Category: Economy

  • MIL-OSI: F&M Bank Announces Appointment of Ahmed Alomari to Board of Directors

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ARCHBOLD, Ohio, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — F&M Bank (“F&M”), an Archbold, Ohio-based bank owned by Farmers & Merchants Bancorp, Inc. (Nasdaq: FMAO), announces the appointment of Ahmed Alomari to the Board of Directors of both the Company and the Bank. Mr. Alomari was appointed by the F&M Board of Directors on June 24, 2025, at the monthly board meeting.

    Mr. Alomari is widely recognized for his expertise in Oracle database performance and enterprise systems architecture. He founded Cybernoor in 2007 and remained CEO until it was acquired in 2021 by Buchanan Technologies [Cybernoor Info]. As part of the acquisition, Alomari became the Executive Vice President for Buchanan Technologies, overseeing the company’s database and application operations [Buchanan Technologies Appoints Ahmed Alomari as Executive VP].

    “Ahmed brings a deep level of technical expertise and a strong track record of innovation and strategic insight,” said Lars Eller, President and CEO of F&M Bank. “His knowledge of enterprise systems and data performance will be a valuable asset as we continue to enhance our digital capabilities and technology infrastructure.”

    Mr. Alomari holds a degree in Computer Science from the University of Michigan’s School of Engineering.

    About F&M Bank

    F&M Bank is a local independent community bank that has been serving its communities since 1897. F&M Bank provides commercial banking, retail banking and other financial services. Our locations are in Butler, Champaign, Fulton, Defiance, Hancock, Henry, Lucas, Shelby, Williams, and Wood counties in Ohio. In Northeast Indiana, we have offices located in Adams, Allen, DeKalb, Jay, Steuben and Wells counties. The Michigan footprint includes Oakland County, and we have Loan Production Offices in Troy, Michigan; Muncie, Indiana; and Perrysburg and Bryan, Ohio.

    Safe harbor statement

    Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Statements by F&M, including management’s expectations and comments, may not be based on historical facts and are “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Actual results could vary materially depending on risks and uncertainties inherent in general and local banking conditions, competitive factors specific to markets in which F&M and its subsidiaries operate, future interest rate levels, legislative and regulatory decisions, capital market conditions, or the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and its impacts on our credit quality and business operations, as well as its impact on general economic and financial market conditions. F&M assumes no responsibility to update this information. For more details, please refer to F&M’s SEC filing, including its most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q. Such filings can be viewed at the SEC’s website, www.sec.gov or through F&M’s website www.fm.bank.

    Company Contact: Investor and Media Contact:
    Lars B. Eller
    President and Chief Executive Officer
    Farmers & Merchants Bancorp, Inc.
    (419) 446-2501
    leller@fm.bank
    Andrew M. Berger
    Managing Director
    SM Berger & Company, Inc.
    (216) 464-6400
    andrew@smberger.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/81637346-a2e6-4544-b7ff-fe65be09b5e1

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Micron Technology, Inc. Reports Results for the Third Quarter of Fiscal 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Record revenue in fiscal Q3 with growth across end markets
    Fiscal Q4 revenue projected to grow another 15% sequentially

    BOISE, Idaho, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Micron Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: MU) today announced results for its third quarter of fiscal 2025, which ended May 29, 2025.

    Fiscal Q3 2025 highlights

    • Revenue of $9.30 billion versus $8.05 billion for the prior quarter and $6.81 billion for the same period last year
    • GAAP net income of $1.89 billion, or $1.68 per diluted share
    • Non-GAAP net income of $2.18 billion, or $1.91 per diluted share
    • Operating cash flow of $4.61 billion versus $3.94 billion for the prior quarter and $2.48 billion for the same period last year

    “Micron delivered record revenue in fiscal Q3, driven by all-time-high DRAM revenue including nearly 50% sequential growth in HBM revenue. Data center revenue more than doubled year-over-year and reached a quarterly record, and consumer-oriented end markets had strong sequential growth,” said Sanjay Mehrotra, Chairman, President and CEO of Micron Technology. “We are on track to deliver record revenue with solid profitability and free cash flow in fiscal 2025, while we make disciplined investments to build on our technology leadership and manufacturing excellence to satisfy growing AI-driven memory demand.”

    Quarterly Financial Results
    (in millions, except per share amounts) GAAP(1)   Non-GAAP(2)
    FQ3-25 FQ2-25 FQ3-24   FQ3-25 FQ2-25 FQ3-24
                   
    Revenue $ 9,301   $ 8,053   $ 6,811     $ 9,301   $ 8,053   $ 6,811  
    Gross margin   3,508     2,963     1,832       3,623     3,053     1,917  
    percent of revenue   37.7 %   36.8 %   26.9 %     39.0 %   37.9 %   28.1 %
    Operating expenses   1,339     1,190     1,113       1,133     1,046     976  
    Operating income   2,169     1,773     719       2,490     2,007     941  
    percent of revenue   23.3 %   22.0 %   10.6 %     26.8 %   24.9 %   13.8 %
    Net income   1,885     1,583     332       2,181     1,783     702  
    Diluted earnings per share   1.68     1.41     0.30       1.91     1.56     0.62  
                                           

    For the third quarter of 2025, investments in capital expenditures, net(2) were $2.66 billion and adjusted free cash flow(2) was $1.95 billion. Micron ended the quarter with cash, marketable investments, and restricted cash of $12.22 billion. On June 25, 2025, Micron’s Board of Directors declared a quarterly dividend of $0.115 per share, payable in cash on July 22, 2025, to shareholders of record as of the close of business on July 7, 2025.

    Business Outlook

    The following table presents Micron’s guidance for the fourth quarter of 2025:

    FQ4-25 GAAP(1)Outlook Non-GAAP(2)Outlook
    Revenue $10.7 billion ± $300 million $10.7 billion ± $300 million
    Gross margin 41.0% ± 1.0% 42.0% ± 1.0%
    Operating expenses $1.35 billion ± $20 million $1.20 billion ± $20 million
    Diluted earnings per share $2.29 ± $0.15 $2.50 ± $0.15
         

    Further information regarding Micron’s business outlook is included in the prepared remarks and slides, which have been posted at investors.micron.com.

    Investor Webcast

    Micron will host a conference call on Wednesday, June 25, 2025 at 2:30 p.m. Mountain Time to discuss its third quarter financial results and provide forward-looking guidance for its fourth quarter. A live webcast of the call will be available online at investors.micron.com. A webcast replay will be available for one year after the call. For Investor Relations and other company updates, follow us on X @MicronTech.

    About Micron Technology, Inc.

    We are an industry leader in innovative memory and storage solutions transforming how the world uses information to enrich life for all. With a relentless focus on our customers, technology leadership, manufacturing, and operational excellence, Micron delivers a rich portfolio of high-performance DRAM, NAND, and NOR memory and storage products through our Micron® and Crucial® brands. Every day, the innovations that our people create fuel the data economy, enabling advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and compute-intensive applications that unleash opportunities — from the data center to the intelligent edge and across the client and mobile user experience. To learn more about Micron Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: MU), visit micron.com.

    © 2025 Micron Technology, Inc. All rights reserved. Micron, the Micron logo, and all other Micron trademarks are the property of Micron Technology, Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements regarding our technologies, demand for our products, our investments, our industry and our financial and operating results, including our expectations and guidance for the fourth quarter of 2025 and full fiscal year. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. Please refer to the documents we file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including our most recent Form 10-K and our upcoming Form 10-Q. These documents contain and identify important factors that could cause our actual results to differ materially from those contained in these forward-looking statements. These certain factors can be found at investors.micron.com/risk-factor. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance, or achievements. We are under no duty to update any of the forward-looking statements to conform these statements to actual results.

    (1) GAAP represents U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
    (2) Non-GAAP represents GAAP excluding the impact of certain activities, which management excludes in analyzing our operating results and understanding trends in our earnings, adjusted free cash flow, and business outlook. Further information regarding Micron’s use of non-GAAP measures and reconciliations between GAAP and non-GAAP measures are included within this press release.
       
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In millions, except per share amounts)
    (Unaudited)
     
      3rd Qtr. 2nd Qtr. 3rd Qtr. Nine Months Ended
      May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
    May 29,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
               
    Revenue $ 9,301   $ 8,053   $ 6,811   $ 26,063   $ 17,361  
    Cost of goods sold   5,793     5,090     4,979     16,244     14,485  
    Gross margin   3,508     2,963     1,832     9,819     2,876  
               
    Research and development   965     898     850     2,751     2,527  
    Selling, general, and administrative   318     285     291     891     834  
    Other operating (income) expense, net   56     7     (28 )   61     (267 )
    Operating income (loss)   2,169     1,773     719     6,116     (218 )
               
    Interest income   135     108     136     350     398  
    Interest expense   (123 )   (112 )   (150 )   (353 )   (426 )
    Other non-operating income (expense), net   (68 )   (11 )   10     (90 )   (24 )
        2,113     1,758     715     6,023     (270 )
               
    Income tax (provision) benefit   (235 )   (177 )   (377 )   (695 )   172  
    Equity in net income (loss) of equity method investees   7     2     (6 )   10     (11 )
    Net income (loss) $ 1,885   $ 1,583   $ 332   $ 5,338   $ (109 )
               
    Earnings (loss) per share          
    Basic $ 1.69   $ 1.42   $ 0.30   $ 4.79   $ (0.10 )
    Diluted   1.68     1.41     0.30     4.75     (0.10 )
               
    Number of shares used in per share calculations          
    Basic   1,118     1,115     1,107     1,114     1,104  
    Diluted   1,125     1,123     1,123     1,123     1,104  
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In millions)
    (Unaudited)
     
    As of May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    August 29,
    2024
           
    Assets      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 10,163   $ 7,552   $ 7,041  
    Short-term investments   648     663     1,065  
    Receivables   7,436     6,504     6,615  
    Inventories   8,727     9,007     8,875  
    Other current assets   945     963     776  
    Total current assets   27,919     24,689     24,372  
    Long-term marketable investments   1,402     1,375     1,046  
    Property, plant, and equipment   44,773     42,528     39,749  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets   628     637     645  
    Intangible assets   426     423     416  
    Deferred tax assets   483     552     520  
    Goodwill   1,150     1,150     1,150  
    Other noncurrent assets   1,616     1,699     1,518  
    Total assets $ 78,397   $ 73,053   $ 69,416  
           
    Liabilities and equity      
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses $ 8,761   $ 6,176   $ 7,299  
    Current debt   538     504     431  
    Other current liabilities   836     1,197     1,518  
    Total current liabilities   10,135     7,877     9,248  
    Long-term debt   15,003     13,851     12,966  
    Noncurrent operating lease liabilities   600     599     610  
    Noncurrent unearned government incentives   603     836     550  
    Other noncurrent liabilities   1,308     1,257     911  
    Total liabilities   27,649     24,420     24,285  
           
    Commitments and contingencies      
           
    Shareholders’ equity      
    Common stock   126     126     125  
    Additional capital   12,960     12,711     12,115  
    Retained earnings   45,559     43,839     40,877  
    Treasury stock   (7,852 )   (7,852 )   (7,852 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)   (45 )   (191 )   (134 )
    Total equity   50,748     48,633     45,131  
    Total liabilities and equity $ 78,397   $ 73,053   $ 69,416  
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (In millions)
    (Unaudited)
     
    Nine Months Ended May 29,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
         
    Cash flows from operating activities    
    Net income (loss) $ 5,338   $ (109 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:    
    Depreciation expense and amortization of intangible assets   6,203     5,794  
    Stock-based compensation   722     620  
    Change in operating assets and liabilities:    
    Receivables   (123 )   (2,562 )
    Inventories   148     (125 )
    Other current assets   (206 )   (435 )
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   38     846  
    Other current liabilities   (681 )   769  
    Other   356     304  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   11,795     5,102  
         
    Cash flows from investing activities    
    Expenditures for property, plant, and equipment   (10,199 )   (5,266 )
    Purchases of available-for-sale securities   (1,203 )   (1,110 )
    Proceeds from government incentives   1,294     267  
    Proceeds from maturities and sales of available-for-sale securities   1,249     1,433  
    Other   (30 )   (35 )
    Net cash used for investing activities   (8,889 )   (4,711 )
         
    Cash flows from financing activities    
    Proceeds from issuance of debt   4,430     999  
    Repayments of debt   (3,604 )   (1,816 )
    Payments of dividends to shareholders   (392 )   (384 )
    Payments on equipment purchase contracts       (127 )
    Other   (220 )   (40 )
    Net cash provided by (used for) financing activities   214     (1,368 )
         
    Effect of changes in currency exchange rates on cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash   (3 )   (15 )
         
    Net increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash   3,117     (992 )
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at beginning of period   7,052     8,656  
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at end of period $ 10,169   $ 7,664  
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES
    (In millions, except per share amounts)
     
      3rd Qtr. 2nd Qtr. 3rd Qtr.
      May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
           
    GAAP gross margin $ 3,508   $ 2,963   $ 1,832  
    Stock-based compensation   115     89     80  
    Other       1     5  
    Non-GAAP gross margin $ 3,623   $ 3,053   $ 1,917  
           
    GAAP operating expenses $ 1,339   $ 1,190   $ 1,113  
    Stock-based compensation   (148 )   (144 )   (137 )
    Patent license charges   (57 )        
    Other   (1 )        
    Non-GAAP operating expenses $ 1,133   $ 1,046   $ 976  
           
    GAAP operating income $ 2,169   $ 1,773   $ 719  
    Stock-based compensation   263     233     217  
    Patent license charges   57          
    Other   1     1     5  
    Non-GAAP operating income $ 2,490   $ 2,007   $ 941  
           
    GAAP net income $ 1,885   $ 1,583   $ 332  
    Stock-based compensation   263     233     217  
    Patent license charges   57          
    Loss on debt prepayments   46     4      
    Other   1         3  
    Estimated tax effects of above and other tax adjustments   (71 )   (37 )   150  
    Non-GAAP net income $ 2,181   $ 1,783   $ 702  
           
    GAAP weighted-average common shares outstanding – Diluted   1,125     1,123     1,123  
    Adjustment for stock-based compensation   19     20     13  
    Non-GAAP weighted-average common shares outstanding – Diluted   1,144     1,143     1,136  
           
    GAAP diluted earnings per share $ 1.68   $ 1.41   $ 0.30  
    Effects of the above adjustments   0.23     0.15     0.32  
    Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share $ 1.91   $ 1.56   $ 0.62  
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES, Continued
     
      3rd Qtr. 2nd Qtr. 3rd Qtr.
      May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
           
    GAAP net cash provided by operating activities $ 4,609   $ 3,942   $ 2,482  
           
    Expenditures for property, plant, and equipment   (2,938 )   (4,055 )   (2,086 )
    Payments on equipment purchase contracts           (45 )
    Proceeds from sales of property, plant, and equipment   12     7     41  
    Proceeds from government incentives   266     963     33  
    Investments in capital expenditures, net   (2,660 )   (3,085 )   (2,057 )
    Adjusted free cash flow $ 1,949   $ 857   $ 425  
     

    The tables above reconcile GAAP to non-GAAP measures of gross margin, operating expenses, operating income, net income, diluted shares, diluted earnings per share, and adjusted free cash flow. The non-GAAP adjustments above may or may not be infrequent or nonrecurring in nature but are a result of periodic or non-core operating activities. We believe this non-GAAP information is helpful in understanding trends and in analyzing our operating results and earnings. We are providing this information to investors to assist in performing analysis of our operating results. When evaluating performance and making decisions on how to allocate our resources, management uses this non-GAAP information and believes investors should have access to similar data when making their investment decisions. We believe these non-GAAP financial measures increase transparency by providing investors with useful supplemental information about the financial performance of our business, enabling enhanced comparison of our operating results between periods and with peer companies. The presentation of these adjusted amounts varies from amounts presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP and therefore may not be comparable to amounts reported by other companies. Our management excludes the following items as applicable in analyzing our operating results and understanding trends in our earnings:

    • Stock-based compensation;
    • Gains and losses from settlements;
    • Gains and losses from debt prepayments;
    • Restructure and asset impairments; and
    • The estimated tax effects of above, non-cash changes in net deferred income taxes, assessments of tax exposures, certain tax matters related to prior fiscal periods, and significant changes in tax law. The divergence between our GAAP and non-GAAP income tax provision relates to the difference in our GAAP and non-GAAP estimated annual effective tax rates, which are computed separately.

    Non-GAAP diluted shares are adjusted for the impact of additional shares resulting from the exclusion of stock-based compensation from non-GAAP income.

    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP OUTLOOK
     
    FQ4-25   GAAP Outlook   Adjustments   Non-GAAP Outlook
                   
    Revenue $10.7 billion ± $300 million         $10.7 billion ± $300 million
    Gross margin 41.0% ± 1.0%   1.0%   A   42.0% ± 1.0%
    Operating expenses $1.35 billion ± $20 million   $147 million   B   $1.20 billion ± $20 million
    Diluted earnings per share(1) $2.29 ± $0.15   $0.21   A, B, C   $2.50 ± $0.15
    Non-GAAP Adjustments
    (in millions)
               
                   
    A Stock-based compensation – cost of goods sold   $ 119  
    B Stock-based compensation – research and development     93  
    B Stock-based compensation – sales, general, and administrative     54  
    C Tax effects of the above items and other tax adjustments     (27 )
                  $ 239  
    (1) GAAP earnings per share based on approximately 1.13 billion diluted shares and non-GAAP earnings per share based on approximately 1.15 billion diluted shares.
       

    The tables above reconcile our GAAP to non-GAAP guidance based on the current outlook. The guidance does not incorporate the impact of any potential business combinations, divestitures, additional restructuring activities, balance sheet valuation adjustments, strategic investments, financing transactions, and other significant transactions. The timing and impact of such items are dependent on future events that may be uncertain or outside of our control.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Nasdaq Announces Mid-Month Open Short Interest Positions in Nasdaq Stocks as of Settlement Date June 13, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — At the end of the settlement date of June 13, 2025, short interest in 3,207 Nasdaq Global MarketSM securities totaled 13,689,191,607 shares compared with 13,504,275,894 shares in 3,184 Global Market issues reported for the prior settlement date of May 30, 2025. The mid-June short interest represents 2.32 days compared with 2.19 days for the prior reporting period.

    Short interest in 1,642 securities on The Nasdaq Capital MarketSM totaled 2,687,331,325 shares at the end of the settlement date of June 13, 2025, compared with 2,610,068,615 shares in 1,632 securities for the previous reporting period. This represents a 1.00 day average daily volume; the previous reporting period’s figure was 1.00.

    In summary, short interest in all 4,849 Nasdaq® securities totaled 16,376,522,932 shares at the June 13, 2025 settlement date, compared with 4,816 issues and 16,114,344,509 shares at the end of the previous reporting period. This is 1.72 days average daily volume, compared with an average of 1.54 days for the prior reporting period.

    The open short interest positions reported for each Nasdaq security reflect the total number of shares sold short by all broker/dealers regardless of their exchange affiliations. A short sale is generally understood to mean the sale of a security that the seller does not own or any sale that is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by or for the account of the seller.

    For more information on Nasdaq Short interest positions, including publication dates, visit
    http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-interest.aspx
    or http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/asp/short_interest.asp.

    About Nasdaq:
    Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) is a leading global technology company serving corporate clients, investment managers, banks, brokers, and exchange operators as they navigate and interact with the global capital markets and the broader financial system. We aspire to deliver world-leading platforms that improve the liquidity, transparency, and integrity of the global economy. Our diverse offering of data, analytics, software, exchange capabilities, and client-centric services enables clients to optimize and execute their business vision with confidence. To learn more about the company, technology solutions, and career opportunities, visit us on LinkedIn, on X @Nasdaq, or at www.nasdaq.com.     

    Media Contact:
    Maximilian Leitenberger
    Maximilian.leitenberger@nasdaq.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/09311b3a-d30b-4a62-9548-112e12a51995

    NDAQO

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Nasdaq Announces Mid-Month Open Short Interest Positions in Nasdaq Stocks as of Settlement Date June 13, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — At the end of the settlement date of June 13, 2025, short interest in 3,207 Nasdaq Global MarketSM securities totaled 13,689,191,607 shares compared with 13,504,275,894 shares in 3,184 Global Market issues reported for the prior settlement date of May 30, 2025. The mid-June short interest represents 2.32 days compared with 2.19 days for the prior reporting period.

    Short interest in 1,642 securities on The Nasdaq Capital MarketSM totaled 2,687,331,325 shares at the end of the settlement date of June 13, 2025, compared with 2,610,068,615 shares in 1,632 securities for the previous reporting period. This represents a 1.00 day average daily volume; the previous reporting period’s figure was 1.00.

    In summary, short interest in all 4,849 Nasdaq® securities totaled 16,376,522,932 shares at the June 13, 2025 settlement date, compared with 4,816 issues and 16,114,344,509 shares at the end of the previous reporting period. This is 1.72 days average daily volume, compared with an average of 1.54 days for the prior reporting period.

    The open short interest positions reported for each Nasdaq security reflect the total number of shares sold short by all broker/dealers regardless of their exchange affiliations. A short sale is generally understood to mean the sale of a security that the seller does not own or any sale that is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by or for the account of the seller.

    For more information on Nasdaq Short interest positions, including publication dates, visit
    http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-interest.aspx
    or http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/asp/short_interest.asp.

    About Nasdaq:
    Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) is a leading global technology company serving corporate clients, investment managers, banks, brokers, and exchange operators as they navigate and interact with the global capital markets and the broader financial system. We aspire to deliver world-leading platforms that improve the liquidity, transparency, and integrity of the global economy. Our diverse offering of data, analytics, software, exchange capabilities, and client-centric services enables clients to optimize and execute their business vision with confidence. To learn more about the company, technology solutions, and career opportunities, visit us on LinkedIn, on X @Nasdaq, or at www.nasdaq.com.     

    Media Contact:
    Maximilian Leitenberger
    Maximilian.leitenberger@nasdaq.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/09311b3a-d30b-4a62-9548-112e12a51995

    NDAQO

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: New climate reporting rules start on July 1. Many companies are not ready for the change

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rachel Baird, Senior Lecturer , University of Tasmania

    PaeGAG/Shutterstock

    A new financial year starts on July 1. For Australia’s large companies, that means new rules on climate-related disclosures come into force.

    These requirements are the culmination of years of planning to ensure companies disclose climate-related risks and opportunities for their business. The Albanese government passed the legislation in September 2024.

    To be clear, the time to prepare is gone. From July 1, large public companies and financial institutions must gather significant amounts of information and data to include in a new year-end sustainability report. Collecting all this information is one challenge; another is finding the specialists across many fields to compile the reports.

    This is a huge change for corporate Australia. It is a whole new reporting regime, supported by volumes of technical detail. Directors will need to sign off on the report. Investors must also upskill to make sense of the disclosures. Neither of these outcomes is assured.

    And it is not clear the increased disclosures will do anything to reduce actual emissions.

    Climate impacts in focus

    Though it’s called a sustainability report, in reality it is very much focused on climate-related disclosures. If you go looking for wider sustainability matters such as social impact, environmental performance and ethical choices, you will be disappointed.

    Markets and ultimately the millions of Australians who hold shares will be watching to find out if:

    1. Corporate Australia is prepared for the transition to this new regulatory regime

    2. End users of the new reports are equipped to decipher and understand the huge amount of additional data.

    My research suggests the answer to both questions is a resounding no.

    Starting with the big end of town

    The government has wisely adopted a three-year transition for the new reporting regime, with only the big end of town facing the music this year. Think the big four banks, big supermarkets and large miners.

    Some large corporations have been publishing sustainability reports for years. National Australia Bank, for example, published its first one in 2017.

    Over the next two years, medium and then smaller companies will join the fold. By 2027–28, companies will be required to report if they meet two of three thresholds: consolidated revenue of A$50 million, or consolidated gross assets of $25 million, or more than 100 employees.

