Category: DJF

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the security of energy supply in the EU

(2025/2055(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

– having regard to Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products[1] (Oil Stocks Directive),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 28 May 2014 entitled ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (COM(2014)0330),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010[2],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU[3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity[4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC[5],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013[8],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘EU external energy engagement in a changing world’ (JOIN(2022)0023),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU Plan’ (COM(2022)0230),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 October 2022 entitled ‘Digitalising the energy system – EU action plan’ (COM(2022)0552),

– having regard to the final assessment report on the EU-NATO Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure, published in June 2023,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast)[9] (Energy Efficiency Directive),

– having regard to the Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2023,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 (the Renewable Energy Directive)[10],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU) 2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast)[11],

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011, (EU) 2017/1938, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2022/869 and Decision (EU) 2017/684 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 (recast)[12],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942[13],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design[14],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation)[15],

– having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia[16],

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report), published on 30 October 2024,

– having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 09/2024 entitled ‘Security of the supply of gas in the EU’[17],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 March 2025 on the European Preparedness Union Strategy (JOIN(2025)0130),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0121/2025),

A. whereas energy security is a key building block of a resilient, sustainable and competitive economy; whereas reliable and affordable energy supplies are essential for economic growth, industrial productivity and societal well-being;

B. whereas in the context of a general security crisis and the need for preparedness against defence challenges, securing energy supply constitutes a priority;

C. whereas despite the potential for developing domestic clean and renewable energy sources, the EU imports more than 60 % of its energy, including 90 % of its gas and 97 % of its oil[18], leaving it vulnerable to potential energy supply disruptions;

D. whereas the EU has the potential to develop renewable resources, and since the publication of the Commission’s last Energy Security Strategy in 2014, the production of home-grown renewable energy has grown substantially – wind power by 98 %, solar photovoltaic by 314 %, solar thermal by 22 % and ocean energy by 244 %; whereas, over the same period, the EU’s domestic fossil fuel production has declined, with coal production falling by 53 %, oil by 31 % and gas by 73 %;

E. whereas with a renewable energy-dominated grid, Europe will need to secure over 100 GW of new clean firm power capacity by 2035 to ensure reliability, energy security and lower costs[19];

F. whereas the gap between energy production and EU demand negatively affects the EU’s trade balance, with energy imports amounting to EUR 427 billion in 2024 – down from a peak of EUR 602 billion in 2022 – for coal, oil and gas[20];

G. whereas EU nuclear production has declined by 24 % since 2014[21]; whereas a number of Member States are demonstrating their commitment to expanding nuclear energy as a pillar of their energy strategies and advancing their nuclear power projects;

H. whereas the diversification of energy sources contributes to the EU’s open strategic autonomy, energy security and resilience against external supply disruptions;

I. whereas applying renewable and clean domestic energy production, energy efficiency and energy saving measures across the entire value chain decreases reliance on external energy sources and enhances the security of energy supply; whereas EU energy efficiency policies have yielded structural results, with energy demand peaking in 2006 and declining by 20 % in 2023[22], highlighting energy efficiency as the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions, enhance competitiveness, make energy consumption more affordable and improve energy security;

J. whereas Member States differ in terms of natural and geographical characteristics, energy supply, security, sources and policies;

K. whereas the Russian Federation has for decades weaponised its supplies of oil, coal, nuclear power and gas to the EU in order to create division among Member States and, since the summer of 2021, to fuel inflation and weaken Europe’s resolve to support Ukraine in its just fight for freedom; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014; whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Member States agreed in the Versailles Declaration[23] to reassess how to ensure the security of their energy supplies and to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports ‘as soon as possible’ by, among other means, speeding up the development of renewables and the production of their key components and accelerating the reduction of overall EU reliance on fossil fuels, taking into account national circumstances and Member States’ energy mix choices; whereas the REPowerEU plan put forward a set of actions to stop importing Russian fossil fuels by 2027 at the latest;

L. whereas while most Russian oil and coal imports have been sanctioned, Russian gas and nuclear imports have regrettably remained outside of the EU’s sanctions regime amid concerns over security of supply;

