NewzIntel.com

Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde, Philip R. Lane: Opening remarks on the ECB strategy assessment press conference

    Source: European Central Bank

    Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB,
    Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB

    Sintra, 30 June 2025

    Good afternoon, ECB Chief Economist Philip Lane and I welcome you to this press conference, on the occasion of the conclusion of the 2025 assessment of our monetary policy strategy.

    The Governing Council recently agreed on an updated monetary policy strategy statement. You can find this statement on our website, together with an explanatory overview note and the two occasional papers presenting the underlying analyses.

    I will start by putting this strategy assessment into the broader context. Philip Lane will then go through the updated strategy statement and explain what has changed and why, as well as what has remained unchanged.

    Following the strategy review we carried out in 2020-21, the Governing Council committed to “assess periodically the appropriateness of its monetary policy strategy, with the next assessment expected in 2025”. Such regular assessments ensure that our framework, toolkit and approach remain fit for purpose in a changing world.

    And the world has changed significantly over the last four years. Some of the issues we were most concerned about back in 2021 – including inflation being too low for too long – have taken a rather different turn.

    Not only did we see inflation surge, but some fundamental structural features of our economy and the inflation environment are changing: geopolitics, digitalisation, the increasing use of artificial intelligence, demographics, the threat to environmental sustainability and the evolution of the international financial system.

    All of those suggest that the environment in which we operate will remain highly uncertain and potentially more volatile. This will make it more challenging to conduct our monetary policy and fulfil our mandate to keep prices stable.

    During the strategy assessment, we asked: what do these changes mean for the way we assess the economy, conduct our policy, use our toolkit, take our decisions and communicate them? In seeking to answer this question, our mindset was forward-looking.

    On the whole, we concluded that our monetary policy strategy remains well suited to addressing the challenges that lie ahead.

    But our strategy also needs to be updated and adjusted in certain areas, so that the ECB can remain fit for purpose in the years to come. The next assessment is expected in 2030.

    With our updated strategy statement, we are taking a comprehensive perspective on the challenges facing our monetary policy, so that the ECB can remain an anchor of stability in this more uncertain world.

    This is our core message to the euro area citizens we serve: the new environment gives many reasons to worry, but one thing they do not need to worry about is our commitment to price stability.

    The ECB is committed to its mandate and will keep itself and its tools updated to be able to respond to new challenges.

    Let me conclude by thanking, on behalf of the Governing Council, all the colleagues across the Eurosystem who have contributed to this assessment in a great team effort.

    I now hand over to our Chief Economist Philip Lane and, following his remarks, we will be ready to take your questions.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strategy assessment: lessons learned

    Source: European Central Bank

    Introductory speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the opening reception of the ECB Forum on Central Banking 2025 “Adapting to change: macroeconomic shifts and policy responses”

    Sintra, 30 June 2025

    As Nietzsche once observed, “it is our future that lays down the law of our today.”

    When we last reviewed our strategy four years ago, our thinking was shaped – quite naturally – by the recent past: a decade of too-low inflation, compounded by the pandemic.

    But as Nietzsche warned, there is a danger in letting the past dominate our thinking. Sometimes, it is the future – still dimly understood – that is already shaping our present.

    And soon after that review, the world changed in ways we had not foreseen.

    The reopening of our economies after the pandemic brought about major sectoral shifts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a fundamental shift in energy markets.

    The geopolitical landscape was upended, reshaping global trade. And structural changes in labour markets became increasingly apparent – driven by demographics, technological transformation, and evolving worker preferences.

    Given all these developments, the fundamentals of our strategy have held up well – as they should, because a sound strategy must be robust to a changing environment.

    Our symmetric 2% inflation target has proven effective in anchoring expectations – even through some of the most severe and persistent shocks in recent economic history.

    And our medium-term orientation has provided essential flexibility to absorb an extremely large shock – helping to reduce the overall cost of disinflation to the economy, while still enabling a timely return of inflation to target.

    We therefore saw no need to revisit these core pillars – which is why we refer to the exercise we have just concluded as a strategy assessment rather than a review.

    The central theme of our work has been to update the framework so that monetary policy can continue to deliver price stability in the face of the new types of shocks we are confronting.

    This evening, without downplaying the other lessons learned, I would like to highlight three key conclusions that have emerged from this work.

    They concern the nature of the new environment, how we assess the risks that arise from it, and how we have adjusted our reaction function to safeguard price stability in this new world.

    The changing environment

    One word has dominated the public debate in recent weeks: uncertainty.

    And this is one of the first key conclusions from our strategy assessment: the world ahead is more uncertain – and that uncertainty is likely to make inflation more volatile.

    First, we see clear signs that supply shocks are becoming more frequent.

    Model-based analysis by ECB staff shows that, during the recent inflation surge, such shocks played a much greater role in driving inflation than they had over the previous two decades. And even today, supply-side forces continue to generate inflation risks in both directions.

    Second, we see mounting evidence that more regular supply disruptions are leading firms to adjust prices more frequently – thereby contributing to greater inflation volatility.

    This is not simply an extrapolation from the most recent shock. Rather, it reflects a structural shift in how firms operate under conditions of permanently higher uncertainty.

    Research shows that, in such an environment, firms tend to react more quickly to shocks – especially supply ones – in order to protect against potential future losses.[1] At the same time, they are more likely to adopt more flexible pricing strategies, which means prices may respond not just to major shocks, but also to smaller frictions and local disruptions.[2]

    Third, if inflation becomes more volatile, we could see non-linearities on both sides.

    In our last strategy review, we rightly focused on the non-linear dynamics that emerge in a prolonged environment of too-low inflation – where interest rates are eventually pushed to their effective lower bound. That constraint can, in turn, feed into inflation expectations and risk creating a self-fulfilling low-inflation trap. And we remain alert to the possibility of renewed downside inflation shocks.

    But recent experience has also revealed non-linearities on the upside.

    Since firms are generally quicker to raise prices than to lower them, more frequent price adjustments mean inflation can rise quickly in response to large upside shocks. If wages then adjust only gradually to these price increases – as we saw in recent years – inflation may remain above target for longer as wage growth slowly catches up. This, in turn, can raise the risk of inflation expectations de-anchoring on the upside.[3]

    Assessing the distribution of risks

    The next question that follows is: if the economic environment becomes more volatile, how can we make our economic assessment more robust?

    Large shocks can trigger feedback loops and non-linear effects that inherently give rise to a broader range of possible outcomes. In a world of higher uncertainty, it is all the more important to augment the baseline with alternative risk scenarios.

    This is why the second key conclusion of our assessment is the need for monetary policy to take into account risks and uncertainty, using a systematic but context-specific approach.

    The ECB has used both scenario and sensitivity analysis for many years – deploying internal scenarios since the global financial crisis and publishing them for the first time during the pandemic.

    But our experience in recent years has underscored the particular strength of scenario analysis in times of elevated uncertainty.

    A clear example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting energy price shock. In that case, scenarios provided insights that neither our baseline projections nor standard sensitivity analyses around the baseline could fully capture.

    For instance, in March 2022 – just a few weeks after the invasion – our baseline projected inflation at around 5% for that year, based on market-implied energy futures. The sensitivity analysis suggested a slightly higher figure of about 5.5%. In contrast, the Ukraine war scenario already pointed to inflation exceeding 7% – close to the final annual figure of over 8%.

    At the same time, there were moments when – in hindsight – publishing scenarios could have supported both our policymaking and our communication.

    One example was the high uncertainty in 2021 about the speed of vaccine rollout and the nature of post-pandemic reopening, including the sectoral shifts in supply and demand across goods and services sectors, both in the euro area and globally.[4]

    Scenario analysis could have helped in illustrating that the range of possible inflation outcomes was unusually wide – and reduced the risk of projecting false certainty to the public.

    This is why our updated strategy commits to ensuring that our policy decisions account not only for the most likely path of inflation and the economy, but also for the surrounding risks and uncertainty – including through the appropriate use of scenario and sensitivity analyses.

    The reaction function

    So what should our reaction function be, if we know that the road ahead is likely to be more uncertain?

    In our last strategy review, we explicitly acknowledged the risks posed by the effective lower bound. Our strategy statement called for “especially forceful or persistent” action when policy rates are close to the lower bound.

    This “asymmetric” focus was grounded in the asymmetry of policy space and the downward inflation bias it can produce. The lower bound continues to constrain monetary policy in the face of large disinflationary shocks.

    But the recent inflation surge has revealed upside non-linearities – and with them, the need for a two-sided reaction function, both in terms of forcefulness or persistence. This is the third key conclusion of our strategy assessment.

    This is not about reacting to small or temporary deviations, but about a symmetric commitment to respond to inflation dynamics that could de-anchor inflation expectations in either direction.

    When disinflationary shocks risk pushing policy rates towards the lower bound, acting forcefully early on helps minimise the time spent near that constraint. Likewise, when inflation overshoots raise the risk of a feedback loop between frequent price adjustments and staggered wage responses, forceful tightening at the outset is key to anchoring expectations.

    We began our recent policy cycle with historically large rate hikes delivered at an unprecedented pace. Our analysis shows that, had we not acted, the probability of inflation expectations de-anchoring would have exceeded 30% in 2022 and 2023.[5]

    At the same time, this policy cycle also offered new perspectives on optimal policy paths.

    One insight from our last strategy review was that, when rates are near the lower bound, persistence can substitute for forcefulness – helping to deliver the necessary policy stance with fewer side effects. Until recently, however, this concept had not been widely applied to tightening cycles.

    Typically, forceful tightening follows an inverted V-shape – with rapid rate increases followed by relatively swift cuts. But as rates move deeper into restrictive territory, the costs and side effects of further tightening also grow.

    At that point, it can become optimal to shift the focus from forcefulness to persistence – even if, in principle, there is no upper bound constraining policy space.

    Model simulations support this insight: forcefulness and persistence can act as substitutes, both capable of delivering the necessary disinflation. But persistence, in particular, can help limit the economic and financial stability costs compared with continued rate increases.

    This was borne out in our own experience. When we entered what I described as the “holding phase”, we placed greater weight on the persistence dimension.[6] This allowed the disinflation process to advance at a steady pace, while the so-called “sacrifice ratio” remained historically low compared with previous disinflation episodes.[7]

    Reflecting this experience, the Governing Council considers that its reaction function is best described as requiring “appropriately forceful or persistent monetary policy action in response to large, sustained deviations of inflation from the target in either direction.”

    To this end, all our instruments remain available in our toolkit. But the word “appropriately” is important, as it underscores that the choice of instruments, and the intensity with which we use them, must reflect proportionality.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Our strategy assessment has been an exercise in evolution, not revolution – and in fact, many of its conclusions are already reflected in our current policy conduct.

    We responded to the recent inflation shock with initially forceful and then persistent action, aiming to steer inflation back to target as swiftly as necessary, but as painlessly as possible.

    And scenario analysis is helping us to better understand the range of risks ahead – and how best to respond to them.

    For example, our scenarios on potential US import tariffs have helped us navigate an uncertain global trade landscape, while also enabling us to communicate more clearly the two-sided risks shaping our current monetary policy stance.

    At our last monetary policy press conference in June, I described our monetary policy stance as being “in a good place”.

    Following the conclusion of this strategy assessment, I would add that our monetary policy strategy is also in a good place – strengthened by experience, and better equipped for the challenges of the future.

    To close the circle with Nietzsche: “he who has a why to live can bear almost any how.”

    Even as the world changes around us, we know our purpose. And we will do whatever is necessary to deliver on it – ensuring price stability for the people of Europe.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Secretary-General’s remarks at the launch of the Sevilla Platform for Action [bilingual as delivered; scroll down for all-English]

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Señor Presidente del Gobierno, querido Pedro Sánchez, Excelencias, señoras y señores:
     
    Gracias por unirse a este lanzamiento de la Plataforma de Acción de Sevilla.
     
    Estimado Presidente: felicito a usted y a su Gobierno por su visión y liderazgo como anfitriones de la Cuarta Conferencia Internacional sobre la Financiación para el Desarrollo.
     
    We are all here to respond to a global development crisis that threatens people and planet alike.
     
    Our roadmap to a better future — the Sustainable Development Goals — is in danger.
     
    Two-thirds of the targets are not progressing fast enough — or at all.
     
    Solutions depend on financing. 
     
    Developing countries need over $4 trillion a year to deliver on the 2030 Agenda.
     
    But they are being battered by limited fiscal space, slowing growth, crushing debt burdens and growing systemic risks. 
     
    The Sevilla Commitment document represents a bold plan to get the engine of development revving again:
     
    Through new domestic and global commitments that can channel public and private finance to the areas of greatest need…
     
    By overhauling the world’s approach to debt to make borrowing work in service of sustainable development…
     
    And by reforming the global financial architecture to reflect today’s realities and the urgent needs of developing countries.
     
    But we need all hands on deck.
     
    And that’s why the Sevilla Platform for Action is so critical — and so significant.
     
    In the midst of a world of division, conflict and economic uncertainty, this Platform contains more than 130 specific initiatives that demonstrate what we can achieve by working together.
     
    Governments, private sector partners, international institutions, and civil society groups all together teaming up to launch high-impact initiatives to bring the Sevilla Commitment to life.
     
    This includes a global hub for debt swaps at the World Bank as part of a broader facility aimed at relieving liquidity constraints and lowering the cost of borrowing.
     
    A debt pause alliance to help countries in times of crisis.
     
    A global coalition to scale-up pre-arranged finance that can be readily deployed when disasters strike.

    A blended finance platform to bring public and private finance together in a new and expanded way.
     
    A new tool for Multilateral Development Banks to manage currency risks.

    And a commission to explore the future of development cooperation.
     
    In December, I appointed a group of experts on debt who today are announcing 11 immediately actionable proposals to help resolve the debt crisis. 
     
    This includes the commitment to establish a borrowers forum for countries to learn from one another and coordinate their approaches in debt management and restructuring.
     
    I look forward to working closely with Member States — including the G20 — to bring this forum to life, to empower borrower countries, and create a fairer system.
     
    Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
     
    The Sevilla Platform for Action offers an ambitious, action-oriented response to the global financing challenge.
    It provides a springboard toward a more just, inclusive, and sustainable world for all countries.
     
    And above all, it proves that progress and change are possible if we work together.
     
    I hope the Platform inspires countries to work as one to tackle other challenges facing our world today.
     
    Y una vez más, agradezco al Presidente del Gobierno y a todos ustedes por su liderazgo.
     
    Muchas gracias.

    *****
    [all-English]

    Mr. President of the Government of Spain, dear Pedro Sánchez,

    Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

    Thank you for joining this launch of the Sevilla Platform for Action.

    Respected President of the Government of Spain — I commend you and your government for your vision and leadership as hosts of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development.

    We are all here to respond to a global development crisis that threatens people and planet alike.