    The reasoning behind the transition is they have the benefit of watching how the larger companies adapt to the new laws.

    What has to be disclosed?

    Reporting entities must include:

    – climate statements for the year plus any notes, and

    – the directors’ declaration about these statements and notes

    This sounds rather simple and straightforward, but it is not.

    Arriving at a completed sustainability report involves an understanding of two detailed documents: the international standards and a new Australian Accounting Sustainability Standard.

    The Australian standards are mandatory and based on the international rules. In broad terms, companies will be required to gather and disclose information on many micro-level issues, which are grouped into four categories. These are: governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.

    Some issues will straddle all four categories.

    For example, the physical risk of climate change (floods, uninsurable properties, supply chain disruption) can be considered at the board level and in dedicated climate committees (goverance); in planning for alternative supply chains in a climate transition plan (strategy); in risk assessment (risk management) and in data prediction of the costs involved (metrics and targets).

    The big challenge for corporate Australia is that the people, expertise and time required to deliver a sustainability report are in short supply.

    More than a quarter of ASX 200 companies do not use the international standards. This means they are not positioned to adapt to the new reporting regime. Even for those that have been early adopters, there has been selective use of the four categories.

    For the smaller companies that will follow the first reporting year, the stakes are high.

    More information is not always better

    The amount of new information (much of it technical) to be disclosed will be overwhelming for the producers of the sustainability reports – and for the readers, whether they are institutional or mum-and-dad investors.

    The cost of collecting and making sense of the data required to meet detailed reporting requirements will lead to many companies being swamped in data. More data collected does not equal better data.

    Deciding what data to collect and then making sense of it so it supports disclosures will be a major headache for most companies.

    The new climate disclosure rules will have a profound impact on corporate Australia. There is a significant gap in capacity and capability to meet the requirements of the new reporting regime. And there is a corresponding need to educate the readers of these new reports to make effective use of the disclosed information.

    Rachel Baird does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. New climate reporting rules start on July 1. Many companies are not ready for the change – https://theconversation.com/new-climate-reporting-rules-start-on-july-1-many-companies-are-not-ready-for-the-change-258706

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  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘I’m not going to give up’: how to help more disadvantaged young people go to uni and TAFE

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lucas Walsh, Professor and Director of the Centre for Youth Policy and Education Practice, Monash University

    Oliver Rossi/ Getty Images

    On Wednesday, Education Minister Jason Clare hailed an increase in the numbers of Australians starting a university degree. In 2024, there was a 3.7% increase in Australian students starting a degree, compared to the year before.

    This follows Clare’s ambition to see more Australians with a tertiary qualification. The federal government wants 80% of workers to have a TAFE or university qualification by by 2050, up from the current 60%.

    A key part of this will be supporting more young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to go on to further study.

    How can we do this? New data from the OECD and a new report from The Smith Family give us further insight into the issues and shows what is working for a group of disadvantaged young Australians.

    Young people and career uncertainty

    Last month, the OECD launched a tool to track teenagers’ career readiness across internationally comparable indicators.

    This shows us how disadvantaged Australian students are less likely than advantaged students to have certainty about the kind of job they would like at age 30 (69% compared to 77%).

    In this context, we are talking about socioeconomic disadvantage, including parents’ education and occupation and resources at home. This can have a “powerful influence” on students’ learning outcomes.

    Career uncertainty is an issue because studies suggest teenagers who have clear plans typically have better employment outcomes.

    What about ambition?

    Even for those with some certainty about the kind of occupation they would like to be working in at age 30, there is a significant gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students’ ambitions.

    The OECD tool shows 55% of disadvantaged students aspire to work as a senior manager or professional, compared to 80% of advantaged students. Similarly, 56% of disadvantaged students aspire to undertake tertiary education (either via a short course or university) compared to 85% of advantaged students.

    Disadvantaged students are also more likely to aspire to an occupation that requires tertiary education while not planning to complete a qualification at that level. One in four (26%) disadvantaged students are misaligned in such ambitions compared to 9% of advantaged students.

    Disadvantaged students are less likely to say they feel well-prepared for their future after school (57% compared to 70%) and less likely to have searched the internet for information about careers (80% compared to 91%).

    These trends suggest a need to enhance career education in school that supports disadvantaged students to better plan and prepare for their post-school pathways.

    What can help?

    A new report provides insight into how we can better support disadvantaged young people in their careers.

    From 2021 to 2023, The Smith Family did surveys and interviews with the same group of financially disadvantaged young people. There were almost 800 young people in the group, who were in Year 12 in 2020. They came from all Australian states and territories.

    Echoing the OECD data, participants were often uncertain about where to go for help or how to develop and pursue a career pathway they valued. The study showed several things can help young people find a path to work, training or study after school. They include:

    • a focus on direct career development skills both at school and post-school. This should include personalised career advice and support, which helps young people articulate their post-school plans and the steps required to achieve this plan

    • support that starts earlier than Year 12

    • support for family members’ to access up-to-date labour market, education and training information and support strategies

    • providing more opportunities to meet employers and build career-related adult networks.

    One young person, Byron, talked about how his careers adviser at school had organised for him to meet a paramedic and find out what the role involved.

    [My teacher] helped me get information for how I could achieve that goal […].

    Braden – whose parents had not finished school – also talked about emotional support provided by his high school teachers:

    There were a lot of teachers who were very supportive and really wanted to see me make it through.

    Does it work?

    With these supports, most young people in the study were trying to build their careers, through work, study or a combination of both.

    By their third year after leaving school, 87% were working and/or studying and 60% were on track to complete a post-school qualification. This is up from 77% in the first year of the study. As Evanna, who is working towards her goal of joining the police, said “I’m not going to give up”.

    Lucas Walsh receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He has worked with The Smith Family and sits in a voluntary capacity on the Growing Careers Project External Reference Group. He was not involved in the creation of the report discussed in this article

    ref. ‘I’m not going to give up’: how to help more disadvantaged young people go to uni and TAFE – https://theconversation.com/im-not-going-to-give-up-how-to-help-more-disadvantaged-young-people-go-to-uni-and-tafe-259444

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: 500,000 Australians live with mental illness but don’t qualify for the NDIS. A damning new report says they need more support

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sebastian Rosenberg, Associate Professor, Health Research Institute, University of Canberra, and Brain and Mind Centre, University of Sydney

    stellalevi/Getty

    Half a million Australians are living with moderate to severe mental illness, but they don’t qualify for the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and cannot access the support they need.

    In a damning report released on Tuesday, the Productivity Commission says addressing this gap must be an urgent priority for all governments.

    The commission is currently reviewing the Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Agreements, signed by the federal government and each state and territory. They aim to improve the community’s mental health and reduce suicide.

    The commission has found little progress, calling the agreements “not fit for purpose”.

    So, how did we get here? And what should happen next?

    More than a lack of funding

    In 1992, the year of Australia’s first national mental health policy, 7.25% of the total health budget was allocated to mental health. In 2022-23, it was still only 7.31%.

    Yet, mental health and drug and alcohol issues account for nearly 15% of Australia’s total burden of disease. While mental health remains woefully underfunded, it is hard to expect much change.

    However, the commission’s main criticism isn’t about funding – it’s about the fragmented way mental health is tackled and the failure of federal and state governments to work together.

    While the agreements may have set out “what to do”, the report says they have failed to describe how change should happen.

    This lack of specific objectives, goals and targets has prevented national mental health reform at the scale required.

    Psychosocial supports

    The report says addressing the lack of psychosocial supports outside the NDIS – a gap that affects 500,000 Australians – must be an urgent priority for states, territories and the federal government.

    Psychosocial supports are non-clinical services for people experiencing mental illness that enable them to live independently and safely in the community.

    For decades, community and charitable organisations have provided these support services in Australia. They can connect people with mental illness to health, housing, employment, education or other community services. This helps people socialise and maintain relationships and daily living skills.

    There is already very strong Australian evidence that psychosocial support services can help people recover from even severe mental illness, improve their quality of life, provide earlier intervention and reduce the burden on hospital-based mental health care.

    Yet, Australia has never adequately funded psychosocial care.

    In 1992, these services received just under 2% of total spending on mental health by the states and territories. In 2022-23, it was 6%.

    The ‘missing middle’

    The lack of psychosocial services, and of community-based mental health care more broadly, is one of the key gaps in Australia’s existing mental health system, giving rise to the term “the missing middle”. This describes people with needs too complex for primary care (such as general practice), but not urgent enough to warrant hospital admission.

    The introduction of the NDIS failed to arrest this gap – and may have made it worse. The scheme was only ever designed to provide support to 64,000 Australians with the most severe, enduring, psychosocial disability.

    In providing funds to set up the NDIS, the federal government, in fact, closed some psychosocial programs it had only recently begun, such as Partners in Recovery and Personal Helpers and Mentors. State and territory funding for psychosocial services was already extremely limited, but they, too, withdrew some community-based supports.

    The neglect of psychosocial services fits into a broader pattern that affects all community mental health services because responsibility for mental health is split.

    The federal government manages primary mental health services, mostly provided by GPs and psychologists under Medicare. Meanwhile, state and territory governments focus on hospital-based, emergency, acute inpatient and outpatient services.

    Currently, nobody is responsible for community mental health care. No wonder these “secondary” services, both clinical and psychosocial, have failed to flourish.

    What’s next?

    The Productivity Commission’s interim report rightly recommends Australia urgently address this gap in psychosocial care.

    Governments are now considering a “foundational supports” funding stream, which would provide psychosocial services for people outside the NDIS.

    However, in 2020, the Productivity Commission found our mental health system to be fragmented and disorganised. Just adding one more funding stream or program to this environment probably won’t help.

    Before considering who funds what, real mental health reform should be based on a clear map that lays out how our mental health system should be organised and the respective role of medical, clinical and psychosocial care in that system.

    Where does the evidence indicate people should go for care? What services should they receive? And what should happen next if their mental health improves or declines?

    This kind of system-wide map can guide investments and prioritise reform, region by region. This would properly put the person, not the funders, at the centre of care.

    If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call Lifeline on 13 11 14.

    Sebastian Rosenberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. 500,000 Australians live with mental illness but don’t qualify for the NDIS. A damning new report says they need more support – https://theconversation.com/500-000-australians-live-with-mental-illness-but-dont-qualify-for-the-ndis-a-damning-new-report-says-they-need-more-support-259549

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Global: What is reconciliation − the legislative shortcut Republicans are using to push through their ‘Big Beautiful Bill’?

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Linda J. Bilmes, Daniel Patrick Moynihan Senior Lecturer in Public Policy and Public Finance, Harvard Kennedy School

    Senate Majority Leader John Thune speaks with reporters about the reconciliation process to advance President Donald Trump’s spending and tax bill on June 3, 2025. AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

    The word “reconciliation” sounds benign, even harmonious.

    But in Washington, D.C., reconciliation refers to a potent legislative shortcut that allows the party in power to avoid opposition and enact sweeping changes to taxes and spending with a simple majority vote. Democrats used the process to pass the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022. Reconciliation helped Republicans pass large tax cuts in 2017.

    Reconciliation is also at the heart of the current budget debate, as Senate Republicans rush to advance their version of the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” also known by its acronym OBBBA, which passed the House in May 2025.

    I served as assistant secretary of Commerce for management and budget during the Clinton administration, when my colleagues and I helped forge bipartisan legislation that balanced the federal budget and produced surpluses over four years, from 1998 to 2001. We were even able to pay off some debt.

    But since 2001, the country’s fiscal situation has deteriorated significantly. And the reconciliation process has strayed from its original purpose as a mechanism to promote sound fiscal policy. Instead, it is now used to pass partisan legislation, often without regard to its economic impact on future generations of Americans.

    Reconciliation 101

    The reconciliation process was created by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which was overwhelmingly supported by both parties. It was designed to align policy goals with budget targets to help rein in deficits.

    The rules specify that a bill using the reconciliation process must pertain directly to budgetary or fiscal matters, cannot change Social Security, Medicare or the budget process itself, or deliberately extend deficits beyond a 10-year window. As part of the process, the parliamentarian goes through each element of the bill and determines whether it meets the requirements, removing any that don’t.

    In the Senate, reconciliation has special procedural advantages. Debate is limited to 20 hours. Conveniently for the party in power, the final bill can pass with a simple majority of 51 votes. This avoids the usual 60-vote threshold needed to overcome a filibuster.

    Over its 50-year history, 23 reconciliation bills have become law.

    Reconciliation on rise as budget process breaks down

    Over time, reconciliation has become the dominant method for enacting major tax and spending legislation, as the regular congressional budget process has broken down.

    Since 1974, there have been multiple government shutdowns, near-shutdowns and short-term, stopgap “continual resolutions” instead of annual budgets, accompanied by rising deficits and national debt.

    With few other tools at its disposal, Congress has used reconciliation to push through many pieces of major economic legislation, including the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts under President George W. Bush, the 2017 tax cuts during President Donald Trump’s first term, and the American Rescue Plan in 2021 and the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022 during the Biden administration.

    However, reconciliation has significant flaws. Because debate is limited, senators often vote on bills over 1,000 pages long with little time to review the details. And once tax cuts are enacted under reconciliation, it is devilishly hard to get rid of them.

    Given the compressed timelines and lack of transparency inherent in such huge, messy spending bills, it is fairly easy for lawmakers to slip in earmarks, tax loopholes and other extraneous items that that don’t get removed by the parliamentarian.

    House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries argues Republicans’ spending and tax bill will ‘explode the deficit.’
    AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

    What’s in the bill?

    At the heart of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, passed by the House, is an extension of President Trump’s tax cuts from his first term, which would otherwise expire at the end of 2025, according to the procedural rules for reconciliation.

    But it also includes multiple new tax cuts – such as an end to taxes on overtime and tips and lower estate taxes – introduces new Medicaid work requirements and repeals various energy credits. In line with the Trump administration’s policies, the bill slashes federal funding for education, Medicaid, public housing, environmental programs, scientific research and some national park and public land protection programs. It also boosts defense spending.

    The bill would sharply worsen the nation’s fiscal outlook, according to analyses by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office and other organizations.

    Currently, the national debt exceeds US$36 trillion, according to the U.S. Treasury, and net interest payments account for some 16% of federal revenue, based on the Congressional Budget Office’s projections for 2025.

    In its analysis, the Congressional Budget Office – which was also created by the 1974 act – said the House-passed version would increase deficits by more than $3.1 trillion over the next decade. The overwhelming share of this cost comes from the permanent extension of individual tax cuts initially enacted in 2017.

    According to the Congressional Budget Office’s analysis, by 2035 households earning at least $1 million would receive an average annual tax cut of about $45,000. Most middle- and lower-income households would receive a cut of less than $500 per year, if anything.

    The costs of reconciliation

    A number of Senate Republicans have questioned some aspects of the reconciliation package. Since they hold only a 53-47 majority, and with all Democrats expected to vote “no,” they need to use reconciliation to pass their version.

    Although it differs from the House version in many ways, the Senate version still favors tax cuts for high-income households and large corporations.

    Senate Republicans also employ a flawed accounting gimmick to minimize its apparent cost. It assumes the 2017 Trump tax cuts, which are set to expire, have already been extended and embeds that assumption into the budget baseline.

    This makes extending the tax cuts appear costless, even though it would grow the debt substantially. The move violates normal scorekeeping conventions and misleads the public. Honest accounting would show that the Senate plan would add to the debt about $500 billion more than the House version.

    Abusing the process

    Lots of wrangling and changes are expected before the Senate is able to pass its version. After that, the House and Senate will need to resolve their differences in a conference committee of Republicans from each house of Congress.

    Once they agree on a final version, each house votes again – and the Senate version will still need to meet the terms of reconciliation in order to pass with a majority vote. President Trump is pressuring Congress to deliver the bill to his desk before he goes on July Fourth vacation.

    In my view, while reconciliation remains a powerful budgetary tool, its current use represents a fundamental inversion of its original purpose. Americans deserve an honest debate about trade-offs, rather than more debt in disguise. Some estimates of the fiscal impact of the Senate’s version of the bill are as high as $3.8 trillion over a decade. Simply waving a magic accounting wand won’t make them go away.

    Linda J. Bilmes served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Department of Commerce from 1997-1998 and as CFO and Assistant Secretary for Management, Budget and Administration from 1999-2001.

    ref. What is reconciliation − the legislative shortcut Republicans are using to push through their ‘Big Beautiful Bill’? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-reconciliation-the-legislative-shortcut-republicans-are-using-to-push-through-their-big-beautiful-bill-255487

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend San Marino on Aligning Citizenship Rights with International Standards, Ask about Temporary Special Measures and Incentives to Encourage Female Employment

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the combined first to fifth periodic reports of San Marino, with Committee Experts commending the State party on ensuring equal transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines, while raising questions on temporary special measures and incentives to promote female employment.

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the efforts and improvements made to align citizenship rights of a small landlocked nation with international standards, ensuring that the rules for transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines were now aligned.

    A Committee Expert asked what kind of temporary special measures were already implemented in legislation and in the judicial branch?  What temporary special measures had been adopted in the area of parity to achieve increased representation of women?  Were there any examples of positive discrimination for women in fields such as the military?  Another Expert said there was an ongoing debate in the country about how to enforce the political participation of women in San Marino.  How did San Marino plan to achieve parity in public life. 

    One Committee Expert asked what was being done to facilitate women’s return to employment? Was there a wage gap?  Could more information be provided regarding measures to increase work life balance and incentivise employers to employ women? 

    On temporary special measures, the delegation said measures to guarantee women’s political life in the country were linked to two laws.  Women made up 50 per cent of the public administration.  Women’s representation within the judiciary was fully granted; a few years ago, the President of the San Marino court was a woman. San Marino did not intend to use the instrument of quotas again, as the results did not justify its existence, and the quotas were intended to be a temporary measure. 

    The delegation said San Marino had been providing incentives for female employment for several years, including that employers would pay less tax for female workers. As of 2025, the labour force in San Marino was better balanced, with the gender gap reduced.  If a female worker had a child and wished to return to work, she could transform her contract into one that was parttime.  This was a key provision which would help women balance their professional and private lives. 

    Introducing the report, Marcello Beccari, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said significant progress had been made to combat gender-based violence in recent years.  On 29 October 2024, the Congress of State adopted delegated decree no. 161 on amendments to law no. 97 of 20 June 2008 – prevention and repression of violence against women and gender violence – and subsequent amendments and to the Criminal Code, which aimed to ensure a more effective system of prevention, protection and support for victims of violence.  In particular, the definition of violence against women and gender-based violence was rephrased.  The Authority for Equal Opportunities was responsible for keeping and disseminating data on gender-based violence.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Beccari thanked the Committee for the dialogue which had enabled the State to review the legislation and all areas where discrimination against women could occur.  The institutions of San Marino were actively engaged in the implementation of the Convention.

    In her closing remarks, Marianne Mikko, Committee Vice-Chair, thanked the delegation of San Marino for the constructive dialogue, which had provided further insight on the situation of women in the country. 

    The delegation of San Marino was comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Employment; the Department of Foreign Affairs; the Department of Institutional and Internal Affairs; the Department of Health and Social Security; the Department of Education and Culture; the Office of the French Border; the Single Court; the Gendarmerie Corp; the Office for Gender Violence and Minors; the Authority for Equal Opportunities; and the Permanent Mission of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninety-first session is being held from 16 June to 4 July.  All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the fifth periodic report of Chad (CEDAW/C/TCD/5).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the the combined initial to fifth periodic reports of San Marino (CEDAW/C/SMR/1-5).

    Presentation of Report

    MARCELLO BECCARI, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said the ratification of the Convention in 2003 had been long-awaited by San Marino society, in light of the undeniable steps forward that the country had made since the 1960s.  Unfortunately, women’s rights in San Marino had been denied for centuries: women had had, de jure and de facto, a position inferior to that of men.  San Marino women exercised their voting right for the first time only in 1964, and it was only in 1974 that they could be elected in the general elections and become members of the San Marino Parliament. 

    At the end of the 1990s, a serious discrimination experienced by San Marino women persisted: only men could transmit San Marino citizenship, which made it impossible for the children of a San Marino woman to become San Marino citizens if the father was not a San Marino citizen.  This discrimination was finally eliminated in 2000.  It was only at this time that the country aligned its legal system with the requirements of the Convention. 

    Significant progress had been made to combat gender-based violence in recent years. On 29 October 2024, the Congress of State adopted delegated decree no. 161 on amendments to law no. 97 of 20 June 2008 – prevention and repression of violence against women and gender violence – and subsequent amendments and to the Criminal Code, which aimed to ensure a more effective system of prevention, protection and support for victims of violence.  In particular, the definition of violence against women and gender-based violence was rephrased.  The Authority for Equal Opportunities was responsible for keeping and disseminating data on gender-based violence.  The data was provided by all the institutions that come into contact with women victims of violence, including the courts, the mental health service and the counselling centre, the Minors’ Protection Service, and all three police forces. 

    San Marino authorities recently implemented comprehensive policies with the adoption of two national plans for the prevention of gender-based violence, including all competent institutional and civil society actors: the comprehensive national plan to combat violence against women 2024–2026, and the multi-year national plan on the elimination of violence and harassment and discrimination in the world of work to implement International Labour Organization Convention no.190 on the elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work.  The 24-hour on-call service of Social Workers and Psychologists was introduced and regulated, and the Emergency Centre was set up, where victims, including those with children, could receive psychosocial, health and legal assistance. 

    Every year on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, San Marino organised numerous meetings and initiatives to raise awareness, including a recent media campaign “the new languages of violence”.  The University of San Marino organised compulsory vocational training courses annually for a wide range of professionals, including magistrates, police forces, professional associations, socio-health services, school staff and family mediators.  The University also actively collaborated with schools to foster an innovative and inclusive educational approach.

    An initiative speared by civil society, the law regulating civil registered partnerships (law no. 147 of 20 November 2018), allowed same-sex couples to obtain a form of legal recognition of their relationship equivalent to marriage. Another action which originated from civil society was the Referendum for the decriminalisation and legalisation of the voluntary termination of pregnancy in February 2021.  One year after the historic overwhelming result which saw more than 77 per cent of San Marino citizens vote in favour of decriminalising abortion, the San Marino Parliament approved law no. 147 of 7 September 2022 regulating voluntary termination of pregnancy.  This law contained the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code for both the decriminalisation of the act and the protection of the procedure.

    Despite the progress that had been made in recent years, some challenges persisted in San Marino in the area of elimination of discrimination against women, particularly when it came to eliminating gender stereotypes.  Mr. Beccari said he would ensure the dialogue was open, useful and fruitful. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    ERIKA SCHLÄPPI, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said this was the first report submitted by the State party.  It was regretful that no reports had been received from civil society. Were the Convention’s provisions directly applicable in San Marino?  Were they referred to in practice in the courts?  What had been done to raise the visibility of the Convention?  Were there any plans to revise article 4 paragraph 1 of the San Marino Constitution to include other forms of discrimination, including gender identity?  Were there plans to introduce a body of laws preventing discrimination in the private and public spheres?  How did the San Marino authorities integrate a gender perspective in the legislative process? 

    What legal procedures could women currently use for submitting complaints about discriminatory acts?  What were the possible barriers for women to make use of existing legal remedies?  How were judges and lawyers trained to ensure gender equality in administrative procedures?  The Committee was concerned about the lack of disaggregated data in San Marino.  It was welcomed that authorities were considering taking measures to improve the data collections system.  What were the plans to improve data collection in the areas of gender equality? What were the timelines?  Did the State plan to enact a comprehensive law to prohibit discrimination?   

    Responses by the Delegation 

     

    The delegation said civil society organizations were informed about the drafting report and had several opportunities to get in touch.  Work had been carried out on the report with the San Marino Union for Women. Women’s rights were a topic close to the heart of San Marino citizens.  The Authority for Equal Opportunities conducted important work on the issue of violence against women.  The data on cases of violence was quite thorough.  San Marino was going through a process to join the European Union and it was hoped that once they had joined, a body on data gathering could be established. Data gathering was currently a weak point for the State and they would appreciate any specific advice from the Committee in this regard. 

