

In doing so, Ukraine has had an eye for strategic effects. As the smaller nation reliant on international support, this has been the only logical choice.

Putin has been prepared to commit a virtually inexhaustible supply of expendable cannon fodder to continue his country’s war ad infinitum. Russia has typically won its wars this way – by attrition – albeit at a tremendous human and material cost.

That said, Ukraine’s most recent surprise attack does not change the overall contours of the war. The only person with the ability to end it is Putin himself.

That’s why Ukraine is putting as much pressure as possible on his regime, as well as domestic and international perceptions of it. It is key to Ukraine’s theory of victory.

This is also why the latest drone attack is so significant. Russia needs its long-range bomber fleet, not just to fire conventional cruise missiles at Ukrainian civilian and infrastructure targets, but as aerial delivery systems for its strategic nuclear arsenal.

The destruction of even a small portion of Russia’s deterrence capability has the potential to affect its nuclear strategy. It has increasingly relied on this strategy to threaten the West.

A second impact of the attack is psychological. The drone attacks are more likely to enrage Putin than bring him to the bargaining table. However, they reinforce to the Russian military that there are few places – even on its own soil – that its air force can act with operational impunity.

The surprise attacks also provide a shot in the arm domestically, reminding Ukrainians they remain very much in the fight.

Finally, the drone attacks send a signal to Western leaders. US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, for instance, have gone to great lengths to tell the world that Ukraine is weak and has “no cards”. This action shows Kyiv does indeed have some powerful cards to play.

That may, of course, backfire: after all, Trump is acutely sensitive to being made to look a fool. He may look unkindly at resuming military aid to Ukraine after being shown up for saying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would be forced to capitulate without US support.

But Trump’s own hubris has already done that for him. His regular claims that a peace deal is just weeks away have gone beyond wishful thinking and are now monotonous.

Unsurprisingly, Trump’s reluctance to put anything approaching serious pressure on Putin has merely incentivised the Russian leader to string the process along.

Indeed, Putin’s insistence on a maximalist victory, requiring Ukrainian demobilisation and disarmament without any security guarantees for Kyiv, is not diplomacy at all. It is merely the reiteration of the same unworkable demands he has made since even before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

However, Ukraine’s ability to smuggle drones undetected onto an opponent’s territory, and then unleash them all together, will pose headaches for Ukraine’s friends, as well as its enemies.

That’s because it makes domestic intelligence and policing part of any effective defence posture. It is a contingency democracies will have to plan for, just as much as authoritarian regimes, who are also learning from Ukraine’s lessons.

In other words, while the attack has shown up Russia’s domestic security services for failing to uncover the plan, Western security elites, as well as authoritarian ones, will now be wondering whether their own security apparatuses would be up to the job.

The drone strikes will also likely lead to questions about how useful it is to invest in high-end and extraordinarily expensive weapons systems when they can be vulnerable. The Security Service of Ukraine estimates the damage cost Russia US$7 billion (A$10.9 billion). Ukraine’s drones, by comparison, cost a couple of thousand dollars each.

At the very least, coming up with a suitable response to those challenges will require significant thought and effort. But as Ukraine has repeatedly shown us, you can’t win wars in the past.

Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Atlantic Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.

– ref. The secret to Ukraine’s battlefield successes against Russia – it knows wars are never won in the past – https://theconversation.com/the-secret-to-ukraines-battlefield-successes-against-russia-it-knows-wars-are-never-won-in-the-past-258172
MIL OSI – Global Reports –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Getting away with it … sort of. How a dictator and a fugitive Nazi advanced international human rights law

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Olivera Simic, Associate Professor in Law, Griffith University

Pinochet and Rauff? They were alike. Each had two faces. One gentle, the other hard. They were joined.

And they both got away with it … Sort of.

Philippe Sands loves to tell stories. A master of historical non-fiction, he has become known for his unique blend of deeply personal, legal and historical narratives, which weave together incredible coincidences with moving stories of human courage in the face of mass atrocities and horror.

Sands is a leading practitioner of international law, a professor at University College London, an author, a playwright, and the recipient of numerous literary awards. He is also someone whose family was murdered in the vortex of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

With his previous two books, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (2016) and The Ratline: Love, Lies and Justice on the Trail of a Nazi Fugitive (2020), he demonstrated his unique skill in presenting complex legal cases to avid readers.

His latest book, 38 Londres Street: On Impunity, Pinochet in England and a Nazi in Patagonia, rounds out the trilogy.

If it weren’t based on facts, one might think it was a brilliantly crafted thriller.

Review: 38 Londres Street: On Impunity, Pinochet in England and a Nazi in Patagonia – Philippe Sands (Weidenfeld & Nicolson)

38 Londres Street weaves together several narratives, but at its heart is the story of the legal attempts to end impunity for two accused criminals. One is Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. The other is Walther Rauff, a former SS officer who fled to South America and allegedly worked with Pinochet’s Secret Intelligence Service.

Sands brings these two men into a single narrative to highlight the legal struggle against impunity for mass atrocities, though he never loses sight of the victims and their human stories of suffering, courage and persistence.

These were people whose lives were abruptly and violently taken. Sands includes many of their names and tragic fates in his book. He informs his readers that the Cementerio Sara Braun in Punta Arenas, Chile, has a memorial bearing the names of Pinochet’s many victims. He clearly wants these individuals never to be forgotten.

Universal jurisdiction and the Pinochet precedent

The building at 38 Londres Street in Santiago was once a site of pain. At this secret interrogation centre, one of many across Santiago and the rest of Chile, Pinochet’s agents imprisoned, tortured, executed and disappeared tens of thousands of people deemed leftists, socialists, communists or “other undesirables”.

Pinochet came to power on September 11, 1973, overthrowing the democratically elected socialist government of President Salvador Allende in a military coup. He would rule Chile with an iron fist until 1990.

Chile’s youth became the targets of his murderous regime. Sands notes that most victims were between 21 and 30 years old. The majority of them were workers; the rest mainly comprised academics, professionals and students. The atrocities were committed with impunity.

Like all dictators, Pinochet believed himself untouchable. But in October 1998, while visiting the UK, he was arrested in London. Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón was seeking Pinochet’s extradition to Spain in order to try him for human rights abuses.

Garzón was acting under the then-controversial legal principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows courts in one country to prosecute grave human rights violations committed outside its borders, regardless of the nationality of the accused.

Never before had a former head of state of one country been arrested by, and in another, for committing international crimes.

Sands would become involved in one of the most famous cases in international law since the Nuremberg trials more than 50 years earlier. Pinochet’s lawyers offered him an opportunity to participate in the case, arguing for the former dictator’s immunity as a former head of state. His wife threatened to divorce him if he accepted.

He declined the offer. Instead, Sands represented Human Rights Watch when the Pinochet case was considered by the Law Lords.

Pinochet had been indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide. At issue was the question of whether Pinochet, as a former head of state, had immunity before the English courts for acts committed in another country while he was in office. Should there be a legal protection for former dictators?

The proceedings in London were novel and remarkable, writes Sands, because this was an open legal question when Pinochet was arrested. His arrest raised an unprecedented issue: was there an exception to the rule of immunity for a former head of state when a crime in international law was involved? And did the exception apply before a national court, rather than an international one?

Many believed Pinochet’s immunity should be lifted and extradition proceedings should go ahead, so that he could answer for the deaths of Spanish nationals and others. If that did not happen, it was argued, the travesty of justice would signal that any dictator could get away with genocide. As Sands writes, immunity and impunity often go hand in hand.

In this landmark case, Pinochet was stripped of the immunity from prosecution he had enjoyed as a former president. He was ordered to stand trial on charges of human rights abuses.

For the next 16 months, he remained in the UK, awaiting extradition to Spain. But it never happened. The initial judgement on immunity was quashed, due to concerns about possible bias of one of the judges. The case returned to square one. New hearings took place.

In January 2000, the UK eventually decided not to proceed with extradition, claiming that Pinochet was too ill to stand trial and that “it would not be fair”. He was allowed to return to Chile as a free man, thanks to medical doctors rather than lawyers.

Political leaders in Europe generally welcomed the ruling. Margaret Thatcher, former British prime minister and Pinochet’s longstanding ally, was adamant that the lengthy legal wrangle had been a waste of public money. Seemingly agitated, she said in front of the cameras:

Senator Pinochet was a staunch friend of Britain throughout the Falklands War. His reward from this government was to be held prisoner for 16 months. In the meantime, his health has been broken, his reputation tarnished, and vast funds of public money have been squandered on a political vendetta.

Subsequent attempts to prosecute Pinochet in Chile were unsuccessful. He died in 2006 at the age of 91, without ever being tried for the human rights abuses that occurred while he was in power. Retributive justice, in the end, was not served. But Pinochet’s case opened the gates for efforts to bring other former and serving heads of state to justice.

Today, the 38 Londres Street serves as a place of national memory where visitors can walk through its halls and learn about its dark past.

The Nazi who invented the gas chambers

Running parallel with Pinochet’s story is that of Nazi fugitive Walther Rauff.

Rauff invented the mobile gas chambers that were precursors to the gas chambers in Nazi concentration camps. At the end of the second world war, he escaped to South America, settling in Chile. Germany made numerous attempts to have Rauff extradited to face charges, but the Chilean government refused these demands. He spent his days in the backwaters of Patagonia, running a king-crab cannery business.

Sands travels to Patagonia and meets people who remember Rauff, whose identity seems to have been common knowledge among his neighbours and co-workers: “everyone knew rumours and stories of his past”; they knew about “the gas vans” and that he “once killed many people”. But no one seemed to be bothered. They describe Rauff as “cultivated and kind”. To many of Sands’ interlocutors, the stories about Rauff “were long ago and far away”.

While dealing with the failed attempts for his extradition, Rauff put his energies into “harvesting crabs, making sure the tins were packed tight, [and] managing the workers”. He continued to do so, enjoying the company of his dog Bobby, when Pinochet became Chile’s new leader.

Pinochet was an old friend. Sands records that the two men met in the 1950s in Quito, Ecuador, where Rauff was staying, having fled an Italian prison camp at the end of the war. The men shared a contempt for communism and an affinity for German culture. Pinochet encouraged Rauff to move to Chile.

Rauff delighted in Pinochet’s murderous regime. Sands tell us that Pinochet used Rauff’s “expertise” to help with the murder and disappearance of thousands of people. But the controversy over whether Rauff worked for the Chilean military, becoming “chief advisor” to its intelligence services, or perhaps even its “head”, remains unresolved. Definitive and provable evidence about the assistance Rauff may have given to Pinochet was never obtained.