    Our roadmap to a better future — the Sustainable Development Goals — is in danger.

    Two-thirds of the targets are not progressing fast enough — or at all.

    Solutions depend on financing. 

    Developing countries need over $4 trillion a year to deliver on the 2030 Agenda.

    But they are being battered by limited fiscal space, slowing growth, crushing debt burdens and growing systemic risks.  

    The Sevilla Commitment document represents a bold plan to get the engine of development revving again:

    Through new domestic and global commitments that can channel public and private finance to the areas of greatest need…

    By overhauling the world’s approach to debt to make borrowing work in service of sustainable development…

    And by reforming the global financial architecture to reflect today’s realities and the urgent needs of developing countries.

    But we need all hands on deck.

    And that’s why the Sevilla Platform for Action is so critical — and so significant.

    In the midst of a world of division, conflict and economic uncertainty, this Platform contains more than 130 specific initiatives that demonstrate what we can achieve by working together.

    Governments, private sector partners, international institutions, and civil society groups all together are teaming up to launch high-impact initiatives to bring the Sevilla Commitment to life.

    This includes a global hub for debt swaps at the World Bank as part of a broader facility aimed at relieving liquidity constraints and lowering the cost of borrowing.

    A debt pause alliance to help countries in times of crisis.

    A global coalition to scale-up pre-arranged finance that can be readily deployed when disasters strike.

    A blended finance platform to bring public and private finance together in a new and expanded way.

    A new tool for Multilateral Development Banks to manage currency risks.
     
    And a commission to explore the future of development cooperation.

    In December, I appointed a group of experts on debt who today are announcing 11 immediately actionable proposals to help resolve the debt crisis. 

    This includes the commitment to establish a borrowers forum for countries to learn from one another and coordinate their approaches in debt management and restructuring.

    I look forward to working closely with Member States — including the G20 — to bring this forum to life, to empower borrower countries, and create a fairer system.

    Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

    The Sevilla Platform for Action offers an ambitious, action-oriented response to the global financing challenge.
     
    It provides a springboard toward a more just, inclusive, and sustainable world for all countries.

    And above all, it proves that progress and change are possible if we work together.

    I hope the Platform inspires countries to work as one to tackle other challenges facing our world today.
     
    Once again, I thank Prime Minister Sánchez and all of you for your leadership.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA to Provide Coverage of Progress 92 Launch, Space Station Docking

    Source: NASA

    NASA will provide live coverage of the launch and docking of a Roscosmos cargo spacecraft delivering approximately three tons of food, fuel, and supplies to the Expedition 73 crew aboard the International Space Station.
    The unpiloted Roscosmos Progress 92 spacecraft is scheduled to launch at 3:32 p.m. EDT, Thursday, July 3 (12:32 a.m. Baikonur time, Friday, July 4), on a Soyuz rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.
    Live launch coverage will begin at 3:10 p.m. on NASA+. Learn how to watch NASA content through a variety of platforms, including social media.
    After a two-day, in-orbit journey to the station, the spacecraft will dock autonomously to the space-facing port of the orbiting laboratory’s Poisk module at 5:27 p.m. on Saturday, July 5. NASA’s rendezvous and docking coverage will begin at 4:45 p.m. on NASA+.
    The Progress 92 spacecraft will remain docked to the space station for approximately six months before departing for re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere to dispose of trash loaded by the crew.
    Ahead of the spacecraft’s arrival, the Progress 90 spacecraft will undock from the Poisk module on Tuesday, July 1. NASA will not stream undocking.
    The International Space Station is a convergence of science, technology, and human innovation that enables research not possible on Earth. For nearly 25 years, NASA has supported a continuous U.S. human presence aboard the orbiting laboratory, through which astronauts have learned to live and work in space for extended periods of time. The space station is a springboard for developing a low Earth economy and NASA’s next great leaps in exploration, including missions to the Moon under Artemis and, ultimately, human exploration of Mars.
    Learn more about the International Space Station, its research, and crew, at:
    https://www.nasa.gov/station
    -end-
    Jimi RussellHeadquarters, Washington202-358-1100james.j.russell@nasa.gov  
    Sandra Jones / Joseph ZakrzewskiJohnson Space Center, Houston281-483-5111sandra.p.jones@nasa.gov / joseph.a.zakrzewski@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA News: The One Big Beautiful Bill Slashes Deficits, National Debt While Unleashing Economic Growth

    Source: US Whitehouse

    President Trump’s bold economic agenda, anchored by the historic pro-growth policies in the One Big Beautiful Bill, will unleash robust, real economic growth and restore fiscal sanity in America.

    Analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) confirms that President Trump’s pro-growth economic policies and reining in wasteful spending are key to improving the fiscal outlook.  President Trump’s proven economic formula — historic tax relief, rapid deregulation, balanced trade, and reining in wasteful spending — will slash our debt down to just 94% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

    Let’s be clear: A vote against the One Big Beautiful Bill is a vote for the largest tax INCREASE — $4 trillion — our nation has ever faced, which would make our national debt explode to 117% of GDP by 2034.

    Key findings from the CEA:

    • Debt-to-GDP falls to 94% by 2034 under the Trump plan — compared to 117% under Biden’s failed path.
    • Total deficit in 2034 is cut nearly in half — 3.2% of GDP under Trump vs. 6.2% under current law—saving the country $1.1 trillion in that year alone.
    • Primary deficits flip to surpluses by 2034 under President Trump’s economic agenda with the OBBB.
    • An accurate budget score for the OBBB, inclusive of economic growth unleashed by President Trump’s policies, is deficit reduction of $755 billion relative to the CBO’s tax hike baseline and deficit reduction of $4.5 trillion relative to the current policy baseline.

    President Trump’s plan doesn’t just grow the economy, it actually reduces the debt burden on future generations — something the D.C. establishment hasn’t done in decades.

    While Joe Biden supersized the national debt, President Trump is supersizing hardworking Americans’ pay checks and restoring fiscal sanity, helping solve our debt crisis for the long run. To accomplish the President’s historic economic agenda, we cannot let the Trump tax cuts expire and we must build on their success with the One Big Beautiful Bill.

    Read the full CEA Analysis HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Eighth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Ukraine

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 30, 2025

    • The IMF Board today completed the Eighth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Ukraine, enabling a disbursement of about US$0.5 billion (SDR 0.37 billion) to Ukraine, which will be channeled for budget support.
    • Ukraine’s economy remains resilient, and the authorities met all end-March and continuous quantitative performance criteria, the prior action, and two structural benchmarks for the review.
    • Despite the challenges, progressing with domestic revenue mobilization, strengthening the investment climate, improving governance, and completing the debt restructuring strategy are necessary to restore fiscal and debt sustainability and support growth. The full and timely disbursement of external support during the program period remains indispensable for macroeconomic stability

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the Eighth Review of the EFF, enabling the authorities to draw US$0.5 billion (SDR 0.37 billion, which will be channeled for budget support. This will bring the total disbursements under the IMF-supported program to US$10.6 billion.

    Ukraine’s 48-month EFF, with access of SDR 11.6 billion (equivalent to about US$15.5 billion, or 577 percent of quota), was approved on March 31, 2023, and forms part of an international support package totaling US$152.9 billion in the program’s baseline scenario. Ukraine’s IMF-supported program helps anchor policies that sustain fiscal, external, and macro-financial stability at a time of exceptionally high uncertainty. The EFF aims to support Ukraine’s economic recovery, enhance governance, and strengthen institutions with the aim of promoting long-term growth and investment.

    For the Eighth Review, Ukraine met all end-March and continuous quantitative performance criteria as well as the prior action to submit to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine a detailed reform plan for the State Customs Service (SCS). Two structural benchmarks on tax reporting for digital platform operators and publication of the external audit of NABU were also completed. Four new benchmarks were also established, including: measures to update the single project pipeline; preparation of a prioritized roadmap for financial market infrastructure; implementation of international valuation standards; and development of legislative proposals to align securitization and bonds with international standards. The timelines of some other structural benchmarks, including the appointment of the head of the SCS, have been reset by the IMF Executive Board to allow the authorities more time to complete these important reforms. The authorities also requested a rephasing of access to IMF financing over the remainder of 2025 to better align them with Ukraine’s updated balance of payments needs, while the overall size of the program remains unchanged.   

    The 2025 growth forecast has been maintained at 2–3 percent as a smaller electricity deficit is offset by lower gas production and weaker agricultural exports. Pressures from Russia’s war will require a supplementary budget for 2025, and the medium-term fiscal path has been revised to better reflect the authorities’ policy intentions on revenue mobilization and expenditure prioritization. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) has maintained a tight monetary policy to respond to the still high inflation, while inflation expectations remain anchored. FX reserves remain adequate, sustained by continued sizeable external support. Overall, the outlook remains subject to exceptionally high uncertainty.

    Following the Executive Board discussion on Ukraine, Ms. Gita Gopinath, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, issued the following statement[1]:

    “Russia’s war continues to take a devastating social and economic toll on Ukraine. Nevertheless, macroeconomic stability has been preserved through skillful policymaking as well as substantial external support. The economy has remained resilient, but the war is weighing on the outlook, with growth tempered by labor market strains and damage to energy infrastructure. Risks to the outlook remain exceptionally high and contingency planning is key to enable appropriate policy action should risks materialize.

    “The Fund-supported program remains fully financed, with a cumulative external financing envelope of US$153 billion in the baseline scenario and US$165 billion in the downside scenario, over the 4-year program period. This includes the full utilization of the approximately US$50 billion from the G7’s Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine (ERA) initiative. Full, timely, and predictable disbursement of external support—on terms consistent with debt sustainability—remains essential to achieving program objectives.

    “The continuing war has necessitated a Supplementary Budget for 2025. Restoring fiscal sustainability and meeting elevated priority expenditures over the medium term will require continued decisive efforts to implement the National Revenue Strategy. This includes modernization of the tax and customs services (including the timely appointment of the customs head), reduction in tax evasion, and harmonization of legislation with EU standards. These reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks, medium-term budget preparation, and fiscal risk management, are critical to underpinning growth and investment. 

    “The authorities continue working to complete their debt restructuring strategy in line with the program’s debt sustainability objectives, which is essential to create room for priority expenditures, reduce fiscal risks, and restore debt sustainability.

    “Given still elevated inflation, the tight monetary policy stance is appropriate, and the NBU should stand ready to tighten further should inflation expectations deteriorate. Greater exchange rate flexibility will help strengthen economic resilience while safeguarding reserves.

    “The financial sector remains stable, though vigilance is needed given heightened risks. Operational and governance weaknesses in the security markets regulator need to be tackled urgently. Closing gaps in Ukraine’s capital markets infrastructure will be key to attracting foreign private capital for post-war reconstruction.

    “Sustained progress in anticorruption and governance reforms remains crucial. The completed audit of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau is an important step; additional efforts are required, including amending the criminal procedures code, appointing the new head of the Economic Security Bureau, and strengthening AML/CFT frameworks.”

    Table 1. Ukraine: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2021–27

    2021

     

    2022

     

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    Act.

    Act.

    Act.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Real economy (percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

    Nominal GDP (billions of Ukrainian hryvnias) 1/

    5,451

    		  

    5,239

    		  

    6,628

    7,659

    8,866

    10,192

    11,322

    Real GDP 1/

    3.4

    		  

    -28.8

    		  

    5.5

    2.9

    2-3

    4.5

    4.8

    Contributions:

    		                  

    Domestic demand

    12.8

    		  

    -19.0

    		  

    11.9

    3.8

    5.2

    3.4

    2.7

    Private consumption

    4.5

    		  

    -19.0

    		  

    3.0

    4.6

    2.8

    3.4

    2.7

    Public consumption

    0.1

    		  

    5.6

    		  

    3.0

    -1.5

    0.3

    -2.5

    -2.0

    Investment

    8.1

    		  

    -5.5

    		  

    5.8

    0.6

    2.1

    2.5

    2.0

    Net exports

    -9.3

    		  

    -9.8

    		  

    -6.3

    -0.8

    -3.2

    1.1

    2.1

    GDP deflator

    24.8

    		  

    34.9

    		  

    19.9

    12.3

    13.5

    10.0

    6.0

    Unemployment rate (ILO definition; period average, percent)

    9.8

    		  

    24.5

    		  

    19.1

    13.1

    11.6

    10.2

    9.4

    Consumer prices (period average)

    9.4

    		  

    20.2

    		  

    12.9

    6.5

    12.6

    7.6

    5.3

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    10.0

    		  

    26.6

    		  

    5.1

    12.0

    9.0

    7.0

    5.0

    Nominal wages (average)

    20.8

    		  

    1.0

    		  

    20.1

    23.1

    17.4

    13.7

    10.8

    Real wages (average)

    10.5

    		  

    -16.0

    		  

    6.4

    15.6

    4.2

    5.7

    5.3

    Savings (percent of GDP)

    12.5

    		  

    17.0

    		  

    12.8

    11.4

    4.4

    10.0

    18.3

    Private

    12.7

    		  

    30.2

    		  

    27.4

    23.3

    21.4

    15.9

    18.0

    Public

    -0.2

    		  

    -13.1

    		  

    -14.6

    -11.8

    -17.1

    -5.9

    0.3

    Investment (percent of GDP)

    14.5

    		  

    12.1

    		  

    18.1

    18.6

    20.9

    22.6

    23.7

    Private

    10.7

    		  

    9.6

    		  

    13.4

    13.3

    16.6

    18.3

    18.9

    Public

    3.8

    		  

    2.5

    		  

    4.7

    5.4

    4.3

    4.3

    4.9
                     

    General Government (percent of GDP)

    		                  

    Fiscal balance 2/

    -4.0

    		  

    -15.6

    		  

    -19.3

    -17.2

    -21.3

    -10.1

    -4.6

    Fiscal balance, excl. grants 2/

    -4.0

    		  

    -24.8

    		  

    -25.8

    -23.1

    -22.1

    -10.4

    -5.6

    External financing (net)

    2.5

    		  

    10.7

    		  

    16.2

    15.0

    24.5

    8.9

    1.7

    Domestic financing (net), of which:

    1.5

    		  

    5.0

    		  

    3.1

    0.3

    -3.1

    1.3

    2.8

    NBU

    -0.3

    		  

    7.3

    		  

    -0.2

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    Commercial banks

    1.4

    		  

    -1.5

    		  

    2.5

    2.9

    2.7

    0.8

    3.4

    Public and publicly-guaranteed debt

    48.9

    		  

    77.7

    		  

    81.2

    89.7

    108.6

    110.4

    106.4
                     

    Money and credit (end of period, percent change)

    		                  

    Base money

    11.2

    		  

    19.6

    		  

    23.3

    7.7

    21.7

    13.1

    10.4

    Broad money

    12.0

    		  

    20.8

    		  

    23.0

    13.4

    14.4

    13.2

    10.4

    Credit to nongovernment

    8.4

    		  

    -3.1

    		  

    -0.5

    13.5

    10.6

    17.7

    18.6
                     

    Balance of payments (percent of GDP)

    		                  

    Current account balance

    -1.9

    		  

    4.9

    		  

    -5.3

    -7.2

    -16.5

    -12.6

    -5.4

    Foreign direct investment

    3.8

    		  

    0.1

    		  

    2.5

    1.8

    2.2

    4.0

    5.0

    Gross reserves (end of period, billions of U.S. dollars)

    30.9

    		  

    28.5

    		  

    40.5

    43.8

    53.4

    52.8

    55.6

    Months of next year’s imports of goods and services

    4.5

    		  

    3.8

    		  

    5.3

    5.1

    6.3

    6.3

    6.5

    Percent of short-term debt (remaining maturity)

    74.4

    		  

    83.3

    		  

    100.3

    130.9

    178.9

    171.5

    172.1

    Percent of the IMF composite metric (float)

    105.5

    		  

    110.3

    		  

    130.2

    125.4

    125.5

    114.0

    115.7

    Goods exports (annual volume change in percent)

    39.0

    		  

    -37.5

    		  

    -8.5

    16.8

    3.0

    14.9

    14.3

    Goods imports (annual volume change in percent)

    15.1

    		  

    -29.7

    		  

    18.5

    6.0

    19.3

    4.7

    5.5

    Goods terms of trade (percent change)

    -8.4

    		  

    -11.6

    		  

    3.6

    0.5

    1.3

    1.0

    0.4
                     

    Exchange rate

    		                  

    Hryvnia per U.S. dollar (end of period)

    27.3

    		  

    36.6

    		  

    38.0

    42.0

    …

    …

    …

    Hryvnia per U.S. dollar (period average)

    27.3

    		  

    32.3

    		  

    36.6

    40.2

    …

    …

    …

    Real effective rate (CPI-based, percent change)

    2.6

    		  

    3.2

    		  

    -6.7

    -6.5

    …

    …

    …

    Memorandum items:

    Per capita GDP / Population (2017): US$2,640 / 44.8 million

    Literacy / Poverty rate (2022 est 3/): 100 percent / 25 percent perpercentpercent

    Sources: Ukrainian authorities; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and IMF staff estimates.