M. whereas the share of Russian pipeline gas, both liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline, in the EU’s total energy imports significantly decreased from 45 % in 2021 to approximately 19 % in 2024; whereas EU imports of Russian fossil fuels in the third year of the invasion have surpassed the EU financial aid sent to Ukraine in the same period (EUR 18.7 billion in 2024)[24]; whereas since the beginning of the war, Russia has earned a total of EUR 206 billion in revenue from fossil fuel exports to the EU; whereas global fossil fuel exports constitute the single largest source of revenue for Russia, amounting to EUR 250 billion per year[25] – equivalent to 160 % of the Russian military budget for this year[26];

N. whereas among the 100 reactors operating in the EU, 18 are located in five EU countries and are of Russian or Soviet-design, each with varying levels of built-in reliance on Rosatom, which poses a particular risk to European energy security; whereas in 2024, Russia met around 23 % of the EU’s total demand for uranium conversion services and 24 % for uranium enrichment services;

O. whereas Russia has been circumventing sanctions through its shadow fleet, which transports oil to willing buyers under false flags or without flags and which poses serious environmental risks; whereas Member States have yet to implement the effective measures adopted by the Council in the 15th sanctions package against sanctions evasion through the shadow fleet;

P. whereas in its November 2024 resolution, Parliament called for the EU and its Member States to ban all imports of Russian energy, including LNG and nuclear, to require that ships exporting LNG from Russia be banned from entering EU ports and to refrain from concluding any new agreements with Rosatom or its subsidiaries;

Q. whereas the absence of an updated robust EU energy security strategy is adversely affecting businesses, industries and households; whereas, among other contributing factors, this has led to a sharp rise in energy poverty with nearly one in ten households (10.6 %) unable to adequately heat their homes in 2023[27], an increase from 6.9 % in 2021[28];

R. whereas attacks against critical energy infrastructure can lead to a loss of power affecting several Member States simultaneously and substantial economic damage, undermine public security and have implications for the EU’s defence capabilities; whereas Europe’s energy sector has been inundated with cyberattacks since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas the Baltic Sea’s critical energy infrastructure is under regular attack from Russia; whereas the growing number of perimeter harassment incidents against offshore energy infrastructure poses a serious concern;

S. whereas NATO’s role in energy security was first defined at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and has since been strengthened; whereas NATO is strengthening the security of critical infrastructure to prevent sabotage, including through the recently launched Baltic Sentry initiative; whereas NATO is supporting national authorities in enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence;

T. whereas the integration of the Baltic states’ electricity systems into the continental European network in February 2025 was a critical step towards enhancing their energy security, as it eliminated reliance on the Russian-controlled grid, thereby reducing geopolitical vulnerabilities and strengthening the resilience of the Baltic region;

A new vision for energy security in a changing global landscape

1. Recalls that the European Environment Agency defines energy security as ‘the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at reasonable and/or affordable prices’; considers that a comprehensive approach to energy security should take into account the physical infrastructure dimension, the availability, reliability, stability and affordability of supplies and their sustainability, and should place emphasis on the geopolitical and climate dimensions;

2. Stresses that energy security is a cross-sectoral issue that underpins the functioning of all critical sectors, making it indispensable for economic stability, public safety and national resilience; underlines that integrating energy security considerations into relevant policies and their underlying impact assessments is crucial for enhancing the coherence, consistency and overall effectiveness of EU policymaking;

3. Emphasises that the current geopolitical situation and continued perilous energy supply dependencies underscore the need to revise the understanding of energy security and recognises that the resilience of energy systems, understood as the ability to anticipate, withstand, adapt to, and quickly recover from possible disruptions, is now a strategic imperative;

4. Stresses that as the energy system continues to decarbonise, the share of renewables increases and electrification advances, a well-functioning and integrated energy market, energy efficiency, the integration of flexibility sources (electricity and heat storage, hydrogen, comprehensively developed and resilient infrastructure, demand response, etc.), and sufficient dispatchable capacity will be crucial to successfully manage the intermittency of renewable energy sources and unlock the full potential of the energy transition;