Holding dictators to account

One of the many coincidences Sands stumbles upon is that Rauff lived in Punta Arenas in southern Chile on a street called “Jugoslavija”, named after the country where I was born, which disintegrated in the 1990s in a brutal civil war marked by mass atrocities and genocide.

Former Yugoslavian and Serbian president Slobodan Milošević would become the first-ever serving head of state to be charged with international crimes and extradited to an international court.

Milošević was extradited to The Hague in 2001 after he was indicted for war crimes committed in Kosovo and Croatia, and for genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina following an order from the Serbian government. His trial is widely hailed as a landmark moment in the development of international criminal law, though he died in his cell before his trial ended, dying “innocent” like his counterparts Pinochet and Rauff.

Slobodan Milošević in The Hague, July 2001.
Robert Goddyn, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

In 38 Londres Street, Sands brings to light the behind-the-scenes struggles to hold Pinochet and Rauff accountable. The book explores the intricacies and politics of international law. Despite its bitter ending, Pinochet’s case remains one of the most far reaching and important in the field of human rights. It caused other countries to reflect on their own legal immunities.

As a researcher and academic, I found the book significant because it also offers insight into what it takes to conduct such expansive archival and qualitative research. Over several years, “in between work and life”, Sands travels to different corners of the globe and speaks to informants from all walks of life, including descendants of the perpetrators. He visits the sites of the events he recounts, most of them places marked by pain. He seeks to see and feel a past that still lingers.

His method requires stamina, passion and unwavering diligence. His strong commitment to neutrality, decency and impartiality makes him stand out not only as a highly skilled writer, but a survivor who continues to unpack and share the legacy of the Holocaust. There is much to respect and learn from in Sands’ account, not least about the intricacies of writing a compelling story.

Holding dictators to account is hard. Pinochet and Rauff deprived victims of the retributive justice they needed and deserved. Yet justice and reparations have many different meanings. They can be symbolic too, and still profoundly meaningful to victims. As one of the survivors of Pinochet’s regime replied to Sands when asked whether he believed his case was one of total impunity: “Not quite total […] Dawson [an island detention camp] has been recognised as a site of national memory, a protected monument, and that means something.”

Pinochet and Rauff were never convicted, but they were not free. Pinochet spent years under house arrest, bitter and devastated, unable to walk the streets. Rauff lived in constant fear of being arrested and extradited. They were both haunted. This, after all, may have brought some satisfaction to the victims.

Sands was once asked: “Do you believe in justice?” He replied: “Sort of.” Sands comes to understand that justice is “uneven in its delivery”. He has learned “to tamper expectations”. Maybe we all need to learn that skill from him too. Ultimately, justice remains a work-in-progress, just like the process of learning from a dark past.

Olivera Simic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Getting away with it … sort of. How a dictator and a fugitive Nazi advanced international human rights law – https://theconversation.com/getting-away-with-it-sort-of-how-a-dictator-and-a-fugitive-nazi-advanced-international-human-rights-law-257241

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Grassley, Republican Colleagues Introduce Legislation to Bolster Violent Crime Laws
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley

WASHINGTON – Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) today led 10 Republican colleagues in introducing legislation to strengthen violent crime statutes and help prevent future crime. The Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act would resolve conflicting court decisions by clarifying penalties for violent offenses like carjacking, robbery and kidnapping.

“Under the Biden-Harris administration, our nation saw a massive spike in violent crime. As the Trump administration works to clean up the previous administration’s mess, Congress has a duty to resolve any legal ambiguities that may weaken our ability to hold criminals fully accountable,” Grassley said. “Our bill includes several modest, but meaningful, reforms to tamp down on future crime and ensure justice is served.”

The Combating Violent and Dangerous Crime Act addresses ambiguity and conflicting applications of existing law by clarifying congressional intent. Among other provisions, the bill would:
- Resolve conflicting circuit court decisions that have resulted in a higher burden to charge violent offenses;
- Clarify that an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence involving physical force meets the legal definition of a violent crime;
- Increase the statutory maximum penalty for carjacking and remove a duplicative intent requirement needed to charge a carjacking offense;
- Clarify that attempted bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery are punishable under the current bank robbery statute;
- Outlaw the marketing of candy-flavored drugs to minors; and
- Establish a new category of violent kidnapping offences, allowing for greater penalties for violent kidnapping.
Grassley is joined by Sens. John Boozman (R-Ark.), Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), Bill Cassidy (R-La.), James Lankford (R-Okla.), Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), Susan Collins (R-Maine), Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) and Jim Risch (R-Idaho).

Read the full bill text HERE. Read the section-by-section HERE.

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MIL OSI USA News –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: Teen faces multiple charges of motor vehicle stealing

Source: New South Wales Community and Justice

Teen faces multiple charges of motor vehicle stealing

Thursday, 5 June 2025 – 9:56 am.

Detectives investigating a series of thefts, reckless driving and property damage across Tasmania’s south have this week charged a 15-year-old boy with multiple offences, including 12 counts of stealing a motor vehicle.
Members of Bridgewater CIB arrested and charged the teenager on Tuesday (June 3) following a search of his home at Herdsmans Cove.
During the search of the property, police allege a number of electronic devices were found and which appear to show the boy had used them to post illegal activities online and to social media.
Following police interview, the boy has been charged with multiple offences including motor vehicle stealing, hooning, driving while not the holder of a driver’s licence, unlawfully setting fire to property, and stealing.
Police investigations continue.
Anyone who may have information about illegal youth activities involving theft and the unlawful use of motor vehicles should contact police on 131 444 or contact Crime Stoppers anonymously on 1800 333 000 or online at crimestopperstas.com.au

MIL OSI News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Restricting The Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats

US Senate News:

Source: US Whitehouse
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION
During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of foreign nationals into the United States, which successfully prevented national security threats from reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court upheld. In Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), I stated that it is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.
I also stated that the United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those aliens approved for admission into the United States do not intend to harm Americans or our national interests. More importantly, the United States must identify such aliens before their admission or entry into the United States. The United States must ensure that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.
I directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to identify countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). After completing that process, the Secretary of State determined that a number of countries remain deficient with regards to screening and vetting. Many of these countries have also taken advantage of the United States in their exploitation of our visa system and their historic failure to accept back their removable nationals.
As President, I must act to protect the national security and national interest of the United States and its people. I remain committed to engaging with those countries willing to cooperate to improve information-sharing and identity-management procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks. Nationals of some countries also pose significant risks of overstaying their visas in the United States, which increases burdens on immigration and law enforcement components of the United States, and often exacerbates other risks related to national security and public safety.
Some of the countries with inadequacies face significant challenges to reform efforts. Others have made important improvements to their protocols and procedures, and I commend them for these efforts. But until countries with identified inadequacies address them, members of my Cabinet have recommended certain conditional restrictions and limitations. I have considered and largely accepted those recommendations and impose the limitations set forth below on the entry into the United States by the classes of foreign nationals identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons described in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. I therefore hereby proclaim the following:
Section 1. Policy and Purpose. (a) It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other national security or public-safety threats. Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that policy. These protocols enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United States.
(b) Information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States. Governments manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents. They also control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments, including information about known or suspected terrorists and criminal-history information. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate steps to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share their identity and threat information with the immigration screening and vetting systems of the United States.
(c) Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14161 directed the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, within 60 days of the date of that order, to jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, a report identifying countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the entry or admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
(d) On April 9, 2025, the Secretary of State, with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, presented the report described in subsection (c) of this section, recommending that entry restrictions and limitations be placed on foreign nationals of several countries. The report identified countries for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full suspension of admissions and countries that warrant a partial suspension of admission.
(e) In evaluating the recommendations from the Secretary of State and in determining what restrictions to impose for each country, I consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate Assistants to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I considered foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals. And I further considered various factors, including each country’s screening and vetting capabilities, information sharing policies, and country-specific risk factors — including whether each country has a significant terrorist presence within its territory, its visa-overstay rate, and its cooperation with accepting back its removable nationals.
I also considered the different risks posed by aliens admitted on immigrant visas and those admitted on nonimmigrant visas. Persons admitted on immigrant visas become lawful permanent residents of the United States. Such persons may present national security or public-safety concerns that may be distinct from those admitted as nonimmigrants. The United States affords lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than it does to nonimmigrants. Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to remove than nonimmigrants, even after national security concerns arise, which increases the costs and aggravates the dangers of errors associated with admitting such individuals. And although immigrants are generally subject to more extensive vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is far less reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate maintains inadequate identity-management or information-sharing policies or otherwise poses risks to the national security of the United States.
I reviewed these factors and assessed these goals, with a particular focus on crafting country-specific restrictions. This approach was designed to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent the entry or admission of foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
(f) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after accounting for the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have determined to fully restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(g) I have determined to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 7 countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(h) Sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation describe some of the identity-management or information-sharing inadequacies that led me to impose restrictions. These inadequacies are sufficient to justify my finding that unrestricted entry of nationals from the named countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Publicly disclosing additional details on which I relied in making these determinations, however, would cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and many such details are classified.
Sec. 2. Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern. The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers described in section 5 of this proclamation:
(a) Afghanistan
(i)   The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan. Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Afghanistan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(b) Burma
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent. Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(c) Chad
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent. According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent. The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for United States immigration laws.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Chad as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(d) Republic of the Congo
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of the Republic of the Congo as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(e) Equatorial Guinea
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Equatorial Guinea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(f) Eritrea
(i)   The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals. Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(g) Haiti
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration. This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Haiti as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(h) Iran
(i)   Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Iran as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended.
(i) Libya
(i) There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya. The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Libya as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(j) Somalia
(i)   Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects. A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven. Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States. The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement. Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(k) Sudan
(i)   Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(l) Yemen
(i)   Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. The government does not have physical control over its own territory. Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active United States military operations.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Yemen as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
Sec. 3. Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.
(a) Burundi
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Burundi as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Burundi to the extent permitted by law.
(b) Cuba
(i)    Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States. Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Cuba as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Cuba to the extent permitted by law.
(c) Laos
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent. Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Laos as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Laos to the extent permitted by law.
(d) Sierra Leone
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent. Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Sierra Leone as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Sierra Leone to the extent permitted by law.
(e) Togo
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Togo as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Togo to the extent permitted by law.
(f) Turkmenistan
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Turkmenistan as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Turkmenistan to the extent permitted by law.
(g) Venezuela
(i)   Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Venezuela as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B‑1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Venezuela to the extent permitted by law.
Sec. 4. Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations. (a) Scope. Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any exceptions made pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:
(i)   are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation; and
(ii) do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation.
(b) Exceptions. The suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall not apply to:
(i)     any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
(ii)    any dual national of a country designated under sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by a country not so designated;
(iii)   any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in the following classifications: A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO‑2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6;
(iv)    any athlete or member of an athletic team, including coaches, persons performing a necessary support role, and immediate relatives, traveling for the World Cup, Olympics, or other major sporting event as determined by the Secretary of State;
(v)     immediate family immigrant visas (IR-1/CR-1, IR-2/CR-2, IR-5) with clear and convincing evidence of identity and family relationship (e.g., DNA);
(vi)    adoptions (IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, IH-4);
(vii)   Afghan Special Immigrant Visas;
(viii) Special Immigrant Visas for United States Government employees; and
(ix)    immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran.
(c) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made for certain individuals for whom the Attorney General finds, in her discretion, that the travel by the individual would advance a critical United States national interest involving the Department of Justice, including when individuals must be present to participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses. These exceptions shall be made only by the Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(d) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made case-by-case for individuals for whom the Secretary of State finds, in his discretion, that the travel by the individual would serve a United States national interest. These exceptions shall be made by only the Secretary of State or his designee, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security or her designee.
Sec. 5. Adjustments to and Removal of Suspensions and Limitations. (a) The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director for National Intelligence, devise a process to assess whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented. Within 90 days of the date of this proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, describing his assessment and recommending whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented.
(b) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately engage each of the countries identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation on measures that must be taken to comply with United States screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements.
(c) Additionally, and in light of recent events, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide me an update to the review of the practices and procedures of Egypt to confirm the adequacy of its current screening and vetting capabilities.
Sec. 6. Enforcement. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and organizations, to ensure efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of this proclamation.
(b) In implementing this proclamation, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
(d) This proclamation shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum by the United States, to a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT). Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT, consistent with the laws of the United States.
Sec. 7. Severability. It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States. Accordingly:
(a) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and
(b) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.
Sec. 8. Effective Date. This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern daylight time on June 9, 2025.
Sec. 9. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty‑five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
                             DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senators Coons, Whitehouse, colleagues demand answers from Justice Dept. on decision to shutter specialized unit for cracking down on global drug crime
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), and several of their colleagues sent a letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi questioning the Department of Justice’s plan to end the successful Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) program.