    1/ GDP is compiled as per SNA 2008 and excludes territories that are or were in direct combat zones and temporarily occupied by Russia (consistent with the TMU).

    2/ The general government includes the central and local governments and the social funds.

    3/ Based on World Bank estimates.

    [1] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summing up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/30/pr-25227-ukraine-imf-completes-8th-rev-of-ext-arrang-under-eff

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: FfD4, Gender Equality, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (30 June 2025)

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Secretary-General/Conference on Financing for Development
    Deputy Secretary-General/FfD4
    Gender Equality
    Gaza
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Security Council
    An Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
    Syria
    Ukraine
    Sudan
    DRC/Rwanda
    Afghanistan Refugees
    International Days
    Financial Contribution
    UNGA80
    Programming Note

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/CONFERENCE ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT
    The Secretary-General is in Sevilla, Spain, where he is attending the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development. This morning, at the opening of the Conference, he said that financing is the engine of development, and right now, this engine is sputtering.
    “As we meet,” the Secretary-General pointed out, “the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, our global promise to transform our world for a better, fairer future, is in danger. He stressed that the conference is not about charity, it’s about restoring justice and lives of dignity.”
    The Secretary-General also added that the conference is not about money, it’s about investing in the future we want to build, together.
    In the afternoon, at the launch of the Sevilla Platform for Action, the Secretary-General highlighted that the Platform offers an ambitious, action-oriented response to the global financing challenge.
    Soon after, at the opening of the International Business Forum, the Secretary-General underscored that by uniting public and private sector leaders, regulators and development banks, we can ensure that the conference is not an end, but rather a beginning.
    The Secretary-General also addressed that media in a joint press encounter with the President of the Government of Spain, Pedro Sánchez. He stressed that with the adoption of the Sevilla Commitment document, countries are proving their dedication to getting the engine of development revving again.
    Today, the Secretary-General also held a bilateral meeting with the President of the Government of Spain, and yesterday, he met His Majesty Don Felipe VI, King of Spain, He is also having a number of bilateral meetings with other delegation leaders who will be at the conference. We will share readouts of some of those meetings shortly.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL/FFD4
    Ms. Amina Mohammed, the Deputy Secretary-General, joined the Secretary-General for the opening ceremony of the conference and his meeting with the President of the Government of Spain.
    Later, she delivered remarks at side events focused on closing the SDG financing gap, including on the role of public-private cooperation, the centrality of gender equality in sustainable finance, and the leadership of African women in advancing the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.
    She also held bilateral meetings with senior government officials and Heads of Government attending the conference.

    GENDER EQUALITY
    At the Fourth International Financing for Development conference in Spain, the adoption of the Compromiso de Sevilla reaffirmed the global commitment to inclusive sustainable development. However, UN Women is warning that chronic underfunding and unfair financial systems are hindering gender equality progress.
    Developing countries are falling short by an estimated $420 billion a year in the funding needed to achieve gender equality under the Sustainable Development Goals.
    UN Women is urging world leaders to match political commitments with the sustained, transparent, and accountable financing needed to deliver on promises to half the world’s population.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=30%20June%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svTsTXC1aiw

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Video: FfD4, Gender Equality, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (30 June 2025)

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Secretary-General/Conference on Financing for Development
    Deputy Secretary-General/FfD4
    Gender Equality
    Gaza
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Security Council
    An Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
    Syria
    Ukraine
    Sudan
    DRC/Rwanda
    Afghanistan Refugees
    International Days
    Financial Contribution
    UNGA80
    Programming Note

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/CONFERENCE ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT
    The Secretary-General is in Sevilla, Spain, where he is attending the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development. This morning, at the opening of the Conference, he said that financing is the engine of development, and right now, this engine is sputtering.
    “As we meet,” the Secretary-General pointed out, “the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, our global promise to transform our world for a better, fairer future, is in danger. He stressed that the conference is not about charity, it’s about restoring justice and lives of dignity.”
    The Secretary-General also added that the conference is not about money, it’s about investing in the future we want to build, together.
    In the afternoon, at the launch of the Sevilla Platform for Action, the Secretary-General highlighted that the Platform offers an ambitious, action-oriented response to the global financing challenge.
    Soon after, at the opening of the International Business Forum, the Secretary-General underscored that by uniting public and private sector leaders, regulators and development banks, we can ensure that the conference is not an end, but rather a beginning.
    The Secretary-General also addressed that media in a joint press encounter with the President of the Government of Spain, Pedro Sánchez. He stressed that with the adoption of the Sevilla Commitment document, countries are proving their dedication to getting the engine of development revving again.
    Today, the Secretary-General also held a bilateral meeting with the President of the Government of Spain, and yesterday, he met His Majesty Don Felipe VI, King of Spain, He is also having a number of bilateral meetings with other delegation leaders who will be at the conference. We will share readouts of some of those meetings shortly.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL/FFD4
    Ms. Amina Mohammed, the Deputy Secretary-General, joined the Secretary-General for the opening ceremony of the conference and his meeting with the President of the Government of Spain.
    Later, she delivered remarks at side events focused on closing the SDG financing gap, including on the role of public-private cooperation, the centrality of gender equality in sustainable finance, and the leadership of African women in advancing the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.
    She also held bilateral meetings with senior government officials and Heads of Government attending the conference.

    GENDER EQUALITY
    At the Fourth International Financing for Development conference in Spain, the adoption of the Compromiso de Sevilla reaffirmed the global commitment to inclusive sustainable development. However, UN Women is warning that chronic underfunding and unfair financial systems are hindering gender equality progress.
    Developing countries are falling short by an estimated $420 billion a year in the funding needed to achieve gender equality under the Sustainable Development Goals.
    UN Women is urging world leaders to match political commitments with the sustained, transparent, and accountable financing needed to deliver on promises to half the world’s population.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=30%20June%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svTsTXC1aiw

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Chevron Eyes Expanded Gas Capacity in Angola, Joins Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) 2025 as Sponsor

    Energy major Chevron has joined the Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) conference and exhibition – taking place September 3-4 in Luanda – as a Champion Sponsor. With a commitment to increasing Angolan gas development and supporting LNG production, Chevron plays an instrumental part in diversifying the country’s economy. Chevron’s sponsorship reflects the company’s long-term vision for the country as it strives to unlock deepwater oil opportunities while strengthening LNG exports.

    Chevron has been at the forefront of Angola’s natural gas development, with projects such as the Sanha Lean Gas Connection project and the company’s non-operated interest in the Angola LNG plant (ALNG) – the country’s sole LNG facility. The Sanha Lean Gas Connection project achieved first gas production in December 2024, serving as a key step towards increasing feedstock for the ALNG plant. Spearheaded by Chevron’s Angolan subsidiary Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC), the project supplies natural gas from Block 0 to Soyo power plants and ALNG, with an initial capacity of 80 million standard cubic feet per day (mmscf/d). A second phase will add a further 220 mmscf/d through the commissioning of the Booster Compression module. The project seeks to increase ALNG feedstock by a total 300 mmscf/d, bringing the total amount to 600 mmscf/d.

    Beyond the Sanha Lean Gas Connection project, Chevron is working towards first production at Angola’s first non-associated gas project. Developed by the New Gas Consortium – comprising Azule Energy as operator, CABGOC, Sonangol E&P and TotalEnergies -, the project is on track to begin operations by late-2025 or early-2026. The project features the development of the Quiluma and Maboqueiro (Q&M) shallow water gas fields, set to increase ALNG feedstock while creating diversified gas opportunities for the country. As of February 2025, the consortium completed the Q&M platforms. The Quiluma deck was loaded out and sailed away from the Ambriz Petromar Yard. The project is expected to lay the foundation for non-associated gas development in Angola, attracting new investments while boosting LNG export capacity.

    In the oil sector, Chevron has been expanding its presence in deepwater basins. In 2024, the company signed Risk Service Contracts (RSC) for ultra-deepwater Block 49 and Block 50, located in Angola’s Lower Congo Basin. The company was awarded the blocks in January 2024, with the RSCs paving the way for seismic studies across the two blocks. Chevron’s other assets in Angola include Block 0 and Block 14. The company’s AOG 2025 sponsorship reflects its commitment to strengthening oil and gas production in Angola, paving the way for future collaborations and deals.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China to offer 10% tax break to foreign investors who reinvest dividends in Chinese companies

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 30 (Xinhua) — China’s financial, tax and trade authorities on Monday announced a 10 percent corporate income tax rebate for foreign investors on domestic direct investment financed by dividends from Chinese enterprises’ profits.

    The credit, which runs from January 1, 2025, to December 31, 2028, allows unused credit to be carried forward to a later date and allows lower rates to be applied under applicable tax treaties.

    Foreign investors may reinvest dividends in increasing the share capital of resident enterprises, establishing new resident enterprises, or acquiring shares of resident enterprises from unaffiliated parties. The industry in which the investee enterprise operates must be included in the Catalogue of Industries Encouraging Foreign Investment.

    Foreign investors may apply for a refund of the tax credit for reinvestments made between January 1, 2025 and the date of the announcement of the introduction of this benefit. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Investing in Indigenous tourism

    Alberta’s tourism sector is thriving, with the province hitting a record-breaking $14.4 billion in visitor spending last year. Indigenous-led tourism is playing a key role in this growth by creating year-round demand, with almost half of international visitors seeking unique and authentic experiences when travelling to Alberta to discover the rich Indigenous cultures, traditions and perspectives across the province.

    To support the growing demand for Indigenous-led tourism experiences, Alberta’s government has committed to investing another $6 million over three years through Travel Alberta’s renewed agreement with Indigenous Tourism Alberta. This investment builds upon the province’s previous record-breaking investments in Indigenous-led tourism, creating meaningful employment and ownership opportunities for Indigenous Peoples while helping reach the ambitious goal of growing Alberta’s annual visitor spending to $25 billion by 2035.

    “This continued support gives Indigenous tourism operators the opportunity to provide authentic experiences for visitors to learn about the histories, arts, cultures and perspectives of Indigenous Peoples. Not only does this strengthen Alberta’s visitor economy, but it creates jobs and economic opportunities for Indigenous communities across the province while fostering understanding and supporting reconciliation.”

    Andrew Boitchenko, Minister of Tourism and Sport

    This continued investment by Alberta’s government will support Indigenous Tourism Alberta’s mentorship and development programs for Indigenous tourism operators, as well as enable joint promotional activities that drive international demand for Indigenous tourism operators across the province. By continuing to invest more in Indigenous-led tourism than any other province, Alberta’s government is positioning the province as a premier destination for travellers and helping the rich histories and cultures of Indigenous Peoples shine on the world stage.

    “When Indigenous communities lead their own tourism initiatives, the benefits ripple far beyond the visitor experience. This renewed investment supports Indigenous ownership, strengthens local economies and helps build vibrant, self-sustaining communities. We recently expanded the mandate of the Alberta Indigenous Opportunities Corporation to include tourism, opening more doors for Indigenous entrepreneurs to access capital, grow their businesses and shape the future of Alberta’s tourism sector. We’re proud to stand with Indigenous Tourism Alberta in building a stronger, more inclusive economy for all.”

    Rajan Sawhney, Minister of Indigenous Relations

    “We’re seeing increasing demand for Indigenous tourism from all over the world at our business, and a strong partnership between Indigenous Tourism Alberta and Travel Alberta is so important to keep that progressing. Tourism is competitive, and Indigenous entrepreneurs represent a huge opportunity as a market differentiator for the entire industry in Alberta, so I’m thrilled to see this collaboration continue.”

    Brenda Holder, chair and founding member of Indigenous Tourism Alberta, owner of Mahikan Trails

    “This renewed investment is a continuation of our long-standing partnership with Indigenous Tourism Alberta, built on a shared vision: more authentic, transformative travel experiences, driven by Indigenous communities that want to share their stories with the world. It reaffirms our belief that Indigenous tourism has the power to support thriving communities, creating economic and entrepreneurial opportunities for Indigenous Peoples to own and lead.”

    Jon Mamela, chief commercial officer, Travel Alberta

    Quick facts

    • Through Travel Alberta’s renewed agreement with Indigenous Tourism Alberta, Alberta’s government is investing $6 million over three years to support Indigenous-led tourism.
    • Since 2021, Alberta’s government invested a historic $12 million to support the growth of Indigenous-owned tourism businesses and organizations across the province.
    • Indigenous tourism contributed $126 million in GDP to Alberta’s economy last year, and is projected to contribute another $138.6 million in 2025.