    Work was underway to create a statistical body, and in the meantime, an office was charged with data collection and gathering.  Article 4 contained a list of protections which was not exhaustive.  This was to simplify the way such protection was worded. The Convention was fully applicable to San Marino’s legal body.  The State had signed the Istanbul Convention.  Women who were victims of violence could directly submit a complaint to the police, which would be passed on to the court.  There were nine police brigades which controlled the whole territory in San Marino, and there was an office dedicated to gender-based violence against minors.  A complaint could be received by the main police station, and victims needed to be informed of their rights.  Personnel of the gender-based violence office attended a three-week training course, in collaboration with the Italian police. 

    Data was gathered by the Authority on Equal Opportunities on gender-based violence and violence against minors, as well as discrimination in the world of work.  A new office, the Office of Statistics, was being created, which would act as a house for data, and would be used to answer questions from international bodies.  The State was striving to have data collected by all different agencies, including the police forces, to have a global vision on the issue.   

    While direct reference to the Convention was not that common, the legal framework of the State fully supported the provisions of the Convention. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said San Marino had demonstrated a commitment to promoting gender equality through several institutional frameworks, including the Commission for Equal Opportunities, which addressed a broad range of discrimination, including gender, disability and sexual orientation.  Could the State party clarify the mandate and resource allocations for the Commission and the Authority for Equal Opportunities?  What were the responsibilities of each body? How were they coordinated?  How were gender perspectives currently integrated into public policy?  The Authority for Equal Opportunities managed a fund for victim support.  Could updated information be provided on human and financial resources available for the bodies responsible for gender equality? Were steps being taken to ensure sustainability in line with their growing mandates? 

    San Marino had a vibrant civil society, with groups including the San Marino Union for Women contributing to reforms.  How were women’s organizations formally included in the development and monitoring of gender equality policies?  What measures were taken to ensure the participation of civil society organizations in national platforms?  Could an update be provided on the process and timeline for establishing a national human rights institution?  How would it ensure compliance with the Paris Principles?

    Another Expert asked what kind of temporary special measures were already implemented in legislation and in the judicial branch?  What temporary special measures had been adopted in the area of parity to achieve increased representation of women?  Were there any examples of positive discrimination for women in fields such as the military? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said there needed to be a radical mind shift within San Marino society. Education at schools and universities played a key role in this regard.  If men felt they had a right to discriminate against women, it meant they were not being educated properly.  This applied to other challenges, including racism and intolerance towards minorities. 

    Work was being done to create an Office of the Ombudsman in San Marino.  The office was expected to be operational in 2026.  The key elements of the office, including monitoring, combatting discrimination, complaints mechanisms, and mediation, among others, had already been identified.  The Ombudsman would have an independent budget and would have a six-year mandate. 

    The State endorsed civil society organizations in fighting gender-based violence and discrimination.  A petition called for the creation of mechanisms to combat discrimination.  A register was being developed for civil society organizations active in the field of women’s rights to facilitate work with these organizations.  San Marino was a small State and its services were fully adequate.  The victims’ reception centre had a 24/7 hotline which provided assistance. 

    A decree had set norms for the employment of specific roles, with incentives for the employment of women.  In April 2025, the gap between men and women was significantly reduced, highlighting the effectiveness of these norms. 

    San Marino was in the process of developing an independent human rights commission, in line with the Paris Principles. The bill would come into force in 2025 and become operative in 2026. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert asked how the effectiveness of training was being assessed?  What complaints mechanisms existed for discrimination against minority women?  Why was psychological harm not considered to be a criminal case?  Had the campaigns targeting men been assessed?  Was the State considering covering witnesses? Did judges, lawyers and law enforcement receive mandatory training in this regard?

    It was welcomed that the State provided services, including shelters for victims of violence.  Could women with disabilities and migrant women have access to these services?  Were there enough of these services?  What economic, labour and housing initiatives were provided for victims?  How many judicial sentences regarding gender-based violence had been handed down?  What period of time elapsed between the complaint and the finalised sentence? What public funds did civil society organizations currently receive when they provided assistance and support to victims?  How many victims of violence and their children had received reparation?  What kind of reparation did they receive?

    Another Committee Expert said the strong demand for foreign labour in the State created opportunities for trafficking.  The State party had reported that no investigations had been launched to date regarding trafficking cases.  When was the State party expecting to finalise work on the national action plan on trafficking?  What funds would be allocated to ensure its success?  How would the State party ensure that all relevant stakeholders were up to speed concerning their role in the fight against trafficking?  What steps was the State party taking to put in place national procedures and mechanisms to ensure the referral of trafficking victims?  Several sectors of the economy had been identified as being susceptible to trafficking, including domestic work.  Was the State party planning to follow the recommendation to raise awareness of the risk of trafficking among the general public?  Was the State party planning to decriminalise sex work?

    Responses by the Delegation 

     

    The delegation said San Marino was carrying out activities to improve its expertise in the area of trafficking.  The State currently had no cases directly relating to human trafficking, demonstrating the phenomenon was limited in the country, possibly due to its limited size, as well as the control and efficacy of law enforcement agencies.  The national strategy for combatting trafficking was currently being drafted.  Since trafficking cases were non-existent in San Marino, it was unlikely the topic would be addressed extensively in training courses, but it would be mentioned. The anti-violence network included magistrates and representatives of the legal system and law enforcement agencies. 

    Since the visit of the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings to San Marino, there had been no indication of risks or cases reported. Work was carried out in collaboration with the Italian State in terms of training opportunities, and new modules were being designed for labour inspectors.  The Labour Inspectorate carried out direct interviews with the home carers and had reported no issues in this regard.  The State would continue to remain vigilant about trafficking, particularly for high-risk sectors, but at present this risk was not prevalent.

    Psychological violence was included in the decree of 2024, which addressed domestic violence against women.  It was defined as any intentional behaviour which impacted the psychological integrity of women.  In 2024, there were four orders of protection enacted by the judge.  Parliament recently adopted a law regarding the duration of trial, which would ensure an improvement in the duration of cases pertaining to violence. 

    Over the last year, training had been dedicated to preventive action against discrimination. The State had a duty to punish perpetrators, and to ensure their rehabilitation.  The union contract had been signed for the 24-hour availability of social servants, for cases of discrimination or violence.  A protocol was in place with the authorities and Order of Psychologists, where psychologists received a financial contribution for completing mandatory training for victims of violence. 

    The State had a list of pro-bono lawyers who could assist victims, but were also working on a specific agreement with the Bar Association, to ensure that victims had legal assistance.  This assistance would be entirely covered by the Authority of Equal Opportunities.  A project was underway to support women victims of violence who did not have access to an income.  Two years ago, a training module was created for journalists to raise awareness about gender stereotypes in the media, with work carried out directly with the Association of Journalists.

    A new emergency centre was created in 2024 and had been operating 24/7, welcoming women victims of violence and their children, as well as unaccompanied minors.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert said the crime of trafficking affected all countries; was size of the country considered an acceptable excuse for the lack of trafficking cases? 

    A Committee Expert said there was an ongoing debate in the country about how to enforce the political participation of women in San Marino.  How did San Marino plan to achieve parity in public life.  How did the State party explain the low representation of women in the cabinet?  Were there legal or policy measures in place to ensure the representation of women? What would be done to increase the number of women in leading positions in the public administration and the judiciary? 

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the efforts and improvements made to align citizenship rights of a small landlocked nation with international standards, ensuring that the rules for transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines were now aligned.  The Committee also welcomed the approval concerning the “amendment on citizenship” to remove the obligations for applicants to renounce their existing citizenship.  However, it was regretful that there was no data in the report enabling the Committee to assess the impact of these acts.  It was also concerning that San Marino was yet to ratify key conventions relating to stateless persons. 

    What was the number of women who had obtained citizenship through naturalisation compared to men?  Was the State party considering abolishing the requirement of the interdiction of dual citizenship?  What support mechanism were in place to ensure eligible individuals were able to access the right to San Marino citizenship?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said approximately 50 per cent of the San Marino population lived abroad. Until the year 2000, San Marino citizenship could only be transmitted through the paternal line.  Those who held San Marino citizenship could hold others as well.  The obligation to renounce other nationalities was linked to the naturalisation process.

    Some diplomats believed there were in fact too many women in the diplomatic core, as there had been significant progress in this regard.  Measures to guarantee women’s political life in the country were linked to two laws.  Women made up 50 per cent of the public administration.  Women’s representation within the judiciary was fully granted; a few years ago, the President of the San Marino court was a woman.  San Marino did not intend to use the instrument of quotas again, as the results did not justify its existence, and the quotas were intended to be a temporary measure.  Instead, the State had introduced a cultural mind shift through better awareness raising.  Measures had been introduced to support families, to allow all citizens to participate in the life of the country. 

    The judiciary had strong female representation, with six female representatives.  The coordinator for the civil administrative sector was a woman.   Psychical criteria had been adjusted for entering the gendarmerie corps, meaning there were new female recruits.  In 2025, 25 per cent of officers within the gendarmerie where female, which was a common trend across all law enforcement agencies.  Women had been able to ascend within law enforcement agencies, with women colonels responsible for several units. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee commended the State party for achieving literacy rates for both women and men at a rate of 100 per cent.  Was the education system full inclusive to migrant girls and girls with disabilities?  The Committee congratulated the State party for ensuring that equality and inclusion started from primary school.  How did San Marino’s schools directly address topics of human rights, gender stereotypes, racism and gender equality?  Were human rights and gender equality issues explicitly addressed in education curricula? What were the specific recommendations made to prevent cyber bullying against women and girls?  Could sex disaggregated data be provided regarding access to financial aid for students? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said San Marino had two dedicated decrees related to education, including for students with learning disabilities.  There were training courses for teachers to ensure they could provide support to students with disabilities and deal with individual cases. Indications were introduced in all San Marino institutions, from kindergarten to secondary school.  Even at university level, courses offered to students related to gender-based violence and racial discrimination.  The curriculum of schools included specific projects for awareness raising.  This initiative was also passed on to families involved in this approach. 

    On 5 July, an exhibition entitled “Open Dreams” would open, gathering works of elementary and secondary school students, created during school projects relating to human rights and gender parity.  This exhibition would be open to the San Marino people and was part of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization celebration for education for peace. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee appreciated policies aimed at better integrating women into the labour force, including the one focusing on women over 50.  However, it was concerning that women were underrepresented in the labour market, but overrepresented in part time jobs. Around 95 per cent of those dismissed during the COVID-19 pandemic were women.  Could the State party provide disaggregated statistical data on the employment of women? Why were women the majority of those who lost their employment in the pandemic?  What was done to facilitate their return to employment?  Was there a wage gap?  Could more information be provided regarding measures to increase work life balance and incentivise employers to employ women? 

    What percentage of fathers had benefitted from parental leave since its introduction? What measures were taken to strengthen childcare and support services?  What was being done to strengthen the monitoring of labour conditions of vulnerable groups?  What measures were being taken to combat sexual harassment in the workplace?  What was being done to increase the low numbers of women in leadership positions in the private sector?  Was there a specific law prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said in San Marino law, selection of an individual for employment was based on merit and the candidate’s skillset.  San Marino’s labour market was fully open, meaning employers were free to make their selection specific to the profile they were looking for.  The labour inspectorate would then provide opportunities for the unemployed.  San Marino had been providing incentives for female employment for several years, including that employers would pay less tax for female workers. 

    As of 2025, the labour force in San Marino was better balanced, with the gender gap reduced. If a female worker had a child and wished to return to work, she could transform her contract into one that was part-time.  There were fiscal incentives for employers who were ready to hear needs of their female workers.  This part time contract was valid for the first three years of the child’s life and could be extended for an additional three years.  This was a key provision which would help women balance their professional and private lives.  There were no distinctions in the area of training and lifelong learning between men and women. 

    San Marino had adopted the International Labour Organization convention on workplace discrimination, and the State had adopted a national action plan in this regard. There were several types of paternal leave.  The San Marino legal system encouraged fathers to request permission to accompany children to the doctor and for other needs.  The legal system also provided for parental leave for foster children. 

    Discriminatory acts in San Marino were punishable under the law.  If this occurred in a work environment, the sentence would be further strengthened.  There were harsher punishments for sexual violence when it occurred in a work environment. 

     

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert asked what the State party was doing to ensure the right of minorities to health?  What were the current challenges faced by the Women’s Health Centre?  How was its sustainability guaranteed?  What measures were taken to ensure sexual and reproductive health, as well as modern, free and low-cost contraceptive measures, especially for more disadvantaged groups?  How was appropriate information provided on how to access appropriate gynaecological and obstetric care? 

    Forced sterilisation was sanctioned under the Penal Code but could be authorised on the grounds of psycho-social disability.  What measures would be taken to combat this harmful practice?  Had changes been made to the Penal Code which recognised exceptions to the general prohibition of abortion, including incest and rape?  How many women had access to legal abortion in 2023 and 2024?  What steps were being taken by the State party to have a team to support female victims of gender violence?  How were women’s needs in mental health being taken into account? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the law to support families included rights for mothers, fathers, natural and adopted children.  For years, the Women’s Health Centre had been working to support women, including counselling them.  This was a dedicated body which fought to protect women, their children, and families. The Centre offered counselling for women and couples, providing them with information and contraceptives. Activities in schools were tailored depending on the age of the pupils. 

    The Constitutional Court in San Marino had issued a ruling on the desire to de-penalise abortion, reflecting the mind shift already present in society.  Screenings for cancer risks were directly managed by the San Marino hospital.  The Women’s Health Centre was tasked with prevention and monitoring of such risks. There was no forced sterilisation in the country.  Close monitoring of contraception occurred under the supervision of medical personnel. 

    A series of events were organised in schools dedicated to sexuality, which were optional for elementary school pupils and mandatory for older pupils.  The content of these events differed depending on the age of the students.  Training courses had been developed to raise awareness among younger populations about sexual health.  These interventions had been favourably welcomed by San Marino households.  In 2023, a new hub providing psychological support was opened, accessible to all pupils.  Mental health support was available through the hub.  Adolescents and young people could freely access the human papillomavirus vaccine. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert congratulated the State party on law no. 158 of 2022, which provided a regulatory framework for the protection and support of women who went through pregnancy and postpartum in conditions of psychological, economic and social discomfort, as well as single pregnant women, and single parent families.  How many single pregnant women and single-parent families had benefited since the adoption of the law in November 2022? 

    Had the State party considered instituting surveillance and monitoring mechanisms to specifically track progress in inclusive social security systems?  What laws and policies had been implemented to promote women’s entrepreneurship, access to economic assets, and business ownership?  Were there government-led programmes that provided support to women entrepreneurs? Were there training or capacity building initiatives in key sectors like financial technology, e-commerce, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and robotics, where women remained underrepresented?  What actions were being taken to increase the number of women in leadership roles within sports and cultural institutions? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said a new law provided favourable conditions for both male and female entrepreneurs.  More and more women were opting for activities in the e-commerce space.  Employers and employees could have access to the family allowance.  This was provided by the State to better support childcare.  Law 158 from 2022 supported pregnant women and single parent families.  The State was currently considering a reform bill which resulted in further allowances to support households with young children, particularly new fathers, to close the gap between men and women in the household. 

    In 2024, there were 22 cases of voluntary abortion in the country.  The San Marino Olympic Committee promoted equality.  In 2024, the University of San Marino organised a day focusing on sports and disability, using sports as a tool for inclusion and equality.  This special day was open to all sports operators and coaches in the country to raise awareness regarding inclusion and combatting all kinds of discrimination in sports. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said around five per cent of the State resided in rural areas, being predominantly involved in agriculture or domestic work.  Could information on the social conditions of rural women in San Marino be provided?  San Marino had 258 migrant workers employed in the private sector as caregivers or badanti. The Committee noted with satisfaction the establishment of the one stop shop set up to provide assistance to these badanti.  What was currently being done to prevent violence against badanti? 

    What measures were in place to ensure inclusive employment for women with disabilities? Since June 2019, discrimination on the ground of gender identity was expressly banned in San Marino.  What steps were being taken to recognise same sex marriage for citizens? 

    A Committee Expert asked for more information on forced sterilisation which had been imposed on women with disabilities over the past five years, possibly authorised by a legal guardian? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said it was difficult to distinguish between urban and rural areas in San Marino. All people living in San Marino enjoyed universal health coverage.  A desk had been organised for badanti to answer questions and deal with issues affecting them, and for families who wished to benefit from their services. There was no discrimination towards badanti in the country; efforts were made to protect their work. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert welcomed the law which allowed a judge to order the removal of the aggressor in cases of gender-based violence, among other initiatives.  How did the courts deal with custody and the visiting rights of parents?  How were the best interests of a child taken into account from a gender perspective? How many children had been able to receive their mothers surname since 2016?  What mechanisms existed to provide oversight for family mediation procedures and ensure the Convention standards were respected? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the interests of minors were always protected when it came to custody matters.  Judges would take into account the circumstance of violence within the household. When it came to separation between the parents, mediation was ruled out if there was violence within the household. 

    Closing Remarks

    MARCELLO BECCARI, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue which had enabled the State to review the legislation and all areas where discrimination against women could occur.  The institutions of San Marino were actively engaged in the implementation of the Convention.  The recommendations by the Committee would be carefully considered.

    MARIANNE MIKKO, Committee Vice-Chair, thanked the delegation of San Marino for the constructive dialogue, which had provided further insight on the situation of women in the country.  

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CEDAW25.017E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Kazakhstan, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Ask about Excessive Use of Force during 2022 Demonstrations and Internet Censorship

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Kazakhstan on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending the State’s abolition of the death penalty, and raising issues concerning excessive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations in January 2022 and internet censorship.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, and other Committee Experts commended Kazakhstan for its abolition of the death penalty and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.

    A Committee Expert cited reports of excessive use of force during demonstrations in January 2022 that resulted in the deaths of several peaceful protesters.  Investigations into these incidents were reportedly insufficient. What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?

    Another Committee Expert said Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval.  Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    Botagoz Zhaxelekova, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said that, as part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation said that the 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.

    On internet censorship, the delegation said this year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked.  Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act. It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Ms. Zhaxelekova, in concluding remarks, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans, she said.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Soh said the delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    The delegation of Kazakhstan was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population; Ministry of Culture and Information; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Court Administration; Anti-Corruption Agency; Prosecutor General’s Office; and the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the initial report of Guinea Bissau (CCPR/C/GNB/1).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/KAZ/3).

    Presentation of the Report

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said international obligations were an integral part of Kazakhstan’s national legal system.  The provisions of the Covenant took precedence over national legislation, and the State’s primary priority was the protection of citizens’ rights.

    During the reporting period, the State made far-reaching reforms aiming to consolidate democracy and build a just Kazakhstan. In 2022, constitutional reforms reinforced human rights protections for all Kazakh citizens, moving the State from a super-Presidential form of Government to a Presidential Republic with a strengthened Parliament.  The President could now serve only a single seven-year term and could not seek re-election. Rural mayors were now directly elected, and regional authorities had been granted greater autonomy. 

    The role of the lower house of Parliament in forming the Government had been strengthened – Parliament’s consent was now required for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.  The lower house was also empowered to hear reports from the Government, including on human rights issues.

    In addition, the registration process for political parties had been simplified; the electoral process had been improved; and the registration threshold had been reduced fourfold, from 20,000 to 5,000 members.  For the first time, six political parties, including opposition parties, were represented in the lower house.  Nearly half of the members of Parliament had been newly elected, including independent candidates.  A 30 per cent quota for women, youth, and persons with disabilities was introduced for the allocation of party list mandates.  The Mazhilis (lower house of Parliament) now included 18 women, six persons with disabilities, and eight individuals under the age of 35.

    The Constitutional Court had been re-established as a key mechanism for protecting rights and freedoms.  All citizens could appeal to it free of charge, and interpretation services were available.  To date, the Court had issued over 500 rulings and 71 final decisions.  In 20 per cent of reviewed cases, legal provisions were found to be unconstitutional.

    Constitutional law had expanded the powers of the Human Rights Commissioner, who could now directly address the President, both chambers of Parliament, and the Government with proposals to improve human rights mechanisms and initiate systemic legislative measures.  The Ombudsman was empowered to file lawsuits to defend the rights of an unlimited number of individuals, access all penal institutions freely, interview any person, and intervene in cases of rights violations. Regional Ombudspersons for the rights of children and for socially vulnerable groups had also been appointed across the country.

    Extensive work had been carried out in the field of lawmaking.  Laws adopted during the reporting period included the law on peaceful assemblies, which introduced a notification-based system for assemblies; a law decriminalising defamation; a law granting citizens and civil society organizations the right to oversee Government and quasi-public entities; a law obliging the Government to respond to petitions that received more than 50,000 signatures; a law expanding journalists’ rights to access and disseminate information; and the Social Code, which guaranteed equality and the inadmissibility of discrimination in all areas of life and increased State social benefits by 15 per cent. 

    Other laws adopted included a law aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence, which led to the annual number of crimes against women decreasing by 2.5 times; legislation increasing penalties for crimes against the sexual integrity of children; a law granting public monitoring commissions and the national preventive mechanism unrestricted access to all closed facilities in the country without prior notice and establishing criminal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment; and a law on combatting human trafficking.

    As a result of preventive measures, the number of registered torture cases had declined each year.  In 2024, the number fell by 40 per cent.  Since 2020, a Compensation Fund for Victims of Torture had been operating, and over the past five years, more than 3,000 compensation payments had been made.

    Kazakhstan was also taking measures to protect its citizens abroad.  From 2019 to 2021, the country carried out special operations repatriating 754 individuals from Syria, including 526 children and citizens of neighbouring countries.  All children received passports and women were supported to return to a normal life.

    As part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  A total of 94 actions had been planned, more than 75 per cent of which had already been implemented.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  This commitment was also enshrined in the Constitution.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.  In 2023, Kazakhstan also ratified two Optional Protocols: one to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and another to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 

    To ensure the effective implementation of decisions and requests from United Nations committees, a working group was established in 2022.  It included representatives from the main State authorities.  Kazakhstan had responded positively to decisions on individual communications by United Nations committees, including through the payment of compensation in the cases of Gerasimov, Bayramov and Malykhin. 

    The State party had also incorporated the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner Volker Türk, who visited Kazakhstan in 2023, into a comprehensive action plan on human rights and the rule of law.  The action plan focused on protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities; combatting domestic violence; strengthening labour rights; and safeguarding freedom of association.

    The Government has been actively engaging with civil society on all major reforms.  One notable example of this engagement was the “Dialogue Platform for the Human Dimension” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Since 2013, more than 50 meetings had been held, and their outcomes were reflected in three human rights action plans, including recently adopted laws on combatting human trafficking, the criminalisation of domestic violence, and the fight against torture.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed Kazakhstan’s abolition of the death penalty and its ratification of the Second Optional Protocol in 2022, as well as the strengthening of the Constitutional Court in 2023 and the establishment of several mechanisms and institutions.  The Committee had, in recent years, issued a substantial number of Views concluding violations of the Covenant by the State party, but had received disturbing information that most of these had not been followed up.  Would the State party extend the mandate of the interagency working group, which was tasked with analysing these Views?  What measures had been taken to give full effect to the Committee’s recommendations?  How were members of the judiciary trained on international procedures?

    The adoption of the international treaties act enhanced the role of international treaties in the national legal order. Did the Covenant have direct effect? The Committee welcomed national plans related to human rights.  How effective had implementation of these plans been?  Domestic courts had assessed a substantial number of cases involving the Covenant.  Had these courts directly implemented the Covenant?  Was training on the Covenant for the judiciary compulsory?  How was the public educated on the Committee’s work?