5. Highlights that energy security cannot work without adequacy; notes that ‘the scarcity issues tend to shift from the peripheral areas of Europe in 2025 to the central parts of the continent by 2033’[29]; believes that capacity remuneration mechanisms play a structural role in securing dispatchable backup capacity to ensure adequacy during peak times or periods of supply shortages and in helping to incentivise the necessary investments in generating capacity that market signals, relying solely on infrequent scarcity price hours, may fail to justify; underlines the need to ensure that the mechanisms are open to different types of resources (such as demand side, energy savings, aggregation, storage units and cross-border resources) capable of providing the necessary services, such as flexibility, do not create undue market distortions or limit cross-zonal trade, and reflect compatibility with a future decarbonised electricity system, including through coherence with defined emission limits as set out in Article 22 of the EMD Regulation; recalls that remuneration for capacity mechanisms only covers their availability; stresses the urgent need to simplify and streamline their approval processes, as requested by the EMD revision, while giving due consideration to the specific problems of the electricity market in the respective Member States in the Commission’s approval process; notes the Commission report on the assessment of possibilities of streamlining and simplifying the process of applying a capacity mechanism[30] and the ongoing works on the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework with concrete proposals to accelerate the approval process; notes that while the balancing market provides essential short-term services, it is not yet investment-friendly and calls therefore on the Commission to develop incentives to build the flexible assets that balancing markets urgently need;

6. Stresses that decarbonisation should take into account the specificities of Member States and their regions, including Europe’s outermost territories and Just Transition Fund regions and their level of access to different types of clean energy sources, the needs of their industries and the vulnerability of their citizens in order to ensure a just transition that maintains energy security by creating synergies between climate ambitions, geographical and natural conditions, and social and economic realities;

7. Notes the need for a broader approach to non-fossil flexibility and energy storage that incorporates molecules and heat; highlights the potential of district heating systems that can use thermal storage to reduce the temperature of the loop and incorporate waste heat, solar, geothermal and other renewable sources, where appropriate, using natural gas and biomass in a transition period; draws attention to the important role that the optimal use of high-efficiency cogeneration, in line with the Energy Efficiency Directive, can play in contributing to balancing the electricity grid and to the competitiveness of some industrial sectors, especially those that do not have alternative ways of producing affordable heat in their industrial processes; stresses the need to modernise and expand district heating grids to this end;

8. Emphasises that technological neutrality plays a key role in enhancing the security of energy supply while avoiding lock-in effects and fostering sustainability, economic efficiency and a just transition; recalls the need to invest in a diverse portfolio of clean technologies that allow regions to adopt technologies best suited to their needs in a cost-effective way, making energy more affordable and accessible;

9. Notes that the Draghi report[31] highlights that a reduction in dependency on fossil fuel imports would enhance EU competitiveness and the affordability and security of supply; notes that natural gas is currently a component of the EU’s energy security, with demand of 320 bcm in 2024, and notes the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts indicating a moderate demand of 260 bcm annually by 2035[32], while a REpowerEU scenario projected a possible demand reduction of 184 bcm by 2030, implying an approximate 50 % slash in natural gas demand in less than five years, compared to demand of 356 bcm in 2022; recalls Draghi’s proposal to establish a comprehensive strategy for natural gas, managing its role during the transition and securing its supply, that should guide infrastructure choices, international partnerships and legislation; notes, with concern, that inconsistent policies on natural gas have weakened the trading position of EU companies, leaving them exposed to global spot market prices and potentially creating a gap between what the EU has contractually secured and what will be imported over time;

10. Stresses that the development of nuclear energy remains a national prerogative in the framework of EU law; notes that for the Member States that choose to have nuclear power in their energy mix, it can have an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables; notes that a number of Member States see a need to support the development and deployment of both existing and a new generation of nuclear technologies, as well as the entire nuclear fuel cycle, that will contribute to building a competitive technological supply chain in the EU so as to ensure open strategic autonomy; stresses the importance of assessing the full cost of the entire nuclear energy life cycle, including construction, operation, security, environmental and health impacts, waste management and decommissioning; notes the existing and ongoing reliance on foreign providers, with approximately 97 % of the EU’s natural uranium supply in 2022 coming from oversea sources[33] and stresses the need to diversify  uranium and nuclear fuel supply sources and to follow the Euratom Supply Agency’s recommendation in developing reliable supply chains to meet the growing demand for nuclear and new nuclear technologies; notes, in this regard, the European Investment Bank’s recent decision to renew its support for strengthening European uranium enrichment capacities; underlines that small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (AMRs) have the potential to enhance energy security by providing low-carbon power; notes, however, that the technology is not yet fully developed; welcomes the announced assessment of the possibility of streamlining licensing practices for new nuclear energy technologies such as SMRs;