“As the Department’s website notes, OCDETF ‘is the centerpiece of the Attorney General’s strategy to combat transnational-organized crime and to reduce the availability of illicit narcotics in the nation.’ OCDETF oversees coordination of thousands of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to implement a national strategy to dismantle transnational drug cartels, the financial networks that support them, and the flow of drugs from these cartels into the United States,” wrote the senators.

The OCDETF program is the largest anti-crime task force in the country. In just the past two months, OCDETF resources have been used to secure prison sentences for two individuals operating a clandestine fentanyl lab in South Carolina and to take down three prolific Chinese money launderers who have pled guilty to laundering tens of millions of dollars in drug proceeds. Many OCDETF investigations target the cartels’ financial networks, an often-overlooked component of the U.S. strategy to combat drug-trafficking organizations. In Fiscal Year 2023, OCDETF investigations resulted in forfeitures and seizures totaling more than $423 million.

Reporting from Bloomberg revealed that the Trump administration plans to eliminate the OCDETF program, including its support for specialized investigators and prosecutors. Such a decision would kneecap America’s ability to dismantle cartels trafficking illicit fentanyl.

“We seek to fully understand the Department’s plans to cease OCDETF operations. We also seek to ensure that the federal government continues to have a coordinated strategy for working with state and local stakeholders to investigate and hold accountable transnational criminal organizations operating in, or financing the operations of organizations that operate in, the United States,” added the senators.

The senators requested answers to the following questions by June 13, 2025:
1. How many cases has OCDETF led, or supported with funds, intelligence, or other resources, that disrupted fentanyl traffickers’ production, distribution, financing, or money laundering networks?
2. Does the Department intend to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations? If so, please specify how.
3. If the Department intends to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations:
In addition to Senators Coons and Whitehouse, the letter is signed by U.S. Senators Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.).

The text of the letter is available here.
MIL OSI USA News –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Governor Polis Signs New Law Supporting Home Ownership for Colorado Educators
Source: US State of Colorado

DENVER – Today, Governor Polis signed SB25-167 – Invest State Funds to Benefit Communities, sponsored by Senators Judy Amabile and Lisa Frizell, and Representatives Shannon Bird and Meghan Lukens. This law helps expand access to housing for teachers, increasing homeownership and supporting Colorado schools by providing down-payment assistance and expanding housing opportunities that educators can afford.

“We are taking big steps to reduce housing costs and breaking down barriers to home ownership for people across the state. This new law is another step in the right direction, and I’m proud to sign it today, helping more educators get housing they can afford , allowing teachers to live in the communities they choose, and supporting Colorado children in the classroom. I thank the sponsors for their work to tackle housing costs,” said Governor Polis.

Governor Polis also signed:
- SB25-122 – Extending Organ & Tissue Donation Fund, sponsored by President James Coleman and Senator Cleave Simpson, and Representatives Jennifer Bacon and Regina English
- HB25-1013 – Department of Corrections Visitation Rights, sponsored by Representatives Regina English and Jennifer Bacon, and President James Coleman and Senator Tony Exum
Governor Polis signed the following bills into law administratively:
- SB25-017 – Measures to Support Early Childhood Health, sponsored by Senators Lisa Cutter and Iman Jodeh, and Representatives Junie Joseph and Yara Zokaie. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-036 – State Patrol Bonding Exception, sponsored by Senators Marc Catlin and Marc Snyder, and Representatives Sheila Lieder and Ty Winter. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-070 – Online Marketplaces & Third-Party Sellers, sponsored by Senators Larry Liston and Dylan Roberts, and Representatives Ryan Armagost and William Lindstedt. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-075 – License to Sell Vehicles Criminal Offense, sponsored by Senator Julie Gonzales, and Representatives Cecelia Espenoza and Jennifer Bacon. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-126 – Uniform Antitrust Pre-Merger Notification Act, sponsored by Senator Marc Snyder, and Representative Cecelia Espenoza
- SB25-162 – Railroad Safety Requirements, sponsored by Senators Lisa Cutter and Marc Snyder, and Representatives Javier Mabrey and Elizabeth Velasco. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-163 – Battery Stewardship Programs, sponsored by Senators Lisa Cutter and Matt Ball, and Representatives Kyle Brown and Rebekah Stewart. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-173 – Revenue Classification Taxpayers Bill of Rights, sponsored by Senator Mike Weissman, and Representatives Lorena Garcia and Yara Zokaie
- SB25-257 – Modify General Fund Transfers to State Highway Fund, sponsored by Senators Jeff Bridges and Barbara Kirkmeyer, and Representatives Shannon Bird and Rick Taggart. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-258 – Temporarily Reduce Road Safety Surcharge, sponsored by Senators Jeff Bridges and Barbara Kirkmeyer, and Representatives Shannon Bird and Emily Sirota. This bill is bipartisan.
  - “This bill is an important part of our work to save Coloradans money. By cutting vehicle registration fees, we are helping Coloradans keep more of their hard-earned money. This is just one piece of our efforts,” said Governor Jared Polis.
- SB25-261 – Property Tax Deferral Program Administration, sponsored by Senators Judy Amabile and Barbara Kirkmeyer, and Representatives Shannon Bird and Emily Sirota. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-286 – Petroleum Products Fees & Penalties, sponsored by Senators Nick Hinrichsen and Marc Snyder, and Representative Shannon Bird. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-299 – Consumer Protection Residential Energy Systems, sponsored by Senator Katie Wallace, and Representatives Kyle Brown and Matt Soper. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-300 – Revisor’s Bill, sponsored by Senators John Carson and Mike Weissman, and Representatives Stephanie Luck and Sean Camacho. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-305 – Water Quality Permitting Efficiency, sponsored by Senators Barbara Kirkmeyer and Jeff Bridges, and Representatives Shannon Bird and Rick Taggart. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-306 – Performance Audits of Certain State Agencies, sponsored by Majority Leader Robert Rodriguez and Senator Barbara Kirkmeyer, and Representatives William Lindstedt and Rick Taggart. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-316 – Auraria Higher Education Center Appropriations, sponsored by Senators Judy Amabile and Jeff Bridges, and Representatives Rick Taggart and Emily Sirota. This bill is bipartisan.
- SB25-319 – Modification Higher Education Expenses Income Tax Incentive, sponsored by Senators Jeff Bridges and Judy Amabile, and Representatives Shannon Bird and Rick Taggart. This bill is bipartisan.
- HB25-1043 – Owner Equity Protection in Homeowners’ Association Foreclosure Sales, sponsored by Representatives Naquetta Ricks and Jennifer Bacon, and Senator Tony Exum. This bill is bipartisan.
- HB25-1056 – Local Government Permitting Wireless Telecommunications Facilities, sponsored by Representatives Meghan Lukens and Jennifer Bacon, and Senators Dylan Roberts and Nick Hinrichsen. This bill is bipartisan.
  - “This bill will help increase connectivity for Coloradans across the state by breaking down barriers. I appreciate the sponsors for their work on this new law and look forward to seeing increased service across Colorado,” said Governor Jared Polis.
- HB25-1061 – Community Schoolyards Grant Program, sponsored by Representatives Rick Taggart and Jennifer Bacon, and Senators Judy Amabile and Barbara Kirkmeyer. This is a bipartisan bill.
- HB25-1082 – Qualified Individuals Death Certificates, sponsored by Representatives Ron Weinberg and Kyle Brown, and Senators Rod Pelton and Dafna Michaelson Jenet. This is a bipartisan bill.
- HB25-1108 – Prohibitions in Rental Agreements Due to Death, sponsored by Representatives Ron Weinberg and Javier Mabrey, and Senators Barbara Kirkmeyer and Jeff Bridges. This is a bipartisan bill.
- HB25-1161 – Labeling Gas-Fueled Stoves, sponsored by Representative Alex Valdez, and Senators Cathy Kipp and Katie Wallace. This bill is bipartisan.
- HB25-1223 – Capital Needs of Rural and Frontier Hospitals, sponsored by Representatives Dusty Johnson and Meghan Lukens, and Senators Rod Pelton and Dylan Roberts. This is a bipartisan bill.
- HB25-1224 – Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act Modifications, sponsored by Representatives Brianna Titone and Matt Soper, and Senator Marc Snyder. This is a bipartisan bill.
- HB25-1234 – Utility Consumer Protection, sponsored by Representatives Naquetta Ricks and Junie Joseph, and Senators Faith Winter and Katie Wallace
- HB25-1307 – Updating Technical References in Education Law, sponsored by Representatives Stephanie Luck and Michael Carter, and Senators Matt Ball and Janice Rich. This is a bipartisan bill.
- HB25-1324 – Clarify Property Tax Objection & Protest Deadlines, sponsored by Representatives Cecelia Espenoza and Stephanie Luck, and Senators Matt Ball and Marc Catlin. This is a bipartisan bill.
- HB25-1327 – Modify Statewide Ballot Measure Processes, sponsored by Representatives Emily Sirota and Meg Froelich, and Senator Cathy Kipp
- HB25-1300 – Workers’ Compensation Benefits Proof of Entitlement, sponsored by Representative Jenny Willford and Senator Cathy Kipp
- HB25-1317 – Correct Error in Self-Pay Estimate Statute, sponsored by Representatives Brandi Bradley and Michael Carter, and Senator Tony Exum.
###