    The Committee welcomed that the Human Rights Commission’s mandate had been expanded but noted that it had “B” status since 2012. Had the State worked to have it accredited with “A” status?  What were the obstacles in this regard?  How did the State party guarantee a transparent and independent procedure for appointing members of the Commission?  How did the Commissioner monitor the implementation of the Covenant?  Could the Commissioner be held accountable for inaction?  The State party had invested in the national preventive mechanism against torture, but this institution depended on the Human Rights Commission to carry out its operations and reportedly needed to announce visits to places of detention in advance.  How would the State party strengthen the mechanism?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed the significant changes to the national framework, including the establishment of the national Anti-Corruption Agency.  There were concerns about the influence of public officials over this institution. What measures were in place to ensure the independence of the Agency?  Media reportedly faced political pressure when reporting on corruption, with some having been imprisoned.  What measures were in place to protect media personnel investigating corruption?

    The law on countering extremism included a vague definition of “extremism” that allowed for arbitrary interpretation.  Would this definition be revised?  Were media personnel pressured to expose colleagues’ actions to reduce sentences against them?  Did the State party plan to remove people convicted of non-violent crimes from the list of people accused of financing terrorism?  Which objective standards were used in courts to define extremist activities?  The Committee called for statistics on persons tried for extremist crimes.

    The Committee welcomed legal safeguards against surgical sterilisation, but was concerned about uneven access to contraception and high rates of teenage pregnancy.  What steps had been taken to expand access to affordable contraceptives and family planning programmes?  The Committee was concerned by reports of forced sterilisation and abortion, particularly targeting persons with disabilities, and gender stereotypes embedded in school curricula.  What measures were in place to address these issues and develop adequate sexual and reproductive health education?

    A Committee Expert said that demonstrations in December 2011 resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians, and reported torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals put under trial related to these protests.  Investigations into these incidents and many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations were reportedly insufficient.  What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?  How many investigations had been carried out thus far and what convictions had been handed down?

    The Committee welcomed measures taken to address the high suicide rate in detention centres, but this high rate reportedly persisted.  What further measures were planned to reduce the suicide rate and to investigate all deaths in custody?

    One Committee Expert said that the State party’s laws on discrimination did not address all forms of discrimination included in the Covenant, despite high levels of discrimination against certain groups in the State party.  Efforts to revise anti-discrimination laws seemed to have stalled.  Was there a plan to revive these?

    The Committee welcomed the State party’s efforts to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.  Would it remove discriminatory language in its laws related to persons with disabilities?

    In 2020, the Dungan community experienced ethnic violence resulting in deaths, injuries, property damage, and the displacement of thousands of community members.  Law enforcement authorities reportedly ignored these incidents, delaying investigations and prosecutions.  What progress had been made in setting up a reconciliation committee and in providing remedies to victims?

    There were credible reports of violence and discrimination targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals. Why had organizations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons been denied formal registration and the right to peaceful assembly?  The Kazakhstan Union of Parents had submitted a petition seeking to ban “propaganda” related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  How had the Government responded to this petition?  Public funding had been removed from gender reassignment surgery and the minimum age for such procedures had been raised to 21.  How would the Government support persons who sought such surgery?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed that Kazakhstan’s law prohibited gender-based discrimination, but expressed concern that women accounted for only 27 per cent of the Mazhilis, and had limited representation in decision-making positions in public and private bodies.  There was a major salary gap between men and women, and the law did not ensure equal pay for equal work.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure substantive equality between men and women and to address discrimination in access to education, land and property rights?  How did the State party promote women’s representation in decision-making bodies and managerial roles?  What measures were in place to address the gender pay gap?

    The Committee welcomed that the State party had financed gender equality initiatives, but noted that the gender equality strategy had been replaced with the gender and family policy.  The 2009 law on domestic violence was limited to violence by immediate family members.  What legislative and other measures had been taken to combat violence against women and girls?  How had the State party tackled the rise in domestic violence observed during the COVID-19 pandemic?  How was it addressing issues such as forced and early marriages and ensuring a victim-centred approach to investigations and prosecutions? 

    Stigma surrounded reporting of cases of domestic and gender-based violence and police were reportedly reluctant to act on such cases. How did the State party encourage reporting of violence by victims, ensure adequate funding for victim support services, and collect data on complaints, investigations and sentences? What measures were in place to strengthen awareness raising campaigns on violence against women targeting public officials and civil society?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Covenant was directly applicable in Kazakhstan and took precedence over domestic legislation. Over the past eight years, over 7,000 decisions were handed down by the courts that referenced the Covenant. Training seminars on Covenant rights were held for members of the judiciary.  The Government had made good progress on the human rights action plan, having implemented around 75 action points thus far, including actions promoting gender equality and women’s representation in decision-making bodies, as well as the investigation of torture.

    The Ombudsperson’s status was enshrined in the Constitution.  It did not report to Government bodies and had immunity in carrying out its activities. Its financial independence was guaranteed and it had direct access to all Government bodies.  In 2023, the Ombudsperson representatives carried out more than 700 monitoring visits and issued over 600 recommendations, some 70 per cent of which were implemented.  An assessment of institutional capacity was carried out in 2023 by the Human Rights Commissioner towards its accreditation with “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

    The independent national preventive mechanism consisted of 126 members, a large percentage of whom were representatives of non-governmental organizations.  They were elected through a transparent process by the coordination council.  The Ombudsperson was working on improving the professional knowledge of the mechanism’s members.  Its annual budget was spent exclusively on its needs.  It had unlimited access to all detention centres in the country and did not need prior permission to conduct visits.

    The Anti-Corruption Agency was independent. It had held several high-level officials accountable for corruption and had seized several millions of dollars in assets from those officials, investing those assets directly in Government programmes such as school construction projects.  The Agency provided free consultations with citizens periodically and worked with citizen volunteers who monitored corruption.

    The State ensured the safety of journalists who investigated corruption, providing all assistance necessary to those journalists. Journalists had broad rights to receive answers to their questions from public officials and to attend public events.

    The concepts of “extremism” and “terrorism” defined in national legislation and the Constitution were in line with those of international law.  The State party welcomed the Committee’s recommendations for improving these laws. All inclusions in the list of organizations linked to terrorism financing were based on the sentences of judges.  Around 1,000 persons had been removed from the list after review, including persons already serving sentences under the Criminal Code and persons found to have given up extremist views.

    Kazakhstan’s Health Code guaranteed the right to reproductive healthcare.  Women had the right not to be subjected to forced abortions or sterilisation and had access to all sexual and reproductive health services.  Gynaecologists determined whether terminations of pregnancy were necessary.  Minors could seek terminations with the written permission of their parents. Family planning and contraception services were provided by the State.  Medical, out-patient and in-patient services had been established in rural areas – 308 medical facilities had been built last year. Events were held that promoted reproductive health and aimed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies.  Increased access to maternal health services had led to a reduction in maternal mortality and the number of abortions.

    The Prosecutor’s Office had conducted investigations into the events of December 2011, as had monitoring bodies from the United Nations.  The Government had allowed representatives of non-governmental organizations and the media to attend trials related to these events.  Some 1,100 witness testimonies were conducted as part of investigations, which led to the sentencing of 13 officials.  All persons who had been arrested were now released. Investigations found that there was no evidence of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of arrested persons by public officials.  One official had been charged with granting officers permission to use lethal firearms, which led to the death of 12 persons.  These victims’ families had been granted damages by the courts.

    Discrimination was not allowed on grounds of sex, ethnicity, race, status, property or religion, among other characteristics. The State party had created a committee promoting inter-ethnic harmony, which had developed guidelines on access to legal remedies for victims of discrimination and recommendations for improving legislation on discrimination. 

    All citizens were equal before the law and no person could be subject to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community had access to all fundamental rights.  The State party had agreed to conduct research on the impact of propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in response to the petition it had received.  Sex changes were regulated by domestic law; persons aged 21 or over with legal capacity had the right to change their sex.

    Some 87 persons had been convicted for having taking part in mass unrest in 2020 affecting the Dungan community, damaging property and obstructing the actions of the police.  All victims had had their property restored.

    The law on persons with disabilities granted persons with category two disabilities priority access to public housing. National standards were in place that supported access to infrastructure and services for persons with disabilities. The accessibility level of buildings was mapped by the State party, and more than 124,000 buildings had been adapted to promote accessibility.

    In April 2024, a law was adopted that aimed to protect women and girls from violence.  There was criminal liability for battery and bodily harm.  Police were obliged to investigate all suspected cases of domestic violence, even when there was no report.  The punishment for sexual violence had been increased to up to life imprisonment.  Forced marriage was punished with up to 10 years imprisonment.  Measures were in place to ensure that victims could file complaints.  The Government funded a specific unit on combatting domestic violence and provided training to officials on responding to domestic violence.  Courts issued restraining orders and instructions relating to behaviour in domestic violence cases as required.  Mobile units responded in a timely manner to reports of violence; they had worked with more than 100,000 families.

    The share of women in local assemblies was 22.7 per cent. There were three women ministers and eight women vice-ministers, and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a woman.  Some 53 per cent of judges were women.  The State party was working actively to ensure that the quota of 30 per cent female candidates was respected.

    The ideology of the gender equality strategy had not changed.  The State party was working with United Nations agencies to promote gender-sensitive budgeting and establish bodies within ministries with gender-related mandates.

    Around 15 per cent of senior public officials were women. Since 2018, some 7,000 women had served in military operations and 15 Kazakh women had served in United Nations peacekeeping roles.  Equal pay for equal work for men and women was enshrined in the Constitution. Discrimination on any grounds was not allowed.  The Labour Code prohibited discrimination on the grounds of gender.  Women who felt they had been discriminated against could turn to the courts to seek remedies.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that the procedure for follow-up on Views had led to legal changes and the payment of compensation to victims.  The Expert also welcomed efforts made by the State party to inform the public about the Committee’s work.  Another Committee Expert welcomed measures promoting access to registration for civil society organizations.  One Committee Expert commended the participation of 15 Kazakh women in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the increasing number of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said he was impressed by the abolition of the death penalty and progress in improving the representation of women, but noted that there were still issues that needed to be addressed.

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on how the State party promoted the independence of the Ombudsperson, despite the President’s role in appointing its members; investigations into individual cases of killings and claims of torture occurring during December 2011 protests and reparations provided to victims’ families, and whether an official public apology had been issued for these human rights violations; whether the State party would formally recognise the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons to protection from discrimination; details on planned revisions to discrimination legislation; the status of research into propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons; whether a law on gender-based harassment would be promulgated soon; and resistance to laws on violence against women from conservative segments of society.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national preventive mechanism carried out more than 500 monitoring visits per year.  It had issued more than 16,000 recommendations to institutions as of 2020, of which 44 per cent had been implemented.

    An investigation was carried out into events related to December 2011 protests.  There was no evidence of the acts of torture that were alleged, preventing judicial investigation of those allegations.  The investigations into the murder of 12 individuals and the injury of six determined that arms were used with unlawful intent, inflicting grievous bodily harm, but not necessarily murder.  One official had refused to provide medical care to an injured person and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

    Issues related to discrimination legislation and the petition on propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons would be considered once research into these issues was completed. Civil society was invited to join discussions related to the petition and other Government measures.

    National legislation allowed for liability for various forms of harassment.  Last year, changes were brought to the Criminal Code banning sexual activity with minors under age 16.  The Government was assessing the effectiveness of current legislation on gender-based violence, which would be revised in 2027.

    The 2022 constitutional law on the Human Rights Commissioner expanded the powers of the Ombudsperson and the mandate of the Human Rights Commissioner.  The findings of the visits of the national preventive mechanism were published in its annual report.  As a result of its findings, disciplinary actions had been taken against over 440 officials.  In addition to the national preventive mechanism, members of Parliament, judges, prosecutors and the Commissioner for the Rights of the Child could also visit places of detention without prior authorisation. 

    The Ombudsperson could participate in discussions on national reports for human rights treaty bodies.  They had not exercised their right to appeal to the Constitutional Court, as they had been able to address all complaints they had received through other legal recourses.  This did not indicate a refusal to exercise this authority.

    The Labour Code prohibited discrimination against women and regulated workers’ rights to respect and dignity. Employers were obliged to ensure safe and healthy working conditions.  Workers could submit complaints of workplace harassment to the Workplace Ethics Committee or to the police.

    There were 170 suicides in prisons between 2017 and 2024.  For each case, an investigation was carried out to determine the causes, and around 150 officials had been sanctioned for not fulfilling their care duties. Training was provided to prison guards on identifying at-risk inmates and preventing suicides, and to prisoners on promoting self-confidence and preparing for release.  Several additional measures had been implemented in prisons to prevent suicides.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the State party did not have a specific law on the use of force and firearms by officials.  Did it plan to enact such a law that was in line with international standards?  There were allegations of excessive use of force during January 2022 protests, which had led to the death of several peaceful protesters.  Did the State party plan to conduct thorough, independent investigations into these allegations, hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies for victims?  The mass detention of protesters reportedly led to disappearances, and detainees had been denied access to lawyers and medical care.  What further steps would the State party take to ensure that all detainees were informed of their rights, provided access to a lawyer and medical treatment, and to investigate all allegations of mistreatment of detainees and hold those responsible accountable?

    Peaceful assemblies held without advanced authorisation were typically dispersed by authorities, with demonstrators arrested. How would the State party bring its administrative detention practices in line with international standards? Courts had a high rate of extending pre-trial detention.  How did the State party ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a last resort, and in line with international standards?

    Another Committee Expert said that the State party had not sufficiently responded to the Committee’s previous recommendation to align legal definitions of torture with those of the Convention against Torture. Despite the high number of torture cases, few effective punishments were imposed on perpetrators, and some persons who reported torture were punished for the crime of reporting false information. What steps had been taken to bring the definition of torture in the Criminal Code in line with international standards and ensure timely investigations?  How many complaints of torture had been filed, legal proceedings launched, and officials punished?

    Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval. Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?  Laws adopted in 2023 and 2024 expanded State control over free speech, resulting in politically motivated trials against journalists and political opposition figures.  What steps had been taken to fully decriminalise defamation?  Could the State party provide statistics on detentions of journalists and human rights defenders?  What had the working group on the protection of human rights defenders achieved?

    A Committee Expert commended steps to transfer prison health services from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health.  How was the State party supporting drug-dependent inmates and working to ensure the availability of sufficient medical equipment in prisons?  Were medical staff trained in detecting torture? Military schools were excluded from the mandate of the national preventive mechanism.  Did the State party intend to address this?

    The Committee was concerned that the right to conscientious objection to military services was not defined in law.  Were there plans to define this in law and establish an alternative to military service?  What steps had been taken to revise religious law to ensure full compliance with the Covenant?  The Committee was concerned by reports that some individuals had been imprisoned for engaging in non-violent religious expression.  How did the State party ensure that persons were not detained solely for expressing religious beliefs?

    What steps had been taken to remove complex registration requirements for non-governmental organizations and trade unions, and to prevent excessive State control of the activities of those organizations?

    Minorities continued to face discrimination and limited access to decision-making positions.  What was the legal and administrative framework covering political parties?  What steps had been taken to promote the effective participation of members of the Roma community in political life?

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the 2024 law on combatting trafficking in persons and the amendment to article 128 of the Criminal Code.  How did the State party ensure the effective implementation of these reforms? There were reports of a lack of training for labour inspectors on trafficking.  How were inspectors trained to detect trafficking?  How did the State party ensure that the cases of all potential trafficking victims were assessed before deportation, and that all migrant children were properly registered and documented?  The Committee welcomed efforts to enhance trafficking penalties, but was concerned that trafficking offences were often not appropriately classified, leading to lower penalties.  Would this be addressed?

    There was no de facto procedure for processing asylum applications and authorities were reportedly reluctant to grant asylum to persons of Russian or Uzbek nationality.  Reportedly, migrants had been detained without being given access to legal representation.  Was the State party addressing these issues?  How did it ensure protection against refoulement?  Individuals were required to renounce their citizenship to apply for Kazakh nationality.  Would the State revise this law to prevent the risk of statelessness?

    What State services were provided to victims of domestic violence, including children?  Could children obtain these services independently of their parents? The Committee was concerned that the State party had not prohibited all forms of corporal punishment.  Would this be done?  Could children file complaints of mistreatment with the Human Rights Commissioner?  Workers at an orphanage had been caught on video beating children.  How was the State party working to prevent such abuse and promoting the foster family system?  Children born outside of medical institutions to undocumented parents did not receive birth certificates.  Would the State party address this issue?

    Another Committee Expert asked how the State party guaranteed the independence of Supreme Court judge candidates, who were nominated by the President, and of lawyers?  There were reports of corruption throughout the judicial system. How was the State fighting this? Had any judicial officials been found guilty of corruption?  Attorneys were not automatically appointed to suspects, and did not always get access to all case files.  How would this be addressed?  How were suspects made aware of their rights?  How did the State party prevent cases being unduly declared “secret”?  What percentage of court cases were now solely held online?  How did the State ensure proper proceedings in online cases?

    To what extent were spontaneous assemblies possible in Kazakhstan?  How did the State party ensure that notification procedures did not create delays or restrictions preventing assemblies?  Could people appeal restrictions on assemblies?  Foreigners were prohibited from participating in assemblies.  How did the State party ensure that foreigners’ assembly rights were respected?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that in cases of mass violence, the State had the authority to use force to ensure public security.  The 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Changing the law on the excessive use of force was unnecessary, as the law functioned effectively.  All persons affected by violence related to this incident were provided with appropriate medical assistance, including detainees. Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.  There were 29 minors who had been detained after carrying out serious offences; they had since been released.

    There were 1,500 peaceful assemblies organised legally between 2017 and 2024.  Some 400 planned demonstrations had been cancelled because authorities had responded to complaints before the demonstration was held.  Some 1,000 demonstrations held during the reporting period were deemed unlawful as protesters had failed to respect notification deadlines or to correctly submit notification documents.  The State party continued to inform the public about notification procedures; this had led to a two-fold decrease in the number of illegal assemblies between 2022 and 2024.  Organisers of such assemblies were brought to court only in exceptional circumstances; in most cases, they were issued fines or warnings.  Law enforcement bodies needed to provide alternative proposals if the location for a planned demonstration was already being used by another event.

    As of 2019, exemption from liability for torture was not possible in Kazakhstan, nor were suspended sentences for perpetrators of torture.  There were 40,000 video cameras placed in detention centres to prevent torture. There had been a downward trend in the number of torture cases reported, from around 800 in 2019 to around 100 in 2024. More than 200 officials had been convicted of torture offences, and no officials found guilty of torture had received amnesties.  Housing and compensation payments were provided to the families of victims of torture. The State party intended to increase the amount of compensation provided to victims of torture ten-fold.

    This year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked. Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act.  It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Defamation had been downgraded to an administrative offence.  There had been a downward trend in the number of cases of defamation in recent years. In 2024, only four cases of spreading misinformation were registered.  Journalists and activists were not prosecuted for defaming public officials.  Persons could not be charged for defaming public or private institutions.

    All persons who entered prisons were provided with a medical assessment.  Detainees requiring specialised assistance were brought to outpatient clinics, and they were isolated when they showed symptoms of contagious diseases.  Legal amendments were made to allow detainees with serious diseases to serve their sentences in appropriate facilities or to have their sentences commuted.

    Over the past few years, there had been an increase in religious practitioners and missionaries, and a decrease in the number of people fined for religious activities.  In the first quarter of this year, only 46 people had been fined. Kazakhstan recognised the right to practice and disseminate religion.  Only persons who practiced religion for financial or extremist purposes were sanctioned.  Legislation on religion was in line with the Covenant.  Members of religious institutions could be released from the obligation to carry out military service.

    Kazakhstan was a multi-ethnic State.  It had a special quota for members of the Senate who were representatives of different ethnic groups.  There were no limitations on the political participation of ethnic groups.

    The national preventive mechanism operated under the Ombudsperson, but maintained operational independence.  Work was underway to expand the national preventive mechanism’s mandate to include facilities under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence.  A draft law on the national preventive mechanism was currently under discussion with State authorities.

    In 2023, the State adopted a law reducing the number of members needed to form a public association to three.  There were no restrictions on organizations receiving foreign funding.  To date, 543 trade unions had been registered.  Political parties’ activities could be restricted when they threatened public order, but such restrictions were temporary.  Liquidation of political parties could only be forced by a court order.

    A law on combatting trafficking in persons was introduced in 2024, which aimed to bring the State’s mechanisms for combatting trafficking in line with international standards, and to increase identification and support for victims.  New offences had been established linked to trafficking, including related to procuring a minor for prostitution and online trafficking. Some 170 labour inspections had been held thus far this year.  These had led to the identification of trafficking victims and the disbanding of organised crime groups, the members of which were held criminally liable. Over 190 victims had been identified and punishments of up to 20 years imprisonment were issued to perpetrators.

    Legislation on refugees and asylum seekers was in line with international law.  Kazakhstan abided by the principle of non-refoulement.  Refugees had the right to seek medical assistance and education, and could apply for permanent or temporary residence in the State. Kazakhstan did not permit the extradition of individuals whose asylum requests were under consideration. Individuals had the right to appeal extradition requests to the Supreme Court.  Kazakhstan was a party to the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which included provisions specifying that signatories needed to respect international norms related to non-refoulement.

    Only citizens could participate in demonstrations in Kazakhstan; foreigners and stateless persons could not.  However, they could pursue other means to lodge complaints with the State.  Police did not monitor whether demonstrators were foreigners or not.

    The Judicial Office provided free legal assistance to persons involved in court cases.  Many court cases took place online.  Artificial intelligence helped judges to automate routine cases, allowing for the analysis of millions of cases and for the maintenance of judicial standards.  Court materials were provided in accessible formats.

    The State party had revised the judiciary’s financing model, allowing the judicial administrative body to set the budget. This had led to a large increase in the judicial budget.  There were sanctions imposed for judges who engaged in corrupt practices.  Cases of corruption were assessed by a judicial panel.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on criteria used to determine whether to send warning letters to citizens regarding online content; alternatives to residential care facilities being developed; plans to prohibit corporal punishment; whether spontaneous protests were possible; whether persons who did not respect notification laws were restricted from filing future notifications; how the judiciary ensured that artificial intelligence was used in a safe manner that protected citizens’ rights; whether the Government intended to abolish the registry of organizations with foreign funding sources; and planned reforms to the registration process for non-governmental organizations.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there was a specialised structure that monitored the information space and detected violations of Kazakh law.  When violations were detected, warning letters were sent to offending parties, often through social network operators, that explained why the content was illegal and needed to be removed.

    The State paid particular attention to the rights of children.  New legislation discouraged corporal punishment.  The number of beatings of children recorded by the State had been falling year-on-year; last year, there were only 250 cases.  Thorough investigations were carried out into complaints of corporal punishment in residential homes.  Video surveillance tools were installed in schools and kindergartens.  There was a hotline for reporting violence and providing consultations to children.

    There was no plan to amend the registry of organizations funded by foreign sources, which was developed in line with international principles.  The State party did not plan to develop a bill on foreign agents.

    All judicial services that used artificial intelligence had been assessed in terms of their implications on security.  They were implemented by the judiciary independently.  The State party had implemented use of electronic monitoring bracelets in around 1,000 cases as an alternative to pre-trial detention.

    Closing Remarks

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, expressed gratitude to the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and to all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The State party welcomed the 22 alternative reports submitted by Kazakh civil society organizations, which it had reviewed carefully.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans.  The State party thanked the Committee for its contributions to human rights in Kazakhstan and around the world.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the constructive dialogue. The delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, the right to peaceful assembly, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

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    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: New Permanent Representative of Senegal Presents Credentials to the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    Aboubacar Sadikh Barry, the new Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations Office at Geneva, today presented his credentials to Tatiana Valovaya, the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    Prior to his appointment to Geneva, Mr. Barry had been serving as Senegal’s Ambassador to Ghana since 2018.

    Mr. Barry served as Deputy Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations Office at Geneva from 2013 to 2016.  He served as Second, then First Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the United Nations in New York from 2004 to 2010.  He was Head of the United Nations Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal from 2001 to 2004.