11. Recognises that renewable energy constitutes an enabler of energy autonomy and long-term security of supply; stresses that renewables are essential in delivering energy security as they already constitute the main source of home-grown energy for the EU; highlights the importance of maximising the use of existing renewable capacities, particularly by tackling the issue of curtailment, as grid congestion in the EU curtailed over 12 TWh of renewable electricity in 2023, resulting in an additional 4.2 million tons of CO₂ emissions[34]; notes that renewables have already helped to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas as they accounted for 25 % of the energy and 45 % of the electricity consumed in the EU in 2023; reaffirms the importance of sustained EU support for the development and deployment of established renewable technologies, such as solar, wind power, geothermal and heat pumps; reiterates the necessity of policy and investment support for less developed or emerging sectors in order to accelerate the deployment of renewable technologies that are the most relevant given their national and local circumstances, such as innovative geothermal technologies, biomethane, solar thermal, marine energy, tidal energy, osmotic energy and concentrated solar power; expresses concern that, without targeted support policies, some innovative technologies may fail to reach commercialisation in a timely manner, and therefore calls on the Member States to support their research, demonstration, market adoption and scale-up; calls on the Commission to present an investment plan for these renewable technologies;

12. Notes, in particular, the potential of geothermal energy, estimated to reach 510 GW by 2035 at a capacity factor of 80-90 %; highlights the vast untapped resources in certain EU regions and calls on the Commission to deliver on Parliament’s call to support the development of geothermal energy, including through the establishment of risk mitigation instruments;

13. Asks the IEA to conduct an analysis to assess the possibilities for using EU natural gas resources; notes that domestic EU natural gas production dropped by more than a third between 2020 and 2023 and that this decline is expected to continue with no significant near-term increase in the production of green gases, including biogas and biomethane, in the EU; notes that Draghi’s report highlights that while progressively decarbonising and moving to hydrogen and green gases in line with RED III and REPowerEU as a transitional measure, domestic natural gas production – where deemed justified by individual Member States – could also play a role in contributing to security of supply and avoiding exposure to negative geopolitical developments;

14. Highlights that diversification is vital to mitigate the risk of supplier dominance in a changing geopolitical context; believes the EU needs to strengthen international partnerships with reliable suppliers of energy, raw materials and clean-tech components in all regions of the world, and, in particular, with European Economic Area countries;

15. Underlines that enhancing energy security requires a holistic approach, notably through improving energy efficiency in key end-use energy sectors, such as buildings and industry, promoting energy savings, boosting investment in research and development, and ensuring meaningful citizen participation, all of which are essential to achieving a resilient, sustainable and inclusive energy system;

16. Calls on the Commission to be mindful of future military capability and mobility needs in the development of the EU’s energy system; notes, with concern, that the EU is highly import-dependent for crude oil and petroleum products; calls on the Commission to prepare a comprehensive strategy on liquid fuels in order to ensure their readily available access for the military in a crisis situation, and to reduce dependencies on vulnerable import chains and unreliable producers, particularly thorough the development of advanced synthetic fuels (such as sustainable aviation fuels and e-fuels) in Europe;

17. Draws attention to the Niinistö report’s recommendation on the need for further work on priority dual-use transport corridors for civilian and defence-related logistical needs, and on the expansion of fuel supply chains for the armed forces along these corridors, as well as stockpiling and strategic reserves of energy, that could be particularly useful for the regions with insufficiently developed pipeline infrastructure and fuel storage; calls, in this respect, on the Commission to review the Oil Stocks Directive in the light of recent geopolitical shifts and the military readiness needs in order to strengthen energy security and resilience against emerging military risks;

18. Acknowledges the rapidly accelerating energy demand driven by the digital sector, particularly the substantial energy requirements of data centres and artificial intelligence systems; stresses that this trend highlights the urgent need for robust energy efficiency policies and underscores the importance of the EU proactively pursuing sustainable, forward-looking solutions to meet this growing demand while safeguarding the resilience of its energy system;