    Related information

    • Indigenous Tourism Alberta
    • Higher ground: a tourism sector strategy

    Related news

    • Alberta’s tourism soars past national average (Jun. 18, 2025)
    • Alberta tops Canada in tourism growth (Apr. 8, 2025)
    • Supporting Indigenous business development (Mar. 21, 2025)
    • Alberta tourism shines on the national stage (Jan. 24, 2025)
    • AIOC mandate expands to tourism (Oct. 30, 2024)
    • Celebrating Indigenous Tourism (Oct. 4, 2024)

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – European Movement Serbia – E-001282/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Evropski pokret u Srbiji [1] (European Movement Serbia) has received limited financial support from the EU over the past decade. This funding is part of the EU’s broader strategy to foster a stronger, democratic, and inclusive Serbia for all its citizens and to support their participation in the country’s EU accession process.

    Organisations like Evropski pokret u Srbiji play a crucial role in promoting and supporting a whole-society approach to the EU accession process.

    The Commission engages with a diverse range of stakeholders through open calls, thereby mitigating the risk of any single narrative dominating the political discourse in Serbia.

    In providing EU financial support for civil society in the Western Balkans, including Serbia, the Commission implements strict monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. These include regular audits, reporting requirements, and assessments of the impact of funded projects.

    This multi-faceted oversight aims to uphold the integrity of the funding process and ensure that it contributes positively to the democratic development of the country.

    The portrayal of civil society organisations that receive EU funding as tools of external influence undermines EU’s legitimate efforts to support civil society and democratic processes within Serbia and goes against the values that are fundamental for the future of any candidate country that wants to join the EU.

    • [1] https://www.emins.org/en/.
    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the security of energy supply in the EU – A10-0121/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the security of energy supply in the EU

    (2025/2055(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products[1] (Oil Stocks Directive),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 28 May 2014 entitled ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (COM(2014)0330),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010[2],

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity[4],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC[5],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[6],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[7],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013[8],

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘EU external energy engagement in a changing world’ (JOIN(2022)0023),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU Plan’ (COM(2022)0230),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 18 October 2022 entitled ‘Digitalising the energy system – EU action plan’ (COM(2022)0552),

    – having regard to the final assessment report on the EU-NATO Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure, published in June 2023,

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast)[9] (Energy Efficiency Directive),

    – having regard to the Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2023,

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 (the Renewable Energy Directive)[10],

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU) 2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (recast)[11],

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011, (EU) 2017/1938, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2022/869 and Decision (EU) 2017/684 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 (recast)[12],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942[13],

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design[14],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation)[15],

    – having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia[16],

    – having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ (Niinistö report), published on 30 October 2024,

    – having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 09/2024 entitled ‘Security of the supply of gas in the EU’[17],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy’ (COM(2025)0079),

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 March 2025 on the European Preparedness Union Strategy (JOIN(2025)0130),

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0121/2025),

    A. whereas energy security is a key building block of a resilient, sustainable and competitive economy; whereas reliable and affordable energy supplies are essential for economic growth, industrial productivity and societal well-being;

    B. whereas in the context of a general security crisis and the need for preparedness against defence challenges, securing energy supply constitutes a priority;

    C. whereas despite the potential for developing domestic clean and renewable energy sources, the EU imports more than 60 % of its energy, including 90 % of its gas and 97 % of its oil[18], leaving it vulnerable to potential energy supply disruptions;

    D. whereas the EU has the potential to develop renewable resources, and since the publication of the Commission’s last Energy Security Strategy in 2014, the production of home-grown renewable energy has grown substantially – wind power by 98 %, solar photovoltaic by 314 %, solar thermal by 22 % and ocean energy by 244 %; whereas, over the same period, the EU’s domestic fossil fuel production has declined, with coal production falling by 53 %, oil by 31 % and gas by 73 %;

    E. whereas with a renewable energy-dominated grid, Europe will need to secure over 100 GW of new clean firm power capacity by 2035 to ensure reliability, energy security and lower costs[19];

    F. whereas the gap between energy production and EU demand negatively affects the EU’s trade balance, with energy imports amounting to EUR 427 billion in 2024 – down from a peak of EUR 602 billion in 2022 – for coal, oil and gas[20];

    G. whereas EU nuclear production has declined by 24 % since 2014[21]; whereas a number of Member States are demonstrating their commitment to expanding nuclear energy as a pillar of their energy strategies and advancing their nuclear power projects;

    H. whereas the diversification of energy sources contributes to the EU’s open strategic autonomy, energy security and resilience against external supply disruptions;

    I. whereas applying renewable and clean domestic energy production, energy efficiency and energy saving measures across the entire value chain decreases reliance on external energy sources and enhances the security of energy supply; whereas EU energy efficiency policies have yielded structural results, with energy demand peaking in 2006 and declining by 20 % in 2023[22], highlighting energy efficiency as the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions, enhance competitiveness, make energy consumption more affordable and improve energy security;

    J. whereas Member States differ in terms of natural and geographical characteristics, energy supply, security, sources and policies;

    K. whereas the Russian Federation has for decades weaponised its supplies of oil, coal, nuclear power and gas to the EU in order to create division among Member States and, since the summer of 2021, to fuel inflation and weaken Europe’s resolve to support Ukraine in its just fight for freedom; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014; whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Member States agreed in the Versailles Declaration[23] to reassess how to ensure the security of their energy supplies and to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports ‘as soon as possible’ by, among other means, speeding up the development of renewables and the production of their key components and accelerating the reduction of overall EU reliance on fossil fuels, taking into account national circumstances and Member States’ energy mix choices; whereas the REPowerEU plan put forward a set of actions to stop importing Russian fossil fuels by 2027 at the latest;

    L. whereas while most Russian oil and coal imports have been sanctioned, Russian gas and nuclear imports have regrettably remained outside of the EU’s sanctions regime amid concerns over security of supply;

    M. whereas the share of Russian pipeline gas, both liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline, in the EU’s total energy imports significantly decreased from 45 % in 2021 to approximately 19 % in 2024; whereas EU imports of Russian fossil fuels in the third year of the invasion have surpassed the EU financial aid sent to Ukraine in the same period (EUR 18.7 billion in 2024)[24]; whereas since the beginning of the war, Russia has earned a total of EUR 206 billion in revenue from fossil fuel exports to the EU; whereas global fossil fuel exports constitute the single largest source of revenue for Russia, amounting to EUR 250 billion per year[25] – equivalent to 160 % of the Russian military budget for this year[26];

    N. whereas among the 100 reactors operating in the EU, 18 are located in five EU countries and are of Russian or Soviet-design, each with varying levels of built-in reliance on Rosatom, which poses a particular risk to European energy security; whereas in 2024, Russia met around 23 % of the EU’s total demand for uranium conversion services and 24 % for uranium enrichment services;

    O. whereas Russia has been circumventing sanctions through its shadow fleet, which transports oil to willing buyers under false flags or without flags and which poses serious environmental risks; whereas Member States have yet to implement the effective measures adopted by the Council in the 15th sanctions package against sanctions evasion through the shadow fleet;

    P. whereas in its November 2024 resolution, Parliament called for the EU and its Member States to ban all imports of Russian energy, including LNG and nuclear, to require that ships exporting LNG from Russia be banned from entering EU ports and to refrain from concluding any new agreements with Rosatom or its subsidiaries;

    Q. whereas the absence of an updated robust EU energy security strategy is adversely affecting businesses, industries and households; whereas, among other contributing factors, this has led to a sharp rise in energy poverty with nearly one in ten households (10.6 %) unable to adequately heat their homes in 2023[27], an increase from 6.9 % in 2021[28];

    R. whereas attacks against critical energy infrastructure can lead to a loss of power affecting several Member States simultaneously and substantial economic damage, undermine public security and have implications for the EU’s defence capabilities; whereas Europe’s energy sector has been inundated with cyberattacks since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas the Baltic Sea’s critical energy infrastructure is under regular attack from Russia; whereas the growing number of perimeter harassment incidents against offshore energy infrastructure poses a serious concern;

    S. whereas NATO’s role in energy security was first defined at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and has since been strengthened; whereas NATO is strengthening the security of critical infrastructure to prevent sabotage, including through the recently launched Baltic Sentry initiative; whereas NATO is supporting national authorities in enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence;

    T. whereas the integration of the Baltic states’ electricity systems into the continental European network in February 2025 was a critical step towards enhancing their energy security, as it eliminated reliance on the Russian-controlled grid, thereby reducing geopolitical vulnerabilities and strengthening the resilience of the Baltic region;

    A new vision for energy security in a changing global landscape

    1. Recalls that the European Environment Agency defines energy security as ‘the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at reasonable and/or affordable prices’; considers that a comprehensive approach to energy security should take into account the physical infrastructure dimension, the availability, reliability, stability and affordability of supplies and their sustainability, and should place emphasis on the geopolitical and climate dimensions;

    2. Stresses that energy security is a cross-sectoral issue that underpins the functioning of all critical sectors, making it indispensable for economic stability, public safety and national resilience; underlines that integrating energy security considerations into relevant policies and their underlying impact assessments is crucial for enhancing the coherence, consistency and overall effectiveness of EU policymaking;

    3. Emphasises that the current geopolitical situation and continued perilous energy supply dependencies underscore the need to revise the understanding of energy security and recognises that the resilience of energy systems, understood as the ability to anticipate, withstand, adapt to, and quickly recover from possible disruptions, is now a strategic imperative;

    4. Stresses that as the energy system continues to decarbonise, the share of renewables increases and electrification advances, a well-functioning and integrated energy market, energy efficiency, the integration of flexibility sources (electricity and heat storage, hydrogen, comprehensively developed and resilient infrastructure, demand response, etc.), and sufficient dispatchable capacity will be crucial to successfully manage the intermittency of renewable energy sources and unlock the full potential of the energy transition;

    5. Highlights that energy security cannot work without adequacy; notes that ‘the scarcity issues tend to shift from the peripheral areas of Europe in 2025 to the central parts of the continent by 2033’[29]; believes that capacity remuneration mechanisms play a structural role in securing dispatchable backup capacity to ensure adequacy during peak times or periods of supply shortages and in helping to incentivise the necessary investments in generating capacity that market signals, relying solely on infrequent scarcity price hours, may fail to justify; underlines the need to ensure that the mechanisms are open to different types of resources (such as demand side, energy savings, aggregation, storage units and cross-border resources) capable of providing the necessary services, such as flexibility, do not create undue market distortions or limit cross-zonal trade, and reflect compatibility with a future decarbonised electricity system, including through coherence with defined emission limits as set out in Article 22 of the EMD Regulation; recalls that remuneration for capacity mechanisms only covers their availability; stresses the urgent need to simplify and streamline their approval processes, as requested by the EMD revision, while giving due consideration to the specific problems of the electricity market in the respective Member States in the Commission’s approval process; notes the Commission report on the assessment of possibilities of streamlining and simplifying the process of applying a capacity mechanism[30] and the ongoing works on the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework with concrete proposals to accelerate the approval process; notes that while the balancing market provides essential short-term services, it is not yet investment-friendly and calls therefore on the Commission to develop incentives to build the flexible assets that balancing markets urgently need;

    6. Stresses that decarbonisation should take into account the specificities of Member States and their regions, including Europe’s outermost territories and Just Transition Fund regions and their level of access to different types of clean energy sources, the needs of their industries and the vulnerability of their citizens in order to ensure a just transition that maintains energy security by creating synergies between climate ambitions, geographical and natural conditions, and social and economic realities;

    7. Notes the need for a broader approach to non-fossil flexibility and energy storage that incorporates molecules and heat; highlights the potential of district heating systems that can use thermal storage to reduce the temperature of the loop and incorporate waste heat, solar, geothermal and other renewable sources, where appropriate, using natural gas and biomass in a transition period; draws attention to the important role that the optimal use of high-efficiency cogeneration, in line with the Energy Efficiency Directive, can play in contributing to balancing the electricity grid and to the competitiveness of some industrial sectors, especially those that do not have alternative ways of producing affordable heat in their industrial processes; stresses the need to modernise and expand district heating grids to this end;

    8. Emphasises that technological neutrality plays a key role in enhancing the security of energy supply while avoiding lock-in effects and fostering sustainability, economic efficiency and a just transition; recalls the need to invest in a diverse portfolio of clean technologies that allow regions to adopt technologies best suited to their needs in a cost-effective way, making energy more affordable and accessible;

    9. Notes that the Draghi report[31] highlights that a reduction in dependency on fossil fuel imports would enhance EU competitiveness and the affordability and security of supply; notes that natural gas is currently a component of the EU’s energy security, with demand of 320 bcm in 2024, and notes the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts indicating a moderate demand of 260 bcm annually by 2035[32], while a REpowerEU scenario projected a possible demand reduction of 184 bcm by 2030, implying an approximate 50 % slash in natural gas demand in less than five years, compared to demand of 356 bcm in 2022; recalls Draghi’s proposal to establish a comprehensive strategy for natural gas, managing its role during the transition and securing its supply, that should guide infrastructure choices, international partnerships and legislation; notes, with concern, that inconsistent policies on natural gas have weakened the trading position of EU companies, leaving them exposed to global spot market prices and potentially creating a gap between what the EU has contractually secured and what will be imported over time;

    10. Stresses that the development of nuclear energy remains a national prerogative in the framework of EU law; notes that for the Member States that choose to have nuclear power in their energy mix, it can have an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables; notes that a number of Member States see a need to support the development and deployment of both existing and a new generation of nuclear technologies, as well as the entire nuclear fuel cycle, that will contribute to building a competitive technological supply chain in the EU so as to ensure open strategic autonomy; stresses the importance of assessing the full cost of the entire nuclear energy life cycle, including construction, operation, security, environmental and health impacts, waste management and decommissioning; notes the existing and ongoing reliance on foreign providers, with approximately 97 % of the EU’s natural uranium supply in 2022 coming from oversea sources[33] and stresses the need to diversify  uranium and nuclear fuel supply sources and to follow the Euratom Supply Agency’s recommendation in developing reliable supply chains to meet the growing demand for nuclear and new nuclear technologies; notes, in this regard, the European Investment Bank’s recent decision to renew its support for strengthening European uranium enrichment capacities; underlines that small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (AMRs) have the potential to enhance energy security by providing low-carbon power; notes, however, that the technology is not yet fully developed; welcomes the announced assessment of the possibility of streamlining licensing practices for new nuclear energy technologies such as SMRs;