    Other high-level positions he has held within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs include Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Senegal in Washington D.C., United States, from 2016 to 2018; and Director of Consular Affairs from 2011 to 2013. 

    Mr. Barry has a certificate degree in diplomacy from the Senegal National School of Administration and a master’s degree in economics and management from the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, where he also obtained a bachelor’s degree in economic sciences.  He is married with five children.

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    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CR25.022E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: First Partner launches and expands her annual Book Club, celebrates libraries as community treasures open to all Californians

    Source: US State of California 2

    Jun 25, 2025

    What you need to know: The First Partner launched her annual Book Club today, which features great kids’ reads curated by librarians across California, as well as investments to support library community programming.

    SACRAMENTO – California First Partner Jennifer Siebel Newsom today launched and expanded her book club, which includes a list of children’s books curated by librarians across the state, as well as investments in library programs that help connect more kids to libraries and reading over the summer — and now all year-round. Part of the First Partner’s California for ALL Kids initiative, the Book Club is a partnership with the California State Library, aimed at boosting early literacy, reducing the “summer slide” of learning, and supporting the mental health and well-being of all California children. Libraries — increasingly under threat from the Trump Administration — play a key role in supporting kids’ early literacy and mental health. 

    “Books and storytelling have the power to change the trajectory of a life — especially the books we read when we’re young. That is why I’m so thrilled to share these inspiring children’s books, curated by librarians across the State of California. Our libraries create community and safe havens for us all, but particularly for our children, allowing them to escape into the joy and wonders of reading, disconnect from the online world, build early literacy skills, and so much more. Although we live in a time when beloved public resources like these are under increasing threat from the Administration in DC, California is working to protect them as the community treasures they are for kids, families, and entire communities.” 

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    This year’s Book Club list includes 20 books centered around themes of positive girl representation, environmental leadership, healthy lifestyles, and youth mental health. The books range in reading levels from preschool to high school and are now available for check-out at 890 public libraries across the state. For the full list of authors and books, see here

    To complement the Book Club, the California State Library “Book to Action” initiative has provided funds for libraries to build programming that encourages kids and families to visit public libraries — from volunteer projects in library gardens to digital storytelling workshops and craft programs. 

    “Books can open entire worlds for young people and access to them is something all California families can enjoy through our public libraries,” said California State Librarian Greg Lucas. “I encourage all families to head to your local library this summer and year-round and check out one of this year’s First Partner’s Book Club picks. We’re grateful for the First Partner’s leadership in helping ensure that our libraries can continue to provide inspiration, joy, learning, support, and community for all Californians.”

    Libraries as community hubs 

    Libraries are places where children learn, families gather, and anyone — regardless of income or background—can access tools to grow and explore. 

    The California State Library Parks Pass gives library cardholders free vehicle day-use entry to over 200 participating state parks. Since the start of the program, 26,000 California State Library Parks Passes have been distributed across all California public library jurisdictions. The First Partner helped spearhead and create the California State Library Parks Pass, as well as the California State Park Adventure Pass, which gives fourth graders and their families who live in California free access to 54 parks for an entire year. 

    Libraries play a key role in knitting communities together, and nowhere is this more visible than in regions rocked by natural disasters and public health emergencies — such as Los Angeles was during the Palisades and Eaton fires. Libraries served as key community hubs for recovery efforts. 

    To help highlight the importance of California’s libraries, the First Partner joined library friends, local authors, and advocates for a visit to the Altadena Library on June 18. Altadena’s Summer Reading program is now fully back and up and running after the Eaton fire and includes the “Lunch at the Library” program, which provides free lunches for children and teens from June 9 through August 1, 2025. Lunch at the Library is a project of the California State Library, supported with funds from the State of California. Last year, the program offered free summer lunch programs for kids at more than 200 libraries across the state.

    Libraries under attack

    Libraries are increasingly under budget attack from the current Administration in DC — and California is pushing back. 

    Summer learning and early literacy 

    Studies show that students who participate in summer reading programs have improved educational outcomes. Additionally, access to reading and learning opportunities between the ages of 0 and 5 are linked to an individual’s future health, education, and economic outcomes.

    Between 2011 and 2022, California had one of the largest gains in 4th-grade reading levels. However, the state has more work to do to ensure that all kids — no matter their zip code–have a chance to read, grow, and thrive. To that end, earlier this month, Governor Newsom announced the Golden State Literacy Plan, outlining sweeping new investments to boost student reading achievement. Under the Governor’s leadership, the state has continued to make foundational investments in education – from expanded before school, after school, and summer school programming, to universal school lunches and free pre-Kindergarten for all 4-year olds.

    Recent news

    News What you need to know: Today marked the start of the final phase of work on the Wallis Annenberg Wildlife Crossing – a monumental wildlife preservation effort in Southern California. LOS ANGELES – Governor Gavin Newsom announced today that the final phase of the…

    News What you need to know: President Trump’s unlawful deployment of military personnel to Los Angeles has slashed California’s National Guard fentanyl and drug interdiction force by 32% — undermining public safety and weakening border fentanyl seizure operations….

    News What you need to know: California is providing $15 million in new apprenticeship funding for youth for new high-paying opportunities that do not require a traditional education or four-year degree. SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced that 29 youth…

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: More drugs at the border, fewer troops to stop them: One-third of California National Guard counterdrug forces pulled amid Trump’s LA militarization

    Source: US State of California 2

    Jun 25, 2025

    What you need to know: President Trump’s unlawful deployment of military personnel to Los Angeles has slashed California’s National Guard fentanyl and drug interdiction force by 32% — undermining public safety and weakening border fentanyl seizure operations.

    Sacramento, CaliforniaAs President Trump escalates his unlawful militarization of Los Angeles, his actions are directly harming California’s ability to fight the flow of illegal drugs into our communities. 

    An estimated 32% of CalGuard’s servicemembers dedicated to the state’s Counterdrug Task Force have been reassigned by President Trump to militarize Los Angeles. Typically, under the Governor’s command, nearly 450 servicemembers are deployed statewide, including at ports of entry, to combat transnational criminal organizations and seize illegal narcotics. Now, those redirected servicemembers join about 4,000 others at Joint Forces Training Base, Los Alamitos sitting idly as Trump lets drugs flow freely across the border.

    Trump’s actions in Los Angeles are harming public safety. Whether it’s fentanyl takedown operations or wildfire response, the California National Guard plays a critical role in protecting our communities — and Trump is deliberately undermining that work.

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    The consequences are dire – CalGuard’s efforts help ensure the public safety of communities statewide. Since they started drug interdiction efforts in 2021, they have helped seize nearly 31,000 pounds of fentanyl and more than 50 million pills containing fentanyl, with a street value of more than $450 million. 

    So far this year, servicemembers, along with local and federal agencies, have helped seize 2,411 pounds of fentanyl and nearly 1.5 million pills for an estimated value of nearly $16 million. 

    Fentanyl is primarily smuggled into the country by U.S. citizens through ports of entry. Within the last year, Governor Newsom announced continued augmentation in staffing and enforcement of CalGuard’s illicit fentanyl operations. 

    Youth-focused efforts take a hit

    An estimated half of the 140 service members that are dedicated to CalGuard’s Youth and Community Programs Task Force, known as Task Force Torch, have also been impacted by Trump’s authoritarian orders. These programs help guide at-risk youth and promote community partnerships. 

    High-ranking U.S. military officials agree

    Retired four-star admirals and generals and former secretaries of the Army and Navy filed another amicus brief outlining the grave risks of Trump’s illegal takeover of the CalGuard. Recently, several veterans and veteran rights’ groups came together to decry Trump’s militarization of California. A recent report exposed that less than 20% of Trump’s federalized servicemembers are being utilized. 

    Hurting the state’s wildfire response capacity

    CalGuard’s critical firefighting crews – known as Task Force Rattlesnake – are operating at just 40% capacity. Eight of 14 teams have been diverted to Los Angeles as part of President Trump’s illegal – and highly inefficient – federalization of the Guard. Capacity has only worsened, reducing available crews from nine of 14 last week to just six now. 

    How we got here

    In 2024, Governor Newsom doubled down on the deployment of the CalGuard’s Counterdrug Task Force by more than doubling the number of service members supporting fentanyl interdiction, and seizing other drugs, at California ports of entry to nearly 400. Fentanyl is primarily smuggled into the country by U.S. citizens through ports of entry. 

    CalGuard’s coordinated drug interdiction efforts in the state are funded in part by California’s $60 million investment over four years to expand CalGuard’s work to prevent drug trafficking by transnational criminal organizations. This adds to the Governor’s efforts to address fentanyl within California, including by cracking down on fentanyl in communities across the state, including San Francisco.

    Recent news

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    News What you need to know: Despite the Newsom Administration’s efforts to increase groundwater and develop stronger partnerships with water agencies, California’s water system remains unprepared for the hotter and drier future. Without the successful completion of…

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) – Curtain-raiser Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina J. Mohammed, accompanied by Ambassador Héctor Gómez Hernández, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, and Ambassador Chola Milambo, the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations, briefed reporters today to preview the upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which will be taking place in Sevilla, Spain.

    Ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), UN deputy chief Amina J. Mohammed said that the Conference offers a chance to “change course, to catalyze investment, to address debt and sustainable development, to reform the rules of the system and to put people’s needs at the center.”

    The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), to take place in Sevilla, Spain, from 30 June to 3 July 2025, will bring together world leaders to advance solutions to financing challenges threatening the achievement of sustainable development. Governments, international organizations, financial institutions, businesses and civil society will come together to commit to financing our future through a renewed global framework for financing for development.

    Rising debt burdens, falling investment, and shrinking aid are among the financing challenges confronting the world today. With progress on the Sustainable Development Goals off track and rising systemic risks, including due to climate change and conflicts, the Conference provides a once-in-a-decade opportunity to mobilize finance at scale and reform the rules of the system to put people’s needs at the center.

    The Conference is expected to adopt the Compromiso de Sevilla, an intergovernmentally negotiated outcome, which was approved for adoption by consensus at the Fourth Preparatory Committee Meeting for FFD4 on 17 June.

    The Conference will mark the beginning of implementation of the outcome document, signaling a new phase of collective action on financing for development. Coalitions of countries and diverse stakeholders will announce ambitious commitments and concrete solutions under the Sevilla Platform for Action that will boost the renewed financing framework and setting out a turning point from dialogue to delivery.

    Related Link:
    4th International Conference on Financing for Development (30 June – 3 July 2025) – Website
    https://financing.desa.un.org/ffd4

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ATlnayBgbE

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI USA:  Sen. Scott Applauds Treasury’s Action to Crack Down on Illicit Actors Fueling Fentanyl Trade

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for South Carolina Tim Scott

    Treasury’s orders are a direct result of the authorities provided by the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, legislation led by Senator Scott to target the China-Mexico fentanyl supply chain.

    WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Tim Scott (R-S.C.), Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee Chairman, today applauded the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) for taking action against three Mexico-based financial institutions who have played a key role in money laundering in connection with the illicit fentanyl trade. Treasury’s orders are a direct result of the authorities provided by the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, legislation led by Senator Scott to target the China-Mexico fentanyl supply chain.

    “For too long, Americans across the country have fallen victim to the illicit actors that fuel the fentanyl trade, and it was clear we needed a different approach to help save American lives. That’s why I drafted and led legislation that was signed into law last year to target the financial assets of the criminal groups in China and Mexico poisoning our communities and profiting off the backs of Americans suffering from addiction. Treasury’s action today – thanks to the authorities provided by our bill – is yet another demonstration of President Trump’s commitment to keeping our communities safe,” said Senator Scott.

    BACKGROUND:

    Senator Scott wrote and introduced the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, which directs the Department of Treasury to use U.S. economic security tools to choke off the profits of the Chinese precursor manufacturers and the Mexican cartels that push fentanyl across the border. The bill was debated and unanimously passed out of the Senate Banking Committee on June 21, 2023, during the committee’s first legislative markup since 2019. Multiple national groups, including law enforcement associations and anti-opioid abuse organizations, also voiced support for the bill. 

    Senator Scott’s bill was signed into law as part of the national security supplemental package in April 2024.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protective equipment for motorcyclists and road safety – E-001776/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission shares the concern for the safety of riders of powered two-wheelers (PTW). This is a very vulnerable road user group, and the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, is promoting a range of initiatives to support PTW rider safety.

    In response to the questions:

    1. The Commission has no current plans for an EU proposal for the adoption of specific advanced protective equipment for PTWs, such as airbags.

    2. There are no EU-level funding streams to give specific financial support to the purchase of this equipment.

    3. The Commission promotes the safety of vulnerable road users through all available mechanisms, including the exchange of best practices through the High-Level Group on Road Safety[1] and the biannual EU Road Safety Conferences; a specific focus on vulnerable road users, and PTW safety in particular, for Member States participating in the EU Road Safety Exchange[2]; and highlighting successful initiatives to support PTW safety through the EU Road Safety Charter[3] and in the annual Excellence in Road Safety Awards[4].

    One recent winner of an Excellence in Road Safety Award, an initiative on the use of road markings to promote safe PTW driving in bends, has resulted in a 60% reduction in road trauma, and has been implemented in other Member States.

    The Commission would also emphasise that it recently adopted a proposal[5] to amend Directive 2014/45/EU[6] on periodic roadworthiness tests , where it proposed more stringent requirements by introducing mandatory inspections for motorcycles above 125 cm3.

    The Commission regularly collects the most recent research on topics related to the protection of vulnerable road users, PTW safety in particular, and makes it available to the public through the EU Road Safety Observatory[7].

    • [1] https://road-safety.transport.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/high-level-group-road-safety_en.
    • [2] https://etsc.eu/projects/eu-road-safety-exchange/.
    • [3] https://road-safety-charter.ec.europa.eu/.
    • [4] https://road-safety-charter.ec.europa.eu/content/excellence-road-safety-awards?page=0.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A180%3AFIN.
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/45/oj/eng.
    • [7] https://road-safety.transport.ec.europa.eu/european-road-safety-observatory/data-and-analysis/thematic-reports_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Promise of gender equality: another case of possible misuse of EU funding in Gaza – E-002605/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has a robust policy in place to monitor and evaluate projects and programmes implemented under its financial support. Independent final evaluations provide information on the results and impact reached and help to inform EU’s programming. They notably systematically include cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender.

    The specific support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) channelled through PEGASE mechanism[1] directly benefits thousands of civil servants and vulnerable families by contributing to the payment of salaries, pensions and social allowances. Selection of beneficiaries follows a strict safeguard mechanism through ex-ante and ex-post screening.

    Within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with Palestine[2] for the period 2014-2021, for a total amount of EUR 2.4 billion, the EU’s strategy has been aligned with the needs of the most vulnerable Palestinian populations and has played a key role in support to the PA to provide basic services to end beneficiaries.

    Gender equality is a cross-cutting issue within the five pillars of the European Joint Strategy in support to Palestine 2021-2024[3]. The Joint Strategy implementation report for 2022-2023[4] showed progress in improving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the PA gender transformative agenda, the fight against gender-based violence and the promotion of economic, labour and social rights.

    It noted challenges in achieving comprehensive gender equality, aggravated by the current conflict. The EU Gender Action Plan III for the period 2021-2025 is under implementation in Palestine[5].

    • [1] ‘Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-économique’ launched in 2008.
    • [2] * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/european-joint-strategy-support-palestine-2021-2024_en?s=206.
    • [4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EJS%20Implementation%20Report_2022%202023.pdf.
    • [5] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-gender-action-plan-iii-country-level-implementation-plan-west-bank-and-gaza-2021-2025_en?s=206.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024 – A10-0114/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025 – 2025/0138(BUD))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3], and in particular point 10 thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2024 on RESTORE – Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1057[8], and in particular the budgetary assessment attached to it,

     having regard to the EEA Report No 1/2024 – European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA)[9],

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0114/2025),

    A. whereas in September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Austrian authorities at EUR 1 711,6 million;

    B. whereas in September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Polish authorities at EUR 3,04 billion;

    C. whereas in September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck entire Czechia which led to flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Czech authorities at EUR 2,82 billion;

    D. whereas as of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions which led to the levels of the Danube and Morava rivers significantly rising resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Slovakian authorities at EUR 84,3 million;

    E. whereas in September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit several districts of Moldova resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Moldovan authorities at EUR 7,8 million;

    F. whereas in October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in several parts of the country resulting in total direct damages estimated by the authorities at EUR 841,85 million;

    G. whereas above mentioned occurrences caused by severe natural disasters are a result of global climate change; whereas the European State of the Climate 2024 confirms that 2024 was the warmest year ever recorded in Europe and that 30 % of the continent’s river network exceeded the “high” flood threshold while 12 % exceeded the “severe” threshold, resulting in the most widespread flooding since 2013;

    1. Expresses its deepest solidarity with all the victims, their families and all the individuals affected by the destructive floods in Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as with the national, regional and local authorities involved in the relief efforts;

    2. Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas, including with those in partner countries;

    3. Reiterates the importance of communicating to the public the tangible benefits brought about by the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), also to further increase citizens’ awareness of Union tools and programmes in the Member States and countries involved in accession negotiations with the Union;

    4. Highlights the increasing number of severe, destructive and deadly natural disasters in Europe and calls on Member States and the Commission to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation measures to avoid human and economic losses; underlines that in 2024 storms and flooding affected an estimated 413 000 people, resulting in the loss of at least 335 lives and that the damage from storms and flooding across Europe during the year is estimated to have cost at least EUR 18 billion[10]; considers that the budget of the EUSF or its equivalent should be substantially expanded in view of the upcoming Commission proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and subsequent inter-institutional negotiations and that the EUSF or its equivalent must provide assistance commensurate to the magnitude of such disasters to citizens; notes that substantially increasing the EUSF would allow Member States to respond more effectively and quickly to disasters while other instruments, particularly cohesion funds whose primary purpose is not disaster response, could be preserved; urges also the Commission to explore all possible avenues for accelerating the mobilisation of the EUSF, in particular by amending current rules and granting higher advance payments to applicant countries;

    5. Calls on the Commission to develop dedicated crisis-response instruments for the post-2027 period, recognising that the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, health emergencies, geopolitical instability, and economic shocks require more agile and tailored financial mechanisms at the Union level; underlines the need for enhanced coordination with national civil protection systems and early-warning mechanisms, ensuring a more integrated and data-driven Union-wide disaster response; emphasises the importance of dedicated support for cross-border and regional cooperation in preparedness, mitigation, and recovery efforts, particularly in vulnerable or high-risk areas;

    6. Stresses that the EUSF is only a curative instrument and that the Union should also continue to address climate change adaptation and mitigation by supporting European and national policies to prevent natural disasters; underlines that EEA Report No 1/2024 ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’ warned that the Union is unprepared for the effects of climate change even if the world manages to keep global temperature rise to 1,5 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, and stresses the need for action to avoid the climate risks identified reaching critical levels; recalls the need for effective synergies with other Union policies and programmes and underlines that Member States should make best use of funding opportunities in particular, of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the rural development programmes; calls on the Commission to assess with due urgency any reasoned requests by Member States to reallocate funds within the National Recovery and Resilience plans to natural disaster assistance, in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council[11]; stresses also the need for preventive measures, not only to mitigate future damage but also to prevent the exacerbation of risk conditions following catastrophic events, such as floods, wildfires, landslides or the drying up of lakes and rivers; emphasises that all reconstruction financed by the EUSF must be climate-resilient; underlines the importance of adequate flexibility between the different programmes; underscores that assistance provided under the EUSF should not be to the detriment of Union funding received by Member States under other Union policies or programmes; recalls that Member States can grant State aid, in accordance with the applicable Union rules, notably for agricultural businesses that have suffered damages due to natural disasters;

    7. Recalls that RESTORE[12] and the specific measures under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)[13] provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural disasters through further flexibilities in the use of the funds; stresses that Member States should make use of the new opportunities; underlines also that RESTORE provided limited flexibility for some Member States as the implementation of the current Multiannual Financial Framework is very advanced;

    8. Recalls the importance of rapid and solid damage assessment that takes due account of the economic repercussions and calls for increased operational efforts to be made in order to reduce the average time for the release of advanced payments to offer timely assistance to regions affected by natural disasters and extreme weather events, while ensuring the Union budget is protected; stresses that Member States should, in the context of disaster response and recovery measures, give due priority to the needs of the affected population, with particular attention to vulnerable groups;

    9. Stresses the urgent need to release immediate financial assistance through the EUSF to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner;

    10. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;

    11. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

    12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.

     

     

    ANNEX: DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[14], and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[15], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

    Having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16], and in particular point 10 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Whereas:

    (1) The European Union Solidarity Fund (‘the Fund’) aims to enable the Union to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to emergency situations in order to show solidarity with the population of regions struck by major or regional natural disasters or major public health emergency.

    (2) The Fund is not to exceed the ceilings laid down in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2020/2093, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765[17].

    (3) On 29 November 2024, Austria submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (4) On 29 November 2024, Poland submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (5) On 4 December 2024, Czechia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (6) On 7 December 2024, Slovakia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (7) On 5 December 2024, Moldova submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (8) On 27 December 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in October 2024.

    (9) Those applications meet the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the Fund, as laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    (10) The Fund should therefore be mobilised to provide a financial contribution to Austria, Poland,  Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    (11) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the Fund, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    For the general budget of the Union for the financial year 2025, the European Union Solidarity Fund shall be mobilised as follows in commitment and payment appropriations in relation to natural disasters:

    (a) the amount of EUR  42 789 075 shall be provided to Austria in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (b) the amount of EUR 75 998 939 shall be provided to Poland in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (c) the amount of EUR 113 979 781 shall be provided to Czechia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (d) the amount of EUR 2 108 187 shall be provided to  Slovakia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (e) the amount of EUR 195 196 shall be provided to Moldova in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (f) the amount of EUR 45 669 725 shall be provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to floods in October 2024.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    It shall apply from [the date of its adoption][*].

     

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President  The President

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Commission proposes to mobilise the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 (EUSF regulation) for an amount of EUR 280 740 903 to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the natural disaster (floods) that took place in 2024.

     

    Austria – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 16 September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding. Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Vienna were particularly affected. In some parts of Lower Austria, 300-420 mm of rain fell in five days. The entire province of Lower Austria was declared a disaster area. Protective measures had to be put in place along the Danube River. In Lower Austria, nearly 2 000 houses had to be evacuated, thousands of households were without electricity, drinking water and sewerage for days. The floods led to five fatalities and 24 people were injured in Lower Austria.

     

    Austria estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 1 711.6 million. This amount represents 0.38% of Austria’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Austria is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Poland – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 11 and 16 September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers. The most impacted provinces were the Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces. Subsequently, nearly 10 600 residential and more than 2 000 farm buildings were flooded. Over 200 000 people were directly affected by the disaster. Numerous businesses were forced to temporarily suspend or significantly reduce their operations which led to significant financial losses.

     

    The Polish authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 3.04 billion. According the EUSF regulation, where the natural disaster concerns several regions at NUTS level 2, the threshold shall be applied to the average GDP of those regions weighted according to the share of total damage in each region. The direct damage expressed as a percentage of total weighted regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces is 8.46%. This amount exceeds 1.5% of the weighted average regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces.

     

    Czechia – major natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 17 September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck the entire country which led to flooding. The most affected regions were the Moravian-Silesian and the Olomouc Region. Dozens of houses and approximately 1 000 road and railway bridges and 2 000 km of roads and railway lines were destroyed, or damaged. More than 350 schools were flooded. Over 250 000 households were left without electricity, heat and drinking water. As a result, over 13 000 people, as well as several hospitals had to be evacuated. The floods also led to eight fatalities.

     

    The Czech authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 2.82 billion. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Czechia of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 1.58 billion in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Slovakia – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    As of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions. Both the Danube and Morava rivers saw significant water level rises, with return periods exceeding 100 years in some locations. Cumulative rainfall reached up to 400 mm in the Záhorie region, exacerbating the impact. The most significant damage was attributed to smaller rivers, where levee breaches were reported, amplifying the flooding and leading to destruction in both rural and urban areas. Roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure were severely affected, straining emergency response efforts.