A resilient energy infrastructure

19. Notes that infrastructure bottlenecks impede the benefits of sector integration and aggravate the threats to energy security; underlines the importance of investing in new energy networks, including cross-border interconnectors and offshore grids, and optimising existing infrastructure to increase capacity using grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) while reducing new infrastructure needs, in order to enable the integration of renewables and other new generation facilities, close price gaps, improve the overall system efficiency and foster solidarity among the Member States in the event of an energy crisis; emphasises the need for technically sound infrastructure planning that takes into account geographical and natural characteristics while ensuring long-term viability and avoiding the creation of stranded assets;

20. Calls on the Commission to urgently assess areas where interconnectors are insufficient so as to achieve the current 15 % interconnection target as set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999[35]; stresses the importance of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) in facilitating the efficient and secure flow of electricity across Member States and regions, thereby strengthening cross-border integration and energy solidarity within the EU; acknowledges the role of the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) in completing the above investments and reiterates its call for its funding to be significantly increased when proposing the next multiannual financial framework;

21. Calls on the Member States to accelerate permitting procedures for electricity installations and networks; notes that excessively long permitting procedures could create legal uncertainty, undermining resource adequacy by delaying the implementation of critical projects – whether for repowering or revamping existing generation sites, or for developing transmission, distribution, or storage infrastructure; welcomes the positive progress made regarding provisions adopted in the latest revision of the Renewable Energy Directive and the Emergency Regulation on Permitting[36] to accelerate, streamline and simplify permit-granting procedures;

22. Recalls that climate change continues to worsen, placing increasing stress on the energy system due to extreme weather events, such as heat waves, that lead to thermal power plant shutdowns, droughts that reduce generation output, and severe storms, floods and fires that damage electricity grids and gas pipelines; stresses that the impact of climate change on generation assets, networks and consumption patterns should be better integrated into the modelling and preparedness of energy infrastructure; emphasises the need for resilient energy system planning, incorporating climate-adaptive strategies such as advanced cooling technologies, grid flexibility, decentralised renewable generation and strengthened infrastructure protections; highlights the importance of integrating a climate-proofing plan, grounded in an initial risk-based assessment, into energy projects from the earliest stages of development;

23. Calls on the Commission to build on Directive (EU) 2022/2557[37] on the resilience of critical entities by facilitating its full and harmonised implementation through the provision of best practices, guidance materials and methodologies, and cross-border training activities and exercises to support Member States, competent authorities and critical energy entities;

24. Emphasises the need to invest in the protection and resilience of energy infrastructure against human-caused threats, such as military, hybrid and cyber attacks; expresses concern about recent sabotage incidents in the Baltic Sea and calls for stronger EU-level action to protect the EU’s critical energy infrastructure, including cross-border connections with non-EU countries, such as subsea pipelines and cables, offshore wind farms and interconnections, designed to support the most impacted Member States, and to complement national measures; welcomes, in this regard, the joint communication on the EU Action Plan on Cable Security;

25. Notes that the decentralisation of the energy system, that both strengthens resilience and facilitates the energy transition, and increased diversity of sources and autonomy, reduce reliance on centralised power plants, minimise outage risks, enhance grid stability, and enable quicker recovery from disruptions; emphasises at the same time that the increased number of remote and dispersed sources of energy, energy storage and new connections require enhanced measures to ensure robust infrastructure protection;

26. Calls on the Commission to draw on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, particularly the critical role of electricity interconnection, microgrids, distributed solar power, wind power and battery storage in ensuring greater resilience of the electricity grid against military attacks, including cyberattacks, drones and missiles; commends Ukraine’s sustained efforts to maintain the functionality and safety of its energy system in the face of Russia’s war of aggression, and underscores that supporting Ukraine also entails helping to safeguard the soundness of its national electrical grid;

27. Notes, with concern, that small distributed energy resources (DERs) connected to the internet, such as inverters, are not covered by appropriate conformity assessment procedures under cybersecurity legislation, such as the Cyber Resilience Act[38], and since they can be remotely controlled and their software updated by the manufacturer, which, in many cases, are non-trusted vendors, they could give these non-trusted vendors control over EU electricity grids; urges the Commission to establish mandatory risk assessments for DERs based on the country of origin, ensuring that devices controlled from jurisdictions with potential security concerns are subject to strict oversight and localisation requirements; calls for enhanced resilience in European supply chains by promoting EU-based manufacturing of DERs and fostering alliances with trusted international partners; highlights the need for an adequate number of professionals specialised in cybersecurity and close coordination among Member States to address these vulnerabilities;