    11. Recognises that renewable energy constitutes an enabler of energy autonomy and long-term security of supply; stresses that renewables are essential in delivering energy security as they already constitute the main source of home-grown energy for the EU; highlights the importance of maximising the use of existing renewable capacities, particularly by tackling the issue of curtailment, as grid congestion in the EU curtailed over 12 TWh of renewable electricity in 2023, resulting in an additional 4.2 million tons of CO₂ emissions[34]; notes that renewables have already helped to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas as they accounted for 25 % of the energy and 45 % of the electricity consumed in the EU in 2023; reaffirms the importance of sustained EU support for the development and deployment of established renewable technologies, such as solar, wind power, geothermal and heat pumps; reiterates the necessity of policy and investment support for less developed or emerging sectors in order to accelerate the deployment of renewable technologies that are the most relevant given their national and local circumstances, such as innovative geothermal technologies, biomethane, solar thermal, marine energy, tidal energy, osmotic energy and concentrated solar power; expresses concern that, without targeted support policies, some innovative technologies may fail to reach commercialisation in a timely manner, and therefore calls on the Member States to support their research, demonstration, market adoption and scale-up; calls on the Commission to present an investment plan for these renewable technologies;

    12. Notes, in particular, the potential of geothermal energy, estimated to reach 510 GW by 2035 at a capacity factor of 80-90 %; highlights the vast untapped resources in certain EU regions and calls on the Commission to deliver on Parliament’s call to support the development of geothermal energy, including through the establishment of risk mitigation instruments;

    13. Asks the IEA to conduct an analysis to assess the possibilities for using EU natural gas resources; notes that domestic EU natural gas production dropped by more than a third between 2020 and 2023 and that this decline is expected to continue with no significant near-term increase in the production of green gases, including biogas and biomethane, in the EU; notes that Draghi’s report highlights that while progressively decarbonising and moving to hydrogen and green gases in line with RED III and REPowerEU as a transitional measure, domestic natural gas production – where deemed justified by individual Member States – could also play a role in contributing to security of supply and avoiding exposure to negative geopolitical developments;

    14. Highlights that diversification is vital to mitigate the risk of supplier dominance in a changing geopolitical context; believes the EU needs to strengthen international partnerships with reliable suppliers of energy, raw materials and clean-tech components in all regions of the world, and, in particular, with European Economic Area countries;

    15. Underlines that enhancing energy security requires a holistic approach, notably through improving energy efficiency in key end-use energy sectors, such as buildings and industry, promoting energy savings, boosting investment in research and development, and ensuring meaningful citizen participation, all of which are essential to achieving a resilient, sustainable and inclusive energy system;

    16. Calls on the Commission to be mindful of future military capability and mobility needs in the development of the EU’s energy system; notes, with concern, that the EU is highly import-dependent for crude oil and petroleum products; calls on the Commission to prepare a comprehensive strategy on liquid fuels in order to ensure their readily available access for the military in a crisis situation, and to reduce dependencies on vulnerable import chains and unreliable producers, particularly thorough the development of advanced synthetic fuels (such as sustainable aviation fuels and e-fuels) in Europe;

    17. Draws attention to the Niinistö report’s recommendation on the need for further work on priority dual-use transport corridors for civilian and defence-related logistical needs, and on the expansion of fuel supply chains for the armed forces along these corridors, as well as stockpiling and strategic reserves of energy, that could be particularly useful for the regions with insufficiently developed pipeline infrastructure and fuel storage; calls, in this respect, on the Commission to review the Oil Stocks Directive in the light of recent geopolitical shifts and the military readiness needs in order to strengthen energy security and resilience against emerging military risks;

    18. Acknowledges the rapidly accelerating energy demand driven by the digital sector, particularly the substantial energy requirements of data centres and artificial intelligence systems; stresses that this trend highlights the urgent need for robust energy efficiency policies and underscores the importance of the EU proactively pursuing sustainable, forward-looking solutions to meet this growing demand while safeguarding the resilience of its energy system;

    A resilient energy infrastructure

    19. Notes that infrastructure bottlenecks impede the benefits of sector integration and aggravate the threats to energy security; underlines the importance of investing in new energy networks, including cross-border interconnectors and offshore grids, and optimising existing infrastructure to increase capacity using grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) while reducing new infrastructure needs, in order to enable the integration of renewables and other new generation facilities, close price gaps, improve the overall system efficiency and foster solidarity among the Member States in the event of an energy crisis; emphasises the need for technically sound infrastructure planning that takes into account geographical and natural characteristics while ensuring long-term viability and avoiding the creation of stranded assets;

    20. Calls on the Commission to urgently assess areas where interconnectors are insufficient so as to achieve the current 15 % interconnection target as set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999[35]; stresses the importance of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) in facilitating the efficient and secure flow of electricity across Member States and regions, thereby strengthening cross-border integration and energy solidarity within the EU; acknowledges the role of the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) in completing the above investments and reiterates its call for its funding to be significantly increased when proposing the next multiannual financial framework;

    21. Calls on the Member States to accelerate permitting procedures for electricity installations and networks; notes that excessively long permitting procedures could create legal uncertainty, undermining resource adequacy by delaying the implementation of critical projects – whether for repowering or revamping existing generation sites, or for developing transmission, distribution, or storage infrastructure; welcomes the positive progress made regarding provisions adopted in the latest revision of the Renewable Energy Directive and the Emergency Regulation on Permitting[36] to accelerate, streamline and simplify permit-granting procedures;

    22. Recalls that climate change continues to worsen, placing increasing stress on the energy system due to extreme weather events, such as heat waves, that lead to thermal power plant shutdowns, droughts that reduce generation output, and severe storms, floods and fires that damage electricity grids and gas pipelines; stresses that the impact of climate change on generation assets, networks and consumption patterns should be better integrated into the modelling and preparedness of energy infrastructure; emphasises the need for resilient energy system planning, incorporating climate-adaptive strategies such as advanced cooling technologies, grid flexibility, decentralised renewable generation and strengthened infrastructure protections; highlights the importance of integrating a climate-proofing plan, grounded in an initial risk-based assessment, into energy projects from the earliest stages of development;

    23. Calls on the Commission to build on Directive (EU) 2022/2557[37] on the resilience of critical entities by facilitating its full and harmonised implementation through the provision of best practices, guidance materials and methodologies, and cross-border training activities and exercises to support Member States, competent authorities and critical energy entities;

    24. Emphasises the need to invest in the protection and resilience of energy infrastructure against human-caused threats, such as military, hybrid and cyber attacks; expresses concern about recent sabotage incidents in the Baltic Sea and calls for stronger EU-level action to protect the EU’s critical energy infrastructure, including cross-border connections with non-EU countries, such as subsea pipelines and cables, offshore wind farms and interconnections, designed to support the most impacted Member States, and to complement national measures; welcomes, in this regard, the joint communication on the EU Action Plan on Cable Security;

    25. Notes that the decentralisation of the energy system, that both strengthens resilience and facilitates the energy transition, and increased diversity of sources and autonomy, reduce reliance on centralised power plants, minimise outage risks, enhance grid stability, and enable quicker recovery from disruptions; emphasises at the same time that the increased number of remote and dispersed sources of energy, energy storage and new connections require enhanced measures to ensure robust infrastructure protection;

    26. Calls on the Commission to draw on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, particularly the critical role of electricity interconnection, microgrids, distributed solar power, wind power and battery storage in ensuring greater resilience of the electricity grid against military attacks, including cyberattacks, drones and missiles; commends Ukraine’s sustained efforts to maintain the functionality and safety of its energy system in the face of Russia’s war of aggression, and underscores that supporting Ukraine also entails helping to safeguard the soundness of its national electrical grid;

    27. Notes, with concern, that small distributed energy resources (DERs) connected to the internet, such as inverters, are not covered by appropriate conformity assessment procedures under cybersecurity legislation, such as the Cyber Resilience Act[38], and since they can be remotely controlled and their software updated by the manufacturer, which, in many cases, are non-trusted vendors, they could give these non-trusted vendors control over EU electricity grids; urges the Commission to establish mandatory risk assessments for DERs based on the country of origin, ensuring that devices controlled from jurisdictions with potential security concerns are subject to strict oversight and localisation requirements; calls for enhanced resilience in European supply chains by promoting EU-based manufacturing of DERs and fostering alliances with trusted international partners; highlights the need for an adequate number of professionals specialised in cybersecurity and close coordination among Member States to address these vulnerabilities;

    28. Calls on energy companies that manage critical infrastructure to work closely with the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and equip themselves with the most advanced cybersecurity tools; considers that cooperation with NATO in the field of cybersecurity should be strengthened in order to counter hybrid threats to Europe’s energy security;

    29. Notes that the Member States need to do their utmost to increase their resilience, which encompasses the ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, resist, mitigate, absorb, accommodate and recover from incidents, taking into full account the interdependence of the EU energy market and the potential domino effect that infrastructure failures in one country may have across the Union; underlines, in particular, the need to strengthen the recovery aspect, which could be achieved through an efficient European repair and response mechanism and national and regional operational plans, which could serve as an important element of the EU’s deterrence strategy; notes the importance of EU solidarity in responding to potential infrastructure incidents, ensuring coordinated action and mutual support among Member States;

    30. Recalls that energy infrastructure constitutes a particularly sensitive sector in need of protection against foreign interests; urges the Member States and the Commission to address security risks associated with foreign investment in and acquisitions of energy infrastructure; expresses concern about a series of potentially sensitive foreign investments, particularly in grids; welcomes, in this regard, the ongoing revision of the Foreign Investment Screening Regulation[39] as a timely step towards adopting a stringent strategic approach to the development and oversight of European energy infrastructure;

    31. Stresses that energy security should include the supply of key clean technologies, components and critical raw materials and notes the need for their diversified sourcing; calls for increased support for the EU’s grid manufacturing industry as a strategic pillar of the energy transition, with particular emphasis on ensuring a fair and competitive regulatory environment for European manufacturers, while exploring the potential for local content requirements to strengthen energy security, supply chain resilience and industrial competitiveness; calls for an update of the Public Procurement Framework to simplify and reduce the administrative burden for grid operators to access the needed grid technologies;

    32. Emphasises the importance of integrating circularity principles into the design of critical infrastructure and equipment, and calls for increased support for their implementation, with the goal of reducing the EU’s dependence on imports of foreign raw materials and enhancing resource efficiency;

    Phase out of Russian energy supplies

    33. Highlights that the challenges posed by a lack of solidarity in the EU and by some Member States prioritising particular interests have made the whole continent aware of the dangers of dependence on an unreliable energy supplier weaponising energy exports; underlines that the lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine need to be at the core of future EU actions, particularly highlighting the critical importance of a united European response in order to eliminate perilous dependencies in energy supplies;

    34. Underlines that the EU has made advances in reducing its energy dependence thanks largely to the REPowerEU plan and the 16 sanctions packages, leading to a decline in imports of Russian gas (pipeline and LNG) from 45 % of total EU gas imports in 2021 to 19 % as of 2024;

    35. Expresses deep concern that the EU still maintains its reliance on Russian gas and, moreover, has recently seen an increase, with imports rising by 18 % in 2024 and continuing to grow in 2025[40]; notes that in 2024 alone, Member States purchased an estimated EUR 7 billion worth of Russian LNG, and since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has imported EUR 200 billion worth of Russian oil and gas – totally[41] fuelling Russia’s war machine;

    36. Welcomes the publication of a roadmap for phasing out Russian energy imports, which must pave the way for their definitive end as soon as possible;

    37. Welcomes the stepwise prohibition of Russian gas imports proposed by the Commission; stresses the need to introduce an EU-wide ban on all Russian natural gas imports by 2027 at the latest, and on new contracts and existing spot contracts by the end of 2025; insists that the Member States, including those currently benefiting from targeted derogations for Russian oil imports, should ultimately phase out these imports by 2027 at the latest; welcomes the upcoming legislative proposals in this regard and calls on the Commission to explore the use of all available transitional instruments that could lead to the end of Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027, such as the introduction of a regular quota system for Russian gas imports into the EU and the introduction of a ceiling price for Russian LNG, following an assessment of market and price impacts; calls on the Commission to provide EU companies with effective and legally sound toolkits to facilitate their efforts to get out of long-term contracts with Russian suppliers without incurring penalties;

    38. Calls on the Member States to include gas deliveries to the EU from the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 terminals in the scope of EU sanctions and the respective sanctioning of the singular fleet of ice-class LNG carriers linked to the Yamal LNG project; notes that sanctioning LNG carriers would be highly effective, as there is a limited number of ice-class LNG carriers in the world; stresses that the above actions would require adequate assessments of the legal and economic impacts on the European companies concerned and to ensure their ability to exit contracts;

    39. Commends the inclusion of the nuclear supply chain in the roadmap; notes, with concern, that Russian nuclear fuel remains present in the EU market, including through indirect supply chains, and that in 2023, 23.5 % of the uranium consumed in the EU came from Russia and 30.1 % of the uranium used in the EU’s nuclear fleet was enriched by Russia; notes that while domestic providers are ramping up capacity in their European facilities to meet increased demand, as utilities proactively move away from Russian supply, clear policy decisions are urgently required at EU and national level to address the above vulnerabilities in the nuclear supply chain; calls therefore for support for projects within the Union that contribute to greater autonomy and security of nuclear fuel supply;

    40. Expresses concern that official data does not provide a complete picture of Russian energy imports and their final destination, as relabelled Russian oil and gas continue to enter the EU market; notes with regret that this, in some cases, occurs with the acquiescence of the state actors involved;

    41. Agrees that an adequate assessment of the amount of Russian energy imports is a prerequisite for phasing out this dependence; regrets the continued whitewashing of Russian energy imports and stresses the need for greater transparency in the EU energy market; calls on the Member States to publish data on the origin of imported, exported and consumed Russian gas, and urges the application of all measures against the whitewashing of Russian energy imports; notes that relevant reporting obligations laid down under Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector can contribute to achieving this goal;

    42. Welcomes the upcoming proposals for transparency, monitoring and traceability mechanisms, as the effective implementation of sanctions depends on compatible control mechanisms in all Member States; underscores the urgent need to develop a legal mechanism to ensure the transparency and traceability of natural gas originating in Russia and exported to the EU as liquefied natural gas and by pipeline, and eventually to cover oil imports; stresses that this mechanism should be extended to energy imports from other destinations in the future; considers that the mechanism would require cooperation between various services, including EU competition services, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and national customs authorities; asks the Member States to consider strengthening the criminal investigation powers of national customs authorities to ensure the effectiveness of the above mechanism and introducing sufficient deterrent measures and fines, such as adequate financial penalties for sanctions evasion;

    43. Stresses the need to adopt a legal framework for diversification, requiring each Member State to prepare, in a coordinated manner and through the appropriate competent authorities, an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to support and oversee the preparation and implementation of specialised exit plans at the level of undertakings active in their respective energy sectors; considers that these plans should include domestic production and demand reduction dimensions;

    44. Strongly condemns the calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of the peace settlement in Ukraine; firmly rejects the idea of the possible certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and insists on the complete decommissioning of Nord Stream pipelines; warns against the EU falling back into dependency on an unreliable supplier and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop safeguards against this, such as a countersignature by the Commission on any potential contracts with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase;