     

    Slovakia estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 84.3 million. This amount represents 0.07% of Slovakia’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Slovakia is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Moldova – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 14 and 16 September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit the Cantemir, Hincesti, Leova, Straseni, Floresti and Telenesti districts of Moldova. Over 200 000 people were affected by the disaster. The floods destroyed or damaged 20 bridges, 8 educational institutions and several public buildings. Dozens of houses and cellars were flooded and over 60 people needed to be rescued.

     

    The Moldovan authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 7.8 million. The Moldovan authorities submitted the application under the “regional natural disaster” criterion as laid down in Article 2(3) of the EUSF Regulation, which is any natural disaster in a region at NUTS level 2 of an eligible State resulting in direct damage exceeding 1.5% of that region’s gross domestic product (GDP).

     

    Bosnia and Herzegovina – major natural disaster: floods in October 2024

     

    Between 3 and 17 October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall, which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in the central, southern and western parts of the country. Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Zenica-Doboj and Canton 10 were the most affected cantons. In addition to power outages lasting several days and disruptions to landline and mobile phone services, there was also a complete disruption to road and rail transport. This caused severe physical and financial damage to residential and commercial buildings, as well as to the transport, water and sewage system. The floods led to 27 fatalities and 22 people were injured. Many families were forced to leave their homes and were accommodated in temporary shelters.

     

    The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 841.85 million. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Bosnia and Herzegovina of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 138.33 million in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Conclusion

     

    The methodology for calculating the aid was set out in the 2002-2003 Annual Report on the EUSF and accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commision therefore proposes to the budget authority to mobilise the following amounts for the applications submitted by Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina:

     

    Disaster

    Total direct damage (EUR)

    Applied disaster threshold

    (EUR)

    2,5% of total direct damage (up to the threshold for major diasters) (EUR)

    6% of direct damage above the major disaster threshold (EUR)

    2.5% of total direct damage

    Total amount of aid proposed (EUR)

    Advance paid

    (EUR)

    Balance to be paid

    (EUR)

    Austria-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    1 711 563 002

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    42 789 075

    42 789 075

    10 663 587

     

    32 125 488

    Poland-floods

    (regional disaster)

    3 039 957 574

    538 909 893

    N/A

    N/A

    75 998 939

    75 998 939

    N/A

     

    75 998 939

    Czechia

    (major disaster)

    2 821 143 019

    1 579 680 000

    39 492 000

    74 487 781

    N/A

    113 979 781

    N/A

     

    113 979 781

    Slovakia-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    84 327 482

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    2 108 187

    2 108 187

    N/A

     

    2 108 187

    Moldova-floods

    (regional disaster)

    7 807 840

    226 331

    N/A

    N/A

    195 196

    195 196

    N/A

     

    195 196

    Bosnia and Herzegovia-floods

    (major disaster)

    841 851 670

    138 325 000

    3 458 125

    42 211 600

    N/A

    45 669 725

    N/A

     

    45 669 725

    TOTAL

    280 740 903

    10 663 587

    270 077 316

     

     

    Council Regulation 2024/765[18] of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 split the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) in two separate instruments: the European Solidarity Reserve and the Emergency Aid Reserve. The European Solidarity Reserve with an annual amount of EUR 1 016 million (in 2018 prices, corresponding to EUR 1 167.1 million in 2025 prices) will be used for assistance to respond to emergency situations covered by the EUSF.

    In order to avoid an early depletion of the annual allocation, Article 3(7) of the EUSF Regulation and Article 9(2), second subparagraph, of the amended MFF Regulation stipulate  that 25% of the annual EUSF allocation (i.e. EUR 291.8 million for 2025) shall remain available on 1 October of each year.

    Finally, according to the Article 4a(4) of the EUSF Regulation, the amount of EUR 50 000 000 has been already inscribed in the EU general budget 2025 (in commitments and payments appropriations) for the payment of possible advances.

    Therefore, the maximum amount that can be used by the EUSF at this stage is EUR 908,95 million (excluding the reserve for advances and the amound that will become available on 1 October). After this mobilisation EUR 980,64 million will remain available for upcoing mobilisastions.

     

    Amount available under the EUSF in 2025 (EUR):

     

    Total annual 2025 EUSF allocation (incl. 1 October tranche)

    1 167 064 638

    Amount carried over from 2024 (incl. unused advances) (+)

    194 316 161

    Credits reserved for advance payments (-)

    50 000 000

    Amount already used for advances to Spain and Austria (-)

    110 663 587

    Amount available only after 1 October (-)

    291 766 160

    Total amount currenty available (excl. reserve for advances and 1 October tranche)

    908 951 052

    Amount proposed for mobilisation under current  Mobilisation Decision (only balance to be paid)

    270 077 316

    Remaining amount for future applications (inc. for advances and 1 October tranche)

    980 639 896

     

     

    The Rapporteur recommends the swift approval of the Commission proposal for a decision annexed to this report, leading to the rapid mobilisation of the aforementioned amounts, as a sign of European solidarity with Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rapporteur calls on the Commission that this financial contribution should be delivered with particular urgency.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: UConn Adopts New Budget with Strategic Adjustments to Address Funding Shortfalls

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    UConn has adopted a 2025-26 budget that maintains excellence in its academic, research, and health care enterprises while addressing serious fiscal challenges resulting from state funding shortfalls and steep reductions in federal research awards.

    The budget increases UConn’s enrollment to bolster revenue; draws from one-time fund balances in accounts throughout the institution; and enacts stringent deficit mitigation plans at UConn Storrs, UConn Health, and the regional campuses.

    UConn’s Board of Trustees adopted the budget at its meeting on Wednesday, June 25, and it goes into effect July 1.

    UConn faces operating budget shortfalls in the upcoming fiscal year of $72 million for the Storrs and regional campuses and $61.8 million for UConn Health, for a combined total of $134 million.

    UConn has also lost $95 million in reduced, slowed, and terminated federal research awards under new policies enacted nationwide since January, and there are no indicators that the funding will rebound in the near future.

    As FY26 progresses, the state Office of Policy and Management (OPM) also could reduce UConn’s appropriations to balance the state budget if needed. With so many revenue sources in flux, UConn expects to continually pivot to adjust to new developments.

    “We’re going to have to forecast and reforecast every month as these changes take place and as we continue to move forward. It’s going to be very fluid,” Jeffrey Geoghegan, UConn’s CFO and executive vice president for finance, told members of the Board of Trustees’ Financial Affairs Committee on Tuesday, June 24.

    That committee reviewed and endorsed the budget proposal and passed it on to the full board for a vote.

    UConn plans to mitigate about $38 million and UConn Health plans to mitigate about $62 million of the FY26 funding losses through several actions, including optimizing and reducing personnel. That will occur through a variety of approaches, including restricting most hiring and reviewing non-permanent and temporary positions as an initial step.

    The University will also review overtime and compensatory time; encourage voluntary schedule reductions where feasible and appropriate; consolidate some office functions; and restrict employee travel, events, and other activities.

    Wherever possible, the University will work to grow its revenue streams as well. Units have been directed to fully utilize unspent balances they hold from UConn Foundation funds. Also, the University will work to identify potential opportunities for new revenue, including continuing to grow patient care revenue at UConn Health.

    “UConn Health is committed to making the difficult decisions necessary to mitigate the reduction in funding, while at the same time continuing its position as one of the highest quality, best patient experience, and fastest growing health systems in Connecticut,” says Dr. Andrew Agwunobi, UConn Health’s CEO and executive vice president of health affairs.

    The overall FY26 operating budget totals $3.6 billion, split roughly equally between UConn Health and the UConn Storrs/regional campuses operations.

    The state’s annual block grant to the University comprised one-quarter of the University’s revenue as recently as FY19 but has been steadily decreasing. In the coming year, that number has fallen to 12% (15% at UConn and 8% at UConn Health). The state allocation covers 23% of UConn’s personnel costs; the rest is borne by the University through revenue it generates.

    At UConn Health, the largest source of income in FY26 is clinical care at 72.5%. At UConn’s Storrs and regional campuses, the largest source of income in FY26 is student tuition and fees at 57%.

    UConn already had committed to leaving its tuition rates flat in FY26 before the new state allocation numbers were determined and does not intend to reverse that decision. Separately, fees that pay for housing, dining, and various student services will increase modestly to pay for those enterprises.

    The cost-cutting initiatives, efforts to identify new revenue sources, increasing enrollment from higher-paying out-of-state and international students, and other measures will all be critical in the coming budget year, UConn officials say.

    The University will also examine every individual account in which unspent funds have been held as part of UConn’s overall reserves and, where possible and appropriate, will consolidate them to use as one-time spending to help fill gaps.

    “These dollars are not held in a central pool, but are in hundreds of accounts and budget lines throughout the institution that are used to fund our operations, meet upcoming needs, maintain our bond rating, and invest in the future of our university,” wrote President Radenka Maric, Provost Anne D’Alleva, and Vice President for Research Pamir Alpay in a message to the community on June 23.

    “Much of these funds are already committed for specific purposes. Using these funds to close short-term deficits will create new financial problems that didn’t exist previously and new unmet needs throughout the institution,” they wrote.

    “And if these one-time funds become exhausted, they do not automatically replenish, and structural deficits will remain. Despite the very real challenges and hardships this will cause, our current financial picture does not leave us with a reasonable alternative.”

    With the FY27 projected deficits even higher than those in FY26, UConn officials say efforts to reduce costs and increase revenue will be needed moving forward while the institution continues to prioritize student success, academic strength, and research impact.

    “Please know that we are not alone in having to make these difficult decisions. Every large research university across the nation is being forced to take similar steps,” Maric, D’Alleva, and Alpay added in their message.

    Overall, Maric says, UConn will continue to focus over the next three to five years on core operational priorities: continuous improvement and effectiveness, improving the enrollment outlook, increasing the academic and research profile, supporting a championship culture and competitiveness in UConn Athletics; and advancing fundraising and engagement efforts at the UConn Foundation.

    “In this and everything we do, we will ask ourselves: Is this helping our graduation rate? Is this supporting student success?” Maric said Tuesday.

    UConn has had a long-standing commitment to providing student financial aid as part of that work and set aside 16.5% of its tuition-generated revenue for those uses – voluntarily higher than the 15% minimum established by the state.

    In the coming fiscal year, UConn will increase institutionally funded financial aid by 10.6% as part of its work to attract and retain students, of whom 85% receive at least one form of financial aid.

    In addition to approving the operating budget, the Board of Trustees also adopted the capital improvement budgets for UConn Storrs / regionals and UConn Health for FY26.

    Those allocations are limited to specific building and infrastructure projects and cannot be shifted to help allay the pressures on the operating fund.

    At the Storrs and regional campuses, the $175 million capital budget for FY26 will fund a variety of projects that include a major renovation of Gampel Pavilion; a portion of the cost of construction of a new nursing building; improvements in various residence halls; and other critical deferred maintenance and infrastructure repair projects.

    The UConn capital budget consists of $128 million in bond funds for projects under the UCONN 2000 program; $8 million of state general obligation bond proceeds; and $39 million from student fees collected to support infrastructure maintenance and residential life facility improvements.

    At UConn Health, the $58.4 million capital budget for FY26 is funded through $28 million in state general obligation bond funds and $30.4 million generated by UConn Health, which has more than doubled its clinical care revenue over the past 10 years.

    Like at UConn Storrs and regional campuses, the capital funds will be directed to UConn Health’s critical deferred maintenance and infrastructure repair projects as well as improvements to clinical spaces that enable revenue growth.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Funding of Animal Rebellion – E-001574/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is not aware of any EU funding to the Animal rebellion group under its current name PLANT BASED CAMPAIGNS LTD[1].

    A person or entity may be excluded from participating in award procedures or from implementing Union funds if they meet any of the situations outlined in Article 138 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[2].

    This regulation provides grounds for exclusion including grave professional misconduct by inciting discrimination, hatred or violence against individuals or groups that are engaging in activities that are contrary to the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union[3].

    • [1] https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/12064173.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509.
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M002.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Making the French solidarity grocery store model more sustainable and widespread under the ESF+, and possibilities for European harmonisation – E-001892/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    With an allocated amount of EUR 5.3 billion for material support, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) is, in continuation to the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), the only instrument to target exclusively the most disadvantaged in the EU.

    According to Article 21 of the ESF+ Regulation[1], the food and/or basic material assistance shall be distributed free of charge to the most deprived persons. In case that paid-for products are distributed in the same place as the ESF+ support, those will have to be financed through different resources.

    In practice, the organisations delivering food support combine ESF+ support with national and private financing, including food donations, in order to ensure a wider coverage for the most deprived.

    The ESF+ Community of Practice for Material Support[2] explores and promotes innovative practices in delivering material support, in line with the regulatory framework for addressing material deprivation with ESF+ programmes.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council
      of 24 June 2021establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj/eng.
    • [2] https://www.socialinnovationplus.eu/cop/material-support/.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU cooperation with OCCRP in the context of USAID termination – E-002383/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002383/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petr Bystron (ESN)

    The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is an influential globalist propaganda network, established in 2007, which maintains close ties with the United States and in the past received substantial funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). According to investigative reports, between 2014 and 2023, OCCRP received approximately USD 1.1 million from the EU, in addition to funding from several individual European countries. This non-transparent and politically biased organisation uses the so-called ‘fight against corruption’ as a pretext for undermining democratic principles and discrediting critical views on various issues such as the war in Ukraine, US foreign policy or the actions of the Commission.

    Therefore, we would like to ask the Commission:

    • 1.How much funding has the Commission and its agencies provided to the OCCRP annually since 2020?
    • 2.How does the Commission justify its partnership with a foreign-funded, politically biased organisation that undermines democratic debate under the pretext of anti-corruption efforts?
    • 3.When does the Commission intend to terminate its cooperation with or financial support of OCCRP in light of the recent termination of USAID funding by US President Donald Trump?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026 – A10-0113/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    (COM(2025)0304 – C10‑0110/2025 – 2025/0158(NLE))

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2025)0304),

     having regard to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0110/2025),

      having regard to the Commission Convergence Report 2025 and the European Central Bank Convergence Report of June 2025,

     having regard to Rule 108 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0113/2025),

    1. Approves the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4. Instructs its President to forward Parliament’s position to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup and the governments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Bulgaria joining the euro area sends a strong political and economic signal of confidence in the enduring viability and appeal of the European Union’s single currency. More than two decades after the euro’s introduction, Bulgaria’s readiness to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026 reaffirms the Union’s cohesion and the euro’s role as a global symbol of stability and unity. Bulgaria has achieved substantial progress towards full economic convergence, making it well-positioned to become the twenty-first member of the euro area.

    Bulgaria introduced its currency board framework on 1 July 1997, pegging the Bulgarian lev to the German mark and subsequently to the euro. Since its EU accession in 2007, Bulgaria has held the status of a “Member State with a derogation,” subject to regular convergence assessments by the European Commission and the European Central Bank.

    At the European Parliament level, the Euro Accession Countries Working Group was established by a decision of the ECON Coordinators on 18 November 2019. It remained active throughout the entire 9th legislative term, scrutinising Bulgaria’s readiness to join the euro area and holding four dedicated sessions with experts, as well as Bulgarian Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Finance. 

    On 25 February 2025, Bulgaria submitted a request for a convergence assessment. The ECB and Commission reports of 4 June 2025 include an examination of the compatibility between Bulgaria’s national legislation, notably the statute of its national central bank, with Articles 130 and 131 of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. The reports also examine whether a high degree of sustainable convergence has been achieved, by reference to the fulfilment of the convergence criteria, and take account of several other factors required under the final sub-paragraph of Article 140(1) of the Treaty.

    Based on its own convergence report and that of the ECB, the Commission proposed that Bulgaria adopt the euro as of 1 January 2026. In accordance with Article 140(2) TFEU, the Council shall decide, by qualified majority and on a proposal from the Commission, which Member States with a derogation meet the necessary conditions for adopting the euro, as defined in Article 140(1) TFEU. This decision is to be made following consultation with the European Parliament and on the basis of the Commission and ECB reports. The Parliament is thus consulted on the legislative proposal for a Council decision to allow Bulgaria to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026.

    On the Convergence Criteria under Article 140(1) of the TFEU, the Rapporteur observes:

    1. Compatibility of National Legislation with Articles 130 and 131 TFEU and the Statutes of the ECB

    Bulgaria’s national legislation, including the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, is fully aligned with EU requirements. The law guarantees the independence of the national central bank and of the members of its decision-making bodies, the prohibition of monetary financing and privileged access, and ensures compliance with the objectives of the ESCB as formulated in Article 127 of the Treaty.

    2. Achievement of a High Degree of Price Stability

    Over the 12 months to April 2025, Bulgaria recorded an average inflation rate of 2.7%, below the reference value of 2.8%. An analysis of a broad set of indicators reveals no concerns regarding the sustainability of price stability. The reference value is calculated as the average inflation rate of the three best-performing EU Member States in terms of price stability, plus 1.5 percentage points. For the period from May 2024 to April 2025, the reference value of 2.8% is based on the inflation rates of Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%), and Italy (1.4%). No Member States were considered statistical outliers in this calculation, as none showed inflation deviations significantly above the euro area average due to country-specific factors.

    3. Sustainability of the Government Financial Position

    Bulgaria is currently not subject to a Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Its general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value, and its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value since 2007. 

    4. Compliance with the Normal Fluctuation Margins of the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at least the past 2 years

    The Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate. Bulgaria has fulfilled nearly all of its post-entry commitments under ERM II. Further efforts are needed related to anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures.

    5. Durability of Convergence, as Reflected in Long-Term Interest Rate Levels

    In the twelve months ending April 2025, Bulgaria’s average long-term interest rate was 3.9%, well below the reference value of 5.1%. The reference value for April 2025 is calculated as the simple average of the average long-term interest rates in Ireland (2.8%), Finland (2.9%) and Italy (3.7%) plus 2 percentage points, yielding a reference value of 5.1%.

    6. Economic Integration and Convergence (Article 140(1), Second Subparagraph TFEU) 

    In accordance with Article 140 TFEU, the Commission’s assessment must also consider additional factors relevant to economic integration and convergence, as these provide insight into a Member State’s capacity to join the euro area without significant difficulties. These include developments in the balance of payments and product, labour, and financial market integration.

    In this context, Bulgaria’s external position has improved, with its combined current and capital account close to balance in 2024. The country is well integrated with the euro area through trade and investment, benefiting from increased banking and financial integration and access to the broader euro area market. Bulgaria continues to make progress but further actions are needed to address the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and regulatory quality. 

    While the financial sector is small and bank-dominated, it is well embedded in the euro area, supported by Bulgaria’s participation in the banking union since 2020. Market-based financing remains underdeveloped, but potential financial stability risks are being mitigated by the Bulgarian National Bank’s conservative macroprudential policy and the robustness of the banking system. The Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report found no need for an in-depth imbalance review, but emphasized the importance of closely monitoring developments in competitiveness, the housing market, and credit growth.

    Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), supported by €5.7 billion in EU grants (2021–2026), targets structural reforms, competitiveness, and reducing regional disparities. A revised RRP was submitted in April 2025 to accelerate implementation, especially in decarbonisation, governance, and business environment. Cohesion policy funds (€10.7 billion for 2021–2027) further support competitiveness, the green transition, social inclusion, and education, with implementation progressing overall, despite some remaining challenges.

    7. Note regarding Consultation of the European Parliament

    In accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure, when Parliament is consulted pursuant to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the committee responsible shall submit a report to Parliament advocating approval or rejection of the proposed act on the basis of which Parliament shall deliberate. Parliament shall take a single vote on the proposed act, to which no amendments may be tabled, which shall apply also to the vote in committee. On 19 March 2025, ECON Coordinators agreed the file to be treated swiftly with plenary vote in July and to allocate the rapporteurship on this file as soon as possible.

    Based on the above, the Rapporteur recommends that the derogation be lifted and Bulgaria adopts the euro on 1 January 2026.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

     

    Entity and/or person

    Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification

    Minister of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union

    Chair of the Committee on Budget and Finance in the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Association of Banks in Bulgaria

    Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank

    Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Bulgarian Commission for Consumer Protection

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    MEP Rada Laykova

    Minority position under Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    The supposed job of the EP is to scrutinize the Commission´s assessment on behalf of the people, as they will pay the price of the ignored Maastricht criteria – mathematical rules to ensure no Ponzi scheme happens to the Euro.

    However, what did it do?

     Ignore incoherence between findings within the Commission report and its final assessment, which strongly suggests a political decision that ignores Maastricht criteria and math to the detriment of the people;

     ignore the suspicious Bulgarian budget data sent to the Commission with absurd income projections and concealed expenses;

     ignore the suppressed referendum in Bulgaria;

     replace the scrutiny by a gleeful statement cheerleading Bulgaria´s boarding of the “Eurotanic”, ignoring the obvious state of the Euro, which shows several classic terminal signs of a flat currency. A short statement like “shared sorrow is half sorrow” would have been more honest.

    The lack of diligence might have serious and far-reaching consequences for the people in the Eurozone or Bulgaria as it recreates certain aspects of Greece´s accession into the Euro.

    Here, the EU´s “democracy in action” was “democracy in name only” and the people will pay the price, as evidenced in the past.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

    (2024/2053(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

     having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

     having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

     having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank[1],

     having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

     having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

     having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

     having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

     having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

     having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

     having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

     having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

     having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

     having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

     having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

     having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

     having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform[8],

     having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[9],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU  policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

    B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

    C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

    D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

    E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

    F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

    G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

    H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

    I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

    J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed[10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

    K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade[11];

    L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

    M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

    N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

    O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

    General remarks

    1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

    2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

    3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

    4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

    5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

    6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

    7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

    8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

    9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

    12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

    13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

    14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

    15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

    16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

    17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

    18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

    19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

    Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

    20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria[13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

    21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

    22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

    23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

    24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

    25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

    26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation[15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

    27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

    Financing peace, security and defence

    28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for  2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

    29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation[16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

    31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

    32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

    33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

    34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

    Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

    35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

    36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

    37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

    38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

    39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

    40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

    41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

    42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

    Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

    44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

    45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

    46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative[17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

    47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

    48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

    49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

    50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

    EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

    51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

    52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

    53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

    54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

    55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

    57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

    58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

    59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

    60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

    Governance: accountability and transparency

    61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

    62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

    63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

    65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

    66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

    67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

    68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

    °

    ° °

    69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

     having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

     having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

     having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

     having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

     having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

     having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

     having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

     having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

     having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

     having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

     having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

    °

    ° °

    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark – A10-0099/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision (14652/2024),

     having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, of the other part (2025-2030) (14781/24),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0227/2024),

     having regard to its non-legislative resolution of …[1] on the draft decision,

     having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4) and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0099/2025),

    1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

    2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the one part, and of Greenland and Denmark, of the other part.

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

     

    At the end of 2024, Greenland and the European Union signed a new Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) (2025-2030). This is a mixed agreement that allows the European Union’s vessels to fish species such as cod, Greenland halibut, redfish and Northern prawn. In return, the European Union pays a financial contribution of EUR 17 296 857 per annum, comprising EUR 14 096 857 for access rights and EUR 3 200 000 for support and implementation of Greenland’s fisheries policy, plus the fees paid by vessel owners. In recent years, the fisheries agreement has allowed around 10 of the European Union’s vessels to operate in the autonomous territory’s waters. The new Protocol provides details of the rules and provisions governing this access.

     

    Fisheries in Greenland

     

    The fisheries sector is of central importance for Greenland in socio-economic and cultural terms. It accounts for 15% of the territory’s jobs and over 90% of its exports. Inshore fishing mainly involves small boats (dinghies), and sustains a local economy and jobs. Many remote Inuit communities rely on subsistence fishing. The territory also has a developed offshore fishing fleet and has fisheries agreements in force that allow foreign vessels to fish in the offshore area. Greenland’s fisheries are suffering the effects of climate change on a vulnerable Arctic marine environment, with particular impacts on the species caught. Greenland has put measures in place to limit the impact of fisheries on the marine environment; these include a ban on discards, a plan for the management of bycatch, etc.