MIL OSI USA News –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats

US Senate News:

Source: US Whitehouse
COMBATING TERRORISM THROUGH COMMON SENSE SECURITY STANDARDS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Proclamation to protect the nation from foreign terrorist and other national security and public safety threats from entry into the United States.
Pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order 14161, issued on January 20, 2025, titled “Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” national security agencies engaged in a robust assessment of the risk that countries posed to the United States, including regarding terrorism and national security.
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s authority to use section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to protect the United States through entry restrictions.
The Proclamation fully restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 12 countries found to be deficient with regards to screening and vetting and determined to pose a very high risk to the United States: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
The Proclamation partially restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 7 countries who also pose a high level of risk to the United States: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
The Proclamation includes exceptions for lawful permanent residents, existing visa holders, certain visa categories, and individuals whose entry serves U.S. national interests.
SECURING OUR BORDERS AND INTERESTS: The restrictions and limitations imposed by the Proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
It is the President’s sacred duty to take action to ensure that those seeking to enter our country will not harm the American people.
After evaluating a report submitted by the Secretary of State, in coordination with other cabinet officials, President Trump has determined that the entry of nationals from certain countries must be restricted or limited to protect U.S. national security and public safety interests.
The restrictions are country-specific in order to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances.
Some of the named countries have inadequate screening and vetting processes, hindering America’s ability to identify potential security threats before entry.
Certain countries exhibit high visa overstay rates, demonstrating a disregard for U.S. immigration laws and increasing burdens on enforcement systems.
Other countries lack cooperation in sharing identity and threat information, undermining effective U.S. immigration vetting.
Some countries have a significant terrorist presence or state-sponsored terrorism, posing direct risks to U.S. national security.
Several countries have historically failed to accept back their removable nationals, complicating U.S. efforts to manage immigration and public safety.
MAKING AMERICA SAFE AGAIN: President Trump is keeping his promise to restore the travel ban and secure our borders.
President Trump: “We will restore the travel ban, some people call it the Trump travel ban, and keep the radical Islamic terrorists out of our country that was upheld by the Supreme Court.”
In his first term, President Trump successfully implemented a travel ban that restricted entry from several countries with inadequate vetting processes or significant security risks.
The Supreme Court upheld the travel ban, ruling that it “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority” and noting that it is “expressly premised on legitimate purposes.”
This Proclamation builds on President Trump’s first-term travel ban, incorporating an updated assessment of current global screening, vetting, and security risks.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FULL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY
Afghanistan
The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan. Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B1/B2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
Burma
According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent. Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
Chad
According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent. According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent. The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for U.S. immigration laws.
Republic of the Congo
According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
Equatorial Guinea
According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
Eritrea
The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals. Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
Haiti
According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration. This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States.
Iran
Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
Libya
There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya. The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
Somalia
Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects. A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven. Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States. The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement. Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
Sudan
Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent.
Yemen
Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. The government does not have physical control over its own territory. Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active U.S. military operations.
JUSTIFICATION FOR PARTIAL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY (Immigrants and Nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J Visas)
Burundi
According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent.
Cuba
Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States. Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
Laos
According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent. Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
Sierra Leone
According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent. Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
Togo
According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent.
Turkmenistan
According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent.
Venezuela
Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Enhancing National Security by Addressing Risks at Harvard University

US Senate News:

Source: US Whitehouse
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION
Admission into the United States to attend, conduct research, or teach at our Nation’s institutions of higher education is a privilege granted by our Government, not a guarantee. That privilege is necessarily tied to the host institution’s compliance and commitment to following Federal law. Harvard University has failed in this respect, among many others.
The Student Exchange Visa Program (SEVP) depends fundamentally on academic institutions’ good faith, transparency, and full adherence to the relevant regulatory frameworks. This is for crucial national-security reasons. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has long warned that foreign adversaries and competitors take advantage of easy access to American higher education to, among other things, steal technical information and products, exploit expensive research and development to advance their own ambitions, and spread false information for political or other reasons. Our adversaries, including the People’s Republic of China, try to take advantage of American higher education by exploiting the student visa program for improper purposes and by using visiting students to collect information at elite universities in the United States.
Protecting our national security requires host institutions of foreign students to provide sufficient information, when asked, to enable the Federal Government to identify and address misconduct by those foreign students. In my judgment, it presents an unacceptable risk to our Nation’s security for an academic institution to refuse to provide sufficient information, when asked, about known instances of misconduct and criminality committed by its foreign students. This principle is one reason why SEVP regulations require foreign students to obey Federal and State criminal laws and require universities to keep records about foreign students’ studies in the United States — including records relating to criminal activity by foreign students and resulting disciplinary proceedings — and furnish them to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on request.
Crime rates at Harvard University — including violent crime rates — have drastically risen in recent years. Harvard has failed to discipline at least some categories of conduct violations on campus. Given these facts, it is imperative, in my judgment, that the Federal Government be able to assess and, if necessary, address misconduct and crimes committed by foreign students at Harvard.
Despite the risks described above, Harvard University has refused the recent requests of the DHS for information about foreign students’ “known illegal activity,” “known dangerous and violent activity,” “known threats to other students or university personnel,” “known deprivation of rights of other classmates or university personnel,” and whether those activities “occurred on campus,” and other related data. Harvard provided data on misconduct by only three students, and the data it provided was so deficient that the DHS could not evaluate whether it should take further actions. Harvard’s actions show that it either is not fully reporting its disciplinary records for foreign students or is not seriously policing its foreign students. In my judgment, these actions and failures directly undermine the Federal Government’s ability to ensure that foreign nationals admitted on student or exchange visitor visas remain in compliance with Federal law.
These concerns have compelled the Federal Government to conclude that Harvard University is no longer a trustworthy steward of international student and exchange visitor programs. When a university refuses to uphold its legal obligations, including its recordkeeping and reporting obligations, the consequences ripple far beyond the campus. They jeopardize the integrity of the entire United States student and exchange visitor visa system, compromise national security, and embolden other institutions to similarly disregard the rule of law.
Harvard University has also developed extensive entanglements with foreign countries, including our adversaries. According to The Harvard Crimson, Harvard has received more than $150 million in total contributions from foreign governments over the last 5 years, and over $1 billion from foreign sources. Over the last 10 years, Harvard has received more than $150 million from China alone. In exchange, Harvard has, among other things, “repeatedly hosted and trained members of a Chinese Communist Party paramilitary organization,” according to a probe by the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Harvard researchers have also partnered with China-based individuals on research that could advance China’s military modernization, according to the same probe.
Finally, Harvard University continues to flout the civil rights of its students and faculty, triggering multiple Federal investigations. Harvard’s discrimination against disfavored races in admissions was so blatant that the Supreme Court decision ending the practice nationwide bears Harvard’s name. Yet even after that Supreme Court decision, Harvard and its affiliated organizations on campus continue to deny hardworking Americans equal opportunities. Instead of those Americans, Harvard admits students from non-egalitarian nations, including nations that seek the destruction of the United States and its allies, or the extermination of entire peoples. It is not in the interest of the United States to further compound Harvard’s discrimination against non-preferred races, national origins, shared ancestries, or religions by further reducing opportunities for American students through excessive foreign student enrollment.
Considering these facts, I have determined that it is necessary to restrict the entry of foreign nationals who seek to enter the United States solely or principally to participate in a course of study at Harvard University or in an exchange visitor program hosted by Harvard University. Such restrictions are authorized under sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), which authorize the President to suspend entry of any class of aliens whose entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I have determined that the entry of the class of foreign nationals described above is detrimental to the interests of the United States because, in my judgment, Harvard’s conduct has rendered it an unsuitable destination for foreign students and researchers. Until such time as the university shares the information that the Federal Government requires to safeguard national security and the American public, it is in the national interest to deny foreign nationals access to Harvard under the auspices of educational exchange.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the entry into the United States of persons described in section 1 of this proclamation would, except as provided for in section 2 of this proclamation, be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. I hereby proclaim as follows:
Section 1. Suspension of Entry. The entry of any alien into the United States as a nonimmigrant to pursue a course of study at Harvard University under section 101(a)(15)(F) or section 101(a)(15)(M) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F) or 1101(a)(15)(M), or to participate in an exchange visitor program hosted by Harvard University under section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J), is suspended and limited, subject to section 2 of this proclamation. That suspension and limitation shall expire, absent extension, 6 months after the date of this proclamation.
Sec. 2. Scope and Implementation of Suspension and Limitation on Entry. (a) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall apply to aliens who enter or attempt to enter the United States to begin attending Harvard University through the SEVP after the date of this proclamation.
(b) The Secretary of State shall consider, in the Secretary’s discretion, whether foreign nationals who currently attend Harvard University and are in the United States pursuant to F, M, or J visas and who otherwise meet the criteria described in section 1 of this proclamation should have their visas revoked pursuant to section 221(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1201(i).
(c) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall not apply to any alien who enters the United States to attend other universities through the SEVP.
(d) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall not apply to any alien whose entry would be in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or their respective designees.
(e) No later than 90 days after the date of this proclamation, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a recommendation on whether an extension or renewal of the suspension and limitation on entry in section 1 of this proclamation is in the interests of the United States.
Sec. 3. Operational Action to Implement this Order. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate to take all necessary and appropriate action to implement this proclamation. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall also consider using their respective authorities under the INA to impose limitations on Harvard University’s ability to participate in the SEVP and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. Any such actions should include an exception for any alien whose entry would be in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or their respective designees.
Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: Devonport man charged after police seize illegal firearms, taser

Source: New South Wales Community and Justice

Devonport man charged after police seize illegal firearms, taser

Thursday, 5 June 2025 – 9:40 am.