    45. Recalls that energy is a fundamental necessity; emphasises that the phase out of Russian energy imports must be a collective effort, ensuring that no Member State, company or household is left behind; emphasises that Member States are not equally positioned to phase out Russian energy imports in the same manner, and therefore urges strong solidarity among them, alongside appropriate support measures from the Commission to ensure a fair and coordinated transition;

    46. Notes that, in the near-term, there is the need to replace phased out Russian energy imports with reliable non-EU sources and urges the Commission therefore to propose measures that ensure their sufficient substitution from trusted partners; stresses, however, that Russian energy supplies should not be replaced by new dependencies in supplies, and therefore that, in the long term, energy imports should be progressively reduced through effective measures to support decarbonisation, electrification and energy efficiency and savings in the sectors where it is possible and cost-efficient, as well as through the development of domestic energy production in line with the REPowerEU plan;

    47. Emphasises that energy dependence on Russia also should not be replaced by new dependencies on individual suppliers of energy technologies, components or critical raw materials;

    Revision of security of supply framework

    48. Welcomes the upcoming revision of the Security of Supply architecture including the Gas Security of Supply Regulation and the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation, and other relevant legislation; considers that the new EU security of supply architecture should reflect such fundamental shifts as increasing cross-sectoral integration of the energy system, the new geopolitical landscape, the profound changes in supply routes, the impact of climate change, as well as changes in the maturity of energy technologies reflected in shifts of levelised costs of energy and the opportunities this presents for the energy transition;

    49. Highlights that energy efficiency plays a critical role in enhancing the security of energy supply by reducing overall energy demand, lowering dependency on energy imports and increasing system resilience; considers that the new security of supply framework should be broadened to reflect a new way of looking at the security of energy supply, based not only on energy sources, but also on the energy efficiency first principle, energy savings, cost efficiency, as well as the ability to produce different types of energy domestically; notes that, in the near-term, the Union should concentrate on effective and solid weaning of Russian energy imports without loopholes, including through securing alternatives supplies from reliable partners and better use of existing infrastructure, while in parallel continuing to develop domestic alternatives to imported energy products, where possible; stresses, nevertheless, the imperative to develop a future-proof security of supply architecture that systematically reduces dependence on external actors, notably by advancing energy efficiency, promoting energy savings, enhancing circularity and ensuring the sustained growth of home-grown clean energy production and well-protected decentralised energy infrastructure;

    50. Emphasises the need to prioritise the resilience of energy infrastructure, drawing on the lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the targeted attacks on its energy systems and the benefits of decentralised energy systems; considers that new energy assets should be ‘resilient by design’, including to possible military threats and extreme weather events;

    51. Stresses the need for greater cooperation among all actors on the resilience of energy infrastructure to both climate impacts and human-caused threats; insists that the protection of this infrastructure requires greater involvement of governments, including through public-private partnerships; welcomes, in this regard, the Niinistö report recommendation to engage with the private sector in institutionalising de-risking efforts, cross-sector stress tests and proactive security measures; asks the Commission to ensure that such cooperation is reflected in plans covering incident management and recovery, and is subject to regular exercises; notes that the Union’s preparedness strategy includes actions to strengthen public-private partnerships and calls on the Commission to further develop relevant specific measures for the energy sector in the review of the security of supply architecture;

    52. Notes the need to accommodate in the security of supply architecture the integration of renewable and low-carbon gases, such as biomethane and hydrogen; recalls that the Hydrogen Strategy already recognised the role that renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production can play in providing flexibility and storage in an integrated energy system with a high share of renewables; calls on the Commission to recognise the complementarities between hydrogen and electricity in the future Electrification Action Plan, in line with energy sector integration, and to set clear conditions for the ramp-up of hydrogen to contribute to the energy transition, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors;

    53. Stresses the need to include affordability risks in national risk assessments; calls for transparency on the implementation of national risk-preparedness measures to increase trust between the Member States; notes the advantages of greater coherence on protected consumer categories (consistent categories and gradation of disconnection priority for grid users) to allow coordinated consumer load-shedding plans to be defined, including plans to support vulnerable households affected by, or at risk of, energy poverty during an energy crisis;

    54. Highlights the need for a unified, resilient and strategically coordinated energy policy; emphasises that as the EU energy markets become more integrated, energy security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of the Member States, thus requiring solidarity and coordination in order to prevent unilateral actions that could undermine the security of the entire EU; warns that a unilateral decision by a single actor to enter into a harmful energy agreement with a non-EU country could expose the whole EU to renewed energy crises, price volatility and geopolitical pressure;

    55. Notes the need for stronger coordination between the Member States on the decommissioning of ageing generation units with cross-border impact, as well as on withdrawal from the system of generation capacity in order to ensure that alternative installations have been completed and are in operation, as this affects the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries;

    56. Underlines that data-driven technologies should positively impact energy security management; recognises the importance of comprehensive energy information and data in identifying and responding to evolving energy security threats and in infrastructure planning, and calls for improved coordination in the collection of such information and data;

    57. Calls on the Commission to include in the security of supply proposal technical provisions for the standardisation and interoperability of critical components of the EU’s energy system, particularly electrical transformers, to ensure that a lack of standardisation does not hinder European solidarity;

    58. Welcomes the establishment by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) of a new Task Force on the Security of Critical Infrastructure, aimed at analysing and proposing recommendations on the topic of security of critical infrastructure; stresses the importance of incorporating lessons learned from Ukraine’s experience, including the valuable expertise of the dedicated unit within the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator (TSO) tasked with identifying and mitigating threats to critical infrastructure; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with ENTSO-E in delivering a comprehensive and systemic assessment of threats to the EU electricity grid, to be completed by 2026;

    °

    ° °

    59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Germany: Largest EIB financing for EWE – over 2,600 km of new underground power lines and more than 1,100 substations for Lower Saxony’s energy transition

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) and EWE AG announced the largest EIB loan that EWE has ever received at a ceremony marking the 25th anniversary of the EIB’s Berlin office today.

    A long-term credit facility of up to €450 million was finalised at an event attended by German federal government ministers, project partners and stakeholders.

    This will support investment totalling more than €700 million between 2025 and 2028. The programme includes the laying of more than 2,600 kilometres of new underground power lines and the construction and modernisation of over 1,100 substations, constituting another major step forward for energy infrastructure and energy security in northern Germany.

    EWE Chief Financial Officer Frank Reiners said:

    “We are pleased to further develop our partnership with the EIB. This financing will help supercharge our investments in grid expansion and digitalisation. This will enable us to rapidly and securely integrate more renewable energy into the power grid and strengthen the security of supply in our regions, thereby making them more attractive for new industrial developments.”

    EIB Vice-President Nicola Beer added:

    “What many people do not know is that the most important energy-transition investments are often right under our feet. With over 2,600 km of new underground power lines and more than 1,100 new and modernised substations, we are working with EWE to build a hidden backbone for a more secure energy supply and expanded use of renewable energy throughout northern Germany. Today’s signature of the EIB’s largest-ever financing for EWE at the 25th anniversary event for our Berlin office – attended by high-ranking representatives from politics and business – sends a strong signal for the future of energy supply in Germany. 2024 was a record year for EIB support for the energy grid and this project shows how we are actively shaping Europe’s green future.”

    Hidden infrastructure – the backbone of the energy transition

    Investing in power grids is at the heart of the European energy transition. The massive expansion of renewable energy makes high-performance, flexible grids vital to adding new wind and solar power systems, switching to electrical power for heat and transport and ensuring secure, reliable supply for households and industry. Around 95% of the electricity fed into EWE’s power grid in Lower Saxony comes from renewable sources. The investments will enable an additional 3 gigawatts (GW) of renewable generation capacity to be connected by 2028, representing an important contribution to German and European climate targets.

    2024: A record year for EIB power grid investment

    2024 was a record year for EIB support for power-grid investment across Europe. As the EU climate bank, the EIB has a long track record of financing key energy infrastructure projects making decarbonisation, economic growth and energy-security possible. In recent years, the EIB has financed grid modernisation and expansion in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland and many other EU Member States, laying the foundations for a sustainable, interconnected European energy market.

    Contributing to national and EU objectives

    EWE’s investment programme is fully aligned with Germany’s national energy and climate plan, which foresees an 80% share of renewable energy in electricity use by 2030. It also supports the REPowerEU initiative by expanding clean-energy integration, cutting emissions and strengthening energy supply. A total of 40% Sof the investments will go to cohesion regions, promoting economic and social cohesion.

    The EIB – a reliable partner for Europe’s energy transition

    The EIB’s long-term, flexible financing provides a stable basis on which EWE can implement its investment plans, diversifies sources of funding and sends a positive signal to capital markets. As an anchor investor, the EIB is mobilising additional public and private capital for critical infrastructure projects.

    Background information

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank is the world’s largest multilateral lender for climate action projects, supporting initiatives that promote sustainable growth, innovation and social cohesion in the European Union and beyond.

    EWE

    EWE AG is one of Germany’s leading energy and infrastructure companies, operating electricity, gas, water supply and telecommunications networks in Lower Saxony and beyond.

    EWE Electricity Grid Investments Germany

    ©EIB
    Download original

    EWE Electricity Grid Investments Germany

    ©EIB
    Download original

    EWE Electricity Grid Investments Germany

    ©EIB
    Download original

    EWE Electricity Grid Investments Germany

    ©EIB
    Download original

    How to finance sustainable housing

    ©Shutterstock
    Download original

    EWE Electricity Grid Investments Germany

    ©EIB
    Download original

    EWE Electricity Grid Investments Germany

    ©EIB
    Download original

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Floods in Aragon and the need to boost EU funding for climate change adaptation – E-002440/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002440/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Rosa Serrano Sierra (S&D)

    The heavy rainfall last weekend caused severe flooding in a number of Zaragoza and Teruel municipalities, notably Campo de Borja, Campo de Belchite and Bajo Martín.

    The storms caused injuries and serious damage to homes, infrastructure, and agricultural and livestock farms. There were major disruptions to water and electricity supplies, landslides, collapsed bridges and blocked roads.

    The new European Climate Adaptation Plan (ECAP), postponed to 2026, will play a vital role in helping European regions prepare for extreme climate events in the short and long term. It will also lay the groundwork for the planning for infrastructure, energy, water, food and land use in cities and rural areas.

    Given that the Commission will present its proposal for the multiannual financial framework (MFF) in July, we would ask the following:

    • 1.To what extent will climate adaptation be taken into account in the next MFF?
    • 2.Does the Commission intend to strengthen the current funds (Civil Protection Mechanism, Solidarity Fund, Emergency Aid Reserve) to tackle the climate emergency or will it establish a new funding instrument?
    • 3.When will ECAP be presented and what specific measures are planned?

    Submitted: 17.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Inclusion of biodiversity in the system monitoring the Recovery and Resilience Facility – E-002442/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002442/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    The planetary crisis that we face today is not just due to climate change, but also to the alarming loss of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystems that are essential to life. In this context, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) officially dedicates 37 % of funding to the green transition, although Member States have exceeded this target, dedicating an average of 42 % of expenditure to climate goals.

    However, while the RRF’s green transition pillar also covers other aspects related to biodiversity and the environment, the current monitoring system only tracks climate-related actions.

    In light of this:

    • 1.How will the Commission improve the monitoring system to more effectively track biodiversity and environmental measures under the RRF?
    • 2.What specific steps will the Commission take to ensure that future financial instruments fairly and comprehensively address both climate action and environmental conservation?
    • 3.How will the Commission ensure compliance with the principles of good government and efficient management of funds for biodiversity?

    Submitted: 17.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Plant for the desalination of brackish water from the sources of the River Tara – P-002102/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Member States must ensure compliance with EU law, including verifying if assessments under Directives 2000/60/EC[1], 2011/92/EU[2], 92/43/EEC[3] and 2009/147/EC[4] are required for a project and, if so, assessing if they were performed in accordance with that legislation. Based on the information provided, the Commission cannot establish a breach of these EU Directives at this point in time.

    In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors Member States’ compliance with EU law, focusing its enforcement action on systemic issues of non-compliance[5]. National courts are competent to verify compliance with EU law for individual cases.

    Investment 4.1 ‘Primary water infrastructure for the security of water supply’ of the national recovery and resilience plan[6] (RRP) aims to ensure security of water supply and increase network resilience[7].

    The Commission does not participate to the selection of projects, which falls under the remit of the Member State, but assesses the implementation of measures on the basis of the annex to the Council Implementing Decision on the Italian RRP[8].

    Member States’ authorities, including the judiciary, are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law, including verifying compliance of the specific projects undertaken in the context of the RRP.

    • [1] Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.
    • [2] Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU.
    • [3] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.
    • [4] Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 20, 26.1.2010.
    • [5] As set out in Communication of 19 January 2017 ‘EU law: Better results through better application’, C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, and in Communication of 13 October 2022 ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’, COM(2022) 518 final.
    • [6] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/italys-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.
    • [7] Target M2C4-29 envisages increasing security of water supply and resilience of 50 water systems.
    • [8] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10d790a3-f955-4377-aa97-b3f74d3d179d_en?filename=COM_2025_285_1_EN_annexe_proposition_cp_part1_v3.pdf.
    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Rural proofing and wood-burning stoves – E-002441/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002441/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE)

    The Commission is working on the regulation derived from Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 on ecodesign requirements for sustainable products (the Ecodesign Regulation). With regard to wood-fired boilers and built-in fireplaces, there seem to be requirements that may involve adapting facilities and replacing equipment that would reduce their emissions, but also render them inoperative in a power cut (a common occurrence in many rural areas, particularly when there are winter storms), and place a significant financial burden on the poorest families in rural areas, whose average income is barely 75 % of the EU average.

    This matter seems to be a clear example of the relevance of the introduction in this and many other legislative and policy initiatives of the rural proofing mechanism, which the Commission says it supports. In view of the above:

    • 1.Should the Commission not put its proposal through the rural proofing mechanism with a view to reformulating it to provide for starting conditions that are more in tune with the actual circumstances in rural areas?
    • 2.What plans, timetable, means and instruments does the Commission have for the introduction of the rural proofing mechanism in all its laws, policies and measures?

    Submitted: 17.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Foot-and-mouth disease – urgent action to protect the Italian livestock industry – E-001501/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has implemented preventive measures for foot and mouth disease (FMD), which include: i) closely monitoring the EU situation; ii) developing specific legislation with disease control measures for FMD and other diseases[1] within an EU legal framework[2], iii) adopting immediate emergency measures with FMD regionalisation measures[3] which require movement restrictions and controls in the restricted zones, thus protecting the EU internal market with tighter biosecurity measures; iv) ensuring EU coordination through standing committee meetings[4]; v) managing and deploying vaccine doses from the EU FMD antigen bank; vi) providing support to all Member States, including training[5] and dispatching the EU Veterinary Emergency Team[6] on-site to assist the competent authorities; vii) regularly informing Member States and trading partners[7] about the evolution of the epidemiological situation, and viii) maintaining constant dialogue with trading partners to advocate for the recognition of EU regionalisation and to avoid unjustified trade bans.