     

    New Protocol implementing the SFPA

     

    The new Protocol that has been signed has a term of six years, providing stability and visibility for stakeholders. It contains provisions aimed at providing a framework for access to waters by European vessels and cooperation with Greenland: fishing opportunities, bycatch, scientific cooperation, monitoring, controls, surveillance, fishing areas, observers etc.

     

    A specific characteristic of the agreement is that catches are regulated on the basis of fishing opportunities that are set annually. Your rapporteur is concerned about the fact that, according to the ex-post evaluation, the TACs for several of the targeted species exceed the limits set on the basis of scientific advice. These proven cases of overfishing, or of uncertainty owing to a lack of data, pose a threat to fish populations and the sustainability of fisheries, as in the case of the Northern prawn. Several indicative fishing opportunities have been reduced. The second noteworthy point is linked to the need for additional data regarding the targeted species and marine ecosystems.

     

    The programming of sectoral support will be adopted in the three months following the application of the Protocol. The sectoral support allocated in recent years has made it possible to support research and scientific assessments, the administration of Greenland’s fisheries, controls and also small-scale coastal fisheries. This is assessed positively in the evaluation of the last Protocol.

     

    Conclusions and recommendations 

     

    In the context of current diplomatic tensions with the United States and the climate crisis in the Arctic, your rapporteur recalls the importance of the SFPA and relations between Greenland and the European Union in the area of fisheries. Through its sectoral support, the fisheries agreement offers assistance that is welcomed by the authorities and a number of civil society actors in Greenland. Positive developments include the increase in the financial contribution paid by the European Union, in the amount of sectoral support and in the fees paid by vessel owners.

     

    Your rapporteur invites the European Union to provide increased support to coastal fishing communities, with respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples and the FAO’s Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. It is advisable to ensure that these peoples, as well as NGOs, are involved in the agreement. Another positive development is the European Union’s support in areas such as controls, the fight against IUU fishing, the collection of data and scientific research.

    Your rapporteur underlines the environmental challenges associated with the agreement. As already requested by Parliament in 2021, it is essential to continue efforts in relation to data collection and the fight against overfishing, by following the scientific advice for setting TACs in Greenland and allocating annual fishing opportunities to the European Union. Even though it fishes smaller quantities, the European Union must follow the precautionary principle. The definition of the surplus is controversial in certain cases. The fishing carried out by the European Union’s vessels furthermore has an impact on seabed ecosystems and the emphasis must be on identifying and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, with the sector’s help.

     

    Finally, your rapporteur asks for this fisheries agreement to be repositioned in the context of regional fisheries governance. Quota exchanges mean that post-Brexit relations with coastal countries, including Norway, are closely linked to the agreement. The European Union and Greenland must strengthen cooperation and transparency within the RFMOs and the agreements between coastal states. More broadly, the European Union must do more to protect species and the marine environment in the Arctic.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

    Entity and/or person

    Delegation of France to the European Union

    Delegation of Germany to the European Union

    Delegation of Denmark to the European Union

    Greenland Ministry of Fisheries

    Oceana

    Europêche

    DG MARE (Commission)

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Fisheries

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand

    (COM(2024)0479 – C10‑0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    A. whereas the previous 4-year Implementing Protocol to the Agreement will expire on 21 April 2025;

    B. whereas the financial contribution for the entire duration of the new Implementing Protocol is EUR 103 781 000, based on:

    (a) an annual amount for access to fishery resources for the categories provided for in the Protocol, set at EUR 14 096 857 for the duration of the Protocol;

    (b) support for the development of Greenland’s sectoral fisheries policy amounting to EUR 3 200 000 per year for the duration of the Protocol;

    C. whereas the implementation of the Protocol requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:

    DG MARE

     

    Year
    N

    Year
    N+1

    Year
    N+2

    Year
    N+3

    Year
    N+4

    Year
    N+5

    TOTAL

    Operational appropriations

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Budget line 08 05 01

    Commitments

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    103.781

    Payments

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    17.296

    103.781

    EUR million (to three decimal places)

    D. whereas on 21 November 2024, Parliament approved DEC 15/2024 submitted by the Commission on 25 October 2024, which makes available the necessary appropriations on operational line 08 05 01 to honour the 2024 financial obligations resulting from the new Implementing Protocol;

    E. whereas the Protocol with Greenland and Denmark was signed and entered into provisional application on 12 December 2024;

    1. Notes that the support allocated to the Protocol should meet the objectives of enabling Union vessels to fish in Greenland’s fishing zone, enabling the Union and Greenland to work closely together to further promote the development of a sustainable fisheries policy and the responsible exploitation of fishery resources in Greenland’s fishing zone, and ensuring that the Union and Greenland cooperate to contribute to decent working conditions in the fisheries sector; considers that there should be thorough scrutiny to ensure that the support meets those objectives effectively during the implementation of the Protocol;

    2. Recommends that, for future agreements, an impact assessment of the added value and socio-economic benefits derived from the previous agreement be taken into account; considers that this assessment should guide the negotiation and renewal of subsequent agreements to ensure that they align with the objectives of sustainable development and efficient use of the Union’s financial resources;

    3. Notes that the transfer of appropriations for an amount of EUR 16 992 434 in commitment appropriations, as submitted by the Commission in DEC 15/2024, was approved by the budgetary authority in the time limit provided for in the Financial Regulation; regrets that the decision on this budgetary matter is disconnected from, and had to be taken prior to, the decision on the consent to be given by Parliament to the new Implementing Protocol; underlines that decisions on the agreement itself and related budgetary matters are inextricably linked, and fears, therefore, that the disconnect risks de facto pre-empting the decision on consent and creating a fait accompli;

    4. Calls on the Commission to explain the need for the provisional application of the Implementing Protocol in question, since the existing Implementing Protocol remains in force until April 2025, thus allowing time for the agreement to be finalised without any risk of a gap; calls on the Commission to provide further information about the budgetary implications of the provisional application of the new Implementing Protocol as of 12 December 2024, given the fact that the current Implementing Protocol is still in force;

    5. Takes note that DEC 15/2024 does not include any transfer of payment appropriations to the operational line for 2024 on the basis that, according to the Commission, the first access payment linked to this Implementing Protocol will be due by 30 June 2025; asks the Commission to clarify the lack of synchronisation between commitment and payment appropriations;

    6. Notes that the 2025 budget as voted on in plenary on 27 November 2024 includes amounts of EUR 150 560 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 135 300 000 in payment appropriations on line 08 05 01, as well as amounts of EUR 59 970 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 41 620 000 in payment appropriations for fishing activities on reserve line 30 02 02; regrets that the amounts are cumulative and not broken down by fisheries agreements, thus making it difficult for Parliament to scrutinise budget implementation in this field;

    7. Stresses that the financial programming of line 08 05 01 needs to be sufficient to cater for the financial obligations in the years 2026-2027 subject to the decision of the budgetary authority in the annual budgetary procedures; calls for scrutiny regarding the financial programming of line 08 05 01 in the annual budgets of 2026 and 2027;

    8. Concludes that the Committee on Budgets is in a position to advise the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to recommend approval of the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    References

    14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)

    Committee(s) responsible

    PECH

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    10.2.2025

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

    12.12.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    23

    0

    5

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Lucia Yar

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    23

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Bogdan Rzońca

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Hildegard Bentele, Andrzej Halicki, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Fabienne Keller, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Giuseppe Lupo, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino

     

     

    5

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    PfE

    Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

    References

    14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)

    Date of consultation or request for consent

    18.12.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    PECH

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    10.2.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Emma Fourreau

    18.12.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    27.1.2025

    18.3.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.5.2025

     

     

     

    Budgetary assessment

     Date of budgetary assessment

    BUDG

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    24

    1

    2

    Members present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ton Diepeveen, Siegbert Frank Droese, Emma Fourreau, Nicolás González Casares, France Jamet, Nora Junco García, Isabelle Le Callennec, Isabella Lövin, Giuseppe Lupo, Giuseppe Milazzo, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, André Rodrigues, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Sander Smit, António Tânger Corrêa, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Sebastian Everding, Marco Falcone, Karin Karlsbro, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hélder Sousa Silva

    Date tabled

    28.5.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    24

    +

    ECR

    Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Nora Junco García, Giuseppe Milazzo, Bert-Jan Ruissen

    PPE

    Carmen Crespo Díaz, Marco Falcone, Isabelle Le Callennec, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, Sander Smit, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen, António Tânger Corrêa

    Renew

    Karin Karlsbro, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Nicolás González Casares, Giuseppe Lupo, André Rodrigues

    The Left

    Emma Fourreau

    Verts/ALE

    Isabella Lövin, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    1

    ESN

    Siegbert Frank Droese

     

    2

    0

    PfE

    France Jamet

    The Left

    Sebastian Everding

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

    (2025/2018(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

     having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[4],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[5],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

     having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

     having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

     having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

     having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

     having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

     having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

     having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

     having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

    C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

    D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

    E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

    F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

    G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

    H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

    I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

    J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

    K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

    L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

    M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

    2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

    3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

    4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

    5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

    6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

    7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

    8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

    9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

    10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

    11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

    12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

    13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

    14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

    15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

    16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

    17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

    18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

    19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

    21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

    22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

    23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

    24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

    25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

    26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

    27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

    28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

    29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

    30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

    31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

    32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

    33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

    34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

    36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

    37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

    38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

    39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

    40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

    41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

    42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

    43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act[8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act[9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

    44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

    45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

    46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

    47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

    Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

    49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

    50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

    51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

    52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

    53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

    54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

    55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

    56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

    57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

    Socio-economic reforms

    58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

    59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

    60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

    61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

    62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

    63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

    64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

    65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

    66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

    67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive[10], the Birds Directive[11] and the Water Framework Directive[12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

    68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

    69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

    70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

    71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

    72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

    73.  Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

    74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

    °

    ° °

    75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure – A10-0107/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure

    (2025/2007(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 173, 179 and 190 thereof,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025: Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem[1] (the Chips Act),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union[2] (NIS 2 Directive),

     having regard to the detailed report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) entitled ‘Foresight Cybersecurity Threats For 2030 – Update 2024’, published in March 2024,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements[3] (the Cyber Resilience Act),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013[4] (the Cybersecurity Act),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents[5] (the Cyber Solidarity Act),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services[6],

     having regard to the Commission White Paper of 21 February 2024 entitled ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (COM(2024)0081),

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2024 entitled ‘State of the Digital Decade 2024’ (COM(2024)0260),

     having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union[8] (the Interoperable Europe Act),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast)[9],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[10],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828[11] (the Data Act),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU[12] (the Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence[13] (the Artificial Intelligence Act),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[14],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240[15],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013[16],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme[17],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027[18],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014[19],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488[20],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1732 of 17 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 as regards a EuroHPC initiative for start-ups in order to boost European leadership in trustworthy artificial intelligence[21],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (recast)[22],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework[23],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2020 entitled ‘Secure 5G deployment in the EU – Implementing the EU toolbox’ (COM(2020)0050),

     having regard to the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, which commits ‘to promote a European way for the digital transformation, putting people at the centre’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 December 2021 entitled ‘Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) (COM(2021)8481),

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0107/2025),

    A. whereas technological sovereignty should be seen as the whole value chain from excellence in research to creating better competition and achieving greater European sovereignty;

    B. whereas the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80 % of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property;

    C. whereas a few technological companies hold concentrated power over key digital markets and control over underlying internet infrastructure, including operating systems, computing, artificial intelligence (AI), search engines, social media capacity, digital advertising and payment services;

    D. whereas our technological sovereignty will greatly depend on Europe’s ability to create the market conditions needed for European companies to flourish and compete with each other, thereby increasing the quality of their products;

    E. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

    F. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

    G. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

    H. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

    I. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

    J. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

    K. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

    L. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

    M. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

    N. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous  vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

    O. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

    P. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

    Q. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

    R. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

    S. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

    T. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

    U. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

    V. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

    W. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

    X. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

    Y. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

    Z. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

    AA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

    AB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

    AC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

    AD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

    AE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

    AF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

    AG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

    AH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

    AI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

    AJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

    AK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

    AL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

    AM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

    AN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

    AO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

    AP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

    AQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

    AR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;

    AS. whereas 60 % of EU companies report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and clean technologies, posing a significant barrier to innovation, competitiveness and the green and digital transitions;

    AT. whereas current labour market developments, including global lay-offs and political instability outside the EU, create an opportunity to attract high-skilled digital talent to the EU;

    AU. whereas increasing competitiveness and resilience require appropriate funding; whereas public funding can act as a catalyst and private investment and competitive market forces are key for the long-term development of digital infrastructure;

    AV. whereas a robust, agile and excellence-driven research and innovation (R&I) ecosystem is essential to ensure the EU’s global competitiveness and leadership in strategic technologies, such as quantum and AI;

    AW. whereas standardisation is at the core of genuine European digital and technological sovereignty; whereas the importance of standards is growing due to increasing technological competition across the world, particularly with the United States and China;

    AX. whereas the EU is committed to negotiating comprehensive digital trade agreements (DTAs) to promote secure, resilient and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries;

    AY. whereas the Commission has announced landmark DTAs with South Korea and Singapore, setting an important precedent for future agreements;

    AZ. whereas Parliament and the Council have agreed on the ‘EU horizontal provisions on Cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements’, which was endorsed by the Commission and remains an important tool in relation to digital trade and the establishment of new DTAs;

    General introduction

    1. Underlines that European sovereignty is the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, preventing reliance on foreign actors and single service providers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure; calls for the development of a comprehensive risk assessment framework to monitor and address dependencies across the digital value chain; underlines that such a framework should serve as a basis for ensuring EU preparedness and resilience by enhancing European industrial policy and boosting domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities in strategic technologies;

    2. Believes that technological sovereignty is the capacity to design, develop and scale up digital technologies needed for the competitiveness of our economy, the welfare of our citizens and the EU’s open strategic autonomy in a globalised world; believes that this includes ensuring the EU’s ability to make autonomous decisions, engaging with trusted non-EU countries and entities, diversifying and strengthening supply chains and promoting the concept of openness and interoperability to ensure that Europe remains an attractive hub for investment;

    3. Recognises the increasing concentration of power in non-EU companies, which constrains Europe’s ability to innovate, compete and maintain control over its digital economy, society and democracy; is concerned by excessive dependencies on non-EU actors in critical areas such as cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity – where market concentration and foreign control threaten to undermine Europe’s competitiveness, democratic resilience and security;

    4. Believes that the EU’s industrial tech ambitions should focus on the key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductor technologies or quantum, that contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and are essential for our green, digital and defence transitions;

    5. Recognises the shift in the geopolitical landscape and the resulting opportunity for market demand for European products and services; sees this as a window of opportunity to position Europe as a global leader in trusted and secure digital solutions;

    6. Underlines the need to foster a supportive regulatory environment that encourages innovation, investment and the development of cutting-edge technologies in Europe, while protecting EU end users from the consequences of extraterritoriality;

    7. Recognises the need for a comprehensive European industrial policy for the digital ecosystem, integrating all relevant policy domains such as market access, standardisation, R&D, investment, trade and international cooperation; calls on the Commission to develop this comprehensive policy with the aim of reducing harmful strategic dependencies, strengthening domestic value chains and ensuring a secure, trustworthy and innovation-driven digital ecosystem that adheres to European values;

    8. Recalls that the high-tech product and digital services markets depend heavily on external supply chains, posing risks to sovereignty and resilience; stresses the importance of boosting industrial capacity and technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies to support the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

    9. Emphasises that boosting Europe’s technological sovereignty in the era of rapid technological development requires enhancing innovation and commercialisation in order to build the necessary capabilities; highlights that Europe must transform itself into a globally attractive and agile business environment by reducing bureaucracy, enhancing regulatory predictability and fostering entrepreneurship and risk-taking;

    10. Recognises that open strategic autonomy and democratic resilience must be at the core of the Commission’s agenda and that a comprehensive approach must integrate procurement, funding and long-term institutional frameworks to establish sovereign digital infrastructure in critical domains;

    11. Calls on the Commission to analyse and establish a comprehensive list of critical dependencies in digital infrastructure and technologies, assessing, at minimum, storage services, identity and payment systems, communication platforms, as well as the software, protocols and standards that support them, and to propose measures to promote market access for products and services with a strong positive impact on the EU’s technological sovereignty, resilience and sustainability; believes, in that regard, that the use of specific award criteria in public procurement may be promoted in areas where such critical dependencies exist; believes that such criteria can help incentivise competition and strengthen European technological sovereignty by facilitating the procurement of European digital products and services, where possible;

    Digital public infrastructure

    12. Strongly believes that digital infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and that there should therefore be a base layer of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that ensures sovereignty and a competition-friendly market environment; observes that the market has not developed this base layer in many important areas, which has resulted in monopolies and reliance on foreign actors; underlines that in order to fill this gap, the EU should take the lead in creating a strong foundation for DPI by creating layers of digital technologies consisting of semiconductors, connectivity solutions, cloud infrastructure, software, data and AI; believes that European DPI should be founded on fair and competitive economic models and also use governance models where neither private companies nor governments maintain centralised control; is of the opinion that it should be built on common and open standards, embrace interoperability and interconnectedness, so as to prevent user and vendor ‘lock-ins’, and spur innovation by facilitating new market entrants, and that it should also ensure privacy and security by default;

    13. Believes that the deployment of DPI should be focused on areas where critical dependencies exist, as identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list; calls on the Commission to prepare a detailed and comprehensive plan for establishing European DPI by identifying technologies that are best suited to European action, and urges the Commission and the Member States to dedicate appropriate resources to deploying European DPI;

    14. Stresses that European DPI should be stimulated by coordinated action at EU level to ensure the presence and competitiveness of European providers as well as a competitive market environment; underlines that these objectives will not be achieved through regulation alone and will require significant public investment; recognises that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF) should therefore include additional funding for this purpose, focusing on EU added value and financing the base layer of European DPI;

    15. Recognises that as part of the forthcoming MFF, the EU must commit to increased spending to achieve technological sovereignty; underlines that this should include a dedicated envelope for the development and deployment of the DPI layers identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list, as well as additional funds to ensure a competition-friendly market environment in other digital areas;

    16. Believes that the funding under the forthcoming MFF should prioritise active capacity-building in key hardware, software and service areas, including high-performance computing, quantum computing, encryption and communication, connectivity, cloud, data, web and AI ecosystems, and digital libraries;

    17. Is of the opinion that European DPI should be based on EU values and remain open to like-minded non-EU partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sustain their efforts and add more impetus to the process with the UN Development Programme on DPI;

    18. Recognises e-government services as a key enabler of efficient, secure and accessible public service delivery, which should be designed to facilitate digital identification, government data sharing and public sector payments without distorting markets or undermining existing private sector solutions; emphasises that the EU’s approach to e-government services should focus on strengthening digital government-to-citizen and government-to-business interactions, while ensuring trust, interoperability and accessibility; believes, therefore, that secure and seamless access to public services requires a trustworthy e-identification framework and welcomes the announcement of a ‘business wallet’ aimed at significantly simplifying the interconnection between businesses and public authorities;

    19. Calls on the Commission to further develop public interest data platforms, enabling secure cross-border data sharing between public and private entities for use cases, in particular, in healthcare, urban planning and environmental monitoring; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to promote interoperability between public interest and industry-specific data platforms, ensuring the seamless flow of data while minimising administrative burdens; notes that this could be achieved by leveraging existing market-driven solutions that foster innovation, maintain trust and uphold privacy and security standards;

    20. Recognises that under the current legal framework, European citizens have the right to control their personal data and that data generated within the EU must be processed in accordance with EU law; stresses that safeguarding privacy and personal data is essential for building trust in the digital economy, allowing European consumers to engage with confidence, regardless of where their data is processed; highlights that European companies – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – must be able to make use of data in a lawful, ethical and secure manner to drive sustainable growth and competitiveness;

    Digital infrastructure

    21. Highlights that digital infrastructure is the backbone of Europe’s economy and society and that its importance will continue to grow; calls on the Commission to include in the requested list of critical dependencies a comprehensive assessment of the composition of European digital infrastructure in order to adequately analyse the state of play, assess risks and coordinate action;

    22. Believes that in order to strengthen digital infrastructure, it is essential to implement capacity-building initiatives in critical areas at EU level; considers that these initiatives should focus on developing a base layer of public infrastructure, such as a network of AI gigafactories and a European web index model; is of the opinion that this base layer will empower companies to develop their business models and boost technological sovereignty; points to the digital solutions created by the EU, such as the EU digital identity, that can offer innovative infrastructure for the EU’s digital economy;

    23. Recognises the strategic importance of critical digital infrastructure and the need to strengthen their security and resilience; understands that critical digital infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, cables (terrestrial and submarine), cellular network towers, satellite communication systems, spectrum and radio equipment, cloud servers that contain sensitive information and data centres that process sensitive information, as well as certain software elements, including security software that protects critical networks and data centres;

    24. Highlights the need to ensure that this infrastructure falls under EU jurisdiction, meaning that it fully adheres to EU law; stresses the importance of privacy and security-by-design; calls on the Commission. therefore, to introduce legislation to mitigate risks posed by high-risk vendors from non-EU countries, including risks posed by foreign-controlled energy resource providers;

    25. Calls on the Commission, while preparing future legislative proposals and the forthcoming MFF, to concentrate efforts on deepening the single market, in line with the recommendations made in Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in Mario Draghi’s report on ‘The future of European competitiveness’, with the aim of unlocking the potential of the digital single market;

    26. Takes note of the recommendations laid down in these two reports that the EU needs a paradigm shift from promoting connectivity in the EU to establishing a single market for electronic communications and connectivity; supports a simplified, harmonised and innovation-friendly telecommunications framework that ensures fair competition and the accessibility of infrastructure;

    27. Welcomes the Commission’s white paper on how to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs, which outlines three pillars: creating the ‘3C Network’ – ‘Connected Collaborative Computing’, completing the digital single market, and secure and resilient digital infrastructure for Europe;

    28. Views the white paper and the subsequent consultation process as part of the preparation of the legislative initiatives planned for this term, including the Digital Networks Act; calls on the Commission to take a more holistic view of digital infrastructure throughout this process and to acknowledge that digital infrastructure comprises many elements beyond mere connectivity; underlines the need to accompany any new digital policy measure with an impact assessment;

    29. Urges the Commission to simplify and harmonise telecommunications rules as part of the forthcoming Digital Networks Act and the broader Digital Package;

    30. Calls on the Commission to introduce an EU cloud and AI development act to strengthen European data infrastructure and the promotion of European cloud providers; underlines that this act should aim to actively build a European single market for cloud and AI;

    31. Acknowledges that deploying cutting-edge digital infrastructure across the EU requires substantial investment and recognises that both public and private funding are essential for achieving this goal; expresses concern over the persistent shortage of venture capital and investment financing in Europe, which undermines technological sovereignty; calls on the Commission to significantly scale up public-private investment instruments, including venture capital, strategic platforms and dedicated funding tools for start-ups and scale-ups in critical technology sectors; highlights the importance of leveraging public procurement to support the deployment and scaling of open and interoperable digital solutions and of ensuring that private capital, competition and innovation become the main drivers of Europe’s digital transformation over the medium and long term;

    High-speed connectivity

    32. Is of the opinion that the upcoming Digital Networks Act must support the objective of providing all EU consumers with high-quality connectivity by 2030, especially in remote and rural areas, as well as removing administrative barriers for the roll-out of 5G, 6G and secure, high-speed broadband;

    33. Recognises the increasing convergence of telecommunications infrastructure with cloud and edge technologies, and sees the potential of open radio access networks to deliver advanced technological solutions, reduce costs and enhance the interoperability of connectivity; believes that the future of connectivity lies in the complementarity of diverse technologies such as 5G/6G, Wi-Fi and satellite, where seamless integration benefits both businesses and consumers;