A man has been charged after police seized three illegal firearms and a taser during a targeted search at a West Ulverstone residence yesterday.
During the search, members of Taskforce Scelus located and seized three gel blasters, the taser, drug paraphernalia, and a quantity of cash believed to be proceeds of crime.
A 46 year old West Ulverstone man was arrested and has since been charged with multiple firearms offences, and minor drug-related offences.
He was detained to appear in the Devonport Magistrates Court today.
Anyone with information about illegal firearms should contact police on 131 444 or Crime Stoppers Tasmania anonymously on 1800 333 000 or online at crimestopperstas.com.au

MIL OSI News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: SFCT uncovers sophisticated scheme

Source: New places to play in Gungahlin

A recent operation led by the ATO’s Serious Financial Crime Taskforce (SFCT) has resulted in jail time for a Victorian woman.

Paolo Esmaquel implemented an elaborate scheme to obtain fraudulent GST refunds by assuming the identities of 3 different individuals.

One of the assumed identities was registered by Ms Esmaquel as a tax practitioner with the Tax Practitioners Board (TPB). To do this, she submitted forged documents to the TPB that falsely claimed she completed the required tertiary education to become a tax agent and forged a declaration from a chartered accountant.

Following this, she set up a tax agent profile on ATO Online Services and linked several taxpayers to her account. Ms Esmaquel then lodged 10 fraudulent business activity statements on behalf of these taxpayers without their knowledge or consent.

An investigation by the ATO and the Tax Practitioners Board uncovered the identity fraud and cancelled the fake tax agent registration.

Read more about the recent prosecution in our media release.

Protect yourself and your clients

We all have a role to play in fraud prevention and this serves as a timely reminder to keep your client, business and personal information safe.

MIL OSI News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Luján, Klobuchar Lead Senate Spotlight Forum on Devastating Impact of GOP SNAP Cuts
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-New Mexico)

Spotlight Forum Follows CBO Analysis Warning That Millions of Food-Insecure Americans Will Face Higher Food Costs;

Lawmakers, Experts Warn of National Hunger Crisis and State Budget Shortfalls Under GOP Proposal

More photos available HERE.

Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Food and Nutrition, Specialty Crops, Organics, and Research, and U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Ranking Member of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, led a Senate Spotlight Forum titled “Hunger by Design: The GOP’s Assault on SNAP,” bringing together national experts and advocates to highlight the dangerous consequences of Congressional Republicans’ proposal to slash the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) by $300 billion.

SNAP is a lifeline for over 42 million Americans, including 16 million children, 8 million seniors, 4 million people with disabilities, and 1.2 million veterans. The forum followed House Republicans’ Big, Beautiful Betrayal of American families – cutting SNAP by 30% – the largest cut in the program’s history. These cuts will raise grocery costs for more than 4 million Americans in need by taking away or reducing their food assistance.

“The House Republican bill proposes the deepest cuts to SNAP in American history – gutting $300 billion in nutrition assistance and forcing states to take on more than $150 billion in costs. This would dismantle one of our most effective anti-poverty programs and hurt millions of Americans – including children, seniors, veterans, and people with disabilities,” said Senator Luján. “In New Mexico, I’ve heard directly from food banks, farmers, and families already stretched thin. These cuts would only make it harder for them to get by.

“I was honored to lead this forum alongside Senator Klobuchar and to stand with my Democratic colleagues in fighting these extreme GOP cuts. I was especially proud to elevate the voice of Katy Anderson from Roadrunner Food Bank of New Mexico, who brought critical insight into how these cuts would impact communities on the ground. The testimony of our witnesses reminded us what’s really at stake – and why we have to keep fighting,” continued Senator Luján.

“House Republicans’ bill will rip the rug out from under families who count on SNAP to put food on the table. It will mean more seniors, children, veterans, and people with disabilities will go to bed hungry,” said Senator Klobuchar.

“The House Republican bill will upend state budgets – forcing states to make impossible choices between food assistance and other priorities, like education, health, and public safety. It will devastate our farmers, who stand to lose $35 billion in revenue over the next decade. It will mean more food pantries with empty shelves. These cuts will cost jobs and wages for everyone who is a part of the food system – from truck drivers to local grocers. SNAP supports nearly 390,000 jobs and $20 billion in wages every year for workers. We are fighting this in the Senate every step of the way,” continued Senator Klobuchar.

Witnesses warned that the House bill would reduce or terminate food assistance for millions and shift over $150 billion in costs to states, forcing them to cut benefits or restrict eligibility. These changes could strain state budgets, particularly when combined with similar proposed Medicaid cuts.

The forum featured testimony from:
- Dr. Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Margaret Walker Alexander Professor, Northwestern University
- Barbara C. Guinn, Commissioner, NY State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance
- Katy Anderson, Vice President of Strategy, Partnerships and Advocacy, Roadrunner Food Bank of New Mexico
- Jade Johnson, Mother and Student
“SNAP provides very important help to a very wide range of Americans who struggle to put food on the table. The provisions in the recently passed House bill would cause substantial harm to children, older Americans, and low-wage workers. This new requirement for states to pay for up to 25% of SNAP benefits would substantially reduce the effectiveness of the program in times of economic downturn,” said Dr. Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach in her opening statement.

“The cuts put forward by the recently passed House reconciliation bill would harm individuals and states nationwide by forcing billions of dollars in annual cost shifts alongside unprecedented administrative hurdles that will harm households that rely on SNAP,” said Barbara C. Guinn in her opening statement.

“SNAP continues to be our country’s most important and effective anti-hunger program. It plays an important role in New Mexico, with 21 percent of the state’s residents relying on the program in order to ensure access to food. More than 61 percent of participants are in families with children, 31 percent are in families with members who are older adults or are disabled, and 43% are in working families. The vast majority of SNAP recipients in New Mexico and across the country are children and seniors,” said Katy Anderson in her opening statement.

“SNAP benefits are the only way we can regularly afford to put food on the table. I would never have time to work a third job to make up for the loss of my SNAP benefits and care for my child effectively. With costs going up on things like rent and other basic necessities, my income gets completely eaten up before I am able to even think about buying food,” said Jade Johnson in her opening statement.

The lawmakers and experts warned that an estimated 500,000 children would lose school meals tied to SNAP eligibility; emergency food providers, already stretched thin, would be unable to meet the increased demand; and farmers, rural grocery stores, and small businesses would see declines in revenue.

Since its creation, SNAP has operated with a consistent national benefit structure that ensures Americans, no matter where they live, can access basic nutrition. The proposed changes would undermine that structure and deepen hunger across the country.

Footage of the full forum can be found HERE.
MIL OSI USA News –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Luján, Whitehouse, Durbin, Blumenthal, Coons Question DOJ Decision to Shutter Specialized Unit for Cracking Down on Transnational Crime
US Senate News:
Source: United States Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-New Mexico)

The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces program has helped arrest fentanyl traffickers, seize hundreds of tons of narcotics, and confiscate billions in dirty money

Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senators Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), and Chris Coons (D-Del.) sent a letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi questioning the Department of Justice’s plan to end the successful Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) program.

“As the Department’s website notes, OCDETF ‘is the centerpiece of the Attorney General’s strategy to combat transnational-organized crime and to reduce the availability of illicit narcotics in the nation.’ OCDETF oversees coordination of thousands of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to implement a national strategy to dismantle transnational drug cartels, the financial networks that support them, and the flow of drugs from these cartels into the United States,” wrote the senators.

The OCDETF program is the largest anti-crime task force in the country. In just the past two months, OCDETF program resources have been used to secure prison sentences for two individuals operating a clandestine fentanyl lab in South Carolina and to take down three prolific Chinese money launderers who pleaded guilty to laundering tens of millions of dollars in drug proceeds. Many OCDETF investigations target the cartels’ financial networks, an often-overlooked component of the U.S. strategy to combat drug-trafficking organizations. In Fiscal Year 2023, OCDETF investigations resulted in forfeitures and seizures totaling more than $423 million.

Reporting from Bloomberg in May revealed that the Trump Administration plans to eliminate the OCDETF program, including its support for specialized investigators and prosecutors, in a move that would kneecap America’s ability to dismantle cartels trafficking illicit fentanyl.

“We seek to fully understand the Department’s plans to cease OCDETF operations. We also seek to ensure that the federal government continues to have a coordinated strategy for working with state and local stakeholders to investigate and hold accountable transnational criminal organizations operating in, or financing the operations of organizations that operate in, the United States,” added the senators.

The senators requested answers to the following questions by June 13, 2025:
1. How many cases has OCDETF led, or supported with funds, intelligence, or other resources, that disrupted fentanyl traffickers’ production, distribution, financing, or money laundering networks?
1. Does the Department intend to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations? If so, please specify how.
1. If the Department intends to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations:
1. Why is the Department choosing to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations?
1. How will the Department ensure that ongoing OCDETF investigations and prosecutions continue uninterrupted?
1. According to GAO, “OCDETF cases must have a financial component” to facilitate the targeting of financial networks underpinning drug trafficking organizations. How will the Department ensure that OCDETF-enabled inter-agency coordination on investigations into the financial networks of fentanyl traffickers and transnational criminal organizations continues uninterrupted?
1. How will the Department ensure that federal, state, and local law enforcement relying on OCDETF’s Fusion Center intelligence products are not hampered by a cessation or reduction of OCDETF operations?
1. Does the Department intend to designate another entity to coordinate investigations and prosecutions of transnational criminal organizations, unrelated to low-level offenders? If so, which entity?
The text of the letter is below and a PDF is available here.

Dear Attorney General Bondi:

We write to request information on the Department of Justice’s plans to terminate its Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) program. On May 5, 2025, Bloomberg reported that DOJ has begun the process of “closing down” OCDETF and “zeroing” out its budget in Fiscal Year (FY) 2026.