    EU co-financing of emergency veterinary measures is available under the Commission’s Single Market Programme, covering costs related to animal culling, owner compensation, and premises cleaning and disinfecting .

    Support is also possible under the common agricultural policy[8] for risk management (e.g., insurance), on-farm biosecurity (e.g., fencing), and agricultural restoration post-outbreaks (i.e., restocking).

    Additional emergency measures[9] for farmers affected by natural disasters, including animal diseases, were adopted on 19 December 2024. Member States may also request exceptional support[10] for farmers impacted by trade restrictions due to animal diseases.

    • [1] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 of 17 December 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and the Council, as regards rules for the prevention and control of certain listed diseases (OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, p. 64, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj).
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) ( OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj).
    • [3] The current regionalisation is regulated by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 of 31 March 2025 concerning certain emergency measures relating to outbreaks of FMD in Hungary and Slovakia and repealing Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/613 (OJ L, 2025/672, 2.4.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/672/oj).
    • [4] Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed: https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/committees/paff-committees_en.
    • [5] Better Training for Safer Food (BTSF) resources: https://better-training-for-safer-food.ec.europa.eu/training/?lang=en.
    • [6] https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal-diseases/veterinary-emergency-team_en.
    • [7] https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a0dcc301-94d4-4eb3-8c64-8cda1d3afc92_en?filename=ad_control-measures_fmd_chron_de-20250110.pdf.
    • [8] Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 (OJ L435, 6.12.2021, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/2024-05-25).
    • [9] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R3242&qid=1735899275178.
    • [10] Article 220 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1308/2024-11-08).
    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: Lightchain AI Positions Itself as the First Layer-One Where AI Logic Actually Lives and Breathes On-Chain

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SHREWSBURY, United Kingdom, June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Lightchain AI positions itself as the first Layer-One blockchain where AI logic truly lives and breathes on-chain. Having completed all 15 presale stages and launched its Bonus Round at a fixed price of $0.007, Lightchain AI has raised $21.2 million from committed buyers and builders.

    Central to its innovation is a fully functional AI-native Virtual Machine, designed to execute complex AI tasks seamlessly within the blockchain environment. Coupled with transparent governance and developer incentives, Lightchain AI is not just promising AI integration—it’s delivering a dynamic, scalable platform that enables decentralized intelligence to thrive and evolve directly on-chain.

    Emergence of AI-Integrated Layer-One Blockchains

    The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) technology into layer-one blockchains is a relatively new concept, but one that has the potential to revolutionize the blockchain industry. By combining AI and blockchain technology, developers are now able to create more powerful and efficient decentralized systems.

    One of the leading projects in this space is Lightchain AI. This innovative platform aims to solve many of the challenges faced by traditional blockchains, such as scalability and high transaction costs, while also bringing advanced AI capabilities to the table.

    Lightchain AI Brings AI Logic Fully On-Chain for Real-Time Processing

    Lightchain AI is revolutionizing blockchain technology by embedding artificial intelligence directly into its core infrastructure, enabling real-time, on-chain processing of AI tasks. Central to this innovation is the Artificial Intelligence Virtual Machine (AIVM), which facilitates the execution of complex AI computations—such as model training and inference—within a decentralized environment .

    The AIVM’s architecture supports parallel processing and is compatible with popular AI frameworks like TensorFlow and PyTorch, ensuring scalability and efficiency . To maintain data privacy and security, Lightchain AI integrates advanced cryptographic techniques, including zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic encryption .

    This seamless fusion of AI and blockchain positions Lightchain AI as a transformative platform for developing intelligent, decentralized applications across various industries.

    How Lightchain AI is Revolutionizing Intelligent Blockchain Networks

    Lightchain AI is redefining the future of blockchain by fusing cutting-edge AI with decentralized infrastructure. Imagine a network where advanced AI tasks run seamlessly in real time, thanks to low latency and high throughput. With a transparent governance framework, the power is truly in the hands of the community, ensuring fairness and collaboration at every step.

    But that’s not all—Lightchain’s gas optimization and sharding technologies make it scalable, cost-effective, and ready for a wide range of applications. Add in privacy-preserving AI workflows, cross-chain interoperability, and robust developer support with grants and tools, and you’ve got a platform that’s raising the bar for blockchain ecosystems.

    Lightchain AI isn’t just building technology; it’s paving the way for smarter, more secure, and efficient blockchain solutions that are set to transform industries and drive innovation.

    https://lightchain.ai

    https://lightchain.ai/lightchain-whitepaper.pdf

    https://x.com/LightchainAI

    https://t.me/LightchainProtocol

    Contact:
    SHAJAN SKARIA
    media@lightchain.ai

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by Lightchain AI. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/e1c4fb3f-3522-4f8e-a114-822447c5c411

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Lightchain AI Positions Itself as the First Layer-One Where AI Logic Actually Lives and Breathes On-Chain

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SHREWSBURY, United Kingdom, June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Lightchain AI positions itself as the first Layer-One blockchain where AI logic truly lives and breathes on-chain. Having completed all 15 presale stages and launched its Bonus Round at a fixed price of $0.007, Lightchain AI has raised $21.2 million from committed buyers and builders.

    Central to its innovation is a fully functional AI-native Virtual Machine, designed to execute complex AI tasks seamlessly within the blockchain environment. Coupled with transparent governance and developer incentives, Lightchain AI is not just promising AI integration—it’s delivering a dynamic, scalable platform that enables decentralized intelligence to thrive and evolve directly on-chain.

    Emergence of AI-Integrated Layer-One Blockchains

    The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) technology into layer-one blockchains is a relatively new concept, but one that has the potential to revolutionize the blockchain industry. By combining AI and blockchain technology, developers are now able to create more powerful and efficient decentralized systems.

    One of the leading projects in this space is Lightchain AI. This innovative platform aims to solve many of the challenges faced by traditional blockchains, such as scalability and high transaction costs, while also bringing advanced AI capabilities to the table.

    Lightchain AI Brings AI Logic Fully On-Chain for Real-Time Processing

    Lightchain AI is revolutionizing blockchain technology by embedding artificial intelligence directly into its core infrastructure, enabling real-time, on-chain processing of AI tasks. Central to this innovation is the Artificial Intelligence Virtual Machine (AIVM), which facilitates the execution of complex AI computations—such as model training and inference—within a decentralized environment .

    The AIVM’s architecture supports parallel processing and is compatible with popular AI frameworks like TensorFlow and PyTorch, ensuring scalability and efficiency . To maintain data privacy and security, Lightchain AI integrates advanced cryptographic techniques, including zero-knowledge proofs and homomorphic encryption .

    This seamless fusion of AI and blockchain positions Lightchain AI as a transformative platform for developing intelligent, decentralized applications across various industries.

    How Lightchain AI is Revolutionizing Intelligent Blockchain Networks

    Lightchain AI is redefining the future of blockchain by fusing cutting-edge AI with decentralized infrastructure. Imagine a network where advanced AI tasks run seamlessly in real time, thanks to low latency and high throughput. With a transparent governance framework, the power is truly in the hands of the community, ensuring fairness and collaboration at every step.

    But that’s not all—Lightchain’s gas optimization and sharding technologies make it scalable, cost-effective, and ready for a wide range of applications. Add in privacy-preserving AI workflows, cross-chain interoperability, and robust developer support with grants and tools, and you’ve got a platform that’s raising the bar for blockchain ecosystems.

    Lightchain AI isn’t just building technology; it’s paving the way for smarter, more secure, and efficient blockchain solutions that are set to transform industries and drive innovation.

    https://lightchain.ai

    https://lightchain.ai/lightchain-whitepaper.pdf

    https://x.com/LightchainAI

    https://t.me/LightchainProtocol

    Contact:
    SHAJAN SKARIA
    media@lightchain.ai

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by Lightchain AI. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/e1c4fb3f-3522-4f8e-a114-822447c5c411

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rutherford Leads Bipartisan, Bicameral Florida Delegation Letter Urging State Management of South Atlantic Red Snapper

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman John Rutherford (4th District of Florida)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – On Monday, U.S. Congressman John H. Rutherford (FL-05) led a bipartisan, bicameral group of Florida legislators in a letter to U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in support of Florida state management of red snapper and other reef fish in the South Atlantic.

    “Every local angler I talk to says there are more red snapper off the coast of Northeast Florida than ever before,” said Rutherford. “Yet, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) under President Biden only gave us one day to fish last summer. It’s time to hand over the South Atlantic fishery management to our Governors DeSantis, Kemp, and McMaster.”

    Rutherford was joined by Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) and Representatives Aaron Bean (FL-04), Gus Bilirakis (FL-), Vern Buchanan (FL-16), Kat Cammack (FL-03), Mario Diaz-Balart (FL-26), Bryon Donalds (FL-19), Neal Dunn (FL-02), Randy Fine (FL-06), Scott Franklin (FL-15), Carlos Gimenez (FL-26), Laurel Lee (FL-15), Anna Paulina Luna (FL-13), Brian Mast (FL-18), Cory Mills (FL-07), Jared Moskowitz (FL-23), Jimmy Patronis (FL-01), Maria Salazar (FL-27), Greg Steube (FL-17), and Daniel Webster (FL-11).

    Read the full letter below:

    Dear Secretary Lutnick,

    We, the undersigned members of Florida’s congressional delegation, write to share our support for the request of Governors DeSantis, Kemp, and McMaster to implement state management of red snapper and other reef fish in the South Atlantic.  For too long, Florida anglers in the South Atlantic have been largely shut out of red snapper harvest opportunities despite unprecedented growth and record abundance in this fishery.

    NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service recently determined that red snapper is no longer overfished and approved a final rule to end overfishing.  We thank you for rejecting the bottom closures that were in the Biden Administration’s proposed rule.  Closing bottom fishing from December to February for 55 species off the east coast of Florida would have been devastating to our state’s economy.  The drastic nature of the proposal highlights the need for significant changes to South Atlantic red snapper management to ensure reasonable harvest opportunities in this fishery, and we look forward to working with President Trump and his administration to achieve that goal.

    Florida has demonstrated its ability to use sound science to successfully manage red snapper in the Gulf. This success was made possible by President Trump during his first administration when he gave the five Gulf states a leading role in managing the red snapper fishery.  Since then, the health of Florida’s Gulf red snapper population has continued to improve, growing the season from 3 to 126 days.  We believe the current abundance of South Atlantic red snapper, combined with strong interest from states in the region to take on a greater role in data collection and management, presents an extraordinary opportunity to make state-led management in the South Atlantic a resounding success, much like the model seen in the Gulf.

    While the federal government has struggled to collect reliable data and timely estimates of recreational red snapper harvests, Florida and the South Atlantic states have the capability of collecting accurate data which will provide more quality fishing opportunities while promoting conservation.  We urge the Department of Commerce to work swiftly with Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina to grant the states the authority to manage red snapper and other reef fish in the South Atlantic. We look forward to advancing state management for the benefit of fishermen, conservation, and our coastal economy. 

    ###

     

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: 2025 Honours List and Justices of the Peace appointments

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4

         â€‹The 2025 Honours List and Justices of the Peace (JPs) appointments are published in the Government Gazette today (July 1).
     
    For the Honours List, the Chief Executive has given a total of 427 awards this year. The award recipients come from different walks of life with diverse backgrounds, benefitting various domains and sectors of the community, including public and community service, education, medical and public health, finance, trade and industry, innovation and technology, charity, arts and culture, sports, housing, transport, construction and urban development, environment, religion, labour and welfare, women and youth affairs, and professional services. Details are as follows:
     

         Award Number
    (a) Grand Bauhinia Medal (GBM) 3
    (b) Gold Bauhinia Star (GBS) 20
    (c) Silver Bauhinia Star (SBS) 29
    (d) Distinguished Service Medals for the disciplined services and the ICAC 12
    (e) Bronze Bauhinia Star (BBS) 46
    (f) Medal for Bravery (Bronze) (MBB) 3
    (g) Meritorious Service Medals for the disciplined services and the ICAC 46
    (h) Medal of Honour (MH) 111
    (i) Chief Executive’s Commendation for Community Service 76
    (j) Chief Executive’s Commendation for Government/Public Service 81
      427

     
    The citations of the award recipients of the 2025 Honours List are provided in Appendix 1.
     
    The Chief Executive, Mr John Lee, extends his congratulations to all award recipients and expresses gratitude for their significant contributions, hoping that they will continue to excel in their own fields and serve the community.
     
    Mr Lee said, “I also express my gratitude to nine officers for their outstanding contributions to safeguarding national security. In the situation facing targeted malicious attacks from external forces, they have remained fearlessly committed to duty and displayed an extraordinary level of determination in discharging their duties, and actively participated in work related to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance. They deserve the honours as recognition of their significant contributions.
     
    “Regarding the No. 3 alarm fire at New Lucky House in Jordan, which led to multiple deaths and injuries on April 10 last year, I would like to thank two citizens who bravely saved a number of trapped people, and therefore awarded the Medal for Bravery (Bronze) to these two citizens.
     
         “I also take this opportunity to express my thanks for the contributions of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region search and rescue team deployed to assist in the search and rescue work in the quake-stricken areas in Myanmar in March and April this year, and therefore awarded the Chief Executive’s Commendation for Community Service and the Chief Executive’s Commendation for Government/Public Service to these officers.”
     
    The presentation ceremony for the awards will be held later this year. 
     
    Moreover, a total of 66 persons have been appointed as JPs by the Chief Executive, of whom 48 were appointed under section 3(1)(b) of the Justices of the Peace Ordinance (Cap. 510) (commonly referred to as Non-official JPs), and 18 were appointed under section 3(1)(a) of the same ordinance (commonly referred to as Official JPs).
     
    The main function of JPs is to visit correctional institutions, detention centres or other institutions to ensure their effective management and that no individual is unfairly treated or deprived of his or her rights. JPs will ensure that complaints lodged by individuals are handled in a fair and transparent manner.
     
    The name list of JPs appointed under section 3(1)(b) and section 3(1)(a) of the Justices of the Peace Ordinance is provided in Appendix 2.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: The EIB and the European Commission announce a more flexible guarantee of €5 billion to boost global investments

    Source: European Investment Bank

    On the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Commission announced today a new type of guarantee agreement that will provide up to €5 billion to de-risk investments and expand EIB operations outside the European Union (EU). Today’s guarantee has the potential to unlock up to €10 billion in funding for critical projects in clean energy, green infrastructure and access to finance for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in partner countries.

    This new guarantee is designed to support an increased number of companies – companies with a state participation or public organisations – that operate at local or regional levels in partner countries outside of the EU. The novelty about today’s new guarantee is that it can also apply to entities that borrow money from financial markets on their own terms – without State backing. Whereas the previous guarantees used to support only State-backed projects. With today’s new type of guarantee agreement, it will be more flexible and faster to back up investments. Ultimately, the new guarantee will advance Global Gateway investments by financing projects of public interest that are considered too risky for traditional lenders while ensuring affordable borrowing costs for partner countries.