    34. Recognises that with cloud and edge services at the core of their transformation, connectivity networks are evolving rapidly into platforms for innovation and will increasingly depend on cloud computing, AI, virtualisation and other technologies;

    35. Calls for ambitious targets in the development and innovation of wireless communication networks, acknowledging the need for a broad-based approach that includes cloud computing, AI, edge computing and quantum computing; emphasises that the innovation ecosystem for electronic communications, especially for vertically integrated telecoms, should remain market-driven, and insists that future regulatory measures be based on thorough, knowledge-based impact assessments of existing regulations;

    36. Recognises that competition between operators of all sizes remains a key driver of investment in connectivity networks; calls on the Member States to ensure that copper networks are switched off progressively in favour of fibre-optic or 5G technologies, in particular where regular maintenance or updates of the network are needed, thus ensuring that the shift is carried out in an attainable manner and allowing providers to plan logistically and financially in advance;

    37. Stresses that all consumers in the EU should have access to adequate quality, reliable and affordable connectivity, thus contributing to increased demand for connectivity services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand and upgrade digital networks, especially in rural areas, and to support public-private investments in broadband and 5G/6G deployment, while maintaining cybersecurity standards and secure-by-design principles;

    38. Is convinced that, as digital connectivity infrastructure such as fibre, 5G and 6G will be crucial for future industrial competitiveness, the forthcoming MFF should include funds for the large-scale deployment of network infrastructure, bridging the existing deployment gap to achieve the 2030 Digital Decade targets, creating pan-European 5G coverage for citizens’ use and ensuring the successful deployment of Industry 4.0 tools;

    Fibre

    39. Stresses the importance of accelerating the deployment of fibre-optic networks and modern wireless communications systems that can deliver fast, secure and reliable digital services;

    40. Recognises that the need to prioritise direct fibre connections for homes, businesses and public institutions is crucial to ensure ultra-fast and reliable connectivity, in addition to network roll-outs with public works, such as roads, water and electricity, to streamline fibre roll-out;

    41. Welcomes the introduction of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, which responds to the growing needs for faster, reliable and data-intensive connectivity; recognises the importance of the shared use of ducts and poles for deploying very high capacity networks to optimise resources and reduce costs; urges the Member States to streamline permitting processes and harmonise regulations to lower financial and administrative barriers to the expansion of fibre infrastructure;

    5G and 6G

    42. Believes that private investments are essential for deployment of electronic communication networks, 5G and 6G that are advanced enough in terms of transmission, speed, storage capacity, edge computing power and interoperability;

    43. Stresses that the enforcement and implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act is further necessary for the creation of a one-stop shop for permits and a centralised digital permitting process to reduce delays in infrastructure deployment and to ensure uniform rules for infrastructure access, pricing and environmental impact assessments; calls, in this regard, for strong efforts in this area;

    44. Takes the view that the EU needs strong cybersecurity protection in all critical infrastructure sectors, with stricter measures to de-risk high-risk vendors in 5G and 6G networks, ensuring dense deployment of small cells and macro towers, particularly in urban and rural areas with inconsistent coverage, and ensuring the sustainability and energy efficiency of the infrastructure so as to support Europe’s global competitiveness in the digital economy;

    Spectrum

    45. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards enhanced coordination of spectrum allocations, in particular through earlier identification and the harmonisation of the release of new frequencies, starting with 6 GHz frequencies; calls for a radio spectrum policy that promotes investment in Europe, including through the harmonisation of spectrum assignment policies across the Member States to accelerate 5G deployment based on best practices, the promotion of longer license durations and access to new spectrum such as the upper 6 GHz band in order to meet future demand and enable 6G; believes that a shared effort from public and private entities is necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of Europe and not lag behind the fastest growing networks in the world, i.e. in China and South Korea;

    Satellites and satellite communication systems

    46. Underlines the importance of satellite-based communications in developing EU digital infrastructure, increasing its resilience, strengthening the capabilities of EU actors, and reducing dependence on non-EU providers, particularly in the area of defence; highlights the need to provide alternative connectivity solutions for consumers in remote and rural areas;

    47. Highlights the strategic role of the EU space programme, as one of the pillars of EU sovereignty, in providing state-of-the-art and secure positioning, navigation and timing services for Galileo and EGNOS and cost-effective satellite communication services for GOVSATCOM; notes that this allows the EU and its Member States to have greater sovereignty in their satellite capabilities, including geopositioning, earth observation, space surveillance and connectivity; welcomes, in particular, the EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 programmes, which aim to ensure the short- and long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

    48. Deplores the strong dependence on non-EU data for the tracking and surveillance of space objects; stresses the need for Europe to urgently reinforce its own capabilities and infrastructure in space situational awareness (SSA) to ensure open strategic autonomy and security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase investment in EU-owned surveillance and tracking assets, and to develop effective mechanisms for information-sharing among the Member States, enabling Europe to independently monitor and protect its critical space infrastructure;

    49. Stresses the importance of private sector involvement in launcher technologies to further accelerate the deployment of IRIS2; stresses the importance of fostering a robust and competitive European space launch sector through greater private sector involvement and support for upstream and downstream industries; calls on the Commission to promote a European space industrial policy that strengthens sovereignty in space technologies and services by reducing strategic dependencies and improving the operational governance of European space programmes;

    50. Calls, to this end, for concrete measures to facilitate the provision of satellite services throughout Europe, including by defining common procedures and conditions; calls, in parallel, for fair competition, with clear and enforceable rules for all satellite constellations accessing the EU market;

    51. Notes that there are currently several issues with latency in satellite networks and recognises that the integration of satellite networks with 5G and, in the future, 6G technologies is pivotal in extending the reach and reliability of terrestrial networks;

    High-performance computing (HPC) systems

    52. Recognises the progress made in recent years in enhancing HPC; calls on the Commission to continuously integrate and enhance the computing power at EU HPC centres, in particular, enhancing the training of AI models and preparing for future advancements in supercomputing;

    53. Calls on the Commission to develop a coordinated strategy to bridge the gap between Europe’s cutting-edge HPC technology and its practical, scalable deployment across industries, including by creating a public network for supercomputing; notes that this strategy should foster collaboration between public institutions and private sector partners, including SMEs, to ensure that Europe’s HPC capabilities become a key driver of economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty;

    54. Highlights that HPC centres must ensure accessibility for developers and deployers of AI foundation models, generative AI and applied AI; notes that EuroHPC Centres should be available for these use cases and particularly for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; emphasises that this must be seamlessly complemented by initiatives to enable the development and deployment of AI in the EU;

    55. Welcomes the creation of new AI factories; underlines that AI factories will upgrade EuroHPC supercomputers to deliver computing capacity for AI and support start-ups and scale-ups in the training and large-scale development of general-purpose and trustworthy AI models;

    Hardware for computing: semiconductors, chips and quantum chips

    56. Believes that urgent action is needed to boost EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, improving supply chain resilience by forming strategic global partnerships, encouraging start-ups and innovation, fostering cross-border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development and providing financial incentives, regulatory support and market access;

    57. Emphasises the need for legal certainty to support semiconductor development, ensuring secure supply chains for critical raw materials and avoiding disruptions caused by investment uncertainties;

    58. Urges to give utmost political importance to ensuring a sufficient supply of AI chips in the EU and to make it a focal point of EU digital industry policies; notes the increase in demand for AI chips driven by expanding applications in cloud computing, edge devices, autonomous systems and generative AI;

    59. Calls on the Commission to react to the new geopolitical realities and the use of digital supply chains as pressure tools; urges the Commission to find a negotiated solution to the US ban on the export of AI chips to 16 EU Member States;

    60. Calls on the Commission to put advanced AI chips, including their design and production, at the core of the revision of the Chips Act; calls on the Commission to present the revision this year, featuring a long-term strategy rooted in current geopolitical realities that builds European strategic indispensability through technological leadership, adequate production capabilities and a strong R&D ecosystem, which will be essential to secure European sovereignty in increasingly troubled times; believes that it is crucial to strengthen the interactions among research, training, suppliers and robust public infrastructure to accelerate the path from research, development, testing and finally full-load production;

    61. Believes that the EU should enhance its efforts on quantum chip development if it intends to accelerate the time-to-market for EU industrial innovation in quantum technology;

    62. Calls on the Commission to support the manufacturing within the EU of widely used chips e.g., for electronic devices and cars; calls for support for the development of chips that reduce the energy consumption of the digital sector;

    63. Underlines the need to support the performance of the circular economy and recalls that information and communications technology products and other electronics are part of the priority product groups in the working plan to be adopted by April 2025 under Regulation (EU) 2024/1781[24];

    64. Believes that additional funding under the forthcoming MFF must be allocated to the development of semiconductor production capacities and other next-generation semiconductor technologies and processes (e.g. photonic chips, wide-bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging) within the EU;

    Cloud services

    65. Recognises that there is a market need for sovereign solutions that offer enhanced levels of control over data for certain categories of sensitive data and acknowledges the risks associated with reliance on single dominant providers; calls for a strategy for reducing reliance on foreign cloud providers, while fostering European alternatives;

    66. Notes that the discussions on the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services have not brought any results; points out that there are sovereignty considerations, in particular related to the extraterritoriality of binding legal regimes, that cannot be solved through technical discussions; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned cloud and AI development act;

    67. Notes the need to secure data storage and computational power, and distributed computing infrastructure; calls on the Commission to ensure that cloud users have the ability to choose solutions that meet their needs by urgently removing barriers to switching and diversifying providers through multi-cloud strategies, and by fostering a competitive European cloud market, thereby reducing reliance on single providers and enhancing digital sovereignty;

    68. Calls on the Commission to leverage initiatives such as 8ra and IPCEI CIS to advance decentralised cloud and edge infrastructure, which are enablers of sovereignty and contribute to reducing reliance on foreign providers and ensuring resilience while enhancing operational flexibility within Europe;

    AI systems

    69. Welcomes the InvestAI initiative, including the AI gigafactories; emphasises the need for Europe to position itself as a global leader in AI model training, scientific research and quantum computing advancements; is committed to further supporting AI development by launching initiatives such as AI factories to provide computing power for start-ups, scale-ups and researchers;

    70. Calls on the Commission to further support the design and development of European AI and to adopt policies and measures that will enable European industrial sectors to benefit from their data and AI deployment;

    71. Emphasises that the delayed deployment of AI-driven innovations hinders technological progress, market competitiveness and digital transformation within the EU;

    72. Expects that the public-private financing model will unlock unprecedented private investment in AI that will open up access to supercomputers for start-ups and industry to supercomputers;

    Quantum

    73. Recognises the urgent need to define a clear roadmap for quantum technology development, including quantum computing and quantum encryption, ensuring that public and private investments lead to tangible commercial applications;

    74. Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment of existing national quantum sandbox frameworks and how existing legislation applies to them in order to prevent market fragmentation; welcomes the announcement of the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass;

    75. Urges the Commission to ensure that the Quantum Act, accompanied by an impact assessment, positions Europe as the leading region for quantum excellence and innovation by investing in R&D and innovation, mobilising funding to scale up the European quantum ecosystem, capabilities and production, and ensuring Europe’s leading quantum research is commercialised in Europe; underlines that it should deliver tangible technological applications by fostering policies that accelerate technological maturity and facilitate the transition from research to commercial success;

    76. Calls for targeted investments, industry collaboration and regulatory frameworks that support the development, scaling and market adoption of quantum technologies across key sectors;

    77. Calls for a coordinated EU strategy for post-quantum cryptography to protect data from future cyberthreats;

    Data centres

    78. Calls on the Commission to support ecosystems for sharing industry-specific data within industrial sectors, fostering collaboration and driving innovation, while maintaining data sovereignty and ensuring compliance with EU regulations, as outlined in the Data Act; urges the Commission for strong enforcement to ensure that dominant market players do not impose unfair terms on SMEs and mid-sized enterprises when accessing and sharing data;

    79. Believes that there is a need to ensure interconnected infrastructure that would allow data centres to work together efficiently under common standards with high-speed connectivity, while flexibility, security and scalability would be maintained; believes this interconnected system would help in ensuring distributed redundancy so that data and services remain available even in the event of a data centre failure;

    80. Calls on the Commission to prioritise interoperability across platforms, enabling the seamless integration of data across businesses and sectors, in alignment with the requirements of the Data Act, which mandate data portability and interoperability obligations for cloud and edge services; stresses the need for the robust enforcement of these provisions to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure that European industrial ecosystems can leverage data-driven innovation without technical or contractual barriers;

    81. Recalls the Commission’s plan to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by 2030; sees the need to improve the integration of data centres with the energy system, focusing on heat reuse and providing flexibility services to the electricity grid needs; recognises the need to incentivise research for cooling and energy-efficient processors, while special attention should be given to supporting EU data centres; urges the Commission to ensure clear and consistent implementation of existing legal requirements for data centre operators across EU legislation and the Member States;

    82. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase and target public investment and to incentivise private investment in digital infrastructure to enable the growth and modernisation of data centres;

    Submarine cables

    83. Calls on the Commission to take coordinated action to protect submarine cables and reinforce cable security and repair capabilities; stresses the need for continued investment in the construction of new submarine cables to ensure redundancy; welcomes the EU’s role in co-financing such projects to enhance digital infrastructure and connectivity across the Member States; calls on the Commission to explore potential synergies between the maintenance of undersea digital and energy infrastructure;

    84. Emphasises the importance of improving EU and Member State repair capabilities and response mechanisms to handle submarine cable disruptions, which are essential for maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications; underlines the importance of international cooperation in repairing sabotaged cables and facilitating the necessary investments, and calls for the establishment of an EU-based rapid-response repair fleet to ensure swift recovery and operational continuity in the event of disruptions; calls on the Commission to carry out an assessment of regulatory measures to ensure fair access and security, regardless of whether the infrastructure is privately or publicly owned;

    85. Welcomes the adoption of the action plan on cable security, which will be organised around four pillars: prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence; highlights the importance of its full and timely implementation; urges, in the current geopolitical context, increased investment in technologies to strengthen the security and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure;

    86. Calls on the Commission to promote R&I to enable advanced technological innovations in cable security, including early warning systems and AI-driven threat assessments;

    87. Urges the Commission to review available instruments designed to better leverage private investments in support of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs); calls on the Commission to include submarine cable projects in the list of IPCEIs; recognises the need to streamline and simplify the application and administrative process governing IPCEIs;

    Cybersecurity

    88. Recalls the legislative work carried out over the previous legislative term aimed at significantly improving cybersecurity in the EU; welcomes, in particular, the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act and the NIS2 Directive; stresses the need for the harmonised and timely implementation and enforcement of these measures;

    89. Calls on the Commission to present an evaluation report on the Cybersecurity Act and to propose a legislative act to review it in order to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity framework, with a particular focus on the interplay between sovereignty and security; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to enhance the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure and prevent foreign interference from entities subject to extraterritorial legislation, as well as accelerating the adoption process for EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls for ENISA’s mandate to be strengthened to coordinate crisis response, oversee cybersecurity certification for critical infrastructure and ensure uniform implementation of cybersecurity standards across the single market;

    90. Emphasises the importance of the upcoming European internal security strategy in strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection;

    91. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement any restrictions on high-risk suppliers, posing significant security vulnerabilities; calls for the full implementation of the EU toolbox for 5G security in order to reduce reliance on high-risk vendors; calls on the Commission to make the toolbox binding, specifically with regard to high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure;

    Simplification

    92. Notes that to achieve true technological sovereignty, the EU must have viable commercial alternatives; stresses that the EU must urgently pursue a comprehensive agenda of simplification and bureaucracy reduction to foster an innovation-friendly environment capable of supporting competitive European alternatives to dominant global digital players; underlines that excessive administrative burdens, fragmented regulatory frameworks, an incomplete digital single market and overly complex compliance procedures disproportionately impact European start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs, limiting their capacity to compete at global level; recognises that the EU should therefore prioritise regulatory streamlining and the deepening of the digital single market, ensuring that legislation is proportionate, innovation-driven and does not stifle the development of European technological solutions;

    93. Emphasises the need for new legislative proposals to be aligned with better regulation principles, ensuring that any new digital policy measure that affects competitiveness is accompanied by an impact assessment, including a competitiveness, SME and small mid-cap check that evaluates whether a given legislative instrument is necessary, proportionate and does not create unnecessary burdens for businesses, especially SMEs, and thus its effects on competitiveness, investment prospects and consumer welfare;

    94. Highlights that the simplification of EU legislation must not endanger any of the fundamental rights of citizens and businesses and thus jeopardise regulatory certainty; believes that any simplification proposal should not be rushed or proposed without proper consideration, consultation and an impact assessment;

    95. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to fully implement the principle of burden reduction for companies in EU legislation; calls on the Commission, therefore, to enhance its efforts by aiming to remove more cost and administrative burdens for businesses compared to the benefits that would be derived from any new regulatory requirements introduced at EU level in the same policy area, so that barriers to market entry are removed to help European companies to scale and grow;

    96. Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent simplification, implementation and enforcement of EU digital legislation through the Digital Package, streamlining definitions and reporting procedures, assessing ways to alleviate reporting obligations and reducing the gap between industry and government;

    97. Believes that supporting companies and innovators to stay in Europe by developing the EU as an attractive and agile business environment is key to enhancing technological sovereignty; emphasises, in that regard, that excessive regulation and administrative burdens should be avoided and that EU rules should be clear, consistent, predictable, proportionate and technologically neutral, thus maintaining a globally competitive regulatory environment; believes that new public procurement methods and the development of regulatory sandboxes and test beds should also contribute to an innovation-friendly framework;

    98. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of a 28th legal regime, recognising that a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules will be a game changer for digital investment and innovation; believes that reducing regulatory fragmentation across 27 national legal regimes will boost private investment, lower compliance costs and accelerate the deployment of next-generation digital infrastructure, products and services; encourages the Commission to ensure that this framework specifically addresses regulatory barriers in the digital sector, such as permitting and cross-border data flows, in order to create a true digital single market;

    99. Urges the Commission to create a single point of contact to simplify the application process for private-sector access to EU funding mechanisms, ensuring that private companies, SMEs and start-ups can more easily participate in digital investment programmes;

    Energy

    100. Emphasises that data centres will put additional pressure on electricity grids, making it imperative to reinforce them through anticipatory investments; stresses that data centres can also help stabilise the grid by participating in demand-side flexibility; calls for measures to incentivise such contributions based on the implementation of the revision of the European electricity market reform;

    101. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to propose and implement instruments that ensure orderly planning of the escalating energy demand from data centres, facilitating their strategic placement near available energy sources and thus minimising reliance on the broader grid infrastructure;

    102. Recognises that fibre is more energy efficient than traditional copper networks; acknowledges the importance of reducing energy consumption in data transmission and ensuring long-term stability and efficiency;

    103. Calls on the Commission to ensure a reliable and sufficient clean energy and net-zero technology supply to support the digital infrastructure of the future;

    Skills

    104. Recognises the urgent need for more skilled professionals in digital fields to meet the EU’s strategic objectives; calls on the Member States to develop national strategies and incentives to retain European talent and attract the world’s best digital professionals, thereby strengthening the EU’s innovation capacity and technological leadership;

    105. Stresses the importance of closing the digital and STEM skills gap to enhance technological resilience, innovation capacity and open strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to strengthen investments in digital education, upskilling and reskilling, particularly in areas essential for the green and digital transitions; supports prioritising investments that address digital skills shortages, particularly in AI, cybersecurity, data analysis and clean technologies, in order to support innovation and technological sovereignty;

    106. Calls for coordinated strategies at national level to improve access to high-quality STEM education, promote lifelong learning and attract talent to ICT and related fields; encourages partnerships between public institutions, industry and educational providers to ensure alignment between curricula and evolving market needs;

    107. Calls for intensified efforts to improve digital literacy and skills across all demographics, focusing on early STEM education, vocational education and training, and lifelong learning in digital technologies; recommends aligning national education and training strategies with the EU Digital Decade goal of 80 % of the population possessing basic digital skills by 2030, with a focus on gender-inclusive policies to increase women’s participation in ICT and STEM fields; calls on the EU institutions to take concrete steps to uphold the commitments referred to in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, both within the EU framework as in the Union’s cooperation with third countries;

    108. Supports the establishment of a common EU certification framework for digital and technical skills to improve the recognition and portability of qualifications among the Member States;

    109. Encourages the European Investment Bank and national development institutions to support digital talent retention by co-investing in European deep-tech start-ups, ensuring that EU-funded innovation remains within the region and contributes to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

    Research and innovation

    110. Recognises the importance of bridging the gap between research and commercialisation and calls on the Commission to enhance the valorisation of innovation within the EU;

    111. Believes that Europe’s ability to transform research into market-ready solutions is critical for building necessary capabilities and reducing reliance on non-EU technologies;

    112. Emphasises that funding needs to be strategically allocated to accelerate the development and market introduction of solutions that strengthen Europe’s technological resilience and drive innovation; underlines the importance of a more agile, excellence-based funding structure, particularly in improving the translation of research into industrial applications; calls for increased investment in R&I to strengthen Europe’s knowledge and technological capabilities and insists that EU research, development and innovation (RDI) funding be based on open competition and excellence;

    113. Highlights the need for policies that support industrial innovation, including targeted investment in key strategic technologies where Europe can lead globally, such as quantum computing, in order to build an innovation ecosystem;

    114. Believes that private investment in RDI is of utmost importance and calls for the EU to create incentives that effectively leverage private funding for the development of critical technologies, including through public-private partnerships;

    115. Stresses the urgent need for stronger incentives to mobilise private sector capital for technology-driven innovation; encourages the Member States to introduce targeted fiscal incentives, regulatory simplification and risk-sharing instruments designed to attract private equity to the technology and digital sectors; highlights the need to streamline cross-border capital flows within the single market to facilitate access to finance for innovative European start-ups;

    Standards

    116. Strongly believes that promoting interoperability and EU standards is paramount to fostering competitiveness in the technology sector, as it ensures that products can be connected and work with each other, thus fostering innovation and open markets; recalls that both interoperability and common technological standards pave the way for the functioning of the single market;

    117. Underlines that the Commission must increase its engagement in existing global standardisation structures and focus on the international uptake of European standards through a bottom-up approach, avoiding centralisation;

    Partnerships

    118. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to negotiating DTAs that facilitate secure and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries; encourages the Commission to increase efforts in negotiating DTAs with additional partner countries;

    119. Calls on the Commission to accelerate technical cooperation in multilateral forums such as the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to develop global standards for digital governance, AI regulation, cross-border data flows and emerging technologies;

    120. Urges the Commission to advance negotiations on a permanent solution to the WTO moratorium on e-commerce to prevent the introduction of digital tariffs, ensuring international digital trade remains open, predictable and conducive to innovation;

    °

    ° °

    121. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

    (2025/2017(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

     having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

     having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

     having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

     having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

     having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

     having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

     having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

     having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

     

    A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

    C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

    D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

    E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

    F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

    G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

    H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

    I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

    K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

    1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

    2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

    3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

    4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

    5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

    6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region; 

    7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

    Democratic institutions, media and civil society

    8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

    9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

    10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of  Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

    11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

    12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

    13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

    14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets  that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act[4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

    15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

    16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

    17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

    18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

    19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

    Fundamental rights

    20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

    21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

    22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

    23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens; 

     

    24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

    25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

    26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

    27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

    28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

    Rule of law

    29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

    30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern  shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

    31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

    32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority;  urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

    33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

    34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

    35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

    36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

    37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

    Socio-economic reforms

    38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

    39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

    40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

    41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

    42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

    43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

    44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive[5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

    45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

    46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

    47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

    Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

    49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment[6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment[7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

    50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

    51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

    52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

    53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

    54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

    Regional cooperation and foreign policy

    55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

    56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

    57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

    58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

    59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

    60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

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    61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

     

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