As the Department’s website notes, OCDETF “is the centerpiece of the Attorney General’s strategy to combat transnational-organized crime and to reduce the availability of illicit narcotics in the nation.” OCDETF oversees coordination of thousands of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to implement a national strategy to dismantle transnational drug cartels, the financial networks that support them, and the flow of drugs from these cartels into the United States. By leveraging resources from its participating and partner agencies, OCDETF can pursue investigations into the highest-level criminal actors behind these drug crime networks.

OCDETF’s intelligence products and insights enhance the capacity of federal, state, and local law enforcement. In FY 2023, OCDETF Fusion Center analysts disseminated 4,141 intelligence products to 36,693 law enforcement personnel across the country. These resources buoy state and local agencies that may otherwise lack the expertise or funds to launch longer, more complex investigations.

According to DEA, “since OCDETF’s inception tens of thousands of arrests have been made and hundreds of tons of narcotics and billions in currency, real property, and conveyances have all been seized.” And as the Department of Justice noted upon the 40th anniversary of President Reagan’s establishment of OCDETF, “[s]ome of the department’s most notable successes against drug cartels have resulted from OCDETF coordinated investigations and prosecutions.” These successes include “taking down the powerful Colombian cartels of the 1980s, the notorious and violent Mexican cartels . . . in the 1990s; and the methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl and opioid threats from all over the world in the last two decades.”

OCDETF investigations continue to deliver. This month, DOJ announced that “three members of a prolific Chinese money laundering organizations plead[ed] guilty to laundering tens of millions of dollars in drug proceeds.” In April, DEA reported that two individuals operating a clandestine fentanyl lab in South Carolina “were each sentenced to 15 years in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl.” OCDETF resources were used for both cases.

Many OCDETF-supported investigations that result in financial forfeitures or seizures channel money into government funds, which can be used to pay for the expenses associated with forfeiture operations, as well as certain investigative costs. In FY 2023, closed OCDETF investigations resulted in forfeitures and seizures totaling $423.1 million. These benefits are in addition to money judgments resulting from ODCETF investigations, which ranged between $125 million to over $750 million from FY 2019 to FY 2023.

We seek to fully understand the Department’s plans to cease OCDETF operations. We also seek to ensure that the federal government continues to have a coordinated strategy for working with state and local stakeholders to investigate and hold accountable transnational criminal organizations operating in, or financing the operations of organizations that operate in, the United States. Thus, we request that you provide answers to the following questions.
1. How many cases has OCDETF led, or supported with funds, intelligence, or other resources, that disrupted fentanyl traffickers’ production, distribution, financing, or money laundering networks?
1. Does the Department intend to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations? If so, please specify how.
1. If the Department intends to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations:
1. Why is the Department choosing to cease or significantly reduce OCDETF operations?
1. How will the Department ensure that ongoing OCDETF investigations and prosecutions continue uninterrupted?
1. According to GAO, “OCDETF cases must have a financial component” to facilitate the targeting of financial networks underpinning drug trafficking organizations. How will the Department ensure that OCDETF-enabled inter-agency coordination on investigations into the financial networks of fentanyl traffickers and transnational criminal organizations continues uninterrupted?
1. How will the Department ensure that federal, state, and local law enforcement relying on OCDETF’s Fusion Center intelligence products are not hampered by a cessation or reduction of OCDETF operations?
1. Does the Department intend to designate another entity to coordinate investigations and prosecutions of transnational criminal organizations, unrelated to low-level offenders? If so, which entity?
Please provide your response to our questions no later than June 13, 2025.
MIL OSI USA News –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Eight Sentenced in Eastern Panhandle Fentanyl Drug Trafficking Operation
Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

MARTINSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA – Eight people have been sentenced for their roles in an Eastern Panhandle drug trafficking organization.

The indictment, returned in January 2024 against Gary Brown, Jr. and eighty-one others, charged that the defendants caused substantial amounts of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine to be distributed in Berkeley and Jefferson Counties.

Those sentenced this week include:
- Eric Garner, also known as “Pops,” age 58, of Baltimore, Maryland, was sentenced to 300 months.
- Gary Rodriguez, also known as “Mr. T,” age 34, of Lanham, Maryland, was sentenced to 240 months in prison.
- Benjamin Paul Knotts, age 49, of Charles Town, West Virginia, was sentenced to 235 months in prison.
- Damian Costello, age 28, of Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, was sentenced to 180 months in prison.
- Michael Bradley Decker, age 44, of Inwood, West Virginia, was sentenced to 97 months.
- Gary Brown, III, age 20, of Baltimore, Maryland, was sentenced to 36 months.
- Wendy Diane Crites, age 58, of Charles Town, West Virginia, was sentenced to 27 months in federal prison.
- Michael Regale Luckett, age 47, of Martinsburg, West Virginia, was sentenced to 9 months in federal prison.
Of the 82 defendants, 81 have been convicted. Including this week’s eight, 70 defendants have been sentenced. One defendant, Charles Delroy Singletary, age 44, of Baltimore, Maryland, remains a fugitive.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Lara Omps-Botteicher and Kyle Kane prosecuted the cases on behalf of the government.

U.S. District Judge Gina M. Groh presided.

Investigative agencies include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Pittsburgh Field Division and Baltimore Field Division); the Drug Enforcement Administration; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Investigations; the United States Postal Inspection Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the United States Marshals Service; the Eastern Panhandle Drug Task Force, a HIDTA-funded initiative; the West Virginia State Police; the West Virginia Air National Guard; the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office; the Berkeley County Sheriff’s Office; Ranson Police Department; Martinsburg Police Department; Charles Town Police Department; the Berkeley County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office; Stafford County Sheriff’s Office (Virginia); Frederick County Sheriff’s Office (Maryland); Frederick County Sheriff’s Office (Virginia); Winchester Police Department; and the Clarke County Sheriff’s Office (Virginia).

This investigation is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

MIL Security OSI –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Tampa Man Sentenced To 20 Years For The Sex Trafficking Of Two Minors And Producing Child Sex Abuse Material

Source: United States Department of Justice (Human Trafficking)

Tampa, Florida – U.S. District Judge Mary S. Scriven has sentenced Dontae D. Burton (40, Tampa) to 20 years in federal prison for sex trafficking a minor and production of child sex abuse material. A federal jury found Burton guilty on January 15, 2025.

According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Burton arranged commercial sexual activity for two minors, ages 16 and 17, by creating and posting ads for them on adult escort websites. Burton handled all communications with clients, scheduled dates, determined the amount of money to be paid for the sex acts, and transported the victims to and from the dates. Burton managed the money and kept approximately half of what the clients had paid for the sex acts. Burton also recorded and edited a video of one of the victims performing a sex act on him.

“This sentence reflects the severity of Dontae Burton’s crimes of exploiting two vulnerable minors for commercial sex and creating child sexual abuse material in the process,” said Homeland Security Investigations Tampa assistant Special agent in Charge Kristopher Pagitt. “Protecting children from predators who traffic and abuse them remains one of HSI’s highest priorities, and we will continue to pursue justice for the victims.”

This case was investigated by Homeland Security Investigations and the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office. It was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Courtney Derry.

This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Manhattan man sentenced to 7 years in prison on drug charges

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

MISSOULA – A Manhattan, Montana man who distributed methamphetamine was sentenced today to 84 months in prison to be followed by 5 years of supervised release, U.S. Attorney Kurt Alme said.

Kevin Andrew Bacon, 51, pleaded guilty in January 2025 to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and one count of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances.

U.S. District Judge Dana L. Christensen presided.

The government alleged in court documents that in June 2022, law enforcement officers began investigating a drug trafficking ring operating in and around Butte. The conspiracy operated in part by sending drugs through the mail from California to Montana. For a substantial portion of the conspiracy, several of the conspirators operated out of a residence in Whitehall, MT.

The investigation led to the arrest of several conspirators in early January 2023 and the seizure of approximately 13 pounds of methamphetamine. On February 23, 2023, law enforcement located a package sent from California to “Kevin Bacon” in Manhattan, MT. Law enforcement searched the package and located 873.5 grams of actual methamphetamine inside.

On February 28, 2023, Bacon arrived at the post office in Manhattan and picked up the package. Bacon was arrested as he exited the building with the package. He told investigators he had a friend in Whitehall who sold methamphetamine, and that friend had asked Bacon to receive a package at Bacon’s P.O. Box, which Bacon knew would contain drugs.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Brian Lowney prosecuted the case. The investigation was conducted by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Homeland Security Investigations, Gallatin County Sheriff’s Office and Montana Division of Criminal Investigation.

This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results. For more information about Project Safe Neighborhoods, please visit Justice.gov/PSN.

XXX

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Dominican National Arrested for his Unlawful Reentry into the United States and for Distributing Fentanyl and One Pound of Methamphetamine

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

CONCORD – A Dominican man was arrested in connection with immigration and drug offenses, Acting U.S. Attorney Jay McCormack announces.

Robely Eladio De Jesus Guerrero, 37, a citizen of the Dominican Republic unlawfully residing in Massachusetts, was charged with unlawful reentry of a deported alien and distribution of controlled substances, specifically methamphetamine and fentanyl. He appeared in federal court today and was detained. His next hearing is scheduled for June 20, 2025.

According to the charging documents, De Jesus Guerrero was deported to the Dominican Republic from the United States in November 2021. He was encountered again by law enforcement in August and September 2024 in New Hampshire.

Between August and September 2024, De Jesus Guerrero allegedly distributed approximately 120 grams of fentanyl and approximately one pound of methamphetamine.

The charges of distribution of a controlled substance and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance carry a sentence of up to 20 years’ incarceration, not less than 3 years of supervised released, and a fine up to $1,000,000. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and statutes which govern the determination of a sentence in a criminal case.

The Drug Enforcement Administration investigated this case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew T. Hunter is prosecuting the case.

This effort is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

The details contained in the charging documents are allegations. The defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

###

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Jackson Man Sentenced to Over 18 Years in Prison for Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Possession with the Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Jackson, MS – A Jackson man, Marcus Guice, was sentenced on May 30, 2025 to 175 months in federal prison and 3 years of supervised release for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and 175 months in federal prison and 5 years of supervised release for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, both sentences and terms of supervised release to run concurrently. Since his criminal conduct was in violation of his federal supervised release, Guice was also sentenced to an additional 46 months in federal prison to run consecutive to the 175-month prison term.

According to court documents, in and around December 2019 and continuing through January 2020, communications between Guice and his coconspirators were intercepted wherein they negotiated and conducted the sale of marijuana, cocaine, cocaine base (commonly known as “crack”), and methamphetamine in the Jackson, Mississippi area. Guice and his coconspirators are responsible for over 69,000 kilograms of converted drug weight being sold in the Jackson, Mississippi area in a two-month period.