28. Calls on energy companies that manage critical infrastructure to work closely with the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and equip themselves with the most advanced cybersecurity tools; considers that cooperation with NATO in the field of cybersecurity should be strengthened in order to counter hybrid threats to Europe’s energy security;

29. Notes that the Member States need to do their utmost to increase their resilience, which encompasses the ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, resist, mitigate, absorb, accommodate and recover from incidents, taking into full account the interdependence of the EU energy market and the potential domino effect that infrastructure failures in one country may have across the Union; underlines, in particular, the need to strengthen the recovery aspect, which could be achieved through an efficient European repair and response mechanism and national and regional operational plans, which could serve as an important element of the EU’s deterrence strategy; notes the importance of EU solidarity in responding to potential infrastructure incidents, ensuring coordinated action and mutual support among Member States;

30. Recalls that energy infrastructure constitutes a particularly sensitive sector in need of protection against foreign interests; urges the Member States and the Commission to address security risks associated with foreign investment in and acquisitions of energy infrastructure; expresses concern about a series of potentially sensitive foreign investments, particularly in grids; welcomes, in this regard, the ongoing revision of the Foreign Investment Screening Regulation[39] as a timely step towards adopting a stringent strategic approach to the development and oversight of European energy infrastructure;

31. Stresses that energy security should include the supply of key clean technologies, components and critical raw materials and notes the need for their diversified sourcing; calls for increased support for the EU’s grid manufacturing industry as a strategic pillar of the energy transition, with particular emphasis on ensuring a fair and competitive regulatory environment for European manufacturers, while exploring the potential for local content requirements to strengthen energy security, supply chain resilience and industrial competitiveness; calls for an update of the Public Procurement Framework to simplify and reduce the administrative burden for grid operators to access the needed grid technologies;

32. Emphasises the importance of integrating circularity principles into the design of critical infrastructure and equipment, and calls for increased support for their implementation, with the goal of reducing the EU’s dependence on imports of foreign raw materials and enhancing resource efficiency;

Phase out of Russian energy supplies

33. Highlights that the challenges posed by a lack of solidarity in the EU and by some Member States prioritising particular interests have made the whole continent aware of the dangers of dependence on an unreliable energy supplier weaponising energy exports; underlines that the lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine need to be at the core of future EU actions, particularly highlighting the critical importance of a united European response in order to eliminate perilous dependencies in energy supplies;

34. Underlines that the EU has made advances in reducing its energy dependence thanks largely to the REPowerEU plan and the 16 sanctions packages, leading to a decline in imports of Russian gas (pipeline and LNG) from 45 % of total EU gas imports in 2021 to 19 % as of 2024;

35. Expresses deep concern that the EU still maintains its reliance on Russian gas and, moreover, has recently seen an increase, with imports rising by 18 % in 2024 and continuing to grow in 2025[40]; notes that in 2024 alone, Member States purchased an estimated EUR 7 billion worth of Russian LNG, and since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has imported EUR 200 billion worth of Russian oil and gas – totally[41] fuelling Russia’s war machine;

36. Welcomes the publication of a roadmap for phasing out Russian energy imports, which must pave the way for their definitive end as soon as possible;

37. Welcomes the stepwise prohibition of Russian gas imports proposed by the Commission; stresses the need to introduce an EU-wide ban on all Russian natural gas imports by 2027 at the latest, and on new contracts and existing spot contracts by the end of 2025; insists that the Member States, including those currently benefiting from targeted derogations for Russian oil imports, should ultimately phase out these imports by 2027 at the latest; welcomes the upcoming legislative proposals in this regard and calls on the Commission to explore the use of all available transitional instruments that could lead to the end of Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027, such as the introduction of a regular quota system for Russian gas imports into the EU and the introduction of a ceiling price for Russian LNG, following an assessment of market and price impacts; calls on the Commission to provide EU companies with effective and legally sound toolkits to facilitate their efforts to get out of long-term contracts with Russian suppliers without incurring penalties;