    The guarantee will support investments in energy, hard infrastructure, economic resilience and SMEs in the North of Africa and the Middle East. It will also help finance telecommunication and energy infrastructure projects and support municipalities in the EU’s enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood regions, contributing strongly to the EU’s accession priorities. At the same time, the guarantee will enable for instance the development of the Transcaspian Corridor in Central Asia, enhance supply chain security for critical raw materials and advance the Global Gateway Investment Agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean.

    “Complementing policy with the right financing tools helps us boosting the economic potential of the Middle East and North Africa, which will be one of the pillars of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and a fundamental one to foster job creation and mutual advantages for the EU and our partner countries. With this agreement, we are one step closer to a connected Mediterranean, especially when it comes to energy infrastructure and support to SMEs. We also aim at building a resilient Mediterranean region.”

    Dubravka Šuica, Commissioner for Mediterranean

    “This new agreement will build on our valued partnership with the European Investment Bank. It will unlock essential financial resources for investment in key areas such as energy, digital and municipal infrastructure. These sectors are crucial for the seamless integration of accession countries into the EU and for sustainable economic growth in our Eastern Neighbourhood region.”

    Marta Kos, Commissioner for Enlargement

    “This agreement is an important boost for the Global Gateway, our strategy to support sustainable development, strengthen EU’s presence globally and deepen our international partnerships. We are providing a €5 billion guarantee to unlock high-impact Global Gateway investments where they are needed the most, from clean energy and infrastructure to empowering small businesses. By de-risking investments, we are enabling large-scale projects that would not happen otherwise. This will help us create new long-term opportunities both for Europe and our partners.”

    Jozef Síkela, Commissioner for International Partnerships

    “This new agreement will help to position Europe as a trustworthy and reliable partner around the world. It expands the scope of our financing and strengthens the European Union’s ability to invest in high impact projects from basic services like water, health and clean energy to value chains in critical raw materials to support for accessible transport in cities and regions. “

    “This new agreement will help to position Europe as a trustworthy and reliable partner around the world. It expands the scope of our financing and strengthens the European Union’s ability to invest in high impact projects from basic services like water, health and clean energy to value chains in critical raw materials to support for accessible transport in cities and regions.”

    Nadia Calviño, President of the European Investment Bank

    Background information

    Global Gateway

    Global Gateway is the EU’s strategy to boost global connectivity through sustainable partnerships. Launched in December 2021, it seeks to mobilise up to €300 billion in public and private investments by 2027 to support projects in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, and education around the world. The strategy emphasises the advancement of smart, clean, and secure links while promoting environmental sustainability, social inclusiveness, and democratic values. Global Gateway serves as a European response to global infrastructure needs, offering transparent and value-based partnerships to foster economic growth worldwide.

    EFSD+

    The guarantee announced today falls under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), a key financing tool for the Global Gateway. It is part of the €26.7 billion guarantee envelope to support EIB lending outside the EU for the period 2021-2027.

    EFSD+ is part of the European Union’s investment framework and is the main financial instrument supporting the EU’s Global Gateway strategy. EFSD+ guarantees act as a safety net for lenders, covering potential losses if projects fail. If projects succeed, the guarantee remains unused, keeping EU funds available for other projects. In blended finance operations the EU combines a small grant contribution with loans to attract additional public and private funding, maximising the impact of projects.

    About EIB Global

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by the Member States. It finances investments that pursue EU policy objectives.

    EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm devoted to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance, and a key partner of Global Gateway. It aims to support €100 billion of investment by the end of 2027 – around one-third of the overall target of this EU initiative. Within Team Europe, EIB Global fosters strong, focused partnerships alongside fellow development finance institutions and civil society. EIB Global brings the EIB Group closer to people, companies and institutions through its offices across the world. Photos of EIB headquarters for media use are available here.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Wine tourism as a pillar of national identity and regional development – E-002472/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002472/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

    Wine tourism is an increasingly popular type of thematic tourism that boosts not only the national economy, but also the cultural identity of Greece. The promotion of our wine-making heritage presents more than a mere tourism option; it constitutes a strategic weapon of cultural resilience and strengthening the region. When we support Greek wines, we support national production. This is why we need to ensure that wine tourism is developed in terms of national strategy, and not just as a commercial tool.

    In view of the above, can the Commission say:

    • 1.How could it support Greece in making wine tourism part of a broader national cultural tourism narrative highlighting Greek identity?
    • 2.What measures are being taken to ensure that small traditional producers and family wineries participate equally in eco-tourism development programmes, without being crowded out by large enterprises and multinational schemes?
    • 3.How can local communities and local and regional authorities be further supported so that wine tourism boosts local economies and does not lead to cultural homogenisation or dependence on imported tourism development models?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Benchmarks to measure human rights improvements in Egypt – E-002532/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002532/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)

    On 18 June 2025, Parliament adopted a decision on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt, granting it a sum of EUR 4 billion. Article 2(1) of the decision states that ‘a pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights’.

    Article 8(1) of the decision requires the Commission to report to Parliament each year on the concrete steps taken by Egypt towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    The Commission is asked to answer the following questions individually, numbering its answers:

    • 1.What specific measures does the Commission expect Egypt to take to respect the pre-condition of continuing to ‘make concrete and credible steps’ on human rights and democracy?
    • 2.What indicators and benchmarks will the Commission use to measure progress, and will it clearly indicate these in its reports to Parliament?
    • 3.Will the Commission suspend the payments if Egypt does not meet these human rights benchmarks?

    Submitted: 24.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Who will benefit from ETS2 and the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive? – E-002526/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002526/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Erik Kaliňák (NI)

    The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and the ETS2 emissions trading system are raising serious concerns on account of their significant negative impact on ordinary EU citizens. The problems include both the mandatory building renovations required by the Directive and the increase in energy and fuel prices that ETS2 will bring. Both of these regulations will significantly increase the cost of living, leaving low-income households and small businesses hardest hit. These measures are not necessary, but rather a kind of ‘stunt’ from the desk of Brussels bureaucrats. Their positive impact is questionable, as these measures are only being imposed on EU Member States which have a negligible impact on a global scale. This is one of the reasons why there are growing calls from both ordinary citizens and businesses for both regulations to be repealed.

    In the light of the foregoing:

    • 1.Does the Commission plan to listen to the voices of EU citizens and review or, better still, repeal the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive in order not to artificially increase the financial burden on citizens?
    • 2.How does the Commission plan to respond to calls for the abolition of ETS2, given its impact on energy prices and the cost of living?
    • 3.How does the Commission feel about the fact that these and other similar measures are being imposed only on EU Member States, meaning that their effectiveness is minimal on a global scale?

    Submitted: 24.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The need to protect production at SGL Carbon (formerly FISIPE) and jobs – E-001905/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    SGL Composites S.A., the Portuguese unit of SGL Carbon located in Lavradio, received a total of EUR 624 514, from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for two projects, through the Lisbon operational programme 2014-2020.

    In addition, the company received EUR 929 520[1], as of May 2025, for the ‘investment project for the decarbonisation of industrial activity and promotion of energy efficiency levels’ under the Portuguese Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP).

    According to the data published by the Portuguese authorities, both ERDF projects were finalised by end-2019, so there is no likely impact on the durability[2] of these operations.

    Following the SGC Carbon announcement of a restructuring of its carbon fibres business unit, justified by ongoing financial losses, in February 2025[3], the company announced in May 2025 the closure of its production site in Lavradio, Portugal[4]. No further information regarding other possible closures has been released.

    The Commission promotes corporate social responsibility in the EU and encourages enterprises to adhere to international principles and to follow socially responsible management when restructuring.

    However, it does not intervene in the management decisions of private companies. In the event of dismissals, workers may benefit from European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) support in their search for new employment under the conditions set out by the Member State’s programmes.

    Additionally, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for displaced workers (EGF) can assist dismissed workers to help them to find new employment in the face of an unexpected major restructuring event.

    • [1] The RRF is a performance-based instrument. This figure is according to the Mais Transparência website of the Portuguese authorities: https://transparencia.gov.pt/pt/fundos-europeus/prr/beneficiarios-projetos/projeto/02/C11-i01/2022.PC658685467-00471800/.
    • [2] As provided by the article 71 of Regulation 1303/2013.
    • [3] https://www.sglcarbon.com/en/newsroom/news/press-report/adhoc-notification-sgl-carbon-decides-to-restructure-its-carbon-fibers-business-unit-presentation-of-preliminary-figures-for-fiscal-year-2024/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
    • [4] https://www.sglcarbon.com/en/newsroom/news/press-report/closure-of-sgl-carbon-production-site-in-lavradio/.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Ordinary people’s insurance funds and investments plundered for the needs of the EU’s war industry – E-001513/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The strategy for the Savings and Investments Union (SIU)[1] aims to offer citizens more and safer opportunities to invest in capital markets and increase their wealth while, at the same time, boosting EU economic growth and competitiveness.

    The SIU is committed to ensuring that citizens have easy, simple and low-cost access to a wide variety of investment opportunities offering good returns on their household savings.

    It will also improve the availability of stronger and more effective supplementary pension systems that deliver better performance to help citizens save for retirement.

    This includes also promoting auto-enrolment in supplementary pension schemes, an instrument that has proven effective in increasing participation of savers in pension schemes resulting in better returns on investment and higher pensions.

    In addition, to boost transparency and encourage participation, planned measures will also include recommending the implementation of pension tracking systems to help workers keep track of their pension entitlements in different schemes and make informed decisions about their retirement savings.

    The SIU will not result in forced contributions, diversion of funds or sequestrations. On the contrary, citizens will enjoy full freedom to invest based on their personal choices.

    They will have control of where they want to keep and allocate their money. The SIU aims to increase their choice by allowing them to get better access to productive investment opportunities.

    The Commission has no competence to deal with the second question, which is a matter solely for the national authorities concerned.

    • [1]  COM(2025) 124 final: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-unveils-savings-and-investments-union-strategy-enhance-financial-opportunities-eu_en.
    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: DRML Miner Launches Zero-Cost USDT Cloud Mining Platform with Daily Payouts and Referral Bonuses

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    London, UK, June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In the fast-changing world of digital finance, DRML Miner has emerged as a trusted name in the cloud mining industry. With the recent launch of its brand-new USDT cloud mining platform, DRML Miner has opened the door for anyone to earn daily stablecoin rewards, enjoy a powerful referral system, and start mining with zero initial cost.

    This new development gives investors and beginners alike the opportunity to generate passive income daily, without needing any mining equipment, technical skills, or up-front investment. As more users seek stable and secure income sources in the crypto space, DRML Miner’s platform stands out as a true game-changer.

    Start Earning Daily with Zero Investment

    At DRML Miner, users can begin earning immediately through a free mining contract provided at registration. Every new account receives a $10 USDT contract to activate cloud mining instantly. This allows users to enjoy automated, real-time earnings, with daily payouts delivered directly to their balance.

    There are no fees, no hidden terms, and no need to purchase mining machines. With the power of cloud computing, DRML Miner does all the heavy lifting—so users can focus on earning rewards passively.

    What Makes USDT Rewards Special?

    USDT (Tether) is a popular stablecoin that maintains a 1:1 value with the US dollar. Unlike volatile cryptocurrencies, USDT offers a predictable and stable income stream. This makes it the perfect choice for users looking to grow their capital steadily without worrying about price swings.

    By earning in USDT, DRML Miner users can withdraw, reinvest, or spend their profits with ease and confidence.

    Referral Program: Multiply Your Profits Effortlessly

    Beyond cloud mining, DRML Miner offers a powerful multi-level referral program designed to reward community growth. Every registered user gets a unique invitation link that can be shared with friends, family, and followers.

    When someone joins using your referral link, you receive commission rewards based on their daily earnings and purchases. The more people you invite, the more passive income you can generate—without spending anything yourself.

    Even better, this referral income is also paid in USDT, making it an excellent complement to your daily mining rewards.

    Referral Highlights:

    • No limit to the number of people you can invite
    • Multi-tiered commission system for long-term growth
    • Automatic bonus payouts in real time
    • 100% free to start sharing and earning

    Eco-Friendly, Scalable, and Secure

    DRML Miner is built on a global network of clean energy-powered mining farms, delivering reliable performance while reducing environmental impact. With over 500,000 mining rigs operating across strategically located sites, the platform ensures maximum uptime and efficiency.

    Security is also a core focus. User data and funds are protected with advanced encryption technologies, while the platform’s smart contract mechanisms ensure transparency and fairness in all earnings and transactions.

    User Dashboard: Full Control at Your Fingertips

    Every user at DRML Miner gets access to a smart and easy-to-use dashboard. From here, users can:

    • Monitor mining performance in real-time
    • Track referral earnings and bonuses
    • Withdraw USDT instantly
    • Reinvest profits into higher-level contracts
    • Upgrade accounts for greater rewards

    The entire platform is web-based and mobile-friendly, allowing users to manage their earnings anytime, from anywhere.

    How to Get Started in Minutes

    Getting started with DRML Miner is quick and easy. There’s no need to install software or buy expensive mining gear. Just follow these steps:

    1. Register an account at DRMLMiner.com
    2. Claim your free $10 USDT mining contract
    3. Start earning daily rewards automatically
    4. Share your referral link and earn extra income
    5. Withdraw or reinvest your earnings whenever you like

    That’s it—there are no complicated steps or technical barriers.

    Why Choose DRML Miner Over Other Platforms?

    • 100% free to join with no hidden costs
    • Daily income in stable USDT, not volatile crypto
    • Generous referral system with lifetime commissions
    • Clean energy operations for long-term sustainability
    • 24/7 customer support for all users
    • Automatic payout system with transparent records
    • Smart contract technology for secure and accurate mining

    Whether you’re a seasoned crypto investor or just starting out, DRML Miner gives you the tools to grow your income with confidence.

    The Time to Start Earning Is Now

    As digital currencies become more mainstream, cloud mining is one of the easiest and most reliable ways to generate consistent profits. With the launch of its USDT cloud mining platform, DRML Miner is making it possible for anyone to join the crypto economy with zero risk and unlimited potential.

    If you’ve ever wanted to earn from crypto without spending money or dealing with complex systems, this is your chance.

    Sign up now at DRMLMiner.com and activate your free mining contract. Start earning daily, grow your network, and unlock the full power of passive income today.

    Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release does not constitute an investment solicitation, nor does it constitute investment advice, financial advice, or trading recommendations. Cryptocurrency mining and staking involve risks and the possibility of losing funds. It is strongly recommended that you perform due diligence before investing or trading in cryptocurrencies and securities, including consulting a professional financial advisor.

    The MIL Network –