In addition to the prison sentence, Guice was ordered to pay a $1,500 fine.

Acting U.S. Attorney Patrick A. Lemon of the Southern District of Mississippi; and Special Agent in Charge Robert Eikhoff of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made the announcement.

The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jackson Police Department and Ridgeland Police Department, and was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Keesha Middleton.

This case is part of Operation Take Back America (https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1393746/dl?inline) a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Oktibbeha County Man Sentenced in OCDETF Illegal Firearm and Drug Trafficking Case

Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Oxford, MS – A Starkville, Mississippi man was sentenced today to over six years for illegal gun possession and drug trafficking.

According to court documents, Michael Anthony Doss, of Starkville, Mississippi, pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District to Mississippi to being a felon in possession of a firearm and trafficking methamphetamine. Doss was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Debra M. Brown on Wednesday to 78 months in prison for the charges. He was further sentenced to three years supervised release following his release from prison.

“Drug dealers and guns are a lethal combination, and I am extremely proud of the work done by our state and local partners and ATF to bring this defendant to justice and protect our communities,” said U.S. Attorney Clay Joyner.

“This sentence sends a clear message that drug trafficking and gun violence will not be tolerated in Mississippi. I’m proud of the collaborative efforts of our local, state, and federal partners who worked tirelessly to bring this individual to justice. Together, we are making our communities safer,” said Department of Public Safety Commissioner Sean Tindell.

The Drug Enforcement Administration, the Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s Department, Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives investigated the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Clyde McGee prosecuted the case.

This investigation and resulting case is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

This case is also a part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Woodside’s North West Shelf approval is by no means a one-off. Here are 6 other giant gas projects to watch

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samantha Hepburn, Professor, Deakin Law School, Deakin University

GREG WOOD/AFP via Getty Images

The federal government’s decision to extend the life of Woodside’s North West Shelf gas plant in Western Australia has been condemned as a climate disaster.

The gas lobby claims more gas is needed to secure energy supplies, pointing to predicted gas shortages in parts of Australia in the short term. But given most proposed gas projects are directed at the export market, the problem is likely to persist.

And the science is clear: no fossil fuel projects can be opened if the world is to avoid catastrophic climate change.

Despite this, a slew of polluting gas projects are either poised to begin operating in Australia, or lie firmly in the sights of industry.

How Australia’s gas contributes to climate change

Gas production in Australia harms the climate in two ways.

The first is via “fugitive” emissions – leaks and unintentional releases that occur when gas is being extracted, processed and transported. These emissions are typically methane, which traps more heat in the atmosphere per molecule than carbon dioxide.

Fugitive emissions count towards Australia’s greenhouse gas accounts, comprising about 6% of our total emissions.

So, government approval for new gas projects undermines Australia’s commitment to reaching net-zero emissions. Labor enshrined this goal in legislation in its previous term of government, and all states and territories have also adopted it.

The second climate harm occurs when Australia’s gas is burned for energy overseas. Those emissions do not count towards our national emissions accounts, but they substantially contribute to global warming.

Under national environment law, the federal government is not required to consider the potential harm a project might cause to the global climate. This loophole means fossil fuel developments can continue to win government backing.

Below, I outline six of the biggest gas projects Australia has in the pipeline.

1. Barossa Gas Project

This A$5.6 billion project by energy giant Santos is located in the Timor Sea, about 300km north of Darwin. The Australian government’s offshore energy regulator approved it in April this year.

The project will extract gas from the Barossa field and transport it to a liquified natural gas (LNG) facility in Darwin for processing and export.

The venture would reportedly be among the worst polluting oil and gas projects in the world. On one estimate, it would release about 380 million tonnes of climate pollution over its 25-year life.

2. Scarborough Pluto Train 2

Pluto Train 2 is an extension of Woodside’s existing Scarborough project, centred around a gas field about 375km off WA’s Pilbara coast. A 430-kilometre pipeline would connect that gas to a second LNG train at a facility near Karratha. “Train” refers to the unit in a plant that turns natural gas into liquid.

The project has federal and state approval. It is about 80% complete and scheduled to begin operating by next year. According to Climate Analytics, the expansion would create about 9.2 million tonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent each year.

3. Surat Phase 2

This coal seam gas project in Gladstone, Queensland, would be operated by Arrow energy – a joint venture between Shell and PetroChina.

It involves substantially expanding existing gas fields by building up to 450 new production wells. The project is expected to supply 130 million cubic feet of gas each day at its peak, and has been opposed by environment groups.

4. Narrabri Gas Project

This $3.6 billion Santos project in northwest New South Wales involves drilling up to 850 coal seam gas wells over 95,000 hectares. The National Native Title Tribunal last month ruled leases for the project could be granted, leaving Santos only a few regulatory barriers to clear.

Environmental groups and Traditional Owners say the project threatens water resources, biodiversity and Indigenous sites. However, the tribunal found the project’s benefits to energy reliability outweighed those concerns.

5. Beetaloo Basin

The Beetaloo Basin is located 500km southeast of Darwin. It covers 28,000 kilometres and is estimated to contain up to 500 trillion cubic feet of gas. A number of companies are vying for the right to develop the huge resource.

It is predicted to emit up to 1.2 billion tonnes over 25 years. A CSIRO report says Beetaloo could be tapped without adding to Australia’s net emissions. However, experts say the report was too optimistic and relies far too heavily on carbon offsets.

6. Browse Basin

Browse Basin, 425 kilometres north of Broome off WA, is considered Australia’s biggest reserve of untapped conventional gas.

Woodside plans to develop the Browse gas fields, but the area is remote and difficult to access. According to the ABC, Woodside’s North West Shelf project is considered the last hope for extracting the valuable resource.

Environmental groups say the project, if approved, would emit 1.6 billion tonnes of climate pollution – three times Australia’s current annual emissions.

The basin is also located near the pristine Scott Reef, a significant coral reef ecosystem.

A major disconnect

The projects listed above, if they proceed, weaken Australia’s efforts to reach its emission reduction goals. And their overall climate impact is truly frightening.

The re-elected Labor government has pledged to revisit attempts to reform national environment laws. This presents a prime opportunity to ensure the climate harms of fossil fuel projects are key to environmental decision making.

Samantha Hepburn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Woodside’s North West Shelf approval is by no means a one-off. Here are 6 other giant gas projects to watch – https://theconversation.com/woodsides-north-west-shelf-approval-is-by-no-means-a-one-off-here-are-6-other-giant-gas-projects-to-watch-257899

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

Source: United States Attorneys General

A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

“This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

“Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

“This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States.

If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion

Source: United States Attorneys General

A New Jersey man pleaded guilty today to tax evasion.

The following is according to court documents and statements made in court: for tax years 2015 and 2016, Matthew Tucci, of West Long Branch, filed tax returns that stated he owed more than $2 million in taxes for both years. Despite admitting that he owed those taxes, Tucci did not fully pay them when they were due. Instead, Tucci purchased real estate and engaged in a series of transactions designed to conceal his interest in those properties.

In 2017, the IRS sent notices to Tucci that he owed taxes, interest, and penalties for 2015 and 2016. After receiving these notices, Tucci transferred multiple properties to an entity owned by another individual, but he continued to exert control over at least two of them. Of the two properties Tucci continued to control, he sold one and refinanced the other. Tucci used the proceeds from these transactions to pay his personal expenses rather than his tax debts. In 2019, Tucci submitted documents to the IRS that falsely claimed that he had no connection to the entity that owned the 12 properties.

Tucci is scheduled to be sentenced on Oct. 9. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison as well as a period of supervised release, restitution, and monetary penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Karen E. Kelly of the Justice Department’s Tax Division and Acting U.S. Attorney Alina Habba for the District of New Jersey made the announcement.

IRS Criminal Investigation and the FBI are investigating the case.

Trial Attorney Catriona Coppler of the Tax Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Belgiovine for the District of New Jersey are prosecuting the case.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

Source: US State of California

A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

“This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

“Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

“This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States.

If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion

Source: US State of California

A New Jersey man pleaded guilty today to tax evasion.

The following is according to court documents and statements made in court: for tax years 2015 and 2016, Matthew Tucci, of West Long Branch, filed tax returns that stated he owed more than $2 million in taxes for both years. Despite admitting that he owed those taxes, Tucci did not fully pay them when they were due. Instead, Tucci purchased real estate and engaged in a series of transactions designed to conceal his interest in those properties.

In 2017, the IRS sent notices to Tucci that he owed taxes, interest, and penalties for 2015 and 2016. After receiving these notices, Tucci transferred multiple properties to an entity owned by another individual, but he continued to exert control over at least two of them. Of the two properties Tucci continued to control, he sold one and refinanced the other. Tucci used the proceeds from these transactions to pay his personal expenses rather than his tax debts. In 2019, Tucci submitted documents to the IRS that falsely claimed that he had no connection to the entity that owned the 12 properties.

Tucci is scheduled to be sentenced on Oct. 9. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison as well as a period of supervised release, restitution, and monetary penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Karen E. Kelly of the Justice Department’s Tax Division and Acting U.S. Attorney Alina Habba for the District of New Jersey made the announcement.

IRS Criminal Investigation and the FBI are investigating the case.

Trial Attorney Catriona Coppler of the Tax Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Belgiovine for the District of New Jersey are prosecuting the case.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: California’s strong gun safety laws continue to save lives
Source: US State of California 2
Jun 4, 2025
What you need to know: California leads the nation in strong gun safety laws, correlating with thousands of lives saved.

Sacramento, California – Year after year, California is ranked as the #1 state in the country for its strong gun safety laws — along with some of the lowest rates of gun deaths — by Giffords Law Center and Everytown for Gun Safety. In states where officials have passed gun safety laws, fewer people die by gun violence. Texas and Florida, which ranked 32nd and 21st, respectively in gun law strength, had firearm mortality rates more than 50% higher than California.

Gun safety laws save lives

Strong gun laws save lives. California has reduced its gun violence rate because of its leading gun safety laws. If the gun death rate in the rest of the U.S. matched California’s over the past decade, there would have been nearly 140,000 lives saved and potentially hundreds of thousands fewer gunshot injuries, according to the California Department of Justice’s Office of Gun Violence Prevention.