38. Calls on the Member States to include gas deliveries to the EU from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 terminals in the scope of EU sanctions and the respective sanctioning of the singular fleet of ice-class LNG carriers linked to the Yamal LNG project; notes that sanctioning LNG carriers would be highly effective, as there is a limited number of ice-class LNG carriers in the world; stresses that the above actions would require adequate assessments of the legal and economic impacts on the European companies concerned and to ensure their ability to exit contracts;

39. Commends the inclusion of the nuclear supply chain in the roadmap; notes, with concern, that Russian nuclear fuel remains present in the EU market, including through indirect supply chains, and that in 2023, 23.5 % of the uranium consumed in the EU came from Russia and 30.1 % of the uranium used in the EU’s nuclear fleet was enriched by Russia; notes that while domestic providers are ramping up capacity in their European facilities to meet increased demand, as utilities proactively move away from Russian supply, clear policy decisions are urgently required at EU and national level to address the above vulnerabilities in the nuclear supply chain; calls therefore for support for projects within the Union that contribute to greater autonomy and security of nuclear fuel supply;

40. Expresses concern that official data does not provide a complete picture of Russian energy imports and their final destination, as relabelled Russian oil and gas continue to enter the EU market; notes with regret that this, in some cases, occurs with the acquiescence of the state actors involved;

41. Agrees that an adequate assessment of the amount of Russian energy imports is a prerequisite for phasing out this dependence; regrets the continued whitewashing of Russian energy imports and stresses the need for greater transparency in the EU energy market; calls on the Member States to publish data on the origin of imported, exported and consumed Russian gas, and urges the application of all measures against the whitewashing of Russian energy imports; notes that relevant reporting obligations laid down under Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector can contribute to achieving this goal;

42. Welcomes the upcoming proposals for transparency, monitoring and traceability mechanisms, as the effective implementation of sanctions depends on compatible control mechanisms in all Member States; underscores the urgent need to develop a legal mechanism to ensure the transparency and traceability of natural gas originating in Russia and exported to the EU as liquefied natural gas and by pipeline, and eventually to cover oil imports; stresses that this mechanism should be extended to energy imports from other destinations in the future; considers that the mechanism would require cooperation between various services, including EU competition services, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and national customs authorities; asks the Member States to consider strengthening the criminal investigation powers of national customs authorities to ensure the effectiveness of the above mechanism and introducing sufficient deterrent measures and fines, such as adequate financial penalties for sanctions evasion;

43. Stresses the need to adopt a legal framework for diversification, requiring each Member State to prepare, in a coordinated manner and through the appropriate competent authorities, an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to support and oversee the preparation and implementation of specialised exit plans at the level of undertakings active in their respective energy sectors; considers that these plans should include domestic production and demand reduction dimensions;

44. Strongly condemns the calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of the peace settlement in Ukraine; firmly rejects the idea of the possible certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and insists on the complete decommissioning of Nord Stream pipelines; warns against the EU falling back into dependency on an unreliable supplier and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop safeguards against this, such as a countersignature by the Commission on any potential contracts with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase;

45. Recalls that energy is a fundamental necessity; emphasises that the phase out of Russian energy imports must be a collective effort, ensuring that no Member State, company or household is left behind; emphasises that Member States are not equally positioned to phase out Russian energy imports in the same manner, and therefore urges strong solidarity among them, alongside appropriate support measures from the Commission to ensure a fair and coordinated transition;

46. Notes that, in the near-term, there is the need to replace phased out Russian energy imports with reliable non-EU sources and urges the Commission therefore to propose measures that ensure their sufficient substitution from trusted partners; stresses, however, that Russian energy supplies should not be replaced by new dependencies in supplies, and therefore that, in the long term, energy imports should be progressively reduced through effective measures to support decarbonisation, electrification and energy efficiency and savings in the sectors where it is possible and cost-efficient, as well as through the development of domestic energy production in line with the REPowerEU plan;

47. Emphasises that energy dependence on Russia also should not be replaced by new dependencies on individual suppliers of energy technologies, components or critical raw materials;

Revision of security of supply framework

48. Welcomes the upcoming revision of the Security of Supply architecture including the Gas Security of Supply Regulation and the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation, and other relevant legislation; considers that the new EU security of supply architecture should reflect such fundamental shifts as increasing cross-sectoral integration of the energy system, the new geopolitical landscape, the profound changes in supply routes, the impact of climate change, as well as changes in the maturity of energy technologies reflected in shifts of levelised costs of energy and the opportunities this presents for the energy transition;

49. Highlights that energy efficiency plays a critical role in enhancing the security of energy supply by reducing overall energy demand, lowering dependency on energy imports and increasing system resilience; considers that the new security of supply framework should be broadened to reflect a new way of looking at the security of energy supply, based not only on energy sources, but also on the energy efficiency first principle, energy savings, cost efficiency, as well as the ability to produce different types of energy domestically; notes that, in the near-term, the Union should concentrate on effective and solid weaning of Russian energy imports without loopholes, including through securing alternatives supplies from reliable partners and better use of existing infrastructure, while in parallel continuing to develop domestic alternatives to imported energy products, where possible; stresses, nevertheless, the imperative to develop a future-proof security of supply architecture that systematically reduces dependence on external actors, notably by advancing energy efficiency, promoting energy savings, enhancing circularity and ensuring the sustained growth of home-grown clean energy production and well-protected decentralised energy infrastructure;

50. Emphasises the need to prioritise the resilience of energy infrastructure, drawing on the lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the targeted attacks on its energy systems and the benefits of decentralised energy systems; considers that new energy assets should be ‘resilient by design’, including to possible military threats and extreme weather events;

51. Stresses the need for greater cooperation among all actors on the resilience of energy infrastructure to both climate impacts and human-caused threats; insists that the protection of this infrastructure requires greater involvement of governments, including through public-private partnerships; welcomes, in this regard, the Niinistö report recommendation to engage with the private sector in institutionalising de-risking efforts, cross-sector stress tests and proactive security measures; asks the Commission to ensure that such cooperation is reflected in plans covering incident management and recovery, and is subject to regular exercises; notes that the Union’s preparedness strategy includes actions to strengthen public-private partnerships and calls on the Commission to further develop relevant specific measures for the energy sector in the review of the security of supply architecture;

52. Notes the need to accommodate in the security of supply architecture the integration of renewable and low-carbon gases, such as biomethane and hydrogen; recalls that the Hydrogen Strategy already recognised the role that renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production can play in providing flexibility and storage in an integrated energy system with a high share of renewables; calls on the Commission to recognise the complementarities between hydrogen and electricity in the future Electrification Action Plan, in line with energy sector integration, and to set clear conditions for the ramp-up of hydrogen to contribute to the energy transition, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors;

53. Stresses the need to include affordability risks in national risk assessments; calls for transparency on the implementation of national risk-preparedness measures to increase trust between the Member States; notes the advantages of greater coherence on protected consumer categories (consistent categories and gradation of disconnection priority for grid users) to allow coordinated consumer load-shedding plans to be defined, including plans to support vulnerable households affected by, or at risk of, energy poverty during an energy crisis;

54. Highlights the need for a unified, resilient and strategically coordinated energy policy; emphasises that as the EU energy markets become more integrated, energy security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of the Member States, thus requiring solidarity and coordination in order to prevent unilateral actions that could undermine the security of the entire EU; warns that a unilateral decision by a single actor to enter into a harmful energy agreement with a non-EU country could expose the whole EU to renewed energy crises, price volatility and geopolitical pressure;

55. Notes the need for stronger coordination between the Member States on the decommissioning of ageing generation units with cross-border impact, as well as on withdrawal from the system of generation capacity in order to ensure that alternative installations have been completed and are in operation, as this affects the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries;

56. Underlines that data-driven technologies should positively impact energy security management; recognises the importance of comprehensive energy information and data in identifying and responding to evolving energy security threats and in infrastructure planning, and calls for improved coordination in the collection of such information and data;

57. Calls on the Commission to include in the security of supply proposal technical provisions for the standardisation and interoperability of critical components of the EU’s energy system, particularly electrical transformers, to ensure that a lack of standardisation does not hinder European solidarity;

58. Welcomes the establishment by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) of a new Task Force on the Security of Critical Infrastructure, aimed at analysing and proposing recommendations on the topic of security of critical infrastructure; stresses the importance of incorporating lessons learned from Ukraine’s experience, including the valuable expertise of the dedicated unit within the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator (TSO) tasked with identifying and mitigating threats to critical infrastructure; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with ENTSO-E in delivering a comprehensive and systemic assessment of threats to the EU electricity grid, to be completed by 2026;

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59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.