Protection orders reduce gun violence

California was the first state in the nation to adopt a “red flag law” in 2016. This law builds off a bedrock of available protection orders – 9 in total – that prohibit firearm possession for people subject to orders ranging from domestic violence and workplace harassment. In the first three years of their existence, these protection orders were used to prevent 58 cases of threatened mass shootings. There have been significant increases in utilization of GVROs – increasing by 118% – from 2020 to 2023.

California’s youth gun violence rate down, U.S. rate up

Nationwide, firearms are the leading cause of death for children and adolescents. Compared to the rest of the nation, California has made substantial long-term progress in reducing per capita rates of youth firearm homicide. CDC data showed that in 2022, California’s firearm homicide rate for youth under 25 was about 50% below the rate recorded for the rest of the U.S. By contrast, nationwide youth gun homicides increased over 46% from 2019-2021.

Criminals take advantage of neighboring soft gun safety laws

California’s gun laws stop at our borders, meaning guns that are illegal in our state can still be used in criminal activity here if sourced in other states. In 2021, just over half (50.4%) of the firearms recovered by law enforcement during criminal investigations in California and successfully traced to a final dealer of record were traced to dealers located in other states.

California’s gun safety laws at-a-glance

Assault weapons ban: California law strictly prohibits assault weapons. This includes possessing, distributing, selling and manufacturing assault weapons.

Red flag law: California became one of the first states in the nation to enact a red flag law in 2016. California law allows law enforcement, family members, employers, coworkers and school employees to seek a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO) against an individual suspected of being a danger to themselves and others. If approved by a judge, the GVRO temporarily prohibits a person from possessing firearms.

Private right of action: California enacted the nation’s first law allowing individuals to sue those making, selling, transporting or distributing illegal assault weapons and ghost guns – guns made at home to avoid tracing – for damages of at least $10,000 per weapon involved.

Waiting period: California has a waiting period of 10 days for all gun purchases. The state is one of nine states and the District of Columbia that have waiting periods and California’s waiting period is among the strictest.

Universal background checks: California requires background checks on all gun purchases and transfers, including private transfers and sales at gun shows. It is one of 14 states and the District of Columbia that require universal background checks.

Mental health reporting: California has some of the nation’s strongest laws preventing those with serious mental illness from acquiring firearms. California law requires the immediate reporting of involuntary inpatient and outpatient treatment, as well as those under guardianship. Mental health treatment facilities and psychotherapists are also required to report under certain circumstances.

Age restrictions: In California, you must be at least 21 years of age to purchase a handgun and at least 18 years of age to purchase a long gun.

Last year, Governor Newsom signed a bipartisan legislative package to further reinforce California’s nation-leading gun laws and prevent traumatic incidents of mass violence.

Click here to download this fact sheet.
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MIL OSI USA News –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Exchange on Child-Friendly Justice in Criminal Matters – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source: European Parliament

Child Abuse Online © Image used under license from Adobe

On 12 June, the LIBE Committee will hold an exchange of views on Child-Friendly Justice in Criminal Matters – Children as Victims, Witnesses and Offenders aiming to identify barriers, gaps, and weaknesses in judicial proceedings.

Every year, around 2.5 million children participate in judicial proceedings in the EU. Due to children’s especially vulnerable position, the EU and international organizations are working to develop child-friendly justice systems. However, the practices regarding children’s participation in criminal proceedings vary considerably across and within Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report – A10-0100/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

(2024/2078(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

– having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [1] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy [2] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union [3] (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014 [4],

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

– having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

– having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

– having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

– having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights [5],

– having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States [6];

– having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland [7],

– having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level [8],

– having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [9],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU [10],

– having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights [11],

– having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights [12],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights [13],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’[14],

– having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 [15],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report [16],

– having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [17],

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU [18],

– having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society [19],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas [20],

– having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe [21],

– having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling [22],

– having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report [23],

– having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)[24],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021 [25],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [26],

– having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia [27],

– having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia [28],

– having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU [29],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP [30],

– having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union [31],

– having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe [32],

– having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[33],

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement [34],

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds [35],

– having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware [36] ,

– having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland [37],

– having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists [38],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (COM(2023)0051),

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023 [39],

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime [40],

– having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications [41],

– having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

– having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

– having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

– having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

– having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

– having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

– having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)[42],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

A. whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

B. whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected [43],[44]; whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

C. whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

D. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

E. whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

F. whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

Independence of the judiciary

1. Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

2. Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

3. Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

4. Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

5. Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice;

6. Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

7. Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

8. Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States [45] and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

9. Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

10. Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

12. Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

13. Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

14. Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

15. Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

16. Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive [46] to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

17. Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

18. Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

19. Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

Anti-corruption framework

20. Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

21. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

22. Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

23. Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

24. Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

25. Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation [47] and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law [48] in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

26. Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

27. Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

28. Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

29. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

30. Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking; acknowledges the agreement on establishing the Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards;

31. Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

Media pluralism and freedom

32. Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)[49] and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

33. Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive [50], as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

34. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings [51], and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

35. Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

36. Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

37. Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

38. Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act [52] (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

39. Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

40. Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

41. Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343 [53] on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

42. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

Civil society organisations (CSOs)

43. Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

44. Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)[54] and civil society networks [55]; reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

45. Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups [56];

46. Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

47. Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

48. Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

49. Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

50. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States [57] and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

Equality and non-discrimination before the law

51. Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

52. Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC [58] on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive [59] and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

53. Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

54. Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

55. Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

56. Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC [60] in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings [61] of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

57. Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

58. Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

59. Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

60. Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500 [62] and Directive 2024/1499 [63], which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

61. Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

62. Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

63. Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)[64]; urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

64. Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

65. Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

Single market and the rule of law

66. Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

67. Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

68. Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

69. Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

70. Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

71. Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

72. Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

Rule of law toolbox

73. Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

74. Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

75. Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

76. Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law [65], not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

77. Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

78. Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

79. Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

Checks and balances

80. Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

81. Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

82. Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

83. Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act [66], the AI Act [67], Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising [68] and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

84. Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

85. Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

86. Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

87. Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms [69]; recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

88. Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

89. Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

90. Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

Horizontal recommendations

91. Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

92. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

93. Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

94. Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

95. Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

96. Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

97. Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

98. Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

99. Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; reiterates the proposal to create a permanent group of eminent personalities (‘wise persons group’) composed of independent legal, academic and human rights experts, tasked with systematically monitoring rule of law developments in Member States and providing regular assessments, recommendations and early warnings to the Commission; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

100. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

101. Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

102. Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

103. Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

104. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

105. Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

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106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Lunenburg County — Man faces multiple charges after he fled from police

Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

A Nine Mile River man has been charged with multiple offences after he fled from police.

On May 29, at approximately 11:50 a.m., an officer from Lunenburg County District RCMP observed a grey Honda civic with no license plate on Hwy. 103 near Chester Basin. The officer activated his emergency lights and sirens and attempted to stop the vehicle, but the driver increased speed and did not stop. The officer deactivated his emergency equipment and did not pursue the vehicle in the interest of public safety.

The vehicle was then observed driving westbound in the eastbound lane of Hwy. 103 near Exit 9 for a short distance. Additional RCMP officers and the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources air services were engaged.

Through the investigation, officers learned the driver was a man wanted in connection with an ongoing investigation led by Shelburne District RCMP, and that there was a passenger in the vehicle.

At approximately 1:15 p.m., officers located the vehicle parked near Oakland Rd. in Oakland. Both the driver, 23-year-old Justin Oakley, and youth passenger were outside the vehicle. Officers safely arrested Oakley. No one was physically injured in the incident.

Oakley has been charged with Flight from Peace Officer and Dangerous Operation in relation to this incident. He has also been charged with Flight from Peace Officer (two counts), Dangerous Operation and Assault with a Weapon in relation to an incident on May 27 in Barrington Passage, which is being investigated by Shelburne District RCMP.

On May 27, at approximately 8:49 p.m., an officer from Shelburne District RCMP observed a grey Honda civic with no license plate and conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle On Highway 330 in Barrington. The civic pulled over, but when the officer opened his door to exit his police vehicle, the civic backed up toward the officer then drove away. The officer did not pursue the vehicle in consideration of public safety.

Through the investigation, officers were able to identify the driver as Oakley.

Oakley appeared in Bridgewater Provincial Court on May 30 and was released on conditions. He is scheduled to appear again in Bridgewater Provincial Court on July 9 at 9:30 a.m.

File # 2025-736441, 2025-727047

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity
Source: United States Department of State (3)

Office of the Spokesperson

G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

Media Note

March 14, 2025

The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

Begin Text:
1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.
Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security
1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.
Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources
1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.
PARTNERSHIPS
1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.
MIL OSI USA News –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Up to $5 Million Reward Offer for Information Leading to Arrest and/or Conviction of Guatemalan Narcotics Trafficker Haroldo Waldemar Lorenzana Terraza

Source: United States Department of State (3)

Tammy Bruce, Department Spokesperson

Up to $5 Million Reward Offer for Information Leading to Arrest and/or Conviction of Guatemalan Narcotics Trafficker Haroldo Waldemar Lorenzana Terraza

Press Statement

March 25, 2025

Today, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is announcing a reward offer under the Narcotics Rewards Program (NRP) of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction, in any country, of Guatemalan narcotics trafficker Haroldo Waldemar Lorenzana Terraza, a/k/a “Haroldito.” This reward is offered in coordination with the Government of Guatemala in a unified effort to bring Lorenzana Terraza to justice and augments the existing Guatemalan reward offer of 50,000 Quetzals for Lorenzana Terraza’s capture.

Lorenzana Terraza is a member of the Lorenzana drug trafficking family operating out of La Reforma, Guatemala, with established trafficking ties to a number of Mexican drug trafficking organizations, including the Sinaloa Cartel (recently designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist). Since 1996, the Lorenzana Drug Trafficking Organization has allegedly coordinated the transportation, storage, and distribution of multi-ton quantities of cocaine from Colombia to Central America and Mexico for eventual distribution in the United States.

The DEA’s investigation of Lorenzana Terraza has led to two indictments in the District of Columbia with international narcotics violations. In the superseding indictment, Lorenzana Terraza was charged with operating a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) and four additional co-defendants were also charged.

Today’s reward offer is authorized by the Secretary under the NRP, which supports law enforcement efforts to disrupt transnational crime globally and bring fugitives to justice as a key pillar of President Trump’s “America First” priorities. If you have information, please contact the DEA by email at HarolditotipsGuat@dea.gov or text at +1 571-519-1025 (text/WhatsApp/Signal). If you are located outside of the United States, you can also visit the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. If you are in the United States, you can also contact the local DEA field office.

ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Government officials and employees are not eligible for rewards.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025